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Iran Nuclear Energy Rights According to International Law
Robert Silva
IR 738
Professor Clavier
1
Introduction
Iran is clamoring for the release of international pressure for the right to civilian
nuclear power. The international community has concerns about Iran’s intentions about
the interest in the nuclear field. This paper will review and look at Iran’s right to nuclear
energy and the nuclear fuel cycle in regards to international law with in existing treaties
and customary norms. Iran wants the right to produce a nuclear fuel cycle with out
international backlash.
The nuclear fuel cycle is wrapped up in arm control treaties and atomic energy
regimes. The creation of nuclear fuel can lead to creation of nuclear weapon grade fissile
material. The problem with having a nuclear fuel enrichment cycle it can be refined and
expanded to make nuclear weapon grade fissile material. The purpose of this paper is to
look at existing article of laws to see if Iran has the right to the nuclear fuel enrichment
cycle. The paper will explore history of Iranian atomic program and International
obligations. The paper will compare Iran’s behavior in recent and past events to articles
of international law to see if they have breach any international obligations or if they
have been adherent this will determine the status of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle program.
Iranian Historical Behavior
In the 1970’s Iran was researching the ability to create nuclear fuel or yellow
cake. In 1967 the United States gave Iran a five-mega watt research reactor. The
University of Iran was researching and educating about atomic energy. Iran became
2
signatories of the NPT on July 1, 1968 and ratified the treaty February 2, 1970 the agreed
to the safe guard agreement on May 15 1974. The war with Iraq in the eighties put a halt
to Iran’s nuclear programs due to the research facilities were being destroyed by Iraq. In
1979 Iran had a revolution and adopted a new constitution.1
In recent years Iran has been
actively pursuing nuclear energy and the ability to enrich nuclear fuel. On July 27, 2005
Iranian present President Mohammad Khatami stated that his resuming the ballistic
missile program the “Shahab-3” missile that was frozen under European agreements. The
desire was to increase the accuracy and the distant of the ballistic missiles. The Shahab-3
can reach Israel and U.S forces at this date. The expansion of the distant will push the
distant of the missile to Greece and Egypt. The incoming President states in the article
that his has the right to enrich uranium to gas because it is use to make nuclear fuel for
energy. On the other hand, the same gas can be used to create weapon grade fissile
material. The New President of Iran states that Iran has no intentions of producing
nuclear weapon material. 2
This is relevant to future argument to nuclear fuel cycle
because the ability to delivery payload and great distances. The articles of regional
customary laws consider the explosive part of the weapon different the delivery
mechanism. It is stated in many regional treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons. The Treaty of Tlatelolco article 5, so it could be assumed the same standards
could be set for Iran, under International law since other sovereigns follow this practice.
In September-October of 2005 Iran was threatened by the IAEA to be referred to
the UN Security Council for noncompliance with standards. Iran has been threatening to
scale back the cooperation with the NPT and IAEA. On October 3, 2005 Iran stated they
1
“Iran’s Nuclear Program” http://www.iranwatch.org/wmd/wponac-nuclearhistory-0904.htm
2
ALI AKBAR DAREINI, “Iran vows to restart uranium reprocessing activities” Associated Press World
stream July 27, 2005
3
have the right to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle under the authority of Article IV of the NPT.3
Iran has stated to the International Community many times stated they are not promoters
of terrorism but a victim. Their nuclear fuel cycle is for nuclear energy creation therefore
peaceful purposes. The IAEA enforcement mechanism for non-compliance is a referral
to the United Nations Security Council. The UN Charter would have right to take action
deem necessary to keep the international peace.
In an article Iran made a declaration that could be considered hostile towards
America, and other nations. When they displayed Shahab-3 missiles in a public parade
with signs that state “We will crush America under our feet''4
A recent article stating
hostilities toward the United States. This brings up the question of self-defense for
United States, that if Iran is pursuing to get the pieces of the nuclear weapon puzzle in
different places. The Iranian argument is we are refining Uranium and doing research to
make civilian nuclear fuel. The missile delivery systems are for conventional weapons
slowly and quietly getting to a place so they have the components to assemble. The
assembling of the weapon would not take much time or coordination. The practices set
down in conventions allow countries to develop delivery system technology and nuclear
and have nuclear energy. They are considered to separate items not related to each other
in many articles of international law.
Iran has stated that they would share nuclear technology with other Islamic like states5
this is also a relevant event because what if the Islamic state is not part of atomic energy
3
“ Secrecy lies fuels Nuclear Talks” October 3 2005 The Irish Times
4
La Guardia, Anton. “US reveals details of Iran’s nuclear ambition” The Daily Telegraph November 24,
2005 Thursday
5
“Xinhua World News summary” Xinhua General News Service September 16 2005
4
regime monitoring practices or other binding document could promote the proliferation
of nuclear weapons without proper monitoring. That practice of legitimate nations and
the codified norm is to only trade with those apart of the NPT and the additional
protocols. Iran would be with in International norms if the Islamic states are part of the
International Atomic trade regime and meet the criterion.
Iran’s Suppliers
The importance of knowing the suppliers is to keep proper monitoring of
materials that are laid out in the NSG part 1 and 2. Because it takes volumes of material
to create nuclear fuel it takes volumes of material to create weapon grade fuel. If Iran
suppliers are not under monitoring regimes then accounting of material can become
difficult.
The following information I received from Iran Watch located at
www.iranwatch.org6
One of Iran suppliers for nuclear technology is the
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) This Company mostly supplied
reactors.
Changgwang Sinyong Corporation is a company out of North Korea.
The Japanese government has reservations and suspicion about this company has been
known to deal in biological, nuclear and missile proliferation. 7
North Korea left the NPT
January 10 2003 and stated that it was effective immediately. The NPT guidelines held
them withdrawal until April 10, 2003.8
On March 24 2003“The Changgwang Sinyong
Corporation of North Korea was sanctioned for transferring Category 1 items regulated
6
Iran Watch, “Suppliers List” http://www.iranwatch.org/suppliers/suppliers-list.asp
7
http://www.iranwatch.org/search/view_record.asp?sc=suppliers&id=10
8
Jean du Preez and William Potter “North Korea's Withdrawal From the NPT: A Reality Check”
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm#fnB5
5
under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to Khan Research Laboratories
(KRL) in Pakistan,”9
Khan research labs are own by Abdul Qadir Khan.
Abdul Qadir Khan is a know smuggler and thief of nuclear secrets that his has
ring that modifies and sells nuclear secrets not under the guidance of the IAEA. Abdul
Qadir Khan has a links to Iran because the British and Dutch centrifuge designs were
stolen in the 1970’s and was modified by Abdul Q Khan. The centrifuge was found by
the IAEA in Iran in the later part of the year of 2002. According to the India Tribune,
“International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found traces of weapons grade Uranium at
Iran's Natanz Nuclear Facility south of Teheran. During interrogation with the IAEA,
Iranian officials gave detailed accounts of how they obtained sensitive equipment from
Pakistan and other countries”10
the centrifuges that create the weapons grade uranium
came from Abdul Khan. According to BBC news Abdul Khan is known to have the
know how to produce and equip nuclear warheads to missiles.
This incident shows the importance of the NPT and Additional Protocols plus the
monitoring regimes. That Iran accepted a device and a technology design to make nuclear
grade fuel. They were obligated by article II of the NPT to refuse any thing that was used
directly or indirectly in the creation of nuclear explosive devises. Weapon grade uranium
could be considered indirectly producing weapons, because it needs other components to
explode the device to make it directly.
The supplier list has relevance to the obligation to the Safe Guard aspect of the
NPT and the other protocols of monitoring. Some suppliers had been intermediaries to
other nations that actively seek nuclear weapons. There have been also reports that Iran
9
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/missilesanctions_may03.asp
10
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040126/nation.htm#5 Tribune India January 26 2004
6
has sought deuterium gas from Russia. According to an intelligence report citing Russian
sources that was circulated at the IAEA in July 2004, Iranian middlemen negotiated with
companies in Russia to purchase deuterium gas after failing to produce it domestically.
Deuterium gas is used, in conjunction with tritium, to boost the yield of fission bombs.
Deuterium and tritium are hydrogen isotopes that release neutrons and energy when they
fuse together in thermonuclear explosions. Article II of the NPT allow Iran to have
deuterium because deuterium gas used with nuclear fuel cycle. According to NSG
guidelines a country can only receive 200 Kg of Deuterium a year in total from all
suppliers. As long Iran only accepts 200 Kg of Deuterium they are with in their rights
according to international norms create by international atomic trade regimes.
International Obligations
Iran is apart of the following Treaties concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
weapons and Atomic Monitoring regimes. Iran is part of the Partial Test Ban Treaty
signatory August 8 1963, ratified May 5, 1964; Outer Space Treaty: Signatory January
27, 1967; Non Proliferation Treaty: signed July 1 1968, Ratified February 2 1970, safe
guard agreement in May 15 1974; Sea Bed Treaty: signed February 11 1971, ratified
August 26, 1971; BW Convention: signed April 10 1972, ratified August 1973 and The
ENMOD convention: signed May 18 1977.11
In the GOV/2005/67 UN document stated
that Iran has been complying with monitoring process of the Additional Protocols that
they sign in November 10 2003, but still waiting for ratification. They have allowed
three complementary accesses since September 2005.
11
Jozef Goldblat,” Arms Control Agreements, a handbook” Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, Preager Publishing New York 1983, p. 262-263
7
Iran is a party to the IAEA which is the International Atomic Energy Agreement it
is an institutional framework to help build consensus among nations about international
atomic practices. The IAEA also promotes Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
regime consists of conventions dealing with arms control, to guideline for trading
material for the nuclear energy cycle. The main objective of the IAEA is to promote
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
One of the major documents of the IAEA regime is the Non Proliferation Treaty
that lays out guidelines for nuclear production a research and creates an obligation to not
create nuclear explosives.
The safe guard requirement of the NPT adds the monitoring process to the international
regime to ensure compliance.
The Nuclear Supplier Group is about accounting of nuclear material and technology
across borders. With in the NSG there are other documents that specify standards and
obligations. To be apart of the NSG regime a country must meet certain criterion
Nuclear Supplier Group Requirements
The Requirement of the Nuclear Supplier Group is as following:
“Must be able to supply items plus items in transit covered in Parts 1 and 2 in the NSG
guidelines, enforcement of a legal based domestic export control system which gives
effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines full compliance of one
of the following treaties, The NPT, Treaty Tlateloloc, Bangkok, or a treaty in the same
standing and multitude. Support efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems.”12
The spirit of the requirements to be part of the NSG is a commitment and active
working against proliferation of weapons through accounting and domestic monitoring of
nuclear production activities.
12
NSG Guidelines
8
Another role of the Nuclear Supplier Group is to produce nuclear fuel for non-
producing countries. The goal is the ability to keep an accounting of fuel the created.
How the regime works the nuclear states creates the fuel then transport it to non-nuclear
states facilities the non-nuclear uses the fuel when spent, the fuel is sent back the country
of origin. This practice is to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and reduce
proliferation and misuse of nuclear energy.
The obstacle Iran is faced with is meeting the requirement of the NSG. That
corporation is needed from Iran with the IAEA. In the past and present situation Iran has
not been giving full transparency with the nuclear activities. The guidelines and the
practices of the International community is not to create a collusion of nuclear energy but
to keep track and accounting to make sure it does not fall in the rogue actors hands that
would use it for weapons.
To this day Iran is not a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group.
Arguments
Does Iran have the right nuclear energy?
Iran has the right to have nuclear energy under article of NPT. In Article IV of
the NPT treaty its states “…a country has the right to develop research, production and
use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with out discrimination as the country abides
by Article I and Article II.”13
The vagueness of the develop research and production is not specified if it means
machinery or fuel or does it assert all aspects of the nuclear energy creation. Iran has
13
Non Proliferation Treaty
9
capabilities of mining their own uranium domestically because of the mining facilities at
Saghad. Does not the right of sovereignty give Iran the right to exploit their own
resources for the benefit of their citizens and nations. Iran has the right to do research in
the pursuit of civilian or peaceful nuclear energy under Article IV as long there is a
compliance with Article I and II.
In Article I of the NPT states “…. a state cannot directly or indirectly create weapon
materials.”
To look at Articles I of the NPT it states a nuclear state cannot assist in helping a
non-nuclear state to acquire weapons or develop them. Article II state a non-nuclear state
is obligated to refuse transmission of nuclear weapons or the knowledge or material that
is in the creation of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly. That if Iran has inalienable
right to produce nuclear energy as long as Iran follows the Non Proliferation Treaty’s
guidelines this could be consider a common practice in the international arena.
The purpose of the NPT articles that I surmise is to diffuse the capability of an
assembly coordination type of network between countries. Country “A” does one aspect
creation of the nuclear cycle while Country “X” does another aspect of the nuclear
weapon creation both countries ship to Country “Q” were Country “Q” assemble the
nuclear weapon devise. I believe the articles are to diffuse this type of coordination to
develop nuclear weapons, put the burden of responsibility and consequences on the
supplier and receiver.
The reporting of atomic related activities to the IAEA is a tool to diffuse the
ability of coordinated covert development of weapons. If country “Q” decide to divert
1
blame to another country “Y” and if Country “Y” has reported truthfully and allowed
IAEA to inspect facilities the accounting is correct then responsibility falls on Country
“Q”.
The individual country’s reporting practice is to be followed up by the IAEA
monitoring practiced to ensure creditability of the individual country’s reporting.
This brings to mind the ability to domestically account and monitoring nuclear research
activities in the domestic country. This is a requirement of being part of the Nuclear
Supplier Group. If accounting and expert controls of atomic research is not done with in
guidelines international norms. A rogue individual actor can steal or operate facilities that
could be considered detrimental to international peace and the practice of promoting non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The responsibility falls on the domestic state for the
individual actor because of jurisdiction and control of territory, in essence the duty of
sovereignty. This is to stop black market activities.
The black market is reality has been documented by many countries intelligence
agencies and reported in the news. Pakistan is reported to allow a free and unrestraint
market approach of the development and distribution of nuclear technologies. In the
article by Michael Hirsh and Sarah Schafer, names major dealers and that Pakistan is a
major breeding ground for unmonitored activities. They name Abdul Qadir Khan a focus
to an international black market of nuclear goods. His claim to fame is transferring
technology to Iran and North Korea. The nuclear black market network Abdul Khan is
part is a web from Switzerland to Japan.14
In another article focuses on middlemen or the
brokers of the Black Market, because NSG would be consider the legitimate market in
the international community. Mark Shapiro discusses Asher Karni in an article in Mother
14
Micheal Hirsh and Sarah Schafer” Black Market Nukes” Newsweek February 23, 2004.
1
Jones, the article explains the process and network of Karni and the players and
destinations. Karni was arrested in Denver Colorado for exporting with out a license. It
shows Karni transnational journey for South Africa to Pakistan to the United States that
coordination and misdirection was the method to sell item to actors to create nuclear
technologies that might had lead to proliferation of weapon. Karni was linked to Abdul
Khan and his black market nuclear weapon network.15
This expresses the need for
international monitoring and accounting plus the importance of domestic monitoring a
sovereign should know what goes on in their jurisdiction. If the sovereign is bound by
international in is mandatory.
The proper accounting of materials, facilities and experiment facilities to the
proper boards domestically then to IAEA is a practice to stop the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
This is part of the paper will be a review of “Islamic Republic of Iran NPT
Safeguards Report” it was concluded that Iran had made attempt to create independent
nuclear fuel cycle without notification with the Governing Board of the IAEA. This puts
them into breaches of international practices and customary norm.16
The report cites
unreported items: import of natural uranium and the transfer for further processing, the
production of UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6. The report further to explain that full transparency
was not given about laser experiments. Iran did not declare pilot enrichment programs at
Kalaye Electric Company, laser enrichment plants Lashkar Ab’ad. They failed to report
15
Mark Shapiro “The Middlemen” Mother Jones May-June 2005
16
IAEA document GOV/2005/67
1
inventory changes that were the results of imports transfer. Iran failed to keep a domestic
record of nuclear material. The Governing board found plutonium solution in less
amount than declared that this could be an indicator that Iran has been extracting
plutonium, after they said they reported that they stop experimenting. The results of the
report shows that Iran has not been keeping up with their domestic inventories or not
following guidelines of reporting properly to the IAEA, and following the international
norms of controlling nuclear material to prevent loss of inventory that might lead to
proliferation. This shows that they are not meeting requirement to be considered to be
apart of the Nuclear Supplier Group because of accounting and reporting purposes. Never
the less, they are partaking in monitoring aspect of the IAEA which is a positive step
towards achieving membership to the uranium fuel cycle according to international
norms and customs.
The Iranian counter argument is in Article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty that
they have a right to research and develop new methods of the creating nuclear energy.
Georges Le Guelte spent thirty-year veteran at the French atomic energy commission and
four years as the IAEA states "Under the treaty the Iranians have the right to do what they
are doing,"
But in Article I of the NPT that indirect or direct production of nuclear weapon
grade fuel is enough to find a country in breach of the NPT. To reinforce this norm the
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which affirms “that proliferation of nuclear,
1
chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery*17
, constitute a
threat to international peace and security.”18
But to argue on the right to nuclear fuel cycle
Iran is not considered a part of the Nuclear Supplier Group, because of lack of
compliance with IAEA monitoring process and criterion to meet acceptance into the
NSG. Iran is a non-nuclear weapon state plus does not have the right to produce the
nuclear fuel cycle according to the guideline set down in the articles of law and accepted
practices. Iran must conform to International Norms become apart of the Nuclear
Supplier Group regime before research and development of the Nuclear fuels enrichment
could be consider legitimate in the international community.
Article II of the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty to quote”..; not to manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.”19
Iran breached this article when accepting nuclear items for Abdul Q
Khan now black market ringleader. Mr. Khan has the knowledge to convert delivery
system and assemble missile with nuclear explosives. Since Iran lacks the competency of
reporting and keeping inventory as found in the Board of Governors Report
GOV/2005/67. This creates a suspicion that Iran could have been used in the
proliferation and the creation of nuclear weapons indirectly.
Does Iran have the right to produce atomic energy for peaceful purposes?
According to the NPT, Yes Article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty they have the right
17
means of delivery: missiles , rockets and other unmanned systems capability of delivering nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons that are specially design for such use.
18
Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
19
Non Proliferation Treaty Article II
1
to Nuclear energy as long there is a compliance with Article I and II of the NPT. Dr
Tertrais, a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, states
that Iran can realize its right to nuclear energy without enriching fuel because nuclear fuel
is available through supplier agreements. "The NPT is short and fuzzy," Tertrais says.
"Nothing in it says 'right to fuel cycle'. Nothing in it says 'enrichment capability'." Dr.
Tertrais is taking the regime approach of the articles of law since the norm is that states
that are part of NPT and IAEA decide to allow the NSG members to become the supplier
of the nuclear fuel for the reactors. The agreement is members state apart of these
stipulated treaties have the right to access nuclear fuel from member states of the NSG
with the requirement the nuclear fuel is sent back to the supplier. This could a
monitoring and accounting process to ensure control of the nuclear fuel so it may not be
used for proliferation of nuclear weapons. So the question does Iran have the right to
nuclear energy for civilian use. The answer would be yes.
The Iranian question is do they have the right the uranium fuel cycle that is what is
being debated. According to NPT there is mixed interpretations. Iranian and some
experts say yes for instance Georges Le Guelte spent 30 year veteran at the French
atomic energy commission and four years as the IAEA states "Under the treaty, the
Iranians have the right to do what they are doing," That the pursuit of the uranium
enrichment fuel cycle is part of the production of nuclear energy. Therefore the
assumption the production of the fuel is part of creation of energy. The counter argument
is the current practice by the international community is they get their fuel from the
member of NSG and comply strictly guidelines with the trigger list. Iran can break
international norms and start producing the uranium fuel cycle on their own as they done.
1
The international community could perceive it by breaking obligations to sign treaties. If
Iran complies with monitoring and transparency of operations and meet the criterion to
become apart of the NSG regime this is only way that an Iranian uranium fuel cycle could
view by the international regime as legitimate. The current standing with in international
law and customary norms Iran would be standing on the other side of the fence.
The counter argument is a political one and does hold some weight in context of
sovereignty. Is the major distinction between states in the treaties are non-nuclear weapon
states and nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapon state holds the responsibility to ensure
no other states acquire the technology of nuclear weapons. This can be considered unfair
for states that have nuclear weapons already and to deny nuclear weapons to states that
do not have them. The conventions Iran has sign they have accepted these conditions of
the treaties Iran have sign document that promotes the disarmament of existing nuclear
stockpiles, plus there is a universal understanding nuclear weapons could and might lead
to the extinction to the human race. This could be considered almost Jus Cogen.
If Iran intention is just to create civilian nuclear energy then following reporting
and inspection regimes should not be any concern to them if nuclear programs are not
promoting the creation of nuclear weapons. Sure the IAEA and the existing treaties
could be considered a gentlemen’s agreement among nations. The problem is when
disputes of practices and customs between gentlemen usually end up in a duel. If Iran is
enriching uranium for civilian energy use then the following international standards
should not be a difficulty because it promotes good will among nations and the
international peace.
1
Does the international community have the right to recourse against Iran
This paper already discussed Iranian behavior and look at the International law
implications. This next section the paper will be applying other articles of international
law to look at the behavior still is with in international customs and norms.
The added article is Security Council Resolution 1540, “affirms that the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery, constitutes
a threat to peace”20
Then I will be applying the concept of self defense of other nations
and looking at the measures if applicable to each Iranian event.
Iran has stated they are pursuing to develop and refine the Shahab-3 missile.
According to the Security Council Resolution a delivery system is “ Means of delivery:
missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear , chemical or
biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use. The Shahab-3 is a
convention weapon that can carry a payload up to 750 kg. Shahab-3 is based of Russian
and North Korean design. The question can it be used to deliver biological, nuclear, or
chemical payloads. Even if it could the right to self defense must be” leaving no moment
for deliberation.” I take this meaning even the process of creation of the weapons gives
time for communication and to diffuse the situation. The case when Israel bomb the Iraqi
nuclear facilities the U.N Security council did view as self defense they drew customary
norm from “The Caroline” the necessity of that self defense is instant, overwhelming and
20
UN Security Council Resolution 1540, preamble
1
leaving no choice of means, and no moment fro deliberation” . That collected action of
self-defense would not be allowed just because Iran is not following international norms.
The Security Council strength to the inspection regime and gave it more teeth
with the statement, Recognizing most state have undertaken binding legal obligations
under treaties which they are a partied to…in the preventing the proliferation of nuclear,
…, taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive
materials, …..recommended by the code of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive sources. This is international norms are considered enforceable
by force. “Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, which adds a new
dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to
international peace and security”21
This put pressure on the domestic states to begin
monitoring processes in there territory, because threat to international peace in the UN
Charter in article 39 can trigger the security council to make a decision to what measures
to be taken to restore international peace or remove the threat. The consequences could
be the ones described in article 41 and 42 in the United Nations Charter. This allows the
international community to take action to prevent proliferation by a non-state actor if the
domestic country does not have capabilities or is not willing to address the trafficking of
WMD’s.
In Iran’s case there monitoring practices have been not up to perfect there action
could perceived a breach of Article II of the NPT because of the acceptance of the
centrifuge that refines uranium to nuclear weapon grade. Does this act threaten
21
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
1
international peace. Yes the proliferation of nuclear stated in the Security Council
resolution clearly state proliferation constitute a threat to international peace. Since there
is a threat to international peace in article 39 in the UN Charter states the security council
can make a recommendation to take measures to restore international peace that are
stated in articles 41 and 42 in the UN Charter. Iran’s behavior of accepting items as non-
weapons state that manufactures directly or indirectly is a breach of NPT plus the making
of nuclear grade uranium could be consider proliferation, and in article II Iran does not
have the right to create nuclear grade fuel with in accordance to the treaty. Because of
the determination of the self-defense clause state with out deliberation, the UN can put
other measures short of arm conflict to curve Iranian behavior. Since there is an open
dialogue the dispute can be resolved in a peaceful manner.
Conclusion
Some critics of the IAEA and the Non Proliferation Regime with the Atomic Energy
Trade Regime the treaties have no teeth to enforce. Since the IAEA is branch of the
United Nation the purpose of these treaties are to promote the peace. The preamble in
most treaties relay the message the world is facing destruction if we as do not stop the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA and the nuclear treaty regimes are going
into the right direction in creating coordination and communication and transparency.
The question of Iran right to civilian to nuclear civilian energy is clear they do have the
right to nuclear energy. They also have the right uranium enrichment and development as
1
long as they follow the guideline and practices set down by the international community.
The goal of any international institution is to promote communication and transparency
so actions and intention would not be misread. In the instance of atomic energy since it is
tied to nuclear weapon creation. If the intention is for nuclear energy creation then
international cooperation and transparency is not an obstacle. The IAEA shares
information about technology ensuring that reactors are safe and not a threat to the
environment and therefore humans. Since the UN Security Council resolution 1540 gives
enforcement powers to the IAEA recommendation and protocols making them a practice
in the international community.
Iran should take their claim to the right uranium fuel cycle to the International
Court of Justice to get their interpretation of Article of IV ,II and I of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, to discern if Iran has the right to enrich uranium. I could not find
any international treaty documents stating a country does not have the right to civilian
nuclear energy. I did find document banning and working against proliferation of nuclear
explosive devices and other weapons of mass destruction. The treaties do asked non-
nuclear weapons states do not seek the uranium enrichment cycle. If one sovereign
nation has the ability then it is only the right that all countries have the ability to enrich
uranium to nuclear fuel. The international community did create standards for the
uranium enrichment. Iran must meet international criterion before the can start uranium
enrichment because of the treaties they are bound too. This does mean they do have the
right to refine but there is practice in place. Since they agree to follow international
customs and norms they must meet the standards to have the right to enrich uranium.
These standards are stated in the Nuclear Supplier Group convention.
2
After thought
For my own learning experience, I have found the IAEA and the treaties create the most
freedom for each state but allows for maintaining the international order. Sovereignty is
not infringe by any nation, but promotes peaceful coexist in the international system.
The domestic law in maintaining security when it comes to nuclear energy is actually in
the forefront of cause against proliferation. It is when the state fails in this job the
international community must step act with some force. The system is a primitive
system of enforcement but the system is dealing with sovereign nations.
2
Bibliography
1. UN Charter
2. UN Security Resolution 1540
3. Non Proliferation Treaty
4. Treaty of Tlateloloc
5. Nuclear Suppler Guide
6. Trigger List
7. Damorosch, Henkin,” International Law fourth Edition” West Group St Paul 2001
8. “Iran’s Nuclear Program” http://www.iranwatch.org/wmd/wponac-nuclearhistory-
0904.htm
9.Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran vows to restart uranium reprocessing activities”
Associated Press World stream July 27, 2005
10.“ Secrecy lies fuels Nuclear Talks” October 3 2005 The Irish Times
11. La Guardia, Anton. “US reveals details of Iran’s nuclear ambition” The Daily
Telegraph November 24, 2005 Thursday
12Mark Shapiro “The Middlemen” Mother Jones May-June 2005
13. IAEA document GOV/2005/67
14.Micheal Hirsh and Sarah Schafer “Black Market Nukes” Newsweek February 23,
2004
15. Jozef Goldblat,” Arms Control Agreements, a handbook” Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, Preager Publishing New York 1983,
2

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IranianRights

  • 1. Iran Nuclear Energy Rights According to International Law Robert Silva IR 738 Professor Clavier 1
  • 2. Introduction Iran is clamoring for the release of international pressure for the right to civilian nuclear power. The international community has concerns about Iran’s intentions about the interest in the nuclear field. This paper will review and look at Iran’s right to nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle in regards to international law with in existing treaties and customary norms. Iran wants the right to produce a nuclear fuel cycle with out international backlash. The nuclear fuel cycle is wrapped up in arm control treaties and atomic energy regimes. The creation of nuclear fuel can lead to creation of nuclear weapon grade fissile material. The problem with having a nuclear fuel enrichment cycle it can be refined and expanded to make nuclear weapon grade fissile material. The purpose of this paper is to look at existing article of laws to see if Iran has the right to the nuclear fuel enrichment cycle. The paper will explore history of Iranian atomic program and International obligations. The paper will compare Iran’s behavior in recent and past events to articles of international law to see if they have breach any international obligations or if they have been adherent this will determine the status of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle program. Iranian Historical Behavior In the 1970’s Iran was researching the ability to create nuclear fuel or yellow cake. In 1967 the United States gave Iran a five-mega watt research reactor. The University of Iran was researching and educating about atomic energy. Iran became 2
  • 3. signatories of the NPT on July 1, 1968 and ratified the treaty February 2, 1970 the agreed to the safe guard agreement on May 15 1974. The war with Iraq in the eighties put a halt to Iran’s nuclear programs due to the research facilities were being destroyed by Iraq. In 1979 Iran had a revolution and adopted a new constitution.1 In recent years Iran has been actively pursuing nuclear energy and the ability to enrich nuclear fuel. On July 27, 2005 Iranian present President Mohammad Khatami stated that his resuming the ballistic missile program the “Shahab-3” missile that was frozen under European agreements. The desire was to increase the accuracy and the distant of the ballistic missiles. The Shahab-3 can reach Israel and U.S forces at this date. The expansion of the distant will push the distant of the missile to Greece and Egypt. The incoming President states in the article that his has the right to enrich uranium to gas because it is use to make nuclear fuel for energy. On the other hand, the same gas can be used to create weapon grade fissile material. The New President of Iran states that Iran has no intentions of producing nuclear weapon material. 2 This is relevant to future argument to nuclear fuel cycle because the ability to delivery payload and great distances. The articles of regional customary laws consider the explosive part of the weapon different the delivery mechanism. It is stated in many regional treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty of Tlatelolco article 5, so it could be assumed the same standards could be set for Iran, under International law since other sovereigns follow this practice. In September-October of 2005 Iran was threatened by the IAEA to be referred to the UN Security Council for noncompliance with standards. Iran has been threatening to scale back the cooperation with the NPT and IAEA. On October 3, 2005 Iran stated they 1 “Iran’s Nuclear Program” http://www.iranwatch.org/wmd/wponac-nuclearhistory-0904.htm 2 ALI AKBAR DAREINI, “Iran vows to restart uranium reprocessing activities” Associated Press World stream July 27, 2005 3
  • 4. have the right to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle under the authority of Article IV of the NPT.3 Iran has stated to the International Community many times stated they are not promoters of terrorism but a victim. Their nuclear fuel cycle is for nuclear energy creation therefore peaceful purposes. The IAEA enforcement mechanism for non-compliance is a referral to the United Nations Security Council. The UN Charter would have right to take action deem necessary to keep the international peace. In an article Iran made a declaration that could be considered hostile towards America, and other nations. When they displayed Shahab-3 missiles in a public parade with signs that state “We will crush America under our feet''4 A recent article stating hostilities toward the United States. This brings up the question of self-defense for United States, that if Iran is pursuing to get the pieces of the nuclear weapon puzzle in different places. The Iranian argument is we are refining Uranium and doing research to make civilian nuclear fuel. The missile delivery systems are for conventional weapons slowly and quietly getting to a place so they have the components to assemble. The assembling of the weapon would not take much time or coordination. The practices set down in conventions allow countries to develop delivery system technology and nuclear and have nuclear energy. They are considered to separate items not related to each other in many articles of international law. Iran has stated that they would share nuclear technology with other Islamic like states5 this is also a relevant event because what if the Islamic state is not part of atomic energy 3 “ Secrecy lies fuels Nuclear Talks” October 3 2005 The Irish Times 4 La Guardia, Anton. “US reveals details of Iran’s nuclear ambition” The Daily Telegraph November 24, 2005 Thursday 5 “Xinhua World News summary” Xinhua General News Service September 16 2005 4
  • 5. regime monitoring practices or other binding document could promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons without proper monitoring. That practice of legitimate nations and the codified norm is to only trade with those apart of the NPT and the additional protocols. Iran would be with in International norms if the Islamic states are part of the International Atomic trade regime and meet the criterion. Iran’s Suppliers The importance of knowing the suppliers is to keep proper monitoring of materials that are laid out in the NSG part 1 and 2. Because it takes volumes of material to create nuclear fuel it takes volumes of material to create weapon grade fuel. If Iran suppliers are not under monitoring regimes then accounting of material can become difficult. The following information I received from Iran Watch located at www.iranwatch.org6 One of Iran suppliers for nuclear technology is the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) This Company mostly supplied reactors. Changgwang Sinyong Corporation is a company out of North Korea. The Japanese government has reservations and suspicion about this company has been known to deal in biological, nuclear and missile proliferation. 7 North Korea left the NPT January 10 2003 and stated that it was effective immediately. The NPT guidelines held them withdrawal until April 10, 2003.8 On March 24 2003“The Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of North Korea was sanctioned for transferring Category 1 items regulated 6 Iran Watch, “Suppliers List” http://www.iranwatch.org/suppliers/suppliers-list.asp 7 http://www.iranwatch.org/search/view_record.asp?sc=suppliers&id=10 8 Jean du Preez and William Potter “North Korea's Withdrawal From the NPT: A Reality Check” http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm#fnB5 5
  • 6. under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Pakistan,”9 Khan research labs are own by Abdul Qadir Khan. Abdul Qadir Khan is a know smuggler and thief of nuclear secrets that his has ring that modifies and sells nuclear secrets not under the guidance of the IAEA. Abdul Qadir Khan has a links to Iran because the British and Dutch centrifuge designs were stolen in the 1970’s and was modified by Abdul Q Khan. The centrifuge was found by the IAEA in Iran in the later part of the year of 2002. According to the India Tribune, “International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found traces of weapons grade Uranium at Iran's Natanz Nuclear Facility south of Teheran. During interrogation with the IAEA, Iranian officials gave detailed accounts of how they obtained sensitive equipment from Pakistan and other countries”10 the centrifuges that create the weapons grade uranium came from Abdul Khan. According to BBC news Abdul Khan is known to have the know how to produce and equip nuclear warheads to missiles. This incident shows the importance of the NPT and Additional Protocols plus the monitoring regimes. That Iran accepted a device and a technology design to make nuclear grade fuel. They were obligated by article II of the NPT to refuse any thing that was used directly or indirectly in the creation of nuclear explosive devises. Weapon grade uranium could be considered indirectly producing weapons, because it needs other components to explode the device to make it directly. The supplier list has relevance to the obligation to the Safe Guard aspect of the NPT and the other protocols of monitoring. Some suppliers had been intermediaries to other nations that actively seek nuclear weapons. There have been also reports that Iran 9 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/missilesanctions_may03.asp 10 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040126/nation.htm#5 Tribune India January 26 2004 6
  • 7. has sought deuterium gas from Russia. According to an intelligence report citing Russian sources that was circulated at the IAEA in July 2004, Iranian middlemen negotiated with companies in Russia to purchase deuterium gas after failing to produce it domestically. Deuterium gas is used, in conjunction with tritium, to boost the yield of fission bombs. Deuterium and tritium are hydrogen isotopes that release neutrons and energy when they fuse together in thermonuclear explosions. Article II of the NPT allow Iran to have deuterium because deuterium gas used with nuclear fuel cycle. According to NSG guidelines a country can only receive 200 Kg of Deuterium a year in total from all suppliers. As long Iran only accepts 200 Kg of Deuterium they are with in their rights according to international norms create by international atomic trade regimes. International Obligations Iran is apart of the following Treaties concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons and Atomic Monitoring regimes. Iran is part of the Partial Test Ban Treaty signatory August 8 1963, ratified May 5, 1964; Outer Space Treaty: Signatory January 27, 1967; Non Proliferation Treaty: signed July 1 1968, Ratified February 2 1970, safe guard agreement in May 15 1974; Sea Bed Treaty: signed February 11 1971, ratified August 26, 1971; BW Convention: signed April 10 1972, ratified August 1973 and The ENMOD convention: signed May 18 1977.11 In the GOV/2005/67 UN document stated that Iran has been complying with monitoring process of the Additional Protocols that they sign in November 10 2003, but still waiting for ratification. They have allowed three complementary accesses since September 2005. 11 Jozef Goldblat,” Arms Control Agreements, a handbook” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Preager Publishing New York 1983, p. 262-263 7
  • 8. Iran is a party to the IAEA which is the International Atomic Energy Agreement it is an institutional framework to help build consensus among nations about international atomic practices. The IAEA also promotes Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons. The regime consists of conventions dealing with arms control, to guideline for trading material for the nuclear energy cycle. The main objective of the IAEA is to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One of the major documents of the IAEA regime is the Non Proliferation Treaty that lays out guidelines for nuclear production a research and creates an obligation to not create nuclear explosives. The safe guard requirement of the NPT adds the monitoring process to the international regime to ensure compliance. The Nuclear Supplier Group is about accounting of nuclear material and technology across borders. With in the NSG there are other documents that specify standards and obligations. To be apart of the NSG regime a country must meet certain criterion Nuclear Supplier Group Requirements The Requirement of the Nuclear Supplier Group is as following: “Must be able to supply items plus items in transit covered in Parts 1 and 2 in the NSG guidelines, enforcement of a legal based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines full compliance of one of the following treaties, The NPT, Treaty Tlateloloc, Bangkok, or a treaty in the same standing and multitude. Support efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.”12 The spirit of the requirements to be part of the NSG is a commitment and active working against proliferation of weapons through accounting and domestic monitoring of nuclear production activities. 12 NSG Guidelines 8
  • 9. Another role of the Nuclear Supplier Group is to produce nuclear fuel for non- producing countries. The goal is the ability to keep an accounting of fuel the created. How the regime works the nuclear states creates the fuel then transport it to non-nuclear states facilities the non-nuclear uses the fuel when spent, the fuel is sent back the country of origin. This practice is to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and reduce proliferation and misuse of nuclear energy. The obstacle Iran is faced with is meeting the requirement of the NSG. That corporation is needed from Iran with the IAEA. In the past and present situation Iran has not been giving full transparency with the nuclear activities. The guidelines and the practices of the International community is not to create a collusion of nuclear energy but to keep track and accounting to make sure it does not fall in the rogue actors hands that would use it for weapons. To this day Iran is not a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group. Arguments Does Iran have the right nuclear energy? Iran has the right to have nuclear energy under article of NPT. In Article IV of the NPT treaty its states “…a country has the right to develop research, production and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with out discrimination as the country abides by Article I and Article II.”13 The vagueness of the develop research and production is not specified if it means machinery or fuel or does it assert all aspects of the nuclear energy creation. Iran has 13 Non Proliferation Treaty 9
  • 10. capabilities of mining their own uranium domestically because of the mining facilities at Saghad. Does not the right of sovereignty give Iran the right to exploit their own resources for the benefit of their citizens and nations. Iran has the right to do research in the pursuit of civilian or peaceful nuclear energy under Article IV as long there is a compliance with Article I and II. In Article I of the NPT states “…. a state cannot directly or indirectly create weapon materials.” To look at Articles I of the NPT it states a nuclear state cannot assist in helping a non-nuclear state to acquire weapons or develop them. Article II state a non-nuclear state is obligated to refuse transmission of nuclear weapons or the knowledge or material that is in the creation of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly. That if Iran has inalienable right to produce nuclear energy as long as Iran follows the Non Proliferation Treaty’s guidelines this could be consider a common practice in the international arena. The purpose of the NPT articles that I surmise is to diffuse the capability of an assembly coordination type of network between countries. Country “A” does one aspect creation of the nuclear cycle while Country “X” does another aspect of the nuclear weapon creation both countries ship to Country “Q” were Country “Q” assemble the nuclear weapon devise. I believe the articles are to diffuse this type of coordination to develop nuclear weapons, put the burden of responsibility and consequences on the supplier and receiver. The reporting of atomic related activities to the IAEA is a tool to diffuse the ability of coordinated covert development of weapons. If country “Q” decide to divert 1
  • 11. blame to another country “Y” and if Country “Y” has reported truthfully and allowed IAEA to inspect facilities the accounting is correct then responsibility falls on Country “Q”. The individual country’s reporting practice is to be followed up by the IAEA monitoring practiced to ensure creditability of the individual country’s reporting. This brings to mind the ability to domestically account and monitoring nuclear research activities in the domestic country. This is a requirement of being part of the Nuclear Supplier Group. If accounting and expert controls of atomic research is not done with in guidelines international norms. A rogue individual actor can steal or operate facilities that could be considered detrimental to international peace and the practice of promoting non- proliferation of nuclear weapons. The responsibility falls on the domestic state for the individual actor because of jurisdiction and control of territory, in essence the duty of sovereignty. This is to stop black market activities. The black market is reality has been documented by many countries intelligence agencies and reported in the news. Pakistan is reported to allow a free and unrestraint market approach of the development and distribution of nuclear technologies. In the article by Michael Hirsh and Sarah Schafer, names major dealers and that Pakistan is a major breeding ground for unmonitored activities. They name Abdul Qadir Khan a focus to an international black market of nuclear goods. His claim to fame is transferring technology to Iran and North Korea. The nuclear black market network Abdul Khan is part is a web from Switzerland to Japan.14 In another article focuses on middlemen or the brokers of the Black Market, because NSG would be consider the legitimate market in the international community. Mark Shapiro discusses Asher Karni in an article in Mother 14 Micheal Hirsh and Sarah Schafer” Black Market Nukes” Newsweek February 23, 2004. 1
  • 12. Jones, the article explains the process and network of Karni and the players and destinations. Karni was arrested in Denver Colorado for exporting with out a license. It shows Karni transnational journey for South Africa to Pakistan to the United States that coordination and misdirection was the method to sell item to actors to create nuclear technologies that might had lead to proliferation of weapon. Karni was linked to Abdul Khan and his black market nuclear weapon network.15 This expresses the need for international monitoring and accounting plus the importance of domestic monitoring a sovereign should know what goes on in their jurisdiction. If the sovereign is bound by international in is mandatory. The proper accounting of materials, facilities and experiment facilities to the proper boards domestically then to IAEA is a practice to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is part of the paper will be a review of “Islamic Republic of Iran NPT Safeguards Report” it was concluded that Iran had made attempt to create independent nuclear fuel cycle without notification with the Governing Board of the IAEA. This puts them into breaches of international practices and customary norm.16 The report cites unreported items: import of natural uranium and the transfer for further processing, the production of UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6. The report further to explain that full transparency was not given about laser experiments. Iran did not declare pilot enrichment programs at Kalaye Electric Company, laser enrichment plants Lashkar Ab’ad. They failed to report 15 Mark Shapiro “The Middlemen” Mother Jones May-June 2005 16 IAEA document GOV/2005/67 1
  • 13. inventory changes that were the results of imports transfer. Iran failed to keep a domestic record of nuclear material. The Governing board found plutonium solution in less amount than declared that this could be an indicator that Iran has been extracting plutonium, after they said they reported that they stop experimenting. The results of the report shows that Iran has not been keeping up with their domestic inventories or not following guidelines of reporting properly to the IAEA, and following the international norms of controlling nuclear material to prevent loss of inventory that might lead to proliferation. This shows that they are not meeting requirement to be considered to be apart of the Nuclear Supplier Group because of accounting and reporting purposes. Never the less, they are partaking in monitoring aspect of the IAEA which is a positive step towards achieving membership to the uranium fuel cycle according to international norms and customs. The Iranian counter argument is in Article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty that they have a right to research and develop new methods of the creating nuclear energy. Georges Le Guelte spent thirty-year veteran at the French atomic energy commission and four years as the IAEA states "Under the treaty the Iranians have the right to do what they are doing," But in Article I of the NPT that indirect or direct production of nuclear weapon grade fuel is enough to find a country in breach of the NPT. To reinforce this norm the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which affirms “that proliferation of nuclear, 1
  • 14. chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery*17 , constitute a threat to international peace and security.”18 But to argue on the right to nuclear fuel cycle Iran is not considered a part of the Nuclear Supplier Group, because of lack of compliance with IAEA monitoring process and criterion to meet acceptance into the NSG. Iran is a non-nuclear weapon state plus does not have the right to produce the nuclear fuel cycle according to the guideline set down in the articles of law and accepted practices. Iran must conform to International Norms become apart of the Nuclear Supplier Group regime before research and development of the Nuclear fuels enrichment could be consider legitimate in the international community. Article II of the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty to quote”..; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”19 Iran breached this article when accepting nuclear items for Abdul Q Khan now black market ringleader. Mr. Khan has the knowledge to convert delivery system and assemble missile with nuclear explosives. Since Iran lacks the competency of reporting and keeping inventory as found in the Board of Governors Report GOV/2005/67. This creates a suspicion that Iran could have been used in the proliferation and the creation of nuclear weapons indirectly. Does Iran have the right to produce atomic energy for peaceful purposes? According to the NPT, Yes Article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty they have the right 17 means of delivery: missiles , rockets and other unmanned systems capability of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons that are specially design for such use. 18 Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) 19 Non Proliferation Treaty Article II 1
  • 15. to Nuclear energy as long there is a compliance with Article I and II of the NPT. Dr Tertrais, a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, states that Iran can realize its right to nuclear energy without enriching fuel because nuclear fuel is available through supplier agreements. "The NPT is short and fuzzy," Tertrais says. "Nothing in it says 'right to fuel cycle'. Nothing in it says 'enrichment capability'." Dr. Tertrais is taking the regime approach of the articles of law since the norm is that states that are part of NPT and IAEA decide to allow the NSG members to become the supplier of the nuclear fuel for the reactors. The agreement is members state apart of these stipulated treaties have the right to access nuclear fuel from member states of the NSG with the requirement the nuclear fuel is sent back to the supplier. This could a monitoring and accounting process to ensure control of the nuclear fuel so it may not be used for proliferation of nuclear weapons. So the question does Iran have the right to nuclear energy for civilian use. The answer would be yes. The Iranian question is do they have the right the uranium fuel cycle that is what is being debated. According to NPT there is mixed interpretations. Iranian and some experts say yes for instance Georges Le Guelte spent 30 year veteran at the French atomic energy commission and four years as the IAEA states "Under the treaty, the Iranians have the right to do what they are doing," That the pursuit of the uranium enrichment fuel cycle is part of the production of nuclear energy. Therefore the assumption the production of the fuel is part of creation of energy. The counter argument is the current practice by the international community is they get their fuel from the member of NSG and comply strictly guidelines with the trigger list. Iran can break international norms and start producing the uranium fuel cycle on their own as they done. 1
  • 16. The international community could perceive it by breaking obligations to sign treaties. If Iran complies with monitoring and transparency of operations and meet the criterion to become apart of the NSG regime this is only way that an Iranian uranium fuel cycle could view by the international regime as legitimate. The current standing with in international law and customary norms Iran would be standing on the other side of the fence. The counter argument is a political one and does hold some weight in context of sovereignty. Is the major distinction between states in the treaties are non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapon state holds the responsibility to ensure no other states acquire the technology of nuclear weapons. This can be considered unfair for states that have nuclear weapons already and to deny nuclear weapons to states that do not have them. The conventions Iran has sign they have accepted these conditions of the treaties Iran have sign document that promotes the disarmament of existing nuclear stockpiles, plus there is a universal understanding nuclear weapons could and might lead to the extinction to the human race. This could be considered almost Jus Cogen. If Iran intention is just to create civilian nuclear energy then following reporting and inspection regimes should not be any concern to them if nuclear programs are not promoting the creation of nuclear weapons. Sure the IAEA and the existing treaties could be considered a gentlemen’s agreement among nations. The problem is when disputes of practices and customs between gentlemen usually end up in a duel. If Iran is enriching uranium for civilian energy use then the following international standards should not be a difficulty because it promotes good will among nations and the international peace. 1
  • 17. Does the international community have the right to recourse against Iran This paper already discussed Iranian behavior and look at the International law implications. This next section the paper will be applying other articles of international law to look at the behavior still is with in international customs and norms. The added article is Security Council Resolution 1540, “affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to peace”20 Then I will be applying the concept of self defense of other nations and looking at the measures if applicable to each Iranian event. Iran has stated they are pursuing to develop and refine the Shahab-3 missile. According to the Security Council Resolution a delivery system is “ Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear , chemical or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use. The Shahab-3 is a convention weapon that can carry a payload up to 750 kg. Shahab-3 is based of Russian and North Korean design. The question can it be used to deliver biological, nuclear, or chemical payloads. Even if it could the right to self defense must be” leaving no moment for deliberation.” I take this meaning even the process of creation of the weapons gives time for communication and to diffuse the situation. The case when Israel bomb the Iraqi nuclear facilities the U.N Security council did view as self defense they drew customary norm from “The Caroline” the necessity of that self defense is instant, overwhelming and 20 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, preamble 1
  • 18. leaving no choice of means, and no moment fro deliberation” . That collected action of self-defense would not be allowed just because Iran is not following international norms. The Security Council strength to the inspection regime and gave it more teeth with the statement, Recognizing most state have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties which they are a partied to…in the preventing the proliferation of nuclear, …, taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, …..recommended by the code of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive sources. This is international norms are considered enforceable by force. “Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security”21 This put pressure on the domestic states to begin monitoring processes in there territory, because threat to international peace in the UN Charter in article 39 can trigger the security council to make a decision to what measures to be taken to restore international peace or remove the threat. The consequences could be the ones described in article 41 and 42 in the United Nations Charter. This allows the international community to take action to prevent proliferation by a non-state actor if the domestic country does not have capabilities or is not willing to address the trafficking of WMD’s. In Iran’s case there monitoring practices have been not up to perfect there action could perceived a breach of Article II of the NPT because of the acceptance of the centrifuge that refines uranium to nuclear weapon grade. Does this act threaten 21 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) 1
  • 19. international peace. Yes the proliferation of nuclear stated in the Security Council resolution clearly state proliferation constitute a threat to international peace. Since there is a threat to international peace in article 39 in the UN Charter states the security council can make a recommendation to take measures to restore international peace that are stated in articles 41 and 42 in the UN Charter. Iran’s behavior of accepting items as non- weapons state that manufactures directly or indirectly is a breach of NPT plus the making of nuclear grade uranium could be consider proliferation, and in article II Iran does not have the right to create nuclear grade fuel with in accordance to the treaty. Because of the determination of the self-defense clause state with out deliberation, the UN can put other measures short of arm conflict to curve Iranian behavior. Since there is an open dialogue the dispute can be resolved in a peaceful manner. Conclusion Some critics of the IAEA and the Non Proliferation Regime with the Atomic Energy Trade Regime the treaties have no teeth to enforce. Since the IAEA is branch of the United Nation the purpose of these treaties are to promote the peace. The preamble in most treaties relay the message the world is facing destruction if we as do not stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA and the nuclear treaty regimes are going into the right direction in creating coordination and communication and transparency. The question of Iran right to civilian to nuclear civilian energy is clear they do have the right to nuclear energy. They also have the right uranium enrichment and development as 1
  • 20. long as they follow the guideline and practices set down by the international community. The goal of any international institution is to promote communication and transparency so actions and intention would not be misread. In the instance of atomic energy since it is tied to nuclear weapon creation. If the intention is for nuclear energy creation then international cooperation and transparency is not an obstacle. The IAEA shares information about technology ensuring that reactors are safe and not a threat to the environment and therefore humans. Since the UN Security Council resolution 1540 gives enforcement powers to the IAEA recommendation and protocols making them a practice in the international community. Iran should take their claim to the right uranium fuel cycle to the International Court of Justice to get their interpretation of Article of IV ,II and I of the Non- Proliferation Treaty, to discern if Iran has the right to enrich uranium. I could not find any international treaty documents stating a country does not have the right to civilian nuclear energy. I did find document banning and working against proliferation of nuclear explosive devices and other weapons of mass destruction. The treaties do asked non- nuclear weapons states do not seek the uranium enrichment cycle. If one sovereign nation has the ability then it is only the right that all countries have the ability to enrich uranium to nuclear fuel. The international community did create standards for the uranium enrichment. Iran must meet international criterion before the can start uranium enrichment because of the treaties they are bound too. This does mean they do have the right to refine but there is practice in place. Since they agree to follow international customs and norms they must meet the standards to have the right to enrich uranium. These standards are stated in the Nuclear Supplier Group convention. 2
  • 21. After thought For my own learning experience, I have found the IAEA and the treaties create the most freedom for each state but allows for maintaining the international order. Sovereignty is not infringe by any nation, but promotes peaceful coexist in the international system. The domestic law in maintaining security when it comes to nuclear energy is actually in the forefront of cause against proliferation. It is when the state fails in this job the international community must step act with some force. The system is a primitive system of enforcement but the system is dealing with sovereign nations. 2
  • 22. Bibliography 1. UN Charter 2. UN Security Resolution 1540 3. Non Proliferation Treaty 4. Treaty of Tlateloloc 5. Nuclear Suppler Guide 6. Trigger List 7. Damorosch, Henkin,” International Law fourth Edition” West Group St Paul 2001 8. “Iran’s Nuclear Program” http://www.iranwatch.org/wmd/wponac-nuclearhistory- 0904.htm 9.Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran vows to restart uranium reprocessing activities” Associated Press World stream July 27, 2005 10.“ Secrecy lies fuels Nuclear Talks” October 3 2005 The Irish Times 11. La Guardia, Anton. “US reveals details of Iran’s nuclear ambition” The Daily Telegraph November 24, 2005 Thursday 12Mark Shapiro “The Middlemen” Mother Jones May-June 2005 13. IAEA document GOV/2005/67 14.Micheal Hirsh and Sarah Schafer “Black Market Nukes” Newsweek February 23, 2004 15. Jozef Goldblat,” Arms Control Agreements, a handbook” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Preager Publishing New York 1983, 2