6. Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free Will
Hume, Enquiry §8
Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: Friday
Study Guide up now
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
2/7
7. Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free Will
Hume, Enquiry §8
Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: Friday
Study Guide up now
Open book, open hand-written notes
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
2/7
8. Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free Will
Hume, Enquiry §8
Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: Friday
Study Guide up now
Open book, open hand-written notes
No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
2/7
9. Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Free Will
Hume, Enquiry §8
Searle, from Minds, Brains and Science
Midterm: Friday
Study Guide up now
Open book, open hand-written notes
No technology: computers, phones, tablets, etc.
No typed text, unless it is OKed by me or a TA
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
2/7
10. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
11. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
A thinking thing exists
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
12. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
13. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
3
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
I am free
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
14. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
3
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
15. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
3
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
16. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
3
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)
Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
17. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
3
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)
Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
18. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
3
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)
Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)
Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
19. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
3
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)
Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)
Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)
Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
20. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
3
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)
Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)
Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)
Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims we
have a problem.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
21. The Story up to Now
Rationalism and Empiricism
Three essential claims for Descartes
1
2
3
A thinking thing exists
I am not my body
I am free
The difference between rationalism and empiricism
Innate ideas? (Hume on impressions)
Better: ideas of pure reason; ideas the existence of which pure reason can
disclose (independent of experience)
Idea of myself (and Hume’s objection)
Idea of non-mental substance (Strawson)
Relation of mind to body (Elizabeth)
In all these cases, Descartes insists we have an idea, where his critic claims we
have a problem.
Empiricism is one way of solving the problem
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
3/7
22. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
23. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
24. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
25. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
26. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
27. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
28. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
29. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
30. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
31. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
32. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states
Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
33. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states
Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction
Divine Foreknowledge
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
34. The Problem of Free Will
Determinism as a problem
Small scale universe: three balls in a genuinely closed box (no forces in or
out).
We can predict where they’ll all end up.
What failings we might have are due to ignorance about initial conditions, etc.
Scaling up: what changes?
More complex laws
More ignorance about initial conditions
Epistemological indeterminacy
Potentially non-deterministic laws
Determinism
Initial state and laws of nature yield all other states
Bracketing indeterminacy issues, perfect prediction/retrodiction
Divine Foreknowledge
Question: can freedom exist in a deterministic world?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
4/7
35. The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacy
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
5/7
36. The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
5/7
37. The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
Basic problem still remains
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
5/7
38. The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
Basic problem still remains
What about non-deterministic laws?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
5/7
39. The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
Basic problem still remains
What about non-deterministic laws?
Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministic
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
5/7
40. The Problem of Free Will
Quantum Indeterminacy: an aside
Epistemic indeterminacy
Precludes perfect prediction/retrodiction
Basic problem still remains
What about non-deterministic laws?
Work at wrong scale: macro-phenomena are deterministic
If my activities were determined randomly, it isn’t obvious that would be any
better
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
5/7
43. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
44. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
45. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
46. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
47. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
48. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
49. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
50. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])
Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
51. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])
Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])
Necessity is opposed to chance.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
52. Humean Compatibilism
Hume’s Compatibilism
The strategy
Puzzle stems from apparent conflict between “necessity” and freedom
Hume: the idea of free will that appears to oppose necessity is, Hume thinks,
a confusion.
It is one of those “ideas of reason” that is no idea at all.
If we can explain what is at stake in describing ourselves as free, it might turn
out that freedom is compatible with necessity.
Necessity
Everyone believes in it.
Example: prediction of drivers on road (employees [17], jailer [19])
Example: friend who behaves unexpectedly ([20])
Necessity is explicability, not secret power ([21])
Necessity is opposed to chance.
If everyone believes in necessity, what exactly is the problem?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
6/7
58. Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
7/7
59. Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
7/7
60. Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
7/7
61. Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
7/7
62. Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
7/7
63. Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?
“Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessity
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
7/7
64. Humean Compatibilism
Compatibilism, continued
Freedom
Constraint is being prevented from doing something one wants to do
Freedom is a lack of constraint
Is constraint necessity? No.
Compatibilism
Our psychological states are subject to natural laws
So long as our actions are determined by our choices, there is no problem
There is no other idea of freedom
The problem of free will
Do we need a non-compatibilist conception of freedom?
“Libertarianism”: we are free in a way that contradicts necessity
Is there an idea of libertarian freedom?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 10
7/7