1. Kerester 1
Andrew Kerester
Prof. Dyson
Pols 3442
Midterm #2
The Iran Deal: A Path to Peace or Cause for Concern?
Nuclear weapons exploded onto the international scene during and after the conclusion of
World War 2, and ever since have sparked numerous debates and pressing questions. Recently,
some of these questions have resurfaced to the forefront of international politics as the P5+1 (US,
UK, France, China, Russia and Germany) agreed to a deal with the reigning Iranian regime
which ends crippling international economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for Iran’s
compliance in taking steps specified in the deal aimed at reducing their capability of developing
and deploying a nuclear weapon. Among the many questions this deal raises, both about the deal
itself and about nuclear weapons in general, the first that must be addressed is, what are the
specific steps Iran is obligated to take in regards to its nuclear program? The next pressing
question that comes to mind is, will it work? Will this deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA)1, prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensure that its
nuclear program exists solely for peaceful purposes? This particular question does not lend itself
well to an immediate definite answer, only time can reveal that; however, we may evaluate
particular aspects of the JCPOA that impact its likelihood of success. Once this topic has
received proper attention, we must ask ourselves this: should we even worry about Iran, or other
1 "Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details." Www.bbc.com. July 14, 2015. Accessed November 24, 2015.

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countries, acquiring nuclear weapons? Kenneth Waltz, in his article “Why Iran Should Get The
Bomb”, argues that we should not worry about Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and should even
welcome it because it would increase the stability of the region. I disagree with Waltz’s
argument. My primary argument throughout this paper is that we should absolutely be worried
about Iran, or any rogue state, acquiring a nuclear weapon and that the Iran Deal (JCPOA)
contains fundamental flaws which will ultimately prevent the deal from, in the long term,
successfully barring Iran from joining the cadre of states possessing nuclear weapons, and
achieving greater regional peace and stability.
Let us turn now to addressing the first question: what are the specifics of the Iran Deal?
One of the key provisions that Iran must comply with is that it must reduce its uranium stockpile
to a maximum of 300kg, a significant reduction from its current 10,000kg stockpile.2 President
Barack Obama claims that this amounts to a 98% reduction in Iran’s nuclear stockpile.3 If Iran
follows through with this obligation than it will limit the amount of material it has available to
construct a nuclear weapon, thereby reducing its capacity to develop nuclear weapons. A key
goal of measures such as this is to reduce Iran’s break-out time—the time it would take to
produce a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium for manufacturing a nuclear weapon.4
Since Iran will still have nuclear infrastructure in place for power generation and other peaceful
means, they will still retain the resources necessary to produce a nuclear weapon if they so
choose to do so at any point. Since the major powers cannot completely eliminate Iran’s nuclear
capabilities, the next best option is to maximize Iran’s break-out time, thereby giving the major
powers more time to detect, and coordinate a response to, the threat of an Iran attempting to arm
2 Botelho, Greg. "What's in the Iran Nuclear Deal?" CNN.com. July 14, 2015. Accessed November 27, 2015.
3 Botelo, “What’s in the Iran Nuclear Deal?”
4 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details” www.bbc.com

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itself with nuclear weapons. Another key component of the JCPOA involves limiting Iran’s
uranium enrichment levels. Uranium enrichment works by filtering uranium hexafluoride gas
into centrifuges in order to isolate the isotope known as U-235.5 Low-enriched uranium contains
about a 3% concentration of U-235 and is used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants, but
uranium can also be highly enriched to the point where it contains a 90% concentration of U-
235, the concentration needed to produce nuclear weapons.6 Due to this fact, the JCPOA limits
Iran to keeping its uranium enrichment levels at a maximum of 3.67% and reduces its collection
of 19,000 centrifuges by two-thirds.7 Nuclear weapons can also be built with plutonium, and so
the JCPOA addresses Iran’s heavy-water nuclear reactor in the town of Arak. The spent fuel
from this reactor contains the plutonium necessary to manufacture a nuclear weapon, and so as
part of the deal Iran has agreed to redesign the Arak reactor so that it cannot produce weapons-
grade plutonium8 and “all spent fuel will be sent out of the country as long as the reactor exists”.9
Iran has agreed to voluntarily adopt these restrictions to its nuclear program, “…in return for the
lifting of crippling sanctions,”10 by the international community. The International Atomic
Energy Agency will hold the responsibility of monitoring Iran’s officially declared nuclear sites
in order to ensure their compliance with the JCPOA.11 Obama, echoing a key provision and
understanding of the Iran deal, stated that, “If Iran violates the deal, all of these sanctions will
snap back into place…So there is a very clear incentive for Iran to follow through and there are
very real consequences for a violation.”12 These aforementioned provisions and limitations
discussed within this section constitute the framework basis of the JCPOA; however, while it
5 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details” www.bbc.com
6 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details” www.bbc.com
7 Botelo, “What’s in the Iran Nuclear Deal?”
8 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details” www.bbc.com
9 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details” www.bbc.com
10 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details” www.bbc.com
11 Botelo, “What’s in the Iran Nuclear Deal?”
12 Botelo, “What’s in the Iran Nuclear Deal?”

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may appear like a favorable deal, such an evaluation only holds true for the very short term. In
the long run, the deal extends an unwise level of trust to Iran, leaving the rogue state with far too
much flexibility and an unsettling potential to develop not only the capabilities of its
conventional forces, but also a threatening nuclear weapons program.
While only the passing of time and acute observation will reveal with absolute certainty
whether the JCPOA will be successful or not in the long term, we may still evaluate the deal and
discuss the troublesome flaws which will significantly its impede the success. One flaw exists in
that while Iran must grant IAEA inspectors essentially free access to their declared nuclear sites
for the next 10-15 years, inspectors do not enjoy this same freedom of access to sites that Iran
has not declared as nuclear sites.13 This lack of true “anytime, anywhere” inspections imposes
meaningful resistance to the chances of the deal succeeding. For instance, even if inspectors or
world powers suspect that Iran may be cheating the deal at an undeclared covert site they cannot
take immediate physical action to verify or alleviate their suspicions. Instead, while, “The
Obama administration assures Americans that the Iran deal grants access within 24 days to
undeclared but suspected Iranian nuclear sites,”14 the troubling reality is that the, “…terms [of
the deal] permit Iran to hold inspectors at bay for months, likely three or more.”15 Essentially,
the language of the JCPOA allows Iran to strategically delay and prevent inspectors, via
manipulating the deal’s rules regarding communication channels and dispute resolution,16 from
gaining access to any sites that Iran has not explicitly declared. During this stalling period, Iran
retains full sovereignty and control over the suspicious site in question and may take measures to
13 Samore, Gary. "The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Harvard University. August 3, 2015. Accessed November 30, 2015.
14Fradkin, Hillel, and Lewis Libby. "Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even Close." WSJ.com (Wall Street Journal).
July 21, 2015. Accessed November 30, 2015.
15 Fradkin and Libby, “Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even Close.”
16 Fradkin and Libby, “Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even Close.”

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conceal or relocate the activity and materials in violation of the JCPOA, thereby presenting an
opportunity for Iran to covertly further its nuclear weapon ambitions, whether via research or
expanded uranium enrichment, while avoiding the ire of international sanctions. Another
significant obstacle to the deal’s success exists in the highly unfortunate fact that the deal does
not directly link the issues of Iranian nuclear ambitions, international sanctions relief and Iranian
support for terrorist proxies throughout the region/Iran’s efforts to destabilize its neighbors.
Even if Iran staunchly adheres to the limitations imposed on its nuclear program, the JCPOA
fails in that it allows for billions in sanctions relief to flow into the country without any strict
mechanisms in place to prevent those funds from benefitting the terrorist proxy groups Iran
supports.17 This means Iran remains acutely aware that it is free to wreak havoc in the region
with its proxy groups on an even larger scale with the help of the money that will flow back into
the country. The end result of this relatively soft policy on Iran’s sponsorship of international
terrorism holds grave implications for the long-term peace and stability of the region.
Furthermore, while the JCPOA reduces Iran’s short-term capability of acquiring a nuclear
weapon, it still allows Iran to legally practice enriching uranium, does not require it to
deconstruct any of its nuclear facilities, and allows for the continued research and development
of more advanced centrifuges and intercontinental ballistic missile technology.18 While this still
means that Iran’s nuclear program is restricted in the short-term, it also means that Iran can look
forward to 10-15 years in the future when it will more than likely be in a better position to
acquire a nuclear weapon of its own construction as a direct result of the advances in research
and development that it will conduct while it patiently bides its time waiting for the deal to
expire and the opportune moment to strike.
17Ernst, Joni. "The Danger of the Iran Deal." CNN.com. September 10, 2015. Accessed November 29, 2015.
18Ben-Meir, Alon. "The Good, The Bad and the Ugly About the Iran Deal." TheHuffingtonPost.com. July 22, 2015.
Accessed November 30, 2015.

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While Kenneth Waltz, in his article “Why Iran Should Get The Bomb”, presents a
compelling argument for why we should not worry about Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and
why we should even welcome it as foundation of regional stability, I believe he is ultimately
misguided in his assertions. A plurality of reasons exist for why we should worry about the
possibility of Iran (or any other rogue state for that matter) acquiring a nuclear weapon. First and
foremost, his argument appears to rely far too heavily on historical precedent. For instance, a
central pillar of his argument rests on the general trend exhibited by other nuclear states. Waltz
claims that, “The problem with these concerns [over how Iran will behave after acquiring nuclear
weapons] is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to
1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable
and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of
major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action.”19
Historical precedent can reveal trends that may hold true in many cases; however a trend does
not equal an unquestionable fact, especially when that trend is based on a relatively small sample
size, as there are not enough nuclear-armed states to constitute a sample size large enough to
draw definitive conclusions from. A trend is simply a trend, and that is all it is. Every trend will
hold true—until it doesn’t. As many a statistician can attest to, even the most rigid of trends
often have anomalies known as outliers, and these outliers are termed as such partially because
their occurrence is not expected—they lie outside the immediate sphere of expected outcomes,
yet they occur anyways, regardless of our expectations. In this sense, we must not rule out the
possibility that Iran, or any other rogue state seeking nuclear weapons, will behave as one of
these outliers and approach the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran with utmost urgency. A key
19Waltz, Kenneth."Why Iran Should Get the Bomb." ForeignAffairs.com. July-August 2012 Issue.Accessed
November 24, 2015.

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indication that Iran will behave as a belligerent outlier, operating outside the general trend
existing nuclear states have followed, is its previous track record of sowing regional discord and
instigating instability. Iran’s past conduct has explicitly and clearly demonstrated that it is able
and willing to, “…engage in clandestine, subversive behavior; Iran undermines regimes, supports
terrorist organizations and continually calls for the annihilation of another UN member state—
Israel.”20 When considering matters of international stability and the consequences of how a
particular state will behave within the international system, it is wise to defer to the general
trends of states, but it is far wiser to recognize the greater relevancy and inherent importance of
the particular state-in-question’s past behavior, trends it actively exhibits and its relationships
with other states. We can directly observe the simple truth of this statement in the vastly
different ways America perceives and reacts to different countries possessing nuclear weapons,
depending on the aforementioned factors. Consider America’s longtime allies, France and the
UK. America has enjoyed a long friendship with these states, during which they have built up a
favorable rapport with each other while all sharing a mutual respect for the established laws and
norms of the current international order. Due directly to the nature of these states’ amicable
behavior toward each other and generally agreeable behavior while acting on the international
scene, America has never expressed serious concern with or felt threatened by the nuclear
arsenals of these two companion states. Let us consider two states who do not share as close a
relationship with America as France and the UK do, but still act relatively “behaved”: Pakistan
and India. The international response to Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon, “…stands in stark
contrast to the reaction to India and Pakistan’s testing of nuclear weapons in 1998 within weeks
of one another. Although there was worldwide condemnation and the US imposed some
20 Ben-Meir, “The Good, The Bad and the Ugly About the Iran Deal.”

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sanctions, they were lifted only after a few months.”21 Now let us consider this response in
comparison to the international response to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran has still not
acquired a nuclear weapon, yet it faces harsher and longer-lasting consequences for the pursuit of
a nuclear weapon, whereas India and Pakistan were essentially let off the hook for acquiring their
nuclear weapons. This contrast is not due to simple chance or historical accident, but rather the
discrepancy in international reaction exists because Iran actively demonstrates to the world its
malicious intentions and eagerness to ignore international law while senselessly putting lives in
danger in its reckless determination to exert its influence in pursuit of regional dominance. The
fact of the matter is that, “Were Iran not engaged in such activities, there would have been no
uproar about its nuclear program and the sanctions might not have been sustained.”22 This
intuitive logic shows further resilience in the example of North Korea’s relationship with the
international community. North Korea is an actively rogue state which abuses its own people,
willingly maintains a hostile attitude toward the majority of the world community, and has
acquired its own small, yet still dangerous nuclear arsenal. North Korea continues to face
international sanctions originating years back directly due to its nuclear program and status as a
rogue state. We must take care to remember these facts when considering whether or not we
should fear another state’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Most importantly of all in this case,
we must not forget that while a majority of states may behave a certain way, this does not mean
all states will therefore inherently conform to the same behavior. With this in mind, we must
recognize that some states will inevitably act unpredictably and adopt courses of action which
may significantly deviate from international norms/expectations, and thus we must certainly
21 Ben-Meir, “The Good, The Bad and the Ugly About the Iran Deal.”
22 Ben-Meir, “The Good, The Bad and the Ugly About the Iran Deal.”

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worry over Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon and the likely failure of the JCPOA to prevent this
in the long-run.
Internalizing this knowledge provides the foundation for maintaining a wise, cautious and
adamant stance against allowing nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of rogue states. Contrary
to Waltz’s belief that nuclear proliferation will bring greater stability, permitting rogue states to
freely possess nuclear weapons acts less as an international stabilizer, and more as an
international fault line, exacerbating existing conflicts and potentially igniting new ones. It is
primarily for these reasons discussed throughout this paper that the international community
must remain on its guard to prevent Iran (or any rogue state) from acquiring nuclear weapons,
especially after having evaluated the likely effectiveness of the JCPOA and arriving at the
conclusion that while it may restrict Iran in the short-term, it provides no lasting solution and
simply sets Iran up to be in a better position to acquire a nuclear weapon than when the deal
began.

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Works Cited
1) Ben-Meir, Alon. "The Good, The Bad and the Ugly About the Iran Deal."
TheHuffingtonPost.com. July 22, 2015. Accessed November 30, 2015.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/the-good-the-bad-and-
the_b_7849296.html
2) Botelho, Greg. "What's in the Iran Nuclear Deal?" CNN.com. July 14, 2015.
Accessed November 27, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/politics/iran-nuclear-
deal-highlights/
3) Ernst, Joni. "The Danger of the Iran Deal." CNN.com. September 10, 2015. Accessed
November 29, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/opinions/ernst-iran-nuclear-
deal/
4) Fradkin, Hillel, and Lewis Libby. "Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even Close."
WSJ.com (Wall Street Journal). July 21, 2015. Accessed November 30, 2015.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-inspections-in-24-days-not-even-close-1437521911
5) "Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details." Www.bbc.com. July 14, 2015. Accessed November
24, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655
6) Samore, Gary. "The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide." Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs. Harvard University. August 3, 2015. Accessed
November 30, 2015.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25599/iran_nuclear_deal.html
7) Waltz, Kenneth. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb." ForeignAffairs.com. July-August
2012 Issue. Accessed November 24, 2015.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb