This document summarizes key tactics used by the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. It discusses their use of snipers, RPGs, IEDs, intimidation/coercion, and propaganda. Sniper attacks peaked in 2010, while the Taliban effectively uses older RPG-7 launchers combined with deception. IEDs became more sophisticated after 2005, transitioning to remote-controlled bombs. Intimidating night letters are an effective low-cost tactic. Propaganda exaggerates Taliban victories and threatens those who aid the U.S. and government. While once common, suicide attacks have declined since their peak around 2005-2007 likely due to less supplies and personnel. Overall, the Taliban continues refining its tactics against U

1. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY
OSINT TARGET REPORT: TALIBAN TACTICS IN AFGHANISTAN
BY
KAYLA ROTH
INTL 502
27 DEC 2015

2. Introduction
The Taliban are an insurgent regime within Afghanistan that were initially toppled in
2001 following a U.S. invasion of combat forces into the region for the Taliban’s role in
harboring umbrella group, al-Qaeda. While dismantled initially, the Taliban have not been
defeated and the ending of U.S. forces in Afghanistan as a combat presence has allowed the
Taliban to maintain its hold over the Afghan people as well as maintain its strongholds within the
south and eastern portion of the country. As the international combat mission in Afghanistan
reaches its close, the Taliban threaten to destabilize the region, harbor terrorist groups with
global ambitions, and set back human rights and economic development in the areas where the
insurgent group prevails (Haass, 2015). Throughout the combat mission led by ISAF and
Coalition Forces from October 2001-December 2014, Taliban insurgents have honed their
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to undermine both U.S. forces as well as the coalition-
backed Afghan government.
The Taliban remains an insurgency group predominantly Pashtun in culture, maintaining
their strongholds in the south and east as well as other Pashtun-dominated districts throughout
Afghanistan.
Outlook
While the Taliban lack the means to defeat ISAF and Coalition Forces, ISAF have also
been unable to effectively defeat pockets of insurgents or wrest the provinces of eastern and
southern Afghanistan from Taliban control. Though the Taliban appears unlikely to topple the
Afghan government and completely revive its hold over the country, it still poses a serious
challenge to Kabul’s authority (Haass, 2015). Taliban insurgents will continue to use effective
TTPs at its disposal, namely snipers, RPGs, IEDs, intimidation and coercion, propaganda and

3. suicide bombers to undermine the Afghan government in Kabul, as well as NATO-led support
forces and Afghan National Army (ANA), and Afghan National Police (ANP) attempting to
stabilize the region.
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)
As of 2015, with the combat mission in Afghanistan at a close, U.S.-led military forces
have suffered nearly 3,500 deaths and more than 10,000 wounded (Haass, 2015). Additionally,
since 2001 and the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom, at least 21,000 Afghan civilians have
been killed in the conflict with ANA and ANP seeing the highest mortality rates in the history of
the conflict (Haass, 2015). Taliban insurgents have been able to hone their TTPs, molding their
approaches with changes in ISAF procedure with devastating effect. Insurgent tactics and
operations against Coalition forces have continued to evolve throughout the conflict, and
increasingly parallel those used against U.S. forces in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
following takes a look at the most common and effective TTPs of Taliban fighters within
Afghanistan against ISAF and Coalition Forces.
Snipers
Not widely used throughout Afghanistan, snipers and reports of incidences involving
snipers and small arms fire against U.S. forces predominantly take place in the Taliban-
controlled south, namely Kandahar and Helmand provinces. 2010 largely seems to be the height
of sniper attacks and small arms fire against U.S. forces by Taliban fighters as OSINT reporting
suggested that sniper schools were being established within the southern portion of Afghanistan
(Chivers, 2010). Many of the instructors were reportedly trained as snipers during the Russian
invasion as well as some Arab-trained snipers (Chivers, 2010). While minimal reporting has
backed up claims of sniper instructors coming from the Soviet-Afghan war, an abundance of

4. OSINT reporting maintains that Taliban fighters are importing snipers from Iran and Arab-based
countries.
Sniper attacks peaked in 2010 within southern Afghanistan. While U.S. deaths by bullet
and small arms fire accounted for just 13% of those listed KIA in 2009, that figure rose to nearly
40% in 2010 (Judd, 2010). This spike in small arms fire suggests a change in not only Taliban
TTPs but also Coalition ones as well. It is likely that during 2010 when sniper incidents spiked,
Coalition Forces were predominantly focusing on IEDs, one of the most effective insurgent
tactics, with the Taliban responding in kind. It is likely that the Taliban, aware of the focus of
ISAF on tackling IEDs were taking a more aggressive stance by actively engaging U.S. forces
through small arms fire (Judd, 2010). Additionally, what may be more alarming is that this trend
indicates a shift in Taliban fighting organization. Insurgent fighters throughout Afghanistan have
traditionally relied upon a haphazard “spray and pray” method of engaging ISAF with small
arms fire (Judd, 2010). This shift to more calculated attacks against U.S. forces could indicate
more professional training in the form of sharpshooters and trained snipers.
RPGs
The Taliban’s use of RPGs has predominantly been adopted from tactics used by
Hezbollah within Lebanon and Israel. While some reporting suggests that insurgents operating in
Afghanistan have been attempting to upgrade their arsenal of Katyusha rocket launchers to more
modern ones used in the Middle East, the RPG-7 still remains the weapon of choice for fighters
(Poole, 106, 2005). While in the Middle East, particularly Iraq, Israel and Lebanon fighters tend
to use more sophisticated RPGs, Taliban fighters have a tendency to combine a “low-tech”
weapon system, like the RPG-7, with the use of tactical deception to turn an out of date weapon
into a tank killer, helicopter destroyer and antipersonnel destroyer (Poole, 106, 2005).

5. The use of this technique shows that the Taliban are not simply a group of uneducated
fanatics and recruits. Taliban insurgents are cunning and know how to play to their strengths and
are aware of their weaknesses. The Taliban are weak when it comes to resources and supply
routes, lacking the money of groups like Hezbollah to both develop and import new weapons
systems. Taliban fighters in Afghanistan do not have the resources to develop RPGs within the
country and must rely upon a single supply route, Pakistan, to import their weapons. Using these
lower-tech RPG-7s allows fighters to deliver volleys of indirect fire (IDF) in a preparatory attack
in support of an infantry assault (Poole, 106, 2005). This tactic allows Taliban fighters to take
full advantage of cost-effective weaponry while preserving manpower.
IEDs
Throughout the duration of Operation Enduring Freedom, IEDs remained the
predominant and one of the most effective TTPs used against coalition and ISAF personnel.
What worked well for the Iraqi insurgency began to make its appearance within Afghanistan as
well in the form of IEDs (Poole, 109, 2005). IEDs within Afghanistan began initially as buried
anti-tank mines and artillery shells rigged up to a pressure plate that would activate when weight
was put on the pressure plate (Feickert, 2006). It seems, however, that from 2005-onward, IEDs
in Afghanistan underwent a massive transformation. After 2005, Coalition Forces began
reporting that they were encountering more sophisticated IEDs. This change in TTPs came in the
form of remote-controlled IEDs (Global Business Media, 2009). These remote-controlled IEDs
are largely radio controlled since Afghanistan lacks the extensive cellphone network that the
Middle East has.
While IEDs were used against U.S. forces throughout Afghanistan southern regions such
as Kandahar and Helmand provinces as well as eastern provinces like Paktika experienced IEDs

6. as a regular daily occurrence. This surge in IED production and usage against coalition forces
and ISAF personnel after 2005 supports OSINT reporting from the time that claimed Taliban
fighters were being trained by al-Qaeda-backed Uzbek insurgents on how to manufacture more
sophisticated roadside bombs as well as establishing IED manufacturing plants and training
schools throughout the south and east. For much of the conflict in Afghanistan, victim activated
pressure plate IEDs remained the most common form of IED followed closely by command wire
and remote controlled activation (Global Business Media, 2009). This assessment fits with
Taliban TTPs are these forms of IEDs require minimal resources and allows fighters to keep
distance between themselves and U.S. forces to activate the IED.
OSINT reporting has suggested that Taliban fighters were developing more sophisticated
IEDs such as ones that use a key chain-like trigger imported from China that would permit
detonation of the IED from nearly one kilometer away (Global Business Media, 2009). While it
is both possible and likely that Taliban fighters are continuing to develop new IED technology, it
is more likely that fighters will continue to utilize IED tactics that require less resources and
remain predominantly composed of fertilizer-based homemade explosives (HME). While there is
potential for IEDs within Afghanistan to become increasingly sophisticated in the future, for
now, it is likely that they will continue to be constructed from “everyday materials such as wood
and saw blades, use fertilizer based HME and rely upon simple detonation devices” like
pressure-plate (Global Business Media, 2009).
Intimidation and Coercion
Whereas IEDs remain the most effective weapon the Taliban has in Afghanistan, the use
of intimidation and coercion is one of the most reliable forms of subversive action at their
disposal when it comes to undermining U.S. forces as well as the Afghan government in Kabul.

7. Since 2005, Taliban insurgents have been able to infiltrate nearly every government facility in
Afghanistan (Poole, 108, 2005). By deploying fighters to intimidate non-government
organizations (NGOs), insurgents have been able to limit the amount of cooperation with ISAF
as well as pressure international groups to withdraw their personnel from the southern region of
the country.
Shabnamah, night letters, have proved an exceptionally effective method of intimidation
throughout Afghanistan. Taliban mullahs, religious leaders, travel into the rural areas of the
provinces speaking to the local village elders and delivering these night letters of intimidation
(Johnson, 320, 2007). This form of intimidation has proven to be a cost-effective method of
limiting western and U.S.-backed Afghan government influence over the country. Common
forms of night letters tell villagers that regardless of how long ISAF and Coalition Forces stay in
country, they will eventually leave and when they leave Taliban forces will come back to each
village and kill all families who have aided U.S. forces as well as anyone who has aided the
American puppet that is the Karzai government in Kabul. These letters are often posted on the
walls of mosques and government buildings at night promising death to anyone who defies their
threats of violence (Johnson, 323, 2007). These night letters are typically directed at symbols of
authority and supporters of the Karzai government but, within the east they have been personally
directed to an individual or family, threatening retribution, warning to refrain from engagement
with foreigners or avoid sending children to school (Johnson, 323, 2007).
Unlike regions like Iraq with extensive means of communication, large regions of
Afghanistan are limited in access to media which the night letters are used to fill this void. With
Afghanistan largely being void of an extensive infrastructure network, and with what little that
does exist being undermined by the Taliban, fighters will continue to rely upon shabnamah to

8. intimidate, coerce and terrorize villagers that live in areas devoid of communications and media
interaction. Night letters have proven to be a cost-effective and well-tested technique that is
unlikely to end in the future.
Propaganda
The use of propaganda by the Taliban was a program of slow development through the
early years of the war that often was confusing and contradictory. Like many of the TTPs in use
by Taliban fighters, the use of propaganda was adopted from observing insurgencies such as
those in Iraq , Israel and Lebanon with messages most often being simple and underpinned by
threats of violence and most often directed at Pashtun tribal people (Foxley, 2007). Throughout
Operation Enduring Freedom continuing to today’s advisory period in Afghanistan, Taliban
fighters continue to rely on propaganda. The main goal of propaganda and Taliban media
activities continues to be that of a publicized and exaggerated version of Taliban operations
undertaken in Afghanistan against U.S. forces as well as ANA and ANP (Foxley, 2007).
Taliban propaganda seems to focus on four key areas: victories on the battlefield, values
and beliefs, information and instructions to the Afghan population, and refuting the claims of
ISAF and Karzai’s government and rely upon the following forms of media: fax, telephone,
mobile phone and satellite phone; radio and TV; newspapers; night letters; direct contact with
the population; CDs/DVDs/videotapes; websites and the internet (Johnson, 77, 2007).
Exaggeration and distortion are rampant within Taliban propaganda, focusing mainly on the
number of casualties inflicted on coalition, ISAF or Afghan forces, claims to have shot down
coalition or ISAF aircraft, kidnappings or capturing of civilian or military personnel, and
weapons systems available to the Taliban (most notably surface-to-air missiles) (Johnson, 78,
2007).

9. Propaganda, like intimidation tactics and coercion cost the Taliban little as far as money,
resources and man power compared to the cost of developing, importing and deploying weapons
and attacks against ISAF personnel . With the combat mission having ended, it seems likely that
the Taliban’s use of intimidation, coercion and propaganda will begin to play a larger role as the
Afghan government attempts to gain control of the country and the Taliban try to regain their
strongholds throughout the country. Furthermore, it is likely that analysts will continue to see an
increase in night letters and intimidation tactics in the rural Pashtun regions of the east along the
Pakistan border.
Suicide Attacks
Suicide bombers were not a tactic seen in Afghanistan until around 2005 and seemed to
have peaked by 2010. Since 2007, suicide bombings have reportedly become less effective with
ISAF officials crediting it with “better training of Afghan forces and the disruption of bomb-
makers’ networks by NATO-led raids”, however it is unlikely that this is strictly the case
(Nordland, 2010) . Whereas the overall number of bombings taking place throughout
Afghanistan have increased, their overall effectiveness seems to have dropped significantly
within recent years. According to a New York Times tally, at least 480 people were killed in 129
suicide bombings in Afghanistan in 2007 and while the total number of suicide attacks increased
in 2009, the death toll dropped to 275 people (Nordland, 2010).
While NATO-led raids and better trained Afghan forces can certainly be contributed to
this decline, it is unlikely that these are the sole reasons behind this drop in suicide bombs. This
decline may not necessarily mean a drop in competence on the part of Taliban fighters but,
instead could mean a lack of adequate supplies since Afghanistan insurgents must rely on
importing supplies from Pakistan. This potential lack of supplies would mean a decreased ability

10. to generate larger and effective bombs like previously seen between 2005-2007 before the
decline of 2007-2010. This could likely be a result of a decrease in adequate personnel as most
suicide bombers within Afghanistan were not even native people. The large majority of suicide
bombers were brought into the country, many of them coming from Pakistan (Lewis, 2013).
With that being said, it is likely that suicide bombs will continue to be on the decline in the
region as they are exceptionally expensive in terms of resources and manpower, two things that
the Taliban are traditionally limited on compared to other insurgent groups.
Conclusion
It cannot be denied that since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001,
Taliban insurgents have continually molded their TTPs, “developing larger-scale, more
sophisticated, better prepared and exhibiting greater degrees of command and control” (Johnson,
2007, 71). With the end of the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan, a revived Taliban supported
by al-Qaeda will continue to increase operations specifically within the southern and eastern
portion of the country near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border where the Pashtun tribal lands lay
and insurgents exhibit more control over the rural populace. TTPs such as propaganda,
intimidation and coercion will continue to be utilized even if they remain relatively crude as the
general population remain relatively tolerant to the Taliban operating in the area and since they
have proven to be exceptionally effective at the local level within Pashtun villages. It is likely
that IEDs will also continue to be one of the main weapons used by Taliban fighters to combat
ANA, ANP and U.S. advisory forces within the region as traditional TTPs have shown that
insurgents increase the amount of IED emplacement along roadsides when pushed out of an area
by coalition forces. With the ANA and ANP becoming more reliable with better training, Taliban

11. insurgents will continue to rely upon this method rather than direct contact with coalition forces
through small arms fire in an attempt to hold onto their footprint in the region.

12. Bibliography
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