WEEK 7 Nuclear Weapons and ThreatsLessonWelcome to .docx

WEEK 7: Nuclear Weapons and Threats
Lesson
Welcome to Week 7 of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and nuclear Threats to the Homeland course!
To put things in perspective so far for this term, “Over 11,500
terrorist attacks occurred in 72 countries in 2010, resulting in
approximately 50,000 victims, including almost 13,200 deaths.
Although the number of attacks rose by almost 5 percent over
the previous year, the number of deaths declined for a third
consecutive year, dropping 12 percent from 2009” (The
American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise 2012). How many of
you would have guessed that deaths directly related to terrorism
would be declining?
Now let's dive into this week topic -- Nuclear Weapons and
Materials Hazards
Is it possible for terrorist organization to develop and employ a
suitcase nuclear weapon? Have they are done so? This week we
will delve deep into the technical understanding of these
weapons, materials, and associated hazards.
In his article titled, How Many and Where Were the
Nukes?What the U.S. Government No Longer Wants You to
Knowabout Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War, Burr (2006)
discloses that, “Declassification decisions on U.S. nuclear

weapons information by federal agencies have taken a
surprising turn. Security reviewers are treating as ‘classified’
information that has been available in the public record for
decades.” He goes on later to say, “excessive secrecy continues
to abound in another category of historical nuclear information:
the overseas deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons during the
Cold War. Information on the deployments that has been
publicly available for many years is also being classified by
U.S. government agencies” (Burr 2006). This certainly makes
us wonder why, because this information was once publicly
available.
In the 20th and 21st Century, nuclear weapons are undoubtedly
the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons
ended WWII, and were the primary threat of the Cold War. One
to four kilograms of plutonium – that’s all scientists in the
Department of Energy estimate is needed to make a small
nuclear weapon. They say that the average head weighs eight
pounds (FAS n.d.). That’s a weight that a head and four
kilograms of plutonium have in common. The explosion that
destroyed Nagasaki weighed in at a “hefty” 6.2 kilograms (FAS
n.d.). How much money would it take a terrorist organization to
build its own nuclear weapon? That answer is not easily
determined for several reasons. Black markets drive the price of
such a “hot” commodity even higher than it would be in the
mainstream market where official researchers and scientists
purchase their materials. On the other hand, desperation to
acquire materials at any cost is much higher, so “deals” and
trades are more common for terrorists who are looking to
purchase nuclear materials needed. No matter what one thing is
for sure – the price is not low. This poses a problem for
terrorists; even though many larger organizations, like al-
Qaeda, are well-funded, the price of building a “stable” nuclear
bomb may be too high for them. In this case, dirty bombs have
been created as a substitute to a pure nuclear bomb because the
cost and risk of acquiring materials for a pure device are

exceptionally high.
Though on a much larger scale, the United States spent
approximately $409 billion “developing, testing, and building
the actual bombs and warheads” from 1940-1996 (NTI 2007).
This is, obviously, not indicative of how much a terrorist
organization or country would have to spend on a nuclear bomb.
It does gives an idea of how much research and development
has gone into creating these weapons in the most pristine
environments throughout the years. At the estimated needed
weigh of plutonium, the cost of that material, alone, would cost
anywhere from four to 16 million. This is no small investment
for any organization, so the likelihood of any of them having
the capabilities to do so are lower than, say, a country. Given
that much of the research and development to create a bomb has
been conducted since the early 1940’s, those particular costs
can be kept down by reusing pre-existing plans.
There are other issues to consider other than acquiring
materials, however. Finding a location secure enough to develop
a bomb without detection and recruiting scientists willing to
participate in their creation also pose severe problems to the
process. Some of the materials like plutonium and uranium give
off very specific signatures; even though they make be slight,
the possibility of getting caught moving them is, indeed, a
factor. These issues are just a scratch in the surface of details
that must be considered when creating a nuclear weapon of mass
destruction. While terrorist organizations can use meticulous
planning techniques, the atomic bomb possess a much larger
challenge than, probably, ANY other of type of weapon. It’s not
an impossible task, but it’s highly improbable.

Kim-Jong Il was the leader of North Korea recognized for his
nuclear ambitions. He was preceded by his father, Kim-Il
Song, and was recently succeeded by his son, Kim-Jung Un
after his untimely death. For the past two decades the United
States has been in a “battle” to secure North Korea’s nuclear
technology. For this week’s discussion I wanted to focus on this
country because of the possible detrimental effects this could
have on the entire world – they certainly have been in the news
lately! We all know the stories and images that come out of the
North, we’ve seen the stories, we’ve heard about the Korean
conflict, and we also know about Kim Jong-Il -- his rhetoric,
downright hatred of western society and his dictatorship. Today,
North Korea possesses the 5th largest Army in the world,
with over one million soldiers and another one to two million
able to be deployed at any time. Nuclear technology in the
hands of an evil dictator with three million people at his
command can be a major ingredient in a recipe for World War
III. According to GlobalSecurity.org, North Korea has two
reasons for obtain nuclear weapons: 1.) They want to make them
and then give them up to the United States in an effort to
maintain peace and increase foreign diplomacy and 2.) they are
trying to build up a nuclear arsenal in anticipation (Global
Security 2005). Anticipation of what? We just don’t know –
and still don’t know even with all of the latest actions of testing
missiles.
North Korea has had ties with terrorism in the past, and even
was linked to a bombing of a Korean Airlines flight that killed
everyone on board in 1987. More recently, they attacked and
sunk a South Korean ship and then shelling an island, killing a
total of 50 people, including two civilians (New York Times
2010). In response South Korea and the United States, (as
allies) prepared for joint military drills. These drills have
intimidated North Korea, which considers the drills as a
rehearsal for invasion. In response, North Korea threatened to
enlarge its nuclear arsenal and "mercilessly" attack both

countries (New York Times 2010). In addition to the terrorist
activity we see here, North Korea also has strong alliances with
known terrorists in the Middle East.
The capabilities of North Korea’s nuclear program are mostly
unknown or classified. North Koreas first nuclear plant was
built in 1987 (New York Times 2010). From that reactor
(capacity of five megawatts) it is capable of producing enough
uranium fuel for the creation of one nuclear bomb each year
(Associated Press 2011). There are also two or three more
plants under construction, temporarily halted due to the 1994
Agreed Framework (Associated Press 2011). Signed on October
21, 1994, this agreement halted the nuclear weapons program in
North Korea, and encouraged nuclear material as an energy
source instead. The goal of the treaty was to strengthen
diplomacy between the United States and North Korea. In 2003,
under President Bush, all talks with North Korea fell through
when Kim Jong-Il announced they had nuclear weapons and
refused to halt its program. With those plants built- the
potential capability of producing increases to 30 nuclear
weapons a year (Sharma 2008). North Korea has also quickly
and secretly built a new uranium enrichment plant that could
contain up to 2,000 centrifuges, this according to U.S. nuclear
scientist Siegfried Hecker of Stanford University, who said he
was "stunned" by the sophistication of the facility, located near
North Korea's nuclear facilities based at Yongbyon (Global
Security 2005). The technology for a more sophisticated nuclear
plant was bought from Pakistan in the sometime in the late
1990s (Global Security 2005). It has been noted that North
Korea’s reactors are not being used as power plants because
satellite imagery shows that there are no electric power lines
coming from these facilities. Roughly three thousand scientists
are working on the country’s nuclear research and development
projects, but experts say it is hard to estimate the rate at which
these programs are developing (Associated Press 2011).

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) speculated that North
Korea produced sufficient plutonium for eight bombs, and
expended one of these bombs in a test in Pakistan in 1998
(Global Security 2005). As of 2005, their plutonium bomb
inventory would exist of seven weapons. Taking the mid-point
of the DIA's estimate of between four and eight uranium bombs,
the plausible uranium bomb stockpile as of early 2005 would be
six weapons, increasing at a rate of one bomb every two
months. Thus, the early 2005 stockpile would be 13 weapons,
growing to about 20 weapons by the end of the year (Global
Security 2005). Other evidence that supports that North Korea
is in possession of nuclear weapons is that they have tested
them. In 2006 and in 2009, North Korea tested nuclear weapons,
the first test was thought to be around one kiloton and the
second test though successful the actual yield of the weapon is
still debated. The weapon went off underground triggering
seismic activity, registered as a 4.7 on the Richter scale
(Sharma 2008).
This all relates to instability in the area. As of today President
Obama is working with China, Russia, and Japan to pressure the
North to give up their nuclear program. The greater threat to the
western way of life is the ability of Kim Jong-Il to sell a
weapon to the highest bidder- including members of Al Qaeda
or Hezbollah, and Hamas. North Korea has already been known
for selling other weapons and technologies to these
organizations, which only increases the threat. All it would take
is a softball sized mass of enriched material to create havoc
among a populous- either in the form of a dirty bomb, or worse,
a nuclear bomb.
References:
Associated Press. 2011. North Korea threatens to Attack South

Korea
[Article]. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/02/26/north-
korea-threatens-south-korea/
Burr, William. 2006. How Many and Where Were the
Nukes? What the U.S. Government No Longer Wants You to
Know about Nuclear Weapons During the Cold
War.http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/inde
x.htm
FAS n.d. Nuclearn Weapon
Design. http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm
Global Security. 2005. Nuclear Weapons Program [Article].
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm
NTI. 2007. The Costs of U.S. Nuclear
Weapons. http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_atomic_audit.html
The New York Times. 2010, December 14. North Korea's
Nuclear Program
[Article]. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/coun
triesandterritories/northkorea/nuclear_program/index.html
The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (2010). Incidents
of Terrorism —
2010. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/ter
rorstats2010.html
Sharma, V. 2008, June 28. State Sponsors: North
Korea. http://www.cfr.org/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/state-
sponsors-north-korea/p9364

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The Nonproliferation Review
ISSN: 1073-6700 (Print) 1746-1766 (Online) Journal homepage:
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Legal aspects of weapons of mass destruction
elimination contingencies
Robert A. Friedman
To cite this article: Robert A. Friedman (2016) Legal aspects of
weapons of mass
destruction elimination contingencies, The Nonproliferation
Review, 23:1-2, 61-82, DOI:
10.1080/10736700.2016.1187370
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Legal aspects of weapons of mass destruction elimination
contingencies
Robert A. Friedman
ABSTRACT
A state seeking to participate in a mission to eliminate weapons
of
mass destruction (WMD) in another state must ensure
compliance
with relevant domestic and international laws. This article
explores
the legal aspects of WMD elimination contingencies, which
could
take place either in the absence of a United Nations Security
Council resolution or within such a context. The author focuses,
in

large part, on chemical weapons elimination, such as the recent
endeavor in Syria, which presented the most complicated and
novel legal issues associated with WMD elimination in the
recent
past. The article concludes by offering lessons to be considered
in
planning future WMD elimination missions.
KEYWORDS
chemical weapons; Syria;
Chemical Weapons
Convention; weapons of
mass destruction;
disarmament; international
law
This article explores the legal aspects of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) elimination
contingencies. It is important to present several framing
concepts and caveats related to
the scope of the article and WMD elimination at the outset.
First, this article is restricted
to WMD elimination contingencies in other states. Thus, for
example, the legal issues
associated with elimination of the United States’s declared
chemical weapons (CW) stock-
pile in accordance with its treaty obligations under the
Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) fall outside the scope of this article.1 This article only
explores the legal issues
that might arise when one state is involved in WMD elimination
efforts in another state.
Second, with the exception of the legal issues associated with
several past WMD elimin-
ation operations specifically discussed below, including the

detailed contours of the Syrian
CW elimination operation, the remaining legal aspects are
addressed in the context of
WMD “contingencies” (i.e., hypothetical operations that may
occur prospectively).
Third, given the diverse and varied permutations of prospective
WMD elimination
operations, it is impossible to set forth a comprehensive survey
of all potential legal
issues that might arise. Because the legal considerations in any
given case will be highly
fact-specific and likely to involve a patchwork of international
and domestic laws that
may be different depending on the contours of the elimination
operation and the specific
states involved, this article is illustrative and not exhaustive. It
highlights several of the
main treaty provisions that are likely to be implicated in a
WMD elimination contingency,
but there may be other relevant treaty-based considerations.
Similarly, several relevant
international laws are briefly mentioned, but decision makers
studying the feasibility of
© 2016 Middlebury Institute of International Studies at
Monterey, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
CONTACT Robert A. Friedman [email protected]
NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, 2016
VOL. 23, NOS. 1–2, 61–82
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1187370
mailto:[email protected]
http://www.nonproliferation.org/
http://www.tandfonline.com

a future WMD contingency would be well served in reviewing
the broader legal landscape
based on the operative facts at the time to: (1) ensure that no
additional, relevant laws are
implicated; and (2) identify implications, if any, of the laws that
are discussed below.
Fourth, this article gives unequal treatment to the different
categories of WMD.2
Although the concept of WMD has evolved over time and is
subject to different definitions
and interpretations, the article follows the definition proposed
by the 1948 United Nations
Commission for Conventional Armaments that considered WMD
to include
atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal
chemical and BW, and any
weapons developed in the future which have characteristics
comparable in destructive
effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned
above.3
Although the generally accepted definition expressly references
four discrete WMD com-
ponents, this article focuses primarily—though not
exclusively—on CW. Where appli-
cable, references to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
will also be considered.
The reason for the primary focus on the CWC is because the
international community

has significant experience operationalizing CW elimination
efforts in the last five years
and, as a consequence, such efforts impart helpful legal lessons
for future elimination mis-
sions. Indeed, because of the nature of the Syria CW
elimination effort, the operational
details were intricately connected to the requisite legal
framework. Additionally, the
complex design and detailed provisions of the CWC, coupled
with the past practice of
the convention’s implementing body—features lacking in the
BWC—create a number
of interesting legal elements that should be examined in the
context of a prospective elim-
ination operation.
Fifth, as an organizational model, this article borrows and
modifies a concept presented
during the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
workshop on “Elimination
of Weapons of Mass Destruction—Lessons Learned,” held
November 9-10, 2015, in
Washington, DC. For the purposes of the workshop and the
broader project, the universe
of potential WMD elimination contingencies was defined, in
part, as varying across two
categories: (1) how the elimination decision was reached
(imposed, coerced, or
induced/voluntary); and (2) how the elimination was carried out
(externally, coopera-
tively, or internally). For this article, some of the workshop
concepts are recast and
others are married to present WMD elimination contingencies
based on: (1) whether
the elimination operation was conducted in the absence of a UN
Security Council resol-

ution (UNSCR) or pursuant to one; and (2) whether the
elimination operation was con-
ducted inside the territory of the possessor state or external to
it. This organization is
better suited to discuss the relevant legal issues because of the
legal effect that an
UNSCR can have, depending on the context, and the nature of
several provisions of the
operative international treaties involved.
To illustrate: any participation by the United States in WMD
elimination missions
would need to comply with international and domestic law.
Relevant international
laws range from UNSCRs to provisions of international
disarmament treaties such as
the CWC. On one hand, in an ordinary setting, any CW
elimination operation—in
the absence of a UNSCR—would need to comply with the CWC.
CW elimination oper-
ations that occur outside possessor states may pose challenges
related to key provisions
of the CWC (outlined below) that are not as pronounced in
elimination operations that
62 R.A. FRIEDMAN
occur inside possessor states. On the other hand, a CW
elimination operation conducted
pursuant to a UNSCR could impose new or different
international legal obligations than
those contained in disarmament treaties, or authorize a new or
different course of action.
Dividing the article in this way helps explain how the

operational details of a WMD con-
tingency can change depending on the international legal
framework involved.
Furthermore, each participating state would need to scrutinize
its domestic legal fra-
mework to ensure its involvement in a WMD elimination
mission was consistent with its
national laws and regulations. The potentially applicable
domestic laws in the United
States for any particular WMD elimination operation are diverse
and varied, and
attempting to catalogue all, or even most, of the laws that might
be implicated is
beyond the scope of this article. Accordingly, this article briefly
summarizes some of
the most prominent domestic laws relevant to WMD elimination
operations, including
relevant funding authorities that have facilitated past US
activities. It also highlights, in
particular, several national laws that were considered in the
context of the Syria CW
elimination operation.
Sixth, although legal issues will be presented broadly along the
lines set forth above, the
greatest portion of the discussion will illustrate the author’s
points using the CW elimin-
ation operation in Syria. The Syria situation presented the most
complicated and novel
legal issues associated with WMD elimination in the recent past
and provides important
lessons that should be considered in future WMD contingencies.
Finally, the article concludes by offering lessons learned.

WMD elimination in the absence of a UN Security Council
resolution
This section discusses legal issues associated with a WMD
elimination contingency con-
ducted in the absence of a UNSCR. Wherein a UNSCR confers
new or different inter-
national legal obligations or authorizes a new or different
course of action, states must
participate in a manner that is otherwise consistent with that
state’s international legal
obligations, including treaty obligations.
Accordingly, the primary focus in this section is on the key
treaty-based provisions
potentially applicable in the event of a WMD elimination
contingency. If certain legal con-
siderations are only relevant in the context of a WMD
elimination contingency outside the
possessor state, this information is noted and explained.
Although the section is largely
drafted through the lens of the CWC, where applicable,
analogous considerations in the
biological and nuclear contexts are noted as well.4 The section
also highlights several his-
torical examples of WMD elimination operations under the
auspices of the CWC that
illustrate how the treaty’s provisions operate in practice.
Finally, the section summarizes
several additional international laws that may be applicable and
that should be taken
into account in future CW elimination operations.
The Chemical Weapons Convention
There are several significant treaty-based legal prohibitions that

affect a WMD elimination
contingency outside a possessor state. Of these, the CWC’s
categorical transfer restriction
is perhaps paramount.
NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 63
Transfer prohibitions
A state party to the CWC has an obligation not to “develop,
produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile, or retain CW, or transfer, directly or indirectly, CW
to anyone.”5 This prohibition
introduces a key legal constraint regarding an external CW
elimination operation. In
short: the external removal and destruction of CW cannot entail
“transferring” CW to
another state party, nor entail another state party “acquiring”
CW. The contours of the
“transfer” prohibition is critical to the feasibility of an external
elimination contingency.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets
forth the general rules
of treaty interpretation, including that a treaty “shall be
interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”6 The CWC’s
categorical prohibition
on “transfering, directly or indirectly, CW to anyone,” is
without exception or qualifica-
tion. Thus, the plain language of the convention does not
distinguish between “bad” trans-
fers (e.g., for purposes of proliferation) and “good” transfers

(e.g., transfers for purposes of
destruction or elimination).
Importantly, the CWC’s travaux préparatoires—official
documents recording the nego-
tiations of the treaty— provide supporting evidence that some
state parties, including the
United States and Germany, sought to include “permitted
transfers” as exceptions to the
categorical transfer prohibition of CW.7 Such a carve-out could
have facilitated external
CW elimination contingencies. Indeed, in a February 24, 1984,
working paper,
Germany noted that the final agreement should include “an
exception to the transfer
ban permitting the transfer of CW between States parties by
mutual agreement for pur-
poses of elimination.”8 Such an exception is “useful since it
allows a State Party to have
its CW destroyed in the destruction facility of another party,
thereby avoiding the
costly construction of its own facility.”9 Accordingly, Germany
sought to include the fol-
lowing provision in the rolling text of the CWC: “By mutual
agreement, CW may be trans-
ferred between parties for the sole purpose of the destruction of
such weapons.”10
Similarly, the draft CWC text submitted by the United States on
April 18, 1984, con-
tains a section on “Permitted Activities” proposing that “A
Party in a position to do so
may assist another Party in destruction of CW, including
shipment of CW to its territory
for the purpose of destroying them, or in destruction of CW
facilities.”11 The CWC’s

travaux préparatoires can be used to confirm the meaning
resulting from application of
Article 31. Here, the plain text of the treaty expressing a
categorical prohibition on the
transfer of CW is supported by reference to certain materials in
the CWC’s travaux pré-
paratoires confirming that transfers for purposes of destruction
was considered and not
accepted into the CWC’s rolling treaty text, and as such, are
prohibited.
It is also notable that other arms-control agreements contain
express exceptions on the
prohibitions of transfers for the purposes of destruction. For
example, in Article I of the
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, each state party
undertakes “never under any cir-
cumstances to: (a) use cluster munitions; (b) develop, produce,
otherwise acquire, stock-
pile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster
munitions … .”12 This
general prohibition closely tracks the general prohibition
contained in the CWC for
banned items. However, Article III(7) notes that
“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of
Article I of this Convention, the transfer of cluster munitions to
another State Party for
the purpose of destruction […] is permitted” (emphasis added).
The 1999 Convention on
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel
64 R.A. FRIEDMAN

Mines and on Their Destruction similarly allows that the
“transfer of anti-personnel mines
for the purpose of destruction is permitted.”13 As in the CWC,
the BWC establishes
binding legal obligations on state parties banning the misuse of
biological materials as
weapons and categorically prohibiting the transfer of biological
weapons (BW).14 Articles
I and II of the NPT, respectively, also prohibit the transfer and
receipt of transfer “whatso-
ever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”15 In sum,
an important legal con-
sideration in the context of an external elimination contingency
would require an analysis
of the degree of possessor state control of its CW throughout
the course of the operation to
avoid a situation that might entail transfer of CW to another
state party. This would be the
case even if such a transfer were supported by legitimate
nonproliferation concerns or
otherwise conducted for the sole purpose of elimination.
Even if a CW elimination operation were conducted wholly
within the territory of the
possessor state, potential CW transfer concerns would not be
completely moot, though
such concerns would probably be less pronounced. The logistics
required for an internal
elimination effort would probably be less complex, reliance on
support from the inter-
national community would probably be less significant, and it
might be easier for the pos-
sessor state to credibly maintain possession and control of its
CW stocks.

A similar legal analysis for WMD elimination contingencies
would apply under
the BWC. Participation by other states would require a close
analysis of the degree of
possessor-state control of its WMD throughout the course of the
elimination operation
to avoid a situation that might entail the transfer of such control
of the possessor state’s
WMD to another state.
Possessor state’s destruction obligation
In addition to the CW transfer prohibition, a CWC state party
also has an obligation to
“destroy CW it owns or possesses, or that are located in any
place under its jurisdiction
or control, in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention” (emphasis added).16
It should be noted that the role of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) during the elimination process of CW is only
to verify the destruction
of declared CW. The state is responsible for the elimination of
the CW stockpile and to
ensure that no “transfer” takes place. The destruction obligation
introduces two potential
legal issues in the context of an external elimination operation.
First, an external elimination scenario might entail another state
party’s direct involve-
ment in removing a possessor state’s CW stockpile. Direct
involvement might result in a
participating state party’s taking “control” or “possession”
within the meaning of the
CWC. Any action that resulted in that state party’s having

ownership, possession, jurisdic-
tion, or control over CW would result in that state party’s
having a further treaty obligation
to destroy the CW in accordance with the destruction
requirements of the CWC. Thus, state
parties’ direct involvement in an external elimination scenario,
in the absence of an UNSCR,
would need to stop short of taking “control” or “possession” of
the CW (because such action
is prohibited by the Article I transfer prohibition discussed
above), but also because it would
result in the CWC destruction obligation’s shifting to that state
party.
Second, Article I(2) of the CWC raises an interesting question
regarding movement of
CW. The CWC clearly prohibits “transfers” of CW as discussed
above, but does not
expressly proscribe “movement” of CW, including across a
border from the jurisdiction
of one state party to the jurisdiction of a second state party. The
concept of “jurisdiction” is
referenced in Article I(2) only with respect to describe the
scope and extent of the possessor
state’s destruction obligation. It does not address the location of
the destruction itself, or
whether the possessor state can fulfill its destruction obligation
on the territory of another
state party. Therefore, the CWC is silent on the movement of
CW from one state party’s
territory to another’s.

There are separate provisions of the CWC and its Verification
Annex that suggest that
CW would normally be expected to be destroyed within the
territory of the possessor
state, or in a place under its jurisdiction or control. For
example, Article IV(4) states
that each state party shall provide access to CW specified in
paragraph 1 for the
purpose of systematic verification of the declaration through
on-site inspection.17
Although nothing in the CWC text necessarily requires
destruction within the territory
of the possessor state, or in a place under its jurisdiction or
control, it is reasonable to
conclude that if the possessor state has an obligation to provide
access to its CW and CW
destruction facility for an on-site inspection, then it ought to
have the sovereign means
to assure such access. If the CW or the destruction facility were
located in the sovereign
jurisdiction of another state party, it would be difficult for the
possessor state to assure
that these obligations were observed.
On the other hand, in the “principles and methods for
destruction of CW” contained in
the CWC Verification Annex, each state party “shall determine
how it shall destroy CW,
except that the following processes may not be used: dumping
in any body of water, land
burial, or open-pit burning. [Each State Party] shall destroy CW
only at specifically desig-
nated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities.”18
Because each state party has a

degree of discretion on how to destroy its CW—assuming such
destruction does not entail
one of the methods that is expressly prohibited—it is reasonable
to conclude that this dis-
cretion could entail external transport for elimination.
In sum, although there are a number of provisions in the CWC
that assume CW
destruction would normally be performed within the territory of
the possessor state,
there does not appear to be a categorical prohibition on moving
CW into the territory
of another state party for purposes of destruction. Finally, as
will be discussed in
greater detail below, there is OPCW precedent for a possessor
state party’s moving its
CW externally for elimination.
The BWC contains substantially similar possessor-state
destruction obligations.
Indeed, under Article II of the BWC, each state party
“undertakes to destroy, or to
divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later
than nine months after
entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment and means
of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in
its possession or under
its jurisdiction or control.” Conversely, it is important to note
that, unlike the CWC,
the BWC lacks similar detailed provisions regarding initial
possessor-state declarations,
procedures for destroying BW, and systemic verification
thereof.
The legal obligations under the NPT are structured differently.

Article VI requires state
parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.” But
the NPT’s regime is inherently binary: it legitimizes the
situation existing at the time
the treaty entered into force—with five nuclear-weapon states.
All the remaining states
66 R.A. FRIEDMAN
are precluded from developing, manufacturing, or otherwise
acquiring nuclear weapons.
In return, non-nuclear-weapon states benefit from assistance
and cooperation in the
peaceful applications of nuclear energy on a non-discriminatory
basis and under inter-
national procedures.
Prohibition of assistance, encouragement, or inducement
A state party also has an obligation not to “assist, encourage or
induce, in any way, anyone to
engage inactivity prohibited toa StateParty underthis
Convention.”19 The obligationnotto
“assist, encourage, or induce” might constitute a violation of
the CWC if, for example, a state
party provided financial or material support to another state
party in removing (or receiving
the transfer of) possessor state’s CW, particularly in the
absence of a clear destruction

plan.20 Similarly, under Article 3 of the BWC, each state party
“undertakes not … in any
way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or
international organizations
to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment or
means of delivery specified in Article I of this Convention.”21
Importantly, however, assuming that the CW elimination
contingency itself—whether
inside or outside the possessor state party—was consistent with
the possessor state party’s
obligations under the CWC, providing material or financial
support in furtherance of such
a CW removal or destruction operation would not appear to
raise additional concerns
under the convention. As discussed below, assistance of this
nature was provided when
the United States assisted Albania in destroying its declared CW
stockpile.
Powers of the OPCW’s Executive Council
As the implementation body of the CWC, the OPCW consists of
a Conference of the States
Parties (composed of all state parties to the treaty), an
Executive Council (EC) (composed
of forty-one member states), and a Technical Secretariat (the
professional staff, headed by
a director-general).
The OPCW’s EC plays an important role in the review and
approval of a possessor
state’s plans for the destruction of its CW. The EC is vested, by
paragraph 20 of Part
IV(A) of the Verification Annex, with the authority to review
the general plans for destruc-

tion of CW (submitted pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1(a)(v)
and in accordance with
paragraph 6) and to assess their conformity with the order of
destruction.22 Thus, the EC’s
role in reviewing the possessor state’s destruction plans means
the body would serve an
integral function in approving a CW elimination contingency,
whether the contingency
occurred inside or outside the possessor state.
The BWC does not have a treaty implementation body akin to
the OPCW’s Technical
Secretariat. The BWC Implementation Support Unit, based in
Geneva at the UN Office
of Disarmament Affairs, provides only administrative support
and assistance to BWC
parties. The conference of state parties, which meets every five
years, is the only body
established by the convention, and the treaty has no verification
provisions, other
than allowing states to request a UN investigation of activities
they consider suspicious
in other states.23 As a consequence, unlike the EC’s role in the
CWC to review and
approve plans of destruction, there is no similar central treaty
body function under
the BWC to review and approve plans of destruction, even in
the event of a state’s
declaring a BW program.
Relevant OPCW historical examples of WMD elimination

Since the entry-into-force of the CWC in 1997, there have been
several cases where CW
have been removed from the territory of the possessor state for
destruction and several
cases where the international community participated in
assisting possessor states with
in-country destruction operations. Two cases involved de
minimis amounts of “old chemi-
cal weapons”—produced before 1925—in hazardous material
condition.24 Two other
examples are offered to illustrate how assistance was provided
from non- possessor
states in CW elimination operations that took place inside
possessor states. These cases
are worth reviewing because they offer helpful guideposts for
how the international com-
munity might approach a future CW elimination contingency
under the CWC.
Importantly, as noted above, the BWC does not require state
parties to declare BW or
facilities, and no states have admitted to possessing such
weapons when ratifying the
treaty or acceding to it, though a number of states have had or
are suspected of
having had BW programs.25
Removal of old chemical weapons from Austria to Germany
(2007)
In 2007, Austria and Germany proposed in a joint national paper
submitted to the OPCW
to remove three old chemical weapons (OCW) across the
Austrian border to a destruction
facility in Germany.
Austria did not have a CW destruction facility and was

therefore unable to destroy the
three shells in its territory in accordance with the provisions of
the CWC, as required by
Article I, paragraph 4. The two states offered a plan to the
OPCW that entailed transport-
ing the three shells from their location in Austria to the
destruction facility in Germany
under the monitoring of an inspection team from the OPCW
Technical Secretariat and
with German specialists. For that purpose, Germany made
available to Austria its special-
ized transportation equipment and provided an escort for the
transport, but the control of
the shells was under the authority of Austria at all times.26
In achieving the overall purpose of the CWC, the joint paper
noted that the CWC sti-
pulates cooperation among state parties (Articles IV, VII, and
X) and the best possible pro-
tection of the safety of people and the environment (Article
VII). Since Austria—unlike
Germany—did not have a destruction facility and was, at the
time, unable to destroy
the shells in accordance with the provisions of the convention,
not transporting them
for immediate destruction in Germany would not only prolong
but even increase the
risk they would pose to the safety of people and the protection
of the environment.
The OPCW EC approved the transport to Germany for
destruction with several caveats.
First, the OCW were at all times to remain under the ownership
and control of Austria. To
this end, Austrian officials accompanied the transport of the
OCW. Second, the Technical

Secretariat continuously monitored the transport and reported to
the EC. Finally, the EC
underscored that “this case shall not establish any precedent for
any future cases.”27
Removal of OCW from Netherlands to Belgium (2013)
In 2013, the Netherlands informed the EC that a single OCW
discovered in a potato field
would be transported to Belgium for destruction. The EC simply
noted the information
provided by the Netherlands and took no formal action to
approve and impose conditions
(in contrast to its actions in the 2007 Austria-German case).
68 R.A. FRIEDMAN
Libya (2004)
Libya joined the CWC in 2004, and, on March 5 of that year,
submitted an initial declara-
tion to the OPCW identifying an inventory of 23 tons of
mustard agent that had been pro-
duced in a facility at Rabta, 60 miles south of Tripoli, between
1980 and 1990, and stored at
two sites. The declaration stated that the CW production facility
at Rabta was no longer in
use. Libya further declared a stockpile of unfilled munitions
totaling 3,200 aerial bombs
and a sizeable stockpile of nerve-agent precursor chemicals.
OPCW inspectors observed
the destruction of Libya’s entire declared stockpile of unfilled
chemical munitions.
Under the CWC, the possessor-state destruction obligation
required Libya to take

responsibility for destruction of its CW stockpile, and the
categorical transfer prohibition
precluded Libya from giving its stockpile to another country for
purposes of destruction.
However, neither of these provisions prohibited the receipt of
assistance from outside
parties. For example, the US State Department’s Bureau of
Arms Control, Verification,
and Compliance, with funding from the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund,
helped Tripoli “ensure rapid submission of an accurate
declaration of its CW stockpile
and civilian chemical industry” and to begin the destruction of
its CW stockpiles.28 As
noted above, as long as the CW elimination contingency is
consistent with the possessor
state party’s obligations under the CWC, providing material or
financial support in
furtherance of such a CW removal or destruction operation does
not raise additional con-
cerns under the convention. In Libya, the assistance provided by
the international commu-
nity was in furtherance of the OPCW-approved plan of
destruction.29
Albania (2002)
In November 2002, Albania notified the OPCW Secretariat that
it had discovered a stock-
pile of CW totaling 16 tons, including mustard, lewisite, and
small quantities of compounds,
all stored in bulk (non-weaponized) form at a site some 50
kilometers from Tirana.
On July 11, 2007, the OPCW confirmed the destruction of the
entire CW stockpile in
Albania. Importantly, in commending Albania’s achievement,

the OPCW’s director-
general extended his appreciation to OPCW member states
Greece, Italy, Switzerland, and
the United States for the support they had provided in Albania’s
destruction effort.30
For example, the State Department installed physical security
systems at the CW
storage site and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency assumed
responsibility for main-
taining the systems and help in developing plans to eliminate
the CW agents (obligating
$18.2 million in fiscal years 2004 and 2005).31 Such assistance
in providing material or
financial support in furtherance of an OPCW-approved plan of
CW destruction is consist-
ent with both the possessor state party and non-possessor state
party’s obligations under
the CWC.
Biological threat reduction in non-Russian former Soviet Union
states
After the fall of the Soviet Union, its successor states faced the
arduous task of disman-
tling the vestiges of the Soviet BW program and securing
pathogen collections and lab-
oratories. Facilities in these countries were abandoned by the
Russian military when the
republics became independent. For example, the United States
learned of dangerous
pathogen collections dispersed throughout the region as part of
the Soviet Anti-Plague
System which consisted of institutes in eleven republics. A
decade after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, many of the aging and neglected facilities
lacked security and

safety measures, were in disrepair, or had lost professional staff
due to harsh and uncer-
tain economic conditions.
The United States therefore
accelerated its assistance to these facilities starting in the late
1990s … and [t]he CTR Biologi-
cal Threat Reduction program … supported activities in
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan, where the
Soviet Union housed much of
its BW production complex.32 … CTR funding helped destroy
the large-scale BW production
facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, [] assisted in
decontaminating the open-air BW testing
site at Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea, Uzbekistan …
built a secure Central Reference
Laboratories (CRL) for pathogen collections in Ukraine and
Kazakhstan, and is constructing
a CRL in Azerbaijan.33
As noted above, unlike the EC’s role in the CWC to review and
approve plans of
destruction, there is no similar central treaty body under the
BWC, even where, as in
the case of the former Soviet states, international efforts were
clearly designed to dismantle
the remnants of the Soviet BW program. Therefore, it must be
determined that inter-
national participation in any BW elimination operation is in

compliance with several
key provisions of the BWC discussed above,
In particular, under Article III of the BWC, state parties may
not transfer to any reci-
pient any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of
delivery that are prohib-
ited by the convention. Thus, for WMD elimination
contingencies that take place inside or
outside of possessor states under the BWC, participation by
other states would require
avoiding a situation that might entail the transfer of such
control of the possessor
state’s WMD to another state.
Additional international legal considerations in the absence of
an UNSCR
Depending on the operational details of a CW elimination
contingency, there could be a
range of international environmental and maritime agreements
that may be applicable and
should be taken into account. Although it is impossible to
conduct a comprehensive
survey of the entire legal landscape in the abstract, several
international laws would
probably require close examination to determine whether there
were relevant restrictions
or prohibitions:
. The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter (the “London Convention”) prohibits
“incineration at sea of indus-
trial waste.” “Industrial waste” is defined as “waste materials
generated by manufactur-

ing or processing operations.”34
. The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention categorically
prohibits incineration at sea
of “wastes or other matter”, defined broadly as “material and
substance of any kind,
form or description.”35
. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal (the “Basel Convention”) generally
prohibits parties from
exporting “hazardous wastes or other wastes” to non-parties.
Waste loaded on a ship
in one state and unloaded in another would typically constitute
an export under this
Convention. The term “wastes” includes “substances or objects
which are … intended
to be disposed of.”36
70 R.A. FRIEDMAN
. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) and various ship-
ping-related Codes that are made mandatory through it, specify
minimum safety-
related standards for the construction, equipment, and operation
of ships. SOLAS
and associated Codes—including, for example, the International
Maritime Dangerous
Goods Code (IMDG Code)—provide highly technical
requirements for ships’ equip-
ment and the manner in which hazardous materials may be
safely transported on

ships, but do not generally prohibit the carriage of particular
materials.
. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL)
aims to prevent or minimize pollution from ships, including
both pollution from acci-
dents and from routine operations. One MARPOL provision
generally prohibits the
shipboard incineration of certain wastes. Compliance with the
IMDG Code is required
under MARPOL, as it is under SOLAS, but as noted above, the
IMDG Code does not
prohibit the carriage of dangerous goods, and instead regulates
the manner in which
dangerous goods are carried.
One final point deserves mention. It addition to analyzing
relevant treaty obligations
and other international laws, those planning for future
elimination contingencies
should also seek to obtain the possessor state’s consent to
enable another state party’s per-
sonnel to assist in securing or destroying CW within its
territory. They should additionally
seek the possessor state’s approval of the participation of those
state parties providing only
financial assistance or material support only, as well as their
consent to the participation of
personnel from international organizations such as the OPCW.
WMD elimination pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution:
the Syria
CW elimination operation
Before discussing the Syria CW elimination operation in detail,

it is important to explain
the importance of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the effects
of decisions that are
taken pursuant to it. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter
empowers the Security
Council to make “decisions” that all UN member states are
obligated to accept and
carry out under international law.
The importance of Chapter VII of the UN Charter
Typically, resolutions that are adopted under Chapter VII
include some provisions that are
binding and others that are not. Security Council
“recommendations” fall into this latter
category, whereas “decisions” (particularly the operative
paragraphs) fall into the
former.37 Unfortunately, there are occasional disagreements
among the Security
Council members, and determining whether certain provisions
are mandatory or horta-
tory are not always uniform. UN member states may have
different views about
whether a particular provision is legally binding and whether
specific operative paragraphs
constitute “recommendations” or “decisions.”
What is clear is that all UN member states have a legal
obligation to accept and carry
out the Security Council’s Chapter VII “decisions.”
Importantly, Security Council
decisions that authorize a mission or actions within the territory
of a member state are
generally understood, as a legal matter, to require that the
member state accept the

mission on its territory and not to frustrate the Security
Council’s ability to carry out its
mandate. It is also possible for the Security Council to
authorize actions that are narrowly
tailored to apply to a subset of member states (or a single
member state) and thus create
limited rights or obligations, depending on the context. Finally,
Article 103 of the UN
Charter stipulates that, in the event of conflict between a state’s
obligations under the
charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations
under the charter shall prevail.
For a WMD elimination operation, a Chapter VII Security
Council resolution can be
crucial in several ways. First, because all UN member states
have a legal obligation to
accept and carry out the Security Council’s Chapter VII
“decisions,” the Council could
facilitate action even in states that are outside the disarmament
treaty structure.
A Chapter VII Security Council resolution could facilitate a
WMD elimination oper-
ation where a disarmament treaty is absent or lacking. For
example, a UNSCR was an
appropriate tool to eliminate Saddam Hussein’s CW stockpile
because the CWC (and
its associated destruction procedures) was not yet in force. In
addition, Iraq had not yet
ratified the BWC. Indeed, in addition to requiring Iraq to

surrender its WMD and
WMD programs, UNSCR 687, citing Chapter VII, called for the
establishment of a
United Nations Special Commission to conduct on-site
inspections of Iraq’s WMD-
related facilities, in cooperation with the International Atomic
Energy Agency.38
For example, Chapter VII would loom large in the event of a
WMD elimination contin-
gency in North Korea, one of four states not to have joined the
CWC. Despite its claims
not to possess CW, North Korea is believed to be among the
world’s largest CW possessors,
ranking third after the United States and Russia.39 If North
Korea failed to join the CWC and
there was an opportunity for the international community to
participate in a WMD elimin-
ation operation, such action would likely require a chapter VII
Security Council resolution.
As will be explained in detail below, a Chapter VII Security
Council resolution could
authorize actions by the international community that might
otherwise be inconsistent
with a state’s treaty obligations.
The Syria CW elimination operation
The CWC is a landmark disarmament treaty. It is the first treaty
to comprehensively and
verifiably ban an entire category of WMD. CWC negotiations
spanned nearly two decades,
and the Conference on Disarmament finally agreed on its text in
1992, at the end of the
Cold War. The CWC opened for signature in 1993 and entered

into force in 1997.
For the most part, the CWC focuses on eliminating state CW
programs in permissive
environments through cooperative, rather than adversarial,
methods of compliance man-
agement. Therefore, when presented with unforeseen situations
within Syria, for example,
state parties and the OPCW had to adapt—sometimes by looking
for new approaches and
solutions to meet the CWC’s overall objectives and purpose.
Unlike the de minimis OCW cases mentioned above, the
removal operation for the
Syrian stockpile involved nearly 1,300 metric tons of chemicals
weapons. A few concepts
should be considered relating to the legal backdrop of CW
elimination in Syria:
(1) The CWC compliance regime had never before been utilized
to carry out such an
expedited and ambitious destruction and verification schedule.
72 R.A. FRIEDMAN
(2) To address the complex and novel Syria CW removal
challenges, the OPCW and
United Nations were given a special mandate from the UN
Security Council and
the OPCW Executive Council, in the form of UNSCR 2118 and
the September 27,
2013. EC decision, respectively. The OPCW took on a large role
in implementing
UNSCR 2118 and the EC decision through the work of its

Technical Secretariat
and as part of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission, formally
established in Security
Council document S/2013/603.40
(3) Prohibitions and limitations in the CWC legal architecture
introduced a unique set of
problems in the Syrian CW destruction effort.
(4) The expeditious destruction of the Syrian regime’s declared
CW arsenal inside a war-
torn country—even under the most optimistic circumstances—
was recognized as
exceedingly difficult, which is why removal of the CW from
Syria was specifically
allowed under UNSCR 2118 for verified destruction elsewhere.
The flexibility pro-
vided in UNSCR 2118 was essential in facilitating the
tremendous cooperation of
the international community in eliminating the declared Syrian
CW stockpile.
The international legal framework
Three main authorities constituted the legal framework of the
Syria CW destruction effort:
the “Kerry-Lavrov Framework,” the EC decision, and UNSCR
2118.
Kerry-Lavrov framework
The first piece to the destruction regime was a political
commitment, rather than a legally
binding agreement, which served as a watershed document that
shaped the entire inter-
national effort to eliminate Syria’s CW. After several days of
high-level discussions

between the United States and the Russian Federation, Secretary
of State John Kerry
and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov concluded the “US-Russia
Framework for Elimination
of Syrian Chemical Weapons,” on September 14, 2013.
Several features of the Kerry-Lavrov Framework had lasting
effects on the development
of the legal elements of the destruction effort. First, it
established a critical role for the EC of
the OPCW. That role was to set out special procedures for
expeditious destruction of the
Syrian CW program, as well as verification of its destruction.
This was important because
the CWC does not provide specific guidance on the destruction
process (including time-
lines) when a state joins the CWC after 2007, the ten-year
period from the convention’s
entry-into-force. The OPCW typically would not take such an
assertive role in dictating
the destruction schedule to a state party. In this case, however,
since Syria—literally
embattledamida civilwar—couldnotdrive thetimeline
forCWdestruction,theframework
envisioned a much more active role for the OPCW EC.
Second, the framework committed the United States and Russia
to work toward adop-
tion of a UNSCR that would reinforce the OPCW EC decision
and provided that, in the
event of noncompliance, the UN Security Council would impose
measures under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. A third key feature of the framework
was that it laid the ground-
work for removal of CW materials and their destruction outside
of Syria. Removal (and

transfer of ownership) is a unique feature of the Syrian case,
and a reflection of the special
challenges the Syria situation imposed. Removal under OPCW
oversight would allow the
international community to press for an aggressive timeline in
accordance with the overall
objective of mitigating the threat that CW posed in Syria, while
still being realistic about
the possibility of meeting the target dates.
Executive Council decision
The second piece to the puzzle was the landmark OPCW EC
decision on Syria CW elim-
ination adopted on September 27, 2013. The key features of the
EC decision included:
(1) timelines for destruction consistent with those provided in
the Kerry-
Lavrov framework;
(2) a decision that the Technical Secretariat would begin
inspections in Syria as soon as
possible and not later than October 1, 2013 (i.e., prior to the
CWC’s entry-into-force
for Syria);
(3) a call for “stringent verification” of the destruction of the
Syria CW program pursuant
to Article IV (8) and Article V (10) of the CWC. This provision
had never previously
been applied. One example of this more exacting verification

standard is in operative
paragraph 1(a)(iii) of the EC decision, which calls for, among
other things,
Syria’s declaration to the Technical Secretariat, of “the location
of all of its CW pro-
duction facilities, including mixing and filling facilities, and
CW research and devel-
opment facilities.”
(4) a call for the OPCW to “inspect as soon as possible any
other site identified by a state
party as having been involved in the Syrian CW programme,
unless deemed unwar-
ranted by the Director General, or the matter resolved through
the process of consul-
tations and cooperation” (paragraph 2[d]). Although the
provision has not been
exercised to date, it presents state parties with an alternative
route to request
OPCW inspections in the event of concerns about Syria’s
compliance with its obli-
gations under the EC decision or the CWC.
UNSCR 2118
The final—and, from an international legal perspective, the
most critical—piece of the
legal international framework was UNSCR 2118. Adopted the
same day as the EC
decision, UNSCR 2118 provided crucial supplementary
authority in several respects.
Operative paragraph 6 of UNSCR 2118 requires the Syrian
government to “comply
with all aspects” of the OPCW decision, notable because Syria
was not yet a party to
the convention. Entry-into-force for Syria was thirty days after
its September 14 deposit

of its instrument of accession. Moreover, even when Syria
became a state party, it was
not clear the EC decision would be legally binding on Syria,
particularly to the extent it
imposed conditions beyond the scope of the CWC.
Operative paragraph 7 of UNSCR 2118 decided that Syria must
fully cooperate with the
OPCW and the United Nations, including by providing
immediate and unfettered access
to any and all sites and individuals that the OPCW had grounds
to believe were important
for the purpose of its mandate. This provision determined such
access to be a “right” of
these international institutions, ensuring that Syria could not
deny access to key sites
and individuals in the CW destruction effort.
Finally, operative paragraph 10 of UNSCR 2118 authorized
member states “to acquire,
control, transport, transfer, and destroy CW identified by the
OPCW, consistent with the
objective of the CWC, to ensure the elimination of Syria’s CW
program as promptly and
74 R.A. FRIEDMAN
safely as possible.” This authorization was crucial because
removal was a key element of
the plan for destruction, and, as noted above, transfer would
have otherwise been prohib-
ited under the CWC.
The language of operative paragraph 10 was not limited to

overcoming CWC restric-
tions. As a result, the UNSCR could be read to authorize states
to transport, transfer, or
destroy CW in a manner that might otherwise be prohibited
under other aspects of inter-
national law in addition to the CWC (including environmental
and maritime prohibi-
tions), provided that the states involved were doing so “to
ensure the elimination” of
Syria’s CW “in the soonest and safest manner.”
The domestic legal framework
Each state that participated in the Syria CW destruction effort
had to navigate a web of
domestic laws regarding, inter alia, regarding, inter alia,
importation, licensing, transport,
customs procedures pertaining to toxic or industrial chemicals,
environmental laws and
regulations, and hazardous waste regulations.
Each participating state would need to point to domestic legal
authority to expend
funds for WMD-related destruction activities or to deploy
personnel, or provide materials
and/or financial support. In the event the United States
contemplated the provision of
financial assistance or other material support for a future WMD
destruction effort, it
would be important to closely review the source of such
assistance or support to
ensure, among other things, that: (1) US government funds are
authorized for such use;
(2) there are no funding restrictions attached to the recipient of
such assistance or
support, including the possessor state and other states that

might be participating; and
(3) there are no end-user restrictions or requirements associated
with the use of such
assistance or support.
The United States uses a number of tools to address WMD-
related contingencies. These
include a set of financial and technical programs known,
variously, as cooperative threat
reduction (CTR) programs, nonproliferation assistance, or
global security engagement.
Over the years, CTR
has grown from a DOD-centered effort to include projects
funded by the Department of
Defense (DOD), the State Department, the Department of
Energy (DOE), and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) … . Although initially
focused on the former Soviet
Union, these programs now seek to engage partners around the
world. The United States
has used its funding and expertise to help secure or destroy
dangerous weapons and materials
in nations that experience civil strife or regime collapse, such
as in Libya, and to prevent their
spread outside a conflict’s borders, such as with Syria’s
neighboring countries … . Several
DOD and DOE programs have helped Russia and the other
former Soviet states eliminate
nuclear weapons delivery systems and secure nuclear warheads
in storage. DOE has also
helped Russia strengthen security and materials accounting at
facilities that store nuclear
materials … DOD has also helped Russia secure and eliminate
CW by supporting the
design and construction of a CW destruction facility at

Shchuch’ye. DOD and the State
Department also provide assistance to address concerns about
the proliferation of pathogens
that might be used in BW. DOD’s biological threat reduction
program now accounts for
nearly 60% in the FY2014 budget request.41
For the Syria CW destruction effort, the United States had an
interagency team of lawyers
working through a range of knotty legal issues, including
representatives from the State
Department, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Commerce, the Department
of Transportation, the Department of Homeland Security
(including the Coast Guard), the
Department of Justice, the Environmental Protection Agency,
and the National Security
Council staff, among others. These lawyers did not identify any
absolute prohibitions
that would preclude US participation in the elimination
operation, although they ident-
ified some significant legal steps that had to be taken before the
activities could commence.
For example, under the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act
(CWCIA), it is unlawful for any person knowingly to “develop,
produce, otherwise
acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile,
retain, own, [or] possess … any
chemical weapon.”42 This prohibition does not apply to these

activities, “pending destruc-
tion of the weapon,” if that person is “authorized by law or by
an appropriate officer of the
United States to retain, own, possess, transfer, or receive the
chemical weapon.” The State
Department worked with interagency colleagues to complete the
procedures for authoriz-
ing the relevant individuals to participate in the destruction
effort.
Similarly, the main implementing statute for the BWC is the
Biological Weapons and
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (BWTA). Both the CWC and the
BWC are also implemented
domestically through other legal authorities, including the
WMD sanctions provisions in
executive orders, penal provisions in the US Code, and
agencies’ implementing regulations.
The domestic implementing statutes (the CWCIA and the
BWTA) provide for civil and
criminal penalties for violations of the laws, prohibitions
(which largely mirror the prohi-
bitions in the BWC and the CWC), but as illustrated above, the
implementing regimes
contain exceptions for government actions.43
Because there are a host of additional implementing measures
under domestic laws, for
example WMD-related executive orders, sanctions legislation,
and foreign-assistance pro-
visions, and given the various possible scenarios and the
complexity of possible US invol-
vement, there would need to be an analysis of the applicability
of any available exemptions
when US participation is under consideration in a WMD

contingency.
Lessons for future CW elimination contingencies
There are three primary lessons derived from the above
discussion to be applied to future
CW contingencies, as well as several additional lessons specific
to future missions that may
occur in the absence of a UNSCR.
(1) Flexibility, creativity, consistency, and enhancement of a
disarmament treaty where
possible. Given the urgency of the situation in Syria, the
destruction timelines and verifica-
tion procedures set forth in the CWC were not well suited to the
circumstances. The
importance of developing a process for eliminating the declared
Syrian CW program
quickly and completely empowered the OPCW to take an active
role in implementation.
To that end, the international community—in cooperation with
the OPCW and auth-
orized through UNSCR 2118—expedited procedures for CW
destruction and extensive
international monitoring and verification, consistent with (and
taking advantage of) pre-
viously unused provisions of the convention, such as Article IV
(8) and Article V (10) of
the CWC. Those CWC provisions were specifically cited in
Annex A of the Kerry-Lavrov
Framework and expressly referenced in the September 2013 EC
decision.
For example, according to the CWC, if a state ratifies or
accedes to the convention more

than ten years after the CWC entered into force, that state shall
destroy its CW and CW
76 R.A. FRIEDMAN
production facilities “as soon as possible.” And “the order and
procedures for stringent
verification for such a state party shall be determined by the
Executive Council.” This
language in the CWC established a critical role for the EC of
the OPCW, and provided
a legal basis under the CWC for the expedited elimination
framework. Essentially, by
linking the elimination framework to the CWC, the international
community was able
to ensure that all CWC parties (including Syria) would support
the legal capacity of the
OPCW and the EC to make destruction-timeline and verification
decisions.
(2) Explaining inconsistencies with the disarmament treaty. It
was also crucial for the
international community to develop a legal basis for removal of
the CW by CWC state
parties in light of the CWC’s complete prohibition on
acquisition and transfer of CW.
In order to ensure that elimination would not be subject to legal
objections, both the
United States and Russia committed to support the adoption of a
UNSCR that would
provide clear authorization for state parties to participate in the
removal and destruction
efforts without raising CWC compliance concerns.

Essentially, operative paragraph 10 of UNSCR 2118 authorized
UN member states to
acquire, control, transport, transfer, and destroy CW identified
by the director-general
of the OPCW, consistent with the objective of the CWC, to
ensure the elimination of
Syria’s CW program as promptly and safely as possible.
(3) Linking the treaty body with the United Nations and
ensuring compliance. Operat-
ive paragraph 8 of UNSCR 2118 was also critical because it
linked the OPCW and the
United Nations together to implement the CW elimination
operation through the
Joint Mission, and set up a process that could leverage the
organizations’ institutional
expertise while respecting the role each played in the
international community. Select fea-
tures of the EC decision (such as those providing for additional
inspections if warranted)
and aspects of the UNSCR (such as those imposing legal
obligations requiring full
cooperation by Syria, including provision of immediate and
unfettered access to sites
and individuals) accounted for the potential that there might be
an intransigent or resist-
ant state party. The UNSCR also included a commitment that, in
the event of noncom-
pliance with the EC decision, the UNSC would “impose
measures under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter.”
The lessons learned from the Syria CW removal operation
present important insights
for future CW removal contingencies and can serve as
guideposts across the disarmament

landscape. One of the key features of the Syria CW removal
operation was the ability to
leverage institutional and stakeholder competency and
expertise. By design, the Syria
CW removal operation required close coordination between the
United Nations, the
OPCW, and the international community. It was critical to the
credibility of the
process and the success of the operation to have the different
pieces working together
in lockstep. Moreover, because the prohibitions and limitations
in the CWC legal archi-
tecture introduced a unique set of problems in the Syrian CW
destruction effort, signifi-
cant time and effort was dedicated to develop a framework to
support the mission that was
consistent with international and domestic laws.
WMD elimination in the absence of an UNSCR: lessons beyond
Syria
For policy makers and officials charged with planning future
WMD elimination missions,
there are five important lessons to consider when a UNSCR
cannot be obtained.
(1) Maintaining the possessor state’s control of WMD. Legally,
the categorical transfer
prohibitions in the CWC and BWC could be effectively
addressed through a UNSCR fol-
lowing the UNSCR 2118 approach, but such an approach is not
a requirement for the
international community to participate in a WMD elimination

operation. In a CW
case, although a UNSCR strengthens its legal basis, it does not
necessarily preclude the
option of a OPCW-based approach to approving a plan of
destruction, as evidenced in
the Austria-Germany case discussed above. To avoid the
categorical transfer prohibition
under the CWC, a fundamental element of this approach to a
WMD elimination operation
is legitimate possessor-state control and possession of the CW
throughout the course of
the operation. How much possession or control is sufficient
would have to be determined
under the circumstances in question.
(2) Movement of WMD outside the possessor state is not
categorically prohibited. Con-
versely, there does not appear to be a categorical prohibition on
the movement of CW or
BW into the territory of another state party for purposes of
destruction. This could be rel-
evant where, for example, the security environment in a
possessor state is exceedingly pre-
carious and physical movement of WMD stocks to the territory
of another state party
(assuming unbroken possession and control by the possessor
state party) mitigates the
proliferation risk. This could also be the case, as in the Austria-
Germany case discussed
above, where destruction facilities were unavailable in the
territory of the possessor state.
(3) Non-possessor state support and assistance is possible. As
long as the plan for the
WMD elimination contingency is consistent with the possessor
state party’s obligations

under the relevant international treaty, the provision of material
or financial support by
members of the international community in furtherance of such
an elimination operation
would not be likely to raise additional concerns. For example,
as noted above, in Libya, the
assistance provided by the international community was in
furtherance of the OPCW-
approved plan of destruction.
(4) The applicable legal parameters may change depending on
the state taking action. A
non-party to a disarmament treaty may be subject to one set of
legal constraints, while
another set of legal parameters may apply to a state party.
Indeed, it is important to
keep in mind that international treaty obligations exist for all
state parties to a particular
international legal instrument, even if, for example, a WMD
elimination operation were to
take place within the jurisdiction of a non-party. For example,
transfer of CW from one
non-party to another non-party would not violate the CWC,
although, of course, there
would be compelling policy reasons to object to any transfer of
CW between non-
parties to the CWC, and there may be stand-alone international
legal obligations found,
for example, in a UNSCR, that would proscribe such conduct.
Transfer from a non-
party to a state party to the CWC would result in treaty-based
legal implications only
for the recipient.44
(5) Different legal tools apply to different degrees of possessor
state cooperation. The

appropriate legal tools—and attendant legal analysis—will
depend, in part, on the posses-
sor state involved and level of cooperation from its government.
Cooperative action taken
by the international community with a permissive government
may introduce fewer legal
hurdles than actions that are resisted by an uncooperative
government or that are taken
without the consent of the possessor state. Accordingly, a
UNSCR may be more appropri-
ate in the event of an intransigent or resistant government that
refuses to meet its treaty
obligations or that is outside the particular treaty regime.
78 R.A. FRIEDMAN
Disclaimer
The views expressed herein are the author’s and are not
necessarily those of the Depart-
ment of State or the United States government.
Notes
1. “The provisions of this Article and the detailed procedures
for its implementation shall apply
to all CW owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are
located in any place under its jur-
isdiction or control … [and] “[e]ach State Party shall destroy all
CW specified in paragraph 1
pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with the
agreed rate and sequence of
destruction.” Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling,

and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC),
April 29, 1997, Article
IV(1),(6).
“Each State Party undertakes “to destroy, or to divert to
peaceful purposes, as soon as
possible … all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of
delivery specified in
article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under
its jurisdiction or
control.” The Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
their Destruction (“BWC”),
March 26, 1975, Article II.
2. The term “weapons capable of mass destruction,” first
appeared in the very first resolution
passed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1946.
See United Nations (UN)
General Assembly Resolution 1(I), “Establishment of a
Commission to Deal with the
Problem Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy,” January
24, 1946. By 1948, an alternate
form, “weapons of mass destruction,” became the preferred
usage and “disarmament diplo-
macy has relied on that definition ever since.” W. Seth Carus,
“Defining ‘Weapons of Mass
Destruction’,” Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Occasional Paper, No. 8
National Defense University Press Washington, DC, January
2012, p. 5.
3. Commission on Conventional Armaments (CCA), UN
document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 18,
1948, <https://documents-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/DER/NL4/835/52/PDF/NL483552.
pdf?OpenElement>. See also Carus, “Defining ‘Weapons of
Mass Destruction’,” p. 5.
4. This article does not discuss radiological weapons
elimination operations because there is no
international disarmament treaty that defines the legal
obligations or constraints related to
the elimination of radiological weapons.
5. CWC, Article I, paragraph 1 (a), emphasis added.
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), May 23,
1969, Article 31.
7. Although elements such as the preparatory work of the treaty
are not included within the
general rules of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the
VCLT, such materials are con-
sidered supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32.
VCLT, Article 32.
8. Chemical Weapons Working Papers, 1983-1985 Sessions,
CD/439.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Chemical Weapons Working Papers, 1983-1985 Sessions,
CD/500.
12. Convention on Cluster Munitions, August 1, 2010, Article 1.
13. Ibid, Article 3. See also Convention on the Prohibition of
the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction in
the Convention on the Pro-
hibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and Their
Destruction, March 1, 1999, Article 1: each State Party

undertakes “never under any circum-
stances: (a) to use anti-personnel mines; [or] (b) to develop,
produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly,
anti-personnel mines.” This
general prohibition also closely tracks the general prohibition
contained in the CWC for
banned items.
https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/DER/NL4/835/52/PDF/NL483552.pdf?O
penElement
https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/DER/NL4/835/52/PDF/NL483552.pdf?O
penElement
14. The Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical and
“bacteriological” methods of warfare has
banned their use in war since 1925, and it is widely accepted
that such prohibition of use con-
stitutes a rule of customary international law. See also
Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction, March 26, 1975, Articles I
and III, <www.opbw.org/
convention/conv.html>.
15. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
March 5, 1970, Articles I and II.
16. CWC, Article I, paragraph 2. Also, the Verification Annex
of the CWC includes extensive

requirements for how the CW destruction must be carried out
and what verification pro-
cedures must be followed, including coordination with and
inspection by the OPCW.
17. CWC, Article IV(4); See also CWC Article IV(5): “each
State Party shall provide access to any
CW destruction facilities and their storage areas, that it owns or
possesses, or that are located
in any place under its jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of
systematic verification
through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site
instruments.”
18. CWC, Verification Annex Part IV(A), paragraph C(12).
19. CWC, Article 1, paragraph 1(d)).
20. The transfer and acquisition prohibitions may also affect the
ability of state parties to take
samples from the possessor state’s CW stockpile if those state
parties seek to transfer
samples outside of the possessor state, or if state parties seek to
assist others in such transfers.
21. BWC, Article 3.
22. Paragraph 6 of CWC, Verification Annex, Part IV(A) states:
“The general plan for destruc-
tion of CW submitted pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1(a)(v),
shall provide an overview of
the entire national CW destruction programme of the State Party
and information on the
efforts of the State Party to fulfil the destruction requirements
contained in this Convention.
The plan shall specify:

(a) A general schedule for destruction, giving types and
approximate quantities of CW
planned to be destroyed in each annual destruction period for
each existing CW destruc-
tion facility and, if possible, for each planned CW destruction
facility;
(b) The number of CW destruction facilities existing or planned
to be operated over the
destruction period;
(c) For each existing or planned CW destruction facility:
(i) Name and location; and
(ii) The types and approximate quantities of CW, and the type
(for example, nerve
agent or blister agent) and approximate quantity of chemical
fill, to be destroyed;
(d) The plans and programmes for training personnel for the
operation of destruction
facilities;
(e) The national standards for safety and emissions that the
destruction facilities
must satisfy;
(f) Information on the development of new methods for
destruction of CW and on the
improvement of existing methods;
(g) The cost estimates for destroying the CW; and
(h) Any issues which could adversely impact on the national
destruction programme.”
23. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was
established in 1957 “to accelerate and

enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the
world” and to ensure that its assistance is not used to military
purposes. See IAEA
Statute, October 21, 1956, Article II. In order to accomplish
these goals, the agency
engages in a host of activities, including: acting as an
intermediary for securing the per-
formance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment
or facilities between two
member states; fostering the exchange of scientific and
technical information by scientists
and experts on peaceful uses of nuclear energy; setting
standards of safety for protection of
health; acquiring or establishing facilities, plants, and
equipment; and “to establish and
administer safeguards designed to ensure that special
fissionable and other materials, ser-
vices, equipment, facilities, and information made available by
the Agency or at its
80 R.A. FRIEDMAN
http://www.opbw.org/convention/conv.html
http://www.opbw.org/convention/conv.html
request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a
way as to further any
military purpose.” Ibid, Article III(a). The NPT requires each
non-nuclear-weapon state
to negotiate and conclude with the IAEA bilateral or
multilateral agreements on safeguards
to verify the fulfillment of its obligations and to prevent the
diversion of nuclear materials
from peaceful uses to the development of nuclear weapons.

24. De minimis is the legal term indicating the subject is
considered too trivial to merit full con-
sideration. “Old chemical weapons” are defined under the CWC
for purposes of determining
which state party is responsible for destroying the CW. In short,
the possessor state party has
responsibility for destroying “old” CW, while an abandoning
state has the responsibility for
destroying “abandoned” CW.
25. “Chemical and Biological Weapons Status at a Glance,”
Arms Control Association, February
2014, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cbwprolif>.
26. In addition, Austria and Germany noted that the prohibition
on transfer needed to be under-
stood in the context of the general aims of the CWC, as laid
down in its preamble, to act
toward “the elimination of all types of weapons of mass
destruction” (paragraph 1), “to
exclude completely the possibility of the use of CW” (paragraph
6), in order to achieve a
“complete and effective destruction” (paragraph 10). The
transport of the three shells in
this instance thus served to meet the overall purpose of the
CWC.
27. In this regard, the Austrian-German paper submitted to the
OPCW indicated that “due to the
specific circumstances of this case and the small amounts
involved, this procedure does not
constitute any precedent with regard to the general application
of Article I of the CWC.”
28. “Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction—

Performance Results for Performance
Goal 2,” Burueau of Resource Management, US State
Department, November 2004,
<www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2004/html/39014.htm>.
29. Notably, in November 2011 and February 2012, the new
Libyan government declared
additional quantities of Category 1 and Category 3 CW to the
OPCW. The newly declared
weapons included several hundred munitions loaded with sulfur
mustard agent, together
with a few hundred kilograms of sulfur mustard stored in plastic
containers. Accordingly,
the EC approved a modified plan of destruction. See Chris
Schneidmiller, “Libya Sets Sche-
dule for Eliminating Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Threat
Initiative, May 31, 2012, <www.nti.
org/gsn/article/libya-sets-schedule-for-completing-chemical-
weapons-disposal/>. See also in
this volume, Patrick Terrell, Katharine Hagen, and Ted A. Ryba,
Jr., “Eliminating Libya’s
WMD Programs: Creating a Cooperative Situation,” pp. 185–96.
30. “Albania the First Country to Destroy All Its Chemical
Weapons,” Organisation for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons, July 12, 2007,
<www.opcw.org/news/article/albania-the-first-
country-to-destroy-all-its-chemical-weapons/>.
31. Cristina Chuen, “Global CW Assistance,” Nuclear Threat
Initiative, June 1, 2005, <www.nti.
org/analysis/articles/global-cw-assistance/>.
32. Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, “The Evolution of
Cooperative Threat Reduction:
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 13,

2014, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
nuke/R43143.pdf>.
33. Ibid.
34. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
November 13, 1972, Annex 1, para. 10(a) and para. 11.
35. Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, March 24, 2006, Article 5, 1(8).
36. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, May 5, 1992.
37. “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Secur-
ity Council in accordance with the present Charter.” Charter of
the United Nations, October
24, 1045, Chapter V, Article 25.
38. Defense Policy Division, Policy Planning Bureau, “2014
Defense White Paper,” MND 02-
748-6237, Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense,
<http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/
mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_2015061611561645
70.pdf>.
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cbwprolif
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2004/html/39014.htm
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/libya-sets-schedule-for-
completing-chemical-weapons-disposal/

http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/libya-sets-schedule-for-
completing-chemical-weapons-disposal/
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/albania-the-first-country-to-
destroy-all-its-chemical-weapons/
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/albania-the-first-country-to-
destroy-all-its-chemical-weapons/
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/global-cw-assistance/
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/global-cw-assistance/
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43143.pdf
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43143.pdf
http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNE
BOOK_201506161156164570.pdf
http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNE
BOOK_201506161156164570.pdf
39. James D. Fry, “Dionysian Disarmament: Security Council
WMD Coercive Disarmament
Measures and Their Legal Implications,” Michigan Journal of
International Law 29 (2008)
p. 242.
40. “Letter dated 11 October 2013 from the President of the
Security Council addressed to the
Secretary-General,” S/2013/603, October 11, 2013,
<www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=S/2013/603>.
41. Nikitin and Woolf, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat
Reduction.”
42. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of
1998, 18 U.S.C. § 229 (1998).
43. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 amended the prohibitions of
the BWTA to include the follow-
ing: “Whoever knowingly violates this section shall be fined as

provided in this title, impri-
soned not more than 10 years, or both, but the prohibition
contained in this section shall not
apply with respect to any duly authorized United States
governmental activity.” Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56
(October 26, 2001).
44. The situation is more complicated for treaty signatory non-
parties. Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties obligates treaty signatory
non-parties to refrain from acts
that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. The
precise contours of states’ obli-
gations will differ depending on the agreement and are subject
to a complicated case-by-
case analysis to determine the object and purpose of a particular
agreement and whether a
state took action to defeat such an object and purpose.
82 R.A. FRIEDMAN
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/6
03
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/6
03AbstractWMD elimination in the absence of a UN Security
Council resolutionThe Chemical Weapons ConventionTransfer
prohibitionsPossessor state's destruction obligationProhibition
of assistance, encouragement, or inducementPowers of the
OPCW's Executive CouncilRelevant OPCW historical examples
of WMD eliminationRemoval of old chemical weapons from
Austria to Germany (2007)Removal of OCW from Netherlands
to Belgium (2013)Libya (2004)Albania (2002)Biological threat
reduction in non-Russian former Soviet Union statesAdditional

international legal considerations in the absence of an
UNSCRWMD elimination pursuant to a UN Security Council
resolution: the Syria CW elimination operationThe importance
of Chapter VII of the UN CharterThe Syria CW elimination
operationThe international legal frameworkKerry-Lavrov
frameworkExecutive Council decisionUNSCR 2118The
domestic legal frameworkLessons for future CW elimination
contingenciesOutline placeholderWMD elimination in the
absence of an UNSCR: lessons beyond SyriaDisclaimerNotes
Assignment Instructions
First, select any Journal Article a relevant article to the course
regarding the regulation of, or response to, Weapons of Mass
Destruction and conduct an Article Review.. It should be related
to the course or course materials. The intent is for students to
do some external research away from the textbook and find an
Article in the AMU/APUS Library. Students should search the
library's online databases, such as ProQuest, EbscoHost, and
others, to find scholarly or peer-reviewed articles.
Additionally, the review of the journal article is an evaluation
of the article's strengths, weaknesses, and validity. It is used to
inform of the article’s value through your explanation,
interpretation, and analysis. As you do this, ask the major
questions that are central to the review process:
1. What is the purpose of this article?
2. Why is it important to investigate or examine the subject of
the article?
3. How are the authors carrying out the task? Are their methods
and comments appropriate and adequate to the task?
4. What do they claim to have found out? Are the findings
clearly stated?
5. How does this advance knowledge in the field?
Writing Guidance:

· The paper should be approximately 5 pages for the body of
your work, double spaced (cover and reference pages are
required - note that they are not factored into your page count).
Appropriate writing requirements using APA style formatted
citations and compiling a complete reference list in accordance
with the APA guidance are part of the requirement (see Lessons
area of the course of style guides).
· Use scholarly or other relevant sources. Your article selection
will be part of the grade.
· No abstract is required.
· Save your work as a Microsoft Word document entitled
'YourLastNamewk#.doc' (i.e., Smith1.doc) and upload this
document as your assignment.
Your work should consist of:
· Introduction (this will have a well-defined purpose statement
in your intro paragraph that provides guidance to the reader
about what you are going to cover in your paper)
· Body (feel free to use sub-headings if necessary)
· Conclusion (this wraps ups the key points of your work and
brings your paper to a logical conclusion)
STYLE AND CONVENTION:
· All written submissions should be submitted in a font and page
set-up that is readable and neat. Students will follow the APA 6
Style as the sole citation and reference style used in written
work submitted as part of
coursework. See http://www.apus.edu/content/dam/online-
library/resources-services/Fuson_2012_APA.pdf
· Additionally, I will use a rubric to grade your papers.
· Typewritten in double-spaced format with a readable style and
font and submitted inside the electronic classroom (unless
classroom access is not possible and other arrangements have
been approved by the professor).
· Times New Roman styles in 12-point font.
· Page margins Top, Bottom, Left Side and Right Side = 1 inch,

with reasonable accommodation being made for special
situations and online submission variances.
· Complete an appropriate page header with page number for
each page.
· Create an appropriate title page.
· Points will be deducted for the use of Wikipedia or
encyclopedic type sources. It is highly advised to utilize: books,
peer reviewed journals, articles, archived documents, etc. (may
be electronic of course and the Turabian manual lists all the
types of possible resources and reference formats, hint…hint),
and valid web sites (use caution with these).
· The paper need to be approximately 5 pages for the body of
your work (not including the title and works cited pages in the
page count). Points will be deducted if the minimum page
requirement is not met accordingly.
· Remember you are a prestigious undergraduate college level
student and expectations are high for quality work!
· Above all…please have fun and learn, learn, learn with this
endeavor
Turn It In Procedures
· This course has a requirement for ALL Papers to be submitted
through Turnitin and this is done automatically when you
submit your work as a Word document in the Assignments area
of the course. Originality Reports with a Similarity Index will
be generated after the Assignment has been submitted. Turnitin
supports attachments only so it is important to upload the
assignment as a Word document.
· Turnitin will ignore any quoted passages in your assignment.
Make sure all directly cited material is between quotation marks
with a parenthetical cite at the end, for example, as in
“limitations of the anarchical international society” (Bull 1977,
49). Summary citations, for example, should look like (Bull
1977). You may use block quotes, but note that these will show
as questionable on the Turnitin originality report. Know that I
look at the Turnitin reports closely as there can be many reasons

that material is being identified -- I never take the Turnitin
report at face value!
If you have any questions about this process, please contact me.
WEEK 6: Radiological Weapons and Threats
Lesson
Welcome to Week 6 of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and Nuclear Threats to the Homeland course!
LESSON NOTES WEEK 6: Radiological Materials and Toxic
Industrial Radiological Hazards
This subject area is broad, fairly new in terms of threats, and
encompasses hazards resulting from dirty bombs, medical
waste, stolen radiological materials, and more. You should find
the instruction you learn this week both enlightening and
informative.
“When convicted terrorist Jose Padilla showed up at the
Chicago airport in May 2002 allegedly with plans to carry out a
dirty bomb attack, few people had ever heard of such a weapon.
The federal government since then has taken steps to prevent
the use of a radiological dispersal device, or RDD — the
technical term of a dirty bomb — but there are still widespread
misunderstandings of what these weapons do” (Magnuson
2008).

WEEK 7 Nuclear Weapons and ThreatsLessonWelcome to .docx

WEEK 7 Nuclear Weapons and ThreatsLessonWelcome to .docx

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