National defence ministries and armed forces to build integrity and reduce corruption. We collaborate with international organisations such as NATO, the UN, and the African Union to develop tools and approaches that reduce corruption risks.
We encourage defence companies to collaborate internationally to enhance the integrity of international tendering. We strengthen civil society’s ability to engage constructively on defence, and provide expertise for those playing a monitoring and oversight role. Through our research programme, we develop new tools to implement anti-corruption change and build knowledge and expertise on defence and security corruption.
http://www.ti-defence.org/
A Manchester graduate in Economics, Jeff had a business career as CEO in multi-national IT, Defence and Aerospace and M&A companies followed by working with NGO’s such as Global Witness (five years as a Director in this natural resource-related corruption NGO) and Transparency International (an advisor for 12 years at TI-UK) and as a CEO in a health-related charity.
He is now a Trustee of TI-UK, Chairs its international Defence and Security Programme, its Finance and Audit Committee and its Advisory Panel on the Corrupt Capital programme (focusing on money laundering). Jeff is also Chair of Future Brilliance, a Charity developing work and entrepreneurial opportunities in highly fragile states such as Afghanistan.
Jeff is currently writing a book on the interplay between faiths and beliefs in the nineteenth Century (religious, economic, political, artistic) that focuses on Manchester in the Industrial Revolution through the eyes and actions of men like Feargus O’Connor (Chartist), James Hull (Moravian Missionary to Manchester from 1835) and Hugh Hornby Birley (made infamous by Peterloo and a major civic leader in the Town thereafter).
2. Why does corruption in defence and security
matter?
DANGEROUS It undermines military effectiveness. Poor
equipment / resources; risks the lives of
troops ; destroys morale.
WASTEFUL The defence sector is worth $1.7 trillion a
year. The waste from corruption is in
billions of dollars.
DIVISIVE It destroys citizens’ trust in government
and the armed forces.
3. Why does corruption in defence and security
matter to International Development?
DANGEROUS It creates risk for all operations
WASTEFUL It diverts money from vital services:
directly and indirectly
DIVISIVE It creates doubt in the minds of donors
and drives corruption in other sectors
UK’s pledges: 0.7% of GNI…......................................................2% of GDP
5. Dangerous: undermines military
effectiveness
• Nigeria: $2billion of fictitious purchases of Alpha jets,
helicopters,bombs, ammunition to fight Boko Haram
• Fake bomb detectors in Iraq, Niger – proved to be
completely inoperable as they were….fake!
• Malaysia: submarines scandal over 12 years €115m bribes
• Greece: NH90 helicopters on the tarmac €37m bribes –
eight year delivery delay
6. Wasteful: impacting on other public services
• South Africa “the Arms deal” – R38 billion
• Tanzania’s air traffic control system £28m for unwanted
system
• ‘Karachigate’ (France)
Deals that “cost” developing nations
7. Divisive: destroying public trust
• Countries without legitimate governments serious risk of
instability – Iraq, Afghanistan, Kenya
• This is true for fragile states but even in seemingly stable
environments
• Sustaining legitimacy should be an important goal for the
military…
8. Corruption drives conflict
• The fuel for violent extremism
• Corroding institutions
• Destroys state legitimacy
“Corruption is the cancer at the heart of so many of the problems we face around the world…
World leaders simply cannot dodge this issue any longer. We have to …. break the taboo on talking about
corruption. I will start tomorrow at the G7 in Germany and I will put corruption at the heart of my agenda at the
United Nations in September and the g20 in Turkey, culminating with a major anti-corruption summit in London
next year.”
David Cameron June 2015
9. • Religious motivation only one of several reason for joining/supporting the
Taliban or Hizb-i Islami.
• Religious message does resonate but mainly because it is couched in terms of
the corruption of government and the presence of foreign forces.
• There was almost no support for government amongst those interviewed.
• The majority expressed support for the Taliban - at least the ‘good’ Taliban but
primarily a way of expressing opposition to the government
• Most radicalisation appears to happen after joining a Taliban group.
Study based on 192 interviews in three insurgency areas: Wardak, Kandahar and wider Kabul area; with a diverse range
of people (government officers, tribal elders, religious leaders, youth groups, women's groups, traders and businessmen
as well as Taliban combatants and Hizb-i Islami commanders).
WHY DOES CORRUPTION IN
DEFENCE MATTER?
The fuel for violent extremism
Causes of radicalisation in Afghanistan – result of a dfid funded study
13. Accountable Defence Sectors Outcomes
1) Wide acceptance of global transparency and accountability standards in the
defence and security sector, particularly among major and emerging powers.
2) Measurable reduction in corruption risk in the defence and security sectors of
key states.
14.
15.
16. Industry Integrity Outcomes
1) Wide acceptance of global transparency and accountability standards in the
defence and security sector, particularly among major and emerging
powersSystemic barriers to reducing corruption in the defence industry are
removed
2) Companies have transparent systems and high anti-corruption standards and
are committed to reducing corruption risks, raising standards globally, and can
be held to account.
17.
18. Conflict & Insecurity Outcomes
1) Reduced defence and security sector corruption in fragile and conflict states
which face a high risk of falling into increased conflict.
2) Corruption on international interventions and operations is minimised by
ensuring that armed forces, civilian practitioners and policymakers have the
incentives, awareness, tools and training that they need to counter corruption.
3) Major power security policy reflects that corruption is a threat to stability and
peace, and practical recommendations to reduce it are implemented.
I’d like to thank the university and the Global Development Institute in this, its inaugural week, for this invitation.
Shalni had introduced TI, TI-UK and the two international programmes that we manage from the UK. I will focus on the Defence and Security programme, that was set up in 2004 with DfID funding – I had been working in the world of Aerospace and Defence for companies now owned by Lockheed Martin and BAe Systems and written a book on corruption in the military-industrial world and was asked by TI to become involved. I became a strategic advisor in 2004, became a Trustee in 2014 and now Chair the Trustee Committee for this international programme.
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Fuel for violent extremism
Calling card for violent opposition movements – can be a powerful weapon in the hands of those who wish to see fragile institutions fail, and major cause of insecurity instability and conflict.
The Taliban, ISIL and Boko Haram all draw on deep public anger at the abuse of official power to secure recruits and support.
Violent extremism flourishes wherever governments line their pockets at the expense of providing basic services, monopolistic elites limit the economic opportunities of ordinary people, or police orchestrate organised crime instead of tackling it.
There is also a wealth of evidence that corruption is a facilitator of terrorism – whether in the supply of US passports to the Mumbai bombers or the support that corrupt capital provides to insurgent groups.
Destroying institutions
Corruption does not just drive people towards violent opposition movements, also corrodes the very institutions tasked with defending the state against these threats.
This makes the challenge of building stability even more difficult.
Pouring large quantities of practical support into weak institutions—in particular security institutions such as the armed forces—can sometimes do more harm than good when weapons and even training are at a high risk of being diverted or wasted.
Undermining state legitimacy
When corruption is pervasive those in power lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public – not about ineffective government, happens when government is repurporsed (government line their pockets at the expense of providing basic services, elites limit the economic opportunities of ordinary people, police orchestrate organised crime instead of tackling it.)
Countries without legitimate governments pose a serious threat to international community - in many cases leads to may find the solutions presented by groups pushing an ideology of violent extremism, so often their articulation of the problem rings true to even the most moderate of populations.
Corruption could well sow the seed of violent uprisings even in countries which seem stable and prosperous, as corruption or even just the perception of corruption caused by a lack of transparency will, in the end, kill public trust and support. Corrupt practices, institutions benefitting the privileged few, and elite failure to share the proceeds of development or engage their populations in debate, are proven to plunge countries into conflict.
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Correlation but not necessarily causality. Add in GI?? This was done for the June 2014 Carnegie Institute report: Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security.
Summary of that Report
Systemic corruption has an unrecognized bearing on international security.
Policymakers and private companies often pay insufficient attention to corruption
when deciding what foreign and defense policies to pursue or where to
invest. Greater understanding of the nature of acute corruption and its impact
on global security would contribute to a better assessment of costs and benefits
and therefore to improved policy and practice.
Security Implications of Severe Corruption
• Acute corruption should be understood not as a failure or distortion of
government but as a functioning system in which ruling networks use
selected levers of power to capture specific revenue streams. This effort
often overshadows activities connected with running a state.
• Such systematic corruption evokes indignation in populations, making it
a factor in social unrest and insurgency.
• It contributes to other international security threats, such as symbiotic
relationships between states and transnational organized crime networks,
facilitation for terrorist organizations, permeable international security
regimes, and acute economic disruptions.
• Corruption does not fuel these threats alone. It combines with other risk
factors, such as ethnic, religious, or linguistic rifts in a population or severe
economic disparities, to increase the likelihood of a security challenge.
• Western policymakers typically prioritize other considerations, such as
immediate security imperatives, the economic or strategic value of maintaining
relations with a given government, or return on investment, over
corruption concerns. As a result, Western institutions and individuals
often enable corrupt governments, exacerbating security threats and incurring
sometimes dangerous reputational risk.
However, not everything is so bleak. There are example where post-conflict nations can fight corruption even after conflict. Here are some example – even if only 7.
Columbia is seen as a shining light internationally – it also has a very good TI chapter!
Liberia, although corruption rears its head from time to time, is working hard under President Sirleaf.
That is a rapid round-up of DS corruption. So what do we do in TI-UK?
We see the world of D&S Corruption in three sectors: Accountable Defence Sectors – government departments
Defence industry integrity – the companies
Conflict and Instability – the countries in post-conflict situations and / or at the highest risk
6.1 Background
This is the first full year of implementing the new DSP strategy. Our goals are to:
?Establish global standards, holding the advanced and emerging powers to account (ADS)
?Address systemic risks in the supply side of the arms trade (II).
?Prevent conflict and support fragile states by creating a measurable reduction in corruption risk in the defence sectors of key states (C&I)
6.2 Focus areas
?Across each of the three teams, we will use high-quality advocacy based on DSP research to put forward policy positions and create change. The focus on advocacy is new for DSP, and we will develop our skills in this area.
?A major focus for the year will also be fundraising; the DFID PPS comes to an end in December, and our strategy is to broaden the programme’s funding base so it is not overly-reliant on a small number of large donors, and has a greater diversity of types of donor. We will particularly target large foundations and institutional donors.
6.3.1 Accountable Defence Sectors
We will be working with governments and civil society to create a set of accountable global defence standards, using the GI as an instrument to facilitate agreement and progress. We aim to have a number of countries sign up to the idea. We will be build a network of support in key emerging and regional powers, such as Mexico, Indonesia or Ghana, and ensure continued buy-in from US, the UK and Germany.
There will be a strong focus on activity in the Asia-Pacific region working closely with government, civil society and TI colleagues in Indonesia and India, and then with ASEAN as a regional organisation around its recent ‘ASEAN Blue Print’ for 2016 -2025, which has a stand-alone section to “Promote greater transparency and understanding of defence policies and security perceptions”.
We will be working with NATO to shape the detail of the ‘Building Integrity’ policy, to be adopted at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, July 2016.
Outputs
?We will draft a set of accountable global defence standards and seek input from potential convening states, like Norway, Germany and the UK.
?We will produce concrete reform tools and guidance that can underpin global standards –based on the GI 2015.
?We will set up a chapter fund to support defence and security work across the TI movement.
?We will conduct an advocacy campaign in ASEAN states.
?We will have a colleague based in a key location outside of Europe / the UK, most likely in Asia.
6.3.1 Accountable Defence Sectors
We will be working with governments and civil society to create a set of accountable global defence standards, using the GI as an instrument to facilitate agreement and progress. We aim to have a number of countries sign up to the idea. We will be build a network of support in key emerging and regional powers, such as Mexico, Indonesia or Ghana, and ensure continued buy-in from US, the UK and Germany.
There will be a strong focus on activity in the Asia-Pacific region working closely with government, civil society and TI colleagues in Indonesia and India, and then with ASEAN as a regional organisation around its recent ‘ASEAN Blue Print’ for 2016 -2025, which has a stand-alone section to “Promote greater transparency and understanding of defence policies and security perceptions”.
We will be working with NATO to shape the detail of the ‘Building Integrity’ policy, to be adopted at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, July 2016.
Outputs
?We will draft a set of accountable global defence standards and seek input from potential convening states, like Norway, Germany and the UK.
?We will produce concrete reform tools and guidance that can underpin global standards –based on the GI 2015.
?We will set up a chapter fund to support defence and security work across the TI movement.
?We will conduct an advocacy campaign in ASEAN states.
?We will have a colleague based in a key location outside of Europe / the UK, most likely in Asia.
6.3.1 Accountable Defence Sectors
We will be working with governments and civil society to create a set of accountable global defence standards, using the GI as an instrument to facilitate agreement and progress. We aim to have a number of countries sign up to the idea. We will be build a network of support in key emerging and regional powers, such as Mexico, Indonesia or Ghana, and ensure continued buy-in from US, the UK and Germany.
There will be a strong focus on activity in the Asia-Pacific region working closely with government, civil society and TI colleagues in Indonesia and India, and then with ASEAN as a regional organisation around its recent ‘ASEAN Blue Print’ for 2016 -2025, which has a stand-alone section to “Promote greater transparency and understanding of defence policies and security perceptions”.
We will be working with NATO to shape the detail of the ‘Building Integrity’ policy, to be adopted at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, July 2016.
Outputs
?We will draft a set of accountable global defence standards and seek input from potential convening states, like Norway, Germany and the UK.
?We will produce concrete reform tools and guidance that can underpin global standards –based on the GI 2015.
?We will set up a chapter fund to support defence and security work across the TI movement.
?We will conduct an advocacy campaign in ASEAN states.
?We will have a colleague based in a key location outside of Europe / the UK, most likely in Asia.
6.3.2 Industry Integrity
We will be tackling the biggest barriers to reducing corruption in the defence industry - aiming for a fundamental shift in both industry and government practice on the use of agents/intermediaries and offset contracts. This campaign will be underpinned by strong evidence-based research into the role of agents/intermediaries and offset contracts in facilitating corruption.
There will be work focussed on increasing standards in companies, following on from the CI 2015. One aim is to create sustained pressure on major companies based in EU and US markets that scored poorly.
We will also begin work to map global sales and corruption to increase our understanding of the current state of corruption in the arms trade.
We will also focus on the role of suspension and debarment with the aim of improving the utility of this tool in European countries.
Outputs:
?We will conduct an advocacy campaign on agents/intermediaries –targeting industry and government and focusing on the recommendations coming out of our forthcoming report.
?We will produce a report on the corruption risks around offset contracting and scope out the concept of a ‘responsible procurement protocol’.
?We will implement tailored engagement plans for companies in the CI and engagement plans for each group. We will conduct a methodological review and impact assessment of Companies Index and begin preparatory work for possible third edition of the Companies Index or similar tool.
?We will develop a defence corruption mapping tool.
?We will publish recommendations on the role of suspension and debarment in the EU or UK, and secure the support of US debarment officials as advocates.
6.3.2 Industry Integrity
We will be tackling the biggest barriers to reducing corruption in the defence industry - aiming for a fundamental shift in both industry and government practice on the use of agents/intermediaries and offset contracts. This campaign will be underpinned by strong evidence-based research into the role of agents/intermediaries and offset contracts in facilitating corruption.
There will be work focussed on increasing standards in companies, following on from the CI 2015. One aim is to create sustained pressure on major companies based in EU and US markets that scored poorly.
We will also begin work to map global sales and corruption to increase our understanding of the current state of corruption in the arms trade.
We will also focus on the role of suspension and debarment with the aim of improving the utility of this tool in European countries.
Outputs:
?We will conduct an advocacy campaign on agents/intermediaries –targeting industry and government and focusing on the recommendations coming out of our forthcoming report.
?We will produce a report on the corruption risks around offset contracting and scope out the concept of a ‘responsible procurement protocol’.
?We will implement tailored engagement plans for companies in the CI and engagement plans for each group. We will conduct a methodological review and impact assessment of Companies Index and begin preparatory work for possible third edition of the Companies Index or similar tool.
?We will develop a defence corruption mapping tool.
?We will publish recommendations on the role of suspension and debarment in the EU or UK, and secure the support of US debarment officials as advocates.
6.3.3 Conflict & Instability
We will be working with four priority fragile states:
?Afghanistan: we will focus on addressing the problem of payment schemes and ghost soldiers
?Kenya: our aim is to strengthen civil society awareness, to increase pressure for government reforms
?Nigeria: we will use the opportunity of the new Buhari government and the enthusiastic chapter to develop a strategy to influence the MOD’s activities and strengthen civil society oversight
?Ukraine: we will be implementing the pilot project (funded by DMFA) to create the Defence Corruption Monitoring Committee, which will involve hiring a member of staff to work in Kiev.
We are looking to conduct a major advocacy campaign to ensure corruption is recognised as a threat to stability and peace, and that practical recommendations to reduce it are implemented. We will be using our research to feed into legislation in the US and UK, and the Anti-Corruption Summit this May. We aim to influence peace operations through the UN and engage in the debate around the SDG national indicators to ensure that defence and security sector integrity is factored in.
We will be updating our training courses, prioritising making new and engaging modules for BISL/BOG and OpTACC as needed. This we will continue to do in collaboration with UKDA as well as establish relationships with new training institutions.
Outputs:
?We will publish a report on fragile states, making the case for the link between corruption and conflict.
?We aim to also publish a report on ghost soldiers in Afghanistan and establish an in-country reporting mechanism.
?In Ukraine we will implement the DCMC project – recruiting a staff member in Kiev, establishing a committee, producing four progress reports on the MOD, developing a website for reporting corruption concerns and making security assistance more transparent.
?We will develop strategies, alongside chapters, for influencing reform in Nigeria and Kenya.
?We will develop ‘Understanding Corrupt Networks’ maps for Kenya, Nigeria and Ukraine.
?We will publish a risk assessment of the UN’s peace operations system and a methodology and plan for how we could monitor a UN mission in 2017.
?We will generate research on managing corruption through peace settlements, oversight mechanism in fragile environments, and create a guidance document aimed at security assistant providers.
?We will manage the delivery of three high quality training courses through the UK Defence Academy: BISL, BIF, and OpTACC, and establish a relationship with one new training provider.
6.3.3 Conflict & Instability
We will be working with four priority fragile states:
?Afghanistan: we will focus on addressing the problem of payment schemes and ghost soldiers
?Kenya: our aim is to strengthen civil society awareness, to increase pressure for government reforms
?Nigeria: we will use the opportunity of the new Buhari government and the enthusiastic chapter to develop a strategy to influence the MOD’s activities and strengthen civil society oversight
?Ukraine: we will be implementing the pilot project (funded by DMFA) to create the Defence Corruption Monitoring Committee, which will involve hiring a member of staff to work in Kiev.
We are looking to conduct a major advocacy campaign to ensure corruption is recognised as a threat to stability and peace, and that practical recommendations to reduce it are implemented. We will be using our research to feed into legislation in the US and UK, and the Anti-Corruption Summit this May. We aim to influence peace operations through the UN and engage in the debate around the SDG national indicators to ensure that defence and security sector integrity is factored in.
We will be updating our training courses, prioritising making new and engaging modules for BISL/BOG and OpTACC as needed. This we will continue to do in collaboration with UKDA as well as establish relationships with new training institutions.
Outputs:
?We will publish a report on fragile states, making the case for the link between corruption and conflict.
?We aim to also publish a report on ghost soldiers in Afghanistan and establish an in-country reporting mechanism.
?In Ukraine we will implement the DCMC project – recruiting a staff member in Kiev, establishing a committee, producing four progress reports on the MOD, developing a website for reporting corruption concerns and making security assistance more transparent.
?We will develop strategies, alongside chapters, for influencing reform in Nigeria and Kenya.
?We will develop ‘Understanding Corrupt Networks’ maps for Kenya, Nigeria and Ukraine.
?We will publish a risk assessment of the UN’s peace operations system and a methodology and plan for how we could monitor a UN mission in 2017.
?We will generate research on managing corruption through peace settlements, oversight mechanism in fragile environments, and create a guidance document aimed at security assistant providers.
?We will manage the delivery of three high quality training courses through the UK Defence Academy: BISL, BIF, and OpTACC, and establish a relationship with one new training provider.