course material

1. 1. According to the Mind/Brain Identity Theory, do mentalistic terms
1. According to the Mind/Brain Identity Theory, do mentalistic terms like “belief” or “pain”
compete with physical terms like “neuronal impulse” or “synaptic cleft”? Should we aim to
preserve the use of both mental terms and physical terms? Why or why not? 2. Reconstruct
Descartes’ first argument for dualism. Is it valid? If not, why not? (Are the premises true? Is
the conclusion true? Explain your answers.) 3. Descartes’ first and second arguments for
dualism both appeal to the same principle: namely, Leibniz’s Law. Will the same objection
suffice to undermine both? If not, why not? 4. What is a propositional attitude? Give three
examples that aren’t discussed above. 5. Consider the following set of propositions: (1)
“Linda remembers receiving an autograph from Muhammad Ali.” (2) “Linda does not
remember receiving an autograph from Cassius Clay.” • Do these propositions contain any
reference to propositional attitudes? If so, which? • Do these propositions attribute any
properties to objects? If so, which objects? • What conclusion, if any, can you derive from
these two propositions? (Does it follow that Muhammad Ali and Cassius Clay are different
people? 6. Descartes says that he can conceive of himself being a disembodied spirit (that is,
having a mind but not a body). What does conceiving of something mean? Does Descartes’
claim entail that it is possible for him to be a disembodied spirit? (See discussion of
conceivability and possibility in Chapter 8.) 7. Is a statue identical with the stone it is made
of? Is an organism identical with the collection of cells in its body? Can Leibniz’s Law be
used to show that either of these claims of identity is false? 8. In the Sixth Meditation,
Descartes argues that he is essentially a thinking thing. An essential property of a thing is a
property that the thing must have if it is to exist. Could Descartes be deprived of thought
and still be Descartes? Could Descartes have been born without the capacity of thought and
still be Descartes? If Descartes can’t doubt that he thinks, is that enough to show that
Descartes is essentially a thinking thing? 9. It was suggested in this chapter that we
understand causality best when there is a physical signal that passes from cause to effect
(the electricity example). However, the fact that “absences” sometimes cause suggests that
causality need not involve a physical signal. For example, suppose a patient dies because his
doctor fails to give him medicine. There is no “physical signal” between the doctor and
patient in this case, but there is causation. Does this point solve the objection to dualism
that concerns the nature of causality?10. Would the discovery of perfect correlations
between certain mental events and physical events (say, between experiences of pain and c-
fiber firings) be evidence against dualism? Why or why not? 11. What are the two central
arguments that advocates of the Mind/Brain Identity thesis typically appeal to when

2. defending their position? 12. Why might someone doubt that the Principle of Uniformity is a
surefire guide to which theories we should pursue? Do you think this skepticism is well-
founded, or is it just another example of philosophers’ penchant for “radical doubt”? 13.
Suppose we observe a perfect correlation between some mental property (like feeling pain)
and some physical property (like having one’s c-fibers fire). Apply the Surprise Principle
(Chapter 3) to see whether this observation strongly favors the identity theory over
dualism. 14.In the passage from Principles of Natural Philosophy quoted in this chapter,
Newton defends the Principle of Parsimony by saying that “Nature does nothing in vain.” Is
this idea consistent with what we now know about natural selection (Chapter 6)? 15. The
Principle of Parsimony is often thought to be relevant to the question of whether God exists.
Formulate and evaluate an argument for atheism that makes use of this principle. 16. On the
companion website, the psychologist U. T. Place defends the identity theory, but does not
mention the Principle of Parsimony. He does so by describing a situation in which the
correlation between two events justifies the conclusion that the two are identical. Evaluate
Place’s argument.17. What would it mean for something to be a first cause without being
God? What would it mean for something to necessarily exist without being God 18. Aquinas
seems to commit the Birthday Fallacy when he argues that, if every natural event has a
cause, then there must be one “first cause.” Why is this line of reasoning fallacious? Can you
think of another example of the Birthday Fallacy? 19. Why does Aquinas think that it is
“inconceivable” that the world is infinitely old? Do you think his argument is plausible? Why
or why not? 20. Why, if at all, do you think it might be helpful to reflect on unsuccessful
arguments for the existence of God? Explain your answer. 21. Which of the four arguments
discussed above do you find most convincing? Why? Problems for Further Thought 1 I
formulated Aquinas’s proofs by having him talk about objects that exist in “nature” (in “the
natural world”). What does “nature” include? Does it include just the things we can see or
hear or touch or taste or smell? 2 In discussing Aquinas’s third proof, I talked about Charlie
the atom as an example of a thing that is both eternal and contingent. Could something exist
that is both necessary and noneternal? It would exist at some time in each possible world,
though it would not exist at all times in the actual world. Can you give an example of such a
thing? 3 I criticized Aquinas’s third argument by discussing numbers, which I claimed exist
necessarily. Can the argument be reformulated so that this objection no longer applies? 4 I
criticized Aquinas’s fourth argument by discussing “maximum stupidity.” Can Aquinas reply
to this objection by claiming that stupidity is just the absence of intelligence?