httpsifes.orgsitesdefaultfilesbrijuni18countryreport_fi.docx

https://ifes.org/sites/default/files/brijuni18countryreport_finaled
ited1_0.pdf
ited1_0.pdf
ited1_0.pdf
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents?pdf=CDL%28
2008%29148-e
2008%29148-e
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/regulating-
political-party-financing-insights-from-praxis.pdf
ited1_0.pdf
ited1_0.pdf
ited1_0.pdf
ited1_0.pdf
ited1_0.pdf

ited1_0.pdf
ited1_0.pdf
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https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?p
dffile=CDL-AD%282010%29024-e
ited1_0.pdf
ited1_0.pdf
http://www.eods.eu/library/Financing%20political%20parties%2
0and%20election%20campaigns%20guidelines.Ingrid%20van%2
0Biezen.pdf
2008%29148-e
ited1_0.pdf
0Biezen.pdf
0Biezen.pdf
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780333978061_1
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-
political-science/article/impact-of-campaign-finance-laws-on-

party-competition/BAC344FE7C753C927E40BB07C362BDD1
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdrb.21106
0Biezen.pdf
0Biezen.pdf
2008%29148-e
0Biezen.pdf
https://ifes.org/sites/default/files/politicalfinanceandstatefundin
gsystems_english_0.pdf
0Biezen.pdf
https://www.quetext.com/
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
LOCAL ELECTIONS
30 June 2019
ODIHR Election Observation Mission

Final Report
Warsaw
5 September 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
...............................................................................................
................. 1
II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
....................................................................... 3
III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
........................................................................... 4
IV. ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
.............................................................. 5
V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
...............................................................................................
.... 6
A. CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION
.................................................................................. .............
.. 7
B. LOWER-LEVEL ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
................................................................................ 8
VI. VOTER REGISTRATION

.......................................................................................... .....
................. 9
VII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION
...............................................................................................
..... 10
VIII. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT
...............................................................................................
....... 11
IX. CAMPAIGN FINANCE
...............................................................................................
................... 14
X. MEDIA
...............................................................................................
............................................... 15
A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
...............................................................................................
.................... 15
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
...............................................................................................
...................... 16
C. MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS
...............................................................................................
..... 19
XI. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES
..................................................................... 19
XII. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS
...............................................................................................
..... 20

XIII. ELECTION OBSERVATION
...............................................................................................
......... 22
XIV. ELECTION DAY
...............................................................................................
.............................. 23
XV. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS
............................................................................... 25
XVI. RECOMMENDATIONS
...............................................................................................
.................. 26
A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS
...............................................................................................
...... 26
B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
.................................................................................. .............
.......... 27
ANNEX I: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS
............................................................................................
29
ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS
...............................................................................................
.......... 31
ABOUT ODIHR
...............................................................................................
.......................................... 34

REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
LOCAL ELECTIONS
30 June 2019
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report1
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following an invitation from the Government of the Republic of
Albania and in accordance with its
mandate, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an
Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the 30 June 2019 local
elections. The ODIHR EOM
assessed compliance of the elections with OSCE commitments,
other international obligations and
standards for democratic elections and national legislation.
The Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued
by the ODIHR EOM on 1 July
concluded that “The 30 June local elections were held with little
regard for the interests of the
electorate. The opposition decided not to participate, and the
government determined to hold the
elections without it. In the climate of a political standoff and
polarisation, voters did not have a
meaningful choice between political options. In 31 of the 61
municipalities mayoral candidates ran
unopposed. There were credible allegations of citizens being
pressured by both sides. Political
confrontation led to legal uncertainty, and many decisions of
the election administration were taken
with the political objective of ensuring the conduct of elections.

Voting was conducted in a generally
peaceful and orderly manner and counting was assessed
positively overall, although several
procedures were not always followed correctly”.
The elections took place against a background of a political and
institutional crisis, stemming from
long-standing antagonism between the governing Socialist Party
(SP) and the opposition Democratic
Party (DP). The latter had left the parliament together with the
Socialist Movement for Integration
(SMI) in February and determined not to participate in elections
until the resignation of the Prime
Minister and the formation of a technical government. On 10
June, President Meta issued a decree
cancelling the elections citing concerns for public safety and his
constitutional responsibility to
protect pluralism. Parliament declared the decree void and
initiated an inquiry procedure to remove
the President from office. The atmosphere of legal uncertainty
and standoff among key institutions
undermined public confidence in the legitimacy of the elections.
Regular opposition protests against the Prime Minister began in
February in Tirana and were often
marred by violence and vandalism directed at state institutions.
Closer to election day, the protesters
in other parts of the country targeted the election
administration, often including acts of intimidation,
violence and arson, and confrontations between municipal and
state police.
The legal framework could provide a sound basis for democratic
elections, if implemented impartially
and with genuine political will. The absence of political
agreement since the 2017 parliamentary

elections prevented progress on electoral reform, leaving most
prior ODIHR recommendations
unaddressed, including those concerning the de-politicization of
the election administration,
transparency of campaign finance and effectiveness of election
dispute resolution.
The Central Election Commission (CEC) regularly held open
sessions and comprehensively regulated
different aspects of the electoral process. The legally prescribed
political balance within the election
administration could not be achieved because of the main
opposition parties’ initial decision not to
nominate commissioners, and the CEC’s subsequent
interpretation that only those parliamentary
parties that stand for the elections could be represented in
election administration. The politically
1 The English version of this report is the only official
document. An unofficial translation is available in Albanian.
Republic of Albania Page: 2
Local Elections, 30 June 2019
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report
unbalanced composition of the election administration and the
opposition parties’ call on voters to
boycott the elections further undermined public confidence in
the process.
No ODIHR EOM interlocutors raised concerns about the
inclusiveness and accuracy of the voter lists.
However, voters declared incapacitated by a court and non-
citizens, irrespective of the length of their

residency, are not entitled to vote in local elections. In addition,
some interlocutors questioned the
quality of the process of verifying address data. Voter lists were
initially posted on the premises of the
Commissions of Election Administration Zones (CEAZs) and
Voting Centre Commissions (VCCs) as
required by law, but were removed in mid-June in most
opposition-governed municipalities, thus
limiting voters’ ability to verify their data.
The CEC was manifestly inclusive in its approach to candidate
registration, which increased the
number of contestants. However, the CEC interpreted the law
inconsistently and in an overly broad
manner, reducing legal certainty. In total, 97 mayoral
candidates and 544 candidate lists for local
councils were registered in 61 municipalities. Nevertheless,
voters did not have a comprehensive
choice from among major political alternatives as the main
opposition parties abstained from the
elections.
The quota system for candidate registration has created an
environment conducive to an increased
participation of women in political life. Only those councillor
candidate lists that included 50 per cent
of each gender were registered, resulting in 44 per cent of local
councillors' seats being won by
women in these elections. Eleven women ran for mayor and
eight (13 per cent) became mayors.
Nevertheless, few women hold leadership roles within political
parties. With some exceptions, women
politicians did not feature prominently in the campaign or
opposition protests. Two out of five CEC
members and 37 per cent of CEAZ members were women.

The visibility of campaign events was low, with the exception
of SP rallies at which the Prime
Minister was the central speaker. While local issues were
addressed at some small-scale events, the
focus fell on the non-participation of the main opposition
parties and cancelling the elections. The
language used by political opponents at rallies, in social media
and broadcast and print media was
often recriminating and inflammatory. Citizens, especially those
employed in public administration,
came under pressure to demonstrate a political preference. With
a low number of contestants and
many uncontested races, the essential choice presented to
citizens was whether to participate or not.
Campaigns may be financed from public and private resources,
with limits set for donations and
expenses. Positively, the CEC adopted instructions and
standardized reporting templates and
organized training for political parties and mayoral candidates
to enhance campaign finance
transparency. The CEC appointed financial experts to verify
campaign expenditures, who published
weekly reports, albeit of varying consistency and degree of
scrutiny.
Media are diverse but remain dependent on the political
alignment and business interests of outlet
owners. In the absence of effective self-regulation, journalists
operate in uncertain labour conditions
and often resort to self-censorship. Broadcast media focused
largely on the political and institutional
crisis, especially the heated exchanges between the DP and SP.
The limited campaign coverage
focused on the current Prime Minister, who heads the SP and
introduced the candidates in the regions,

as well as on the incumbent SP mayor of Tirana. The practice
used by the SP and officials of
providing the media with footage from official and campaign
events whilst restricting their access to
them, limited voters’ ability to obtain objective information.
The law guarantees the right to vote and to stand for election to
all citizens regardless of ethnic
background, race, religion or language. Several ODIHR EOM
interlocutors reported that members of
the Roma community are especially vulnerable to voter
registration problems because of the lack of a
permanent address. Some national minority parties decided not
to participate in the elections, limiting
the choice available to voters. The ODIHR EOM did not
observe any election materials produced by
the CEC in minority languages.
Electoral disputes were resolved by the CEC and the court
within the prescribed deadlines, but a
timely accessibility of their decisions and notification of
relevant parties to the case was not always
ensured. This undermines the transparency of dispute resolution
and does not serve to enhance the
public’s awareness of the rules of the electoral process. The
court narrowed legal standing of
contestants in candidate registration disputes, thus leaving
affected stakeholders without an effective
remedy.

The law provides for citizen, international and party observers
at all levels of election administration,
but only the latter are entitled to receive the counting and
tabulation results at counting centres. The
CEC accredited 630 citizen observers, but some NGOs
abstained from voter education and election
observation activities to avoid the appearance of expressing a
political preference by engaging in the
electoral process.
Election day was generally peaceful, with small protests and
isolated clashes in some communities.
Turnout varied among the municipalities, with the CEC
establishing the official nationwide figure at
22.96 per cent. The presence of party observers, predominantly
from the SP, was noted during all
electoral stages, with citizen observers present in smaller
numbers. Opening and voting was positively
assessed by the ODIHR EOM in the vast majority of voting
centres observed; however, group voting,
including family voting, was noted in 10 per cent of
observations. Almost two-thirds of the observed
voting centres did not allow for independent access for voters
with disabilities. Counting and
tabulation were assessed positively, although some procedures
were not always followed correctly.
The remarks of the main political stakeholders after the
elections again reflected deep divisions, and
several outgoing mayors stated publicly that they would not
accept the results of the 30 June vote and
would remain in office. The CEC received requests for
invalidation of election results in more than
40 municipalities, mainly due to alleged difference between
official turnout and data reported by the

party observers. The CEC rejected all these complaints mainly
for the lack of evidence. The Electoral
College stepped in to allocate mandates for all 61 local councils
due to CEC’s failure to reach the
required qualified majority for the decision. On 27 July, the
CEC approved the final election results.
This report offers recommendations to support efforts to bring
the electoral process in Albania further
in line with OSCE commitments and other international
obligations and standards for democratic
elections. Priority recommendations relate to engaging electoral
stakeholders in an inclusive dialogue
over electoral reform, guaranteeing the voters’ right to a free
and secret choice, eliminating the long-
standing problem of misuse of administrative resources,
enhancing independence and the impartiality
of the election administration and the judiciary, and effective
investigations of electoral violations.
ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities in improving the
electoral process and addressing the
recommendations contained in this and previous reports.
II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Following an invitation from the Government of the Republic of
Albania to observe the 30 June local
elections and based on the recommendation of the Needs
Assessment Mission conducted from 19 to
21 March, ODIHR deployed an Election Observation Mission
(EOM) on 23 May. Headed by
Ambassador Audrey Glover, the ODIHR EOM included 14
experts based in Tirana and 18 long-term
observers who were deployed throughout the country from 1
June. On election day, 174 observers

from 33 countries were deployed. The Mission remained in
Albania until 12 July to follow post-
election developments.
The ODIHR EOM assessed compliance of the electoral process
with OSCE commitments and other
international obligations and standards for democratic elections,
as well as national legislation. This
final report follows a Statement of Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions, which was released at a
press conference in Tirana on 1 July.2
The ODIHR EOM wishes to thank the authorities for the
invitation to observe the elections, and the
Central Election Commission (CEC) and the Ministry for
Europe and Foreign Affairs for their
assistance and cooperation. It also expresses appreciation to
representatives of other national and local
state institutions, election administration, political parties, civil
society, media, the international
community and other interlocutors for sharing their views.
III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
In November 2018, in line with the Constitution, President Ilir
Meta announced the 30 June local
elections. Citing concerns for public safety and his
constitutional responsibility to protect pluralism,

the President revoked the decree on 10 June. On 13 June,
parliament passed a resolution declaring the
revocation invalid and, on 19 June, it began a procedure,
initiated by the Socialist Party (SP), to
dismiss the President on grounds of having exceeded his
mandate.3 On 27 June, President Meta
announced another decree setting 13 October 2019 as the date
for local elections.4 During this period,
the CEC continued preparations to hold the elections on 30
June.
The political environment ahead of the elections was polarised
and antagonistic. In February, the
opposition Democratic Party (DP) and Socialist Movement for
Integration (SMI) rescinded their
mandates after parliament had voted down their initiative on the
vetting of politicians. Joined by
several smaller parties, the DP and SMI announced that they
would not participate in elections until
the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama (SP leader) and the
formation of a transitional
government that would organize early parliamentary elections.5
Regular opposition protests in Tirana,
led by the DP, began in February and were often marred by
violence and vandalism directed at state
institutions, including the offices of the prime minister.
The Prime Minister rejected the opposition’s demand and,
warning against establishing a precedent
that would threaten what he described as the “democratic co-
existence” of elected governments and
their parliamentary opposition, announced that the elections
would be held as scheduled.6
The political crisis intensified as election day approached. In
mid-June, nearly all opposition mayors

informed the CEC that they would implement the 10 June decree
and end all election preparations.7 In
some of these municipalities, protests targeted the election
administration, often including acts of
intimidation, violence and arson, and confrontations between
municipal and state police. Many
domestic stakeholders and the country’s international partners
called for dialogue to resolve the
2 See all previous ODIHR election reports on Albania.
3 The parliament resolution charged among other things that
the President had violated the principle of periodicity
of elections and the citizens’ right to elect.
4 Unlike the 10 June decree, the presidential decree of 27 June
remained unpublished in the Official Gazette,
although the publication of acts issued by the President is
required by law.
5 Before the elections, the SP held mayoral positions in 33
municipalities; the Macedonians’ Alliance for European
Integration Party (MAEIP) and Greek Ethnic Minority for the
Future Party (MEGA) held one mayoral position
each. Opposition parties held mayoral positions in 26
municipalities, including DP mayors in 16 municipalities
(Devoll, Dropull, Kamez, Kavaja, Klos, Kukes, Lezha,
Mallakaster, Mat, Permet, Pogradec, Selenica, Shkoder,
Tropoja, Vau i Dejes and Vora), SMI mayors in 8 (Berat,
Bulqiza, Cerrik, Delvina, Gjirokaster, Kucova, Skrapar
and Prrenjas), and PJIU mayors in Peqin and Rrogozhina.
6 See the Prime Minister’s ‘Seventh Letter’ of 1 June.
7 The mayor of Bulqiza (SMI) was the only opposition mayor
who did not inform the CEC that the local

administration would prevent elections from being held on 30
June.
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania
http://www.parlament.al/News/Index/8468
https://www.facebook.com/edirama.al/posts/1015672257720152
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political crisis, but political parties demonstrated little will
overall to engage in constructive co-
operation.8 This antagonism was indicative of the lack of
shared responsibility toward the integrity of
the electoral process that would transcend party divisions, and,
consequently, negatively impacted the
right of citizens to take part in government.
Following the European Commission’s 29 May recommendation
to open European Union accession
negotiations with Albania, on 18 June the European Council
postponed the decision until October
2019.

IV. ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Elections were held for a total of 61 mayors and 1,619
municipal councillors nationwide. Mayors and
councils are elected directly for four-year terms. Mayors are
elected in first-past-the-post contests and
councillors from closed lists under a proportional system. The
constituencies for local elections are
the territories of the municipalities. There are no specific
provisions for the conduct of unopposed
elections, and there is no minimum voter turnout requirement
for the validation of results. The number
of councillors to be elected in each municipality is determined
according to its population size and
ranges from 15 to 61.
To qualify for seat allocation, parties must pass a three per cent
threshold of votes cast in the
respective municipality, while coalitions must pass a five per
cent threshold.9 Local council mandates
are allocated to parties and coalitions according to the d’Hondt
method, while the distribution of seats
to parties within a coalition is conducted using the Sainte-Laguë
method.10
Local elections are primarily governed by the 1998 Constitution
(last amended in 2016), the 2008
Electoral Code (last amended in 2015), the 2000 Law on
Political Parties (last amended in 2017), the
2015 Law on Guaranteeing the Integrity of Persons Elected,
Appointed, or Exercising Public
Functions (so-called Law on Decriminalization), the 2001 Law
on Demonstrations, the 2008 Law on
Gender Equality in Society, the 2013 Law on Audio-visual
Media, relevant provisions of the 1995

Criminal Code and the 2015 Code of Administrative Procedures,
as well as CEC regulations and the
decisions of the Electoral College of the Court of Appeals of
Tirana (Electoral College). Albania is
party to major international and regional instruments relevant to
holding democratic elections.11
In an effort to address past ODIHR EOM recommendations, an
Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee on
Electoral Reform, co-chaired by representatives of the DP and
SP, was re-established in November
2017 to elaborate relevant amendments. Although it had a
technical mandate and followed an
inclusive and consensus-based approach, the work of the
committee was blocked by the opposition in
December 2018, and the electoral reform was forestalled by a
lack of political agreement.
8 See the general principles of the Council of Europe’s
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission) Parameters on the Relationship between the
Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a
Democracy: A Checklist, CDL-AD(2019)015 (24 June), pp. 7-8.
9 An independent candidate obtains a seat in a council if the
number of votes for this candidate is greater than the
minimal quotient defined for the allocation of seats for parties
and coalitions.
10 When voting for a coalition, a voter chooses one of its
constituent parties expressing thereby her or his
preference. The number of individual votes for a party within a
coalition defines the number of seats allocated to
this party out of the total number of seats won by the coalition
in a given constituency.

11 Including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), 1965 International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1979
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1990 International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 2003 UN
Convention against Corruption, 2006 Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), as well as the
1950 European Convention on Human Rights and
the 1998 Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities. Albania is also a member of the
Venice Commission and Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO).
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
AD(2019)015-e
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
AD(2019)015-e
Consequently, most ODIHR EOM recommendations remain
unaddressed, including those pertaining
to the de-politicization of election administration,
decriminalization of defamation and effectiveness
of election dispute resolution. Positively, on 10 May, the
government adopted two decisions aimed at
preventing the misuse of public administration and resources
during elections.12
The legal framework for elections, although largely unchanged

since the last elections, could
generally provide a sound basis for democratic elections.
Nevertheless, the lack of clarity in some
provisions, for example on the right of parties not to collect
supporting signatures or on the status of
parliamentary parties allowed for perceptions of bias in their
implementation by the CEC. Electoral
stakeholders did not always demonstrate political will to
implement properly legal provisions,
including when nominating members of the election
commissions and during the candidate
registration process.
With a view to strengthen pluralistic democracy, reaffirm the
right of citizens to take part in
government and demonstrate shared responsibility toward the
integrity of the electoral process,
political parties and other electoral stakeholders should engage
in an open and inclusive dialogue
and facilitate electoral reform addressing the recommendations
contained in this and prior ODIHR
reports.
The atmosphere of uncertainty and standoff among key
institutions undermined public confidence in
the legitimacy of the elections. The uncertainty was further
compounded by the disagreement among
the electoral stakeholders regarding the division of
responsibility between the Constitutional Court, as
the only body mandated to decide on the constitutionality of
presidential decrees, and the Electoral
College that is mandated to oversee the legality of the electoral
process. The Constitutional Court is
temporarily not functioning due to “judicial vetting”, an on-
going multi-year nationwide process of re-
evaluating all judges and prosecutors in Albania.

V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
Election administration comprises three tiers: the CEC, 90
Commissions of Electoral Administration
Zones (CEAZs) and 5,417 Voting Centre Commissions (VCCs).
Counting is conducted by Counting
Teams in 90 Ballot Counting Centres (BCCs), one for each
Electoral Administration Zone (EAZ).13
Two out of five CEC members and 37 per cent of CEAZ
members were women. While women
constituted 25 per cent of VCC members observed on election
day, including 19 per cent of the
chairpersons, 40 per cent of the voting centres visited included
no women commissioners.14
The law provides equitable opportunities for parliamentary
parties to be represented at all levels of the
election administration. Previously, ODIHR recommended to
allow for non-partisan appointment of
election commissioners with the aim of depoliticization of the
election administration. In this electoral
process, these entitlements were used by the parties for political
manoeuvring at the expense of the
impartiality of the election administration. The refusal of
opposition parties to nominate their
members to the CEC and CEAZs, combined with the CEC’s
subsequent interpretation of the law that
only those parliamentary parties that are contesting the
elections can nominate members, left the
12 See the 10 May Government’s Decisions on Measures and
Monitoring Activity, Use of Human, Financial and

Logistic Resources of State Administration During the Election
Process for 2019 Local Elections and on
Temporary Suspension of the Start of Procurement Procedures
by Municipalities from 1 to 30 June 2019.
13 As a rule, the EAZs correspond to the territory of
municipalities. In 10 municipalities (Durres, Elbasan, Fier,
Kamez, Korce, Lezha, Lushnje, Shkoder, Tirana and Vlore) that
have more than 80,000 voters, additional EAZs
are formed. In these municipalities, candidate registration and
tabulation processes are administered by the CEC.
14 One male head of a CEAZ informed the ODIHR EOM that
long working hours, difficult working conditions and
remote voting centre locations all factored into the low level of
women’s representation as VCC members.
http://www.kryeministria.al/newsroom/vendime-te-miratuara-
ne-mbledhjen-e-keshillit-te-ministrave-date-10-maj-2019/
election administration politically unbalanced. Consequently,
many ODIHR EOM interlocutors
expressed lack of trust in all levels of the commissions.
In line with previous ODIHR recommendations, in order to
enhance public confidence in the electoral
process, consideration should be given to alternative formulas

for nominating members of election
administration, supported by procedural safeguards for their
independence.
A. CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION
The CEC is a permanent body appointed by parliament. By law
it is composed of seven members,
three each nominated by the parliamentary majority and
parliamentary opposition15 with chairperson
elected by parliament through a process of open application.
During these elections, the CEC
consisted of five members, including the chairperson formally
not affiliated with a party, three
members nominated by the SP and one by the Republican
Party.16 The DP has not filled its quota of
two members since October 2018.
The CEC is in charge of the overall conduct of elections. It has
a broad mandate and responsibilities,
including issuing binding decisions, registering parties and
coalitions, training lower level
commissions, considering complaints, monitoring campaign
finance and accrediting international and
citizen observers.
The CEC regularly held open sessions, live-streamed online and
attended by observers and media, and
comprehensively regulated different aspects of the electoral
process. Remaining within its legal
competences, in several cases the CEC implemented the law
inconsistently or in a manner that
exhibited bias (see Candidate Registration).17 Some CEC
decisions, including those on candidate
registration denials and complaints, were published with a

significant delay, which undermined
transparency.18
To increase the transparency of the work of election
administration, the Central Election Commission
should systematically and in a timely manner publish all
decisions on its website.
The CEC adopted guidelines for administering the voting and
counting processes in a timely manner
and organized the training of the CEAZs and VCCs. Training
materials were well developed and the
ODIHR EOM assessed the training sessions positively overall,
but noted low attendance in some
cases. The CEC also developed comprehensive voter education
materials, including on election day
procedures and regarding criminal liability for electoral
violations. Video materials issued by the CEC
that included sign language interpretation were broadcast on
different nationwide TV channels.
15 The largest parliamentary majority and the largest
opposition party propose two CEC members each. In addition,
the next largest parliamentary majority and opposition parties
propose one member each.
16 The current CEC deputy chairperson is the former
chairperson, and was nominated to the CEC on the Republican
Party quota. He became deputy chairperson as a consequence of
a political agreement in 2017.
17 Rejecting the opposition’s request to replace the CEC-
appointed CEAZ members, the CEC issued an “individual”

decision, which requires a vote by a simple majority of its
members. This decision was then given a “normative”
effect, since the CEC instructed CEAZs to also reject DP and
SMI nominees for VCCs and Counting Teams.
Normative decisions require a two-thirds majority. According to
the Venice Commission’s 2002 Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters, “It is desirable that electoral
commissions take decisions by a qualified majority or
by consensus”.
18 Paragraph 68 of the Explanatory Report to the Venice
Commission’s 2002 Code of Good Practice in Electoral
Matters states that “Only transparency, impartiality and
independence from politically motivated manipulation
will ensure proper administration of the election process, from
the pre-election period to the end of the processing
of results”.
dffile=CDL-AD(2002)023rev2-cor-e
dffile=CDL-AD(2002)023rev2-cor-e
The 10 June presidential decree was regarded as void by the
majority of CEC members.19 In
municipalities governed by SP mayors, preparations for the
elections continued as planned. In almost
all municipalities governed by the opposition, the mayors
ordered the CEAZs to discontinue
preparations and vacate municipal premises.20 As a result, the
CEC had to reallocate more than 200

voting centres as well as a number of CEAZs and BCCs. The
opposition’s calls on the electorate to
boycott the elections, the political bias of municipal authorities
and an unbalanced composition of the
election administration all negatively affected the public
confidence in the electoral process.
B. LOWER-LEVEL ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
By law, the CEAZs appoint the members of the VCCs and
Counting Teams, distribute election
materials and consider complaints against their relevant VCCs
and Counting Teams. The CEAZs are
also in charge of candidate registration and tabulation of
election results at the local level, unless these
functions are performed by the CEC.
The CEAZs are composed of seven members and a non-voting
secretary, all appointed by the CEC for
each election. The nomination formula is similar to that for the
CEC, with the parliamentary majority
and opposition each nominating three members in all and the
seventh member in half of the CEAZs.21
While the SP nominated commissioners to all CEAZs, the DP
and SMI submitted no nominations
within the legal deadlines, thus prompting the CEC to appoint
members on their own initiative and
leaving all CEAZs without opposition appointees.22 As a result,
in 45 CEAZs the SP had four
commissioners, including the chairpersons.23 The other 45
CEAZs had three SP-nominated
commissioners, one CEC-nominated commissioner, and
operated without chairpersons.24
According to the law, the CEC-nominated CEAZ members could
be replaced by those proposed by

political parties before 31 May. On 20 May, the DP and SMI
submitted a request to replace the CEC-
nominated CEAZ members. In its interpretation of the diverging
provisions of the Electoral Code, the
CEC linked the parliamentary parties’ right to nominate
commissioners to their registration as
electoral subjects, and decided that those that did not register to
participate in the elections had
forfeited their right to nominate commissioners at all levels of
the election administration.25
The VCCs are responsible for organizing voting on election day,
as well as packing and transporting
ballots and other election materials after voting to the relevant
BCCs, where the Counting Teams
count votes centrally. In order to fill the resulting vacancies, the
CEC issued an open invitation for
applications and subsequently approved a list of potential VCC
candidates. The CEAZs formed the
19 The position of the CEC on the invalidity of the presidential
decree was expressed in its 13 June decision to reject
the National Unity Party’s withdrawal request. The Electoral
College further upheld the CEC decision.
20 In several municipalities this was followed by attempts to
eject election management bodies from their premises.
In Kamez, Kavaja, Klos, Kukes, Mat, Shkoder, Tropoja and
Vora this led to violent clashes, arson and destruction
of election materials and premises. Many municipal
administrations announced that they would hold cultural
events in the voting and counting premises on the eve of and on
election day.
21 Three members should have been nominated by the SP, two

by the DP and one by the SMI. The DP and SP can
also nominate the seventh member in 45 CEAZs each. In half of
the CEAZs, the chairperson is nominated by the
SP, and in the other half, by the DP. The deputy chairperson and
secretary belong to the main political party that
did not nominate the chair in the respective CEAZ.
22 The Electoral Code provides alternative mechanisms for
nominating commissioners in case nominating subjects
do not do so. On 18 March, the CEC published an open call for
citizens to fill vacant positions in the CEAZs. As
per CEC instruction, if the number of applications is greater
than the number of vacancies, commissioners are
selected by drawing lots.
23 In these CEAZs, one more commissioner and a non-voting
secretary were nominated ex officio by the CEC.
24 In these CEAZs, non-voting secretaries were nominated ex
officio by the CEC. The functions of chairpersons
were exercised by deputy chairpersons.
25 Different provisions of the Electoral Code on the
composition of election administration refer to “political parties
representing the parliamentary majority and parliamentary
opposition”, “registered political parties” or “electoral
subjects”.
VCCs after the 11 June statutory deadline.26 On 25 June, five
days past the deadline for their

formation, the CEC decided that Counting Teams would be
composed of two SP-nominated members
and two CEAZ-nominated members. On election day, most
VCCs and Counting Teams observed by
the ODIHR EOM were composed of four members. However,
four per cent of the observed VCCs
functioned without the required quorum. Several ODIHR EOM
interlocutors claimed that
commissioners nominated ex officio were inexperienced or in
reality represented the SP.27
Effective measures should be taken to further strengthen the
recruitment and training methods of
commissioners in order to ensure their professionalism. To
enhance the professional capacity of
election commissions, the Central Election Commission could
offer periodic training and certification
of potential commissioners, with the aim of creating a roster of
qualified people.
VI. VOTER REGISTRATION
Citizens aged 18 years or older on election day are eligible to
vote. Those serving a prison sentence
for committing certain crimes are denied the right to vote.28
Restrictions on voting rights of citizens,
who are mentally incapacitated, even when supported by a court
decision, are contrary to international
obligations.29 Despite previous ODIHR recommendations and
international good practice, non-
citizens are still ineligible to vote in local elections,
irrespective of the length of their residency.30
Voters over 100 years of age are automatically removed from
the voter list and must confirm their
records for re-inclusion, despite a longstanding ODIHR

recommendation.
Restrictions on the suffrage rights of persons with mental
disabilities and non-citizens in local
elections should be reconsidered.
The voter registration system is passive. Voter lists are based
on the electronic National Civil Status
Register (NCSR), which is maintained by the General
Directorate of Civil Status (GDCS) of the
Ministry of Interior and includes all voters with an official
residence in Albania.31 Voters were
included in the voter list of voting centres serving their place of
residence and could vote only there,
without the possibility to vote by mail, via mobile ballot box, or
from abroad.32 The final voter list
included 3,536,016 voters, including an unspecified number of
those who reside abroad, but maintain
an official residence in Albania.
The GDCS reported that the quality of the voter list was
improved by deleting duplicates and reducing
the number of entries with incomplete addresses from 284,065
in December 2018 to 727 on 21 May.
26 The VCCs are composed and appointed using a formula
similar to that used for the CEAZs. The law does not
explicitly prescribe how to fill vacant positions in VCCs, but
stipulates that the CEAZs “take necessary measures”
to enable the VCCs to reach a simple majority quorum of four
members.
27 A representative of the DP informed the ODIHR EOM that
the opposition discouraged their supporters from

participating in the open application process initiated by the
CEC.
28 The Law on Decriminalization suspends voting rights of
citizens serving a prison sentence for committing crimes
listed in some 60 articles of the Criminal Code.
29 See articles 12 and 29 of the 2006 CRPD. See also
paragraph 9.4 of the CRPD Committee’s Communication No.
4/2011 (Zsolt Bujdosó and others v. Hungary) which stated that
“Article 29 does not foresee any reasonable
restriction, nor does it allow any exception for any group of
persons with disabilities. Therefore, an exclusion of
the right to vote on the basis of a perceived or actual
psychosocial or intellectual disability, including a restriction
pursuant to an individualized assessment, constitutes
discrimination on the basis of disability”.
30 The UN Human Rights Committee in its 1996 General
Comment No. 25 to the ICCPR confirms the existence of
an emerging trend to grant voting rights to permanent residents
in local elections. The Venice Commission’s 2002
Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters states: “It would be
advisable for foreigners to be allowed to vote in
local elections after a certain period of residence”.
31 Local civil status offices compile the lists, which include
voters according to their place of residence.
32 Special voting centres, 19 in total, were organized in
hospitals, prisons, and pre-trial detention centres.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Downlo
ad.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f21%2fRev.1%2fAdd.7&Lang
=en

While this may have enhanced the accuracy of the voter list,
some ODIHR EOM interlocutors,
including one CEC-appointed auditor of the voter lists, stated
that given the volume of data, some
addresses may have been reassigned without verification.
The Electoral Code provides sufficient mechanisms for voters to
request corrections to their data.
After elections were called, the GDCS published updated
extracts from voter lists on a monthly basis,
allowing voters to register any changes with local civil status
offices. Corrections to voter records are
possible up to 40 days before the elections. As of then, and up
to 24 hours before election day,
requests for change or inclusion in voter lists can be made only
through a district court. Although the
law prescribes that each voter receives a written notification
from municipal authorities on the
location of their voting centre, the ODIHR EOM was informed
that this obligation was ignored in
some regions.33 Information on the time and place of voting
was also made publicly available on voter
lists posted in CEAZs and VCCs; however, in mid-June voter
lists were taken down on the orders of
the opposition mayors, depriving voters in these municipalities
of the possibility to verify their data.
VII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION
Any eligible voter resident in a municipality can stand for an
election, except those whose right to

stand for office is restricted by the 2015 Law on
Decriminalization.34 The Constitution also lists
categories of officials whose occupation is incompatible with
the right to stand.35
In order to field candidates, political parties, coalitions of
parties and groups of voters must first
register with the CEC as electoral subjects. Parties and groups
of voters must submit supporting
signatures of no less than one per cent of voters from the
respective municipality, unless they have
been represented in parliament or municipal government for at
least six months.
The CEC took a manifestly inclusive approach to candidate
registration. While this provided for a
larger number of contestants on the ballots, the CEC interpreted
the law in an overly broad and
sometimes inconsistent manner, reducing legal certainty. The
CEC registered the Democratic
Conviction Party (DCP) as an electoral subject on 27 April,
although the latter was only registered as
a political party on 25 April, with a court decision becoming
final on 10 May.36 The CEC did not
require the newly registered DCP to collect supporting
signatures.37
33 In a number of EAZs, voters claimed that they did not
receive these notifications. Moreover, the deputy mayor of
Shkoder informed the ODIHR EOM that it was the CEAZ’s
responsibility to distribute voter notifications, while
in EAZ No. 30 (Tirana) notifications were distributed with the
help of SP volunteers.

34 This includes citizens convicted of certain crimes or
deported, even in the absence of a final court decision, from
an EU member state, Australia, Canada and the United States,
as well as those under an international warrant.
35 This includes the president, high state officials, judges,
prosecutors, military, national security and police staff,
diplomats and members of election commissions.
36 In 2013 and 2015, the CEC rejected the registrations of
Civil Party of Albania and Shkoder 2015 Party that did
not provide final court decisions on their registrations as
political parties.
37 The Electoral Code does not specify how the period of six-
months tenure in parliament, council or mayor post
should be calculated, which facilitated the CEC’s circumventing
of this requirement. The CEC registered the DCP
as a parliamentary party on the basis of certificates issued by
parliament that defined the six-month period
backwards from the anticipated expiry of mandates of two DCP-
affiliated MPs in 2021. The ECtHR requires
eligibility conditions “to comply with a number of criteria
framed to prevent arbitrary decisions. […t]he
discretion enjoyed by the body concerned must not be
exorbitantly wide; it must be circumscribed, with sufficient
precision, by the provisions of domestic law”. See Podkolzina
v. Latvia case (application no. 46726/99, 6 July
2002), paragraph 35.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60417

The Electoral Code prohibits changes to candidate lists after
their final approval and does not regulate
the withdrawal of candidates. The CEC rejected several
withdrawal requests submitted by DCP
mayoral candidates, thus leaving their names on the ballot.38
The rules on candidate registration and withdrawals should be
formulated precisely and their
implementation by the Central Election Commission should be
guided by the principle of legal
certainty.
The Law on Gender Equality provides for a minimum 30 per
cent representation of women in all
public-sector institutions at national and local levels. In 2015,
the Electoral Code introduced a 50 per
cent gender quota for municipal councillors’ lists, with genders
alternating in every other position.
This created an environment conducive to increased political
participation of women, who won 706
local councillors mandates (some 44 per cent) and 8 mayoral
positions (13 per cent).
Non-compliance with the gender quota resulted in the rejection
of two candidate lists.39 Grounds for
rejection other lists or candidates included missing deadlines
for submission of documents and failure
to meet the residency requirement. The CEC published
decisions on rejections and reinstatements of
candidates with significant delays, thus negatively affecting the
transparency of the candidate
registration process.
In total, 97 candidates, including 11 women and 6 independent

candidates, stood for mayor. The SP-
led coalition “Alliance for European Albania” put forward
mayoral candidates in all 61 municipalities
and stood unopposed in 31 of them. For municipal councils, 2
coalitions, 38 political parties,
including 9 individual parties, and 11 independent candidates
ran on 544 candidate lists, totalling
9,872 candidates, including 4,839 women (or 49 per cent).
Nevertheless, abstention of major
opposition parties from the electoral process limited the choice
of political alternatives available to
voters. All 26 outgoing opposition mayors opted not to
participate in the elections.
VIII. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT
The campaign, which began on 31 May and lasted until the start
of electoral silence on 29 June, was
largely invisible.40 Apart from voter education billboards with
materials provided to municipal
authorities by the CEC, the ODIHR EOM observed few posters
or other signs of imminent
elections.41 Contestants campaigned predominantly in social
media, through door-to-door visits and
small-scale meetings with voters. There was little face-to-face
debate among the candidates.42 The
38 Representatives of the DCP informed the ODIHR EOM that
some of their candidates withdrew because of DP
pressure (in Kamza, Kavaja and Lezha) and one because of SP
pressure (in Skrapar). In addition, one candidate
claimed that his signature on the registration documents was
falsified.

39 On 22 May, the CEC rejected candidate lists for Lezha and
Vlore submitted by the Demo-Christian Alliance
Party, a member of the SP-led coalition. On 30 May, in the only
case related to gender quota compliance, the
Electoral College upheld the CEC decision to reject the list.
40 Contestants respected the electoral silence period. During
these days, the non-contesting DP repeatedly called on
citizens to boycott the vote and to record and film any abuses
on election day. The SMI issued statements
attacking the Prime Minister and Rudina Hajdari, the leader of
the Democratic Group in parliament, who was
elected in 2017 on a DP ticket and did not surrender her
mandate in February 2019. The DP and SMI called upon
citizens to refrain from violence and provocations on election
day.
41 The voter education materials publicized the polling hours,
but not the date of the elections. The ODIHR EOM
noted visual materials posted on and outside SP regional
offices. The DCP distributed leaflets and opened
campaign offices in some cities, with campaign materials
displayed on their exterior in several locations. Some
SP candidates opened temporary offices, especially in and
around Tirana.
42 Durres was an exception, where, during a 22 June debate
organized by local NGOs, the two mayoral candidates,
both women (SP and DCP), discussed community development
issues before an audience of 200 people. Shortly
after the debate, the SP candidate distributed a leaflet
describing her platform focused on local issues; it was the
only SP candidate leaflet observed in the regions by the ODIHR
EOM.

only large campaign rallies were those that featured the Prime
Minister as the main speaker
campaigning for the candidates from the SP-led coalition, both
in municipalities governed by the SP
and opposition mayors.43
The limited campaigning was overshadowed by national-level
developments that deepened long-
standing political divisions. Political discourse focused on the
non-participation of the main
opposition parties and on the date of the elections. Through
broadcast, print and social media, public
assemblies and meetings with party representatives, citizens
were exposed to a choice of views about
the elections themselves that in many areas were non-
competitive. As election day neared, opposition
leadership and the President issued increasingly critical
statements that pointed to the lack of
competition as an indicator of the SP’s supposed intent to
institute one-party rule. The Prime Minister
reiterated that the opposition parties, which had mayors and a
majority in local councils of many
municipalities, had excluded themselves from the elections. The
language with which political
opponents addressed one another was frequently recriminating
and inflammatory.44
Many candidates described to the ODIHR EOM the challenge of
motivating voters to turn out to
vote. Most party representatives described their frustration with
the overall state of political life and

the toll it was taking on their local communities. Several
interlocutors across the political spectrum
shared with the ODIHR EOM their belief that an agreement
between parties was needed to prevent
further erosion of trust in democracy, elections and politicians.
Some expressed misgivings about the
strategies their respective party leaderships had pursued.45
Others spoke of the lack of internal party
dialogue that had motivated them to leave their parties and
stand as candidates from other parties or
as independents. Several party officials, including some party
leaders, argued for greater internal
party democracy.46
To prevent inflammatory and insulting language during
campaign, political parties and electoral
contestants could develop and adhere to a common code of
conduct. Political parties should
strengthen enforcement of their internal ethical codes, foster
internal party democracy and ensure
that their internal functions respect and promote transparency,
equality and non-discrimination.
Citizens, especially those employed in public administration,
came under pressure to demonstrate a
political preference, which is at odds with Paragraph 7.7 of the
1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document.47
43 On 13 June, the SP rally in Librazhd was disrupted by
several hundred protestors throwing eggs and firecrackers,
resulting in arrests of and criminal charges being brought
against several DP officials and supporters. On 20 June,
however, the mayor of Shkoder attempted to prevent the SP
rally and led a simultaneous protest that resulted in

fireworks being thrown at the heavy police cordon separating
the two events. The police used tear gas to disperse
the protestors.
44 For example, speaking to media during a 2 June DP-led
protest, former president and prime minister Sali Berisha
described the Prime Minister as “a political cadaver that has not
yet been cremated”. Politicians routinely referred
to one another using nicknames, which were often pejorative.
The Prime Minister frequently referred to the DP
head as “Pinocchio” and to the SMI head as “the fortune-teller”.
45 One ODIHR EOM interlocutor said that the strategy had
been “imposed by bigger party players”. An opposition
mayor decried the lack of will by party leaderships to reach a
political solution. Another opposition mayor told
the ODIHR EOM that he did not have a firm position on the
boycott, but adhered to party line to implement it.
Two SP mayoral candidates expressed hope that elections would
be postponed.
46 An SP candidate informed the ODIHR EOM that “the
greatest political conflicts in Albania are inside the
parties”. Paragraphs 61 and 110 of the 2010 ODIHR and Venice
Commission Guidelines on Political Party
Regulation refer to recognised good practice that the internal
functions of political parties respect the principles of
non-discrimination and equality, and that “party constitutions
should be approved through a participatory process
… rather than by a party leader individually, and made widely
available to party membership”.
47 Paragraph 7.7 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document
provides that participating States “ensure that law and
public policy work to permit political campaigning to be
conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in which neither

administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties
and the candidates from freely presenting their
views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning
and discussing them or from casting their vote free
of fear of retribution”.
https://opinion.al/berisha-nje-mesazh-rames-komenton-dhe-
viziten-e-stoltenberg/
https://www.osce.org/odihr/77812?download=true
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304?download=true
The ODIHR EOM received concerns from citizens that turning
out to vote or abstaining would
potentially expose them to retribution in their communities.
Several described direct intimidation and
threats of firing or withdrawal of social service benefits.48
The ODIHR EOM received many allegations that, despite
existing prohibitions in the legal framework
and new measures introduced in May, public administration and
utility enterprise employees were
under direct and indirect pressure to engage in political activity
during and after working hours.49 The
mayor of Shkoder (DP) ordered all employees in municipal
administration to work from 7:00 to 19:00
on both 29 and 30 June.50 The ODIHR EOM observed
municipal officials, health services and
education staff at large SP-led rallies that in many cities were
held immediately after working hours.
The ODIHR EOM noted widespread perception among

interlocutors and the public that employment
in the public sector is dependent on political affiliation.51
Combined, this challenges Paragraph 5.4 of
the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document.52
The authorities and political parties should undertake utmost
measures to eliminate the long-standing
problem of misuse of administrative resources in and between
elections. Authorities should issue
precise rules that define how public resources may and may not
be used for electoral purposes.
Further steps should be taken to achieve the de-politicisation of
the civil service and ensure that
pressure is not applied on voters to attend campaign events or
vote in a particular way.
Municipal employees were among those protestors observed by
the ODIHR EOM that physically
obstructed election administration in at least 13 municipalities
governed by the opposition mayors.53
Most of these cases included the destruction of election
materials as well as confrontations between
municipal and state police.54 On 28 and 29 June, fires set by
protestors destroyed election
administration premises in Bushat, Has and Vau i Dejes.55
48 In Devoll, for example, two municipal employees showed
the ODIHR EOM copies of letters sent by the mayor
on 1 July, dismissing them from their posts, effective the same
day. Both alleged that they were let go for not
advocating the election boycott. The Commissioner for
Oversight of the Civil Service started an inquiry into one
of the dismissals.

49 As the campaign began, the Commission for Oversight of
the Civil Service issued instructions on neutrality,
impartiality and integrity in the performance of duty during an
electoral period.
50 The mayor released the order at a 26 June press conference.
51 When local governments change, new administrations
routinely restructure personnel, leading to a high turnover.
During SP campaign rallies in Elbasan (SP mayor) and Skrapar
(SMI mayor), where SP-coalition mayoral
candidates ran unopposed, the Prime Minister (and SP leader)
promised that women and those who had not been
used as “cannonballs“ of political parties would not lose their
jobs in the new municipal administrations. The
Prime Minister repeated this pledge in his post-election
remarks.
provides that participating States will maintain “a clear
separation between the State and political parties; in particular,
parties will not be merged with the State”.
53 Incidents occurred in Devoll, Diber, Has, Kamez, Kavaja,
Kukes, Mat, Pogradec, Prrenjas, Shkoder, Tropoja, Vau
i Dejes, and Vora. Among others, a school was set on fire in
Shkoder; Molotov cocktails were thrown at the state
police in Kavaja; protestors kicked in the door and threw in
smoke bombs at the city museum in Tropoja. In
Diber, police used tear gas to disperse protestors who threw
firecrackers at them.
54 The Minister of Interior announced that he would reorganise
the municipal police after it was used to undermine
the elections in some municipalities. The Commission for

Oversight of the Civil Service instructed its monitoring
teams to initiate disciplinary proceedings against civil servants
involved in violent acts against the election
administration. Compliance varied significantly among the
different municipalities, ranging from claims from
Berat, Kavaja, Kukes, Lezha, Mallakaster, Mat, Prrenjas,
Shkoder and Tropoja that the instruction was void due
to 10 June presidential decree, to initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against employees who had publicly
indicated their political preferences.
55 Citing the Law on Local Self-Government, on 28 June the
Prime Minister removed the mayor of Vau i Dejes for
serious violations of constitutional authority.
https://shqiptarja.com/lajm/bashkitw-e-djathta-kwrkojnw-
lirimin-e-kzazve-dhe-qendrave-tw-votimit#523919
http://www1.kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/komunikim-publik-i-
kryeministrit-pas-perfundimit-te-zgjedhjeve-te-30-qershorit/
https://mb.gov.al/2019/06/19/qendrimi-i-ministrit-te-
brendshem-sander-lleshaj-ne-lidhje-me-sulmet-ndaj-kzaz-ve-ne-
vend/
https://shqiptarja.com/lajm/djegia-e-kzaz-nw-bushat-lleshaj-
kryebashkiaku-i-vaut-tw-dejws-do-shkarkohet?r=kh1
Despite a significant number of women candidates, women
continue to hold few leadership roles in
political parties.56 With a few exceptions, women politicians
were not prominent but participated in
the campaign and opposition protests.57

Women politicians affiliated with the opposition were among
the first to call for an end to violence
and vandalism associated with the protests, including in
Shkoder. A few ODIHR EOM interlocutors
noted that the threat of violence may have inhibited women’s
participation in public assemblies and as
election observers and voters. Several women politicians
described to the ODIHR EOM the particular
challenges of promoting women’s participation as candidates,
members of election administration and
voters in rural areas, where insufficient educational
opportunities and conservative traditional norms
combine to limit prospects.
Awareness should be raised about the importance of equal
participation of women and men in public
and political life, in both urban and rural areas, and with a
particular emphasis on the role of women
within political parties and electoral processes.
IX. CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Electoral campaigns may be financed from public and private
resources, including loans. Public funds
are allocated to parties for their regular activities based on their
results in the last parliamentary
elections. Additional public funds are provided for campaign
purposes to all parties contesting the
elections as an advance, and recalculated after the elections.58
On 16 May, the parliament allocated
ALL 65 million (some EUR 533,000) for these purposes.59 On
10 June, the CEC divided the sum
among the parties contesting the elections in proportion to their
results in the last local elections: ALL
41 million went to the SP, and the remainder to 35 other eligible

contesting parties. Parties that secure
fewer votes than their funding entitlement must repay the
difference. Independent candidates are not
entitled to public funding.
Donations from both citizens and domestic legal entities,
including in-kind, are capped at ALL 1
million (EUR 8,200).60 Contributions above ALL 100,000 must
be made through a designated bank
account. Each electoral subject had to register all donations in a
special register approved as a
template by the CEC. Total campaign expenditure for these
elections was capped at an equivalent of
ALL 408 million for political parties and ALL 20.4 million for
independent candidates. Many ODIHR
EOM interlocutors claimed that since the opposition did not
participate in elections it was not
necessary to spend much on campaigning and total expenses
were very low.
56 CEDAW Committee, in its Concluding Observations on the
fourth periodic report of Albania (25 July 2016,
CEDAW/C/ALB/CO/4, paragraph 26) noted the increased
representation of women in political life but drew
attention to their insufficient representation in decision-making
roles and to the barriers to participation that
disadvantaged or marginalized groups, such as Roma and
Egyptian women and women with disabilities, continue
to face, including to exercising their right to vote.
57 Two political parties, the SMI and the Red and Black
Alliance Party, are headed by women. See OSCE
Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/09 on Women’s

Participation In Political And Public Life, which calls on the
participating States to “Encourage all political actors to
promote equal participation of women and men in
political parties, with a view to achieving better gender-
balanced representation in elected public offices at all
levels of decision-making”.
58 Parties that received more than 0.5 per cent of valid votes
during the last parliamentary elections receive 95 per
cent of the funds, proportionally to the number of valid votes
received. The remaining 5 per cent is distributed to
parties that received less than 0.5 per cent of votes and to
parties that did not participate in the last elections.
59 EUR 1 equals approximately ALL 122 (Albanian Lek).
60 Anonymous contributions, donations from recipients of
public funds and contracts above an established amount,
donations from partners in public projects, media companies,
and debtors to the state budget or state institutions
are prohibited.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Dow
nload.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fALB%2fCO%2f4&Lan
g=en
https://www.osce.org/mc/40710?download=true
https://www.osce.org/mc/40710?download=true
In May 2017, the Law on Political Parties was amended to
reduce the costs of campaigns, enhance
campaign finance transparency and accountability and introduce

new measures against electoral
violations. Shortly before the elections, the CEC, which is the
oversight body for campaign finance
matters, provided detailed guidance for the implementation of
campaign finance rules by contestants
and auditors, thus contributing to legal certainty.
On 11 April, the CEC adopted an instruction on the verification
of campaign expenditures, based on
which it appointed financial experts to monitor campaigns.
Positively, the experts issued weekly
reports on campaign expenditures. While these reports were
published on the CEC website, the
methodology used to compile them was not always consistently
applied. Several reports described
difficulties that the financial experts faced locating some party
offices, which precluded effective
monitoring. Some experts appeared to rely heavily on the
information that the political parties were
willing to provide instead of their own analysis of the data.
In another positive move, on 8 May, the CEC approved a
standardized template and guidelines for
campaign finance reporting, which political parties and, for the
first time, mayoral candidates were
required to use to record, document and report on their
campaign funds. The CEC also held a series of
training seminars for mayoral candidates and political parties on
documenting the funds received and
spent during the campaign.
Electoral subjects are obliged to submit to the CEC and make
public the final reports on their
campaign income and expenditure within 60 days of the
announcement of official results. Within five
days of this announcement, the CEC must appoint auditors to

review the contestants’ final campaign
finance reports. The law does not prescribe specific deadlines
for completing the audit, but requires
the CEC to publish the auditors’ reports no later than 30 days
after their submission.
The CEC may impose fines on contestants and donors for non-
compliance with campaign finance
rules, as well as for non-cooperation with the CEC auditors.
According to some ODIHR EOM
interlocutors, the range of fines applied for campaign finance
violations is not dissuasive, although
certain violations may lead to an up to five year suspension of
public financing for a political party. In
April 2019, the CEC publicly acknowledged the absence of
legal provisions that would allow the CEC
to conduct in-depth financial investigations, in particular on
their own initiative or as regards
transactions abroad.61 Some ODIHR EOM interlocutors
questioned the overall effectiveness of the
party finance oversight mechanisms, arguing that there are ways
to circumvent the regulations and
that auditors may be reluctant to carefully scrutinize party
finances for fear of retribution.
Consideration should be given to reviewing the law to ensure
that the CEC has the appropriate
powers and procedures to effectively oversee and enforce party
and campaign finance rules.
X. MEDIA
A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
The media environment is diverse but constrained by a limited

advertising market. According to
ODIHR EOM interlocutors, limited profitability has led to
media outlets acting as lobbying platforms
for their owners. In the absence of effective self-regulation and
with uncertain labour conditions,
journalists remain vulnerable to pressure and often resort to
self-censorship. Intimidation, harassment
and assaults against journalists, while condemned by the
authorities, are rarely thoroughly
investigated and prosecuted, creating an atmosphere of
impunity. Television (TV) remains the leading
source of political information, while online portals and social
media have rapidly replaced the print
61 On 3 April, the CEC chairperson presented the report on
CEC activities in 2018 before parliament.
http://cec.org.al/raportimi-i-kqz-se-ne-kuvendin-e-
shqiperise/?fbclid=IwAR0Hrl0lXPlU1Dkuw64TfHt7q7YD3aPcq
_fB3NKONBBzqwJhFLMo0qkn3dU
media as a source of political opinion and commentary. The
2016 amendments to the Audio-visual
Media Law, while providing for formal transparency of media
ownership, also cancelled the limits on
the share of ownership of broadcast media that a single
proprietor can hold.62 The subsequent
digitalization process resulted in one family controlling three of
the five national TV frequencies,
raising concerns about ownership concentration.63

The audiovisual media law should be amended to effectively
limit concentration of media ownership
in the broadcast sector.
Following digitalization, the public broadcaster RTSH has
significantly expanded its portfolio, now
broadcasting on 12 channels, including RTSH-2 that airs in
primetime in five national minority
languages: Aromanian, Greek, Macedonian, Roma and Serbian.
It is supervised by the Steering
Council, an 11-member collegial body appointed by
parliament.64 RTSH’s General Director Thoma
Gëllçi is a former editor-in-chief of the SP newspaper Zëri i
Popullit and served as the Head of the
Department of Information in several SP governments.
Furthermore, the RTSH remains partially
dependent on state funding.65 Dependence on the state budget
and politicization of RTSH
management raise concerns about the impartiality of the public
broadcaster.66
The Audiovisual Media Authority (AMA) is the main regulator
for the broadcast media. It allocates
broadcast licenses and oversees media’s compliance with the
legal framework outside of elections. It
consists of a chairperson and six members, all appointed by
parliament. ODIHR EOM interlocutors
raised concerns about the body’s impartiality, especially during
the allocation of broadcasting
licenses.67 On 4 July, the parliament dismissed one AMA
member, citing conflict of interest.68
The independence of the media regulator and public broadcaster
should be further strengthened
through measures that prevent conflict of interest. Senior
management positions at the public

broadcaster should not be accessible to people with clear
political affiliation.
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Constitution and legislation provide for freedom of
expression and prohibit censorship. Contrary
to previous ODIHR recommendations, defamation remains a
criminal offense, punishable with fines
up to ALL 3 million. Moreover, the proposed amendments to the
Law on Audiovisual Media and the
Law on Electronic Communications, approved and released for
public scrutiny by the government on
62 The OSCE Representative on the Freedom of the Media
(RFOM) concluded that the amendments “could in the
long term very negatively impact media plurality and therefore
media freedom in Albania”. The 2009 Declaration
of UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and
Expression (RFOE) and the OSCE RFOM calls states to
“put in place a range of measures, including […] rules to
prevent undue concentration of media ownership”.
63 According to the National Business Centre, the Hoxha
family owns 100 per cent of Top Channel and some 51 per
cent of DigitAlb. The latter owns 100 per cent of ADTN. Each
company holds one national license. Article 62.4
of the Law on Audio-Visual Media prohibits any physical or
legal person who owns a national license from
owning more than 20 per cent of a company that holds another
national license.
64 Six members are nominated by the ruling majority and five
by the opposition.
65 According to the RTSH, during 2018 some 30 per cent of its

budget was sourced from the state, while 53 per cent
from broadcast tax (ALL 100 per month for every household).
Some 9 per cent came from advertising, and the
rest from renting out transmission antennas or broadcasting for
third parties.
66 Paragraph 8.20 of the 2008 PACE Resolution No 1636
“Indicators for Media in a Democracy” designates the
next basic principle: “public service broadcasters must be
protected against political interference in their daily
management and their editorial work. High management
positions should be refused to persons with clear party
political affiliations“.
67 Some ODIHR EOM interlocutors alleged that AMA
chairperson’s past employment as a director of DigitAlb may
have influenced the authority’s decision to provide multiple
nationwide licenses to companies affiliated with
DigitAlb owners.
68 A 2001 joint report by the UN RFOE and the OSCE RFOM
states that “broadcast regulators and governing
bodies should be so constituted as to protect them against
political and commercial interference”.
https://www.osce.org/pc/165276?download=true
https://www.osce.org/fom/37188?download=true
http://www.qkr.gov.al/
https://www.rtsh.al/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/RAPORT-
VJETOR-RTSH-2018.pdf
https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-
en.asp?FileID=17684&lang=en
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=4
8&lID=1

3 July, entitle the regulator to remove or amend website and
blog content for a wide range of
violations, including those of professional and ethical
standards. The amendments also introduce fines
up to ALL 1 million that must be paid before the legal remedies
are exhausted. The amendments were
widely criticized domestically and internationally, including by
the OSCE RFOM who stressed, that
AMA “must not be a substitute for the independent judiciary or
proper self-regulatory mechanisms on
issues of freedom of expression”.69 While the amendments are
yet to be voted by parliament, their
adoption in original form would have a chilling effect on the
media.
Campaign coverage in broadcast media is regulated in detail by
the Electoral Code, while print and
online media are largely unregulated. The law provides for free
time on the RTSH to “registered
parties”, allocating markedly more time to those that won seats
in the last parliamentary elections than
to the non-parliamentary parties and independent candidates
contesting these elections. The CEC
interpreted the legal requirements to exclude from allocation
those parliamentary parties that did not
participate in these elections.70 The contestants showed limited
interest in free airtime. ODIHR EOM
media monitoring indicated that only 37 out of the 102 free time
slots allotted to contestants on
RTSH-1 were used.

Broadcasters that air campaign advertisements must offer the
same prices to all contestants and submit
pricelists to the CEC.71 Only 7 of the 54 private broadcasters
submitted the pricelists to the CEC and
informed the ODIHR EOM that no advertising time was
purchased.72 However, during the last three
days of the campaign, five private broadcasters aired DCP
materials free of charge.73 The value of the
airtime provided by some media at no cost exceeded the limit
set for in-kind campaign donations.
Market value of these advertisements was not reflected in the
DCP’s interim financial reports.
The ad hoc Media Monitoring Board (MMB) oversees media’s
compliance with the Electoral Code
during the campaign period. Although the CEC should have
established the MMB 40 days before the
start of the campaign, it was only formed on 28 May (32 days
before). Assisted by the AMA, the
MMB started to monitor only 14 TV channels on 1 June, one
day after the campaign started.74
The Electoral Code requires broadcast media to allocate all
parties that won over 20 per cent of seats
in the last parliamentary elections twice the amount of news
coverage than other parliamentary parties
receive, which is contrary to the international commitments.75
Some ODIHR EOM media
interlocutors noted that the MMB did not provide any
clarifications to the media on how to function in
a situation, when the opposition boycotted the elections. The
MMB chose to monitor only contesting
69 Calling for their withdrawal, 10 prominent Albanian media
and human rights organizations expressed concerns

that the amendments could “increase [the level] of censorship
and self-censorship in the local media and could
contribute to further setbacks on media freedom and freedom of
expression in Albania”. On 15 August, the
President issued a statement expressing his concerns over the
government-proposed anti-defamation draft law.
See also the statement and the legal review of the OSCE RFOM.
70 On 30 May, the CEC provided the SP with 60 minutes, SDY
with 30 minutes, all other non-parliamentary parties
contesting the elections with 10 minutes and independent
candidates with 5 minutes of free airtime on the RTSH.
71 The Electoral Code limits the amount of paid airtime for
each private broadcaster for the campaign to 90 minutes
for parliamentary and 10 minutes for non-parliamentary parties
and independent candidates. The 2007 Council of
Europe’s Committee of Ministers Recommendation
CM/Rec(2007)15 recommends to all participating states that
their “regulatory frameworks […] ensure that all contending
parties have the possibility of buying advertising
space on and according to equal conditions and rates of
payment”.
72 In these pricelists, most media outlets also offered pay-for
space in news and current affairs programmes.
73 Some media outlets informed the ODIHR EOM that the free
airtime was provided to the DCP as it did not have
sufficient resources to pay for advertisements. Some of these
media did not submit pricelists to the CEC.
74 The CEC did not approve the MMB’s 3 June request to
recruit more staff to monitor a larger sample.
requires the participating States to “Provide that no legal

or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded
access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for
all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in
the electoral process”. Paragraph 8.5 of the 2008
PACE Resolution No 1636 highlights that “political parties and
candidates must have fair and equal access to the
media”.
https://www.ecpmf.eu/news/ecpmf/joint-statement-against-
albanian-anti-defamation-law
http://president.al/en/reagim-presidentit-te-republikes-sh-t-z-
ilir-meta-6/
https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-
media/425453
https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-
media/426152
https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/committee-of-
ministers-adopted-texts/-
/asset_publisher/aDXmrol0vvsU/content/recommendation-cm-
rec-2007-15-of-the-committee-of-ministers-to-member-states-
on-measures-concerning-media-coverage-of-election-
campaigns?inheritRedirect=false
parties, and was thus unable to fully assess the legally
prescribed balance in the coverage of all
parliamentary parties.
The Electoral Code should be amended to guarantee equal
access to the media for all contesting
parties in all types of editorial programming and to allow all
contestants to purchase advertising

space under equal conditions. Additional considerations could
be given to allocating a certain
amount of free time equally to all contestants.
The MMB submitted its first two weekly aggregated reports
only on 18 June, followed by a third
report three days later.76 In these reports, the MMB arbitrarily
proposed that the CEC order all 14
monitored media outlets to compensate the Social Democratic
Party and 2 outlets to compensate the
DCP with 30 minutes of news coverage. While the CEC ordered
the compensation on 22 June, the
fourth report presented to the CEC on 28 June indicated that the
outlets had failed to comply with the
request. The MMB reports were devoid of analysis and largely
only included statistical information
prepared by AMA, followed by general administrative
proposals. Some MMB reports and monitoring
results were not published on the CEC website, thus
undermining transparency.
The responsibilities of the MMB should be clearly defined. The
MMB should adopt a monitoring
methodology in a timely manner, publish without delay its
media monitoring reports, as well as
decisions and other types of letters and requests to the media.
The MMB should be allotted adequate
resources for more detailed media monitoring, including of
regional broadcasters.
Many ODIHR EOM interlocutors criticized the long-standing
widespread practice of the main
political parties and public officials providing media outlets
with pre-recorded or live footage from
official and campaign events, while such events are closed to
the media.77 Although on 3 June the

MMB called on the media to explicitly label all news coverage
produced by political parties, such
footage remained unidentifiable throughout the campaign,
potentially misleading viewers about its
nature. Some ODIHR EOM interlocutors stressed that, in these
elections, Prime Minister Rama’s
official and campaign activities were generally both filmed and
transmitted exclusively by the
Facebook-based channel ERTV, which other outlets could only
rebroadcast.78 The practice of
restricting media access to public events organised by state
officials and political parties limited the
voters’ ability to obtain objective information during the
campaign. It also challenged the fundamental
right of the media to receive information and fulfil their
watchdog functions with the effect of
reducing the accountability of the state officials to the public.79
Legislation should be amended to ensure that the media are able
to independently cover activities of
electoral contestants with a view to limit the use of party
produced content in news programming and
avoid misleading voters. Whenever content produced by
political parties is used by the media, it
should be clearly labelled.
76 Starting with 7 June, the MMB provided daily monitoring
results to the CEC.
77 Most national and regional media outlets complained to the
ODIHR EOM that they were not allowed to film
official or campaign events that feature Mr. Rama.
78 The Prime Minister’s communication office informed the
ODIHR EOM that such events are always open to the

media, while the purpose of footage produced by the office and
the party is to merely assist the media, and it is
ultimately the outlet’s choice whether or not to air it.
79 The right to receive and impart information is guaranteed by
the Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
the Human Rights. Paragraph 26 of the 1996 UN CCPR General
Comment No. 25 to Article 25 of the ICCPR
states: “the free communication of information and ideas about
public and political issues between citizens,
candidates and elected representatives is essential. This implies
a free press and other media able to comment on
public issues without censorship or restraint and to inform
public opinion”.
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
https://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/general%20c
omment%2025.pdf
C. MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS
The ODIHR EOM’s media monitoring results indicate that the
listless campaign was overshadowed
by the ongoing political crisis, with news and talk shows
focusing on increasingly heated exchanges
between the DP and SP leadership.80 This has narrowed the
scope of information about the
contestants, especially outside of the capital, thus limiting the

voters’ opportunity to make an
informed choice. A notable exception was the media coverage
of the incumbent mayor of Tirana and
SP candidate Erion Veliaj, and introductions of other SP
candidates by Prime Minister Rama.
The SP and DP dominated the news coverage in all monitored
media outlets, with the former
receiving between 29 and 34 per cent and the latter between 20
and 26 per cent of coverage. The level
of polarization was reflected in the tone of the coverage. The
two most watched TV stations, Top
Channel and TV Klan, covered the SP in a mainly positive and
neutral tone, and the DP in a neutral
and negative tone. By contrast, News 24 covered the SP in a
negative and neutral tone, while the DP
in neutral and positive tone. Similarly, Vizion Plus covered the
DP in a positive and neutral manner
and the SP in a more balanced manner, with an equal share of
positive and negative coverage. The
public RTSH-1 was marginally more neutral, with the SP
covered in a neutral and positive manner,
and the DP in a neutral tone.81
Similarly to the news, the talk shows and current affairs
programs on Top Channel, News 24 and
RTSH-1 also reflected the outlets’ editorial policy. While Top
Channel and RTSH-1 mainly served as
a platform to promote the SP, the talk shows on News 24 were
critical of the ruling party. However,
the talk show Opinion on TV Klan differed from the outlet’s
news coverage, serving as a platform for
SP criticism. Talk shows and current affairs programmes on
Vizion Plus devoted almost twice the
amount of time to the SP as they had to DP, 44 and 23 per cent
respectively, with the tone being

mostly neutral for both parties.
While the Panorama news portal also devoted more space to the
SP than to DP, 33 per cent to the
former and 24 to the latter, it strongly criticized the SP and the
government, while DP was covered
mainly neutrally and positively. Syri.net displayed a clear bias
against the SP, the government and the
mayor of Tirana, and was favourable towards the DP. Both
websites also allotted considerable
amounts of neutral coverage, seven and nine per cent
respectively, to the SMI.
Women candidates and politicians received very limited
coverage during the campaign. Although
more than 11 per cent of the mayoral candidates and half of
local municipal candidates were women,
during the campaign all private media devoted only between 3
and 11 per cent of coverage to them.
While RTSH-1 allotted somewhat more time to women (17 per
cent), male politicians also dominated
in their news and current affairs programmes.
XI. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES
The law provides for full political, civil and social rights for
persons belonging to national minorities
and guarantees the right to vote and to stand for election to all
citizens regardless of ethnic
background, race, religion or language. Campaigning in national
minority languages is permitted and
was observed in several municipalities, notably in Pustec and
Finiq. While official acts of the election

80 The ODIHR EOM monitored primetime coverage on five TV
stations (public RTSH-1 and private News 24, Top
Channel, TV Klan and Vizion Plus) and followed two online
sources (Panorama and syri.net).
81 The RTSH informed the ODIHR EOM that coverage of the
opposition parties and their protests was more visible
on the recently founded 24-hour news channel RTSH-24.
OSCE ODIHR
Note
In case of problems opening Media Monitoring Results, please
upgrade to the latest version of Adobe Acrobat reader. The
results are embedded as attached PDF (go to view/navigation
panels/attachments).
administration are issued only in Albanian, the ODIHR EOM
observed working-level discussions in
the language of a national minority held during a CEAZ
meeting.
No instances of direct discrimination were observed against
national minorities during the election
process. However, some political party activists and candidates
from Roma and Egyptian national
minorities expressed a concern to the ODIHR EOM that their
role and contributions were
insufficiently valued by their respective party or coalition
leaderships. They argued that the same is

true of their communities as a whole, whose votes or conversely
whose non-participation party
representatives tasked them to ensure.82 As some national
minority parties decided to join the boycott
of the elections, in several communities where national
minorities might normally field candidates,
no such choice was available to voters.83
The Greek Ethnic Minority for the Future (MEGA) party, which
did not run within a coalition, did
not re-nominate the mayor of Finiq, who ran as an independent.
The Prime Minister campaigned on
behalf of the MEGA candidate, who won. In Pustec, the current
mayor representing the
Macedonians’ Alliance for European Integration Party was
defeated by the SP candidate.
The CEC informed the ODIHR EOM that voter education
materials relating to the functioning of the
electoral system and voting procedures were produced in the
languages of national minorities, which
is in part required by the Law on Protection of National
Minorities. However, the ODIHR EOM did
not come across any such materials, and no interlocutors
reported seeing them in the regions.
With some international support, the CEC ran voter education
programmes targeting the Roma and
Egyptian communities. Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors
reported that these communities remain
vulnerable to vote-buying practices, and that they persistently
experience voter registration problems,
because of some of their members’ lack of a permanent address.
The ODIHR EOM received reports
on the distribution of goods to some Roma and Egyptian
communities, which several interlocutors

considered to be a means to influence their choice whether or
not to participate in the elections.
XII. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS
The Electoral Code provides for a system of administrative
complaints against VCC and CEAZ
decisions, and judicial appeals against CEC decisions. Voters
may appeal errors in the voter lists
before the district court of local jurisdiction. Any political party
or candidate has the right to complain
to the CEC against a CEAZ decision that affects their legal
interests, within three days from its
announcement. Electoral subjects have the right to appeal to the
Electoral College against CEC
decisions that affect their legal interests; non-contestants may
not bring cases before the Electoral
College. Citizen observer groups may only appeal CEAZ and
CEC decisions denying their
accreditation. Election results in a specific voting centre,
electoral zone or municipality can be
invalidated by the CEC upon request of electoral subjects or ex
officio and further appealed to the
Electoral College.
The CEC adopts decisions on complaints in open sessions
within two days and publish their reasoned
text on its website within 24 hours. Claimants are not notified
of the decision by written notification,
and in a few cases, when the publication of CEC decisions was
delayed, some missed the five-day
82 In Shkoder, a Roma candidate occupied the last place on the
SP list; in Vlore, the penultimate place; in Fier, the

30th place; in Gjirokaster, an Egyptian candidate occupied the
28th place. Exceptionally, an Egyptian national
minority candidate was in the 9th position on the SP councillor
candidate list in Berat.
83 The CEC denied registration to a member of the Greek
national minority and mayoral candidate for Himara,
Dhionisios Alfred Beleri, because of a past conviction. On 30
May, the Electoral College upheld the CEC
decision and ruled that Mr. Beleri is ineligible to stand for
office until 2021.
deadline for lodging an appeal to the Electoral College.84 On
30 May and 6 June, the Electoral
College ruled that the CEC is not obliged to communicate its
decisions to parties in a written form,
and that the latter must send their representatives to the
respective CEC session, or otherwise be
informed of the decision through the CEC website. The
procedure for notifying claimants and
publishing CEC decisions on complaints is thus not always
efficient or conducive to an effective
remedy, at odds with OSCE commitments.85
The Electoral College, the highest authority on electoral
disputes, consists of eight judges selected for
four years through drawing of lots by the High Council of
Justice. Because of the ongoing “vetting of
judges”, the Electoral College was staffed with only six judges

during the electoral period.86
Decisions of the Electoral College, which must be adopted
within 10 days, are final.87
While the ruling part of any Electoral College decision is
delivered in public sessions, the full
reasoned decision is only accessible on the Court of Appeals of
Tirana website to persons who hold a
special password, which does not facilitate general public
awareness about the rules of the electoral
process and does not contribute to the transparency of electoral
dispute resolution. Reasoned decisions
of the Electoral College are given to the parties either directly
at the court or dispatched by registered
post, which may be subject to delays.
In order to ensure transparency of electoral dispute resolution
outcomes, all decisions of the
Electoral College could be published promptly and be accessible
to all.
Both the CEC and Electoral College respected the legally
prescribed timeframes for adjudicating
electoral disputes. By 30 June, the CEC received 16 complaints
against CEAZ decisions, mostly on
candidate registration. As the result of resolving complaints
against rejections of candidates by the
CEAZs, the CEC reinstated 11 candidates. Thirteen CEC
decisions were appealed to the Electoral
College, which overturned three and upheld ten.88 Overall the
Electoral College respected the due
process, hearing parties in open sessions and delivering
decisions in public. The Electoral College’s
narrow interpretation of the legal standing of contesting parties
to challenge the registration of other
contestants affects their right to appeal the legality of candidate

registration.89 It also raises concerns
about access to an effective legal remedy.
On 13 June, the CEC rejected the National Unity Party’s request
to withdraw from the elections,
reasoning inter alia that the 10 June presidential decree
cancelling the elections was invalid. On 24
84 The ODIHR EOM received such information from Demo-
Christian Alliance Party, Red and Black Alliance and
National Conservative Party.
states that “everyone will have an effective means of
redress against administrative decisions, so as to guarantee
respect for fundamental rights and ensure legal
integrity”.
86 The vetting of judges and prosecutors, which is part of the
ongoing judicial reform, evaluates the integrity, assets
and professionalism of all judges and prosecutors in Albania.
The vetting resulted in many dismissals and
resignations, impacting the functioning of many courts and
prosecutor offices, leaving, in particular, the
Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice without the
quorum necessary to operate.
87 The Constitution grants the Constitutional Court jurisdiction
over violations of constitutional rights and freedoms
but in practice this jurisdiction is not exercised with respect to
electoral rights.
88 The upheld decisions included those pertaining to the non-
participating political parties’ eligibility to nominate

members of election administration, political parties’ standing
in cases challenging other contestants’ registration,
candidate registration, rejection of candidate withdrawal
requests and the location of voting centres.
89 In its 9 May decision on the appeal against registration of
the DCP, the Electoral College found that the
complainant Albanian Democrat Union Party and other
contestants have no legitimate interest in challenging the
legality of registration of other contesting parties and therefore
cannot appeal relevant CEC decisions. Section
3.3.f of the 2002 Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters recommends that “All
candidates […] registered in the constituency concerned must be
entitled to appeal”.
June, the Electoral College rejected the appeal against this CEC
decision also ruling the 10 June
presidential decree as invalid.90
Some ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed concerns about the
CEC’s lack of impartiality, pointing
to instances in which majority of CEC members voted along
party lines.91 While the Electoral College
judges enjoy immunity and cannot be subject to disciplinary
proceedings during the entire term for
which the College is constituted, they are subject to the ongoing
“vetting process”, which could affect
the security of their tenure and thereby potentially impact their
independence.

All courts that have a competency in elections should be fully
operational during the electoral
periods. The independence and the impartiality of the Central
Election Commission and the judiciary
should be ensured.
By 9 July, the Prosecutor General’s Office reported 18 ongoing
proceedings regarding election-related
criminal offences, involving a total of 75 persons placed in
detention or under arrest.92 Charges
included public calls for violence, the organization of or
participation in illegal assemblies,93 blocking
of roads, destruction of property by explosives, obstructing
election administration and destruction of
electoral materials, as well as non-compliance with police
orders. Opposition parties considered some
of these cases to be politically motivated.
Although the ODIHR EOM witnessed cases of voter
intimidation and violation of the secrecy of the
vote in the voting centres and received similar reports from
political parties, no such cases were
officially registered, reportedly for lack of citizens’ complaints
to the police. Several ODIHR EOM
interlocutors expressed concerns about overall lack of
effectiveness of criminal investigations that
contributes to widespread perception of impunity over the past
electoral crimes, including for vote-
buying and pressure on voters.
Law enforcement bodies should investigate all allegations of
electoral violations thoroughly, swiftly
and in a transparent manner. The government should establish a
procedure by which current and
prospective public administration employees may report any

political pressures brought upon them in
connection with obtaining or retaining a position or with work
performance. Such persons should
enjoy the protections currently guaranteed by law to whistle-
blowers.
XIII. ELECTION OBSERVATION
The Electoral Code provides for citizen and international
observation at all levels of the election
administration. Parliamentary parties and coalitions may
appoint permanent representatives to the
CEC, while other parties have the right to appoint
representatives for the electoral period only.
Contestants are entitled to appoint one observer to each relevant
CEAZ, VCC and BCC. The right to
appoint observers representing coalitions rests solely with the
coalition, not its composite political
parties.
90 Two judges expressed concurring opinions arguing that the
Electoral College does not have the competence to
review the status of the presidential decree.
91 Section 3.1 a of the 2002 Venice Commission Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters recommends that “An
impartial body must be in charge of applying electoral law”.
92 Three criminal proceedings were initiated in Shkoder, two
in Diber, Elbasan, Mat and Tirana each, one in Durres,
Fier, Kavaja, Korce, Kurbin, Pogradec and Tropoja each. Most
cases involved multiple suspects.

93 For holding assemblies the organizers are obliged to notify
the police in written no later than three days before the
date of the assembly (three hours, in case of urgent assemblies).
Police must ensure public order and security
during assemblies.
For these elections, the CEC registered 494 international
observers as well as 630 citizen observers
from 6 organizations. While no issues relating to the
accreditation of observers had been raised, some
NGOs informed the ODIHR EOM that they would not
participate in voter education and election
observation activities this time to avoid the appearance of
expressing a political preference by
engaging in the electoral process.
The law obliges the VCCs and CEAZs to only provide party and
coalition observers, not citizen or
international observers, with the voting centres’ records of
closing and voting and tabulation results
protocols, thus limiting their ability to effectively scrutinize the
counting and tabulation processes.
XIV. ELECTION DAY
Voting took place against a backdrop of announcements by most
municipalities governed by
opposition mayors that elections would not go ahead on 30

June. Several mayors attempted to use
their powers to disallow the use of public buildings as voting
centres. In response, the election
administration resorted to requesting the use of privately owned
premises to administer and conduct
the elections in some areas. On election day, the CEC confirmed
that voting did not take place in
seven voting centres.94
Election day was generally peaceful, despite some tensions and
isolated clashes in a small number of
communities.95 Turnout varied among municipalities, and the
overall figure published on the CEC
website was revised several times before it was officially
established at 22.96 per cent.96
Opening procedures were observed by the ODIHR EOM in 73
and voting in 743 voting centres across
85 EAZs. Closing was observed in 69 voting centres and
counting in 85 BCCs. The presence of party
observers noted in more than two-thirds of voting centres
visited, mainly from the SP, and citizen
observers noted in one-fifth of these centres contributed to
transparency. However, some party
observers or activists were seen, at times, interfering in the
administration of the process.97
Opening was assessed negatively in 9 of the 73 observed voting
centres. In over a half of the voting
centres observed opening was delayed, mostly for not more than
15 minutes. The opening procedures
were generally followed, but the ODIHR EOM noted that in 11
cases VCC members did not appear to
be aware of the opening procedures; for instance, in 10 voting
centres, the records of sealing were not
deposited inside the ballot box.

Voting was generally orderly and was assessed positively in 95
per cent of the ODIHR EOM
observations. The negative assessments were in part due to
voters not always being checked for traces
of ink (21 per cent of observations), and not always being
marked with ink before being handed a
ballot (10 per cent). Seemingly identical signatures, indicative
of proxy voting, and cases of someone
attempting to influence voters were each noted in three per cent
of observations. Group or family
voting and proxy voting were respectively noted in 10 and 2 per
cent of observations; this raises
concerns and indicates that previous ODIHR recommendations
pertaining to safeguards against
94 The ODIHR EOM observed no voting taking place in at least
12 voting centres, including in 8 centres in CEAZ 2,
3 in CEAZ 4 and 1 in CEAZ 78.
95 The ODIHR EOM noted tensions or unrest outside voting
centres in 1.8 per cent and inside voting centres in 1.1
per cent of observations.
96 Lowest turnout was registered in Shkoder (10.3 per cent)
and the highest in Pustec (55.5 per cent).
Representatives of the DP in several instances publicly disputed
the official turnout figures.
97 While interference by unauthorised persons was noted in
less than four per cent of voting observations, several
ODIHR EOM observers reported that some SP observers were
indistinguishable from VCC members. Citizen
observers appeared to be associated with political parties in five

per cent of cases.
family voting were not effectively addressed. In 16 per cent of
the observations, the ODIHR EOM
noted instances of the same person providing assistance to
multiple voters.
Voters were turned away in over 23 per cent of the observed
voting centres, mostly for valid reasons,
including redirection to other voting centres in close to two-
thirds of such cases. This was indicative
of the impact of late changes to the locations of voting centres
due to their blockage by opposition
activists, but also poor signage. Ballot box security seals were
not recorded in the VCC meeting
record books in 8 per cent and information on voting procedures
was not posted in a visible place in
almost 14 per cent of observations.
The layout of voting centres was inadequate in six per cent and
did not allow for secrecy of the vote in
five per cent of observations. In 10 per cent of observations,
voters did not always mark their ballots
in secret; meanwhile in 11 per cent of observations, voters did
not fold their ballots to ensure the
secrecy of their vote. According to ODIHR EOM interlocutors,
some voters feared that participation
itself would reveal their political preference, especially where
SP candidates stood unopposed. In
many cases, activists of political parties (mainly the SP, but

also DP) kept track of voters who
participated, challenging their right to cast their ballot free of
the fear of retribution.
Authorities should guarantee the voters’ right to a free and
secret choice. The voting procedures
should be reviewed to ensure the secrecy of the vote and
protection against undue influence on voters.
The importance of ballot secrecy should be emphasized during
the training of election commissions
and in voter education materials.
The authorities did not take appropriate measures to ensure the
full participation of persons with
disabilities as voters and candidates in electoral process. In
two-thirds of observations, the voting
centres did not allow for independent access for voters with
reduced mobility. In 71 per cent of
observations, the layout of voting centre was not suitable for
voters with disabilities. This obstacle
contravenes international obligation to guarantee equal suffrage
to all voters.98
Authorities should take a proactive role ensuring accessibility
of voting centres for persons with
disabilities. Premises that lack accessibility should be identified
well in advance and alternative
solutions offered where necessary.
Closing was assessed negatively in 7 of the 69 observations due
to late closing of these polls. In
almost all observations, closing procedures were correctly
followed and the VCCs transferred
materials to the BCCs without delay. In all but five cases
materials arrived at the BCCs within legally
prescribed three hours after closing. The transfer and receipt of

materials were assessed positively in
all but two observed cases. In 16 instances, the BCC premises
were overcrowded and in 12 cases they
were deemed inadequate for the VCCs to deliver materials
largely due to insufficient space or security
arrangements. Fourteen delivered ballot boxes were declared
irregular, including due to missing or
broken seals, but only half of those cases were properly
recorded.
Counting and tabulation of results were assessed positively in
all but 9 of the 100 observations, in part
due to some procedures not having been always correctly
followed.99 Namely, the vote count was
interrupted in 20 cases (19 different CEAZs), ballots were not
always unfolded and stamps were not
exposed to the camera in 24 cases (18 CEAZs), and the front
side of the ballot was not always
98 Article 29(a) of the CRPD obliges States to “ensure that
persons with disabilities can effectively and fully
participate in political and public life on equal basis with others
… inter alia, by ensuring that voting procedures,
facilities and materials are appropriate, accessible and easy to
… use”.
99 With reference to the verification of election materials, the
record of the closing of polls was not always found
inside the ballot box in 19 cases (18 CEAZs). In more than half
the cases where this occurred, the record was
found in the box with election materials.

exposed to the camera in 19 cases (13 CEAZs). The total
number of ballots cast was not counted and
compared to the number of signatures on the voter list in 18
cases (13 CEAZs); equally, votes for all
parties or candidates were not counted and announced in 17
cases (12 CEAZs). Copies of the table of
results for voting centres were not given to party observers in
24 cases (18 CEAZs). Several ODIHR
EOM interlocutors remarked that the practice of counting the
ballots in BCCs rather than directly at
the voting centres diminishes voter confidence in the process
and may be prone to abuse.
XV. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS
The remarks of the main political stakeholders in the immediate
aftermath of the elections reflected
continuously deep divisions. The President thanked all “who did
not fall victim to the confrontational
rhetoric of irresponsible leaders who through the incitement of
violence want to hide their scandals
and accountability”.100 The DP chairperson stated that “voting
did not resolve but deepened the
crisis”.101 Referring to the previous six months as an “open
wound” that requires healing, the Prime
Minister offered co-operation and noted that “an agreement can
be built only through unconditional
dialogue and by expressing without hesitation the readiness to
together commit and work in order to
contribute towards opening the accession negotiations with the
European Union”.102

After the elections, the DCP filed complaints to the CEC
requesting invalidation of the election results
in 40 municipalities, alleging a considerable difference between
the official turnout and data reported
by DCP observers. Between 10 and 15 July, the CEC rejected
all these complaints for a lack of
evidence, thereby leaving in force the results approved by
respective CEAZs and CEC. Additional
five complaints related to the results were submitted to the CEC
by the Albanian Emigration Party,
Democratic Alliance Party, National Conservative Party (NCP)
and two unsuccessful mayoral
candidates. All were either dismissed or rejected due to
inadmissibility.103
The CEC approved tabulation results for mayoral and council
races in all municipalities by 11 July.
The law provides for the allocation of councillor seats to be
adopted by a qualified majority of five
CEC members. While the CEC established the results of
mayoral elections by four votes, it failed to
distribute councillor mandates as the CEC chairperson voted
against. After the deadline for the CEC
to allocate councillor mandates, the SP filed complaints to the
Electoral College so as to pave the way
for convening new municipal councils and swearing in new
mayors. The College satisfied these
complaints and stepped in to allocate mandates for all 61 local
councils between 22 and 26 July.104 On
27 July, the CEC approved the final election results with four
votes, while the CEC chairperson voted
against, maintaining that the 30 June elections were cancelled
by the President.
At least three outgoing DP mayors from Kamza, Mallakaster

and Shkoder stated publicly that they
would not accept the results of the 30 June vote. In her role as
the chairperson of the Albanian
Association of Municipalities, the outgoing mayor of Shkoder
appealed to the international
community to discuss their potential engagement in resolving
the situation. The DP and to a lesser
extent SMI leadership began reaching out to outgoing mayors to
discuss the next steps, including
100 See the President’s 1 July statement..
101 Lulzim Basha described a nation “more united than ever,
not about a party, but about the European values”.
102 The Prime Minister added: “The election reform according
to the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations and the
recommendations from the European Council remain a common
challenge with both parliamentary and non-
parliamentary opposition”.
103 Upon complaint of the NCP, the CEC recounted 11 ballot
boxes from Lezha and found minor discrepancies.
104 At the same time, the Electoral College dismissed all five
DCP appeals against CEC refusal to invalidate the
election results in five municipalities as well as similar appeal
of an independent candidate.
http://president.al/en/mesazh-presidentit-te-republikes-sh-t-z-
ilir-meta/
https://pd.al/2019/07/basha-qendrimi-yne-nuk-ndryshon-edi-
rama-duhet-te-largohet-dhe-te-hetohen-te-gjithe-ata-qe-kane-
manipuluar-zgjedhjet-me-krimin/
https://www.kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/komunikim-publik-i-
kryeministrit-pas-perfundimit-te-zgjedhjeve-te-30-qershorit/

requesting the courts not to certify the mayoral election results
until after the Constitutional Court had
ruled on the constitutionality of the 10 June presidential
decree.105
XVI. RECOMMENDATIONS
These recommendations as contained throughout the text are
offered with a view to further enhance
the conduct of elections in the Republic of Albania and to
support efforts to bring them fully in line
with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and
standards for democratic elections.
These recommendations should be read in conjunction with past
ODIHR recommendations that have
not yet been addressed.106 ODIHR stands ready to assist the
authorities of the Republic of Albania to
further improve the electoral process and to address the
recommendations contained in this and
previous reports.
A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. With a view to strengthen pluralistic democracy, reaffirm the
right of citizens to take part in
government and demonstrate shared responsibility toward the
integrity of the electoral process,
political parties and other electoral stakeholders should engage

in an open and inclusive
dialogue and facilitate electoral reform addressing the
recommendations contained in this and
prior ODIHR reports.
2. The authorities and political parties should undertake utmost
measures to eliminate the long-
standing problem of misuse of administrative resources in and
between elections. Authorities
should issue precise rules that define how public resources may
and may not be used for
electoral purposes. Further steps should be taken to achieve the
de-politicisation of the civil
service and ensure that pressure is not applied on voters to
attend campaign events or vote in a
particular way.
3. Authorities should guarantee the voters’ right to a free and
secret choice. The voting
procedures should be reviewed to ensure the secrecy of the vote
and protection against undue
influence on voters. The importance of ballot secrecy should be
emphasized during the
training of election commissions and in voter education
materials.
4. In line with previous ODIHR recommendations, in order to
enhance public confidence in the
electoral process, consideration should be given to alternative
formulas for nominating

members of election administration, supported by procedural
safeguards for their
independence.
105 The DP convened its mayors in Tirana on 11 July, and
opposition leadership began touring the country for on-site
meetings with sitting mayors.
106 According to the paragraph 25 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul
Document, OSCE participating States committed
themselves “to follow up promptly the ODIHR’s election
assessment and recommendations”. The follow-up of
prior recommendations is assessed by ODIHR EOM as follows:
recommendation 11 from the final report on the
2017 parliamentary elections (2017 Final Report), 6 from the
final report on the 2015 local elections (2015 Final
Report), 2, 7, 8 and 17 from the final report on the 2013
parliamentary elections (2013 Final Report) as well as 5,
9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 26 from the final report on the
2011 local elections (2011 Final Report) are fully
implemented. The recommendations 23 from the 2017 Final
Report, 15 and 28 from the 2013 Final Report, and 6,
17, 20 and 27 from the 2011 Final Report are mostly
implemented. The recommendations 3, 4, 10, 12, 16 and 18
from the 2017 Final Report, 2, 8, 10, 14, 18, 20, 21 and 23 from
the 2015 Final Report, 1 and 9 from the 2013
Final Report, as well as 4, 11, 13, 14, 23, 24 and 25 from the
2011 Final Report are partially implemented. See
also www.paragraph25.odihr.pl.
https://www.osce.org/mc/39569
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/346661?download
=true

=true
=true
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106963?download=true
http://www.paragraph25.odihr.pl/
5. All courts that have a competency in elections should be fully
operational during the electoral
periods. The independence and the impartiality of the Central
Election Commission and the
judiciary should be ensured.
6. Law enforcement bodies should investigate all allegations of
electoral violations thoroughly,
swiftly and in a transparent manner. The government should
establish a procedure by which
current and prospective public administration employees may
report any political pressures
brought upon them in connection with obtaining or retaining a
position or with work
performance. Such persons should enjoy the protections
currently guaranteed by law to
whistle-blowers.
B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

Election Administration
7. Effective measures should be taken to further strengthen the
recruitment and training methods
of commissioners in order to ensure their professionalism. To
enhance the professional
capacity of election commissions, the Central Election
Commission could offer periodic
training and certification of potential commissioners, with the
aim of creating a roster of
qualified people.
8. To increase the transparency of the work, the Central
Election Commission should
systematically and in a timely manner publish all decisions on
its website.
9. Authorities should take a proactive role ensuring
accessibility of voting centres for persons
with disabilities. Premises that lack accessibility should be
identified well in advance and
alternative solutions offered where necessary.
Voter Registration
10. Restrictions on the suffrage rights of persons with mental
disabilities and non-citizens in local
elections should be reconsidered.
Candidate Registration

11. The rules on candidate registration and withdrawals should
be formulated precisely and their
implementation by the Central Election Commission should be
guided by the principle of legal
certainty.
Electoral Campaign
12. To prevent inflammatory and insulting language during
campaign, political parties and
electoral contestants could develop and adhere to a common
code of conduct. Political parties
should strengthen enforcement of their internal ethical codes,
foster internal party democracy
and ensure that their internal functions respect and promote
transparency, equality and non-
discrimination.
13. Awareness should be raised about the importance of equal
participation of women and men in
public and political life, in both urban and rural areas, and with
a particular emphasis on the
role of women within political parties and electoral processes.

Campaign Finance
14. Consideration should be given to reviewing the law to
ensure that the CEC has the appropriate
powers and procedures to effectively oversee and enforce party
and campaign finance rules.
Media
15. The independence of the media regulator and public
broadcaster should be further
strengthened through measures that prevent conflict of interest.
Senior management positions
at the public broadcaster should not be accessible to people with
clear political affiliation.
16. The audiovisual media law should be amended to effectively
limit concentration of media
ownership in the broadcast sector.
17. The Electoral Code should be amended to guarantee equal
access to the media for all
contesting parties in all types of editorial programming and to
allow all contestants to purchase
advertising space under equal conditions. Additional
considerations could be given to
allocating a certain amount of free time equally to all
contestants.

18. The responsibilities of the MMB should be clearly defined.
The MMB should adopt a
monitoring methodology in a timely manner, publish without
delay its media monitoring
reports, as well as decisions and other types of letters and
requests to the media. The MMB
should be allotted adequate resources for more detailed media
monitoring, including of
regional broadcasters.
19. Legislation should be amended to ensure that the media are
able to independently cover
activities of electoral contestants with a view to limit the use of
party produced content in
news programming and avoid misleading voters. Whenever
content produced by political
parties is used by the media, it should be clearly labelled.
Complaints and Appeals
20. In order to ensure transparency of electoral dispute
resolution outcomes, all decisions of the
Electoral College could be published promptly and be accessible
to all.

ANNEX I: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS 107
Number of registered voters 3,536,016
Number of voters who voted 811,727 22.96 per cent
Number of valid votes for mayor elections 766,482
Number of invalid votes for mayor elections 44,263 5.45 per
cent
Number of valid votes for council elections 761,918
Number of invalid votes for council elections 49,018 6.04 per
cent
Results for mayoral elections
Electoral subject Seats
Alliance for European Albania Coalition 60
Greek Ethnic Minority for the Future Party 1
Results for local council elections
Electoral subject Votes obtained Seats
Number Percentage
Alliance for European Albania Coalition 716,621 94.05 1,555
Socialist Party 564,679 74.11 1,136
Social-Democratic Party 27,422 3.60 81
Social Democracy Party 27,865 3.66 79
Green Party 14,246 1.87 35
National Unity Party 10,045 1.32 29

Moderated Socialists Party 8,682 1.14 25
National Arbanon Alliance Party 9,513 1.25 24
Demo-Christian Alliance Party 8,016 1.05 20
Democratic Alliance Party 6,655 0.87 17
Albanian Future Party 5,049 0.66 17
Alliance for Democracy and Solidarity Party 4,512 0.59 15
Christian Democratic Party 5,198 0.68 15
G99 Party 4,965 0.65 13
Albanian Democratic Reforms Party 4,680 0.61 11
Albanian Social-workers Party 4,072 0.53 9
Alliance for Equality and European Justice
Party
3,316 0.44 8
Denied Rights Party 3,396 0.45 7
Party for the Protection of Emigrants Rights 1,862 0.24 7
Democrat Party for Integration and Prosperity 1,179 0.15 3
Albanian Workers Movement Party 1,018 0.13 3
National Reconciliation Party 251 0.03 1
Hope for Change coalition 8,615 1.13 12
Time of Albania Party 3,377 0.44 7
New European Democracy Party 1,196 0.16 3
National Front Party 2,387 0.31 2
Liberal Democrat Union Party 1,123 0.15 0

107 Source: the CEC website.
http://cec.org.al/rezultate_2019/
Red and Black Alliance Party 340 0.04 0
Albanian Emigration Party 192 0.03 0
Parties running alone 34,716 4.56 50
Democratic Conviction Party 20,350 2.67 23
Greek Ethnic Minority for the Future Party 3,028 0.40 13
New Democratic Spirit 8,630 1.13 8
Macedonians’ Alliance for European
Integration Party
665 0.09 4
Communist Party of Albania 1,372 0.18 1
Party for the Protection of Workers Rights 183 0.02 1
People with Disabilities Party 481 0.06 0
Party for Freedom, Democracy and Ethics 7 0.00 0
National Conservative Party of Albania 0 0.00 0
Independent candidates 1,966 2

ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS
ODIHR EOM Short-term Observers
Claudia Maria Amry Austria
Klaus Kapper Austria
Johannes Payr Austria
Arno Riedel Austria
Werner Rohracher Austria
Margarita Nikolova-Ivanova Bulgaria
Stoyko Yordanov Bulgaria
Petr Piruncik Czech Republic
Klara Von Kriegsheim Kadlecova Czech Republic
Oldřich Vondruška Czech Republic
Ewa Apolonia Chylinski Denmark
Kirsten Joergensen Denmark
Wagn Winkel Denmark
Käthlin Saluveer Estonia
Maylis De Verneuil France
Nadia Jurzac France
Isabelle Le Guellec France
Loic Tregoures France
Christina Vasak France
Heike Baddenhausen Germany
Peter Besselmann Germany
Katharina Franziska Braig Germany
Christoph Bürk Germany
Ulf Claassen Germany
Kerstin Dokter Germany
Gerda Elisabeth Charlotte Dopheide Germany
Stelian Dumitrache Germany
Frank Fischer Germany
Christoph Hubert Alexander Freiherr Von Feilitzsch Germany
Mendel Goldstein Germany
Enrico Gunther Germany

Dorit Happ Germany
Nicola Hoochhausen Germany
Anke Kerl Germany
Nicole Koenig Germany
Jutta Krause Germany
Daniel Kuehnhenrich Germany
Tina Mede-Karpenstein Germany
Magdalena Metzler Germany
Ulrike Neundorf Germany
Thomas Oye Germany
Oliver Pahnecke Germany
Claudia Preusser Germany
Heinrich Rosendahl Germany
Anca Stan Germany
Pavel Utitz Germany
Peter Vogl Germany
Rebecca Wagner Germany
Heinz Bernd Wittich Germany
Andreas Stergiou Greece
Christos Gribas Greece
Sarantis Moschovis Greece
Michael Gannon Ireland
Clíonadh O' Keeffe Ireland
Brendan O'Shea Ireland
Geraldine Power Ireland
Vincenzo Alfano Italy
Francesca Carpinella Italy
Lorenzo Cugola Italy
Luigi D'agostino Italy

Nicoletta Manzini Italy
Zineb Naini Italy
Anna Lisa Pantusa Italy
Chiara Parolin Italy
Diane Pezzini Italy
Paolo Zucchi Italy
Gheorghe Bosii Moldova
Valentin Macari Moldova
Max Bader Netherlands
Maria Nijenhuis Netherlands
Sellina Van Bruggen Netherlands
Jean Van Der Hoeven Netherlands
Pepijn Zevenuizen Netherlands
Ilir Islami North Macedonia
Filip Popovski North Macedonia
Alida Boye Norway
Sofie Alexandra Engli Høgestøl Norway
Øystein Moen Norway
Soren Munch Norway
Sven Gunnar Simonsen Norway
Anne Skatvedt Norway
Robert Adam Romania
Bogdan Biris Romania
Anca Popa Romania
Alexandra Visalom Romania
Peter Harmanovský Slovakia
Evelina Mäsiarová Slovakia
Peter Golob Slovenia
Lorena Diz Conde Spain
Åsa Aguayo Akesson Sweden
Jan Peter Andersson Sweden
Paulos Berglöf Sweden
Irina Bernebring Journiete Sweden
Sara Louise Julia Lhådö Sweden
Bengt Mårten Erik Löfberg Sweden
Dan Thorell Sweden

Philipp Koller Switzerland
Adrian Maitre Switzerland
Jacques Merat Switzerland
Seda Kirdar Turkey
Syeda Ali United States of America
Stephen Bouey United States of America
Leonilla Connors United States of America
Harry Edelman United States of America
Timothy Enright United States of America
Alan Friedman United States of America
Carol Fuller United States of America
Gerry Fuller United States of America
Kathryn Gest United States of America
Martin Gleason United States of America
Rebecca Graham United States of America
Ana Gutierrez United States of America
James Heilman United States of America
Jordan Kanter United States of America
Marsha Kennedy United States of America
Max Loebl United States of America
Lesia Lozowy United States of America
Nancy Lubin United States of America
Marie-Celeste Marcoux United States of America
Joseph Mcdonagh United States of America
Joseph Meyer United States of America
Garrett Monti United States of America
Brooke Nagle United States of America
Darcie Nielsen United States of America
Kelly Norton United States of America

Hans Opsahl United States of America
Robert Paullin, Jr United States of America
Urania Petit United States of America
Octavius Pinkard United States of America
Marissa Polnerow United States of America
Jeannie Schindler United States of America
Steven Smith United States of America
William Spitznagle United States of America
Mary Stegmaier United States of America
Anne Tara United States of America
Arthur Traldi United States of America
Jack Van Valkenburgh United States of America
Roxanne Weiss United States of America
Long-term Observers
ODIHR EOM Core Team
Audrey Glover Head of Mission United Kingdom
Ahmad Rasuli Kyrgyz Republic
Laurentiu Hadirca Moldova
Johannes Schmeets Netherlands
Jane Kareski North Macedonia
Stefan Szwed Poland
Przemyslaw Wasik Poland
Svetlana Chetaikina Russian Federation
Ivan Brezina Slovakia
Anders Eriksson Sweden
Egor Tilpunov Ukraine
Oleksander Stetsenko Ukraine
William Romans United Kingdom
Barbara Davis United States of America
ODIHR EOM Long-term Observers
Kateřina Duffková Czech Republic

Stephanie Marsal France
Evgenia Avetisova Georgia
Christian Keilbach Germany
Hildegard Rogler-Mochel Germany
James Mc Carthy Ireland
Mike Daldossi Italy
Ilgiz Kambarov Kyrgyz Republic
Munkhnaran Bayarlkhagva Mongolia
Toril Lund Norway
Ivana Krstic Serbia
Robert Hall Sweden
Astrid Nunez Sweden
Zouhal Avzalchoeva Tajikistan
Bujar Ajdari United States of America
Andrea Shelley Mcthomas United States of America
Jason Toy United States of America
ABOUT ODIHR
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) is OSCE’s principal institution
to assist participating States “to ensure full respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, to
abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy
and (…) to build, strengthen and
protect democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance
throughout society” (1992 Helsinki
Summit Document). This is referred to as the OSCE human
dimension.
ODIHR, based in Warsaw (Poland) was created as the Office for
Free Elections at the 1990 Paris
Summit and started operating in May 1991. One year later, the

name of the Office was changed to
reflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and
democratization. Today it employs over
150 staff.
ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field of election
observation. Every year, it co-
ordinates and organizes the deployment of thousands of
observers to assess whether elections in the
OSCE region are conducted in line with OSCE commitments,
other international obligations and
standards for democratic elections and with national legislation.
Its unique methodology provides
an in-depth insight into the electoral process in its entirety.
Through assistance projects, ODIHR
helps participating States to improve their electoral framework.
The Office’s democratization activities include: rule of law,
legislative support, democratic
governance, migration and freedom of movement, and gender
equality. ODIHR implements a
number of targeted assistance programmes annually, seeking to
develop democratic structures.
ODIHR also assists participating States’ in fulfilling their
obligations to promote and protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms consistent with OSCE
human dimension commitments.
This is achieved by working with a variety of partners to foster
collaboration, build capacity and
provide expertise in thematic areas, including human rights in
the fight against terrorism, enhancing
the human rights protection of trafficked people, human rights
education and training, human rights
monitoring and reporting, and women’s human rights and
security.

Within the field of tolerance and non-discrimination, ODIHR
provides support to the
participating States in strengthening their response to hate
crimes and incidents of racism,
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance.
ODIHR's activities related to tolerance
and non-discrimination are focused on the following areas:
legislation; law enforcement training;
monitoring, reporting on, and following up on responses to
hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as
well as educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and
mutual understanding.
ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies
on Roma and Sinti. It promotes
capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti
communities, and encourages the
participation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-
making bodies.
All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and
co-operation with OSCE
participating States, OSCE institutions and field operations, as
well as with other international
organizations.
More information is available on the ODIHR website
(www.osce.org/odihr).
http://www.osce.org/odihrI. EXECUTIVE SUMMARYII.
INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTSIII.
BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXTIV. Electoral
System and LEGAL FRAMEWORKV. ELECTION
ADMINISTRATIONA. Central Election CommissionB. Lower-
level Election AdministrationVI. VOTER REGISTRATIONVII.

CANDIDATE REGISTRATIONVIII. CAMPAIGN
ENVIRONMENTIX. CAMPAIGN FINANCEX. MEDIAA.
Media EnvironmentB. Legal FrameworkC. Media Monitoring
FindingsXI. Participation of National MinoritiesXII.
COMPLAINTS AND APPEALSXIII. ELECTION
OBSERVATIONXIV. ELECTION DAYXV. POST-ELECTION
DAY DEVELOPMENTSXVI. RECOMMENDATIONSA.
Priority recommendationsB. Other recommendationsANNEX I:
FINAL ELECTION RESULTS 106FANNEX II: LIST OF
OBSERVERSABOUT ODIHR
Republic of Albania
ODIHR ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
MEDIA MONITORING RESULTS
The ODIHR EOM conducted systematic monitoring of the
selected broadcast and online media
during the official campaign period from 31 May until 28 June.
The monitoring sought to
evaluate whether the media provided impartial and balanced
coverage of candidates and political
subjects, enabling voters to make an informed choice. The

monitoring of the broadcast media
focused on the editorial content of all political and election-
related programmes and broadcasts
in prime time (from 18:00 till 24:00).
Media monitoring included quantitative and qualitative analysis
of the coverage, assessing the
amount of time or characters allocated to each candidate and
party as well as the tone of the
coverage.
Quantitative analysis measures the total amount of time devoted
to relevant political and
election-related subjects on news and information programmes
in the broadcast media, or the
total amount of space devoted to the relevant subjects in the
print and online media.
The qualitative analysis evaluates the tone in which the relevant
political subjects have been
portrayed – positive, neutral or negative.
Monitored media outlets:

Television
• RTSH-1 (Public Broadcaster)
• TV Klan
• Top Channel
• Vizion+
• News 24
Online
• Panorama
• Syri.net
Explanation of the charts:
• The pie charts show the proportion of airtime, space or posts
allocated to contestants,
electoral stakeholders or other relevant subjects in the defined
period.
• The bar charts show the total amount of hours and minutes or
the total number of
characters of positive (green), neutral (white) and negative (red)
airtime or space devoted
to monitored subjects by each media outlet in the defined
period.

Republic of Albania page: 2
Public television RTSH-1
Percentage of total time given to electoral stakeholders in prime
time news
Tone of the coverage given to electoral stakeholders in prime
time news
Central Election
Commission
4%
President
18%
Government
14%
Socialist Party
32%
Local SP
Government
3%

Other parties from
SP-led coalition
1%
Democratic Party
20%
Local DP
Government
4%
Socialist Movement
for Integration
1%
Party for Justice,
Integration and
Unity
1%
Democratic
Conviction Party
1%
Other parties
1%
00:00:00
00:30:00

01:00:00
01:30:00
02:00:00
02:30:00
03:00:00
03:30:00
Negative Neutral Positive
TV Klan
time news
time news
Central Election
Commission

3%
President
18%
Government
13%
Socialist Party
29%
Local SP
Government
7%
Democratic Party
21%
Local DP
Government
5%
Socialist Movement
for Integration
2%
Other Opposition
Parties
[PERCENTAGE]
Democratic

Conviction Party
1%
00:00:00
00:30:00
01:00:00
01:30:00
02:00:00
02:30:00
03:00:00
03:30:00
Top Channel
time news

time news
Central Election
Commission
3%
President
17%
Government
8%
Socialist Party
31%Local SP
Government
8%
Other parties from
SP-led coalition
1%
Democratic Party
25%
Local DP
Government
4%
Socialist Movement
for Integration

2%
Democratic
Conviction Party
1%
00:00:00
00:15:00
00:30:00
00:45:00
01:00:00
01:15:00
01:30:00
01:45:00
02:00:00
Vizion Plus

time news
time news
Central Election
Commission
2%
President
16%
Government
13%
Socialist Party
32%
Local SP
Government
5%
Democratic Party
26%
Local DP
Government

1%
Socialist Movement
for Integration
1%
Other opposition
parties
2%
Democratic
Conviction Party
2%
00:00:00
01:00:00
02:00:00
03:00:00
04:00:00
05:00:00
06:00:00
07:00:00

News 24
time news
time news
Central Election
Commission
2%
President
14%
Government
8%
Socialist Party
34%Local SP
Government
6%
Other parties from

SP-led coalition
1%
Democratic Party
25%
Local DP
Government
2%
Socialist Movement
for Integration
4%
Party for Justice,
Integration and
Unity
2%
Other opposition
parties
1%
Other parties
1%
00:00:00
01:00:00
02:00:00

03:00:00
04:00:00
05:00:00
06:00:00
07:00:00
08:00:00
09:00:00
10:00:00
11:00:00
Online Panorama
Percentage of attention given to electoral stakeholders in the
portal home page
Tone of the coverage given to electoral stakeholders in the
portal home page

Central Election
Commission
1%
President
13%
Government
11%
Socialist Party
33%
Local SP
Government
6%
Democratic Party
24%
Local DP
Government
1%
Socialist Movement
for Integration
8%
Party for Justice,
Integration and

Unity
1%
Other opposition
parties
1%
0 cr
100,000 cr
200,000 cr
300,000 cr
400,000 cr
500,000 cr
600,000 cr
700,000 cr
800,000 cr
Positive Neutral Negative

Online portal syri.net
Percentage of attention given to electoral stakeholders in the
portal home page
Tone of the coverage given to electoral stakeholders in the
portal home page
CEC
2%
President
11%
Government
13%
Socialist Party
28%
Local SP
Government
3%
Other parties from
SP-led coalition
1%
Democratic Party
29%

Local DP
Government
2%
Socialist Movement
for Integration
7%
Party for Justice,
Integration and
Unity
1%
Other opposition
parties
2%
0 cr
100,000 cr
200,000 cr
300,000 cr
400,000 cr
500,000 cr
600,000 cr

700,000 cr
800,000 cr
900,000 cr
1,000,000 cr
Total Positive Total Neutral Total Negative
Public television RTSH-1
Percentage of total time given to electoral stakeholders in
current affairs programmes
Tone of the coverage given to electoral stakeholders in current
affairs programmes
Central Election
Commission
1%
President
7%

Government
29%
Socialist Party
32%
Democratic Party
15%
Socialist Movement
for Integration
1%
Democratic
Conviction Party
15%
00:00:00
00:30:00
01:00:00
01:30:00
02:00:00
02:30:00

TV Klan
affairs programmes
CEC
1%
President
17%
Government
16%
Socialist Party
20%
Local SP
Government
17%
Democratic Party
20%
Local DP

Government
4%
Socialist Movement
for Integration
4%
Other parties
1%
00:00:00
00:30:00
01:00:00
01:30:00
02:00:00
02:30:00
03:00:00
Top Channel

affairs programmes
CEC
1%
President
6%
Government
7%
Socialist Party
43%
Local SP
Government
3%
Other parties from
SP-led coalition
1%
Democratic Party
23%
Local DP

Government
6%
Party for Justice,
Integration and
Unity
3%
Other opposition
parties
5%
Democratic
Conviction Party
2%
00:00:00
01:00:00
02:00:00
03:00:00
04:00:00
05:00:00
06:00:00
07:00:00

08:00:00
09:00:00
10:00:00
Vizion Plus
affairs programmes
CEC
2%
President
11%
Government
2%

Socialist Party
44%
Local SP
Government
14%
Other parties from
SP-led coalition
1%
Democratic Party
23%
Democratic
Conviction Party
3%
00:00:00
01:00:00
02:00:00
03:00:00
04:00:00
05:00:00
06:00:00
07:00:00

08:00:00
News 24
affairs programmes
CEC
1%
President
7%
Government
10%
Socialist Party
40%

Local SP
Government
8%
Other parties from
SP-led coalition
3%
Democratic Party
17%
Socialist Movement
for Integration
6%
Other opposition
parties
2%
Other parties
6%
00:00:00
01:00:00
02:00:00
03:00:00
04:00:00

05:00:00
06:00:00
07:00:00
08:00:00
Total Negative Total Neutral Total Positive
All monitored TV channels
Percentage of total time given to electoral stakeholders by
gender by all broadcasters
Percentage of total time given to electoral stakeholders by
gender by RTSH-1
© 2019 ODIHR Election Observation Mission to Albania
Male
93%

Female
7%
Male
83%
Female
17%
Read Media Monitoring Results:
BUYING INFLUENCE:
MONEY AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN ALBANIA
PUSHTETI DHE PARTITE POLITIKE
NE SHQIPERI NEN NDIKIMIN E PARASE
Acknowledgements
The CRINIS tool – Latin for ray of light – was developed by

Transparency International (TI)
and The Carter Center. Through an innovative research module,
the tool assesses levels of
transparency and accountability in the political finance system
and enables targeted advocacy
for reform of the regulatory framework and change in practices.
This research is an integral part of the CRINIS project being
implemented in five countries of
Western Balkans: Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia and
Serbia. It is a product of
combined efforts of numerous individuals and Transparency
International Albania, devoted
to among other things, the promotion of transparency and
accountability in political finance
in the Republic of Albania.
Special thanks are addressed to Transparency International
Secretariat in Berlin for providing
the methodology, facilitating the adaptation to the country
context and the quality control
throughout the whole implementation process.
Sincere gratitude goes also for Tinatin Ninua, for her special
support in facilitating the
implementation of this second cycle of the CRINIS research,
and Helen Turek for her
valuable contribution in coordinating the project management at
regional level.
Thank you all!

TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
ALBANIA
CONTENTS
Foreword…………………………………………………….………
…………………...-3-
I. Introduction and background to the
study………………………………………-4-
II. Executive summary and

recommendations…………………………………..….-5-
III. General context on political party
financing…………………………………….-7-
IV.
Methodology……………………………………...…………………
………….-10-
V. Research results: overall
finding………………………………………………..-11-
Annex 1: Overview of scores by
dimension……………………………………………-24-
Annex 2: Ten dimensions of transparency in political
finance…………………………-25-
and sources of information used

BUYING INFLUENCE: MONEY AND POLITICAL PARTIES
IN ALBANIA
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
ALBANIA
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Foreword
Money in politics is among the most important issues
concerning the democracy and
development of a political system. Political parties stand as the
castle of democracy, being
utmost essential to open and competitive democratic politics,
particularly in emerging
democracies.
The aim of political finance regulations is not to hamper the
performance of political parties.
Representative democracies cannot function without them.
Furthermore, political parties and
candidates to elected office need money to communicate their
platforms and policies to
voters. Parties need funding in order to survive, compete, and
perform their democratic
functions, both during and between election campaigns.

With activities of political parties increasing in sophistication
and cost, the importance of and
need for political donations is ever-increasing. As a result,
political parties are vulnerable to
offers of funding in exchange for the provision of favours. This
buying of influence via
political donations undermines the very foundations of
representative democracy. Therefore,
it is critical to address this problem and to strengthen the
transparency and accountability of
political parties in Albania. Transparency International Albania
has continuously called on
political parties in the country to be open and accountable to the
public through detailed
disclosure procedures of their political platforms, CVs and
donations of their candidates on
elections, donors and funding provided during election
campaigns and annual activity. The
challenge is to limit the opportunities for corruption, while
promoting political equality and
recognising the demands on political parties and candidates. In
addition, public trust in
democracy is eroded when elected leaders fail to comply with
the laws they have designed
and respect the oversight institutions they have established.
The CRINIS assessment for Albania has focused in the annual,
non-electoral funding of
political parties and presents an evaluation of the important
aspects of legal regulations on
annual party financing. It also provides key recommendations
for ensuring their effective
implementation, improvement of supervision and disclosure.
This report aims to serve to the
public and all interested actors as a tool to increase

political parties in the country. Transparency, through the full
disclosure of their political
financing policies and practices, provides the ability to verify
that no malpractice has
occurred and that regulatory frameworks are being effectively
implemented.
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I. Introduction and Background to the study
In the framework of the regional project “CRINIS – shining a
light on money in politics”,
Transparency International Albania conducted this second cycle
of research to measure the
level of transparency in political party funding in Albania.
CRINIS is an assessment tool that

evaluates legislative systems and studies the practices of key
actors involved in political
finance. It aims to identify gaps and shortcomings in political
financing systems, with the
objective of promoting transparency in political party funding.
It is based on the principle of
transparency as a guarantee for strengthening the internal
accountability and democracy of
political parties.
International law has increasingly recognised the importance of
transparency for mitigating
corruption in party politics and using disclosure of political
financing as a means to improve
it. The United Nations Convention against Corruption
(UNCAC), which entered into force in
2005, calls on states to “enhance transparency in the funding of
candidates for elected public
office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties”1.
In line with the international legislation in place, Albania`s
legal framework on oversight and
control of political finance offers good provisions for
political parties. Unfortunately, a weak point of this system
continues to be its effective
implementation. For the first time in 2012, the political parties
in our country reported to the
state oversight agency on their annual funding during 2011. As
analysed further on this report,
a series of issues remain to be addressed for a proper
implementation of the law. Political
parties in Albania are strongly recommended to put a new
emphasis on transparency and
public accountability in order to facilitate a fair electoral
process and enhance their internal

democracy.
The following report is focused on the analysis of legal
framework for the annual funding of
political parties in Albania for the year 2012, and provides
findings on the importance and
standards of money in politics. The transparency of political
parties` finances and the civic
right to disclose such information to the public offers one of the
best guarantees for
transparent governance and effective institutions delivering
high levels of accountability for
citizens.

1UNCAC was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2005.
UNCAC entered into force for Albania
in 2006. For more information see:
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
IN ALBANIA
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Page
5
II. Executive Summary and Recommendations
Political financing in Albania scored an average result of 5.9
points according to an analysis
using the CRINIS methodology, with a focus on the annual
funding of political parties.
Results of the research are categorized in three main evaluation

groups: insufficient (0 to 3.3),
average (3.4 to 6.7) and good (6.8 to 10). Albania’s score is
evaluated as “average”. This
evaluation is a reflection of an improving legal infrastructure,
but not a good implementation
in practice.
The lowest scoring dimensions evaluated in the research were
sanctions and preventive
measures. Sanctions and preventive measures prove to be inter-
related, because the poor
practical implementation of sanctions does not provide a strong
foundation for the proper
implementation of preventive measures. The sanctions
prescribed by law do not envisage
penalties extended beyond monetary fines and they are not
appropriate enough to tackle the
violation of rules. To this extent, even the preventive measures
are not adequate to discourage
malpractices of the parties on annual financial reporting and
these measures fail to create a
well regulated system which would need, at a later stage,
stronger sanctions for the violation
of the law.
Bookkeeping, scope of reporting and depth of reporting have
good legal standards, and score
good evaluations respectively. Financial reports should contain
detailed explanations on
income and expenditure, and private donations. Auditing reports
must be prepared by
independent and certified auditors.
The competences for the oversight and control of political
parties financing are delegated to
the Central Elections Commission (CEC), which makes this

institution the most important
guardian of transparency and public disclosure. The CEC has a
major role not only with
regards to the functions of monitoring and control, but to the
entire process of financial
reporting and auditing as well. The law provides the CEC with
the competences to issue legal
dispositions and decisions for the format and timing of
reporting, the auditors’ selection and
public disclosure. Hence, it is important for the CEC to
demonstrate the necessary
independence and political consensus in order to keep on track
the practice of the improving
legal framework of one of the fundamentals pillars of political
parties and democracy – their
finances.
Finalisation of the CRINIS research in 2012 has offered a set of
recommendations for the
Albanian legal system:
1. Disclosure of financial information by political parties
should be regulated by
specific legal provisions and monitored by the state oversight
agency.
Political parties in Albania have failed to disclose financial
information to the public,
its party members and voters. This is considered the main
indicator of non-
responsibility and lack of transparency. Even though it is cited
in the Constitution of
Albania, the law is not respected and for this reason we
recommend a specific legal
provision to regulate the disclosure of such information by the
parties themselves. The

implementation of this disposition should be monitored by the
state oversight agency,
which must apply sanctions in case of the law not being
respected.
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2. Reports on annual funding and election campaign funding
need to be submitted
separately during electoral years.
The Political Parties Law should include an article to define
what constitutes election-
related spending, in order to avoid political parties disguising
election campaign
spending as ordinary spending. The law should provide clear
regulations that any
expenditure on items or services that are used for campaign
purposes counts as
election campaign spending, even if it is spent before the start
of the official election
campaign period.

3. Identification and reporting on in-kind donations should be
regulated by clear
and adequate legal provisions.
The current law implies that reporting on in-kind donations is
covered by standardised
reporting templates issued by the Central Election Commission.
This is a general
provision, which should not be left only to sub-legal acts, i.e.
decisions of the CEC
unspecified in law. The law should explicitly state that in-kind
donations, loans and
guarantees are to be defined and regulated through specific sub-
legal acts issued by
the CEC.
4. Legal provisions on preventive measures need to be
strengthened.
Abuse of state resources must be addressed rigorously through
relevant regulations
and legislation. There is an essential need to clearly define what
constitutes such
practices and prescribe clear penalties for breaching the
established rules. The Central
Elections Commission should adopt all the necessary
mechanisms in order to prevent
political parties from abusing with state resources such could be
using public offices
or state institutions resources for electoral purposes by the
political parties in power.
5. The Central Election Commission needs to conduct proactive
investigations to

verify the financial accounts of political parties.
The first round of annual financial reporting of political parties
in Albania revealed a
weakness in the oversight functions of the CEC and lack of
adequate control of the
reliability of information provided by parties, given that the
reports were not further
investigated by CEC experts or independent auditors assigned
by the CEC. Based on
the non-application of proper penalties and sanctions, we
recommend a proactive
approach to investigation by the oversight agency in order to
promote more
transparency and more effective implementation of the law.
IN ALBANIA
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
ALBANIA
Page
7

III. General Context on Political Financing
The annual funding of political parties in Albania is regulated
by the following set of legal
dispositions:
a) Article 9, paragraph 3 in the Constitution of Albania cites
that “the financial resources
of political parties, as well as their expenses, shall be made
public in a timely manner”.
b) The financing of political parties annual activity is regulated
by the Law no. 8580 date
17.2.2000 “For Political Parties” – amended with the Law no.
9542 date 2.2.2006 and
with the Law no. 10 374 date 10.2.2011. Its dispositions
regulate the financing of
political parties from financial and material resources, public
and private, which are
not regulated by the provisions in the Electoral Code. The law
empowers the Central
Election Commission with the competences of financial control,
the rules of auditing
and compiling regular financial reports, and sanctions for
irregularities and refusals of
declaring donors or the amount of donation.
Limits on private finance
The Law on Political Parties2, on the one hand, prohibits
political parties through the Article
21 to profit from financial and material donations from foreign

governments, public or
private entities. On the other hand, this article allows gifts or
aid from parties or international
unions parties, politics organizations or foundations, Albanian
and foreign, individuals,
Albanian physical or juridical private persons.
The law3states that the donation of private funds of an amount
larger than 100,000 Leke
(approx. 720 EUR) should be made only through a designated
bank account opened by the
political party. It also prohibits the donation of private funds
from subjects who do not
declare their identity or whose identity is undefined clearly
from the beneficiary political
party.4
Donations are prohibited when the conditions mentioned below
apply to a juridical person, or
any of its shareholders:
a) has profited from public funds, public contracts or
concessions during the last two
years for an amount of money exceeding 10,000,000 Leke
(approx. 71,950 EUR);
b) bases its activity in the field of media.
c) has been a partner on projects benefiting from public funds;
d) has monetary obligations toward the State Budget or any
public institution.
This ban is not applied when the shareholder possess these
shares as a result of a public
tender.

2 The Law no. 8580 date 17.2.2000 “For Political Parties” –
amended with the Law no. 9542 date
2.2.2006 and with the Law no. 10 374 date 10.2.2011
3 The Article 23/1 (disposition no.2) of the Law “For Political
Parties”
4 The Article 23/1 (disposition no.3) of the Law “For Political
Parties”
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Public subsidies
The Law on Political Parties5states that every year the state
budget is assigned a fund which
serves as a public financial subsidy for the annual activity of
political parties. This financial
subsidy during non-electoral years should not be lower than the
subsidy provided in the
preceding year.
The rules of distribution are as follows:
a) 70 % is allocated according to the number of MPs in the
recent parliamentary
elections. Every parliamentary party profits from a financial
subsidy in accordance
with the number of MP seats won as per the electoral system
predicted in the
Electoral Code;
b) 20 % is allocated equally to the parliamentary parties;
c) 10 % is allocated in accordance with the percentage of votes
won by political parties
who participated in the recent parliamentary elections and who
won more than 1% of
the votes nationwide.

Any part left unallocated from the final 10 % is added to the
first 70 % and is re-allocated to
The parliamentary parties are provided by the state with a
building for their central and local
headquarters6. This access is available also for those political
parties, whose average votes in
the three last parliamentary elections has been more than 1 %
nationwide. When there are no
free state buildings available for this purpose, the state takes
responsibility to pay the rent of
the central and local headquarters of the party.7
State control
The CEC is the institution responsible for the control and
oversight of political parties and
election financing. It used to be the Supreme Audit Institution;
however, the article which
gave these competences was repealed with a decision no.33 date
9.5.2011 by the
Constitutional Court because no control was put into practice by
this institution.
The competences of the CEC are defined in the Article 15/2 of
the Law no. 8580 date
17.2.2000 “For Political Parties” – amended with the Law no.
9542 date 2.2.2006 and with
the Law no. 10 374 date 10.2.2011 – as below mentioned:
a) Compiling and passing the rules for reporting of finances, for
monitoring, overseeing
and financial auditing of the political parties, also for the
standardized formats of

annual financial reporting ;
b) Adopting the format of the special register for private funds
of political parties, and
also the format and content for the declaration of non-public
fund donations ;
c) Selecting the list of licensed auditors and elects them by an
occasional ballot for the
purpose of auditing the funds and expenses of political parties ;

5 The Article 19 of the Law “For Political Parties”
6 The Article 22 of the Law “For Political Parties”

7 The Article 22/1 of the Law “For Political Parties”
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d) Monitoring, overseeing and auditing the financing of
political parties, through the
control of financial documentation and accounts of political
parties and of the subjects
associated directly or indirectly with political parties or under
their control ;
e) Putting sanctions in place when it ascertains irregularities of
the provisions of the
law ;
f) Compiling directives, carries out awareness programs and
organizing trainings for
financing of political parties and subjects included in this
process in accordance with
the provisions of the law ;

g) Assigning the amount of public funding to each party as a
form of annual financial aid
in accordance with the law ;
h) Enacting regulations in accordance with and for the
implementation of the provisions
of the law.
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IV. Methodology
The CRINIS methodology entails assessment of two different
types of political financing:
non-electoral finances of political parties and election campaign
funding for legislative, and
where applicable, presidential elections. This report looks at the
assessment of annual
funding of political parties in Albania in 2012, whereby
resources were mobilized by political
parties to support their annual activity during the non-electoral
period.
The methodology involves examining the regulatory framework
on transparency of political
financing and its actual implementation vis-à-vis international
standards. By providing
thorough diagnosis of the legal framework and actual practice,
it provides strong empirical
evidence to create a clear picture of areas in need of reform.
The information collected during the research was used to build
an index on the transparency
of political party funding. The level of transparency is
quantified taking into consideration
the following ten dimensions:
(1) Internal bookkeeping refers to the way in which political
parties manage their

financial resources internally.
(2) Reporting to the electoral management body evaluates the
extent to which parties
or candidates report to a government oversight body.
(3) The next three dimensions: comprehensive of reporting;
(4) depth of reporting; and
(5) reliability of reporting centre around the nature of data
furnished in the financial
reports, and help to determine the quality of data submitted to
the electoral bodies.
These evaluate crucial areas such as relevant financial activity,
including cash, in-kind
and other transactions; donor identity; the credibility of
submitted data; and the
perception of the credibility of reports by key actors.
(6) Disclosure of information to citizens examines public access
to political finance
information.
(7) Dimensions encompassing prevention;
(8) sanctions; and
(9) state oversight address the monitoring of compliance with
established rules and
regulations. This includes preventive measures to facilitate
effective oversight, the
existence of sanctions that can be imposed and the institutions
and actors in charge of
performing oversight functions.

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V. Research Findings
This section presents the system of annual funding of political
parties in Albania and draws
some general conclusions and lessons. The main focus of the
analysis in on identifying
strengths and weaknesses in legislation and practices.
Table 1: Crinis Index: Graph showing overall findings with
aggregated averages
Table 2: Graph showing overall results Law and Practice

5.9
8.2
5.1
7.8
8.1
6.5
5.4
2.1
2.1
7.7
5.5
0
2

4
6
8
10
Crinis Index: Aggregated Averages
6.4
9.1
6
8.7
8.8
6.4
0.8
3.6

7.8
0
2
4
6
8
10
Sc
or
e
Crinis Index: Law vs. Practice
Law
Practice

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Dimension 1: Internal bookkeeping
The first stage of reporting by political parties is internal
bookkeeping. Legal obligations
related to bookkeeping and the political culture of the parties
are factors that can influence
this dimension. For parties to comply with legal regulations and
uphold their own values and
principles, it is essential for them to have a functioning
administration, with the necessary
capabilities.
In this study, the internal bookkeeping of parties was measured
with five general indicators.
These include legal requirements for parties to keep books on
income, expenditure and assets
and their actual practice in this regard. Other indicators address
questions of disclosure of this
information to party members, the standard of accounting
procedures followed, whether there
are authorized individuals to sign financial accounting reports,
and whether financial records
are kept for a prescribed length of time.
Graph here:

Law: 9.1
Practice: 7.4
The Law on Political Parties obliges political parties in Albania
to keep internal accounting
books and report on their assets, income and expenditures.
Parties should submit financial
reports once a year to the Central Elections Commission (CEC),
together with an audit report
prepared by licensed accountants as prescribed in the law.
The annual financial reports are to be prepared, signed and
submitted by the responsible
person for finances within the political party or the elected
person defined in the Statute of
the party. In the case of electoral years, the annual financial
report of the party should be
submitted together with the financial report of the electoral
campaign.
The annual financial report, the audit report and the report of
CEC must be published on the
official website of the CEC no later than 30 days after the
submission date to the CEC. The
legal provisions in place do not provide detailed regulations
about whether the financial
records should be kept for a prescribed length of time.
The annual financial reports of political parties in Albania were
drafted and submitted to the
CEC for the first time for the year 2011. Only five
parliamentary parties submitted these

9.1
7.4
8.2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Law
Prac1ce
Total
Internal
bookkeeping
Internal

Book-‐keeping
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reports and irregularities were found even in the audit reports8.
Due to the fact that local
elections were held in the year 2011, annual financial reports
and electoral campaign reports
should have been drafted and submitted together to the CEC,
which did not happen in
practice for all the parties.9 Among the five parliamentary
parties, the Democratic Party
submitted a report only for the period of local elections while
the Socialist Party, Republican
Party, Unity for Human Rights Party and Socialist Movement
for Integration Party submitted
reports for the annual period of 2011. The audit reports were
prepared only for the electoral
campaign finances while according to the law, the audit reports
should cover both reporting
for the annual period and local elections period. In this context,

we recommend clear
provisions to be included in the law in order to discourage
similar malpractices and separate
the reporting format of annual finances from the reporting of
election finances in case of
electoral years.
The standard of accounting procedures followed is not
considered of a high level and the
financial reporting lacks an adequate reflection of the
International Accounting Standards
(IAS) and National Accounting Standards (NAS). The reporting
is not easy to understand for
the public and it lacks detailed explanations on the expenditure
items or sources of donations.
The deadline of submission of the reports was not respected by
all parties.10The available
financial reports were submitted and disclosed by CEC in
different periods of timing. This is
considered to happen as a consequence of a legal loophole
regarding the deadline of
submission, because the Law “For Political Parties” did not
provide specifications on the date
of reporting.
Political parties in Albania do not themselves disclose financial
information to the public and
their members11. The only available information is provided by
the CEC on its official
website. There is no available information on party funding in
the respective websites of the
political parties in Albania. Members of the political parties in
Albania find it difficult to
obtain information on funding received and spent by their party.
There is no internal

transparency regarding finances and donors within the political
parties.
Dimension 2: Reporting to the Oversight Agency
For this dimension, the study focused on five indicators that
covered both the legal
framework and reporting to the designated government
oversight agency. These indicators
included questions about whether parties must render accounts
to a state agency, whether
media companies are required to report, whether there is a
specific standardized format for
submitting information, and how often reporting is required.

8http://www.cec.org.al/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
rticle&id=304&Itemid=315&lang=sq
10 Referred to the information provided by the Central
Elections Commission.
http://www.cec.org.al/index.php?option=com_content&view=art
icle&id=304&Itemid=315&lang=sq
11Referred to the questionnaires by members of five
parliamentary parties in Albania. Such
information is also not found by a detailed analysis of our
research team.
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Graph here:

Law: 6
Practice: 4.1
Article 15/2 of the Law on Political Parties assigns the
competences of oversight of political
party finances to the CEC, through controlling the financial
documentation and accounts of
political parties and of the subjects related directly or indirectly
to the party or the ones under
the party’s dependence.
Each political party should register in a specified format, as
approved by CEC, the total
amount of funds received from each person or legal entity, as
well as other general data
including the name, surname and identification details of the
person or legal entity. The
donor must sign a declaration form, the format of which is
approved by the CEC. A list of
persons donating more than 100,000 ALL (approximately 720
EUR) should be disclosed to
the public. This threshold is considered to be high because it
creates possibilities to hinder the
transparency of funding sources under this amount. Hence, we
recommend amending this
legal provision and lowering the threshold up to the average
salary in the country or remove
the threshold in order to disclose all donations made to the
political parties.
6
4.1

5.1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Law
Prac1ce
Total
ReporEng

to
the
Oversight
Agency
Repor1ng
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In practice, not all political parties reported on their annual
finances to the CEC. Only the
parliamentary parties submitted these reports12. From the
analysis of their reports, the
research group found that they did not respect the standardized
format of reporting.
Dimension 3: Scope of Reporting
Scope of reporting looks into two main indicators: what types of

funding sources are included
in the reports (e.g., donations and public funding) and what
expenses are included in the
reports (e.g., expenses from private donations and expenses
from public subsidies).
Graph here:
Law: 8.7
Practice: 7
Article 17 of the Law on Political Parties defines that the
financial and material resources of
political parties include membership fees, public funding,
private funding (which could be a
financial donation), in-kind donations, services, sponsorships,
loans or other guarantees, and
any other financial transaction. Article 23 of the law specifies
that the annual financial reports
must contain detailed information for all income and expenses.
They should be reported
accordingly to a standardized format approved by the CEC.
However, we evaluate that this is
a general provision, which should not be left only to sub-legal
acts, i.e. decisions of the CEC
unspecified in law. The law should explicitly state that in-kind
donations, loans and
guarantees are to be defined and regulated through specific sub-
legal acts issued by the CEC.
The law does not require the expenditure listed in the reports to
be specified as funded by
public or private income.13

12http://www.cec.org.al/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=301&Itemid=311&lang=sq
8.7
7
7.8
0

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Law
Prac1ce
Total
Scope

of
ReporEng
Scope
of
Repor1ng
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In practice, parties have included all types of income and
expenses in their reports. However,
limited information is given on in-kind donations and in-kind
public subsidies.14
Dimension 4: Depth of Reporting
The detail or depth of information provided is just as important
as the scope of the reporting.
The usefulness of financial reports depends largely on the
information included in them.
Therefore, reports should identify each donor, the amount and
the date of each donation, and

similarly itemize expenditures. This depth of information allows
oversight bodies, civil
society groups and voters in general to examine the accuracy of
information provided,
identify parties who depend excessively on a few selected
donors and monitor future
representatives for any potential action that may benefit their
donors at the expense of the
public. This dimension was measured by aggregating multiple
indicators such as how
detailed income and expenditure reports are, and whether there
is a threshold for reporting of
income in financial reports.
Graph here:
Law: 8.8
Practice: 7.5
In the financial reports of political parties, the date of each
donation, the amount and name of
a donor or official registration of corporate donors should be
explicitly mentioned. Also for
the reporting of expenditures, copies of original invoices should
be provided, including the
date, number of receipt, name and official registration of each
vendor.15

13 The Law no. 8580 date 17.2.2000 “For Political Parties” –
amended with the Law no. 9542 date
2.2.2006 and with the Law no. 10 374 date 10.2.2011
15 Article 23 of the Law “For Political Parties”
8.8

7.5
8.1
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
Law
Prac1ce
Total
Depth
of
ReporEng
Depth

of
Repor1ng
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The law also defines a threshold, 100,000 Leke (approximately
720 EUR) and above, for
disclosing a list of donors to the public with the respective
amounts donated. This list shall be
made public at all times.
In practice, the financial reports analysed by the research team
include information on the
name of the donor, the date and amount of each donation. The
reports on expenditure include
copies of the invoice or receipt for each expenditure, with
detailed information such as the
date and amount of expenses, the name and official registration
number of the vendor.

Dimension 5: Reliability of Reporting
One key element of reporting - due to its close ties to
transparency - is its reliability, or the
belief that the data contained in a report is accurate. This
dimension, therefore, is perception
based and there are no law indicators (see graph below). The
reliability of a report is related
to how accessible it is to the public and to what extent the
public controls its veracity. If the
reliability of the data is questionable, the public’s interest in
monitoring will naturally wane.
Measuring the reliability of data is difficult. The Crinis
methodology relies on data from
surveys with key actors working in the thematic area, such as
party accountants, officials of
oversight agencies and members of civil society.
Multiple indicators processed the responses to questions such
as: how accurate reports are
(for example, in terms of the percentage of donations likely to
be reported) and whether it is
possible to obtain an accurate idea of the financing of parties by
looking at the official
accounting statements.
Graph here:
Based on the surveys conducted by our research team, the
opinions of citizens and field
experts did not correspond to a satisfactory mark for the
reliability of the official financial

information as declared by political parties in Albania. The
reporting is considered as reliable
for the public funding, but there is a general perception among
citizens that some private
donations (especially in-kind) are left out of their financial
reporting.
6.5
6.5
0
2
4
6
8
Law
Prac1ce
Total
Reliability
Reliability
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The respondents have a strong perception that the government
favours the ruling parties
through the abuse of administrative resources, and that the
biggest donors do not want to be
disclosed because the real purpose of their donations is to
promote future favours.
Dimension 6: Public Disclosure
The disclosure of financial information is a key element in
ensuring that the media, civil
society organizations, citizens and aspirants to public office can
engage in monitoring party
finances. This dimension is based on indicators, which describe
the types of requirements to
which the parties are subject. These include the disclosure of
information on public subsidies,
the disclosure of information on private financing received, the
frequency of disclosure, and
the channels through which the public is made aware of such
information (visits to the party,
the electoral management body, internet access etc.).
Furthermore, additional indicators based on the findings of field
tests were used to measure

practices of disclosure. This included a citizen test, in which a
group of citizens, journalists
and students requested information addressed to various
stakeholders (such as political
parties, donors and TV stations). These indicators are based on
the following questions: what
information was obtained by way of field tests conducted by
volunteers? What was the rate of
response achieved with requests for information submitted by
local research teams? And do
parties voluntarily disclose financial information?
Graph here:
Law: 6.4
Practice: 4.5
The annual state budget in Albania allocates a fund which
serves as a public financial subsidy
for the annual activities of the political parties. This financial
subsidy during non-electoral
years should not be lower than the subsidy provided in the
previous year.16

16 Article 19 of the Law “For Political Parties”
6.4
4.5
5.4
0
2
4
6
8

Law
Prac1ce
Total
Public
Disclosure
Public
Disclosure
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The annual financial report, the report of the certified
accounting experts, the financial report
of the election campaign and the report of the CEC shall be
published on the official website
of the CEC no later than 30 days after the date of submission by

the political party.17In
practice, the CEC has published all available information on the
official website on a regular
basis.18
Additionally, Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of
Albania obliges political parties to
publish information on their sources of financing, and
expenditures shall be disclosed to the
public in a timely manner. However, the law should provide
more detailed explanations about
the manner and timing of disclosure by political parties in order
to eliminate possible
legislative gaps. In practice, none of the political parties in
Albania disclose information on
their annual funding themselves.
Dimension 7: Preventive measures
This study assesses the dimension of preventive mechanisms in
political party funding using
indicators that look at the existence of a centralized system of
bank transactions (known as a
“single account”) and a ban on cash deposits which could
prevent the identification of the
origin of donations. Furthermore, this dimension looks into the
existence of preventive
measures against the abuse of government resources and
whether fiscal incentives for
disclosure of donations exist. Another indicator focuses on
whether there are media
regulations on preventing potential abuse of political influence.
Graph here:

Law: 0.8
Practice: 3.3
The law specifies that the donation of private funds of an
amount larger than 100,000 Leke
(approximately 720 EUR) shall be made only through bank
transaction to a special bank
account opened by the political party itself.19 The person
responsible for the finances of the
political party declares the bank account number and related
information to the CEC within

17 Article 23 (disposition no.5) of the Law “For Political
Parties”

18 Referred to information published in the official website of
CEC:
19 Article 23/1 (disposition no.2) of the Law “For Political
Parties”
0.8
3.3
2.1
0
1
2
3
4
Law
Pra1ce
Total

PrevenEon
Preven1on
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three months after the creation of the political party. The bank
account number for each
political entity must be published on the official website of the
CEC. Donations from private
sources, which do not declare their identity or whose identity is
not defined clearly by the
beneficiary party, are strictly prohibited.
In practice, not all financial transactions above 100,000 Leke
(approximately 720 EUR) are
executed through bank transactions. Irregularities have also
been found in some cases, when
parties have not correctly declared their bank account number to
the CEC (as set out by law),
or within the specified timeframe.

The Law “For Political Parties” lacks media regulation
concerning political advertising
during political parties` annual activity (non-electoral
campaign). Even though the law does
not guarantee price equality to parties for media advertising,
parties do have access to paid
media advertising. The frequency of advertising is high,
especially during electoral
campaigns or even prior to the official start date of campaigns.
Comparing the regular prices
set by media companies, the cost of airtime and advertising
seems to be high; parties should
disclose the details of these costs in their financial reporting.
We recommend the insertion of
provisions in the law that would guarantee fiscal incentives for
media companies to disclose
information for the airtime and costs of advertising paid by
political parties.
Dimension 8: Sanctions
As with most other dimensions, multiple indicators that focused
on both the legal framework
and practice were used to evaluate the dimension of sanctions.
Questions included: are
existing laws on financing of election campaigns of political
parties adhered to in practice? Is
current legislation in this area adequate? Are sanctions for
violation of established rules
appropriate?
Graph here:

Law: 3.6
Practice: 0.6
The Article 23/4 of the Law on Political Parties provides in
general a good framework for
preventing political parties from committing financial
misdemeanors or not complying with
3.6
0.6
2.1
0
1
2
3
4
Law
Prac1ce

Total
SancEons
Sanc1ons
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the rules. Sanctions are adequate; however, clear definitions
should be provided for specific
cases in order not to leave gaps in practice. The sanctions below
are explicitly prescribed by
law:
� Financial misdemeanors of legal provisions committed by the
person responsible for
the finances of the political party, or by the assigned person in
its respective statute, is
subject to a fine ranging from 50,000 Leke to 100,000 Leke20.

� Infringement of the obligation of the political party to
cooperate with the certified
accounting expert assigned by the CEC is subject to a fine of
1,000,000 to 2,000,000
Leke21.
� The political party which fails or refuses to make the
financial sources of the party
transparent or to allow an audit by the certified accounting
expert assigned by the
CEC to take place is subject to a fine ranging from 2,000,000
Leke22 to a five-year
suspension of public funding for the political party.
� Failure to submit the financial report within the established
timeframe or submission
of reports which fail to comply with the standardised template
approved by the CEC
is subject to a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 Leke23.
� If the identity of the donor of non-public funds to a political
party is unknown or not
clearly defined, the funds shall be passed on to the CEC.
� Failure to receive non-public funds exceeding the amount of
100,000 Leke
(approximately 720 EUR) through a bank transaction is subject
to a fine of 30% of the
donated amount.
The research team found that there has never been a case where
parties were sanctioned with
the suspension of public funding for irregularities found in their
financial reporting.

Dimension 9: State Oversight
State oversight is an indispensable element in strengthening the
systems that regulate political
financing. The independence and clear mandate of the oversight
body is necessary for its
effective functioning. It is also vital that the institution has
sufficient resources and technical
capacity to carry out its duties. The two indicators for this
dimension include questions on the
legal mandate and institutional arrangement to evaluate whether
the body has necessary legal
powers to carry out independent oversight of political party
funding. Other indicators focus
on examining actual practices, such as: how independent is the
electoral management body,
as evaluated by relevant actors in the field? What are its
capacities and shortcomings in terms
of its resources?
Graph here:

20 Equivalent in EUR: 360 to 720 EUR
21 Equivalent in EUR: 7,150 to 14,300 EUR
22 Equivalent in EUR: 14,300 EUR
23 Equivalent in EUR: 360 to 720 EUR
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Law: 7.8
Practice: 7.5
The CEC is the institution responsible for the control and
oversight of political parties and
election financing. It used to be the Supreme Audit Institution;
however, the article which

gave these competences was repealed with the decision no.33
date 9.5.2011 by the
Constitutional Court because no control was put into practice by
this institution.
The competences of the CEC include: the drafting and adoption
of the rules on reporting of
funding; monitoring; overseeing; the financial audit of political
parties; and providing
standardized formats for annual financial reporting and the
special register for private funds
of political parties.24 The CEC selects certified accounting
experts and assigns them by lot to
audit the funds and expenses of political parties. The CEC also
supervises the funding of
political parties through checks on financial documentation and
accounts. The CEC has the
power to impose sanctions in case of law infringements and
determines the amount of public
funds each political party shall receive as annual financial aid.
In accordance with the
provisions of the law, the institution is also in charge of
organizing awareness programmes
and training sessions on funding of political parties and other
relevant bodies included in this
process.
In general, the CEC is considered to conduct its oversight work
on the annual funding of
parties, respecting the law and the specific regulations. The
weakest points in its oversight
work are related to the application of sanctions and conduct of
proactive investigation where
irregularities are found in the financial reporting. This problem
can be explained by the fact
that the CEC in Albania is composed of members of political

parties, who are most likely to
favour their own parties. Additionally, there is a lack of
resources and capacity to carry out
these kinds of investigations.
Dimension 10: Public oversight
In addition to the oversight functions performed by state bodies,
other actors such as the
media, academics, civil society organizations and citizens and
at times, political parties
themselves may engage in monitoring the funding of political
parties. Monitoring may
include activities such as reporting irregularities to government
bodies, analyzing finance

24 Article 15/2 of the Law “For Political Parties”
7.8
7.5
7.7
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
Law
Prac1ce
Total
State
Oversight

State
Oversight
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23
reports to inform the public and pressuring authorities to ensure
that their oversight is
functioning and effective. This study addressed this dimension
by focusing on the oversight
activities performed mostly by civil society organizations and
media. The specific questions
included: whether there are organizations that oversee election
financing, whether they are
independent, active and influential in their activities. Another
indicator also looks into the
question of whether civil society, citizens or political parties
report irregularities in election
financing to the state oversight body.

Graph here:
Several civil society organizations have been engaged in
monitoring the finances of political
parties and elections in Albania. This issue, however, remains
out of the spotlight of public
debate in Albania, and few organizations have conducted
comprehensive research or have
developed good monitoring documentation.
Debate is mostly focused on the high costs of the electoral
campaigns conducted by the two
major political parties in the country, and also the fact that the
candidates in legislative
elections or donors are usually the richest individuals in the
country. The first CRINIS
research conducted within the framework of this project, and
published in November 2011,
had a large impact and good media coverage, which initiated a
public debate on the
legislation in place and the weakest dimensions of the practice
of party funding in the country.
5.5
5.5

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Law
Prac1ce
Total
Public
oversight
Public
oversight

TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
ALBANIA
ANNEX 1
OVERVIEW OF SCORES BY DIMENSION
Dimensions Scores
Bookkeeping LAW 9.1
PRACTICE n/a
Reporting LAW 4.9
PRACTICE n/a
Scope of reporting LAW 8
PRACTICE n/a
Depth of reporting LAW 7.5
PRACTICE n/a
Reliability of reporting PRACTICE n/a

Public disclosure LAW 4.1
PRACTICE 1.4
Preventive measures LAW 0.7
PRACTICE 2.7
Sanctions LAW 2.5
PRACTICE n/a
State oversight LAW 6.5
PRACTICE 4.8
Public oversight PRACTICE 4.6
IN ALBANIA
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
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25

ANNEX 2
TEN DIMENSIONS OF TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICAL
FINANCE
Dimensions
Generic questions for building indicators
1. Internal bookkeeping of parties Is bookkeeping mandatory by
law? How professional is staff in
practice?
2. Reporting to state oversight
agency (Central Election
Commission)
By law, do parties, service providers, donors and media render
accounts on their role in political finance?
When and in what format?
3. Comprehensiveness or scope of
reporting
Do reports include public and private sources?
Do they cover income and expenses?
Do they cover monetary contributions, in-kind contributions,
rebates etc.?
4. Depth of reporting By law, do reports include information on

individual donations?
Do they clearly identify the donor of each donation?
5. Reliability of reporting Do different actors disclose all
resources in reports?
How accurate are reports, to the knowledge of experts?
6. Disclosure to the public Is it mandatory for state
agencies/parties to disclose information
on political finance?
In practice, how accessible is such information to experts,
journalists and ordinary citizens?
7. Preventive measures Are donations channeled exclusively
through official bank
accounts?
Are there any loopholes for anonymous donations?
8. Sanctions What are the existing sanctions - civil, criminal
and political –
according to the law? In practice, are the existing laws strictly
enforced?
9. State oversight
(Central Elections Commission)
Do experts evaluate institutions of state oversight as
independent?
Are they considered efficient?
From the perspective of self-evaluations, do they lack human
resources? Do they lack training?
10. Public oversight Do civil society organisations monitoring
political finance exist?
In which areas of political finance do they develop activities?

Do experts evaluate organizations of public oversight as
independent?
Page
26
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www.tia.al
Punoi: Inesa Hila
Foto në kopertinë: © istockphoto.com/GYI NSEA
Janë realizuar të gjitha përpjekjet për të veri�kuar vërtetësinë e
informacionit që përmban ky
raport. Cdo informacion i përket periudhës deri në Qershor
2013. Transparency International
Albania nuk mban përgjegjësinë për ngjarje të ndodhura pas

kësaj periudhe, apo pasojat e
përdorimit të tij për qëllime apo kontekste të tjera.
© 2013 Transparency International Albania. Të gjitha të drejtat
e rezervuara.
Ky dokument është realizuar me ndihmën �nanciare të
Ministrisë së Punëve të Jashtme
Norvegjeze. Përmbajtja e tij është përgjegjësi e vetme e
Transparency International Albania dhe
nuk pasqyron domosdoshmërisht pikëpamjet e Ministrisë së
Punëve të Jashtme Norvegjeze.
www.tia.al
Prepared by: Inesa Hila
© Cover photo: © istockphoto.com/GYI NSEA
Every e�ort has been made to verify the accuracy of the
information contained in this report. All
information was believed to be correct as of June 2013.
Nevertheless, Transparency International
Albania cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its
use for other purposes or in other
contexts.
© 2013 Transparency International Albania. All rights reserved.
This document has been produced with the �nancial assistance
of the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign A�airs. The contents of this document are the sole
responsibility of Transparency Interna-
tional Albania and can under no circumstances be regarded as
re�ecting the position of the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign A�airs.

Falenderime
Studimi CRINIS – “rreze drite” në latinisht – është një projekt i
zhvilluar bashkarisht nga
Transparency International (TI) dhe Qëndra Carter. Përmes një
moduli kërkimor inovativ,
projekti analizon nivelet e transparencës dhe llogaridhënies në
sistemet e financimit politik
dhe mundëson advokimin për reforma në kornizën ligjore dhe
ndryshimeve në praktikë.
Ky modul kërkimor është pjesë integrale e projektit CRINIS të
implementuar në pesë vende
të Ballkanit Perëndimor: Shqipëri, Kroaci, Kosovë, Maqedoni
dhe Serbi. Ai është produkt i
përpjekjeve të kombinuara të shumë individëve dhe
Transparency International Albania, i
përkushtuar vec të tjerash të promovojë transparencën dhe
llogaridhënien në financimin
politik në Republikën e Shqipërisë.
Falenderime të vecanta shkojnë për Sekretariatin e
Transparency International në Berlin
lidhur me mundësimin e metodologjisë, përshtatjen me
kontekstin vendas dhe cilësinë e
verifikimit përgjatë të gjithë procesit të implementimit.
Meritojnë vecanërisht të përmenden
Tinatin Ninua, për mbështetjen tejet të vlefshme në
implementimin e fazës së dytë të studimit
CRINIS, dhe Helen Turek për kontributin e vlefshëm në

menaxhimin e projektit në nivel
rajonal.
Ju faleminderit të gjithëve!
PUSHTETI DHE PARTITE POLITIKE NE SHQIPERI NEN
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PËRMBAJTJA
Parathënie…………………………………………………….………
…………………...-3-
I. Hyrje dhe paraqitja e
studimit………………………………………………….....-4-
II. Përmbledhje ekzekutive dhe
rekomandime…………………………………..…...-5-
III. Kontekst i përgjithshëm mbi financimin e partive
politike……………………….-7-
IV.
Metodologjia……………………………………...…………………
……….......-10-
V. Rezultatet e studimit: gjetjet
kryesore……………………………………………-11-
Aneks 1: Paraqitja e rezultateve sipas
dimensioneve…………………………………....-24-
Aneks 2: Dhjetë dimensionet e transparencës në financimin
politik……………………-25-
dhe burimet e informacionit të përdorura

NDIKIMIN E PARASE
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Parathënie
Paraja në politikë është ndër cështjet më të rëndësishme në
funksionimin e demokracisë dhe

zhvillimin e një sistemi politik. Partitë politike janë kështjellë e
demokracisë, dhe si të tilla
tejet esenciale për politika demokratike të hapura dhe
konkurruese, sidomos në demokracitë e
reja.
Qëllimi i kuadrit rregullator në financimin politik nuk është të
pengojë performancën e
partive politike. Demokracitë përfaqësuese nuk mund të
funksionojnë pa to. Për më tepër,
partitë politike dhe kandidatët e zgjedhur kanë nevojë të
vazhdueshme për mjete monetare
për të komunikuar platformat dhe politikat e tyre tek votuesit.
Partitë kanë nevojë për fonde
me qëllim mbijetesën, garën elektorale dhe zhvillimin e
funksioneve demokratike, si në
përiudhat gjatë fushatave elektorale, ashtu edhe në periudhat
midis fushatave.
Me rritjen e sofistikimit dhe kostove të aktiviteteve të partive
politike, rëndësia e nevojës për
donacione politike është rritur shumë. Si rezultat, partitë
politike janë lehtësisht të
ndikueshme nga ofertat për financim në këmbim të favoreve në
të ardhmen. Kjo blerje e
influencës dhe pushtetir përmes dhurimeve politike minon
parimet bazë të një demokracie
përfaqësuese. Prandaj është thelbësore adresimi i këtij problemi
dhe forcimi i standarteve të
transparencës dhe përgjegjshmërisë së partive politike në
Shqipëri. Transparency
International Albania u ka bërë apel të vazhdueshëm partive
politike në Shqipëri të jenë
transparente dhe të përgjegjshme ndaj publikut përmes
publikimit të detajuar të platformave
të tyre politike, CV-ve e donacioneve të kandidatëve për

deputetë, donatorëve dhe
financimeve të siguruara si gjatë fushatave elektorale, edhe
gjatë aktivitetit vjetor. Sfida
qëndron në kufizimin e shanseve për korrupsion, përmes
promovimit të barazisë politike dhe
njohjes së kërkesave të partive politike dhe kandidatëve të tyre.
Gjithashtu, besimi publik në
demokraci ulet kur liderët e zgjedhur dështojnë në zbatimin e
ligjeve që kanë hartuar dhe
respektimin e institucioneve mbikqyrëse që kanë ndërtuar.
Studimi CRINIS për Shqipërinë është fokusuar në financimin
vjetor, jo-elektoral të partive
politike dhe prezanton një vlerësim të aspekteve më të
rëndësishme të rregullimeve ligjore
mbi financimin vjetor të partive. Mundëson gjithashtu
rekomandimet kryesore për të
garantuar një implementim efektiv, përmirësim të mbikqyrjes
dhe publikimin e
informacioneve respektive. Ky raport synon të shërbejë si një
mjet në duart e publikut dhe
gjithë palëve të interesuar për të rritur transparencën dhe
llogaridhënien e partive politike në
vend. Transparenca, përmes publikimeve të plota të politikave
dhe praktikave të financimit
politik, krijon mundësinë e verifikimit të praktikave abuzive, si
dhe implementimit efektiv të
kuadrit ligjor.

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I. Hyrje dhe paraqitja e studimit
Në kuadër të projektit rajonal “CRINIS – të hedhim dritë mbi
paratë në politikë”,
Transparency International Albania zhvilloi këtë analizë të dytë
kërkimore për të matur
nivelet e transparencës në financimin e partive politike në
Shqipëri.
CRINIS vlerëson sistemet legjislative dhe studion praktikat e
aktorëve kryesorë të përfshirë
në financimin politik. Përmes kësaj analize, synojmë të
identifikojmë boshllëqet dhe
mangësitë në sistemet e financimit politik, duke patur si
objektivë promovimin e
transparencës në financimin e partive politike. Transparenca

përbën një garanci themelore për
forcimin e përgjegjshmërisë dhe demokracisë së brendshme të
partive politike.
Legjislacioni ndërkombëtar ka njohur gjithnjë e më shumë
rëndësinë e transparencës në
përballjen me korrupsionin në politikat partiake dhe bërjen
publike të financimit politik si
mjeti për ta përmirësuar atë. Konventa e Kombeve të Bashkuara
kundër Korrupsionit
(UNCAC), hyrë në fuqi në vitin 2005, u kërkon vendeve anëtare
shprehimisht “të rrisin
transparencën e financimit të kandidatëve të zgjedhur në zyrat
publike, dhe ku është e
mundur, financimin e partive politike”1.
Në linjë me legjislacionin ndërkombëtar në fuqi, korniza ligjore
për mbikqyrjen dhe
kontrollin e financave politike në vendin tonë ofron parime të
mira të transparencës dhe
përgjegjshmërisë së partive politike. Fatkeqësisht, një pikë e
dobët e këtij sistemi vijon të jetë
implementimi efektiv. Për herë të parë në vitin 2012, partitë
politike në vendin tonë raportuan
në institucionin mbikqyrës shtetëror mbi financimet vjetore të
përfituara gjatë vitit 2011. Sic
edhe do të analizohet më tej në këtë raport, një sërë cështjesh
duhen adresuar për zgjidhje në
mënyrë që të sigurohet një implementim rigoroz i ligjit. Partitë
politike në Shqipëri duhet me
cdo kusht të vendosin prioritete të reja lidhur me transparencën
dhe llogaridhënien publike
me qëllim që të mundësohet një proces i drejtë elektoral dhe të
përmirësojnë demokracinë e
brendshme.

Raporti që keni përpara përmban një analizë të kuadrit ligjor
mbi financimin vjetor të partive
politike në Shqipëri për vitin 2012, dhe paraqet gjetjet kryesore
mbi rëndësinë dhe standartet
e parave të ligjshme në politikë. Transparenca e financave të
partive politike dhe e drejta
qytetare e publikimit të këtyre informacioneve ofron një ndër
garancitë më të mira për një
qeverisje transparente dhe institucione efektive në shërbim të
qytetarëve.

1 Konventa e Kombeve të Bashkuara kundër Korrupsionit u
miratua në vitin 2003 dhe hyri në fuqi në
vitin 2005. Konventa hyri në fuqi për Shqipërinë në vitin 2006.
Për më shumë informacione mund të
shihni:
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
NDIKIMIN E PARASE
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II. Përmbledhje ekzekutive dhe rekomandime
Financimi politik në Shqipëri shënoi një rezultat mesatar prej
5.9 pikësh përmes analizës së
studimit CRINIS, me fokus në financimin vjetor të partive
politike. Rezultatet e këtij kërkimi
kategorizohen në tre grupe kryesore vlerësimi: pamjaftueshëm
(0 deri në 3.3), mesatar (3.4
deri në 6.7) dhe mirë (6.8 deri në 10). Pikët e vlerësuara për
Shqipërinë janë në kategorinë

“mesatare”. Ky vlerësim është pasqyrim i një kuadri ligjor të
përmirësuar, por implementim
jo të mirë në praktikë.
Indikatorët e vlerësuar me pikët më të ulëta janësanksionet dhe
masat parandaluese.
Sanksionet dhe masat parandaluese duket të jenë të ndërlidhura
në këtë proces, pasi
mospërputhja me praktikën lidhur me sanksionet e aplikueshme
me ligj nuk mundëson një
mjedis të përshtatshëm për implementimin adekuat të masave
parandaluese. Sanksionet e
parashikuara në ligj nuk parashikojnë penalitete përtej gjobave
financiare dhe nuk janë
mjaftueshmërisht të përshtatshme për t` iu përgjigjur shkeljes së
ligjeve. Në këtë kontekst,
edhe masat parandaluese nuk janë adekuate në diskurajimin e
praktikave të gabuara të partive
mbi raportimin e financave vjetore dhe këto masa deshtojnë të
krijojnë një sistem të
mirërregulluar që në një fazë të mëvonshme, do të ketë nevojë
të plotësohet me sanksione më
të forta për shkeljen e ligjit.
Mbajtja e kontabilitetit, Qëllimi dhe Detajimi i raportimit
mundësojnë standarte të mira
ligjore, duke marrë vlerësim të mirë. Raportet financiare duhet
të përmbajnë shpjegime të
detajuara mbi të ardhurat dhe shpenzimet, si dhe donacionet
private. Raportet e auditimit
duhet të përgatiten nga auditues të pavarur e të certifikuar.
Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve (KQZ) ka kompetencat për
monitorimin dhe mbikqyrjen e
financimit të partive politike, cka i krijon mundësinë këtij
institucioni të jetë para-rojë për

transparencën dhe bërjen publike të informacionit financiar të
partive. KQZ ka rolin kryesor
jo vetëm lidhur me funksionet e monitorimit dhe kontrollit, por
edhe funksionimin e procesit
tërësor të raportimit financiar dhe auditimit. Gjithashtu, ligji i
mundëson KQZ kompetencat e
nxjerrjes së dispozitave ligjore, vendimeve dhe udhëzimeve për
formatin e raportimit, datën,
përzgjedhjen e ekspertëve kontabël dhe publikimin e
informacionit. Në këtë mënyrë,është e
rëndësishme që KQZ të demonstrojë pavarësinë e duhur dhe
konsensusin politik për zbatimin
efektiv në praktikë të kornizës së përmirësuar ligjore lidhur me
një nga shtyllat bazë të
partive politike dhe demokracisë, parave në politikë.
Me konkludimin e analizës kërkimore të projektit CRINIS në
vitin 2012, TIA propozon një
sërë rekomandimesh mbi sistemin ligjor të vendit tonë:
1. Publikimi i informacionit financiar nga partitë politike duhet
të rregullohet
përmes dispozitave specifike ligjore dhe të monitorohet nga
autoriteti mbikqyrës
shtetëror.
Partitë politike në Shqipëri kanë dështuar në bërjen publike të
informacionit financiar
për publikun, anëtarët e partisë dhe votuesit. Ky konsiderohet si
treguesi kryesor i
papërgjegjshmërisë dhe mungesës së transparencës. Megjithë
parashikimin në
Kushtetutën e Republikës së Shqipërisë, ligji nuk respektohet
dhe për këtë arsye,
rekomandojmë shtimin e një dispozite të vecantë ligjore për të
rregulluar publikimin e

këtyre informacioneve nga vetë partitë politike. Zbatimi në
praktikë i kësaj dispozite
NDIKIMIN E PARASE
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duhet të monitorohet nga autoriteti mbikqyrës shtetëror, duke
aplikuar sanksione në
rast të mosrespektimit të ligjit.
2. Raportet e financimit vjetor dhe financimit të fushatave
elektorale duhet të
dorëzohen të ndara në rastet e viteve zgjedhore.
Ligji “Për Partitë Politike” duhet të parashikojë një nen të
vecantë për të përcaktuar
një përkufizim të qartë mbi shpenzimet e fushatave zgjedhore,
me qëllim që të evitojë
deklarimin e shpenzimeve elektorale si pjesë e shpenzimeve të

zakonshme vjetore të
partive politike. Ligji duhet të përmbajë rregullime të qarta
lidhur me faktin që cdo
shpenzim për artikuj apo shërbime të përdorura për qëllime të
fushatës elektorale të
kontabilizohet si shpenzim i financimit elektoral, edhe në rast
së kryhet përpara datës
së nisjes zyrtare të periudhës së fushatës.
3. Identifikimi dhe raportimi i dhurimeve në natyrë duhet të
rregullohet me
dispozita ligjore të qarta e adekuate.
Ligji aktual parashikon që kjo të zgjidhet përmes formateve të
standartizuara të
raportimit të miratuara nga KQZ. Ndërkohë që është një
dispozitë e përgjithshme dhe
nuk mund t`u lihet akteve nën-ligjore sic janë vendimet e marra
nga KQZ për veprime
të paspecifikuara në ligj. Në ligj duhet të përmendet qartë, së
paku duke cilësuar në
mënyrë të vecantë se dhurimet në natyrë, sponsorizimet, kreditë
apo garancitë e
ndryshme duhet të përcaktohen dhe rregullohen përmes akteve
nën-ligjore të hartuara
dhe miratuara nga KQZ.
4. Dispozitat ligjore mbi parandalimin e mosrespektimit të
rregullave ligjore të
parashikojnë masa dhe penalitete më të forta.
Abuzimi me burimet shtetërore duhet të adresohet rigorozisht
përmes rregullave dhe

legjislacionit përkatës. Ekziston një nevojë esenciale për të
përcaktuar në mënyrë të
qartë se cilat janë këto praktika dhe si të parashikohen
penalitete të qarta për shkeljen
e rregullave të vendosura. Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve
duhet të adoptojë
mekanizmat e nevojshëm me qëllim që të parandalojë partitë
politike nga abuzimi me
burimet shtetërore sic mund të jenë rastet e përdorimit të zyrave
shtetërore apo
burimeve të institucioneve shtetërore për qëllime elektorale nga
partitë në pushtet.
5. Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve duhet të ndërmarrë
investigime proaktive për
të verifikuar llogaritë financiare të partive politike.
Faza e parë e raportimit financiar vjetore nga partitë politike në
Shqipëri nxorri në pah
dobësitë e funksioneve mbikqyrëse të KQZ dhe mungesën e një
kontrolli adekuat për
besueshmërinë e informacionit të deklaruar nga partitë, duke
qenë së raportet nuk
investigohen nga ekspertë të KQZ apo audituesit e pavarur të
përcaktuar nga KQZ.
Bazuar në mosaplikimin e penaliteteve apo sanksioneve të
duhura, ne rekomandojmë
që autoriteti shtetëror të hetojë në mënyrë proactive financat e
partive me qëllim
promovimin e transparencës dhe implementimin efektiv të ligjit.

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III. Kontekst i përgjithshëm mbi financimin e partive politike
Financimi vjetor i partive politike në Shqipëri rregullohet
përmes këtyre dispozitave ligjore:
a) Neni 9, paragrafi 3 në Kushtetutën ë Shqipërisë citon se
“Burimet financiare të partive,
si dhe shpenzimet e tyre bëhen kurdoherë publike”.
b) Financimi i aktivitetit vjetor të partive politike rregullohet
me Ligjin nr. 8580 datë
17.2.2000 “Për Partitë Politike” – ndryshuar me Ligjin nr. 9542
datë 2.2.2006 dhe me
Ligjin nr. 10 374 datë 10.2.2011. Dispozitat e tij rregullojnë
financimin e partive
politike nga burimet financiare e materiale, publike e private, të
cilat nuk përfshihen
në Kodin Zgjedhor. Ligji përcakton kompetencat e kontrollit të
financave nga KQZ,

rregullat e auditimit dhe përgatitjes së raporteve të rregullta
financiare, sanksione për
shkeljet dhe mos deklarimin e dhuruesve apo shumave të
dhurimit.
Limitet mbi financimet private
Ligji “Për Partitë Politike”2, nga njëra anë, përmes Nenit 21 të
tij, i ndalon partitë politike të
përfitojnë dhurime financiare e material nga qeveri, entitete
publike ose private të huaja. Nga
ana tjetër, ky Nen lejon dhuratat ose ndihmat që vijnë nga parti
apo unione ndërkombëtare
partiake, organizata apo fondacione politike, shqiptare dhe të
huaja, individë, person fizik apo
juridik shqiptar.
Ligji3 citon se dhurimi i fondeve jopublike, me vlerë më të
madhe se 100,000 Lekë (afërsisht
720 Euro), duhet të bëhet vetëm në një llogari të posaçme, të
hapur në një bankë nga partia
politike. Gjithashtu, ndalon përfitimin e fondeve jopublike,
kryer nga subjekte që nuk
deklarojnë identitetin e tyre apo identiteti i të cilave është i
papërcaktuar qartë nga partia
politike përfituese e fondit jopublik4.
Dhënia e fondeve ndalohet nga një person juridik apo çdo
aksionar i tij në rast se ndodhet në
një nga kushtet e mëposhtme:
a) Ka përfituar fonde publike, kontrata publike apo koncesione
në 2 vitet e fundit me
vlerë mbi 10 000 000 Lekë (rreth 71,950 Euro);

b) Ushtron veprimtari në fushën e medias;
c) Ka qenë partner me fonde publike në projekte të ndryshme;
d) Ka detyrime monetare ndaj Buxhetit të Shtetit ose ndaj çdo
institucioni publik.
Ky detyrim nuk zbatohet nëse aksionari i zotëron këto aksione
si rezultat i ofertës
publike.

2 Ligji nr. 8580 datë 17.2.2000 “Për Partitë Politike” –
ndryshuar me Ligjin nr. 9542 datë 2.2.2006
dhe me Ligjin nr. 10 374 datë 10.2.2011
3 Neni 23/1 (dispozita nr.2) i Ligjit “Për Partitë Politike”

4 Neni 23/1 (dispozita nr.3) i Ligjit “Për Partitë Politike”
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Ndihmat publike
Ligji “Për Partitë Politike”5 citon se cdo vit në Buxhetin e
Shtetit përcaktohet një fond që
shërben si ndihmë financiare publike për kryerjen e
veprimtarisë vjetore të partive politike.
Ndihma financiare e parashikuar në Buxhetin e Shtetit në vitet
jozgjedhore, si rregull, nuk
mund të jetë më e vogël se ndihma e parashikuar në vitin
paraardhës.
Rregullat e shpërndarjes parashikohen si më poshtë:
a) 70 %, sipas numrit të deputetëve të fituar në zgjedhjet e

fundit parlamentare. Çdo
parti parlamentare përfiton ndihmë financiare në përputhje me
numrin e deputetëve që
ka fituar në bazë të sistemit zgjedhor të parashikuar në Kodin
Zgjedhor;
b) 20 %, në mënyrë të barabartë, ndërmjet partive parlamentare;
c) 10 %, sipas përqindjes së fituar ndërmjet partive politike që
kanë marrë pjesë në
zgjedhjet e fundit parlamentare dhe kanë fituar mbi 1 % të
votave në shkallë vendi.
Pjesa që mbetet pa u shpërndarë nga 10-përqindëshi i shtohet
fondit prej 70 për qind dhe u
ndahet partive parlamentare.
Partive parlamentare u mundësohet një ndërtesë për zyrat e tyre
qëndrore dhe lokale6. Kjo
mundësi u jepet edhe partive politike, mesatarja e votave të të
cilave ka qenë më e madhe se
1 % në rang kombëtar në tre zgjedhjet e fundit parlamentare.
Kur nuk ka ndërtesa të lira për
këtë qëllim, shteti merr përsipër pagesën e qirasë së selisë
qendrore dhe të zyrave vendore të
partisë politike.7
Kontrolli shtetëror
Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve është organi përgjegjës për
monitorimin dhe mbikëqyrjen e
financimit të partive politike dhe fushatave zgjedhore. Përpara
tij, një pjesë të këtyre
kompetenca i kishte Kontrolli i Lartë i Shtetit por Neni që

përcaktonte këto kompetenca u
shfuqizua përmes vendimit nr.33 datë 9.5.2011 të Gjykatës
Kushtetuese pasi nuk realizoi
asnjë kontroll në praktikë.
Kompetencat e KQZ përcaktohen në Nenin 15/2 të Ligjit
nr.8580 datë 17.2.2000 “Për
Partitë Politike” – ndryshuar me Ligjin nr.9542 datë 2.2.2006
dhe me Ligjin nr. 10 374 datë
10.2.2011 si më poshtë vijon:
a) Harton dhe miraton rregullat për raportimin e financimit, për
monitorimin,
mbikëqyrjen dhe auditimin financiar të partive politike, si dhe
për formatet e
standardizuara për raportimin financiar vjetor ;
b) Miraton formatin e regjistrit të posaçëm të fondeve jopublike
të partive politike, si
dhe formatin për formën dhe përmbajtjen e deklaratës së
dhurimit të fondeve
jopublike ;

5 Neni 19 i Ligjit “Për Partitë Politike”
7 Neni 22/1 i Ligjit “Për Partitë Politike”
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c) Mban listën e ekspertëve kontabël të licencuar dhe i cakton
me short ata për auditimin
e fondeve dhe të shpenzimeve të partive politike ;
d) Monitoron, mbikëqyr dhe auditon financimin e partive
politike, nëpërmjet kontrollit

të dokumentacionit financiar e të llogarive kontabël të partive
politike, të subjekteve
të lidhura, drejtpërdrejt ose tërthorazi, me partitë politike apo
që ndodhen nën
kontrollin e tyre ;
e) Vendos sanksione kur konstaton shkelje të dispozitave të
këtij ligji ;
f) Harton programe ndërgjegjësuese dhe organizon trajnime për
financimin e partive
politike dhe të subjekteve të përfshira në këtë proces, sipas
dispozitave të këtij ligji ;
g) Përcakton masën e fondit publik që përfiton çdo parti politike
në formën e ndihmës
financiare vjetore, në përputhje me këtë ligj ;
h) Nxjerr akte nënligjore në bazë dhe për zbatimin e dispozitave
të këtij ligji.

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IV. Metodologjia
Metodologjia CRINIS trajton analizën e dy formave të
financimit politik: financave jo-
elektorale të partive politike dhe financimeve të fushatave
elektorale për zgjedhjet
parlamentare dhe në rastet e mundshme, zgjedhjet presidenciale.
Ky raport përfshin vetëm
vlerësimin e financimeve të aktiviteteve vjetore të partive
politike në Shqipëri në 2012, për
burimet e përdorura për mbështetjen e strukturave të partive dhe
aktiviteteve gjatë vitit jo-
elektoral.

Metodologjia përfshin analizimin e kuadrit rregullues ligjor mbi
transparencën e financimeve
politike dhe implementimin aktual në krahasim me standartet
më të mira të njohura
ndërkombëtarisht. Përmes një diagnostikimi tërësor të kuadrit
ligjor dhe praktikës aktuale,
mundësohet një evidencë e mirë empirike për të krijuar një
pamje më të qartë të fushave që
duhen reformuar.
Të dhënat e mbledhura gjatë kërkimit janë përdorur për të
krijuar një indeks mbi
transparencën e financimit të partive politike. Niveli i
transparencës përcaktohet duke marrë
në shqyrtim dhjetë dimensionet e mëposhtme:
(1) Kontabiliteti i brendshëm i referohet mënyrës përmes së
cilës partitë politike
menaxhojnë burimet e brendshme financiare.
(2) Raportimi në organin e administrimit zgjedhor vlerëson
shkallën e raportimit të
partive apo kandidatëve në organin mbikqyrës shtetëror.
(3) Tre dimensionet në vijim: kuptueshmëria e raportimit;
(4) detajimi i raportimit; dhe
(5) besueshmëria e raportimit përqëndrohen rreth natyrës së të
dhënavë që përmbajnë
raportet financiare, dhe ndihmojnë në përcaktimin e cilësisë së
të dhënave të
dorëzuara në institucionin e administrimit zgjedhor. Këto
vlerësojnë fushat kyce sic
janë aktiviteti përkatës financiar, përfshirë këtu mjetet
monetare, dhurimet në natyre

dhe transaksione të tjera; identitetin e dhuruesit; kredibilitetin e
të dhënave të
dorëzuara; dhe perceptimin e kredibilitetit të raporteve nga
aktorët kryesorë.
(6) Publikimin e informacionit për qytetarët shqyrton aksesin
publik për informacionin
e financava politike.
(7) Dimensionet që lidhen me parandalimin;
(8) sanksionet; dhe
(9) mbikqyrjen shtetërore adresojnë monitorimin e përputhjes
me rregullat e vendosura.
Kjo përfshin masat parandaluese për të lehtësuar mbikqyrjen
efektive, ekzistencën e
sanksioneve që mund të vendosen dhe institucionet e aktorët
përgjegjës për kryerjen e
funksioneve mbikqyrëse.
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V. Rezultatet e studimit
Ky seksion paraqet sistemin e financimit vjetor të partive
politike në Shqipëri dhe përmbledh
disa konkluzione të përgjithshme. Fokusi kryesor i analizës
është identifikimi i pikave më të
forta e të dobëta në legjislacionin dhe praktikat përkatëse.
Tabela1: Indeksi Crinis: Grafiku me gjetjet e përgjithshme dhe
rezultatet e mesatarizuara
Tabela2: Grafiku me rezultatet e përgjithshme në Ligj dhe
Praktikë
5.9
8.2
5.1
7.8
8.1

6.5
5.4
2.1
2.1
7.7
5.5
0
2
4
6
8
10
Indeksi Crinis: Rezultatet e mesatarizuara

6.4
9.1
6
8.7
8.8
6.4
0.8
3.6
7.8
0
2
4
6

8
10
Indeksi Crinis: Ligji perkundrejt Praktikes
Ligji
Praktika
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Dimensioni 1: Kontabiliteti i brendshëm

Faza e parë e raportimit të partive politike është kontabiliteti i
brendshëm. Detyrimet ligjore
në fushën e kontabilitetit dhe kultura politike e partive janë
faktorë që mund të influencojnë
këtë dimension. Me qëllim përputhjen me rregullimet ligjore
dhe arritjen e vlerave e
parimeve të tyre, është esenciale që partitë të kenë një
administratë funksionale, me
kapacitetet e nevojshme.
Në këtë studim, kontabiliteti i brendshëm i partive është matur
përmës pesë indikatorëve të
përgjithshëm. Këto përfshijnë kërkesat ligjore që partitë të
mbajnë llogaritë e të ardhurave,
shpenzimeve dhe aseteve, si dhe praktikat aktuale për këtë
qëllim. Indikatorë të tjerë lidhen
me pyetjet mbi publikimin e këtij informacioni për anëtarët e
partisë, standartet e
procedurave kontabël të aplikueshme, individët e autorizuar për
të nënshkruar raportet
financiare të kontabilitetit dhe faktin nëse të dhënat e
regjistruara financiare mbahen për një
kohëzgjatje të përcaktuar.
Grafiku:
Ligji: 9.1
Praktika: 7.4
Ligji “Për Partitë Politike” i detyron partitë politike në Shqipëri
të mbajnë librat e
kontabilitetit të brendshëm dhe të raportojnë mbi asetet që
disponojnë, të ardhurat dhe
shpenzimet. Partitë duhet të dorëzojnë raportet financiare një

herë në vit pranë Komisionit
Qendror të Zgjedhjeve (KQZ), së bashku me raportin e auditimit
të përgatitur nga
kontabilistë të certifikuar sipas përshkrimit përkatës në ligj.
Raportet financiare vjetore përgatiten, nënshkruhen dhe
dorëzohen nga personi përgjegjës për
financat në partinë politike apo personi i zgjedhur sipas
përcaktimit në Statutin e partisë. Në
rastet e vitit elektoral, raporti financiar vjetor i partisë duhet të
dorëzohet së bashku me
raportin financiar të fushatës elektorale.
Raporti financiar vjetor, raporti i auditimit dhe raporti i KQZ
duhet të publikohen në faqen
zyrtare të internetit të KQZ jomë vonë se 30 ditë nga data e
dorëzimit të tyre pranë KQZ.
Dispozitat ligjore në fuqi nuk mundësojnë rregullime të
detajuara nëse regjistrat financiarë
duhet të mbahen për një afat kohor të parashikuar.
9.1
7.4
8.2
0
2
4

6
8
10
Ligji
Prak3ka
Totali
KontabiliteD
i
brendshem
Kontabilite3
i
brendshem
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Raportet vjetore financiare të partive politike në Shqipëri u
hartuan dhe dorëzuan në KQZ për
herë të parë për periudhën ushtrimore të vitit 2011. Vetëm pesë
parti parlamentare i kanë
dorëzuar këto raporte dhe një sërë parregullsish janë vënë re në
raportet e auditimit.8 Për
shkak të zgjedhjeve lokale të mbajtura në vitin 2011, raportet
vjetore financiare dhe raportet
për fushatën elektorale duhet të hartoheshin dhe dorëzoheshin
së bashku pranë KQZ cka nuk
u zbatua në praktikë nga të gjitha partitë.9 Ndër pesë partitë
parlamentare që dorëzuan këto
raporte, Partia Demokratike dorëzoi raportim vetëm për
periudhën e fushatës së zgjedhjeve
lokale ndërkohë që Partia Socialiste, Partia Republikane, Partia
Bashkimi për të Drejtat e
Njeriut dhe Lëvizja Socialiste për Integrim raportuan për të
gjithë periudhën vjetore të 2011.
Raportet e auditimit u përgatitën vetëm për financat e fushatës
elektorale ndërkohë që sipas
ligjit, këto raporte duhet të përfshinin raportimin financiar për
periudhën vjetore dhe fushatën
e zgjedhjeve lokale njëkohësisht. Në këto kushte,
rekomandojmë përfshirjen e dispozitave të
qarta ligjore me qëllim diskurajimin e praktikave të gabuara dhe
ndarjen e formatit të
raportimit të financave vjetore nga financat e fushatës
elektorale në rastet kur kemi të bëjmë

me vit elektoral.
Procedurat e ndjekura kontabël nuk konsiderohen në nivele të
mira referuar standarteve dhe
raportimi financiar nuk reflekton rigorozisht aplikimin e
Standarteve Ndërkombëtare të
Kontabilitetit (SNK) e Standarteve Kombëtare të Kontabilitetit
(SKK). Raportimi nuk është
lehtësisht i kuptueshëm nga publiku dhe nuk paraqet shpjegime
të detajuara mbi shpenzimet e
kryera apo fondet e përfituara.
Afati kohor për dorëzimin e këtyre raporteve nuk u zbatua nga
të gjitha partitë politike.10
Raportet u dorëzuan dhe publikuan nga KQZ në afate të
ndryshme kohore. Kjo parregullsi
lidhet me faktin se ka patur një boshllëk ligjor mbi afatin e
raportimit, pasi Ligji “Për Partitë
Politike” nuk citon specifikime për datën e raportimit.
Partitë politike në Shqipëri nuk i publikojnë vetë informacionet
financiare as për publikun e
gjerë, as për anëtarët e tyre.11 I vetmi informacion është ai i
mundësuar nga Komisioni
Qendror i Zgjedhjeve dhe i publikuar në faqen zyrtare të
internetit të KQZ. Në faqet zyrtare
të internetit të partive politike në Shqipëri nuk ekziston asnjë
informacion i vlefshëm lidhur
me financimet e partisë. Anëtarët e partive e konsiderojnë të
vështirë sigurimin e
informacionit mbi fondet e përfituara dhe të shpenzuara nga
partia e tyre. Partitë politike në
Shqipëri kanë një mungesë të theksuar të transparencës së
brendshme në lidhje me financat
dhe donacionet.

Dimensioni 2: Raportimi në autoritetin mbikqyrës
Lidhur më këtë dimension, studimi fokusohet në pesë indikatorë
që mbulojnë kuadrin ligjor
dhe raportimin pranë agjensisë së përcaktuar për mbikqyrjen
shtetërore. Këto indikatorë
përfshijnë pyetje lidhur me faktin nëse partitë duhet t`i
raportojnë llogaritë pranë agjensisë
shtetërore, nëse donatorëve, shitësve dhe kompanive të medias u
kërkohet të raportojnë, nëse

rticle&id=304%3Araportet-
audit&catid=126&Itemid=315&lang=sq

10 Referuar informacionit të mundësuar nga Komisioni Qendror
i Zgjedhjeve.
icle&id=304%3Araportet-
audit&catid=126&Itemid=315&lang=sq
11 Referuar pyetësorëve të plotësuar nga anëtarë të pesë partive
parlamentare në Shqipëri. Një
informacion i tillë nuk mund të gjehetj as përmes një analize më
të detajuar të grupit të kërkimit.
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ekziston një format i standartizuar specifik për dorëzimin e tyre
dhe sa shpesh kërkohet
raportimi.
Grafiku:

Ligji: 6
Praktika: 4.1
Neni 15/2 i Ligjit “Për partitë politike” përcakton kompetencat
e mbikqyrjes së financave të
partive politike nga Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve, përmes
kontrollit të dokumentacionit
financiar e të llogarive kontabël të partive politike, të
subjekteve të lidhura, drejtpërdrejt ose
tërthorazi, me partitë politike apo që ndodhen nën kontrollin e
tyre.
Çdo parti politike duhet të regjistrojë në një regjistër të
posaçëm, sipas formatit të miratuar
nga Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve, shumën e fondeve të
përfituara nga çdo person fizik
ose juridik, si dhe të dhëna që lidhen me identifikimin e qartë të
dhuruesit. Dhuruesi, në
kohën e dhurimit, nënshkruan detyrimisht një deklaratë dhurimi,
sipas formatit të miratuar
nga KQZ. Lista e personave, që dhurojnë shuma jo më pak se
100,000 Lekë (rreth 720 Euro),
si dhe vlera përkatëse, duhet të bëhen kurdoherë publike. Ky
kufi konsiderohet i lartë pasi
krijon mundësi për të penguar transparencën e burimeve të
financimit nën këtë shumë.
Kështu, rekomandojmë amendimin e kësaj dispozite ligjore dhe
uljen e kufirit për bërjen
publike deri në nivelin e pagës mesatare të vendit ose heqjen e
këtij kufiri me qëllim që të
bëhen publike të gjitha donacionet ndaj partive politike.

Në praktikë, jo të gjitha partitë politike kanë raportuar financat
e tyre vjetore pranë KQZ.
Vetëm pesë parti parlamentare i kanë dorëzuar këto raporte.12
Nga analiza e këtyre raporteve,
grupi i kërkimit ka analizuar se nuk është respektuar formati i
standartizuar i raportimit.

12
6

4.1
5.1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ligji
Prak3ka
Totali
RaporDmi

ne
autoriteDn
mbikqyres
Rapor3mi
ne
autorite3n
mbikqyres
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Faqe
15
Dimensioni 3: Qëllimi i raportimit
Qëllimi i raportimit analizon dy indikatorë kryesorë: llojet e
burimeve të financimit të
përfshira në këto raporte (p.sh. dhurimet dhe financimin publik)
dhe llojet e shpenzimeve të
përfshira në këto raporte (p.sh. shpenzimet nga dhurimet private

dhe shpenzimet nga ndihmat
publike).
Grafiku:
Ligji: 8.7
Praktika: 7
Neni 17 i Ligjit “Për partitë politike” përcakton se burimet
financiare dhe material të partive
politike përbëhen nga: kuotat e anëtarësisë, fondet publike,
fondet jopublike, të cilat mund të
jenë dhurimet financiare, dhurimet në natyrë, shërbimet,
sponsorizimet, kreditë apo garancitë
e ndryshme, si edhe çdo transaksion tjetër financiar. Neni 23 i
këtij ligji specifikon se raportet
financiare vjetore duhet të përmbajnë informacion të
hollësishëm për të gjithë të ardhurat dhe
shpenzimet. Ato duhet të raportohen në bazë të formatit të
standartizuar, të miratuar nga dhe
me vendim të Komisionit Qendror të Zgjedhjeve. Megjithatë, ne
vlerësojmë se kjo është një
dispozitë e përgjithshme dhe nuk mund të lihet për tu adresuar
nga aktet nën-ligjore si
p.sh.vendimet e KQZ të paspecifikuara në ligj. Ligji duhet të
citojë shprehimisht përcaktimin
e qartë të dhurimeve në natyrë, huave e garancive si dhe faktin
se ato duhet të rregullohen
përmes akteve nën-ligjore të vecanta të miratuara nga KQZ.
Ligji nuk kërkon që shpenzimet e përfshira në raportim të
specifikohen nëse janë mbuluar
nga fondet publike apo private.13

13 Ligji nr. 8580 datë 17.2.2000 “Për Partitë Politike” –
ndryshuar me Ligjin nr. 9542 datë 2.2.2006
dhe me Ligjin nr. 10 374 datë 10.2.2011
8.7
7
7.8
0

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ligji
Prak3ka
Totali
Qëllimi

i
raporDmit
Qëllimi
i
rapor3mit
NDIKIMIN E PARASE
Faqe
16
TRANSPARENCY
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Në praktikë, partitë i kanë përfshirë të gjithë llojet e të
ardhurave dhe shpenzimeve në
raportimet e tyre. Megjithatë, është dhënë informacion i
kufizuar mbi dhurimet në natyrë apo
ndihmat publike në natyrë të përfituara.14
Dimensioni 4: Detajimi i raportimit

Detajimi apo hollësitë e informacionit të mundësuar janë po aq
të rëndësishme sa
kuptueshmëria e raportimit. Përdorueshmëria e raporteve
financiare varet gjerësisht në
informacionin e përfshirë në të. Për këtë arsye, raportet duhet të
identifikojnë cdo donator,
shumën dhe datën e cdo dhurimi dhe në mënyrë të ngjashme
shpenzimet e detajuara sipas
zërave kontabël. Këto informacione të hollësishme u
mundësojnë organeve mbikqyrëse,
grupeve të shoqërisë civile dhe votuesve në përgjithësi
shqyrtimin e vërtetësisë së
informacionit të mundësuar, identifikimin e partive që varen në
mënyrë të vecantë nga një
numër i vogël donatorësh të caktuar dhe monitorimin e
përfaqësimeve të ardhshme për cdo
veprim të mundshëm që mund të përfitojnë donatorët e tyre me
shpenzime të publikut. Ky
dimension është matur nga agregimi i indikatorëve të
shumëfishtë sic janë mënyra e detajimit
të raportimit të të ardhurave e shpenzimeve, dhe nëse ekzistojnë
kufij për publikimin e
shumave të të ardhurave në raportet financiare.
Grafiku:
Ligji: 8.8
Praktika: 7.5
Në raportet financiare të partive politike, duhet të përcaktohet
specifikisht data e cdo dhurimi,
shuma dhe emri i donatorit apo regjistrimi zyrtar i kompanive
dhuruese. Gjithashtu, lidhur me

raportimin e shpenzimeve duhet të mundësohen kopje të
faturave origjinale, të detajuara me
zërat e artikujve, përfshi këtu edhe datën, numrin e faturës,
emrin dhe regjistrimin zyrtar të
cdo shitësi.15

8.8

7.5
8.1
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
Ligji
Prak3ka
Totali
Detajimi
i
raporDmit
Detajimi
i

rapor3mit
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17
Ligji përcakton gjithashtu një shumë limit për deklarimin e
listës së donatorëve për publikun
me shumat respektive të dhuruara, që është mbi nivelin e
100,000 Lekëve (rreth 720 Euro).
Kjo listë duhet të bëhet publike kurdoherë.
Në praktikë, raportet financiare të analizuara nga grupi
kërkimor përfshijnë informacione mbi
donatorët, datën dhe shumën e cdo dhurimi. Raportet mbi
shpenzimet përfshijnë kopje të
faturave për cdo shpenzim, me informacione të detajuara sic
janë data dhe shuma e
shpenzimeve, emri dhe numri zyrtar i regjistrimit të cdo shitësi.
Dimensioni 5: Besueshmëria e raportimit

Një element kyc i raportimit – për shkak të lidhjes së ngushtë
me transparencën – është
besueshmëria, ose bësimi se të dhënat në raportim janë të sakta.
Prandaj, ky dimension
bazohet në perceptim dhe nuk ka indikatorë ligjorë.
Besueshmëria e një raporti lidhet me
faktin se sa i aksesueshëm është për publikun dhe në cfarë mase
publiku arrin të kontrollojë
vërtetësinë e tij. Nëse vërtetësia e informacionit është e
diskutueshme, bie edhe interesi i
publikut për monitorim.
Matja e besueshmërisë së të dhënave është e vështirë.
Metodologjia e CRINIS bazohet në të
dhëna nga sondazhet me aktorët kryesorë në këtë fushë sic janë
financierët e partive, zyrtarë
të agjensive mbikqyrëse dhe aktivistë të shoqërisë civile.
Indikatorë të shumëfishtë iu përgjigjën pyetjeve të tilla: sa të
saktë janë raportet (shembull, në
terma të përqindjes së dhurimeve të mundshme për raportim)
dhe nëse është e mundur të
sigurohet një ide e saktë mbi financimin e partive duke
analizuar deklarimet e kontabilitetit
zyrtar.
Grafiku:
Bazuar në sondazhet e realizuara nga grupi kërkimor, opinionet
e qytetarëve dhe ekspertëve
nuk korrespondojnë me një rezultat të pëlqyeshëm për
besueshmërinë e informacionit
financiar zyrtar të deklaruar nga partitë politike në Shqipëri.
Raportimi konsiderohet si i

besueshëm për fondet publike, por qytetarët kanë një perceptim
të përgjithshëm se disa
donacione private (vecanërisht në natyrë) lihen jashtë raportimit
financiar.
Të anketuarit kanë një perceptim të lartë për favorizimin e
partive në pushtet nga ana e
qeverisë përmes abuzimit të burimeve administrative, dhe se
donatorët më të mëdhenj nuk
duan të publikohen meqënëse qëllimi real i donacioneve të tyre
është të sigurojnë favore të
ardhshme.
6.5
6.5
0
2
4
6
8
Ligji
Prak3ka
Totali
Besueshmeria

Besueshmeria
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18
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Dimensioni 6: Publikimi i raportimit
Publikimi i informacionit financiar përbën një element thelbësor
që siguron përfshirjen e
medias, shoqërisë civile, qytetarëve dhe aspiruesve për zyrtarë
publik në monitorimin e
financave të partive. Ky dimension bazohet në indikatorë që
përshkruajnë llojet e kërkesave
ndaj të cilat partitë janë subjekt: publikimi i informacionit mbi
ndihmat publike; publikimi i
informacionit mbi financimet jo publike të përfituara, frekuenca
e publikimit; si dhe kanalet
përmes të cilave publiku është përgjegjës për këto informacione

(vizitat në parti, organi i
administrimit zgjedhor, aksesi në internet etj.)
Për më tepër, indikatorët shtesë bazohen në gjetjet e testeve të
përdorura për matjen e
praktikës së publikimit. Kjo përfshin analizën me qytëtarët,
sipas së cilës një grup qytetarësh,
gazetarësh e studentësh kërkuan informacione drejtuar grupesh
të ndryshme interesi (si
partitë politike, donatorët, stacionet televizive). Këto indikatorë
bazohen në pyetjet e
mëposhtme: cfarë informacioni u sigurua nga testet me qytetarët
të zhvilluara në mënyrë
vullnetare? Cili ishte vlerësimi i përgjigjes së arritur përmes
kërkesës për informacion nga
grupi i kërkuesve lokalë? Dhe nëse partitë publikojnë në mënyrë
vullnetare informacion
financiar?
Grafiku:
Ligji: 6.4
Praktika: 4.5
Buxheti vjetor i shtetit në Shqipëri alokon një fond për ndihmën
financiare publike lidhur me
aktivitetet vjetore të partive politike. Kjo ndihmë financiare
gjatë viteve jo-elektorale nuk
duhet të jetë më e ulët se ndihma e dhënë në vitin paraardhës.16
Raporti financiar vjetor, raporti i ekspertëve kontabël të
licencuar, raporti financiar i fushatës

zgjedhore dhe raporti i Komisionit Qendror të Zgjedhjeve duhet
të publikohen në faqen
zyrtare të internetit të Komisionit Qendror të Zgjedhjeve jo më
vonë se 30 ditë nga koha e

6.4
4.5
5.4

0
2
4
6
8
Ligji
Prak3ka
Total
Publikimi
i
raporDmit
Publikimi
i
rapor3mit
NDIKIMIN E PARASE

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Faqe
19
dorëzimit të tyre prej partisë politike.17 Në praktikë, KQZ e ka
publikuar në kohën e duhur të
gjithë informacionin e disponuar në faqen zyrtare të
internetit.18
Për më tepër, Neni 9, paragrafi 3 i Kushtetutës së Republikës së
Shqipërisë i detyron partitë
politike të bëjnë publike kurdoherë të dhënat mbi burimet e
financimit dhe shpenzimet.
Sidoqoftë, ligji duhet të përmbajë shpjegime të detajuara mbi
mënyrën dhe datën e publikimit
nga vetë partitë politike me qëllim evitimin e boshllëqeve të
mundshme ligjore në cdo rast.
Në praktikë, asnjë nga partitë politike në Shqipëri nuk ka
publikuar informacione mbi
financimet vjetore përkatëse.
Dimensioni 7: Masat parandaluese
Ky studim vlerëson dimensionin e mekanizmave parandalues në
financimin e partive politike
duke përdorur gjashtë indikatorë. Këto përfshijnë ekzistencën e
një sistemi qëndror
transaksionesh bankare (të njohur si “llogari e vetme bankare”)

dhe një ndalesë mbi depozitat
në para cash cka mund të parandalojë identifikimin e origjinës
së dhurimeve. Më tej, ky
dimension analizon ekzistencën e masave parandaluese ndaj
abuzimit të burimeve qeveritare
dhe nëse ekzistojnë nxitje fiskale për publikimin e dhurimeve.
Një indikator tjetër fokusohet
në faktin nëse ekzistojnë rregullime për median lidhur me
parandalimin e abuzimit të
mundshëm të influencave politike.
Grafiku:
Ligji: 0.8
Praktika: 3.3
Ligji specifikon se dhurimi i fondeve jopublike, me vlerë më të
madhe se 100,000 Lekë (rreth
720 Euro), duhet të bëhet vetëm në një llogari të posaçme, të
hapur në një bankë nga partia
politike.19 Personi përgjegjës për financat në partinë politike,
brenda tre muajve nga krijimi i
partisë politike, deklaron pranë Komisionit Qendror të
Zgjedhjeve numrin e llogarisë bankare,

17 Neni 23 (dispozita nr.5) i Ligjit “Për Partitë Politike”
18 Referuar informacionit tw publikuarnw faqen zyrtare tw
KQZ:
19
Neni 23/1 (dispozita nr.2) i Ligjit “Për Partitë Politike”
0.8
3.3
2.1
0
1

2
3
4
Ligji
Prak3ka
Total
Parandalimi
Parandalimi
NDIKIMIN E PARASE
Faqe
20
TRANSPARENCY
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ALBANIA
të hapur për këtë qëllim. Numri i llogarisë bankare për çdo
subjekt politik duhet të publikohet
në faqen zyrtare të internetit të Komisionit Qendror të
Zgjedhjeve. Është rreptësisht i ndaluar
përfitimi i fondeve jopublike, kryer nga subjekte që nuk
deklarojnë identitetin e tyre apo
identiteti i të cilave është i papërcaktuar qartë nga partia
politike përfituese e fondit jopublik.
Në praktikë, jo të gjitha transaksionet financiare mbi 100,000
Lekë (rreth 720 Euro) janë
kryer përmes transaksioneve bankare. Parregullsi janë vënë re
në shumë raste, kur partitë nuk
kanë deklaruar numrin e llogarisë së tyre bankare pranë KQZ
(sic parashikohet në ligj), ose
në afatin kohor të përcaktuar.
Ligji për partitë politike nuk përmban rregulla për median
lidhur me reklamat politike gjatë
aktivitetit vjetor të partive politike (jashtë fushatës elektorale).
Megjithëse ligji nuk garanton
barazi në cmim ndaj partive për reklama në media, partitë kanë
akses ndaj reklamave me
pagesë. Frekuenca e reklamës është e lartë, vecanërisht gjatë
fushatave elektorale ose edhe
më përpara ditës zyrtare të fillimit të fushatës. Duke krahasuar
cmimet e rregullta të
vendosura nga kompanitë e medias, kosto e kohës televizive dhe
reklamave duket të jetë e
lartë, dhe partitë duhet të publikojnë detajet e këtyre
shpenzimeve në raportimet e tyre

financiare. Ne rekomandojmë përfshirjen e disa dispozitave në
ligj që do të garantojnë nxitje
fiskale për kompanitë e medias me qëllim publikimin e
informacionit për kohën dhe koston e
reklamës së paguar nga partitë politike.
Dimensioni 8: Sanksionet
Ashtu si edhe me pjesën më të madhe të dimensioneve të tjera,
indikatorët e fokusuar në
kuadrin ligjor u përdorën për të vlerësuar dimensionin e
sanksioneve. Pyetjet ishin të tilla: A
është legjislacioni në fuqi adekuat? A ekzistojnë sanksione të
përshtatshme për shkeljen e
rregullave të vendosura?
Grafiku:
Ligji: 3.6
Praktika: 0.6
Neni 23/4 i Ligjit “Për Partitë Politike” mundëson në përgjithësi
një kornizë të mirë për
parandalimin e shkeljeve financiare nga ana e partive apo
mospërputhjen me rregullat.
Sanksionet përmbajnë rregulla adekuate, por megjithatë duhen
mundësuar përcaktime më të
3.6
0.6

2.1
0
1
2
3
4
Ligji
Prak3ka
Total
Sanksionet
Sanksionet
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qarta për raste specifike me qëllim që të mos krijohen hapësira
për boshllëqe në praktikë.
Ligji parashikon sanksione si më poshtë vijon:
� Shkelja e dispozitave për financimin e partive politike nga
ana e personit përgjegjës
për financat në partinë politike apo e personit përgjegjës sipas
statutit të saj dënohet
me gjobë nga 50,000 deri në 100,000 Lekë20.
� Shkelja e detyrimit për bashkëpunim me ekspertin kontabël të
licencuar, të caktuar
nga Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve, nga ana e partisë politike,
dënohet me gjobë nga
1,000,000 deri në 2,000,000 Lekë21.
� Refuzimi për të bërë transparente burimet e financimit të
partisë politike apo për të
lejuar ushtrimin e kontrollit nga ana e ekspertit kontabël të
licencuar nga Komisioni
Qendror i Zgjedhjeve, dënohet me gjobë nga 2,000,000 deri në
5,000,000 Lekë22
ose/dhe me pezullimin deri në 5 vjet të financimit publik për
partinë politike.

� Shkelja e afatit të dorëzimit të raportit financiar në kohën e
duhur apo paraqitja e
raporteve në shkelje të formateve të standardizuara, të miratuara
nga Komisioni
Qendror i Zgjedhjeve, dënohet me gjobë nga 50,000 deri në
100,000 Lekë23.
� Fondet jopublike të përfituara nga partia politike, kur
identiteti i dhuruesit nuk njihet
apo nuk është i përcaktuar qartë, kalojnë për llogari të
Komisionit Qendror të
Zgjedhjeve.
� Pranimi i fondeve jopublike, me vlerë më të madhe se
100,000 Lekë24 dhe kur
transaksioni nuk është kryer nëpërmjet llogarisë bankare
dënohet me gjobë në masën
30 % të shumës së dhuruar.
Grupi kërkimor ka analizuar se nuk ka patur raste kur partitë
janë sanksionuar me ndërprerjen
e financimit publik për shkak të parregullsive të gjetura në
raportimin financiar.
Dimensioni 9: Mbikqyrja shtetërore
Mbikqyrja shtetërore është një element i domosdoshëm në
forcimin e sistemeve që
rregullojnë financimin politik. Pavarësia dhe mandati i qartë i
institucionit mbikqyrës janë të
nevojshme për funksionimin efektiv të tij. Po ashtu është
thelbësore që institucioni të ketë
burime të mjaftueshme dhe kapacitete teknike për të kryer
detyrat e tij. Tre indikatorët e
përdorur në këtë studim përfshijnë pyetje mbi mandatin ligjor

dhe rregullimin institucional
për të vlerësuar nëse ky institucion ka fuqitë e mjaftueshme
ligjore për të kryer një kontroll të
pavarur të financimit të partive politike. Pyetje të tjera
fokusohen në ekzaminimin e
praktikave aktuale, si për shembull, sa i pavarur është
institucioni i administrimit të

20 Ekuivalenti në Euro: 360 deri në 720 Euro
21 Ekuivalenti në Euro: 7,150 deri në 14,300 Euro
22 Ekuivalenti në Euro: 14,300 Euro
23 Ekuivalenti në Euro: 360 deri në 720 Euro
24 Ekuivalenti në Euro: 720 Euro

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zgjedhjeve, sipas vlerësimit të aktorëvë përkatës të kësaj fushe?
Cilat janë kapacitetet e tij
dhe mangësitë në terma të burimeve?
Grafiku:
Ligji: 7.8
Praktika: 7.5
Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve është organi përgjegjës për
monitorimin dhe mbikëqyrjen e
financimit të partive dhe fushatave zgjedhore. Këto funksione i

takonin më parë Kontrollit të
Lartë të Shtetit (KLSH) por Neni që i jepte këto kompetenca u
shfuqizua me një vendim të
Gjykatës Kushtetuese nr.33 datë 9.5.2011 për shkak se KLSH
nuk arriti të zbatonte asnjë
mekanizëm mbikqyrës e kontrollues.
Kompetencat e KQZ përfshijnë hartimin dhe miratimin e
rregullave të raportimit të
financimeve, mbikqyrjes dhe auditimit financiar të partive
politike, dhe formatet e
standartizuara të raporteve financiare vjetore, si dhe formatin e
një registry të vecantë për
financimet jo publike të partive politike.25 KQZ përzgjedh
listën e ekspertëve kontabël të
licencuar dhe i cakton me short ata për auditimin e fondeve dhe
të shpenzimeve të partive
politike, si dhe mbikëqyr financimin e partive politike,
nëpërmjet kontrollit të
dokumentacionit financiar e të llogarive kontabël të partive
politike. KQZ vendos sanksione
kur konstaton shkelje të ligjit dhe përcakton masën e fondit
publik që përfiton çdo parti
politike në formën e ndihmës financiare vjetore. Ky institucion
është gjithashtu përgjegjës për
organizimin e programeve ndërgjegjësuese dhe trajnimeve për
financimin e partive politike
dhe të subjekteve të përfshira në këtë proces, sipas dispozitave
të këtij ligji.
Në përgjithësi, mund të konkludojmë se KQZ konsiderohet të
këtë realizuar funksionet
mbikqyrëse mbi financat vjetore të partive në bazë të ligjit dhe
rregullave përkatëse. Pikët më
të ulëta në punën mbikqyrëse lidhen me vendosjen e
sanksioneve dhe ndërmarrjen e

investigimit proaktiv në rastet kur ka parregullsi në raportimin
financiar. Ky problem mund të
shpjegohet me faktin se KQZ është e përbërë nga anëtarë të
partive politike, të cilët janë më

25 Neni 15/2 i Ligjit “Për Partitë Politike”
7.8
7.5
7.7

7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
Ligji
Prak3ka
Total
Mbikqyrja
shteterore
Mbikqyrja
shteterore
NDIKIMIN E PARASE

TRANSPARENCY
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ALBANIA
Faqe
23
probabël të favorizojnë partitë e tyre. Gjithashtu, ekziston një
mungesë burimesh dhe
kapacitetesh të KQZ për të kryer këto lloj investigimesh.
Dimensioni 10: Mbikqyrja publike
Krahas funksioneve mbikqyrëse të realizuara nga organet
shtetërore, aktorë të tjerë si media,
akademikët, organizatat e shoqërisë civile e qytetarët dhe në
disa raste, vetë partitë politike,
mund të angazhohen në monitorimin e fondeve të partive
politike. Monitorimi mund të
përfshijë aktivitete si raportimi i parregullsive në organet
qeveritare, analizimi i raporteve
financiare për të informuar publikun dhe autoritetet për të
siguruar që mbikqyrja e tyre është
funksionale dhe efektive. Studimi e adreson këtë dimension
duke u fokusuar në aktivitetet
mbikqyrëse të realizuara më së shumti nga organizatat e
shoqërisë civile dhe media. Pyetjet
specifike trajtojnë nëse ekzistojnë organizata që monitorojnë
financimet politike, nëse janë të
pavarura, aktive dhe me influencë në këto aktivitete. Një tjetër
indikator analizon pyetjen

nëse shoqëria civile, qytetarët apo partitë politike raportojnë
parregullsi në institucionin e
mbikqyrjes shtetërore.
Grafiku:
Disa organizata të shoqërisë civile janë angazhuar në
monitorimin e financave të partive
politike dhe zgjedhjeve në Shqipëri. Por duke qenë se kjo
cështje vijon të mbetet pak e
debatueshme në vendin tonë, pak prej tyre kanë realizuar
studime kërkimore apo
dokumentuar monitorime të mirë-hartuara dhe zhvilluara.
Debati është fokusuar më së shumti në kostot e larta të
fushatave elektorale të zhvilluara nga
dy partitë kryesore politike në vend, si dhe faktin se kandidatët
në zgjedhjet parlamentare apo
donatorët janë zakonisht individët më të pasur në vend. Studimi
i parë CRINIS i realizuar në
kuadrin e këtij projekti, publikuar në Nëntor 2011, pati një
impakt të madh dhe mbulim të
mirë mediatik, cka inicioi edhe një debat publik mbi
legjislacionin në fuqi dhe pikat më të
dobëta të praktikës së financimit politik në Shqipëri.
5.5
5.5
0

1
2
3
4
5
6
Ligji
Prak3ka
Total
Mbikqyrja
publike
Mbikqyrja
publike
NDIKIMIN E PARASE

Faqe
24
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
ALBANIA
ANEKS 1
PARAQITJA E REZULTATEVE SIPAS DIMENSIONEVE
Dimensionet Rezultatet
Kontabiliteti LIGJ 9.1
PRAKTIKË 7.4
Raportimi LIGJ 6
PRAKTIKË 4.1
Qëllimi i raportimit LIGJ 8.7
PRAKTIKË 7
Detajimi i raportimit LIGJ 8.8
PRAKTIKË 7.5

Besueshmëria e raportimit PRAKTIKË 6.5
Publikimi LIGJ 6.4
PRAKTIKË 4.5
Masat parandaluese LIGJ 0.8
PRAKTIKË 3,3
Sanksionet LIGJ 3.6
PRAKTIKË 0.6
Mbikqyrja shtetërore LIGJ 7.8
PRAKTIKË 7.5
Mbikqyrja publike PRAKTIKË 5.5
NDIKIMIN E PARASE
TRANSPARENCY
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Faqe
25
ANEKS 2
DHJETË DIMENSIONET E TRANSPARENCËS NË
FINANCIMIN POLITIK
Dimensionet
Pyetje të përgjithshme për zhvillimin e indikatorëve
1. Kontabiliteti i brendshëm i
partive
Është kontabiliteti i detyrueshëm me ligj? Sa professional është
stafi në praktikë?
2. Raportimi pranë agjensisë
mbikqyrëse shtetërore (Komisioni
Qendror i Zgjedhjeve)
Sipas ligjit, a raportojnë partitë, donatorët, shitësit dhe media
për
rolin e tyre në financimin politik?
Kur dhe në cfarë formati?
3. Kuptueshmëria ose qëllimi i
raportimit

A përfshijnë raportet burime publike dhe private?
A i përfshijnë të ardhurat dhe shpenzimet?
A i përfshijnë kontributet monetare, në natyrë, zbritjet etj.?
4. Detajimi i raportimit Sipas ligjit, a përfshijnë raportet
informacione mbi dhurimet
individuale?
A identifikojnë qartësisht donatorët për cdo dhurim?
5. Besueshmëria e raportimit A i publikojnë aktorët e ndryshëm
të gjitha burimet në raportim?
Sa të sakta janë raportet, sipas opinionit të ekspertëve?
6. Publikimi A është e detyrueshme për agjensitë
shtetërore/partitë publikimi
i informacioneve mbi financat politike?
Në praktikë, sa i aksesueshëm është ky informacion për
ekspertët, gazetarët dhe qytetarët e zakonshëm?
7. Masat parandaluese A kryhen dhurimet vetëm përmes
llogarisë zyrtare bankare të
partive?
A ekzistojnë boshllëqe ligjore për dhurimet anonime?
8. Sanksionet Cfarë parashikojnë sanksionet ekzistuese – civile,
kriminale dhe
politike – sipas ligjit? Në praktikë, a janë ligjet ekzistuese të
implentuara rigorozisht?
9. Mbikqyrja shtetërore
(Komisioni Qendror i Zgjedhjeve)
A i vlerësojnë ekspertët institucionet e mbikqyrjes shtetërore si
të pavarura?
A konsiderohen ato eficiente?
Nga perspektiva e vetë-vlerësimit, a u mungojnë atyre burimet

njerëzore? Kanë nevojë për trajnime?
10. Mbikqyrja publike A ekzistojnë organizata të shoqërisë
civile që monitorojnë
financimet politike?
Në cilat fusha të financimeve politike e zhvillojnë aktivitetin e
tyre?
A i vlerësojnë ekspertët organizatat monitoruese si të pavarura?
NDIKIMIN E PARASE
Faqe
26
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
ALBANIA

This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please
bring this copy.
www.venice.coe.int
Strasbourg/Warsaw, 13 March 2009
Opinion No. 513 / 2009
CDL-AD(2009)005
Or. Engl.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH
LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)

JOINT OPINION
ON THE ELECTORAL CODE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
Adopted by the Venice Commission
at its 78th plenary session
(Venice, 13-14 March 2009)
on the basis of comments by
Mr Oliver KASK (Member, Venice Commission, Estonia)
Mr Jessie PILGRIM (Electoral expert, OSCE/ODIHR)
CDL-AD(2009)005
- 2 -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION....................................................................

.............................................. 3
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
...............................................................................................
..... 4
III. DISCUSSION OF THE ELECTORAL CODE
............................................................. 5
A. Election System for the National
Assembly................................................................. 5
B. Media Access
Provisions...............................................................................
................. 8
C. Campaign Finance Provisions
..................................................................................... 10
D. Election
Administration........................................................................
.......................... 11
E. Observers and Transparency
...................................................................................... 17
F. Voter
Registration.............................................................................
.............................. 18
G. Voting Procedures
...............................................................................................
...... 18
H. Appeals of the Decisions of Election Commissions before
the CEC................ 19
I. Appeals of CEC Decisions to the Electoral College
................................................ 19
J. Invalidation and Repeat
Elections...............................................................................
20
K. Provisions on
Referenda................................................................................
............... 21
L. Technical Drafting Questions

....................................................................................... 21
IV.
CONCLUSION........................................................................
........................................ 22
CDL-AD(2009)005
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. This joint opinion on the Electoral Code of the Republic of
Albania is provided by the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office
for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) and the Council of Europe’s
European Commission for
Democracy through Law (“Venice Commission”). This joint
opinion comments on the most
recent version of the Electoral Code of the Republic of
Albania1. Earlier opinions2 of the
OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s European
Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission), as well as numerous election reports
from previous OSCE/ODIHR and
Council of Europe observation missions in Albania, provide
excellent background for
understanding the historical development of the Code. The

most recent version of the Electoral
Code continues to incorporate recommendations for
improvement. The most significant
change is the introduction of a new electoral system intended to
alleviate abuses that occurred
under the old electoral system.
2. The present opinion was elaborated following resolution
1320 (2003) of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, which invites the Venice
Commission to formulate opinions
concerning possible improvements to legislation and practices
in particular member states or
applicant countries.3
3. The Electoral Code of Albania provides a thorough technical
foundation for elections. The
recent reform continues to improve the Code and reflects the
commitment of Albania to
enhance the legal framework for elections. Although the new
code continues the process of
electoral reform and addresses a number of important previous
recommendations offered by
the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, the provisions
related to media access and
campaign financing are less effective. These are areas that
could be improved with future
amendments.
4. It should also be noted that any positive impact the Code
may have in conducting the
process in line with OSCE commitments and other international
standards for democratic
elections, will ultimately depend on the level of political will
exhibited by the political parties and
authorities of Albania to implement the Code in good faith.

5. This opinion is based on an unofficial English translation of
the Electoral Code provided by
the OSCE Presence in Albania (CDL(2009)005). The
translation reviewed consists of 186
articles of text on 109 pages. Also included in the review is
Annex I to the Electoral Code,
which lists the number of voters estimated for the twelve
proportional representation electoral
zones. The Code and Annex I are reflected in Republic of
Albania Law No. 10019, dated 29
December 2008.
6. In addition to the Code, this opinion is based on:
- an unofficial English translation of the Constitution of
Albania;
- the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report on the
18 February 2007 Local
1 Herein “the Electoral Code” or “the Code”.
2 See Joint Opinion on Amendments to the Electoral Code of
the Republic of Albania, CDL-EL(2007)018,
prepared by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s
European Commission for Democracy Through Law
(Venice Commission) (Opinion 435/2007 (Strasbourg/Warsaw 5
July 2007) and herein “the 2007 opinion”); Joint
Recommendations on the Electoral Law and the Electoral
Administration in Albania made by the OSCE/ODIHR
and Venice Commission on 2 November 2004 (Opinion no.
273/2004, CDL-AD(2004)017 and herein “the 2004
opinion”).
3 Point 11.ii.b.

CDL-AD(2009)005
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Elections;
- the OSCE/ODIHR Final Report on the 2005 Parliamentary
Elections in Albania, 3 July and 21
August 2005;
- the report of the Ad hoc Committee of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe
for the observation of the parliamentary elections in Albania (3
July 2005) (Doc. 1664, 12
September 2005);
- the report of the -Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
of the Council of Europe on
the observation of the local elections in Albania held on 12
October 2003 (CG/CP (10) 16, 8
December 2003);
- the report of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
of the Council of Europe on the
local by-elections in Tirana (Albania), 28 December 2003 -
Addendum to report Albania, CG/CP
(10) 16 (CG/Bur (10) 87) - 23 February 2004), and
- the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters adopted by the
Venice Commission, including
the Guidelines on Elections (CDL-AD(2002)023rev).

7. This opinion was adopted by the Venice Commission at its
78th session (Venice, 13-14
March 2009).
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
8. The recent reform continues to improve the Code and
reflects the commitment of Albania to
enhance the legal framework for elections. A major step in
addressing previous
recommendations in the Electoral Code is the adoption of a new
electoral system for members
of the National Assembly, based on amendments to the
Constitution adopted in April 2008,
which, with regards to this aspect of the reform, were welcomed
by the Venice Commission.4
Changes in the formation of the CEC are also significant as the
CEC is no longer established
under a constitutional appointment process, but is now elected
by the National Assembly.5 In
line with previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, the new
code provides for a voter
registration system based on national computerised and
modernised civil registers. These
changes and improvements are the culmination of an electoral
reform process that was initiated
by political parties and has been ongoing since 2003.
9. Although the Code continues to be improved, there are areas
in the Code that should be
addressed in future amendments, these include:
• Provisions which grant special candidacy rights for National
Assembly elections to the

chairpersons of political parties.
• Requirements for signature support for candidacy for non-
parliamentary parties;
• Ambiguous requirements for including women candidates on
lists of candidates;
• Provisions on access to media, paid political advertising and
public funding of
campaigns that provide less favourable treatment to non-
parliamentary political parties,
and
• Provisions for removal of members of lower election
commissions that may hinder the
professional and non-partisan performance of the election
administration.
10. The above areas should be considered for future
amendments. However, the fact that the
4 See Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution of the
Republic of Albania, adopted by the Venice
Commission at its 77th Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13
December 2008) (CDL-AD(2008)033).
5 These changes in the Code were made possible when the
National Assembly amended the Constitution on 21
April 2008. These Electoral Code amendments are consistent
with the 21 April 2008 amendments to the
Constitution of Albania made by the National Assembly.
CDL-AD(2009)005

- 5 -
Code can be further improved should not detract from the
positive improvements made to the
legal framework for elections over the last several years.
Albanian stakeholders and institutions
involved in the reform are to be commended for their efforts
and the resulting improvements.
11. This joint opinion discusses the above matters and other
issues that remain to be
addressed in the Electoral Code.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE ELECTORAL CODE
A. Election System for the National Assembly
Overview
12. The Constitution of Albania was amended by the National
Assembly on 21 April 2008.
Some of the amendments repealed the complicated election
system that used a combination of
proportional representation and single member electoral zones.
This system allocated 100
mandates in a plurality election in each electoral zone and an
additional 40 mandates based on
an electoral subject’s share of the national votes. The prior
election system had an element of
proportionality that attempted to allocate mandates in
proportion to a political party’s or
coalition’s national share of the valid votes. However, political
parties were able to circumvent

the constitutional goal of proportionality by applying various
strategies in Assembly elections.
Although the strategies for the 2005 elections were different
from the strategies applied in the
2001 parliamentary elections, the goal of obtaining a
disproportionate share of the mandates
was the same.6 In both elections the allocation of mandates
was controversial and subject to
legitimate criticism. The April 2008 constitutional amendments
address this issue.
13. Article 64 of the Constitution now provides that 140
members of the Assembly are elected
“on a proportional system with multi-names electoral zones”.
Article 64 also provides that these
zones correspond to the administrative divisions “of one of the
levels of the administrative-
territorial organisation”. The rules for implementation of the
electoral system, including the level
of administrative-territorial organisation that is to be used for
electoral zones and number of
mandates to be elected in each electoral zone, are to be
determined by the Electoral Code.
14. Article 2(25) of the Electoral Code provides that the
“Electoral zone is the administrative
territorial division of the region for the elections for the
Assembly and the municipality or the
commune in the case of local government elections.” There are
currently twelve administrative
regions in Albania. Thus, there will be an election in each
region (electoral zone), based on
proportional representation, for National Assembly elections.
15. The formula for allocation of mandates in each regional
constituency is stated in Articles

162 and 163 of the Code. Article 162 establishes a three percent
(3%) legal threshold for
political parties and a five percent (5%) legal threshold for
coalitions. A political party or coalition
whose percentage of valid votes in the region is less than the
legal threshold does not
participate in mandate allocation in the region.7 The threshold
applies in each regional election.
16. Mandates are allocated in a regional constituency to
political contestants using D’Hondt
divisors (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, et seq.) for the initial allocation and
Sainte-Laguë divisors (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, et
seq.) for allocating mandates to political parties within a
coalition. The vote totals of electoral
contestants are divided by the divisors to arrive at a series of
quotients for each political subject.
Mandates are allocated to the highest quotients in sequential
order.
6 See OSCE/ODIHR Final Report Republic of Albania
Parliamentary Elections, 3 July 2005, at pp. 4-5.
7 Article 65 provides that the registration of coalitions is based
on the national level. A political party that participates
in a coalition cannot participate in another coalition, nor can it
submit multi-name list of candidates outside the
coalition in which it participates.
CDL-AD(2009)005
- 6 -

17. The number of mandates to be allocated in each electoral
zone will be based on the
population. According to Annex I of the Electoral Code, the
estimated voting populations of the
twelve electoral zones range from 78,770 to 748,322, with an
average of 264,396.8 Depending
on the population of a region, the number of seats to be
distributed could generate a natural
threshold, understood as the percentage of votes needed to get
one seat, as high as – or
higher than – the legal thresholds of three percent (3%) and five
percent (5%) imposed by
Article 162 of the Electoral Code for political parties and
coalitions.9 While this phenomenon is
not unusual for this type of electoral system, it must be noted
that the combined effect of the
natural and legal thresholds may reduce the number of mandates
won in the Assembly by
smaller political parties and candidates supported by groups of
voters (“independent
candidates”). Regardless of this potential effect, departure from
the previous electoral system,
which was subject to much abuse, is a positive development.
Special Treatment for the Chairpersons of Political Parties
18. In a negative development, a new provision grants special
candidacy rights to the
chairpersons of political parties. To protect the candidacies of
political party chairpersons, the
Code allows the chairpersons of political parties – and
chairpersons only – the right to run on
the political party’s list in each of the twelve electoral zones for
the National Assembly.10 This
special treatment for the chairpersons of political parties
violates the fundamental principle of

equality11 and of non-discrimination.12
19. The special treatment granted to the chairpersons of
political parties in the exercise of
candidacy rights appears to be contrary to international and
European standards. The Venice
Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Article
67(3) of the Code be amended
to respect the fundamental principles of equality and non-
discrimination.
Gender Requirements Related to Candidacy
20. Under Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention for the
Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, a state has a positive obligation to take special,
temporary measures to ensure the de
facto equality of men and women, including in political and
public life. In addition, the Albanian
Parliament adopted in July 2008 a Law on Gender Equality,
which aims at establishing equal
women representation in State institutions. The Code attempts
to take effective measures for
women. Article 67(5) requires that in Assembly elections, for
each electoral zone, “at least thirty
percent of the multi-name list and/or one of the first three
names in the multi-name list should
be from each sex”.13 However, this provision might be subject
to different interpretations.
Arguably, this provision gives the list presenter one of two
options: (1) one woman in the top
three candidates or (2) thirty percent (30%) of the candidates
must be women, who can appear
8 It should be noted that these are only estimates and subject to

changes as there were changes in the
populations of these electoral zones.
9 For additional details on legal/natural thresholds, please see:
European Commission For Democracy Through Law
(Venice Commission), Comparative Report on Thresholds and
Other Features of Electoral Systems, Strasbourg, 15
December 2008, CDL-AD(2008)037.
10 Article 67(3) of the Code states: “The chairpersons of
political parties which are running either on their own or
as part of a coalition are exempt from this rule, and they can
candidate in one or more electoral zones for the
elections to the Assembly.”
11 Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; Protocol 12 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms; Paragraph 7.6 of the Copenhagen Document. The
issue raises a question of conformity with Article
3of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights (possibly combined with Article 14 of
the Convention).
12 Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; Article 14 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms; Paragraphs 5.9, 7.5, and 7.8 of the Copenhagen
Document.
13 Lists that do not meet this requirement are to be rejected.
CDL-AD(2009)005
- 7 -

anywhere on the list, including being placed as the very last
names on the bottom of the list.
Thus, as written, this article might not be equivalent to an
“effective measure” promoting the
representation of women in the Assembly. The Venice
Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR
recommend that the “and/or” text in Article 67 be changed to
“and”. It is further recommended
that Article 67 be reviewed to provide more efficient
mechanisms to promote women
representation in parliament.
21. For local government elections, Article 67 states that “one
in every three names on the list
should be from each sex”. Although this appears to be a
stronger requirement than is required
for Assembly elections, Article 67(6) allows a political party to
purchase an exemption for the
requirement by paying a fine to the CEC. The Venice
recommend that Article 67(6) be amended so that a political
party cannot purchase an
exemption from the law. A political party list of candidates that
does not meet legal
requirements should not be registered.
Nomination Procedures
22. Article 68 provides that multi-name lists of candidates may
be submitted by a political party
or coalition (an electoral subject). Article 69 allows an
individual citizen to be nominated as an
electoral subject within 40 days before election day, with the
signature support of at least one
percent (1%) of the voters in the list of voters of the respective
electoral zone. It is understood

that “list of voters” should be construed as referring to the
preliminary voter lists, as the final
voter lists would only be published 25 days before election day.
The nomination of an individual
is commenced by an “Initiating Committee” composed of no
less than nine voters from the
respective electoral zone. However, the exemption from
signature support requirements
granted to parliamentary political parties does not also extend to
a candidate, proposed by
voters, who holds a mandate in the Assembly. The Venice
Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR recommend that the exemption be equally
available to a candidate supported
by a group of voters if such a candidate already holds a
mandate.
23. Article 70(5) exempts a candidate proposed by a group of
voters from the requirement for
supporting signatures in local government elections if the
candidate is a mayor of a municipality
or a commune. However, the exemption does not extend to a
candidate, proposed by a group
of voters, who holds a mandate on a local government council.
Article 70(6) provides such an
exemption to political party candidates. The Venice
recommend that the exemption be equally available to a
candidate supported by a group of
voters who holds a mandate on a local government council.
24. Article 68 requires that lists of political parties or
coalitions, which do not have a mandate in
the previous Assembly, be supported by 10,000 and 15,000
registered voters, respectively.
These numbers appear excessive if they are meant to apply at

the level of the constituency.
Indeed, it is unclear whether the signature support requirement
applies to the contestant at
national level, or for each of the contestant’s lists. Based on
the number of registered voters in
Albania and the number of administrative zones, the number of
required signatures should be
substantially lower.14 It is also not clear why a percentage, as
applied to individual citizen
candidates (Article 69), would not be used for political party
and coalition registration. It is
generally recommended that the requirement for signature
support not exceed one percent
(1%) of the registered voters in the constituency.15 Indeed, the
numbers of 10,000 and 15,000
14 Annex I to the Code provides estimated numbers for voters
in the twelve electoral zones. Ten of the twelve
electoral zones indicate numbers less than 303,000.
15 One percent (1%) is recognised as a maximum needed for
signature support. See Venice Commission Code
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (CDL-AD(2008)023rev,
I.1.3.iii).
CDL-AD(2009)005
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are quite high in comparison with the previous law, which only
required 7,000 and 10,000
signatures for a political party or coalition, respectively, to be

registered nationally. It would
seem that the numbers of 7,000 and 10,000 should be reduced
by a factor of 12 instead of
increased. The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR
recommend that these
provisions be clarified, and that the signature requirements be
reduced uniformly to a maximum
of one percent (1%) of the registered voters in an electoral
zone.
25. Article 71(2) provides that a voter cannot support more
than one political party or coalition
with the voter’s signature. The signature support process is not
an election itself and there does
not appear to be a justifiable reason for limiting the right of
voters to support the ballot access
efforts of more than one political party, coalition, or candidate.
A voter should be able to support
more than one candidacy with the voter’s signature. In
addition, checking whether a voter has
given support to more than one contestant would appear to be
burdensome, if at all feasible.
The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that
Article 71(2) be amended
to remove this restriction on voters.
26. In a positive development, Article 73(6) requires the CEC,
no later than 90 days before
election day, to issue a special instruction for the rules for
verification of the candidacy
documentation. This would appear to include rules for
verification of supporting signatures. In
past elections, the CEC has not adopted a decision regulating
the procedures for verification of
support signatures and this has resulted in inconsistent
verification of supporting signatures. As

this amendment legally requires a special instruction to be
issued by the CEC, it is more likely
that there will be a procedure in future elections for conducting
signature support verification in
an objective and non-discriminatory manner.
Limitations on Candidates Proposed by Groups of Voters
27. Article 69(2) provides that a candidate proposed by a group
of voters cannot be “directly or
indirectly supported by any other subject or candidate running
in the elections”. A similar
provision is found in Article 70(2). Candidates should not be
prohibited from expressing views
concerning other candidates or from answering questions from
voters as to which candidates or
political parties are best suited to be colleagues in the
Assembly. An expression of such views
would be “directly or indirectly supporting” another candidate
or electoral subject. In their
current form, these articles are too broad and could be applied
to restrict legitimate campaign
expression designed to enable voters to make informed choices.
The Venice Commission
and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Articles 69(2) and 70(2)
be reviewed to ensure that
they cannot be interpreted or applied to restrict the freedoms of
expression and association,
which are especially important in election campaigns.
B. Media Access Provisions
28. The new media access provisions are stated in Articles 80
through 85 of the Code. These
are areas that could be improved with future amendments.

29. Ideally, a regulatory framework for elections will ensure
the unimpeded flow of full
information to voters from all candidates and political parties
participating in the elections
because an election is about the right of the voters to choose
their government after having
received fully complete information on all candidate choices. It
is not the purpose of the
regulatory framework to ensure that parliamentary parties
maintain an advantage over non-
parliamentary parties or that a political party candidate has an
advantage over a non-political
party candidate. The overarching rule should be the principle of
non-discrimination. Articles 80
through 85 of the Code provide less favourable treatment to
non-parliamentary parties as did
prior versions of these articles. As a result, these articles
should be carefully considered.
30. Article 80 of the Code regulates the “electoral campaign on
Public Radio and Television.”
CDL-AD(2009)005
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However, Article 80 makes no provision for a candidate
nominated by a group of voters. Such
candidates are simply excluded from the free airtime on Public
Radio and Television. The
Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that
such candidates be included in
the allocation of free airtime on Public Radio and Television.

31. Article 80(3) introduces a new provision, which provides:
“Public Radio and Television
broadcasts free political advertising by estimating the
broadcasting time within the free air time
in accordance with point 1 of this article.” This would appear
to permit parliamentary parties an
advantage in political advertising on Public Radio and
Television and to double their advantage
over non-parliamentary political parties in regard to the total
airtime on Public Radio and
Television.
32. Aside from the issue of doubling the advantage of
parliamentary parties, this provision
appears contrary to the principle that all political advertising
must be allowed to all electoral
participants under equal conditions. Where a state permits
political advertising in the media
during elections, it must ensure that all contending parties have
the possibility of buying
advertising on and according to equal conditions and rates of
payment.16 The Venice
80(3) be amended to provide
that all political parties and candidates have the possibility of
buying political advertising
according to equal conditions and rates of payment.
33. Article 81(1) of the Code states: “During political airtime
of news broadcasts, Public Radio
and Television must apply an equal time ratio for all
parliamentary parties that in the previous
parliamentary elections obtained up to 20 percent of the seats in
the Assembly. The parties that
obtained more than 20 percent of the seats in the Assembly, are

entitled to airtime that is
allocated equally among them. Each of these parties is entitled
to double the amount of airtime
of a party that has obtained up to 20 percent of the seats in the
Assembly.” This provision
raises concern as it treats news coverage as if it is the same as
free airtime for political parties.
Concerning news coverage, it is commonly accepted that:
Member states should adopt measures whereby the media which
are owned by public
authorities, when covering election campaigns, should do so in
a fair, balanced and
impartial manner, without discriminating against or supporting
a specific political party or
candidate.17
34. Article 81(1), which dictates the amount of news coverage
provided to parliamentary
political parties, raises a question of compatibility with the
above principle. The Venice
81(1) accordingly be amended.
35. Conversely, when it comes to news coverage of non-
parliamentary parties, Article 81(4)
allows the application of “professional criteria for news”, but
only if such professional criteria do
not result in airtime “greater than the time applied for
parliamentary parties.” This is of concern
since citizens should have a right to receive news and
information. Article 81(4) also is of
concern since a state should not itself determine media content
or exercise political authority or

influence to determine media content.18 Newsworthiness
should be determined by professional
standards and not based on the degree of political authority or
influence a particular political
party holds. The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR
recommend that Article 81 be
amended to delete the provision that limits professional news
coverage of non-parliamentary
parties if such coverage exceeds the news coverage of
16 See Council of Europe Committee of Ministers
Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)15 on measures concerning
media coverage during election campaigns.
17 Id.
18 Id.
CDL-AD(2009)005
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36. Article 84 of the Code regulates private radio and
television during elections. Article 84(2)
requires that the news coverage of private radio and television
be based on the same formula
used to allocate free airtime on Public Radio and Television to
parliamentary political parties in
Article 80. Article 84(2) also limits news coverage of non-
parliamentary parties if such coverage
results in coverage “greater than the time applied for
parliamentary parties.” Article 84(2) raises

questions of compatibility with the two principles discussed in
paragraphs 33 and 34 above.
Article 84(2) discriminates in favour of specific political parties
and raises questions of
compatibility with the principle that a state should not itself
determine media content or exercise
political authority or influence to determine media content. The
Venice Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Article 84 be accordingly
amended.
37. Article 84(5) of the Code provides: “The total airtime for
political advertisements, during the
whole electoral campaign, by each private radio and television
station may not be more than 45
minutes for each party that has obtained up to 20 percent of the
seats in the Assembly and 90
minutes for each party that has obtained more than 20 percent of
the seats in the Assembly.”
Article 84(5) raises a question of compatibility with the
principle that political advertising must be
allowed to all electoral participants under equal conditions.
The Venice Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Article 84(5) be amended to
provide that all political parties
and candidates have the possibility of buying political
advertising according to equal conditions
and rates of payment.
38. Article 84(9) of the Code states: “The airtime for the
advertisements of non-parliamentary
parties and candidates proposed by the voters must not exceed
10 minutes for the whole
electoral campaign.” In addition to the issue of equality of
opportunity in the area of paid
political advertising, Article 84(9) might censure the political

message of a non-parliamentary
party or candidate proposed by a group of voters if the message
extends beyond 10 minutes.
The Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR recommend that
Article 84(9) be amended to
remove this discriminatory limitation on political advertising.
39. Regulation of media during electoral campaigns is a
challenging and complex area in every
country. The regulatory framework for media during the
elections should respect the editorial
independence of the media, while at the same time ensuring that
all political contenders and
parties are treated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. In
some areas, such as paid
political advertising, “fair” requires “equal opportunity” for all
political contestants and parties
and no advantage should be given to parliamentary parties. The
Venice Commission and
the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Articles 80 through 85 be
thoroughly reviewed with the
goal of improving these articles in the same positive manner in
which other areas of the
Electoral Code have been improved.
C. Campaign Finance Provisions
40. The campaign finance provisions of the Code have also
been amended. The new
campaign finance provisions are stated in Articles 86 through
92 of the Code.
41. Article 86(1) stipulates that the Assembly shall determine
the amount of public funds to be
provided to a select group of electoral contestants – political
parties in the Assembly. Article

87(2) states that fifty percent (50%) of the public campaign
funds is “to be distributed among
political parties registered as electoral subjects and having seats
in the Assembly” “on the basis
of the number of mandates won in the elections for the
Assembly”. The remaining fifty percent
(50%) of public campaign funds “is to be distributed among
political parties registered as
electoral subjects and which have obtained not less than 2 seats
in the Assembly in the
preceding elections for the Assembly, in proportion with the
votes obtained by them
nationwide”. This text means that only parliamentary parties
are allocated public funds for the
elections. It is questionable whether the parliamentary parties
in the Assembly should give all
of the public funds for the electoral campaign to themselves.
The Venice Commission and
CDL-AD(2009)005
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the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that these provisions be amended
to provide some public
funding mechanism for non-parliamentary parties.
42. Moreover, the second allocation is given to award the
winners by forcing the losers - those
who did not obtain any seat but had at least two seats in the
previous Assembly - to pay back
their initial allocation to the CEC [Article 87(2)b and 87(3)],
which re-allocates these funds

among the winners [Article 87(5)]. This raises an issue of
concern since, ideally, it is hoped that
there are sufficient campaign funds for all electoral contestants
so that voters are fully informed.
It is unavoidable that some electoral subjects, who met the legal
requirements to be placed on
the ballot, will not be successful in the elections and will fail to
secure a mandate. These
electoral subjects should not now be punished. The system of
public funding for campaigns
fulfils the public policy objective of providing information to
voters about all electoral
contestants, even those that ultimately fail to win a mandate.
The Venice Commission and
the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Articles 86 and 87 be
accordingly amended so that the
campaign funds of losers are not withheld and distributed
among the victors.
43. Articles 89 and 90 regulate the use of private funds for
electoral campaigns. Parliamentary
parties already have campaign funds due to the largess of the
Assembly under Article 86 and
87 of the Code. As noted above, non-parliamentary parties are
excluded from receiving public
funds and must rely solely on private donations. As a result,
parliamentary parties are not
impacted by Articles 89 and 90 as much as non-parliamentary
parties are impacted by these
articles. Article 90(3) limits campaign expenditures by tying
the expenditure limit to ten times
the largest amount of public funds given to a parliamentary
party. The problem with this
formula is that parliamentary parties can establish an
unreasonable expenditure limit by
reducing the amount of public funds parliamentary parties take

from the state budget. Article
90(4) provides a similar limit for candidates nominated by
groups of voters, which is fifty percent
(50%) of the largest amount of public funds given to a
parliamentary party. The Venice
Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that these
articles be reviewed to ensure
that they will not have a negative impact on non-parliamentary
parties or independent
candidates.
44. Article 91 of the Code regulates the auditing of campaign
accounts by the CEC. There is a
concern with Article 91(3), which allows the CEC to verify data
in the campaign finance reports.
The concern is that the CEC, established by the parliamentary
parties, can start contacting the
contributors to non-parliamentary parties even if there is no
factual basis that would suggest an
enquiry is justified. Such a provision is often abused. The
regulatory body contacts a contributor
and the contributor, due to the political considerations, denies
making the contribution. The
political party and its officials then face criminal sanctions. The
OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Article 91(3) is amended to
provide objective and non-
discriminatory criteria that are required to be satisfied before
the CEC can contact contributors
of private funds.
D. Election Administration
Central Election Commission (CEC)
45. Article 154 of the Constitution of Albania, which

established the CEC as a constitutional
body, was repealed by the constitutional amendments of 21
April 2008. The CEC is now
regulated only by the Electoral Code. This amendment is only
one of several amendments
adopted over the years in the electoral reform process in
Albania. It should be recognised that
these amendments may contribute significantly to reduce the
highly politicised environment in
the election administration that has been observed in past
elections in Albania. Although it is
not the purpose of this joint opinion to provide a complete
history of the changes in the election
administration in Albania, it can be stated that the cumulative
effect of the amendments should
encourage more efficiency and professionalism in election
administration. Two issues must
CDL-AD(2009)005
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however be raised for reminder. First, even if not provided for
in the Constitution, the existence
of independent, impartial election commissions at all levels is a
cornerstone of democratic
elections.19 Second, professionalism does not mean that
political parties cannot be involved in
the nomination process; so-called professionals are not always
independent from political
forces, as soon as they are nominated or appointed by political
bodies; and non-politicised
members are not per se going to act in a professional manner by

simple virtue of their non-
partisan nomination.
46. Article 12 of the Electoral Code establishes a CEC
consisting of seven members.
Members serve a term of four years and can be re-elected.
Article 14 regulates the election of
CEC members and Article 15 regulates the election of the
Chairperson of the CEC. Taken
together, these articles attempt to establish a CEC where four
members, including the
Chairperson position, are nominated by the parliamentary
majority in the Assembly and three
members are nominated by the parliamentary opposition in the
Assembly. All members are
elected by the Assembly, and the nomination process includes
several steps that allow the
chairpersons of parliamentary groups and parliamentary groups
to be involved.20
47. The following steps, based on the text of the translated
Article 14, are taken to elect the six
members of the CEC (excluding the Chairperson). First, there
are to be four “proposing
subjects”. The four “proposing subjects” are: (1) “party that
has the largest number of seats
from the parties of the parliamentary majority”, which has two
candidacies; (2) “party of the
parliamentary opposition which has the largest number of seats
in the Assembly”, which has
two candidacies; (3) “deputies’ groupings of parliamentary
majority parties, with the exception of
the biggest party of the majority”, which have one candidacy;
and (4) “deputies’ groupings of
the parliamentary opposition parties, with the exception of the
biggest party of the opposition”,

which have one candidacy.
48. Different rules apply to the election of the first four
positions to be nominated by the
largest majority/opposition parties and the final two of the
smaller majority/opposition party
groupings. Concerning the first four nominations belonging to
the largest political parties in
the majority and opposition of the Assembly, Article 14 states:
b) the proposing subjects, during the selection phase, present no
less than two
candidacies for each vacancy. Chairs of the parliamentary
groups of the proposing
subjects select, collegially, four candidacies in accordance with
the criteria provided
19 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (CDL-
AD(2002)023rev), II.3.1.
20 Article 14 states: “1. Assembly of Albania elects the CEC
members in accordance with the following procedure:
a) two members are proposed from the party that has the largest
number of seats from the parties of the
parliamentary majority, and two members from the party of the
parliamentary opposition which has the largest
number of seats in the Assembly of Albania;
b) the proposing subjects, during the selection phase, present no
less than two candidacies for each
vacancy. Chairs of the parliamentary groups of the proposing
subjects select, collegially, four candidacies in
accordance with the criteria provided in letter (a) of this point.
The proposing subjects of letter (a) select one

candidature from each sex;
c) candidacies selected in accordance with letter (b) of this
point, are submitted to the Assembly for
approval;
ç) the fifth member of the CEC is elected from the candidacies
proposed by deputies’ groupings of
parliamentary majority parties, with the exception of the biggest
party of the majority grouping. The sixth member
of the CEC is elected from the candidacies proposed by
deputies’ groupings of the parliamentary opposition
parties, with the exception of the biggest party of the
opposition. The proposing grouping presents a list with no
less than two candidacies for the respective vacancy.
The list of candidates that has accumulated the highest
number of supporting signatures of deputies of the
respective parliamentary groups of the parliamentary majority
and opposition, including also the deputies of the
two biggest parties from each grouping, is presented to the
Assembly for voting. If two or more lists have
accumulated the same number of supporting signatures, all the
candidacies included in these lists are presented
for voting.
2. Voting for the election of the CEC members in accordance
with this article is carried out in one single day. “
CDL-AD(2009)005
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in letter (a) of this point. The proposing subjects of letter (a)
select one candidature

from each sex.
49. The above text distinguishes two steps: proposition and
selection. It may be subject to
different interpretations. For the proposition step, it would
appear that the deputies of the
proposing subjects offer as many candidates as they desire, but
no less than two for each
candidacy. This results in at least eight candidates. Then, it
would appear, the two chairpersons
of the proposing groups, i.e. the chairpersons of the
parliamentary groups of the largest party of
the majority and of the largest party of the opposition,
“collegially” narrow the number of
candidates to four. In practice, this gives the main opposition
party a right to select two names
from a pool proposed by the main party of the majority, and
vice-versa. It is unclear whether the
requirement for “one candidature from each sex” applies to the
selection of the remaining four
candidates, or only to the selection made by the proposing
subjects under letter (a) of Article
14. However, it could also be argued the phrase “one
candidature from each sex” should be
interpreted to mean that each proposing subject of the first four
nominations has one female
CEC slot and one male CEC slot, which should result in two
female members on the CEC
because there will be two women in the remaining four
candidates.
50. The next step, according to Article 14, states “candidacies
selected in accordance with
letter (b) of this point, are submitted to the Assembly for
approval”. However, the text does not

state the procedure for this approval. It is assumed that each
candidacy is voted on and each
candidate who receives at least 71 votes in the Assembly is
approved. Article 14 does not
address the situation where a candidacy fails to receive
approval. The Venice Commission
and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that these two points be
clarified.
51. Article 14 then discusses the election of the remaining two
CEC members. It includes three
steps: nomination of lists by groups of MPs, collection of
support signatures for the lists, and
vote. The right to nominate candidates for the remaining two
CEC seats belongs to groupings
of MPs from the smaller political parties’ of the
majority/opposition in the Assembly. The term
“grouping” used in the code does not refer to parliamentary
groups but to any group of at least
two MPs who can belong to different parliamentary groups,
except those of the two largest
parties, as long as they are on the same side of the political
spectrum. Concerning these two
CEC slots, “The proposing grouping presents a list with no less
than two candidacies for the
respective vacancy.” It is not clear why the phrase “no less
than two” is used since only two
vacancies remain and the subsequent voting is done on the basis
of “lists of candidates”.
There are no requirements regarding the sex of the candidates
for these two positions. The
text of Article 14 then provides:
The list of candidates that has accumulated the highest number
of supporting signatures

of deputies of the respective parliamentary groups of the
parliamentary majority and
opposition, including also the deputies of the two biggest
parties from each grouping, is
presented to the Assembly for voting. If two or more lists have
accumulated the same
number of supporting signatures, all the candidacies included in
these lists are
presented for voting.
52. The number of lists nominated by MPs groupings is not
limited. Only the lists, which obtain
the highest number of support signatures on each side of the
political spectrum, are presented
for a vote by the Assembly. Although the largest political
parties in the parliamentary majority
and opposition cannot participate in the nomination of the lists
of candidates, they participate in
the signature support and Assembly voting, which gives them
considerable influence on
deciding who, among the MPs from the smaller parties allied to
them will eventually obtain the
fifth and sixth seats on the CEC. It is understood that the
Assembly then votes on the
individuals nominated on the lists which obtained the highest
number of signatures on each
side of the political spectrum, hence on at least two names for
each of the two remaining seats.
In case of a tie in the number of support signatures, the
Assembly votes on all individuals
CDL-AD(2009)005

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nominated on these lists.
53. The election of the Chairperson of the CEC is relatively
straightforward. First, “the
parliamentary group of the biggest party of the parliamentary
majority submits to the Assembly
a list of no less than four candidacies”. Then, “the
parliamentary group of the biggest party of
the parliamentary opposition selects two from the four
candidacies proposed”. The Assembly
votes on the remaining two candidates and the candidate who
“obtains more than half of the
votes of the Assembly deputies is elected as the CEC
Chairperson”. The Deputy Chairperson
of the CEC is elected by the CEC from within the six CEC
members.
54. The Assembly’s control over the CEC extends from
election of CEC members to removal.
Although the prior Code did permit the removal of a CEC
member by the Assembly, a
dismissed member had the right to appeal the dismissal decision
to the Constitutional Court.
The suppression of such a right could make easier a removal for
political reasons. The Venice
Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that
consideration be given to providing the
right of appeal to a dismissed member.
55. Article 19 regulates the filling of CEC vacancies. Article
19(2) provides that vacancies are
filled using the initial appointment procedures of Article 14.
Article 19(2) has the following

sentence: “Otherwise, the candidacies are proposed from the
political party which meets the
criteria of ranking and affiliation.” It is assumed that
“otherwise” refers to possible changes in
the ranking between political groups in Parliament and in MPs’
affiliations, however, this
provision would benefit from more clarity.
56. According to Article 19(3) if the mandate of a member of
the CEC ends prematurely during
an electoral period, he/she is to be replaced by the Assembly as
soon as possible, but no later
than 48 hours after the creation of the vacancy. It means that the
Assembly has to have a
session in the first two days (incl. Saturday and Sunday) after
the termination of the mandate of
the CEC. Before the session the candidates to the CEC have to
be found and their consent to
start their duties practically immediately is needed. Such
procedure might be too speedy to
apply. It could be suggested to reconsider the nomination
procedure for the replacement of the
members of CEC. A possible solution could be a nomination
procedure of substitute members
beforehand. The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR
recommend that this regulation
be reconsidered.
57. Article 19(5) provides for special appointment of the CEC
“if the mandate of the CEC
terminates in the nine last months before the end of the
Assembly mandate.” The appointment
of members is made according to Articles 14 and 15 “by always
maintaining the equal
proportions of political representation”. Although this
additional phrase is rather vague, it would

appear that shifting political alliances within the Assembly
likewise shifts the right of
appointment, but only in cases where the full CEC is
reconstituted under Article 19(5). The
Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that the
original language text of
this provision be checked to ensure that it reflects the intent of
the legislator.
58. Article 23 of the Electoral Code provides that the CEC can
issue “acts”, which are either
“decisions” or “instructions”. Article 23(3) requires that every
“normative act” be voted on by
the CEC. Article 24 governs the voting process for CEC
decisions. Although Article 24 does
not specifically mention “instructions”, Article 24(1)(d) does
reference “acts of a normative
nature that aim to regulate issues related to elections”. The
OSCE/ODIHR recommend that consideration be given to
amending Article 24 to
specifically include “instructions” as subject to the voting rules
of Article 24. Further,
consideration should be given to amending Article 24 to provide
greater detail on the
contents of a CEC decision. Article 144, which governs the
content of a CEC decision on
electoral appeals, is illustrative. Article 24 could be amended to
require that all CEC
CDL-AD(2009)005
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decisions provide a factual explanation of the circumstances and
facts and legal analysis
that supports the decision.
59. Article 18(1) sets the criteria for expiry of the mandate of a
member of CEC. Point (a) of
that clause provides expiry of the mandate, if the member
performs a political activity. Point
(dh) provides the end of the mandate, if by acting or failing to
act, he threatens the activity of
the CEC concerning the preparation, supervision, direction and
verification of all aspects that
pertain to elections and referenda, as well as to the declaration
of their results. Although the
provisions are appropriate in themselves, they can give ground
for arbitrary practice. The
Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that
reasons for dismissal be
stipulated more clearly.
60. According to Article 23(5), the normative acts of the CEC
enter into force after their
publication in the Official Journal, except for those cases when
the circumstances impose
their immediate entry into force, while other acts enter into
force immediately. The provision
should be reconsidered. Unpublished norms might be applicable
as instructions for the
members of lower electoral bodies, but the principle of rule of
law does not allow application
of norms which are not published. Especially responsibilities
and sanctions (Articles 168 to
176) cannot be applied in these cases.
61. Finally, the OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission again

underscore that a partisan
approach in the functioning of the election administration,
whereby party interests are being
placed above the common objective to deliver an electoral
process in line with international
standards, is not conducive to the professional conduct of
democratic elections. In this regard,
it is recommended considering further streamlining Central
Election Commission decision
making mechanisms in order to avoid deadlocks that could be
motivated by partisan interests.
Zone of Electoral Administration Commission (ZEAC)
62. The level of election commission administration below the
CEC is the Zone of Electoral
Administration Commission (ZEAC). This applies to all
elections, which is a novelty of this
code.21 The geographical territory covered by a ZEAC should
not be confused with the
geographical territory covered by an electoral zone, understood
as a constituency, which for
parliamentary elections is based on the administrative level of
the region. According to Article
27(2) of the Code, the territorial jurisdiction of the Zone of
Election Administration, “as a rule, is
the same with the administrative district in accordance with the
law that regulates the territorial
organization of the Republic of Albania.” Article 27(2) also
provides that districts with more than
70,000 citizens entitled to vote are divided and municipalities
with more than 40,000 citizens
entitled to vote constitute a Zone of Election Administration of
its own if the total number of the
citizens entitled to vote at the district level is greater than
70,000. Further, in municipalities

which have more than 100,000 citizens entitled to vote, the CEC
may establish two Zones of
Election Administration. For the Municipality of Tirana, each
of the boroughs constitutes a Zone
of Election Administration of its own.
63. A list of ZEACs is attached as an annex to the Electoral
Code, defining 66 Zones of
Election Administration. The corresponding 66 ZEACs are
meant to fulfil the tasks formerly
vested with 100 Zone Election Commissions for national
elections. It is also understood that for
the election to Local Government Units, the 66 ZEACs will
perform the tasks formerly vested
with the Local Government Election Commissions, which were
one per Local Government Unit
(384 in 2007). Each ZEAC will have to organise elections in
more than six local government
units on average. This could represent a challenge, considering
the tasks involved, in particular
with regards to the registration of candidates and lists, checking
signatures, handling election
21 In the previous version of the Code, Zone Election
Commissions were established for parliamentary elections
and Local Government Election Commissions for local
elections.
CDL-AD(2009)005
- 16 -

material, organising the count for several LGUs in one single
counting centre, etc.
64. Article 27(5) provides that “ZEACs are established by the
CEC not later than 9 months
before the end of the Assembly mandate, on the basis of the
number of citizens entitled to vote
“on the last date of the electoral period for setting the election
day, according to the information
given by the General Directorate of Civil Status (GDCS)”. The
phrase “on the last date of the
electoral period for setting the election day” is confusing and
should be clarified.
65. The ZEAC consists of seven members and a secretary, each
appointed by the CEC.
Two members are proposed by “the main party of the
parliamentary majority”; two members
are proposed by “the main party of the parliamentary
opposition”; one member is proposed
by “the second party of the parliamentary majority”; and one
member is proposed by “the
second party of the parliamentary opposition”.22 Should this
appointment process fail to
achieve a “political balance”, then Article 29(1) provides that
“the respective group is
compensated with the candidacies of the main party until a
political balance between the
majority and opposition has been reached”.
66. In half of the ZEACs, the seventh member is proposed by
“the first party of the
parliamentary majority” and in the remaining half of the ZEACs
the seventh member is
proposed by “the first party of the parliamentary opposition”.
The sharing of seventh members

is to be based on objective criteria of (1) “random selection”
and (2) “equal distribution in the
electoral territory”. In those ZEACs where the seventh member
belongs to the main party of the
parliamentary majority, one of the ZEAC members representing
the main party of the
parliamentary majority is elected chairperson while, for the
other half, one of the members of
the ZEAC representing the main party of the parliamentary
opposition is elected chairperson.
The deputy chairperson is of the opposite political affiliation to
that of the chairperson. The
ZEAC secretary is proposed by the party that proposes the
deputy chairperson of the ZEAC.
67. Similar to the appointment process for the CEC, there is a
requirement for the largest
political parties to appoint women to the ZEAC. The text states
that: “30% of the members
proposed respectively from the biggest party of the majority and
from the biggest party of the
opposition should be from each gender”.
68. Article 32(2) allows a political party who has nominated a
member of the ZEAC to
substitute its member. The OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice
Commission have previously
criticised this provision in the Code. The ability of political
parties to control the actions of the
persons they have appointed to election commissions, by virtue
of the unlimited powers to
appoint and remove members at will, significantly hampers the
development of an independent,
professional, efficient, and non-partisan election administration.
The Venice Commission’s
Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters is quite clear on this

point: “The bodies appointing
members of electoral commissions must not be free to dismiss
them at will.”23 The ability to
arbitrarily replace members of election commissions without
legal cause also raises an issue of
compatibility with international and European standards.
69. Article 32 of the Code already provides broad grounds for
removal of a member of the
ZEAC who does not fulfil the member’s duties as required by
the law and subsidiary regulations
issued under the law. Where such a situation exists, then a
political party can bring this matter
22 Article 29(4) states: “The ranking order of the parties for
the purpose of allocating the seats of the ZEAC, in
accordance with the definitions of this Article, is made based on
the number of mandates won by the political party in
the previous elections for the Assembly. In the case of local
elections, the ranking is determined in accordance with
the number of the votes won nationwide for the local councils in
the previous elections by the parliamentary parties. If
two or more parties have the same number of mandates and it is
impossible to decide the benefiting party, their
ranking is determined based on the number of votes won
nationwide. If two or more parties have the same number of
votes, their ranking will be determined by lot by the CEC.”
23 See Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice in Electoral
Matters (CDL-AD(2002)023rev), II 3.1 f.
CDL-AD(2009)005

- 17 -
to the attention of the CEC and, at the appropriate time after the
anticipated removal, appoint a
new member. Thus, in addition to the concern noted in
paragraph 61 above, there is no
practical need for such a provision.
70. The conduct of elections by the election administration
should be professional and efficient.
Arbitrary removals of election commission members, which are
not based on the failure to fulfil
legal duties, do not facilitate the professional and efficient
administration of elections. In fact,
arbitrary removals disrupt the continuity of election processes
and are not consistent with the
other positive changes introduced into the Code’s regulation of
the election administration.
71. Although service on a ZEAC is temporary and the ZEAC is
not a permanent body, the
ZEAC nonetheless is an important institution of the Republic of
Albania when elections are
conducted. Thus, persons who hold positions on the ZEAC must
be completely free from
political influence or pressure. The Venice Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR recommend,
consistent with the international and European principles and
the Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters, that the Electoral Code be amended to
provide that a member of an election
commission can only be dismissed for failure to fulfil the
member’s legal duties imposed by the
Code.
72. As noted by the 2004 and 2007 opinions and prior election

observation reports, election
administration has been highly politicised in Albania. This high
degree of politicisation should be
reduced due to the cumulative affect of these amendments,
particularly due to the reduction of
the number of election commissions and the number of
commission members.
Voting Centre Commissions (VCC)
73. Article 36 of the Code provides that the Voting Centre
Commission (VCC) is composed in
accordance with the manner and the criteria provided by Article
29 for the ZEAC, with the
exception of the thirty percent (30%) gender requirement stated
in Article 29(1). Thus, concerns
stated above regarding the ZEAC also apply to the VCC. The
concern about legal provisions,
which allow a political party that has nominated a member of
the ZEAC to dismiss and replace
its member, is particularly applicable since a similar provision
in Article 39(2) allows
discretionary replacement of a VCC member. The Venice
Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Article 39(2) of the Code be
amended in the same fashion as
recommended for Article 32(2).
74. It should be noted that Article 42, which regulates meetings
and decisions of the VCC,
does not contain a quorum requirement for meetings and
decisions. The Venice Commission
and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Article 42 be amended
to include such a quorum
requirement.

E. Observers and Transparency
75. The articles regulating observers are now Articles 6 and 7,
which have replaced former
Articles 18 and 19. Articles 6 and 7 provide broad rights for
observers, including the right to
examine electoral material and documentation. The Electoral
Code also provides that a
complaint can be filed when an application for observer
accreditation is rejected.
76. New Article 6 has changed the accreditation eligibility
criterion for Albanian and foreign
non-governmental organisations, as well as international
organisations. Previously,
accreditation was given to organisations “specialised or engaged
in the area of protection of
human rights”. The new Article 6 allows accreditation to
organisations “specialised or engaged
in the area of good governance and democratisation”. It is not
clear to what extent, if any, this
change will limit the ability of observer groups, both national
and international, to obtain
accreditation. Since the new accreditation criterion would
appear to be narrower in scope, it is
CDL-AD(2009)005
- 18 -
possible that this amendment could have a negative impact on
the overall transparency of
election processes. Should an organisation’s accreditation for

observer status be denied in the
2009 elections, which would have been granted under the
previous version of the law, then this
amendment would have to be considered as a negative change in
the legal framework. It is
important to apply the provision in a broad manner to consider
also organisations specialised in
the area of protection of human rights as protecting
democratisation. This issue should be
followed in the 2009 elections by accredited observer groups.
77. Article 6(1) grants political parties the right to appoint an
observer “for every table of the
Ballot Counting Centre”. Article 6(3) regulating observers for
candidates presented by an
Initiating Committee of voters, however, is limited to an
observer to the Ballot Counting Centre”.
The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that
Article 6(3) be amended to
be consistent with Article 6(1).
F. Voter Registration
78. Voter registration is regulated in Article 46 to Article 57 of
the new code. Voter lists have
been a source of controversy for past elections in Albania.
Controversy over voter lists has
extended not only to issues of accuracy of the lists, but also to
the identification documents
used as a basis for registration, and for identification before
voting. Problems in this area have
been critically addressed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe in its Report
on the Observation of the parliamentary elections in Albania (3
July 2005), which dealt also with
problems relating to addresses. Due to the high level of distrust

among the political actors in
Albania, it has been difficult to separate perception from reality
concerning the degree of
“inaccuracy” of voter lists. Regardless of whether the problem
is one of perception or reality,
the recent amendments confirm the efforts to improve the
accuracy of voter registers. In line
with previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, the new code
provides for a voter registration
system based on national computerised and modernised civil
registers kept at local Civil Status
Offices. The bulwark of this effort is the creation and
maintenance of a permanent data base
that contains reliable and accurate information on citizens.
79. Improvement in the maintenance and quality of the basic
data on citizens should improve
the quality of voter lists. New provisions in the Electoral Code
continue these efforts. As with
prior versions of the Code, there will be a preliminary voter list,
a process for revision and
changes, and the preparation and posting of a final list. An
adequate legal foundation exists for
accurate voter lists. Political will, human resources, and
adequate funding are necessary to
build upon this legal foundation. The administration of the next
elections will in large part
determine the effectiveness of the new Electoral Code
provisions.
G. Voting Procedures
80. It should be noted that the concern, expressed in both the
2004 and 2007 opinions, over
the recording of official information on an individual voter’s
disability, remains. This concern is

due to Article 108(6) of the Electoral Code, which regulates
voting by a voter who cannot vote
without assistance. Clause (6) of Article 108 requires the
identification of such voters in official
state documentation that “proves the type and category of
disability”. Although this may be
intended to assist voters with specific needs, the requirement
for an official government label of
“disability” in order to vote is not consistent with international
standards. The Venice
Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that the law
facilitate voting by a person
with a disability without imposing the stigma that may be
associated with an official state
declaration of the person’s disability.
81. It should also be noted that the new Code does not change
the procedures for voting by
military and police forces personnel. The Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters counsels
that these personnel should vote at their place of registered
permanent residence whenever
CDL-AD(2009)005
- 19 -
possible.24 The 2004 and 2007 opinions recommended applying
the rule of Article 111(2),
which required such personnel to vote in their domiciles, to all
elections and not just local
elections. The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR again
recommend the

amendment of Article 111.
H. Appeals of the Decisions of Election Commissions before
the CEC
82. Article 124 limits the right to appeal to the CEC against the
ZEAC decisions to any political
party, being or not a member of a coalition, and any candidate
proposed by the voters, and to
those individuals or political parties whose requests for
registering as an electoral subject have
been refused, and to subjects appealing against the refusal of
requests for accreditation as
observers. Still, the Code does not allow appeals by voters who
have been denied their right to
vote or who find some voting procedures to be conducted in
contradiction with law. The Code of
Good Practice in Electoral Matters states in Section II.3.3.f that
all candidates and all voters
registered in the constituency concerned must be entitled to
appeal. A reasonable quorum may
be imposed for appeals by voters on the results of elections. It
has to be reminded that not only
the right to be elected but also the right to vote in elections
conducted according to law has to
be protected. The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR
recommend that Article 124 of
the Electoral Code be accordingly amended and revised.
83. Article 143(3) gives the deadlines for the CEC to decide on
the appeals. There are two
different time-limits: a 10-day time-limit for deciding on
decisions on the approval of the table of
elections results and a 2-day time-limit for all other appeals.
Paragraph 75 of the 2007 Joint
Opinion on amendments to the Electoral Code of Albania by the

Venice Commission and
OSCE/ODIHR welcomed that the deadline has been extended to
ten days, which appears to
be more realistic in light of the high number of appeals that
have been filed with the Central
Election Commission in past elections. The Venice Commission
and the OSCE/ODIHR
recommend that the 2-day time-limit should be extended, as the
administrative procedure
before the CEC is investigative and it would not be possible to
ask for documents, call for
experts etc in such a short time. According to Article 144 clause
(4) the decisions of CEC on
appeals have to be accompanied by the dissenting or concurring
opinions. Such opinions can
usually be written after the text of the decision of CEC is
available to its members. Thus the
time-limit for the adoption of the decision is in practice even
shorter.
I. Appeals of CEC Decisions to the Electoral College
84. Article 146 of the Code regulates the procedure for
selecting judges on the Electoral
College. The procedure has remained unchanged from the
previous Electoral Code (Article
163). Clause (3) gives the two largest political parties of both
the parliamentary majority and
opposition the right to remove one of the judges selected by the
initial lottery. Already in the
2004 Joint Recommendations, the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice
Commission had criticised
this privilege and recommended its use to be phased out.25
Article 146(3) raises a question of
compatibility with the principle of the independence of the
judiciary.26 Under Article 14 of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a state has
an obligation to ensure the
impartiality of courts and tribunals. As noted by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee,
this requires judges to be selected without political interference
and the prohibition on political
interference extends to “appointment, remuneration, tenure,
promotion, suspension and
24 See, e.g., Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters, point I.3.2.xii.
25 See paragraph 109, OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission,
Joint Recommendations of 2 November 2004
(Opinion no. 273/2004, CDL-AD(2004)017).
26 See Paragraphs 5.12 and 5.13 of the OSCE 1990 Copenhagen
Document and Paragraphs 19.1 and 19.2 of
the OSCE 1991 Moscow Document. See also Recommendation
No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe on the Independence, Efficiency and Role
of Judges; UN Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary.
CDL-AD(2009)005
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dismissal” of judges.27 A system that grants to four specific
political parties a significant role in
the selection of the judges on the Electoral College is a system
that facilitates political
interference in the establishment of the judiciary and is contrary
to Article 14 of the ICCPR.

Further, this provision is unnecessary since a judge can be
challenged and excluded from a
case where justified by the facts.28 The Venice Commission and
the OSCE/ODIHR
recommend that Article 146(3) of the Electoral Code be
accordingly amended and revised to
comply with Article 14 of the ICCPR.
85. Article 151(2) enumerates a number of motives for
exclusion of judges from hearing a
case. These provisions should be understood within the
framework of the case-law on Article 6
paragraph 1 of the ECHR by European Court of Human Rights.
86. Article 145 limits the right to appeal a CEC decision to the
Electoral College to “electoral
subjects”. However, an “interested person” has the right to
participate in proceedings before
both the CEC and Electoral College. Article 145 does not
expressly recognise the right of an
interested person, who has been adversely affected by a CEC
decision in a case in which the
interested person participated, to appeal to the Electoral
College. The Venice Commission
and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that Article 145 be amended
to provide the right to appeal
to voters and other electoral stakeholders (“interested persons”)
who may have a legitimate
interest in seeking appellate review of a CEC decision (see also
paragraph 75a).
87. The Code does not foresee the possibility for the Electoral
College to invite other interested
parties to the proceedings which were not parties in the
proceedings before the CEC. It is thus
possible that a person whose rights have been affected by a

decision of the CEC, may not
appeal to the Electoral College if he/she was not invited to the
procedure before the CEC or if
his/her request to participate in the proceedings according to
Article 133(2) was rejected. In
view of Section II.3.3.f of the Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters quoted above the
Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that the
Code be amended
accordingly.
J. Invalidation and Repeat Elections
88. Article 160 of the Code provides that the elections shall be
declared invalid “if there have
been violations of the law.” While it is assumed that the term
“law” should not be understood as
referring to the Electoral Code only but in a broader sense, this
could be usefully clarified.
Article 160 also provides that elections are invalidated “if the
voting has not begun or has been
suspended for more than six hours.” On a similar provision in
the former version of the electoral
code (Article 117), the previous Joint Opinion on Amendments
to the Electoral Code of Albania
by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR (CDL-
AD(2007)035) suggested “to consider
whether such time limit should be reduced”. The Venice
reiterate this recommendation.
89. Article 160 regulates invalidation of elections in voting
centres and Article 161 regulates the
holding of repeat elections if the CEC’s determination of
invalidity “influences the allocation of
mandates in the electoral zone or nationwide”. Article 161(2)

provides that “A case when the
number of voters who have voted or could have voted in the
voting centre or centres declared
invalid is equal to or greater than the number of voters required
for the allocation of one seat in
the respective electoral zone, based on the calculation of valid
votes in the electoral zone,
performed in accordance with Article 162, shall be considered
as having an impact on the
allocation of seats for the Assembly.” The intent of this rule
appears to require a repeat election
27 See General Comment No. 32 of the United Nations Human
Rights Committee (adopted 27 July 2007),
interpreting Article 14: Right to equality before courts and
tribunals and to a fair trial (U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32
(2007).
28 See Article 151, Article 153 clause (2), and Article 155
clause (2).
CDL-AD(2009)005
- 21 -
“when the number of voters who have voted or could have voted
in the voting centre(s)
declared as invalid” is of a sufficient quantity to either change
(1) the resulting quotients or (2)
ranking of resulting quotients and such change would shift the
allocation of a mandate from one
electoral subject to another electoral subject. If this is the
intent, it is not clearly stated in the

English translation. The text should state very clearly that the
“number of votes required for the
allocation of one mandate in the electoral zone” has to be
determined by considering potentially
new quotients and a re-ranking of quotients. In other words, one
cannot simply look at a
difference in vote totals for the electoral subjects. Although this
would be possible in a simple
election between two contestants, it does not automatically
apply to proportional representation
formulas which rank quotients that result from a series of
divisions. This is particularly true for
the Code, which uses D’Hondt divisors (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, et seq.) for
the initial allocation to electoral
subjects and Sainte-Laguë divisors (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, et seq.) for
allocating mandates to political
parties within a coalition. The Venice Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR recommend that
Article 161 be amended to state more clearly and in greater
detail the application of the rule for
repeat elections.
K. Provisions on Referenda
90. The reform has not touched upon the legal framework for
referenda. Article 185 in the final
and transitory provisions provides that “Part Nine "Referenda"
of the law No. 9087, dated
19.06.2003, "The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania", as
amended, as well as any part
of its provisions that are related to it, remains in force until the
approval of the new law on
general and local referenda.” A recent controversy over the
notions of “constitutional
referendum” and “general referendum” suggests that aspects of
the chapter on referenda

should be further clarified. The provisions on referenda could
be integrated into the Code or left
to be regulated by a special law, but it is recommended to avoid
unreasonable differences
between the conduction of elections and referenda, as otherwise
there will be need for
additional education of the members of Electoral Commissions
and problems in conducting the
voting might appear more easily.
L. Technical Drafting Questions
91. Article 9 of the Electoral Code regulates setting the date
for Assembly elections. Article
9(1) provides: “If the mandate of the Assembly expires earlier
than 30 days from the beginning
of the electoral period, elections are conducted during the
preceding electoral period.” It would
appear that, in the event of mandate expiration “earlier than 30
days from the beginning of the
electoral period”, then the holding of elections “during the
proceeding electoral period” could
result in elections being held several months before the new
Assembly’s mandate would
commence. The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR
recommend that the text of
Article 9 be checked to ensure that the original Albanian text
correctly states the intent of the
legislator.
92. Article 9(5) of the Code states: “Pursuant to paragraph 2 of
article 104 of the Constitution,
the elections are to be conducted no earlier than 30 days and no
later than 45 days after the
dissolution of the Assembly.” Article 9(5), unlike Articles 9(4)
and 9(6), does not state the

“when” event that triggers Article 9(5). Although the “when”
event could be determined by
consulting Article 104(2) of the Constitution (dissolution of the
assembly after a negative vote
on a motion of confidence), it would be better for the text of
Article 9(5) to be similar in format to
Articles 9(4) and 9(6). The Venice Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR recommend that
Article 9(5) be amended to state the event that the word “when”
is intended to reference.
93. The Albanian Parliament adopted in February 2009 a Law
No.10066, which amends law
no.8952 on identity documents, and modifies the official term
designating ID Cards to
“Letërnjoftim”, while Article 105(1)a) and Article 179 of the
Electoral Code still use the term
“kartë identiteti”. In order to avoid any possible confusion
regarding the officially valid ID
CDL-AD(2009)005
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documents to be used for the identification of voters before
voting, the Venice Commission
and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that the relevant provisions
of the Code be amended to
reflect the legally valid terminology.
IV. CONCLUSION
94. The Electoral Code of Albania provides a thorough

technical foundation for elections. The
recent amendments continue to improve the Code and reflect the
commitment of authorities in
Albania to improve the legal framework for elections. Although
the amendments continue the
process of electoral reform, amendments related to media access
and campaign financing are
less effective. These are areas that could be improved with
future amendments. However, the
fact that the Code can be further improved should not detract
from the commitment and
concrete efforts made by the authorities in Albania or the
positive improvements made to the
Code over the last several years.
95. The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR continue to
stand ready to assist the
authorities of the Republic of Albania in their efforts to create a
legal framework for democratic
elections in conformity with Council of Europe and OSCE
commitments and other international
standards for democratic elections.
96. It has however to be reminded that the stability of the
electoral legislation is important for
the public’s confidence in the electoral process.29 Amendments
should therefore take place in
the future when necessary to improve the conformity of the
legislative framework with
international standards, but should otherwise be avoided in
principle.
29 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (CDL-

AD(2002)023rev), II.2.b; Interpretative Declaration on the
Stability of Electoral Law (CDL-AD(2005)043).
Ghost parties and
the deformation
of democracy:
the case
of Albania
and the Region
2
3
Acknowledgments
This paper was made possible through
the financial support of the Alumni
Program Grant awarded to the author by
the Open Society Institute.
The author wishes to express its
gratitude to the donor as well as to the
mentors, contributors and editors of her
work.

4
5
Table of contents:
Ghost pArties And the deformAtion
of democrAcy: the cAse of AlbAniA
Alba Çela............................................................................. 7
invisible pArties for A cleAr victory?
explAininG the role of the Ghost pArties
in the mAcedoniAn politicAl system
Mišo Dokmanović, PhD .................................................... 45
smAll And Ghost politicAl
pArties in KosovA
Adnan Ahmeti.................................................................... 65
6
7
Ghost parties and
the deformation
of democracy:
the case

of Albania
Alba Çela
Tirana June 2012
8
list of acronyms:
CEC- Central Election Committee
HSA- High State Audit
SP- Socialist Party
DP- Democratic Party
Table of contents:
1. Introduction .................................................................. 9
2. Chasing ghosts in the political arena .............................12
3. The state of Albanian democracy ..................................20
4. Legal provisions .............................................................24
5. Implications for democracy and representativeness ....27
6. Alternate Views ............................................................31
7. Conclusion .................................................................. 33
8. Recommendations .......................................................36
Bibliography.......................................................................38
ANNEX . ........................................................................... 42
9
1. Rudina Laka, Tirana Observer,
http://www.tiranaobserver.al/2011/11/21/

ne-shqiperi-ka-113-parti-politike-te-regjistruara/
2. World Values Survey, 4th wave, 2002 results for Albania.
1. Introduction
From the end of World War II till 1991, Albania was under
one of the most radical one-party communist regimes
and allowed no pluralism of ideas let alone of political
organizations. The first elections that were organized with
the presence of multiple parties were those of 1991 and the
first ones won by a party other than the Communist party
officially dubbed the Party of Labour were in March of 1992.
Today, 20 years after Albania has 113 registered political
parties for a population that counts slightly above 4 million
people. It has been stipulated that this might even be the
highest number of political parties per capita in Europe.1)
Total membership in political parties, according to the last
World Values poll done in Albania is 14.8 percent.2)
To the present day the largest most determining parties in the
political arena are the Democratic Party, the first opposition
party to be created upon the fall of the communist regime
10
3. The jargon has been pickled up and is used extensively by
the Albanian
media. See for example the following print dailies’ titles: E.
Ajazi: “Partite
fantazem nuk marrin as votat e anetareve”, 14/07/ 2011,
Accessed on:
http://lajme.shqiperia.com/lajme/artikull/iden/1047074955/titull
i/

Partite-fantazem-nuk-marrin-as-votat-e-anetareve ; S. Sulce:
“Rezultati i
zgjedhjeve, partitë fantazma që nuk arritën të fitonin as 0.1% të
votave”
August 6, 2009. Accessed on http://www.gazeta-
albania.net/news.
php?id=19338
and the Socialist Party, which sprang form the Party of Labor,
however made a clear break with the past by denouncing its
repressive politics and changing significantly its ideological
profile.
The change in terms of numbers of political parties is self
explanatory. What is less obvious though is the fact that a
large number of these political parties often lack political
activity, media presence, concrete physical offices, and
sometimes have even imaginary leaders or candidates. In
popular jargon they are called ‘ghost parties’.3) This paper
argues that these parties distort the function of pluralism,
radicalize public opinion against the political parties by
discrediting their representative and organizational functions
and finally are an impediment in the democratization process
of Albania which remains incomplete.
In his landmark study on Albanian political parties, the
scholar Afrim Krasniqi notes that there exist several
temporary groups of individuals who never managed to
turn into functional parties and were used by the leaders of
the main political parties in Albania, the DP and the SP and
Ghost Parties and the Deformation of Democracy:
11

4. Afrim Krasniqi, “Partite Politike ne Shqiperi 1920- 2006”,
Instituti Shqiptar i
Studmit te Politikave, Tirane: 2006, p.345.
The Case of Albania
he writes that “despite them being individually irrelevant as
subjects of study, taken collectively they are an ideal case
study of analyzing the characteristics of political parties and
political life in Albania.”4)
A clarification needs to be made from the beginning to
avoid any misinterpretation of the aim of this paper. Small
parties are not to be confused with ghost parties. There are
a considerable number of small political parties in Albania,
who have regular consistent activity, unyielding presence
evident in voting processes and even substantial media
presence throughout the years. The analysis to follow in this
paper does not apply to these parties. Neither is this paper
concerned with the negative implications of small parties
becoming king-makers in certain political instances and
specific political processes.
12
5. Arjan Dyrmishi, “Albanian Political Parties and Elections
Since 1991”, AIIS.
Tirana: 2009, p.13.
6. Krasniqi, “Partite Politike ne Shqiperi”, pp 204-205.
2. chasing ghosts in
the political arena

It is almost witty to witness that that the first use of ghost
political parties posing to be real political alternatives
was made actually by the Party of Labor in Albania, in its
deathbed. When the first pluralistic election were held in
1991, the Party of Labor used its annexes, the Democratic
Front, the Women Union and the Veterans Comittee as
separate political parties to achieve two main aims. First by
adding to the list of choices the Labor Party was essentially
competing with itself5). Second and most important it would
create a general perception of chaos6) and attach this to the
perception of pluralism. People would associate pluralism
with an anarchic set of futile choices and dislike it. The
association of ghost parties and chaos persist to this day.
In 1991, a ghost party, which later became famous for the
incident, was created under the problematic name “The
13
7. Krasniqi, pp242-243.
8. Kosta Bajraba, “Albania in transition: elite’s role and
perspective”, NATO
Academic Affairs Office Research project, Tirana: 1998.
Available at http://
www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/barjaba.pdf
Christian and Muslim Union” and applied for getting an
appointment with American Secretary of State, James Baker,
the first high level American diplomat visiting Albania after
several decades of communist isolation. The party was never
real, it never ran for elections and was soon forgotten. Its
supposed leaders though continued their political life, this

time as members of other parties.
In 1997, Krasniqi says that the Democratic Party inserted in
its coalition list two parties that did not exist and the Socialist
Party did the same for one other fictitious party.7)
The scholar Kosta Bajraba, in a study about elite and elite
formation in Albania, published in 1998 gives a very frank
and interesting account about ghost political parties and
may be the first Albanian scholar to write about them for
the foreign audience. Bajraba notes that:
“In Albania exist around 45 political parties but it can
be hardly said that they all exercise political activity.
Contrary even from the point of view of the most alert
and systematic analyst the activity of most political
parties in Albania is inexistent. In fact half the number
of these ghost parties do not even mention the names
of their leaders.”8)
The Case of Albania
14
9. Barjaba, pp.35-40.
List of ghost political parties9):
The Party of Independents- its political activity is
completely ignored
The National Progress Party- its activity is not known
at the national or at the local level

Democratic Prosperity Party- its activity is ignored
National Democratic Party- practically its unknown
Albanian Universal Party- its activity is completely
ignored
Liberal Party- its activity is ignored
Labor Social Albanian Party- practically unknown
The Albanian popular league- it’s a small political
party which become known only for the fact
that its leader Bashkim Driza was the chief of the
pyramid scheme (Ponzi scheme)
Albanian Nationalist Party- its activity is ignored
Ideal Democratic Party – its activity is unknown
Social Reformer Party- its activity is ignored
He proceeds to offer a long list of parties whom he denotes
as with activities being ignored, inexistent and unheard
of. The parties belong to different ideological points in the
political spectrum.
15
Albanian democratic Union party- unknown
Alternative republican party- remains out of political

life
By the end of the list the author’s patience to
consider them one by one runs out and he groups
the following in the category “All remain out of
political activity” :
Social Justice Party
Popular Progress
Legality Triumph
National Right Defense
Albanian Demo-Christian Union
National Legality
National Prosperity
National Community
New Socialist Party
After such a long and exhaustive list, the author concludes
that “it is quite obvious that the major part of the political
forces in the Albanian political scene do not have any activity,
they remain as reliques in the registers of the Ministry of
Justice.”10)
10. Bajraba, p.40
The Case of Albania

16
11. Dorian Jano “On parties and party Systems in Albania”,
Social Science
Research Network, 04/07/2008
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1154507, p.12
12. Krasniqi, p.214.
In another paper, Dorian Jano notes that “although about 45
political parties are registered in reality not all of them exercise
political activity. In fact, most of the political parties in
Albania
are inexistent ad do not have any activity, or else most of them
fail to have a countable electorate.”11) Jano attributes in part
the large number of political parties to the fashion of endless
fragmentation, the authoritative mindset of political leaders
and the quest for maximizing individual power.
One way to spot ghost political parties is to start from a
cumulative number of party members and see if it makes
any sense compared to the actual number of people who
vote in elections, in a context where citizens are increasingly
disappointed with conflictual politics. Hence, Krasniqi notes
that in 2001 when 2.1 million voters were registered, around
180,000 of them were reported as party members, a figure
that makes 18% of total voters. That is higher than any
percentage in consolidated democratic countries in Europe.12)
Krasniqi then concludes that large number of political parties
registered at the court of Tirana are actually fictitious party
that do not enter in elections and are unknown to the public
and to the media. He produces a long list of parties whose
existence he says can be barley traced in some rare press
statement given in small local media channel or by some

anachronic protest notes sent to the Central Elections.
17
13. Ligji nr “Per Partite Politike”, Republika e Shqiperise
14. Central Election Committee (CEC), Official results of 2001
Elections, all
figures are available at www.cec.org.al
Another more concrete and accurate way is to compare the
number of cast ballots for a specific party and see if a certain
party has gotten at least the vote of its assumed members.
The first law on political parties of the year 1991, stipulated
that the minimum number of citizens to come together for
the purpose of founding one political party was 300. In the
changes made a decade later, in 2000, the law increased this
requirement to 500 initial party members for the founding.13)
It is therefore interesting to see some of the results of the
political parties throughout the years which show cases of
certain parties getting fewer ballots that the alleged number
of their members:
In 2001, two out the 28 participating political parties:
Partia e Pajtimit Kombetar and Partia Lidhja Fshatare won
respectively 357 and 496, less than the required number of
their members.14)
In 2005, all competing parties got more than 500 votes,
however one party was just 70 votes above this minimum
limit, that was the Party of Albanian National Security.

During the local elections of 2007, 14 electoral subjects had
less than 500 votes in their results for council advisers (see
Annex 2). Some political parties had almost 0 percent of the
national vote, with the most striking examples of the Party of
The Case of Albania
18
15. CEC, Official Results of 2009 Elections.
16. CEC, Official Results of 2011 Elections.
Albanian National Community (44 votes), the Conservative
Party (27 votes) the Party ‘Albanian Emigration’ (4 votes) and
finally the Democratic Party Peze – Gjirokaster of Albania
with 0 votes. The very name of this party makes little sense
in the original language: It can be roughly translated into ‘
Democratic Party Peze Gjirokaster of Albania’ , Peze being
an Albanian village close to the capital and Gjirokastra a city
in the south. This party has got 0 votes.
In the General Elections of 2009 the following parties scored
less than 500 votes: Partia Toleranca e Re (437), Partia per
mbrojtjen e Emigranteve (376), Partia e Gjelber (437), Partia e
Reformave Demokratike (495), Partia Forca Albania (319).15)
In February of 2011, the law on political parties was amended
and the required number of members for a party to be
registered was increased to 3000. The judge that took the
decision to register the party was also required to put down
in the legislation certificate the exact number of establishers,
which by definition are the initial party members.
That very same year the following parties got less than

500 votes in the Local elections that took place on May 8th:
Partia Demokrate për Integrim e Prosperitet (74), Partia për
Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave të Punëtorve të Shqipërisë (389),
Partia e Çështjeve Shqiptare (366), Partia Kristian Demokrate
e Shqipërisë (495), Partia Lëvizja Punëtore Shqiptare (98).16)
19
17. Gladiola Bendaj, “ Kryetare partish vetem ne Facebook”
(Head of parties,
just in Facebook), MAPO Magazine, 5/03/2011.
18. “120 parti ne Shqiperi” (120 partie in Albania, Top Chanel,
21/03/2012,
available at http://top-channel.tv/artikull.php?id=231155
The number of parties who got more than 500 but less than
3000 is much larger (see Annex 1) however their justification
might legitimately be that they were established before the
law was established.
Finally, the Albanian media periodically takes initiatives to
expose and often ridicule ghost parties through investigative
journalism. Although the main mission of the media efforts
seems to be ridiculing the individuals behind these parties
and not exposing the damaging effects the phenomenon
has, several pieces offer interesting insights on the current
state of ghost political parties. Hence in an article published
last year it was stipulated that ghost parties now have found
a heaven that hosts them, social media sites. Exposing some
ghost parties with accounts online, the article mentions
different political parties which when connected at their

available numbers, the responses comes from completely
different institutions such as public administration and
hospitals. The journalist then concludes that “ghost political
parties are often also called kiosk political parties but it
would be good even if they had a kiosk to hold meetings
because more often than not they don’t even have that.”17)
In another even more recent piece, Albanian Top Chanel
television ran a long feature that exposed the existence of
120 political parties in Albania and mentioned their names
The Case of Albania
20
as usual associating them with descriptive adjectives such as
“very strange” and “unheard of”. The piece investigates that
although the number is quite high the process of registration
of new parties is uninterrupted and several requests are in
process at the Court even at the time of the investigation
done by the journalist. It is also reported that requests are
denied sometimes because the proposed name by anew
party happens to be already taken or because the proponent
party leader does not appear in court.18)
18. “120 parti ne Shqiperi” (120 partie in Albania, Top Chanel,
21/03/2012,
available at http://top-channel.tv/artikull.php?id=231155
21

19. Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and defective democracies”,
in
Democratization, Vol. 11, No 5, December 2004, p.51.
20. Merkel, p.49.
3. the state of Albanian
democracy
In a 2002 classification of democracies all over the world
Wolfgang Merkel, a well known political science scholar
for having coined the term ‘embedded democracies’ lists
Albania in the column of illiberal democracies19), pertaining
to his definition that illiberal democracies are:
Democracies with… “incomplete and damaged
constitutional state, where the executive and
legislative control of the state are only weakly
limited by the judiciary[…],constitutional norms
have little binding impact on government actions
democracies where the principle of rule of law
is damaged affecting the actual core of liberal
self-understanding, namely equal freedom of all
individuals.”20)
22
21. Democracy index ‘The Economist’ 2011; FRIDE (Fundación
para las
Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior) and Open
Society
Foundation , 2010.

22. “Albania twenty years after: Reflections on State and
democracy” Albanian
Institute for international Studies, Tirana: 2010, p. 39.
23. Klarita Gerxhani and Arthur Schram: “Clintelism and
Polarized Voting:
empirical evidence” In Public Choice (2009) 141, p.308
Albania is pinpointed as a hybrid democracy several times by
several international rankings.21) In a survey of 2010 citizens
themselves believe that Albania is partially democratic,
while 20 percent believe it is more undemocratic than
democratic.22)
This describes very well in a nut shell some of the basic
problems of Albanian democracy today which coupled with
a diminishing representativeness of political parties vis a vis
their electorate is a strong signal of worry.
Political parties in general, and ghost political parties as
an example of extreme showcasing, display an aptitude
for clientelism and reinforced client relations with their
electorate and party infrastructure. In their empirical
investigation on polarized voting in Albania, Gerxhani and
Schram argue that even if the main two political parties
in Albania, DP and SP, display most of the characteristics
related to clientelistic parties and that one central feature
of this is the voters expectation that once in power “parties
will bestow ‘gifts’ upon their clients.”23)
23

24. Merkel, p.55
25. Gerxhani and Schram, p. 315.
Ghost parties in this sense are both a symptom and a factor
in the deteriorating of the natural role of political parties
as forms of organizational and representation and their
transformation into client-patron structures deprived of
concerns for transparency, efficiency and accountability.
Neither could we hope that such phenomena can be
surpassed with the time lapse and eventual strengthening
of institutions and institutional modes of operation. Merkel
notes wisely that defective democracies are by no means
transitional regimes and that by forming contextual links to
they can survive for a long time because elites especially in
context of clientelistic societies see an opportunity to seek
power through their maintenance.24) The use of ghost political
parties is hereby presented as one of the mechanisms used
by these elites and that reinforces and reproduces the poor
health of Albanian democracy.
Gerxhani and Schramm also reiterate the point by saying
that:
“As long as clientelistic parties are able to use the
government to serve their clients, it may be expected
that voters will behave the way they have been doing.
In turn, this gives parties no reason for change.”25)
Hence in a similar vein it can be argued that as long as
incentives are embedded in the system that rewards forms
The Case of Albania
24

of political organization that have nothing in common with
the true spirit of a political party but are schemes of profit
and manipulation, than the presence of ghost parties shall
continue to mark the Albanian political scene with all the
implications that are associated. The voters than will have
a consolidated opinion that small political parties an ghost
political parties alike are evidence of the manipulation of
electorate representation and fist time voters will be facing
confusion staring at the very absurd long list of political
parties with their often funny names.
25
4. legal provisions
The law on political parties stipulates that the status of
being a political party can be taken away once the number
of members falls down from the legal requirement minimum
or from the number set in the party’s own status. However,
the concrete mechanism through which this can be done
is very unclear and the specific authority is not vested
with anyone in particular. The final decision is taken by the
court by the mechanism to initialize such a process is left
undetermined.
According to CEC representatives, this institution can not
undertake any action towards political parties, since it
considers the court decision of the party registration as
ultimate proof of a party’s regular existence. Although
the CEC has in its knowledge full information about the
concrete results that the parties achieve it follows only the

Electoral code, where no dispositions at all are included
that would indicate some informative action to the court or
to any other instances. There is a minimal space for some
fact checking for CEC in that it requires parties to submit
an official physical address of their headquarters and of
26
their leader upon registering for elections. Given the media
coverage of some of these places being non existent than
the CEC could step in to address these signals. However this
could be circumvented easily and serves little to address the
problem in general.
Hence with the present Code the CEC has no competences
in this field and can to act as an institution that can check
and verify the political parties and their existence.
According to law experts, the procedure to verify the number
of party members is technically very difficult. Once a person
has signed in the registration act of apolitical party, it would
require another signed statement of him/her expressing
the decision to leave the party. This almost never happens
and experts argue that the resources required for the state
to verify the present number of members would not be
justified by the objective.
When it comes to using public finances, in the past political
parties would benefit at the moment of their creation from
state funds by being assisted with an initial sum of 100.000
leke and being offered premises for their offices. In 2009 this
changed and only those parties with an average of national
votes were granted this subsidy. As for their yearly finances
the parties with mandates inside the parliament were the

sole beneficiaries of state funds.
However, according to what has been made public from
the negotiations that are being carried with the objective
27
26. “PD-PS, konsensus për financimin e fushatës. Partitë mund
të marrin edhe
kredi“ 27/01/2012 http://www.gazetashqiptare.org/pd-ps-
konsensus-per-
financimin-e-fushates-partite-mund-te-marrin-edhe-kredi/
to change the Electoral Code, the forthcoming changes will
be carried out. Parties shall be allocated public money not
according to the mandates they have in the parliament but
according to the percentage of national votes achieved. The
CEC is supposed to allocate a financial value to each valid
vote, 5 days after the certification of the results. Furthermore,
parties will have to compete on their own and can borrow
money for their electoral campaigns, as long as the loan
does not exceed the money they get from the state.26)
It remains to be seen if the minimum percentage set to be
able to benefit from state fund will reflect a consideration
of the minimal number of party members or if it leave the
financial options are also open for parties who have not
even got a percentage of the national votes that would
correspond to the minimum number of their members.
Even in the most positive scenario, when all the financial
elements are taken care of to zero the impact of ghost parties

on public finances, the social damage done to the democratic
culture of voters remain. No progress will be done to limit
the implications of ghost parties taken from this perspective
unless there is a clear and precise mechanism that foresees
their closure once they step over the boundary set by law.
The Case of Albania
28
27. Zamira Cavo, “Partite ne Shqiperi, Rrezik i Madh per
Demokracine”, Gazeta
Shqip (Albanian daily), 2011-07-03.
5. Implications for democracy
and representativeness
In an editorial that exposes Albanian parties as a real threat
to democracy, political science professor Zamira Cavo says
that “ tens of political parties with the weirdest of names
sprang up not form democracy not from democratic need
but to secure a guaranteed place of leader in the system
we routinely cal democracy.”27) The sheer large number of
political parties coupled with the anomalous and usually
ridiculous names that they often have, as elsewhere
mentioned in this paper, creates a popular perception that
anyone can create apolitical party for any unreasonable and
unworthy reason. It adds to the general negative sentiment
that citizens have about political parties as actors striving for
power deprived by any concern for real representation and
real agendas for progress.
Krasniqi notes that the misuse of political parties and the
schemes of large parties to create and support fictitious

29
28. Krasniqi, p. 244.
29. Bajraba, p.43.
30. Corruption in Albania 2009, Summary of Findings, IDRA&
USAID, available
at http://www.idra-
al.org/cs2009/Corruption%20in%20Albania%20
2009%20-%20Summary%20of%20Findings.pdf pg. 14
parties seriously endangers the role of political parties to
serve as intermediaries between individuals and the state
as well as thought pools for political action.28)
Low trust in political parties is a key element to be considered
in this analysis. The presence of ghost political parties and
the ridicule vested with the by media coverage affects the
public perceptions of citizens, albeit not only about them
but about political parties in general.
Study after study proves in Albania that people are
disillusioned with political parties and have very low trust
in them. Hence since his study in 1998, Bajraba pinpoints
that political parties are among the institutions which have
the minimum credibility to citizens.29) Political parties have
a score of 33.7 points in a 100 scale, second only to trade
unions and Property Restitution Agency, when it comes
to the lowest levels of public trust, according to a survey
carried out in 2009. Among public officials the reputation of
political parties is even worse.30)
The effect that ghost political parties produce in election

rounds by distorting results, misinforming voters and taking
The Case of Albania
30
up unwarranted media time, are direct threats to democratic
representation and harm the valuable direct link of citizens
to politics.
Ghost political parties have a spillover perception effect
on real small political parties that are often considered by
mistake as ghost parties by citizens. The existence of so
many ghost parties and their common denominator the very
small number of members, influence the citizens perception
that being small is being irrelevant. This is augmented by
the common misuse that the two main large parties often
make of both small and ghost parties. Since very often small
political parties as well as ghost ones are treated equally
and rendered puppets in the big parties electoral schemes,
the public is induced into thinking that small political parties
are just as unimportant and even malicious. On one side this
is also the fault of small parties themselves who allow such
a treatment, but on the other side, the fierce context of
Albanian bi-partism allows for few alternatives.
Most importantly the existence and effects of ghost political
parties have a strong discouragement effect for genuine
interest groups that consider the political party as a form of
organization but discard the idea for not wanting to appear
ridiculous to citizens. More often than not, a group of citizens
that would like to unite in order to further their own agenda
of requests, within the Constitutional logic of the Albanian
state, refrains from forming a political party for fear of being

discredited.
31
31. The lion share of this on air time goes to the main political
parties and to
parties represented in the parliament, however even other
parties are
entitled to no less than two spots of 5 min. Provisions for this
are made in
the Electoral Code , Articles 80 and 81.
Other side effects of ghost parties include unfair
consummation of media time during electoral campaigns.
In a provision of the Electoral Code, the Public Broadcaster
is required to make time in its programming during electoral
campaign for messages and spots of political parties and
grant to each party that is registered at the CEC an amount
of time determined by law.31)
The Case of Albania
32
6. Alternate views
Ghost political parties, I believe are not a deformation
of democracy but part of the democracy. In the case of
Albania the easiness with which parties are created and
maintained is the result of the Law on Political Parties,
approved in 2002 and since then amended several

times as well as by the way they are financed, the way
they mange institutionalized membership, etc.. Hence
the large quantity of these political parties in Albania
is directly connected to the ease that the Law offers.
For their large number, small electorate and the lack of
their representation both in parliament and at the local
[level] they display a lack of efficiency but I wouldn’t
say deformation. Deformation might be the case of the
law which offers this high degree of ease for them to be
created, but as long as ‘party’ means ‘piece’ then maybe
we have the desire to be in many ‘pieces’.
As long as the legal framework makes it possible for
political parties to be created and then go on without
institutionalized control, which would check if they have
a fixed office , without the institutional infrastructure,
register of members or even auditing for their funds,
this will act as a catalyst for ghost parties or parties that
appear only during election times. In the meantime, a
good part of them are simply one-man-party and don’t
have elected structures. From the legal perspective
opportunities should be created for parties to exert their
functions however there should be set some limits in
order for the process not to be rendered so ridiculous.
Geron Kamberi, expert on domestic political and
development issues
The Case of Albania
33
“Political parties are a national asset; the right to assemble
is an unlimited constitutional right. Some say we have too

many parties. We have a few tens. We should say welcome
to any new party.”
Artan Hoxha,
Evening Show Prizem, Alb Screen Tv, Aired on April 30, 2012
“It is beyond doubt that ghost political parties are a
deformation of democracy because they come up mainly
for two reasons: a) just to promote their supposed leader
in order for him/her to get a mediocre administrative
seat and b) they are created by the spin of main political
parties both in the majority and in the opposition, with
the sole objective of harming the other side, something
that the current electoral code and the regional
proportional system actually favors. Their number is
scary and they operate like NGOs- centers represented
by one sole individual. This is a direct harm to democracy
because it does Not promote the coagulation of
values and the orientation of the electorate towards
philosophies, ideologies, and platforms where they would
feel represented, through their interests or even their
emotional attachments, values, etc.
There should be strong control in the matter of verifying
the signatures that apart collects in order to be registered
officially at court, but at the same time there should
be intermediary mechanisms that verify the ongoing
existence of these political parties that while occupying a
certain name, in reality they might be not functional and
have become ghost parties.”
Ilir Kalemaj
The Case of Albania

34
“I don’t believe that we can talk about a full fledged
deformation of democracy in this case, since they affect
minimally or not at all the democratic progress or regress
of a country. However, I am troubled by the sometimes
quite extensive access to power that this pseudo-parties
enjoy. I have seen a party that usually can be held
accountable for littering the walls of Albania with posters,
who have no presence whatsoever, no media, no program,
no political contribution, however it manages to remain
in a coalition with the DP throughout the years and hence
has unjustified access to power
The interpretation of law is clear. If you need 300
signatures for a party hen if the number falls under 300 it
should cease to exist. The problem is that technically this
is very hard to understand and say when and how a person
is no longer a member of a political party. If someone has
adhered in a political party X, he has to present signed
declaration that he wishes to leave the party and in most
cases this does not happen, and people continue to
remain numeric albeit fictitious members of a party. In
an effective democracy the political market makes these
parties disappear but even if they go on to exist they are
an unimportant and ignorable component regarding the
existence of a healthy democracy.”
Genci Kojdheli, law expert
35

First and foremost, I think that Albanian ghost political
parties, like as a number of other organisms and ventures
in Albania which are just as ridiculous, reflect the low level
of modernization of the society.
Second, these organizations in a way distort the very idea
of political parties, their necessity and usefulness for
the very functioning of a modern political system. This
becomes more relevant in the context of considering that
in our days, political parties, even the more serious ones,
even in the most consolidated democratic systems, are
no longer popular and attractive to citizens. The situation
is even worse in Albania, whose exposure to the political
organization of political parties is a late one and which
carries the heavy load of communist legacy.
Third, ghost political parties are an abuse with democracy,
an abuse with the freedom of the individual to contribute
in the construction and functioning of a liberal
political system and of a democracy which is base don
participation.
Last but not least the Albanian experience throughout
these years has testified that these ghost parties have
been used to distort the rules of the “democratic game.”
I think that there can be and that there should be
legal instruments to neutralize the damage that such
phenomena can cause. Here there is also a role for media
but at the very end I believe that the bets instrument is
the “refusal of the society” and this one might require
more time.
Albert Rakipi, PhD Executive Director,
Albanian Institute of International Studies

The Case of Albania
36
32. Ilir Kalemaj “Kërpudhëzimi i partive, quo vadis?” Shekulli
16/04/2012.
33. A1 Television, vox populi series with Tirana citizens “What
do you think
about he large number of political parties in Albania?” March
2012.
7. conclusion
Next year, around summertime, Albania shall hold its next
round of general Elections with many new parties that
have already entered in the arena. Media analysts are
already ridiculing the large number of political parties and
questioning their relevance to the public, since they have no
ideological programs and have very low public profiles. Ilir
Kalemaj describes the process of initializing new parties in
Albania as “mushrooming”.32)
Questioned in a series of interviews at A1 television about the
large number of political parties in Albania, one by one citizens
have expressed disappointment, skepticism and ridicule
about political parties in general emphasizing explanations
related to “personal gains”, “political maneuvers”, “dirty
politics” and “pointless establishments”.33)

37
Slowly the image of political parties in Albania and especially
small political parties (or any political party outside the 4 or
5 big well-known ones) is losing credibility and discouraging
citizens from using their civic opportunity to organize,
assemble and seek organized action for the fulfillment of
their needs and aspirations. Political parties are the main
vessels through which citizens can make their voice heard
and can act together in pursuit of common goals. In case that
the situation is unaltered the civic apathy which is at already
high levels in Albania, shall continue and deepen leaving the
area of political competing only in the hand of a skilled few
who will only use it for manipulation and personal gain as
well as in the hands of their militants.
The Case of Albania
38
8. Recommendations
For lawmakers and Electoral reform drafters
- Draft and implement regulations for clear
mechanisms that can initiate the procedure of
removing the political party status from organizations
that fall under the minimum number of embers as
designed per law. One potential way is for the CEC
to act as an informative mechanism and inform the
court where the political parties are registered (First
instance Court of Tirana) about election results and
signal those parties that fall under the new set limit

of 3000 members, as to initiate control measures.
- Define control measures , timing and al other details
that are associated with the procedure of checking
and status removal for the Court.
- Include specific provisions for the identification and
removal of structures defined here as ghost parties
from opportunities to reenter electoral processes
39
and distort results, opportunities to benefit from
media space and other public assets.
- Consider best practices from the region. The case of
Macedonia serves the example of requesting signed
declarations from party founders every four years.
for the high state Audit
- Refine regulations and empower mechanism that
audit the use of financial assets granted by state
budget to political parties as to make sure that they
correspond to the initial aim of the grant and that
the use is still relevant and unaltered.
- In case the New Electoral Code is passed in the
Parliament, adopt and prepare all implantation
and management staff capacities to the new ways
provisions about political party finances as well as
pay special attention to the control of funds and fund
use since non-Parliamentary parties will be eligible
for financial support.

The Case of Albania
40
bibliography:
Notes about some primary documents:
n An English version of the 2008 Electoral Code is available
at: http://www.cec.org.al/images/stories/eng/legjislacion/
Electoral%20Code.pdf
However the Code has been amended in 2009 and is going to
be amended again this year.
n The law on political parties is available in Albanian at: http://
www.qpz.gov.al/doc.jsp?doc=docs/Ligj%20Nr%208580%20
Dat%C3%AB%2017-02-2000.htm
However this is the original version of 2000, amendments have
be done in 2008 and in 2011.
n All results of general and local elections ca be found tabulated
in the web portal of the Central Electoral Commission of
Albania
(www.cec.org.al )
Primary Sources
(Official Gazette) Fletore Zyrtare, Ligji Nr.8580, dt. 17.2.2000,
•
“Për partitë politike”. (Law on Political Parties)

Court Documents: Political Party Registration Evidence for:•
- Partia Toleranca e Re (The New Tolerance Party)
41
- Partia per Mbrojtjen e Emigranteve (Party for the Protection
of Immigrants)
- Partia e Reformave Demokratike (Party for Democratic
Reform)
- Partia Forca Albania (Party Forca Albania)
- Partia Ora e Shqipërisë (Party: the Hour of Albania)
- Partia Demokrate për Integrim e Prosperitet (dsemocratic
Party for Integrationa nd prosperity)
- Partia Bashkimi Popullor i Pensionistëve Shqiptar (Party:
Popular Union of Albanain Pensioners)
- Partia Lëvizja Punëtore Shqiptare (Albanian Workers’
Movement)
- Partia e Çështjeve Shqiptare (Albanian Issues Party)
- Partia e Pajtimit Kombëtar (National Reconciliation Party)
Books and Articles
Bajraba, Kosta “Albania in transition: elite’s role and
perspective” •
NATO Academic Affairs Office Research project, Tirana: 1998.

Available at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/barjaba.
pdf
Cavo, Zamira “Partite ne Shqiperi, Rrezik i Madh per •
Demokracine”, Gazeta Shqip (Albanian daily), 2011-07-03.
(Also available at: http://www.gazeta-shqip.com/opinion/
c3c2e1628e1ac0ddde7b8caa6b964cbe.html )
Dyrmishi, Arjan: “Albanian Political Parties and Elections
Since •
1991”, AIIS. Tirana: 2009
Fuga, Artan: “Majtas jo djathtas” ORA Botime: Tirana, 2003•
Gerxhani Klarita, Arthur Schram: “Clintelism and Polarized •
Voting: empirical evidence” Public Choice (2009) 141, pp.305-
317
The Case of Albania
42
Jano, Dorian. “On parties and party Systems in Albania”, Social
•
Science Research Network, 04/07/2008 http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154507
Krasniqi, Afrim: “ Partite politike ne Shqiperi”, GEER, Tirana:
•
2006.
Krasniqi, Afrim “Partitë politike dhe sfidat e sigurisë”,
Alternativa •
(2006), 2: 3-28 (Lubjana).

Merkel, Wolfgang “Are dictatorships returning –Revisiting •
the democratic rollback hypothesis”, Contemporary politics,
Volume 16, nr 1, pp 17-31. March 2010. Routledge
Merkel, Wolfgang “Embedded and defective democracies”, •
Democratization, Volume 11, Nr 5. pp 33-58. December 2004
Merkel, Wolfgang and Aurel Croissant, “Good and Defective •
Democracies”, Democratization, Volume 11, Nr 5. pp 199-213.
December 2004
Toole, James: “Straddling the East West divide: Party •
organization and Communist legacies in East Central Europe”,
Europe-Asia Studies Vol.55, Nr.1, 2003, pp 101-118.(Carfax
Publishing)
Websites:
Erion Ajazi: “Partite fantazem nuk marrin as votat e anetareve”,
•
14/07/ 2011, Accessed on: http://lajme.shqiperia.com/lajme/
artikull/iden/1047074955/titulli/Partite-fantazem-nuk-marrin-
as-votat-e-anetareve
Shaban Sulce: “Rezultati i zgjedhjeve, partitë fantazma që nuk •
arritën të fitonin as 0.1% të votave” August 6, 2009. Accessed
on http://www.gazeta-albania.net/news.php?id=19338
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/•
artikel.php?ID=42093

43
Freedom newspaper: “When Ghost political Parties legitimize a
•
dictatorship” January 27, 2009. Accessed on:
http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/Homepage/tabid/36/•
mid/367/newsid367/3930/EditorialWhen-Ghost-Political-
Parties-Legitimize-A-Dictatorship/Default.aspx
http://allafrica.com/stories/200808181234.html•
Rudina Laka, Tirana Observer, http://www.tiranaobserver.•
a l / 2 0 1 1 / 1 1 / 2 1 / n e - s h q i p e r i - k a - 1 1 3 - p a r t i
- p o l i t i ke - t e -
regjistruara/
Interviews (during 2012):
Albert Rakipi PhD, Executive Director, Albanian Institute for •
International Studies, Tirana 2012.
Leonard Olli, Spokesperson from Central Election Commission,
•
Tirana 2012.
Enri Hide, Political Science and International Relations
Associate •
Professor, European University of Tirana.
Geron Kamberi, Development Issues expert (OXFAM
Albania)•
Genci Kojdheli, law expert•

Ilir Kalemaj PhD, Albanian Liberal Institute •
The Case of Albania
44
ANNEX 1
Table 1. General Election June 2009 results:
Political party Number of Votes > 0.1 %
of National Vote
Partia Aleanca e Maqedonasve 1043 0.07
për Integrim
Partia Toleranca e Re 437 0.03
Partia për Mbrojtjen e të 376 0.02
Drejtave të Emigrantëve
Partia e Gjelber 437 0.03
Partia Rruga e Lirise 1002 0.07
Partia Konservatore 1067 0.07
Partia e Reformave Demokratike 495 0.03
Partia Bashkimi Demokrat 1030 0.07
Partia Forca Albania 319 0.02

Partia e të Drejtave të Mohuara 1408 0.09
Partia Aleanca për Demokraci 1067 0.07
dhe Solidaritet
Partia Ora e Shqipërisë 786 0.05
> 0.2 %
of National Vote
Partia Demokracia e Re Europiane 2111 0.14
Lëvizja për të Drejt. e Liritë e Njeriut 2931 0.19
Summary: There is a total of 12 parties with less than 0.1
percent
of the national vote and 2 parties with less than 0.2 percent.
Note
that none of these parties reaches 3000 votes which would equal
minimum membership quota per Revised Law on Political
Parties.
(Official figures available at www.cec.org.al )
45
Table 2: Local Elections May 2011 Results
Political party Number of votes > 0.1 % of

National Vote
Partia Bashkimi Popullor i
Pensionistëve Shqiptar 523 0.03
Partia Demokrate për Integrim
e Prosperitet 74 ~ 0%
Partia e Pajtimit Kombëtar 823 0.05
Partia për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave
të Emigrantëve 860 0.05
Partia për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave
të Punëtorve të Shqipërisë 389 0.02
Partia Rruga E Lirisë 1355 0.09
Partia Toleranca e Re e Shqipërisë 700 0.04
Partia Personat me Aftësi të Kufizuar 910 0.06
Lëvizja për Drejtësi e Shqiptarëve 540 0.03
Partia e Çështjeve Shqiptare 366 0.02
Partia Kristian Demokrate e Shqipërisë 495 0.03
Partia Mendimi i Djathtë Liberal 1179 0.08
Partia Lëvizja Punëtore Shqiptare 98 0.01
> 0.1 % of
National Vote
Partia Ardhmëria Shqiptare 2503 0.16
Partia Demokratike e Bashkimit
Mysliman të Shqipërisë 1726 0.11
Partia Reformatore Demokratike 1653 0.11
Partia Aleanca e Maqedonasve
për Integrim Europian 2512 0.16
Partia Aleanca për Demokraci
dhe Solidaritet* 3062 0.19
Summary: There is a total of 13 parties with less than 0.1
percent
of the National Vote and 6 parties with less than 0.2 percent.
*Note
that only one of these parties reaches 3000 votes which would
equal

minimum membership quota per Revised Law on Political
Parties.
(Official figures available at www.cec.org.al )
The Case of Albania
46
Partia Aleanca Socialiste
e Shqiperise 499 0.04
Partia Ardhmeria Shqiptare 488 0.04
Partia e Reformave
Demokratike e Shqiperise 443 0.03
Partia Levizja Punetore
Shqiptare 393 0.03
Partia e Pajtimit Kombetar 367 0.03
Partia Social Kristiane
e Shqiperise 296 0.02
Partia Levizja Monarkiste
Demokrate Shqiptare 251 0.02
Partia Ambientaliste 158 0.01
Partia Demokratike Demokracia
e Re e Djathte Shqiptare 93 0.01
Partia Demokratike e Rinovuar 76 0.01

Partia Bashkesia Kombetare
Shqiptare 44 0.00
Partia Emigracioni Shqiptar 4 0.00
Partia Demokrate Peze
Gjirokaster e Shqiperise* 0 0.00
ANNEX 2
Local elections 2007: Results for council adviser votes
Party name Nr of votes for
council advisers
National
percentage
Source: www.cec.org.al
47
Invisible parties
for a clear victory?
Explaining the role
of the ghost parties
in the Macedonian
political system
Mišo Dokmanović, PhD

48
Mišo Dokmanović, PhD
Assistant Professor, Faculty of law, Ss. Cyril and Methodius
University, Skopje, Macedonia,
[email protected], [email protected]
www.pf.ukim.edu.mk
49
Political pluralism exists in Macedonia for
over 20 years. The country has experienced 7
parliamentary elections and as a result of that
the multi-party system has evolved over the
years with its own specifics.
The phenomenon of invisible ghost parties
existed in Macedonia for a considerable period
of time. In that direction, this paper makes an
attempt to analyze the role of the invisible,
ghost parties and their impact on election
results in the country.
A special emphasis will be put on the
case study of the Social Democratic Party
of Macedonia, its specific approach in the
parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2008 and
the lessons learned.

50
Table of contents:
Introduction .................................................................... 51
Case of the Social Democratic Party of Macedonia....... 55
Conclusion ....................................................................... 64
51
Introduction
As a result of the fall of the Berlin wall and the growing
liberal tendencies in Yugoslavia, in December 1989 the
League of communists of Macedonia has reached a decision
to introduce party pluralism in the country. The first
multiparty elections were organized in November 1990 and
since then a total of 7 parliamentary elections (1990, 1994,
1998, 2002, 2006, 2008 and 2011) were organized in the
country. Each and every parliamentary election had its own
peculiarities and specifics.
Given the fact that political pluralism has been oppressed
for over 40 years in the country an unavoidable proliferation
of political parties took place. Over 45 political parties were
established in the period from 1990 – 1994. The peak of this
process has been achieved in 2005 when over 150 political
parties have been registered in the country.
According to the current legal framework in the country,
any citizen at legal age of 18 could vote in the parliamentary
elections including the persons sentenced to imprisonment.

On the other hand, every citizen of Macedonia with a
voting right is eligible to stand as a candidate except for
52
the individuals who have been sentenced court decision
for imprisonment of at least six months or are serving a
sentence for a committed criminal offence.
A total of 123 MP’s are elected to serve a four year term
in the Macedonian parliament. In that direction, 120 MPs
are elected according to the proportional representation
system from six electoral districts and one MP is elected from
each of the newly established out of the country electoral
districts in Europe and Africa, North and South America,
and Australia and Asia. The six electoral districts are roughly
based on geography, but shaped according to the number of
voters so that each district holds roughly the same amount
of registered voters.
The legal status of the political parties in the country
is regulated by the Law on political parties.1) At least 1000
citizens could form a political party in Macedonia. The
number of the party founding members used to be 500 and
the number has been increased with the changes of the
Law on the Political parties adopted in 2007.2) In 2008 the
provisions of this part of the law were further expanded by
the obligation of the political parties to submit authorized
statements of their founding members every four years.3)
1. Law on Changes and Amendment of the Law on Political
Parties. (Official
Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 76/2004), art. 1.

Parties. (Official
Parties. (Official
Explaining the role of the ghost parties in Macedonia
53
However the number of registered political parties remained
high. According to the data from the Political Party Court
Registry in Skopje, the number of registered political parties
in Macedonia in 2011 was 55. Besides that, there were 24
political parties whose registration was not harmonized with
the provisions of the 2008 law on the changes (1000 voters).4)
Since 2006 the ruling party in Macedonia is the Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic
Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO - DPMNE). The
main opposition party is the Social Democratic Union of
Macedonia (SDSM).
The parliamentary elections in Macedonia in the last
decade demonstrated that the invisible ghost parties could
also have a significant influence on the election results. In
that direction, unmistakable evidence has established the
fact that indivisible parties can affect the distribution of the
seats in the Parliament.
Given the fact that a relatively big number of political
parties have been registered in the country, a practice has
been established that both leading ruling and opposition

parties form large coalitions for the parliamentary elections.
The majority of the parties participating in the coalition
could fit the definition of invisible – ghost parties (registered
political parties with small number of members, without
4. Transparency Macedonia, (2011) First Periodical Report.
Transparency in
Political Party Financing. Skopje, Pp.36-40.
54
infrastructure and party activities and in some cases with
strong family ties).
The number of the political parties which were members
of the pre-election coalition had a tendency of increase in
the last decade. In that direction, during the parliamentary
elections in 2006 the coalition of VMRO – DPMNE was
composed of 14 political parties and the coalition of SDSM –
8 political parties. The number of political parties – members
of the large pre-election coalition further increased in the
next elections. The pre-election coalition of VMRO –DPMNE
in 2008 was composed of 19 members. Finally, during the
last parliamentary elections held in 2011, the governmental
parties created a large coalition of 22 political parties while
15 parties took part in the opposition block.
As a result of the presented statistics, it could be
concluded that invisible parties can make a difference in
the overall election results. It seems that the affect of the

invisible –ghost parties is even stronger in smaller countries
with lower number of voters and large diaspora such as
Macedonia. The case of the pre-election large coalitions in
Macedonia demonstrates that the biggest political parties
are strongly interested in attracting more and more ghost
parties in their coalitions. Thus, the explanation for this
approach is simple: if the ghost parties in Macedonia were
not useful, the politicians would not exploit them.
55
Case of the Social Democratic
party of macedonia
One of the most illustrative example of ghost invisible
parties practice in the country occurred during the
parliamentary elections in 2006. The example established
during these parliamentary elections strongly supports the
assumption that ghost parties under certain conditions
could have an impact on the election results.
As a part of the analysis of the ghost party role in
Macedonia I have focused on a specific case. As a result of
that I will analyze the election results on the parliamentary
elections in 2006 and the role played by the Social Democratic
Party of Macedonia (SDPM).
SDPM is a political party that fits the framework of a
standard invisible party. It does not have a visible party
infrastructure, activities or election program. However, the
party participates in the elections with own list of candidates
in the last 15 years.

Although SDPM is one of the oldest political parties in
the country, it has not made any significant result. It has not
won a parliamentary seat so far. In general, based on the
provisions of the political program, its political orientation
could be characterized as leftwing. It is also important to
56
emphasize that the name and abbreviation of the party is
very similar to SDSM - the second biggest political party in
the country.
2006 Parliamentary Elections in Macedonia5)
Political
Party Electoral district 3
Nikola Popovski
Nikola Popovski
Electoral district 5
Ilinka Mitreva
Ilinka Mitevska
Name and surname of the candidates
SDSM

SDPM
5. State Electoral Commission. (2006). Final results of the
Parliamentary
elections in 2006. Available at: http://www.sec.mk/arhiva/2006_
parlamentarni/Rezultati_poIE_konecni.pdf. [Accessed on 15
April 2012].
During the parliamentary election in 2006 the SDPM
has decided to nominate persons as lead candidates of the
party lists that had the same name and surname with the
candidates of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
(SDSM), the leading governmental party at the time of
elections. In that direction, it should be underlined that
the name and surname of the candidates of the leading
governmental party SDSM and the “ghost party” SDPM in
the electoral district 3 were the same – Nikola Popovski. At
the same time, the name and surname of the frontrunner
of the lists of both parties were almost identical – Ilinka
Mitreva for SDSM and Ilinka Mitevska for SDPM.
57
As a result of the similar party names and the almost
identical names of the party lead candidates, SDPM has
scored considerably better results than in the other electoral
districts. SDPM party score in electoral district 1, 2, 4 and
6 was at average level of 507 votes. On the other hand, in
the districts were the party had selected frontrunners with
almost identical names with the ruling party’ candidates
(electoral district 3 and 5) SDPM scored an average of 3098
votes.

Further analysis of this new emerging feature of the
Macedonian political systems has demonstrated that this
approach of the SDPM has not been limited to the number
of votes won only. In that direction, it should be emphasized
that this election score of SDPM has also affected the
distribution of the MP mandates in these two electoral
districts.
2006 Parliamentary Elections Results of SDPM by
electoral districts 6)
District 1 2 3 4 5 6
Votes 306 691 3564 775 2632 258
6. State Electoral Commission. (2006). Final results of the
Parliamentary
elections in 2006. Available at: http://www.sec.mk/arhiva/2006_
parlamentarni/Rezultati_poIE_konecni.pdf. [Accessed on 15
April 2012].
58
Given the fact that 20 mandates in each electoral district
are distributed according to the standard D’Hondt formula,
according to the final results the ruling party SDSM won 7
seats in the electoral district 3 and 6 seats in the electoral
district 5. However, if we added the surplus of the average
votes won by the SDPM in the other electoral districts, we
come to the conclusion that in the both cases, SDSM would
have won an additional seat in the parliament.

In other words, the confusion created with the identity
of the candidates has influenced the final results and as a
result of that SDSM, at the time ruling party in the country,
has lost two parliamentary seats in 2006.
This approach represented a new political phenomenon
in the country as it occurred for the first time. However, this
specific approach did not decide about the winner and loser
in the elections as it was limited to the distribution of few
mandates only.
Parliamentary elections 2006 -Number of votes for the
parties that won a seat in the Parliament
District 3
15311
12338
70202
47063
District 5
10997
9071
55657
37412
Party

VMRO-NP
NSDP
VMRO-DPMNE
SDSM
59
Another important feature related to the ghost parties
represents the old political theory notion that the parties
are not useful for democracies only but for the politicians
as well. In many countries, such as a Macedonia, political
parties control career and employment opportunities. This
concept was applied in the SDPM case as well given the fact
that after the elections and the formation of new rightwing
government, its president has been appointed as CEO of a
public enterprise.
Nevertheless, the 2006 parliamentary elections were
not the end of the SDPM approach. On the contrary, SDPM
approach was further developed during the 2008 early
parliamentary elections. The main reason for the dissolution
of the Parliament and organization of early parliamentary
elections represented the outcome of the NATO summit
in Bucharest. Macedonia was not extended a membership
invitation due to the existing outstanding issues with Greece
that resulted in early parliamentary elections held in June

2008. The elections were organized in order to avoid creation
of a political crisis in the country.
During 2008 elections, SDPM again decided to nominate
candidates with almost identical names with SDSM, the
leading opposition party in the country. However, this
specific approach in the parliamentary elections in 2006 was
expanded and consequently SDPM has selected candidates
with almost identical names and surname with opposition
lead candidates in 5 out of 6 electoral districts.
60
The table below shows the similarity in the identities of
the lead candidates of both parties.
name and surname of the candidates
(Parliamentary elections 2008) 7)
District 1
Radmila
Shekjerinska
Rada
Shekjerovska
District 2
Jovan
Manasijevski

Jovan
Manchevski
District 4
Zoran
Zasev
Zoran
Zasev
District 5
Jani
Makraduli
Janis
Makris
District 6
Igor
Ivanovski
Igor
Ivanovski
Political
Party
SDSM
SDPM
According to Utrinski newspaper the act of election

of twin candidates had the sole purpose to confuse SDSM
voters.8) Besides that, several TV stations have attempted to
interview the candidates of the SDPM, but in most cases,
when addressed, the candidates were not aware that
they were selected as lead candidates or declined media
interviews.
Given the fact that this approach of the SDPM
represented a clear manipulation of the election process,
the leading opposition party SDSM has filed a complaint to
the State Electoral Commission (SEC) against the registration
7. State Electoral Commission (2008). Early Parliamentary
Election 2008
– List of candidates. Available at:
http://www.sec.mk/arhiva/2008_
predvremeniparlamentarni/index/listinakandidati.htm.
[Accessed on 16
May 2012].
8. Utrinski Newspaper, 4 May 2008. Twins to Confuse SDSM
voters. Available
at:
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=CFFEFAF8FE0BE34D9D
83B52A31
5ED2B6. [Accessed on 21 May 2012].
61
of SDPM candidate list. As a result of that this approach
of SDPM became one of the main issues discussed during
the candidate registration and campaign period of the

elections.
However, while regarding SDPM’s candidate list
was perceived as an attempt to confuse voters, the SEC
concluded that the Election Code did not provide grounds
for its rejection. Consequently, SDSM filed an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Macedonia. The Supreme Court has
dismissed the appeal on the grounds that “there was no
explicit right to such an appeal in the Election Code”.
The information that some of the candidates had not
been consented to be nominated was further investigated
by the Public Prosecutor office in Skopje. In that direction,
the Prosecutors office has requested from the police to
obtain information from the SDPM candidates. Given the
fact that no such information was received before Election
Day, the Skopje Prosecutor concluded that the candidates
in question had agreed to their candidacy. This incident has
been mentioned in the OSCE Election Observation Mission
Final Report.9)
Having in mind that the selection of lead candidates
of SDPM during the parliamentary elections in 2006 has
9. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
(2008). Early
Parliamentary Elections – 1 June 2008 – Election Observation
Mission
Final Report. Available at
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/33153.
[Accessed on 11 May 2012].

62
affected the election results, I have further explored whether
this was the case with the parliamentary elections in 2008.
SDPM has won votes ranging from 465 – 1816 votes in the
six electoral districts in Macedonia. In that direction, after
the comparison of SDPM election results and the elections
results of the political parties that won a seat in the
parliament, a conclusion could be reached that the SDPM
votes did not affect the distribution of the seats in any of
the electoral districts in Macedonia in this parliamentary
election.
results of sdpm in the electoral districts
(Parliamentary elections 2008) 10)
District 1 2 3 4 5 6
Votes 1816 1203 1029 1300 593 465
10. State Electoral Commission (2008). Early Parliamentary
Election
2008 – Final Results by Electoral Districts.
Availableat:http://www.
sec.mk/arhiva/2008_predvremeniparlamentarni/fajlovi/rez_kone
cni/
Konecni03072008poIE.pdf.[Accessed on 18 May 2012].
It should not be forgotten that to a large extent this
outcome was due to the efforts of the leading opposition
party to prevent the events that occurred in 2006 when a
considerable number of its voters were misleaded with the
identity of the lead candidates. In other words, during the
campaign SDSM was unavoidably forced to concentrate its
energy and time to the complaint and appeal proceedings as
well as to voters’ education in order not to make the same

mistake again.
63
Finally, we come to the latest parliamentary elections
in Macedonia which were held in 2011. During this latest
election process SDPM decided not to select candidates with
similar identities with lead candidates of the opposition as it
was in previous elections. Once more the party did not win
any seats in the Parliament.
However, two new recently founded ghost parties
participated in the parliamentary elections: Democratic
Right (DR) and Social Democratic Union (SDU). Although
the both party lists did not include similar names of the
leading opposition party, it seems that the main reason for
their establishment was a government attempt to attract
oppositions voters, both rightwing and leftwing in the
Macedonian political arena.
It is obvious that the notion that “parties are useful for
politicians not only for democracies” prove to be true in this
case as well. Couple of months after the end of the elections,
the president of the Democratic Right Party, Filip Petrovski,
announced that the party will unite with the ruling party
VMRO – DPMNE.11) One month later, he was appointed Vice
President of the Managing Board of the State Lottery of
Macedonia.12) At the same time, the President of the Social
Democratic Union, Lazar Elenovski, has been nominated to
serve as Macedonian Ambassador to Brussels although SDU
claimed to be an opposition party.

11.
http://www.time.mk/read/4b57b1d524/bbe160a441/index.html
12.
http://www.vest.com.mk/?ItemID=BE279FD25403704B88F1C3
7012B94800
&arc=1
64
Finally, I have also examined the results of 2011
parliamentary elections, the number of votes won by these
two parties and the key issue – whether their results has
affected the distribution of the seats in the electoral districts
across the country. However, it could be concluded that
both political parties did not make any significant result in
the election. The votes won for DR ranged from 0, 08 – 0,
30% of the votes won in the electoral district and for SDU
from 0,10 – 0.31% of the votes. As a result of that, the two
political parties did not affect the distribution of the seats in
the parliament.
conclusions
Having in mind the issues raised in the paper, several
conclusions about the role of the ghost parties in Macedonian
political system could be reached.
Firstly, it is evident that invisible ghost parties exist in

the Macedonian political system. Their establishment was
conditioned by the long period of the one-party system
in the country as well as the specifics of the post-socialist
political system. As a result of that currently there is a
significant number of invisible ghost parties in the country.
The tendency of their continuous growth which culminated
in 2005 was limited in the last several years by the legal
provision requiring a minimum of 1000 founding members.
The main features of the invisible parties include their
65
absence from the public life, lack of party infrastructure
and political activities and membership around the legal
minimum. Besides that, it seems that in some cases family
or other similar relations may be crucial for the party
organization.
Secondly, it seems that in the last decade there is a
growing willingness of both leading and invisible parties for
pre-election coalition. In many cases, the political orientation
did not play a role in the coalition. However, when winning
the elections, political leaders of the ghost parties have been
offered lower executive positions within the government.
Based on the presented statistics, the rising number
of invisible party coalition members suggests that their
participation is important in the final score. Another
important factor in the rising role of invisible parties is the
fact that Macedonia has a small voting body and high level
of migrations abroad. Consequently, this strengthens the
position of the invisible parties especially in respect of the

distribution of mandates based on the D’Hondt formula.
Thirdly, there are examples in the country when invisible
political parties were formed just to serve one election only.
After the finalization of the elections, a considerable number
of the small ghost parties have joined or united with the
main ruling party. This approach represents a misleading of
the voters.
66
Finally, the example of the case of the Social Democratic
Party of Macedonia during the parliamentary elections in
2006 and 2008 represent one of the most vivid approaches
for manipulation of voters. The legal and judicial system did
not have a legal mechanism at disposal to address this issue
efficiently. Besides that, it seems that further debate in the
Macedonian society concerning the legal minimum of party
founding members should be encouraged. The potential
increase of the legal minimum could be identified as an
instrument for reduction of the effect of ghost parties in
the political system. As a result of that further efforts in this
direction to should be justified.
67
Small and

Ghost Political
Parties in Kosova
Adnan Ahmeti
May 2012, Prishtina
68
Table of contents:
List of abbreviations .........................................................69
Introduction .................................................................... 70
Legal background ............................................................ 72
Small Political Parties .......................................................73
Profile ............................................................................... 76
Representation of small political parties at
the Assembly of Kosovo ................................................77
Political Parties under the election threshold ..................80
“Ghost” or just small political parties ..............................82
Conclusion ....................................................................... 83
List of Interviews ............................................................. 85
Literature ......................................................................... 86
69
List of Abbreviations
ADK Alternativa Demokratike e Kosoves
(Kosovo Democratic Alternative)

AKR Aleanca per Kosoven e Re (Alliance for
New Kosovo)
BK Balli Kombetar (National Front)
BD Bashkimi Demokratik (Democratic Union)
BPP Big Political Parties
CEC Central Election Commission of Kosovo
KDI Kosovo Democratic Institute
KIPRED Kosovo Institute for Policy Research
and Development
LB Levizja per Bashkim (Movement for Union)
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo
PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo
PREK Partia e Re e Kosoves (Kosovo New Party)
PQLK Partia Qendra Liberale e Kosoves
(Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo)
SPP Small Political Parties
70
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of small

political parties on democracy-building process in Kosovo.
I tried to make the difference between small political
parties and the parties as are called in political vocabulary
“Ghost Political Parties” 1). Small parties are indispensable
for democracy-building process or creating the basis for
democracy in an area that never experienced before the
democratic regime, and in no way they should be seen as
a single conglomerate. As you will see below, many SPPs
contribute a lot to the democracy and political landscape
of Kosovo.
Political parties are the engine of every democratic
endeavours, or better saying “the democracy is unimaginable
1. This term is borrowed from political parlance and it means
that “‘ghost
political parties’ are those political parties with dubious
membership
as questioned by their results in the elections (less votes than
minimum
number of members as required by law), little or no public
presence in
media and often not-to-be found headquarters/web pages/
leaders as well
as some other criteria.]”
Small and Ghost Political Parties in Kosova
71
without the existence of political parties”2). Therefore,
not only big political parties play or shall play a significant
role in emerging democracies, but also the small political
parties shall be very vigilant and proactive for promotion

of democracy and democratic values, and at the same time
not to allow the presence of hegemony of big parties3). This
is very true especially in case of Kosovo, as an emerging
democracy.
Small political parties in Kosovo are striving for their place
in the political landscape. For an emerging democracy
their existence and activism will be of crucial significance,
because they will enrich the political life. Therefore, for
Kosovo as an emerging democracy existence of well-placed
and profiled small political parties will mean a balanced
political landscape.
I have undertaken several interviews with political
figures, political analysts, media people and head of civil
organizations that deal with politics in Kosovo. I tried this
information to illustrate with some numbers from last
central elections in Kosovo and some small comparisons
with regional countries.
2. Diamond, Larry and Gunther, Richard: As Kopecky´ (1995:
516) has
observed for the Czech Republic, ‘a conception of democracy
prevailing
among the designers of the emerging democracies seems to be
one in
which political parties are the core foundation of the democratic
political
system.’ Larry Diamond: Political Parties in New Democracies
pg.1
3. Interview with Mr. Daut Maloku, President of PGJK, May
2012.

72
legal background
Legislative framework that regulates the field of political
parties and their activity is one of the areas highly criticized
by many in Kosovo. Currently there are under discussion the
Law on Electoral Reform and Law on Financing of Political
Parties.
Current setup of regulative base is Law on General Elections
and Law on Local Elections.4) Also, the Regulation for
Registration and Certification of Political Parties at CEC is
the legal instrument dealing with this area. Both above-
mentioned laws also regulate the financial sources of the
political parties. After 1999 until 2008 the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe’ Mission in Kosovo was
in charge of election process in Kosovo and it run the CEC5)
and before the independence political parties in Kosovo
operated under UNMIK Regulation.6)
Actually, the Law on General Elections, Article 12 (j),
stipulates that a political part for registration needs ‘name
and address of at least 500 party members who are residing
in Kosovo and who are found on the Kosovo Voters List’ 7).
This number is hardly to be met by several PPs existing in
4. KDI, Legislation and Practices the Financing of Political
Parties - Kosovo
2011; www.kdi-kosovo.org
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Law on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo.
www.kuvendikosoves.

org
73
the political landscape of Kosovo, and given that they are
not so active, they can be very easily classified as ‘ghost’
political parties.
It is of great importance to regulate this field very important
for fragile or emerging democracies. Upon establishment
of any new political party the above criteria of 500 party
members is very tricky. It happens that members of one
party are at the same time are affiliated to another. This is
so due to the fact that there is no check of list of names
when a certain party applies for registration at the Central
Election Commission of Kosovo - Office for Registration and
Certification of Political Parties. As a consequence, Kosovo
has a big number and variety of small political parties against
its number of population, which are not active. There shall
be a checking instrument that will clear out those names
overlapping in lists of different political parties in regard to
meet this criteria for registration.
Small Political Parties
Political parties in general still face many problems regarding
their functioning, internal democracy and communicating
with citizens and political development of comprehensive
programs. According to one of CEC officials, small political
parties organize their conventions only to meet the criteria
for continuing registration and those are usually a formality.
The main reasons why people vote for a political party are

regional and personal preferences instead of programs that
74
offer these parties. This is valid for both small and political
parties. Even that some of interviewees said that small
political parties in Kosovo are not all about the leaders, the
reality shows something else.
Many small parties that exist in today’s political scene are
established by the people who did not agree with or could
not find an appropriate position in their original parties.
However, in last decade emerged some political parties with
a promising attitude, but they are not any more active in
politics. These are especially Reformist Party ORA 8) and FER,
while some other small parties left no trace during their short
life in political landscape of Kosovo (PREK, PQLK...) During
the existence of ORA as a parliamentary party the discussion
at the Assembly of Kosovo was much more streamlined
and structured and richer. Also, the opposition of that time
was much stronger with ORA. But after failing to pass the
election threshold of 5% in Election 2007 they merged into
LDK. 9) While FER after gaining no votes sufficient to pass
the threshold merged into Vetevendosje, which according
to many interviewees was a wrong move.
Since Kosovo still operates as a single electorate district,
this stifles the development and progress of political
parties.10) Creation of more electoral districts with
8. “A Power Prime” – a handbook to politics, people and parties
in Kosovo,

pages 48, 49, 50. Kosovo Stability Initiative. www.iksweb.org
9. Ibid.
10. Interview with Leon Malazogu, ED, Democracy for
Development.
75
combined Proportional Representation will ensure also
better representation of certain regions or towns of Kosovo
that are currently underrepresented.11) At the same time,
more electoral districts will enable political parties to
compete in more wider geographic zones, and spread their
constituencies.12)
Small parties in Kosovo are more or less the reflection of
big parties, with some different features. Also, as BPPSs, all
small political parties are characterized by ethnic structure
and they lack membership from mixed nationalities.
One of reasons for this is that given the context of the
country they still do not dare to identify themselves based
on political ideology, and the patriotic sentiment is still
strong among both majority and minority political parties.
There were some initiatives to bring together people of
different ethnicities under one political subject, but the
failure in last elections was drastic and gained almost no
vote. When it comes to the transparency and corruption,
there is no difference between small and political parties.
They are equally corrupted as the big parties.13)
Regarding their activism, it depends on how much they are

close to the power. The closer to power, the more active
Development
Development
13. Based on the report of the Global Corruption Barometer
perceptions 2009
by Transparency International, the most corrupt institutions are
political
parties in Kosovo [Balkan Policy Institute -
http://policyinstitute.eu/alb/
areas/political_parties_and_elections/]
76
and more stable they are. Far away from the power their
existence increasingly is being called into question.
Profile
Small political parties in Kosovo are not grass-root parties14),
but they are parties more based on the cult of personality
of the leader – personalistic parties15). However, few of
them are well-structured in terms of their ideology and
programmes, but when it comes to run for power they forget
their ideology and programme and become part of coalition
to run for elections or part of government only according to
the slice of pie they get.
Profiling of political parties based on their ideological
orientation is not only a challenge for small political parties

but for the whole political scene in Kosovo. 16) Since even
the big political parties are characterized by poor internal
organization, lack of internal democracy, the undisputed
power of the leader, the marginal role of youth and women
within the structures of Parties, this makes it even more
difficult for the small political parties, because in order to
14. Interview with Jeton Zulfaj, Executive Director of NGO
Celnaja
15. Diamond, Larry and Gunther, Richard. “The most purely
electoralist party
is what we call the personalistic party (named the “non-partisan
party” by
Piero Ignazi), since its only rationale is to provide a vehicle for
the leader to
win an election and exercise power”. Political Parties and
Democracy, page
28, pp2.
16. Driton Selmanaj, Program Manager, KDI,
77
survive they are inclined to opportunism and conformism
with the major political parties by sacrificing even their
programs and ideologies upon which they are established.
And they have no approach to certain problems based on
their ideology. 17)
Representation of (small) political parties
at the Kosovo Assembly

Kosovo uses a proportional open list system. In Parliamentary
Elections that took place in 2010 for 100 seats competed
26 political parties and 3 coalitions.18) In Kosovo Assembly
entered the coalition run by AKR which was composed by
another six small political parties. This coalition currently
is part of the Government which is run by PDK and
consisted of some minority parties, and it is considered to
be unnatural coalition since we have parties with different
ideologies and programs on it.19) Nevertheless, this is the
first government after the war which is not established by
three big parties.20)
17. Interview with Ilir Deda, Executive Director, KIPRED
18. KIPRED, Kosovo National Elections 2010: Overview and
Trends, page12.
www.kipred.org
19. Interview with Daut Maloku, President of PGJK (Kosovo
Green Party), May
2012.
20. Kosovo Stability Initiative. In 2001, 2004 and 2007
Kosovo’s governments
were all coalitions which were made as a result of a deal
between two of
the three big parties. This changed in 2010 however when the
PDK formed
a coalition with the smaller Albanian and minority parties.
Before the poll
78

The Kosovo Constitution has guaranteed 20 seats for minority
parties, and this resulted in creation of many political parties
among the minorities, and compared to Albanian majority
they can be considered small political parties, but in their own
community they are more or less of the same size and the
definition of small political parties in that sense is
irrelevant.21)
Plus the threshold for minorities is 1%, thus making very easily
for them to get elected for the Assembly.22)
SPPs are more voted in urban areas than in rural ones, and
also in the local level some SPPs that could not manage to
pas the threshold of 5% at the central level, here they gained
enough votes to be part of municipal governments.
As one can see from the table below, in total all SPPs,
including the coalition composed of 7 parties gained in total
11.6%, which according to the percentage of biggest party
– PDK with 32.11%, is not so huge difference. Regarding the
minority political parties, the picture is very interesting – 22
political parties and initiatives with only 7.87% of votes and
with 25 mandates at the Assembly of Kosovo. This is positive
discrimination action of the democracy which is a good
the PDK had struck a pre-election pact with Edita Tahiri’s ADK
and Bajram
Kosumi’s PPK. Afterwards it built a coalition with the support
of the Turkish
minority party, the KTDP, the Serbian SLS and with the AKR.
The AKR had
in turn entered the election together with the PD, the PSD, the
PGJK, the
PNDSH, the PPK, the PPI, and the economic expert group E15.
The AAK had
a pre-election alliance with the Lista Ibrahim Rugova led by

Ukë Rugova.
Afterwards Rugova broke that agreement to enter into
government with
the PDK”. A Power Prime, page 62. www.iks.org
21. Interview with Ismet Kryeziu, Executive Director, KDI,
May 2012.
22. KIPRED, Kosovo Electoral System,2011, page 9, pp. 4.
79
feature for Kosovo, as post-conflict and post-communist
country.23)
23. Interview with Jeton Zulfaj, NGO Celnaja
Table 1: Results of 2010 Elections for Kosovo Assembly
Name of the party Percentage of votes Number of
mandates
PDK 32.11 % 34
LDK 24.69 % 27
VETËVENDOSJE! 12.69 % 14
AAK 11.04 % 12
Coalition AKR-PD-PSD-
PPI-PPK-PNDSH-PGJK 7.29 % 9
FER 2.17% 0
LDD 2.14 % 0
SLS* 2.05 % 8
KDTP* 1.22 % 3
JSL* 0.86 % 4
VAKAT* 0.76 % 2
PDAK* 0.41 % 1

NDS* 0.35 % 1
BSDAK* 0.26 % 1
IRDK* 0.24 % 1
SDA* 0.23 % 0
PAI* 0.20 % 1
KTB* 0.20 % 0
LEK* 0.14 % 0
SDSKIM* 0.14 % 1
SDS* 0.12 % 0
GIG* 0.11 % 1
CDS* 0.11 % 0
SNS* 0.11 % 0
PREBK* 0.10 % 1
SDSGP* 0.09 % 0
SKMS* 0.07 % 0
SNSD* 0.07 % 0
GIKN* 0.03 % 0
Source: Central Election Commission of Kosovo
Note: *These are political parties belonging to minorities
80
Political parties under the election
threshold
The number of small political parties in Kosovo that could not
reach the threshold for parliament has varied greatly since
first local election in 2000. While the three main political
parties maintained more or less their level of votes,24) this
cannot be said for small political parties. In local elections
in 2000, in addition to the above parties, no other political
party gained more than 1 percent of casted votes.25) But

in last central electoral elections in 2010 small political
parties managed to break through and increased steadily
their number of votes, even that some of them still did not
pass the threshold of 5 percent. As noted above, some of
them are part of government coalition and run ministerial
portfolios.
Whereas, countries in the region apply also different
electoral threshold – Albania 3% for parties and 5 % for
coalitions, Croatia 5%, Slovenia 4%26), Serbia 5%,27) whereas
Macedonia has no threshold, there are current discussions
and suggestion in Kosovo to reduce this to 3%.
24. Kosovo Stability Initiative, “A Power Prime” – a handbook
to politics, people
and parties in Kosovo; page 56, pp.2; www.iksweb.org
25. Ibid.
26. KIPRED, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems in South-
East Europe, page
7.
27. Election Guide, www.
http://electionguide.org/country.php?ID=242
81
One of the overarching remarks during the interviews and
noted in many research papers about the political landscape
and elections in Kosovo is that the threshold of 5% is too high.
This is preventing many small political parties to promote
their ideas, concepts and stay behind their programmes,

because simply they cannot become of the power structures,
and after taking part in one cycle of elections they stop being
active or cease to exist. Proposal by many civil organizations,
think tank organizations,28) analysts and political parties is to
reduce this into 3% or as the Kosovo Democratic Institute
proposes – 3 % for political parties and 5 % for coalitions.29)
Thus based on the above table the number of political parties
under the threshold is not so huge at the central level, while
at the local level small political parties find much easier to
get elected because there is no threshold. They contribute
more to democracy at the local level with their activism,
ideas, proposals and solutions.30)
28. KIPRED, “One of the arguments to the amendment of
election threshold is
that a natural threshold—1%, equivalent to 4000-8000—
encourages the
participation of smaller parties and independent candidates. The
current
threshold of 5% favours large parties and eliminates the
opportunity
for local civic and regional initiatives. Establishing the natural
election
threshold would allow smaller parties to concentrate in election
districts
where they assess they have bigger support in winning
mandates. At the
same time it would allow bigger parties with a national reach to
compete
in all districts simultaneously in order to secure as many
mandates as
possible.” Kosovo Electoral System Review, Policy Brief,
2012/01, page 31.
29. Interview with Driton Selmanaj, Program Manager, KDI.

30. Faton Peci Counsellor at the Municipal Assembly of
Mitrovica stated that
the opposition at this Municipal Assembly comes actively from
a voice of
a small political party member, and he also noted the same can
be said for
other municipal assemblies.
82
Perhaps, this high threshold for democracy in Kosovo is
killing the raise of new parties that could enrich the political
spectrum in Kosovo and who will have no burden behind
them.
“Ghost” or just small political parties
Currently at the Register of Political Parties in Kosovo figure
51 political parties31). For our research I have analysed 16
small political parties from Albanian Majority. Only 5 out of
this number have no website and it was difficult to find their
programmes or structure. I find it pretty odd that among
these “ghost” parties is the ADK of Edita Tahiri, who is a
Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo and the Head of Kosovo
Delegation for talks with Serbia. But, even for those parties
that appear to have website, their structure and leadership
is not so clear and information about them is blurred.
Many of the above criteria for Ghost Parties are attributable
to small parties in Kosovo. In spite of having difficulties with
funds, nobody can excuse them for being so inactive in an
emerging democracy with so many problems and issues

like Kosovo. Until 2007 their justification for dealing with so
narrow scope of activities was struggle for independence,
and somehow this justified them in the eye of public. But
after 2007 their mission should be shifted towards the
31. CEC, Register of Political Parties, www.kqz-ks.org
83
overarching problems of our society. Maybe, this is the
reason why they still are not so active. Simply, it seems that
they were not prepared for new path of democracy after
declaring the independence.
conclusions
Based on undertaken interviews and the observation of
political spectrum in Kosovo, the impact of SPPs is not
satisfactory at all, at least in the central level. While at the local
level several small parties are part of the local governments,
and they contribute more to the political spectrum at this
level with their ideas, concepts and governance.
Most of the small political parties in Kosovo today are run by
the people who before establishing their party were affiliated
to some another party and due to disputes with the leaders
or having no room to stand at the spotlight decided to leave
and establish their own political parties. This fact shows that
these parties are more ‘personalistic parties’ as highlighted
above or parties of the leaders and do not rely so much on
program or political ideology.
Another factor why the SPPs are not so active is that the

media in Kosovo is controlled by big parties and there is no
room for manoeuvre of small parties, and if we add to this
that the small political parties have no sufficient funding,
it makes even harder for them to compete with their ideas
versus big parties that are very active in media.
84
As a bottom line, development and activism of small political
parties will depend pretty much on electoral threshold,
which is expected to go down to 3%, and creation of electoral
districts in Kosovo that is believed will allow for more SPPs
to increase their geographic representation and gain more
votes than they currently do. Also, they have to stand behind
their programmes and ideologies and match that with the
real problems faced by Kosovar society (i.e. in a country that
is mainly agriculture country there is no party that protects
and promotes interest of farmers, or since pollution and
environmental issues are so acute here, we have two green
parties that are not active at all).
85
List of interviews
Jeton Zulfaj, Executive Director, NGO Celnaja1.
Ramush Tahiri, Political Analyst - Adviser to the President 2.

of Kosovo
Besa Luzha, Deputy Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 3.
Kosovo
Astrit Gashi, Editor in Chief, daily “Zeri”4.
Ilir Deda, Executive Director, KIPRED, (one of leaders of 5.
political party “Fryma e Re” that merged into Vetevendojse
after 2010 Elections )
Nol Kristaj, Officer for PR, PNDSH6.
Ismet Kryeziu, Executive Director, KDI7.
Leon Malazogu, Executive Director, Democracy for 8.
Development
Gjergj Deaj, President of PLK9.
Driton Selmanaj, Program Manager, KDI10.
Faton Peci, Municipal Counsellor at the Municipal 11.
Assembly of Mitrovica.
86
Literature
Diamond, Larry and Gunther, Richard. (2001). Political •
Parties and Democracy. (The John Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore and London).
Lewis, Paul G., Political Parties in Post-Communist •

Eastern Europe, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group
London and New York, 2000.
Heywood, Andrew (1997). Politics. (Palgrave •
Foundations, New York)
KIPRED, www.kipred.org •
Kosovo Democratic Institute. www.kdi-kosova.org•
OSCE Mission in Kosovo. www.osce.org/kosovo•
Instruction no. 1 Dated 11.04.2019 Instruction time 12:00 hrs
On the procedure of checking and verification of political
parties and election campaign financing and
expenditure
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION
INSTRUCTION
ON THE PROCEDURE OF CHECKING AND VERIFICATION
OF POLITICAL PARTIES
AND ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND
EXPENDITURE

The Central Election Commission, pursuant to Article 21, item
1, Article 23, item 1, letter
"b" of the law no. 10019, dated 29.12.2008 "Electoral Code of
the Republic of Albania", as
amended and article 15/2 of the law no. 8580, dated 17.02.2000
"On Political Parties", as
amended,
INSTRUCTS:
Part I
GENERAL PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Article 1
This instruction aims to:
a) establish specific rules for filing, publishing, checking and
verifying financial reports filed
by political parties and / or electoral subjects, legal auditors and
financial experts, related to
annual financial reports of political parties or election campaign
financing;
b) administration and review of information, claims, proposals,
complaints or charges filed
to the CEC by third parties related to election campaign funding
or financial reports of
political parties;
c) establishing the criteria to be applied in calculation of
sanctions for electoral subjects.

Artice 2
Deadlines for the delivery of reports
1. Political parties should make their Annual Financial Report
public and submit it to CEC no
later than March 31 of each year.
expenditure
2. The legal auditor, contracted by the CEC to audit the funds
received and spent by political
parties during the calendar year, should file the audit report in
the Central Election
Commission, also in electronic format, within 30 days after
signing the contract.
3. Political parties that are registered with the CEC as electoral
subjects should make public
and submit to the CEC the Election Campaign Report no later
than 60 days from the
announcement of the final election result.
4. The financial expert, contracted by the CEC to monitor the
expenses incurred by the
political parties during the electoral campaign, must file with
Commission a monitoring report no later than 4 months from the
date of the announcement

of the election results, also in electronic format.
5. The legal auditor, contracted by the CEC to audit the funds
parties during the election campaign, must submit to the Central
Election Commission also
in electronic format, the audit report no later than 20 days from
the submission of the
report monitoring.
Article 3
Publication of Reports
The Central Election Commission publishes on its official
website the annual financial report,
the legal auditor report on annual funds and election campaign
funds, the election campaign
financial report, the campaign monitoring report by the
financial experts, no later than 10
days after they are filed.
Article 4
Preliminary check
1. The CEC administration carries out preliminary check and, as
a rule, no later than 5 days
from the submission of the annual financial report or the
campaign report, notifies the
electoral subject about the shortcomings that are found.
2. The scope of the preliminary Check of financial reports is to
check if the elements comply
with the standard format approved by the CEC.

3. The Electoral Subject, no later than 72 hours from the date of
notification by the Central
Election Commission, shall refile the corrected report or,
depending on the case, the
relevant explanations on the shortcomings found.
4. The corrected report or, depending on the case, the
explanations of the electoral
subject, are published by the CEC on its official website no
later than 10 days after they are
filed.
Article 5
Verification and control
1. The CEC administration verifies and checks the compliance
with the provisions of the
Electoral Code, as amended, Law no. 8580, dated 17.02.2000,
"On Political Parties", as
amended, and the bylaws on the financing of the election
campaign, regarding the funds
received and spent by the political party during the election
campaign
2. The CEC administration checks the financial report of the
election campaign submitted by
the political party by:
a. comparing the data with the findings and conclusions of the
Election Campaign Audit
Report and the Election Campaign Monitoring Report;
b. checking the procedure of donation documentation (if the
donor has signed the
declaration required by Article 90, item 1 of the Electoral Code,
amended, the limit of

expenditure
donation value and whether the donation of non-public funds is
made in the special account
opened for this purpose) ;
c. checking whether the funds benefitted and spent by
candidates for the election campaign
are declared in the report submitted by the political party.
d. recalculate the total campaign expenditure declared and
compare it with the permissible
limit of expenses for the electoral subject
If, after checking campaign financial reports, it is found or
there is justifiable doubt on non-
compliance or shortcomings, the Central Election Commission
may decide to make
verifications of the data in the report, by investigating different
people and entities, obtain
information from responsible authorities that supervise money
laundering and illegal
financing, by investigating documents related to this issue in
the offices of the relevant
political parties that filed the report, and obtain information
from banks or third parties.

4. The CEC administration carries out the verification of
financial reports of political parties,
campaign monitoring reports and audit reports of funds received
and spent by political
parties during the campaign as a rule no later than 2 months
after the delivery of the final
monitoring report of the election campaign.
5. At the end of the verification process, the administration
submits to the Central Election
Commission the draft act and the relevant finding regarding the
results of verification of
election campaign funding reports in a public session.
6. The CEC shall comply with the procedures provided for in
this Article on the verification of
financial reports for the calendar year.
PART II
Article 6
Interim reports of financial experts on election campaign
monitoring
The financial experts, contracted by the CEC to monitor
election campaign expenditures,
should submit, on weekly basis, a report on monitoring results
to the CEC, which is also in
electronic format. The CEC immediately sends copies of the
interim report, for information

and for rejection to the electoral subject.
2. The CEC reviews the results of the interim report within 24
hours after the report is filed.
3. If after the verification and review of the interim report and
the objections submitted by
the electoral subject, violation of the provisions of the law "On
Political Parties", as
amended, are found, related to organization of the election
campaign, the CEC notifies the
Mayor of the Municipality where the violation was found and
the electoral subject in order to
take measures to restore legitimacy.
expenditure
4. The interim report and when necessary, the CEC decision on
the measures taken is
immediately made public.
Article 7
Third Party Action
1. Third parties have the right to file information, requests,
complaints or charges to the
CEC related to financing of election campaign and funds

parties during the calendar year.
2. Information, claims, complaints, charges by third parties
must be done according to
model no. 1, attached to this instruction. The application must
be sufficiently clear and
specify the plaintiff and the defendant, by attaching proof and
evidence to support the
allegations submitted.
3. The CEC records the information, claims, complaints or
charges made by third parties
and makes following preliminary checks:
a) checks if the CEC is the competent body to review the claim.
b) If the subject and type of alleged violation are clearly
identified.
4. After the preliminary verification, if the requirements of
paragraph 3 of this Article are
met, the CEC shall forward the information, request, complaint,
or charges made by third
parties, to the respective political or electoral subject, in order
for the claim to be
communicated or refuted, within 24 hours after they are filed,
setting a deadline of
maximum 5 days to appeal it.
5. When a CEC decision is needed to resolve the case, the case
will be discussed at the

meeting no later than 5 days from receiving the response from
the subject.
At the meeting, the CEC may decide on further verifications to
be made by the CEC
administration or to forward the matter to the legal auditor or
financial expert. In this case,
the CEC should map the actions to be taken as well as the
deadline for reviewing the case at
the meeting.
6. When reviewing third party information, claims, appeals or
charges made during the
election campaign, the CEC shall, to the greatest extent
possible, follow the procedures
provided for in this Article by applying reasonable time limits
in order to address them
effectively.
7. Information, allegations or facts made public regarding
violations of the provisions of the
Electoral Code, as amended, and the Law "On Political Parties",
as amended, on financing of
the electoral campaign will be reviewed by the CEC along with
the final reports of financial
experts and / or legal auditors.
PART III
Article 8
Sanctions

expenditure
1. If the CEC finds violations of the legal provisions and
normative acts issued by the CEC, if
they do not constitute a criminal offense, it applies the
sanctions provided for in Article 172,
Article 173 of the Electoral Code, as amended, and Article 24/2,
item 7 of Article 23/4 of
Law no. 8580/2000 "On Political Parties", as amended.
2. In setting sanctions, the CEC is guided by the principle of
proportionality.
Article 9
Criteria for determining the fine
in cases of violations of provisions on the financing of the
election campaign or annual
financing of political parties, the CEC shall take into account
the following criteria in
choosing and determining the amount of the fine,:
a) the circumstances under which the violation is committed;
b) the degree of violation;
c) whether it is a repeated offence of this electoral subject
d) the attitude of the electoral subject related to CEC
recommendations, cooperation with
the CEC during the verification process;

e) the consequences of actions or failure to the act of the
declaring subject;
Neni 12
This instruction comes immediately into effect.
Klement ZGURI - Chairman
Denar BIBA – Deputy Chairman
Bledar SKËNDERI- Member
Edlira JORGAQI- Member
Rezarta BITRI- Member
LAW no. 8580, dated 17 February 2000
ON POLITICAL PARTIES
(updated as of 22 May 2017)
In reliance on articles 9, 78 and 83 point 1 of the Constitution,

on the proposal of the
Council of Ministers,
THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
D E C I D E D:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Article 1
Political parties are voluntary unions of citizens on the basis of
joint political interests,
ideas, beliefs and points of view or interests, who aim at
influencing the life of the country
through participation in elections and representation of the
people in the elected organs of
power.
Article 2

Political parties take part in the formation of the political will
of the people in all
fields of public life and especially through:
a) influencing the creation of public opinion and political
education;
b) encouraging active participation of citizens in political life
and providing evidence
of the ability of citizens to undertake public responsibilities;
c) participation in general and local elections.
Article 3
Albanian political parties are part of a free and democratic
system of government in
the country. Their creation and activity are free and guaranteed
by the Constitution.
Article 4
In the activity for reaching their goals, political parties use
only democratic methods
and means.
Article 5

The activity of political parties may extend to the whole
territory of the Republic of
Albania or to several units of the territorial administrative
division of the country.
Article 6
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Political parties are prohibited from creating organizations of a
military or
paramilitary nature.
Article 7
The registration of a party is prohibited in cases when:
a) its internal organization is in violation with democratic
principles and, particular,
with the following principles: construction of the party from
bottom to top, internal

democratic elections for the party forums; the right of every
member to express his opinion;
the freedom to enter and leave the party; the right of every
member to vote and to be elected;
b) in the documents of foundation of the party, it is expressly
mentioned or, from their
content, it comes out that they are in violation of the
constitutional provisions that prohibit
the creation of parties or party structures in the fields and
institutions contemplated by them;
c) the party was created outside the territory of the Republic of
Albania;
ç) in the documents of its formation, the purpose of using force
to take power or to
influence state policy is expressed;
d) in the documents of its formation, the encouragement and
support of racial,
religious, regional or ethnic hatred is expressed;
dh) it relies on totalitarian methods or has a secret nature;
e) another party is registered with the same name.
Article 8

Unconstitutional activity of political parties is prohibited.
The determination of unconstitutional activity of a political
party and its prohibition is
decided by the Constitutional Court.
CHAPTER II
THE CREATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Article 9
The registration of political parties is done in the court of the
first level of the district
of Tirana, which keeps the register of political parties. In the
registry of political parties there
is indicated: the numerical order of registration, the protocol
number [number of the official
document], the number of the judicial decision, the date of
announcement, the disposition of
the decision, the full name of the party, the initials of the party,
the emblem of the party, a
description of the configuration of the seal, the name of the
chairman, notes about the change

of the name, configurations of the seal or chairman of the party,
the expunging or ending of
the activity of the subject, the date the note was made, and the
name and signature of the
competent employee.
The political party is recognized as a juridical person from the
date when the court has
approved and registered it.
Until the date of registration, the founders of the party may
perform actions that are
necessary for its organization, such as, especially, the calling
and holding of the meeting of
the founders and the election of the management organs, but
they may not perform activity as
a political party.
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Article 10

After the meeting of the founding members of the political
party has approved the
documents of the party, its program, status and management
organs, a request for its
registration is submitted to the court.
The request for registration of a political party shall be signed
by no less than 3000
Albanian citizens, its founding members, with a permanent
domicile in the Republic of
Albania.
The request for registration of a political party shall be
deposited to the secretariat of the
Court of First Instance of Tirana Judicial District, and must
contain, for each founding
member:
A) name and surname;
B) personal number;
C) residence.
In the decision of the political party registration, the court also
indicates the number of

founding members.
Article 11
In the documents for the registration of a political party, there
are set out:
a) the name and headquarters of the party;
b) its purposes and duties;
c) the leading organs and the construction of the party;
ç) number of founding members
Article 12
The name of a party shall be clearly distinguishable from that
of other existing parties.
The initials and emblems of the political parties shall not be the
same.
Only the names or initials of political parties that are registered
are used in the
elections.
Article 13

The registration of a political party is done within 30 days from
the date of
submission of the request for registration and the documents
contemplated in article 10 and
11 of this law.
In the case when the documents of the political parties are not
proper, the court
returns the request within 20 days for the respective additions to
be made.
Article 14
The provisions of this law for the registration of political
parties are equally valid for
amendments and deletions in the prior registrations.
The request for amendments in the register of political parties
is done by the organ of
the party that has representation toward third parties in its
competency.
4

4
Article 15
The court decision for registration or non-registration of
political parties in the
register of political parties may be appealed to the court of
appeals of Tirana within 15 days
from the date the court decision is announced.
CHAPTER III
FINANCIAL MEANS AND MATERIALS OF THE PARTIES
Article 15/1
1. The provisions of this chapter shall regulate the funding of
political parties from
financial and material resources, public and non-public, which
are not regulated by
the provisions of the Electoral Code.
2. The funding of political parties shall be guided by the
principle of transparency. Data

on the parties’ financial resources and expenses shall be
published at any [given] time.
3. The rules on monitoring, supervision and auditing of
financial and material resources
must observe at all times the equality of political parties before
the law and must not
infringe their right to be established freely.
Article 15/2
1. The Central Election Commission is the body responsible for
the monitoring and
supervision of the funding of political parties according to the
rules of this law.
2. The Central Election Commission, based on and in order to
implement this law, has
the following competencies:
a. It drafts and adopts both rules on reporting of funding, on
monitoring, supervision and
financial auditing of political parties, and standardised
templates of annual financial
reporting;
b. It approves both the template of the special record book
[register] of non-public funds

of political parties, and the template on the form and content of
the statement of
donations of non-public funds;
c. It selects certified accounting experts and assigns them by lot
to audit the funds and
expenses of political parties;
ç. It monitors, supervises and audits the funding of political
parties through checks on
financial documentation and accounts of political parties,
entities linked directly or
indirectly with or under the control of political parties;
d. It imposes sanctions when it ascertains infringements of the
provisions of this law;
dh. It drafts guidelines and awareness-raising programmes, and
organises training
sessions on the funding of political parties and entities involved
in this process, in
accordance with the provisions of this law;
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5

e. It determines the amount of public funds each political party
shall receive annual
financial aid, in accordance with this law;
ë. It issues subordinate legal acts based on and in order to
implement the provisions of
this law”.
Article 16
Political parties are juridical persons. They have property for
performing their
activity. Political parties have their means of propaganda, as
well as the respective
institutions for realizing them.
Article 17
The financial sources and materials of the political parties
consist of
a) membership dues;
b) public funds including the financial assistance in the amount
set in the State Budget,
approved by law by the Assembly.
c) non-public funds, which are financial donations, in-kind

donations, services, sponsorships,
loans or guarantees, as well as any other financial transaction.
Article 19
1. A fund which shall serve as public financial aid for the
annual activities of political parties
shall be allocated each year in the State Budget. The financial
aid foreseen in the state budget
during non-electoral years, as a rule, shall not be less than the
aid foreseen in the preceding
year.
2. The fund shall be divided according to the following rules:
a) 70 percent shall be divided according to the number of seats
obtained in the last
parliamentary elections. Each party sitting in parliament shall
be entitled to
financial aid in accordance with the number of seats obtained
based on the
proportional system;
b) 20 percent shall be divided equally among parliamentary
parties and the parties
which have received more than 10 thousand votes in the last

parliamentary
elections;
c) 10 percent shall be divided according to the percentage
obtained among [by] the
political parties that took part in the last parliamentary elections
and obtained over
1 percent of the votes.
The non-allocated remainder of the 10 percent shall be added to
the 70 percent fund
and it shall be divided among parliamentary parties.
3. The concrete amount of the public fund received by each
political party in the form of
annual financial aid in compliance with this law shall be
determined by a decision of the
Central Election Commission. Both the beneficiary political
parties and Ministry of Finance
shall be notified of this decision.
4. In any case, annual financial aid shall be awarded on the
proviso that political parties have
already submitted the financial report of the preceding year
according to the rules defined by

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the Central Election Commission. Failure to submit annual
financial reports shall lead to
exemption of political parties from receipt of annual financial
aid.
5. Appeal against the decision of the Central Election
Commission which sets the exact
amount of public funds for each political party may be filed
with the court in line with rules
on the reviewing of administrative disputes”.
Article 20
The creation by political parties of commercial and non-
commercial juridical persons
that exercise activity with the purpose of profit is prohibited.
Political parties may use their property and premises for
economic-social activity of

the nature of publications, printing presses, services or leasing,
according to the legislation in
force.
Article 21
Financial assistance and materials from foreign public or
private entities and from
government is prohibited, or from Albanian public entities or
those with the participation of
state capital.
Gifts and assistance that come from a party or international
union of parties, from
political foundations and organizations, Albanian and foreign,
and from individuals who are
Albanian private natural and juridical persons is permitted.
Article 22
The state facilitates the activity of political parties. The
facilitation by the state of the
activity of political parties includes the following fields:

a) Parties have the right to use, without compensation, the
public mass media in the
case of electoral campaigns and referenda.
b) parliamentary parties obtain premises (headquarters) for their
central and local
offices.
The right to obtain premises belongs also to the political party
with the average of
votes over the last three parliamentary elections was over 1
percent nationwide.
c) if the party is equipped with a lease contract building,
according to this law, but
does not meet the requirements of the letter" b "of this article, it
(the party) shall have the
right to conclude a lease contract for the building, only for
headquarters or its local offices
use. More detailed rules are defined by the Council of Ministers
on proposal of the Minister
of Interior.
Article 22/1
1. The request for premises according to Article 22, letter “b”

shall be submitted in writing to
the Minister of Interior, in relation to state properties under the
administration of central
government, and to the Mayor in relation to properties which
are owned or leased by local
7
7
government. They shall take all necessary measures to provide
the parliamentary party with
premises.
2. Once free premises are identified, where appropriate, either
the Minister of Interior or the
Mayor shall conclude a lease contract with the political party.
Should no free premises be
identified, the state, through the Ministry of Finance, shall take
upon itself to pay the rent of
the party headquarters and its local offices. The lease contract
or rental payments shall
continue for as long as the political party exercises
parliamentary activity.

3. Detailed rules on the type of document, administrative
procedure of reviewing the request,
payment methods, number of premises for local offices and rent
ceiling shall be defined by
the Council of Ministers on proposal of the Minister of
Finance”.
Article 23
1. Political parties shall submit financial reports to the Central
Election Commission once
per annum.
2. The annual reports must contain detailed information:
a. on funding sources based on the standardised template
approved by the Central Election
Commission;
b. on expenses based on the standardised template approved by
Commission;
c. (information) provided by the political party itself on
subjects directly or indirectly linked
to or under the control of political parties themselves.

3. Political parties shall submit the annual financial report along
with the auditing report
drawn up by certified accounting experts in accordance with the
provisions of this law.
4. The annual financial report shall be submitted either by the
person in charge of finances
at the political party or by an individual assigned [to carry out
this duty] by the statute of
the political party within the timeframe defined by the Central
Election Commission.
5. During an election year, the financial reports of the political
party must be submitted with
the financial report of the election campaign.
6. The annual financial report, the report of the certified
accounting experts, the financial
report of the election campaign and the report of the Central
Election Commission shall
be published in the official website of the Central Election
Commission no later than 30
days from the date of their submission by the political party”.
Article 23/1
1. Each political party must record in a special record book,

according to the template
approved by the Central Election Commission, the amount of
funds received by any
natural or legal person, and data clearly defining the identity of
the donor. When
awarding the donation, the donor shall at all times be obliged to
sign a donation
statement, in accordance with the template approved by the
Central Election Commission.
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The list of persons who donate funds of not less than one
hundred thousand ALL along
with the respective amount [donated] shall be made public at all
times.
2. The donation of non-public funds in excess of one hundred
thousand ALL must be made
only through a special bank account opened by the political
party. The person in charge
of finances at the political party shall notify the Central
Election Commission of the bank

account number opened for this very purpose no later than three
months from the
establishment of the political party. The bank account number
of each political entity
shall be published in the official website of the Central Election
Commission.
3. Receiving non-public funds donated by entities which fail to
declare their identity, or
whose identity is not clearly identified by the political party
that is the beneficiary of the
non-public fund, shall be prohibited.
4. All political party expenses shall be incurred and documented
in compliance with the tax
legislation in force.
Article 23/2
1. The CEC holds in implementing this law, the list of certified
accounting experts,
including all certified accounting experts with experience, who
practice the profession
over the last five years, and which apply for conducting
political parties auditing.
2. The Central Election Commission shall assign by lot one or

more certified accounting
experts from the list it has selected itself in accordance with
this law to audit the funds
received and used by the political party throughout the calendar
year. The assignment
shall take place no later than 45 days from the registration of
the political party and at the
beginning of each calendar year. The auditing report shall be
submitted to the Central
Election Commission within the timeframe set by the CEC when
it decided on the
assignment of the experts.
3. Political parties must make available to the expert assigned
by the Central Election
Commission any information, document or data concerning the
funds and expenses
incurred during the calendar year, in accordance with this law.
4. The Central Election Commission may verify the data on the
report by interviewing
individuals and various entities, by checking the documents
related to this issue with the
respective offices of the political parties that have submitted the
report, as well as by
obtaining information from the banks or any other third persons.

Natural and legal
persons are obliged to assist in the smooth running of the
verification procedure.
5. The Central Election Commission shall publish the political
party auditing report no later
than 30 days from the date the report was submitted, or where
appropriate, from the date
the verification procedure was completed.
6. The failure of political parties or donors to comply with the
rules defined in this law shall
be deemed an administrative offence, unless it constitutes a
criminal offence, and it shall
be punished according to the provisions of this law.
Article 23/3
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1. In any case, an accounting expert may not audit the same
political party for two
consecutive years.

2. The expenses needed to audit the political parties shall be
covered by the political parties
themselves. Political parties shall transfer the sums needed for
this purpose to the bank
account of the Central Election Commission. Detailed rules on
the running of this process
shall be defined by way of an instruction issued by the Central
Election Commission.
Article 23/4
1. The infringement of the provisions of the funding of political
parties by the person in
charge of finances within the political party or the individual
assigned by the party statute
[to carry out this duty] shall be punishable by a fine of 50 000
to 100 000 ALL.
2. The infringement of the obligation of the political party to
cooperate with the certified
accounting expert assigned by the Central Election Commission
shall be subject to a fine
of 1 000 000 to 2 000 000 ALL.
3. Failure or refusal to make the financial sources of the
political party transparent or to

allow the auditing by the certified accounting expert of Central
Election Commission to
take place shall be subject to a fine ranging from 2 000 000
ALL to 5 000 000 ALL
and/or a five-year suspension to fund the political party.
4. The failure to submit the financial report within the
established timeframe or the
submission of reports which fail to comply with the
standardised template approved by
the Central Election Commission shall be subject to a fine of 50
000 to 100 000 ALL.
5. Non-public funds received by the political party, if the
identity of the donor is unknown
or not clearly defined, shall be passed on to the Central Election
Commission.
6. Receipt of non-public funds in excess of one hundred
thousand ALL and the failure to go
through with the transaction through a bank account shall be
subject to a fine of 30% of
the donated amount”.
Article 24
In cases when a political party does not pay its obligations

deriving from executive
titles or applicable administrative acts, then the respective
amount is retained from the annual
state budget that is contemplated for financial assistance to the
respective party.
“CHAPTER III / 1 (added as of 22.5.2017)
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXPENSES OF POLITICAL
PARTIES
DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Article 24/1
Election Campaign Financing
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1. The only allowed sources of electoral campaign funding for
political parties
registered as electoral subjects are those provided for in Article
87/1 of the Electoral Code.

2. It is forbidden to finance electoral campaigns from funds,
gifts or services without
counter-charge, provided by physical or legal persons, domestic
or foreign, out of the cases
and rules provided by the Electoral Code. Violation of this
prohibition brings legal
responsibility for the person responsible for finances in the
political parties, as well as
physical or legal person, domestic or foreign.
3. The Central Election Commission establishes detailed rules
for monitoring the election
campaign expenditures of political parties registered as
electoral subjects, To verify the
observance of the detention provided for in point 2 of this
article, as well as the manner of
spending the financial fund benefited by the political party. The
election budget should also
provide the necessary funding for the audit of electoral subjects,
as well as to monitor the
election campaign expenditures.
Article 24/2

Limitation and determination of the indispensable expenses for
the election campaign
1. Each political party participating in elections, can not
exceed the expense for
financial campaign fund specified in paragraph 3 of Article 90
of the Electoral Code.
2. Central Election Commission, in accordance with the
maximum fund provided for
in paragraph 1 of this Article, determines the maximum
expenditure for each election
campaign, based on the overall economic situation in the
country, the total number of voters
enrolled in the voter list, the activities, services and materials
necessary for the conduct of an
election campaign. 3. The Central Election Commission shall
approve the manner of
calculating the financial cost of any activity, service or material
to be used for election or
political purposes by political parties during the election
campaign.
4. The Central Election Commission determines by an
instruction the types and
number of activities, activities, services and materials allowed
to be used by a political party
in the electoral field.

5. In any case, the use of propaganda materials, including flags
and posters of any
kind or size, is prohibited at a distance of more than 5 m from
the electoral subject or
candidate electoral office.
6. It is forbidden to broadcast commercials produced, funded or
paid by state
institutions or any other state or public entity for the period of
three months before the
election date, except for those serving the information of voters,
according to legal
definitions.
7. Failure to comply with the rules provided for in this article,
except for the provisions of the
Criminal Code, constitutes an administrative contravention and
passes the punishment by the
Central Election Commission of the person responsible for the
finances, respectively with a
fine from 1 000 000 to 3 000 000 lekë.
Article 24/3
Documentation of expenditures

1. Political parties are obliged to document in a correct and
complete manner,
according to the rules of the legislation in force, all the
expenses incurred and the manner of
using the funds during the election campaign. All persons
responsible for finances in a
political party are trained by the Central Election Commission
for the maintenance,
administration, reporting and retention of documentation and
data under this article.
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2. The political party submits to the Central Election
Commission a full copy of the
documentation for each payment made during the election
campaign period. Within 60 days
of the announcement of the election result, any political party
that is registered in the
elections must make public and submit to the Central Election
Commission a report on the

financial declaration of the campaign, including all branches
and their constituent parts.
The report contains correctly:
a) The income earned or available by the political party,
including the source and date
of the benefit for the period from the setting of the election date
until Election Day;
b) All expenses incurred for the period from the setting of the
election date until
Election Day, detailing any expenses that have been made to the
financial fund provided for
election campaign expenditures;
c) The balance sheet of the assets and liabilities of the political
party for the period
from the setting of the election date to the Election Day.
3. Each political party participating in elections should keep
and preserve in their
archives for a period of seven (7) years, Full and detailed
documentation of its financial
standing and all branches for the period covered by the report,
including:
a) Accounting books, in accordance with the applicable law,
where all revenue by

source, amount, identifying the manner in which the payment
was made, as well as all
payments made to third persons, the purpose of the payment and
How the payment was done;
b) Accurate documentation of all expenses incurred;
c) The situation and movements in its bank accounts;
ç) Complete documentation of immovable property in
possession or owned by a
political party, as well as any contracts related to the lease,
lease, order, or sale of movable
and immovable property;
4. If the amount earned by the political party, according to the
Electoral Code, is
greater than the amount documented as spent for financing the
election campaign, The party
is obliged to return the difference received to the CEC.
5. The Party, which does not return the respective funds,
according to point 4 of this
article, within 90 days from the announcement of the election
result, loses the right to other
public funding for a period of time not less than 5 years, and
does not register as an electoral

subject in the next election, regardless of their type, either
alone or as a member of any
coalition.
Article 24/4
Monitoring of election campaign expenses
1. No later than the start of the election campaign, The Central
Election Commission
appoints a sufficient number of financial experts by lot, To
conduct the election campaign
monitoring of political parties, including the activities,
activities and materials used by them
during the election campaign.
2. The monitoring report is submitted to the Central Election
Commission within the
deadline set in the appointment decision, But in any case no
later than 4 months from the date
of the announcement of the final election results. The report
details in full all the activities,
events and materials used by the political party during the
election campaign.
3. Financial experts are also entitled to request and verify

financial transactions
conducted for the period of 3 months before and after election
day, by physical or legal
persons, domestic or foreign, with the purpose of identifying
unjustified transactions and that
may have been used for unlawful financing of the election
campaign of one or several
political parties.
12
12
4. At the request of the financial expert, forwarded through the
Secretary General of
the Central Election Commission, Second tier banks and other
entities exercising banking and
financial activities in the Republic of Albania, are required to
provide information on
deposits, accounts and transactions conducted during the
monitoring period. Data collection,
processing and administration, under this article, is subject to
the rules for the protection of

personal data. They should be public only if it is proved to be
used for illegal financing of a
political party, and in this case the Central Election
Commission submits a criminal report to
the prosecution body.
5. The procedures, the criteria for selecting the preliminary list
and the appointment of
financial experts, as well as the manner of exercising their
activity, are determined by the
instruction of the Central Election Commission.
Article 24/5
Reducing political party spending for political advertising
1. Exceptionally stipulations of the Electoral Code, during the
election campaign for
the 2017 Assembly elections, National, local or satellite radio
and television stations are
obliged to make available free of charge to electoral subjects
for political advertising,
Respectively only 90 minutes for the largest party of the
parliamentary majority and the
largest party of the parliamentary minority, 45 minutes for the

other parliamentary parties and
10 minutes for the non-parliamentary parties. Political parties
and any other subjects are
prohibited from making political advertisements versus payment
during the election
campaign. The cost of making available free time to electoral
subjects is calculated as a full
deductible tax expense. The Central Election Commission, the
Audiovisual Media Authority
and the Minister of Finance are charged to issue the relevant
instruction.
2. In case of a violation of the obligations provided for in
paragraph 1 of this article, or the
transmission of political advertisements versus payment, the
Central Election Commission
fines the local or satellite radio-television operator with 4 000
000 ALL, National radio and
television operator with 8 000 000 lek, and the political party
with 3 000 000 lekThe decision
of the Central Election Commission is an executive title and is
executed by the bailiff's office.
The appeal against the decision does not suspend its execution.
In case of a violation, the
CEC orders the Audiovisual Media Authority to block the

transmission of the radio-television
operator for 48 hours. The deadlock is set no later than 18.00
hrs of the following day.
3. Monitoring the implementation of the rules provided for in
this article, Is done by
the Media Monitoring Board, Which informs the Central
Election Commission, within one
day, if its consideres violations of the obligations set out in this
LawThe Central Election
Commission shall impose sanctions according to point 2 within
24 hours from the moment of
notification by the Media Monitoring Board or the request of
any electoral subject.
CHAPTER IV
DIVISION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Article 25
In the case of a division of a political party by agreement, the
parties decide on who
the name, symbol, flag of the party and its property belong.
When there is no agreement between the parties, this is done by

court decision.
13
13
CHAPTER V
DISSOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Article 26
A political party is dissolved:
a) when it merges into or joins with another party;
b) when it is divided into two or more other parties with a new
name;
c) when it dissolves itself in accordance with the norms of its
charter;
ç) when the number of members of the party has gone below
the minimum number set
by the charter or according to this law;

d) when its activity is prohibited by order of the competent
organ.
A decision for the dissolution of the political party is deposited
in the court of the first
level of the district of Tirana. This court decides on the
deregistration of the party and the
respective procedures for its liquidation.
CHAPTER VI
TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 27
Within 30 days from the date of entry of this law into force, the
Minister of Justice
transfers to the court of the first level of the District of Tirana
the documents of the political
parties registered by it up to the date of the entry of this law
into force.
The court of the first level of the District of Tirana makes the
transfer into its special register

for political parties within 90 days from receiving the
documentation at its disposal.
Article 27/1
(Amended by Law No. 10374, dated 10.2.2011)
1. The Agency for the Inventory and Transfer of Public
Properties, within 6 months
from the entry into force of this Law, performs:
a) the inventory of immovable state properties given to political
parties;
b) Identification of the legal relationship established between
the state and the political
party for the property given to the political party.
2. After the completion of the inventory process of these
properties, the Minister of
Interior informs the political party that within a 30 day
deadline:
a) release and submit these properties, if the condition referred
to in letter "b" of Article
22 is solved. Or
b) to conclude a lease contract in accordance with the letter "c"
of Article 22
3. The same procedure is also applied by the governing bodies
of the local government
units for state property transferred to the ownership

4. 4. Upon the entry into force of this law, the Minister of
Finance, if the condition
stipulated in letter "b" of Article 22 is resolved, orders the
termination of payment of
the rent of political parties, if any, from the funds of the State
Budget
14
14
5. The person responsible for the finances in the political party
or the person designated
in its statute shall within three months from the entry into force
of this law declare to
the CEC the number of the open bank account for the donation
of non-public funds
more than 100,000 ALL, in favor of the political party.
6. The Central Election Commission shall compile the
preliminary list and assign within
45 days from the date of entry into force of this law, by lot, of
one or more licensed
accounting experts, to perform the audit of the funds received
and spent during the
year Calendar by the political parties, setting the deadline for
submitting the audit

report to the Central Election Commission.
Article 27/2
The financial effects deriving from the implementation of Law
17/2014 for the
budgetary year 2014, extend only for the period from its entry
into force to the end of the
year
Exceptionally for 2014, the Ministry of Finance, in cooperation
with the CEC, determines the
amount of the public fund benefiting each political party, in the
form of annual financial
assistance, in accordance with this law.
Article 28
Law Nr. 7502 dated July 25, 1991 “On Political Parties” and
every provision that
conflicts with this law is repealed.
Article 29

This law is effective 15 days after publication in the Official
Journal.
IP3017 Final Year Dissertation
1
Session 2:
Literature Review & Finding Sources
Recap: The Research Process
Question
Literature Review
Method
Analysis
Theoretical Framework

The Research Question
Your research needs to be driven by and to pivot around a
central research question
Everything that you include and do needs respond to this
question.
You need explain exactly how everything you are
including/doing is working to respond to your research
question.
You must state it explicitly at the very outset of your
introduction and refer back to it as much as possible
The Literature Review
What is a literature review?
Your appraisal of existing works on your topic.
No topic is completely new – we draw on existing studies
A process of reading, thinking, and writing about the literature.
Results in a short, written synthesis of previous research on a
particular topic.
Where does the Lit Review belong?
Introduction
Introduce research question/s
Set the scene (context: empirical and academic)
Provide summary of what’s to come
Literature Review(/Theoretical Framework)*
What has everyone else in academia already said?
What are the key academic debates in this area?
What are the key theories in the literature that are informing
your research

What are the key concepts you will be working with?
Methodology
Research Method/s
Discussion/Analysis
Conclusions
Bibliography
*
What is a literature review for?
To achieve a general overview of a body of research with which
you are not familiar
To discover what has already been done well and not waste time
“reinventing the wheel”
To determine where there are flaws in existing research are
To place your research in identifiable scholarly literature
Identify your ‘original contribution’
8
How do I conduct a Literature Review?
Collect Academic Sources
Read Analytically
Summarize the literature
Connect your research to the literature
**These stages happen simultaneously in practice**
Step 2: Reading Critically
The purpose of an academic text:

It is your job to analyse how successfully the author makes their
point:
Important information for reference lists and citations!
Summary of the source
Critique of the article
The bigger picture
Adapted from Cottrell (2011)
Step 3: Writing the Lit Review
“Conventional Wisdom” Model:
What the existing studies have in common? What is the
“conventional wisdom” about a subject?
“Ongoing Debates” Model:
What the studies disagree about? What are the main “camps” or
“schools of thought”?
Thematically:
What are the key themes running through the literature? How do
different authors approach these?
Step 4: From the Literature Review to your Research

The conclusion of the literature review should indicate how
your research will relate to what other scholars have done so far
Will your research:
Question the conventional wisdom? Are there areas where the
literature is inconclusive?
Weigh in on an existing controversy in the literature? Providing
evidence for one side or the other
Fill a Gap Theoretical? Is there any alternative theory that no
scholar discussing that topic has yet to consider?
Fill an Empirical gap? Is there any relevant historical case or
source of data that has been overlooked in answering that
question?
Reminders: Literature Review
Content
1) review of what is already known/argued on your topic
2) review of theoretical approaches and methodology used by
others to research your topic or similar issues
How
Show relationship between sources – not just an analysis of
each source in turn
Show how sources relate to your research – what is useful and
why, how will you extend or refine the existing literature?
Organise by theme, not by publication date or author
Not just a description or summary or other people’s work
15
What is bad about the literature review?

Sessions
TERM 1
Tuesday 12th November (wk 8), 4pm - 6pm, Room ELG15
Using Theory
TERM 2
Wednesday 29th January (wk 2), 9am-11am, Room: Geary
Conducting Research/Writing your thesis
Wednesday 18th March (wk 9), 9am -11am, Room: Geary
Final Q&A session
IP3017 Final Year Dissertation
1
Outline
What is the Dissertation?
Sessions
Submission details
The research process
How to come up with a topic
What makes a good proposal
What you need to do…

2
What is the Dissertation?
A dissertation is a piece of independent research that answers a
research question
Opportunity to delve into a topic that interests you
Culmination of all your studies at City
Draws directly from IP2021 training.
Independent research, under the guide of an allocated
‘dissertation advisor’.
You should treat this as a year-long module.
3
Sessions
TERM 1
Tuesday 15th October (wk 4), 4pm-6pm, Room: ELG15
Literature Review & Library Workshop
Tuesday 12th November (wk 8), 4pm - 6pm, Room ELG15
Using Theory
TERM 2
Wednesday 29th January (wk 2), 9am-11am, Room: Geary
Conducting Research/Writing your thesis
Wednesday 18th March (wk 9), 9am -11am, Room: Geary Final
Q&A session

Submission detailsStageTaskDeadline1Submission of the
tentative dissertation title and brief summary of proposed
content.
On the basis of this you will be assigned a dissertation advisor
in Week 3 of Term 1. Monday 7th October 2019, by 4pm, via
Moodle only
2Preparation of a 3000 word research proposal, which focuses
on conceptual and methodological dimensions and the literature
review.
The proposal is the plan of your research project. A good, well
thought through proposal is essential in completing the final
dissertation.
If you do it well, you will already be half way through the work
of the dissertation (see below)Monday 6th January 2020, by
4pm, via Moodle only
3Writing of the actual 10,000 word dissertation Friday 1st May
2020, by 4pm, via Moodle only
5
Seeking Advice
Dissertation Advisor
The advisor is your main port of call for help with the
dissertation
Allocated in Week 3 based on the dissertation title form
Whether in person or by email staff are not allowed to read or
comment on drafts

YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTACT THEM
Seeking advice from other members of staff
You can also ask for specific advice from other members of
staff as long as you do not expect the other person to replace the
supervisor
Academic Tutor
For additional academic support, contact [email protected]
Administrative questions,
please contact [email protected] (T1); [email protected] (T2)
6
Questions?
7
Feedback
What was one piece of positive feedback you received on
IP2021
What was one thing you were told to improve on IP2021?
The Research Process

9
Find a Research Topic or field of inquiry
Formulate a Research Question
Understand Existing Answers to the Question (Literature
Review)
Develop your own explanation (Theory) and derive observable
propositions (Hypotheses)
Chose Research Design
Collect & Analyze data
Discuss Findings
Step 1:
The Topic Form

Coming up with a topic
Step1: come up with a topic you would like to research
Think about what you have enjoyed in your studies & what you
have a background in
Look online at the expertise of members of staff
TOPIC FORM
By Mon Week 3, you will need to fill in a topic form
Outlines general area you want to research in order to assign
you an advisor
The more specific the outline, the easier to find someone
suitable
11
How to come up with a topic
What do you want to know more about?
What have you enjoyed in your degree so far?
What have you done well in so far?
What would make an interesting, viable project?
What would make a viable project?
What do staff members specialise in – see profiles?
What are you thinking of researching?

13
Step 2:
The Research Proposal
Key elements of the dissertation proposal
Research Question
Problem Statement
Conceptual/theoretical part. Can comprise a brief introduction,
defining the terms and setting the context
Outlines the research problem (s) – the main issues and
theoretical concepts associated with your topic and guiding your
questions
Literature Review – scans academic work to see who else has
addressed the same or similar issues and research questions, and
how
Theoretical Framework – is there a particular lens you will look
at your question through?
Research strategy/methodology – the steps through which you
will answer your questions
Ontology/epistemology
Data collection: What evidence will you use and how will you
get it
Data Analysis: How will you analyse the data you have
collected
Bibliography

15
Formulating a research question
Once you have identified a topic, you need to formulate a
research question
A research question must be able to be resolved – you must be
able to provide an answer.
Therefore, it must be narrow and precise
It must not contain any judgemental terms
It must specify what it is looking at
16
A good research question
Keohane, King, Verba: Two principles
Real World Relevance: A research project should pose a
question that is “important in the real world” (real consequences
for social, political, or economic life) and
Academic Relevance: “make a specific contribution to an
identifiable scholarly literature” (KKV, p. 15)
How not to formulate a research question
Avoid a PhD topic
Don’t pick a question that is so ambitious that requires 4 years
Stick to the kind of question that would be asked in a journal

article
Do not ask a question about the future
“Will the Security Council be reformed?”
Do not study something too close or too far
Find something that happened in the past, i.e. that is concluded.
No moving targets
But not too distant in the past so that you can’t find materials
18
A bad research question
Have simple and easy answers
Can be answered in one word or one sentence
Cannot be answered
Are too broad and vague
Are purely opinion
Uses loaded terms
Good vs Bad Research Questions
How are Muslim women represented in studies on Islam and
Women?
What impact did social media have on Brexit?
Is Western Capitalism compatible with democracy?
What explains the emergence of Black Lives Matter Movement?
Why are far right parties being tolerated in democratic
societies?
Why does tax avoidance occur?
What influence did external forces have on the 2011 division of

Sudan?
What is a literature review for?
To achieve a general overview of a body of research with which
you are not familiar
To discover what has already been done well and not waste time
“reinventing the wheel”
To determine where there are flaws in existing research are
To place your research in identifiable scholarly literature
Identify your ‘original contribution’
21
How to write a literature review
Content
1) review of what is already known/argued on your topic
2) review of theoretical approaches and methodology used by
others to research your topic or similar issues
How
Show relationship between sources – not just an analysis of
each source in turn
Show how sources relate to your research – what is useful and
why, how will you extend or refine the existing literature?
Organise by theme, not by publication date or author

Not just a description or summary or other people’s work
22
A theoretical framework provides a particular perspective, or
lens, through which to study your topic.
Helps you to direct your analysis and not just provide a
descriptive answer.
Theory can be used in different ways:
Use theory to explain a case study
Use theory to understand a topic
Test theories
Build theory
Your supervisor can advise you on what direction to go.
Session in Week 8
What is a theoretical framework?
23
Research Design
The methods section describes actions to be taken to investigate
a research problem and the rationale for the application of
specific procedures or techniques used to identify, select,
process, and analyse information applied to understanding the
problem.
The methodology section of a research paper answers three

main questions:
What data was used?
How was the data collected or generated?
How was it analysed?
In your research proposal, you say what you WILL do.
Most of you will have a straightforward methods section
Some will use primary research but not necessary
Use scholarly writing to guide you on appropriate data
specification, data collection and methods of analysis.
Use research methods literature to justify your choice of
methodology.
Eg. comparative case study, discourse analysis of primary UN
documents, media analysis of news reports, interviews
Research Design
25
Research Ethics
Any project that intends to use human participants eg.
interviews, surveys, focus groups must get ethical approval
BEFORE starting
Speak to your supervisor
See Ethics section on Moodle
It takes time to get approval so fill in form in advance

What does a good proposal look like?
No ideal structure (but something close to the earlier slide is
frequent)
Set a clear question at the beginning and explain how you will
answer the question.
Why is this topic worth studying – what are the main issues you
are looking into.
Have a good survey of the literature in relation to the question
you are asking.
Identify how you are going to conduct your project
Clearly written, realistic research project. Outlined so someone
else can read it and know what you are doing and why you are
doing it.
27
Re-cap: What you need to do…
Think of a topic and fill in the dissertation topic form on
Moodle – deadline 7th October
Once allocated an advisor contact them to arrange a first
meeting and plan for the term
Recap lectures from IP2021
Attend next session in wk4 on the Literature Review
READ to help develop research questions and to build literature
review
Work on your research proposal consistently throughout the
term – DO NO LEAVE IT TO THE LAST MINUTE

28
Asylum in the European
Union: The Politics of
Protection and Containment
What are the consequences of biopolitical
responses to calls from ethnic nationalism?
Student Name: Irina Rizmal
Student Number: 090004435
Module: International Politics Project (IP3001)
Course: BSc International Politics
Date of Submission: May 2012
Department: Social Sciences
Supervisor: Dr. Sara Silvestri
Word Count: 10,993

1
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
...............................................................................................
............................. 2
1.1 Research Questions
...............................................................................................
.............. 2
1.2 Objectives
...............................................................................................
............................... 4
2. Theoretical Framework
...............................................................................................
......... 5
3. Literature Review
...............................................................................................
................... 6
3.1 Supranationalism vs. Intergovernmentalism
..................................................................... 6
3.2 The Politics of Protection or Containment
......................................................................... 7

3.3 The Power of Ethnic Nationalism
....................................................................................... 8
4. Research Strategy
...............................................................................................
............... 10
4.1 Limitations
...............................................................................................
............................. 11
5. Findings
............................................................................... ................
................................. 12
5.1 The Politics of Containment
..............................................................................................
13
5.2 Minimum Common Standards on Procedures
............................................................... 15
5.3 From Dublin to Stockholm
...............................................................................................
.. 19
The Dublin Convention
...............................................................................................
............... 19
The Hague Programme
...............................................................................................
.............. 20
The Schengen Borders Code
...............................................................................................

.... 20
The Stockholm Programme
...............................................................................................
....... 22
5.4 Other principles, actions and tools
................................................................................... 24
Global Approach to Migration
...............................................................................................
.... 24
Border Surveillance System
...............................................................................................
...... 25
Readmission Agreements
...............................................................................................
.......... 27
Regional Protection Programmes
............................................................................................
27
5.5 FRONTEX
...............................................................................................
............................. 29
5.6 Thematic Programmes
...............................................................................................
........ 32
6. Case Study: Italy
...............................................................................................
.................. 35

7. Conclusions
...............................................................................................
.......................... 37
8. List of Abbreviations
...............................................................................................
............ 40
9. Bibliography
...............................................................................................
.......................... 41
ANNEX
......................................................................................... ......
.................................................. 48
*Front cover image courtesy of the EUObserver, available at:
http://euobserver.com/22/28235
2
1. Introduction
Despite subscribing to a common asylum regime, European
policy responses in this
sphere remain characterised by ‘intergovernmental cooperation
and non-binding
instruments’
1

, rather than liberal, democratic and humanitarian responses
supposedly
working under an umbrella of supranationalism. As a result,
European borders pose as
‘highly differentiated border zones [...] of highly perforated
systems or regimes’
2
, with
decision making driven by individual Member States’ interests,
portraying the Union as
incapable of adequately responding to flows of asylum seekers
attempting to reach its
borders.
Despite the common belief that this inability results from the
reluctance of Member
States to assume responsibility, or their concerns over the
notions of sovereignty and
power, the fact that European borders have been ‘more real for
most non-OECD
national than for members of OECD countries’
3
calls for different explanations.
Exclusionist policies of the European asylum regime divide
global society into groups of
‘Us’ and ‘Them’, whereby a ‘civilised European order is

situated like an island within a
threatening sea of starving, brutalised, but determined-because-
desperate inferior
peoples’
4
aiming to find refuge within European borders.
1.1 Research Questions
This paper seeks to unveil the space created by the European
asylum regime to allow
Member States to choose the preferred and exclude unwanted
asylum seekers,
adopting an essentialist concept of the nation through a lens
which argues that ‘if your
race or culture or religion does not fit the parameters, then you
cannot belong’
5
. By
implementing barriers to entry for specific groups of asylum
seekers, the European
Union allows the ethnic nationalist sentiments of its Member
States to guide policy on
asylum down a path of social exclusivity whereby Europe is
created ‘less as a
cosmopolitan melting pot and more [as] a white fortress’.

1
Lindstrom, C. (2005) European Union Policy on Asylum and
Immigration. Addressing the Root Causes of
Forced Migration: A Justice and Home Affairs Policy of
Freedom, Security and Justice? Social Policy and
Administration, vol.39 no.6 p.589
2
Tsianos, V. and Karakayali, S. (2010) Transnational Migration
and the Emergence of the European Border
Regime: An Ethnographic Analysis, European Journal of Social
Theory, vol.13 no.3 p.378
3
Huysmans, J. (2006) The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration
and asylum in the EU, Routledge p.74
4
MacMaster, N. (2001) Racism in Europe, Basingstoke:
Palgrave p.217
5
Schlesinger, P. (1994) Beyond Nationalism? in Hutchinson, J.
and Smith A. D. (1994) Nationalism, Oxford
University Press p.325
3

This paper argues that, given the fact that the formation of the
European asylum regime
is mainly led by the interests of Member States, it is guided by
sentiments of ethnic
nationalism, employed as ‘a source of cohesion and stability’
6
. Gaining strength through
official acknowledgments that multiethnic projects in Member
States have in fact failed
7
,
European policy responses are erecting a selective asylum
regime, whereby those who
do not fit into the picture of a ‘European nation’, are in great
numbers sentenced to
containment outside of the Union’s borders. With buffer zones
already in place through
Strategic Partnerships and Association and Cooperation
Agreements with neighbours on
the Eastern and South-Eastern Border, the focus is now placed
on the only parameter
left to be covered by this triumphant ‘separatist project’
8
of an exclusivist European
asylum regime – the Mediterranean - stemming flows of asylum
seekers from the African

continent.
To this end, this paper poses questions such as:
migration regime?
6
Muller, J. (2008) Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic
Nationalism, Foreign Affairs, vol.87 no.3 p.31
7
Statements of Member States’ leaders: Nicolas Sarkozy
declares multiculturalism had failed (2011) Telegraph;
Merkel says German multicultural society has failed (2010)
BBC
8
4

1.2 Objectives
Through the analysis of official documents published by the
European Union,
partnerships with non-EU countries and other publications, this
paper outlines what
mechanisms have been set up to contain asylum seeker flows,
preventing them from
reaching the European Union and where these mechanisms have
been implemented,
demonstrating exactly which groups of asylum seekers it is that
they are set out to
contain.
To that end, this paper shows how the assertion of border
protection over the protection
of individuals is made possible through collective action of
Member States, harmonising
their asylum and migration policies
9
. Analysing who belongs to the excluded groups of
‘Them’, and what weight such projects carry for the European
Union, the fact that there
is a sense of emergency in containing flows of asylum seekers
from the Southern Border

is highlighted. Through the analysis of the Union’s partnerships
and agreements in the
field of asylum, this paper demonstrates that, at least to an
extent, policy responses
concerning asylum in Europe are led by sentiments of a post-
colonial whiteness
refashioned against an amorphous, heterogenous, non-descript,
yet essentialised and
decidedly culturally inimical mass of non-EU nationals
10
, leading to the
institutionalisation of a regime based on biopolitics, aiming to
enable population control,
even in the sphere of granting asylum, serving the purpose of
excluding the Unwanted.
Ultimately, a case study on Italy, the Member State at the peak
of Europe’s Southern
Border is analysed to enable a more coherent understanding of
the aims of containment
policies, how they are erected and in what ways do they serve
the Union’s overall
interest in containing African asylum seekers.

9
Humphrey, M. (2003) Refugees: An endangered species?
Journal of Sociology, vol.39 no.1 p.36
10
De Genova, N. (2010) Migration and Race in Europe: The
Trans-Atlantic Metastases of a Post-Colonial
Cancer, European Journal of Social Theory, vol.13 no.3 p.408-9
5
2. Theoretical Framework
Walzer sees people belonging to a community defending their
politics and culture
against strangers and, by valuing their assumed distinctiveness,
allowing for the creation
of an atmosphere in which closure must be permitted
11
. In that sense, this paper
explores the notion of interest whereby Member States of the
European Union are
guided primarily by self-interest in strengthening social
cohesion within their individual

borders and excluding those who are deemed as the ‘Others’.
Methods of discourse analysis are employed in the process of
reconstructing the current
discourse on migration which ‘codifies migrants as a security
threat in an a priory
fashion’
12
. Through this method the process of desecuritisation of the
notion of asylum
tackles the question of the political itself
13
, examining how policy responses to asylum
are manufactured within the EU. Comparative analysis of
prescribed responses is
employed to highlight the extent to which ethnic sentiments
play a role in setting courses
of action and targets at which these responses are aimed at.
The complexities of the European asylum regime are broken
through, by fundamentally
breaking away with the reductionist tendency to justify
containment and exclusionist
policies by branding migrants as nothing more than a national
security threat
14

. By
applying a desecuritised lens through which to observe the
European asylum regime,
this paper enables a more coherent analysis of the patterns of
inclusion and exclusion
inherent in it, going beyond mere generalisations about its
overall effects on asylum
seekers.
Ultimately, seen as arising from ethnic nationalist tendencies,
the concept of biopolitics
which Foucault and Duffield have addressed is employed
analysing the sentiments
guiding asylum policy formation, with the ultimate result of
containing specific refugee
flows outside of European borders. In this context, biopolitics is
employed as dealing
with populations ‘as a political problem, a biological problem
and a power’s problem’
15
.
11
Weiner, M. (1996) Ethics, National Sovereignty and the

Control of Migration, International Migration
Review, vol.30 no.1 p.175
12
İçduygu, A. and Fuat Keyman, E. (2000) Globalization,
Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey, Global
Governance, vol.6 no.3 p.389
13
14
İçduygu, A. and Fuat Keyman, E. (2000) Globalization,
Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey, Global
Governance, vol.6 no.3 p.396-7
15
Foucault, M. (2003) Society Must Be Defended, Penguin Books
Ltd. p.245
6
3. Literature Review
3.1 Supranationalism vs. Intergovernmentalism
The literature agrees that policy responses to asylum in the
European Union reflect an

intergovernmental mechanism. Instead of elaborating a coherent
and integrated
approach to migration, Member States ‘chose to build upon past
domestic experiences
and national restrictive laws’
16
. As a result, ‘post-Maastricht policies are characterised by
intergovernmental cooperation and non-binding instruments’
17
in which Member States
implement policy mechanisms in line with their domestic
discourses on asylum.
Similarly, Geddes concludes that EU responses to migration and
asylum remain on the
level of intergovernmental cooperation combined with attempts
to implement elements of
domestic political constraints on immigration control
18
.
However, other than highlighting the ineffectiveness of a
supranational approach, the
literature does little to highlight the full extent of the
consequences of such an

arrangement. Despite efforts of a handful of scholars to argue
that the mixture of
national and supranational politics in Europe set the conditions
for a sense of identity
panic to be produced
19
, little has been done to analyse the extent to which this
condition
allows Member States to implement their individual interests in
policies regarding asylum
in the EU.
Therefore there is a gap in the literature dealing with asylum in
general, and in the
European Union in specific, which would pose as a more
coherent analysis of the forces
behind, as well as the consequences of, the development of a
variety of identitarian
obsessions amongst Member States, following the model of
mutual reinforcement and
exclusion, as Balibar argues
20
.
16

Kostakopoulou, T. (2000) The ‘Protective Union’: Change and
Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-
Amsterdam Europe, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.38
no.3 p.498
17
18
Geddes, A. (2000) Immigration and European Integration:
Towards fortress Europe? Manchester University
Press p.67
19
Schlesinger, P. (1994) Beyond Nationalism? in Hutchinson, J.
and Smith A. D. (1994) Nationalism, Oxford
University Press p.318
20
Balibar, E. (2004) We, The People of Europe? Reflections on
Transnational Citizenship, Princeton University
Press p.170
7

3.2 The Politics of Protection or Containment
The Member States’ commitment to strict border controls and
an exclusionist approach
to asylum are generally acknowledged to have shifted asylum
regimes from a
protectionist mechanism to one of containment outside the
borders of the European
Union. A post-Maastricht development sees the replacement of
a static fortress-like
portrayal of the EU by a model of concentric circles, referring
to the agreements and
partnerships between the Union and other, non-EU countries
21
. Action Plans devised by
the High-Level Working Group are portrayed as having a
crucial role in the ‘reduction of
migratory pressure in the main countries of origin of
immigrants’
22
, focusing on specific
refugee-producing states and/or regions. These have also been
criticised for supporting

the externalisation of asylum policies through their ‘primary
focus on exporting migration
control’
23
. Another means of exporting asylum containment is through
Association and
Cooperation agreements and Strategic Partnerships between
Member States and other,
non-EU countries
24
.
Castles thus argues that asylum regimes have undergone
fundamental transformations,
shifting from a liberal system concerned with human rights, to a
non-entree regime,
‘designed to exclude and control asylum seekers from the
South’
25
. There is, however,
little work addressing the question of where such mechanisms
are employed the most,
and thus which groups of asylum seekers is it most strongly set
out to deter. Thus, the
literature on containment could be enriched by implementing

socio-cultural
categorisations in order to analyse the current stream of what
Duffield sees as a racial
discourse concerned with cultural-types in circulation, in which
the immigrant, as the
21
no.3 p.512-13;
Duffield, M. (2008) Global Civil War: The Non-Insured,
International Containment and Post-Interventionary
Society, Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.21 no.2 p.154
22
Boswell, C. (2003) The ‘External Dimension’ of EU
Immigration and Asylum Policy, International Affairs,
vol.79 no.3 p.627-8
23
Castles, S. Crawley, H. and Loughna, S. (2003) States of
Conflict: Causes and patterns of forced migration to

the EU and policy responses, IPPR p.37
24
Morris, L. (1997) Globalisation, Migration and the Nation-
state: The Path to a Post-National Europe? The
British Journal of Sociology, vol.48 no. p.201
25
the EU and policy responses, IPPR p.45-6
8
embodiment of cultural difference in motion, becomes the
iconic figure
26
, returning once
again to the need to address notions of ethnic nationalism
present in asylum policy
formulations and introducing the idea of biopolitics at work,
with the aim of managing
populations within and outside of the borders of Member States.
3.3 The Power of Ethnic Nationalism

The UNHCR has confirmed the stance that international
mechanisms dealing with
refugees are failing in their delivery of protection and aid to
asylum seekers as
definitions of who is to be considered a refugee are becoming
narrower whilst strategies
to prevent them to make claims ‘are adopted through detention
policies, border
protection and containment at a distance’
27
. Thus there is agreement on the fact that
European policies have been devised in ways that enforce the
externalisation of
immigration and asylum
28
.
This failure is commonly attributed to the reluctance of states to
grant financial support,
assume the burdens of material relief, asylum and resettlements
and their concerns over
how such action may implicate other foreign policy objectives
29
. There is general

agreement on the notion that there are different forces and
concerns at play,
determining the course of the European response. Huysmans
defines these as ‘internal
security, cultural identity and welfare’
30
. Castles finds them in a focus on ‘cultural,
socioeconomic and political’
31
threats. Hall finds reasons for a ‘defensive and regressive
exclusionism’ in the erosion of national economies and national
cultures
32
.
Despite the term being present in every of the reasons for
exclusionist asylum policies
above, identity concerns are often left sidelined and ignored. As
a result, the majority of
the literature focuses explanations around the notions of asylum
seekers being ‘a
26
Duffield, M. (2006) Racism, migration and development: the
foundations of planetary order, Progress in

Development Studies, vol.6 no.1 p.71
27
Journal of Sociology, vol.39 no.1 pp.31-43 p.33-4
28
Administration, vol.39 no.6 p.591-2
29
Shacknove, A. E. (1985) Who is a Refugee? Ethics, vol.95 no.2
p.276
30
31
Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. (2009) The Age of Migration:
International Population Movements in the Third
World, Palgrave Macmillan p.212
32
Morris, L. (1997) Globalisation, Migration and the Nation-
state: The Path to a Post-National Europe? The
British Journal of Sociology, vol.48 no.2 p.193

9
serious burden for European societies’
33
, and ‘uncontrollable immigration as a potential
security threat’
34
, thus posing as incomplete and inherently simplistic. This
security
discourse, Huysmans argues, places the choice for or against
migration as a choice
about the survival of the political community
35
. However, the discourse does not fully
explain exactly why the survival of the political community is
threatened in the first place.
Thus, little has been done to explore the link between Member
State interest, identitarian
politics and social cohesion concerns, and exclusionism. At its
core, the ethnic
nationalist idea remains lingering in the shadow of mainstream
literature, based on the
idea of nations defined by ‘a shared heritage’

36
, perfectly capable to serve as a tool for
explaining policy outcomes on asylum. As Connor explains,
most authors writing on
ethnic nationalism mainly deal with its manifestations or
policies aimed at its
containment, probably as a result of the intellectual’s
discomfort with dealing with non-
rational explanations as such
37
. Therefore there is space, and, undeniably, a need, to
pay greater attention to the acknowledged fact that ‘ethnic and
cultural parochialism is
almost everywhere a stronger political force than
cosmopolitanism’
38
, and apply such an
acknowledgement to supposedly cosmopolitan liberal bodies
such as the European
Union, analysing its consequences.
33

34
no.3 p.506
35
Huysmans, J. (2000) The European Union and the
Securitisation of Migration, Journal of Common Market
Studies, vol.38 no.5 p.758
36
37
Connor, W. (1994) Ethnonationalism: The Quest for
Understanding, Princeton University Press p.75-6
38
Waever, O. Buzan, B. Kelstrup, M. and Lemaitre, P. (1993)
Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda
in Europe, London: Pinter Publishers Ltd p.45
10
4. Research Strategy

This paper analyses the policy responses to asylum flows in the
European Union, with a
specific focus on the notion of containment assumed to arise as
a result of sentiments of
ethnic nationalism. A qualitative analysis of official policy
documents of the European
Union setting up mechanisms for border control and asylum
screening and processing is
conducted.
The mechanisms of containment are analysed with specific
reference to:
- The Global Approach to Migration
- The European Border Surveillance System
- Readmission Agreements
- Regional Protection Programmes
- Thematic Approaches
- FRONTEX operations
As it is acknowledged that, increasingly, ‘seeking asylum in
Europe has been
criminalised’
39

, with asylum seekers grouped together with illegal migratory
flows,
general border control and protection mechanisms set up are
analysed, as they play a
significant role in deterring all forms of migration, including
asylum seekers.
Reports from FRONTEX are analysed to provide information on
where operations to
contain migration, including asylum flows, are employed most
extensively, offering
information on which groups they are aimed at.
Publications and statistics provided by other bodies are
employed, providing data for
analysing the extent of bias in Europe in the approach of
granting asylum based on
origin. These include reports from the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees,
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the
International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Reports from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles
(ECRE), a pan-European
alliance of 70 organisations in 30 countries, established to
promote the rights of those

who seek international protection in Europe
40
, provides reports on the effects of policies
39
Broken Promises – Forgotten Principles (2004) An ECRE
Evaluation of the Development of EU minimum
standards for refugee protection, Tempere 1990 – Brussels
2004, ECRE, p.17
40
European Council on Refugees and Exiles website, available at:
http://www.ecre.org/about/this-is-ecre/in-a-
nutshell.html
11
adopted by the European Union and individual Member States
on those who seek
asylum within Europe’s borders.
For the case study on Italy, official publications and NGO
reports, alongside other
publications and news articles are used to determine the scope
of the mechanisms set

up for dealing with flows of asylum seekers and how these
operate in practice.
Generally the most recent policy documents are used. However,
this paper limits itself to
developments in the European asylum regime up to 2010 and
therefore does not include
the strategies adopted in response to the refugee crisis arising as
a result of the
revolutions in North Africa.
For more elaborated and differentiated views on policy
developments, as well as
theoretical tools, books are used as secondary sources,
alongside academic journals
which mainly prevail due to the contemporary nature of the
research question at hand,
and the continuous developments of asylum policies.
4.1 Limitations
Primarily, the contentious nature of the topic, calls for
increased sensitivity when making
direct arguments. The fact that many scholars avoid dealing
with the topic of ethnic
nationalism, especially in relations to asylum, serves to
highlight this point. This in effect

limits the availability of literature dealing with, and especially
supporting, the argument
put forward by this paper.
Secondly, data from official sources, such as the International
Organisation for
Migration, or the European Union itself, simply does not exist,
as numbers of asylum
seekers diverted from the European Union are blurred together
with numbers of illegal
migrants.
Finally, a language barrier means that the paper relies
predominantly on sources
available in English.
12
5. Findings
The growing branch of rules, tools and procedures, on European
asylum law,
supposedly guided by humanitarian concerns and human rights
has proven inconsistent

as ‘appeals based solely upon compassion, solidarity or rights
are only occasionally
successful’
41
. Instead of constructing a Protective Europe, European asylum
laws have
had the opposite effect, meshing together with restrictive
migration provisions and
notions such as organised crime and human trafficking. This is a
highly recognised
occurrence, with the UNHCR consistently calling for the
differentiation between refugee
and migratory movements as they ‘fundamentally raise different
concerns and require
distinct policy responses’
42
. This has not yet taken place, nor does it seem that it will in
the near future. An ECRE report estimates that ‘90% of asylum
seekers have to rely on
illegal methods to access the territory of the EU’
43
due to the restrictive migration
measures adopted. In this respect, Member States have widened
their scope of tools

used for identity formation placing asylum within the sphere of
EU’s external interactions.
By focusing on the social boundaries erected by the politics of
asylum in Europe, it
becomes possible to ‘build a general theory of the emergence of
collective,
supranational identities’
44
and spot patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Here, it is
impossible to avoid the notion of collective identity formation
in Europe led by Member
States’ national interest and thus an inherent rejuvenated racial
project of expressly
European identity closing down boundaries towards the race-
neutral but mercilessly
racialised Third World
45
, led by revitalised sentiments of ethnic nationalism posed
against the inimical ‘Other’. By analysing where the patterns of
exclusion are strongest,
the exact kind of identity that Europe is building becomes
clearer, finding the
Mediterranean Border as the main focus of the control fanatics,

with the virtual extension
of European borders to the North African coast creating a
second rejection ring around
Europe
46
. Here, a conservative alliance-containment model has been
created,
41
Shacknove, A. (1993) From Asylum to Containment,
International Journal of Refugee Law, vol.5 no.5 p.517
42
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (October 2000),
Reconciling Migration Control and Refugee Protection
in the European Union: A UNHCR Perspective, Point 4(i), p.1
43
2004, ECRE p.17
44
Downs, W. M. (2001) Review of Cederman, L. E. (2001)
Constructing Europe’s Identity: The External
Dimension, The Journal of Politics, vol.63 no.4 p.1295

45
De Genova, N. (2010) Migration and Race in Europe: The
Trans-Atlantic Metastases of a Post-Colonial
Cancer, European Journal of Social Theory, vol.13 no.3 p.408-9
46
Dietrich, H. (2004) The Desert Front – EU refugee camps in
North Africa? Konkret, issue 12
13
constituting a non-entree regime, deterrence measures,
readmission agreements, harsh
border controls and involuntary returns of refugees to countries
of origin
47
. By studying
how Europe’s boundaries emerge out of specific and differing
interactions with the
Union’s external environment, inferences about Europe’s
identities are obtained much
more accurately
48
. Through erecting rings of rejection, the European asylum
regime

serves the purpose of excluding specific groups of would-be
asylum seekers from official
proceedings within the Union, serving the national interests of
Member States
concerned over notions of ethnic nationalism, creating a
biopolitical system of screening
and, in a way, ‘rescuing the European nation states’
49
.
5.1 The Politics of Containment
Interests of border protection have become more important than
the protection of the
individual, as harmonisation has been accompanied by policies
aimed at tackling
irregular and illegal migration and human trafficking, having
asylum seeker flows
increasingly portrayed as the products of international organised
crime
50
. As a result,
mostly all persons intercepted, returned or otherwise prevented
to reach the EU’s
territory are treated as illegal migrants, with no provisions made

for potential asylum
seekers amongst them
51
. As the IFRC notes, despite the growth in asylum and refugee
law emanating from the European Union, ‘the most critical
component of a
comprehensive strategy appears to be missing: effective access
to international
protection/asylum in the EU’
52
. In this light, ECRE has argued that it is important not to
47
Chimni, B. S. (2002) Aid, Relief and Containment: The First
Asylum Country and Beyond, International
Migration, vol.40 no.5 p.77
48
Downs, W. M. (2001) Review of Cederman, L. E. (2001)
Constructing Europe’s Identity: The External
Dimension, The Journal of Politics, vol.63 no.4 p,1295
49

50
51
Leonard, S. (2010) EU border security and migration into the
European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation
through practices, European Security, vol.19 no.2 p.240-1
52
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC) (2008) Opinion of the National Red
Cross Societies of the Member States of the European Union
and the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies on the European Commission Policy
Plan on Asylum, p.1
14
allow Member States to enjoy the privilege of operating in a
legal vacuum as is currently
the case
53
. The European Commission maintains that:

‘sea border surveillance activities aimed at preventing
unauthorised border
crossings, whether carried out in the territorial waters of the
Member States,
in the contiguous zone, in the exclusive economic zone or on
the high seas,
fall within the remit of the Schengen Borders Code’
54
This said it should be taken for granted that officials performing
border checks under
these provisions should also respect other European laws and
therefore the right to seek
asylum in the European Union. Instead, the wide ranging
migration control measures
introduced by European states are blunt instruments, which,
failing to distinguish
between refugees and ordinary migrants, undermine the
foundations of the refugee
protection regime, encompassing policies such as non-arrival,
diversion, restrictive
application of the 1951 Convention and deterrence policies
55
. As a result, it comes as no

surprise that the overall conclusion drawn is that the
strengthened and externalised
border controls in Europe ‘have had the effect of preventing
access to asylum in the
European Union’
56
. It only remains to analyse where, that is, who at, these
mechanisms
are aimed at in order to fully understand what they are set out to
achieve as
discrimination seems to be ‘written into the very nature of the
European Community’
57
.
The European asylum regime, as a mechanism of managing and
compensating for
cultural difference, seems to construct a form of socio-cultural
racism whereby the
immigrant and, essentially, the asylum seeker as well, are the
embodiment of cultural
difference
58
which is to be contained outside of the Union, and away from
the assumed

communities of its Members’ nation states.
53
European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2010) Briefing on
the Commission proposal for a Regulation
amending Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing a
European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union (FRONTEX), p.5
54
Ibid. p.18
55
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (October 2000)
Reconciling Migration Control and Refugee Protection in
the European Union: A UNHCR Perspective, Point 19, p.7
56
Plan on Asylum, p.6
57
Bhabha, J. (1998) ‘Get Back to Where You Once Belonged’:
Identity, Citizenship and Exclusion in Europe,
Human Rights Quarterly, vol.20 no.3 p.598-9

58
Duffield, M. (2006) Racism, migration and development: the
foundations of planetary order, Progress in
Development Studies, vol.6 no.1 p.71
15
5.2 Minimum Common Standards on Procedures
The starting point of any analysis of the European Union’s
asylum regime is found in the
examination of its core guiding principles, the tenets of which
consist of the Directive on
Minimum Common Standards and Procedures in Member States
for granting and
withdrawing refugee status. If engaging only with the
legislative side, European
cooperation and development on common asylum law can be
argued to have
succeeded in curtailing regulatory competition and in doing so
largely halting the race to
the bottom in protection standards in Europe
59
. However, this level of analysis poses as

simplistic, failing to comprehend the complex set of actions
arising from the application
of such procedures. Ultimately, these are only texts of
directives and not actual
measures adopted, and therefore do not allow comprehension of
what scope of action
they allow in practice.
The London Conclusions set out the elements to be taken into
consideration when
evaluating risks of persecution in third countries as follows:
(a) Previous numbers of refugees and recognition rates
(b) Observance of human rights
(c) Democratic institutions
(d) Stability
60
This allows Member States to shrink their responsibilities to
asylum seekers by
transferring them to third countries found in compliance with
the above provisions.
According to ECRE however, this is at odds with international
refugee law which sets out

that ‘the primary responsibility for international protection
remains with the State where
the asylum claim is lodged’
61
. Nevertheless, the London Resolution further states that
‘the principle of the host third country is to be applied to all
applicants for
asylum, irrespective of whether or not they may be regarded as
refugees’
62
59
Thielemann, E. and El-Enany, N. (2010) Refugee protection as
a collective action problem: is the EU shrinking
its responsibilities? European Security, vol.19 no.2 p.216
60
Article 4 of the Conclusions on Countries in Which There is
Generally no Serious Risk of Persecution, London,
30 November and 1 December 1992
61
2004, ECRE, p.10

62
Article 1(b) of the Resolution on a Harmonised Approach to
Questions concerning Host Third Countries,
London, 30 November and 1 December 1992
16
The third country can be considered a host country even if the
applicant merely ‘had an
opportunity, at the border or within the territory of the third
country, to make contact with
that country’s authorities in order to seek their protection’
63
. Thus the politics of
European asylum containment are widened to third countries,
irrespective of whether the
person concerned can and would be recognised as a refugee by
the European Union.
Even the Union itself recognises the inefficiency of such a
regime, with the Presidency
claiming that
‘the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin
for the purposes

of this Directive cannot establish an absolute guarantee of
safety for nationals
of that country. [...] For this reason, it is important that, where
an applicant
shows that there are serious reasons to consider the country not
to be safe in
his/her particular circumstances, the designation of the country
as safe can
no longer be considered relevant for him/her’
64
However, the application of the right of specific groups of
refugees to seek asylum by
providing reasons to consider that a third country is not safe for
his/her particular
circumstances is increasingly sidelined by the general
application of the regulation. This
is particularly evident when further examination of regional and
thematic approaches to
the notion of asylum is conducted.
Hence, a Communication from the Commission describing a
strategy on the External
Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
highlights the importance of

‘geographic prioritisation’
65
. The list of regions sets out the political priorities for each
region as follows:
‘Cooperation with the Western Balkan countries is intensive
with the aim of
strengthening stability in the region in the light of the
countries’ European
perspective. As regards Russia, justice, freedom and security
has become a
central feature of the strategic partnership. For Ukraine,
strengthening
stability through the European Neighbourhood Policy and
promoting capacity
63
Article 2(c) of the Resolution on a Harmonised Approach to
Questions concerning Host Third Countries,
London, 30 November and 1 December 1992
64
Footnote 1 of the Note from the Presidency on the subject of
the amended proposal for a Council Directive
on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting and withdrawing refugee status 8772/04

2000/0238 (CNS), p.4
65
Chapter V of the Communication from the Commission: A
Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice COM(2005) 491 final
17
building such as a fundamental overhaul of the judiciary, and
the
development of border management and an asylum system in
line with
European standards. With the Mediterranean countries,
strengthening good
governance and the rule of law as well as improving migration
management and security are the main goals. [...] Migration and
border
management are at the top of the agenda, and partnerships
should be
strengthened in the region with countries of origin and transit.
Further
progress is necessary on readmission agreements, and efforts to

develop the dialogue with Libya on migration should be
pursued.’
66
The priorities of migration and border management are
highlighted particularly for the
Mediterranean countries, recognised as the greatest transit zone
for African asylum
seekers. Readmission agreements which target asylum seekers
as much as they do
other types of migrants are emphasised upon, in practice
allowing for the third country
principle to be applied. Such thematic approaches, are
consistent in most EU strategies
on migration and asylum, highlighting the continuous
importance to better control and
contain African populations, with a much more tranquil
approach adopted towards other
regions.
One important element has however been ignored by the
Directive – that of access. With
this in mind, a proposal to amend the Directive on minimum
standards on procedures
has been erected in 2009, adding the notion of responsibility. It
states that

‘with a view to ensuring an effective access to the examination
procedure,
officials who first come into contact with persons seeking
international
protection, in particular those carrying out surveillance of land
or maritime
borders or conducting border checks, should receive
instructions and
necessary training on how to recognise and deal with requests
for
international protection. They should be able to provide third
country nationals
or stateless persons who are present in the territory, including at
the border,
in the territorial waters or in the transit zones of the Member
States, and wish
to request international protection, with all relevant information
as to where
and how applications for international protection may be
lodged. Where those
persons are present in the territorial waters of a Member State,
they should
66

Chapter VII of the Communication from the Commission: A
Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice COM(2005) 491 final, original
emphasis
18
be disembarked in land and have their applications examined in
accordance
with this Directive’
67
This provision carries particular weight given the fact that land
and maritime surveillance
conducted extensively by Member States throughout the
Mediterranean, often focus on
intercepting and deterring groups of migrants attempting to gain
access to the territory of
the European Union, irrespective whether or not potential
asylum seekers are amongst
them. Hence, this provision would enable for a more effective
asylum system in the EU,
allowing it to fulfil the duties it is prescribed by international
refugee law. However, the

Proposal was not passed; maintaining asylum seekers
intercepted at European maritime
borders trapped within the rejection circles of restrictive
migration laws of the Union.
Again, a regional overview of the restrictive European asylum
regime demonstrates who
the primary target of such provisions is. A Communication from
2010 shows that during
that year ‘the most important countries of citizenship of asylum
seekers in the EU were,
in order: Afghanistan (20 580), Russia (18 500), Serbia (17 715,
excluding Kosovo), Iraq
(15 800) and Somalia (14 350)’
68
. Therefore, the greatest influx of asylum seekers in the
EU came from its Eastern and South-Eastern Borders.
Nevertheless, the same
Communication, highlights the need to address ‘the geographic
and thematic priorities of
the EU’, offering ‘a structured dialogue on migration, mobility
and security to its partner
countries, and in particular those in the Southern
Mediterranean’
69

. This highlights two
points. Firstly, the number of asylum seekers in the EU seems to
be originating
significantly less from North Africa than other regions. This
may be a direct result of
reduced refugee flows from the region or, more likely, due to
the effectiveness of
mechanisms erected in order to stem their flow. Secondly,
although partnerships on
issues such as migration, mobility and security existing between
the European Union and
other states and regions, such as Russia, Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe and Asia;
the focus is placed on the Southern Mediterranean, despite
figures pointing in another
direction. Therefore, the current containment apparatus of the
European Union is
primarily aimed at asylum seekers from the African continent.
67
New Point 19 in the Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and
withdrawing international protection COM(2009)

554 final 2009/0165(COD)
68
Chapter II(2) of the Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament and the Council:
Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2010) COM(2011)
291final
69
Chapter V of the Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: Annual
Report on Immigration and Asylum (2010) COM(2011) 291final
19
5.3 From Dublin to Stockholm
The Dublin Convention
The Dublin Convention was set out to deal with issues
concerned with determining the
Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum
application. It was replaced
in 2003 by the Dublin II Regulation which reaffirms these
principles, dealing with a
variety of scenarios including applications for asylum lodged in
other Member States or

transit zones, applicants with family members present in the
European Union and
applicants in possession of a valid visa for one or more Member
States
70
. However, what
the Regulation inherently fails to do is address the scenario
which has by now become
common – that of responsibility for applications lodged in
international waters in the case
of interception. Thus what European refugee law is consistently
failing to do is to
address the cases arising as a result of the provisions and
actions adopted by the
European Union itself.
In 2004, the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council introduced a
Regulation for creating a
network of immigration liaison officers, aiming to prevent and
combat illegal migration,
the return of illegal migrants and the management of legal
migration
71
. However, the

Regulation makes no reference to the notion of asylum and the
right to seek
protection
72
. Therefore, asylum seekers intercepted in international waters
are most
likely to be returned to third countries without being given the
option to seek protection in
the EU. Having in mind that, as Figure 3 in the Annex shows,
most maritime operation
are concentrated in the Mediterranean, it is, again, the asylum
seekers from the African
continent that are most vulnerable to such provisions, or rather,
the lack of them.
70
Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for
determining the Member State responsible for examining an
asylum application lodged in one of the Member
States by a third-country national
71
Article 2 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of 19
February 2004 on the creation of an immigration
liaison officers network

72
Stemming the Flow: Abuses Against Migrants, Asylum Seekers
and Refugees‟ (2006) Human Rights Watch,
vol.18 no.5, p. 95
20
The Hague Programme
The Hague Programme aims at strengthening freedom, security
and justice in the
European Union stressing the equal need for intensified
cooperation and capacity
building ‘both on the southern and the eastern borders of the
EU’
73
. However, there are
significant differences in the application of cooperation between
these two regions. The
Programme states that ‘it welcomes initiatives by Member
States for cooperation at sea,
on a voluntary basis, notably for rescue operations’
74

. Yet, as this paper shows in
Section 5.6, cooperation at sea has been inherently regionally-
oriented, notably placing
primary focus on the Southern Mediterranean. It is also applied
consistently with aims
different to the proclaimed goal of rescue operations, focusing
rather on stemming
migration and asylum flows from reaching European coasts.
The Schengen Borders Code
Article 3 establishing the scope of the Schengen Borders Code
states that the
Regulation applies to any person crossing an international
border without prejudice to
the rights of refugees and persons requesting international
protection
75
. In order to reach
European Union territory, Article 5 sets Entry Conditions for
third-country nationals as
follows:
‘For stays not exceeding three months per six-month period, the
entry conditions for
third-country nationals shall be the following:

(a)they are in possession of a valid travel document or
documents authorising
them to cross the border; (b) they are in possession of a valid
visa, if required
pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March
2001 listing
the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of
visas when
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are
exempt from
that requirement (1), except where they hold a valid residence
permit; (c) they
justify the purpose and conditions of the intended stay, and they
have
sufficient means of subsistence, both for the duration of the
intended stay and
73
Article 1(1.6.3.) of The Hague Programme: Strengthening
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European
Union (2005/C 53/01)
74
Article 1(1.7.1) of The Hague Programme: Strengthening
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European
Union (2005/C 53/01)

75
Article 3(b) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders (Schengen
Borders Code)
21
for the return to their country of origin or transit to a third
country into which
they are certain to be admitted, or are in a position to acquire
such means
lawfully; (d) they are not persons for whom an alert has been
issued in the
SIS for the purposes of refusing entry; (e) they are not
considered to be a
threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the
international
relations of any of the Member States, in particular where no
alert has been
issued in Member States’ national data bases for the purposes of
refusing

entry on the same grounds’
76
Therefore it is not applying for asylum, but reaching the
territory of the European Union in
order to do so that is extremely difficult. With the erection of
carrier sanctions and strict
border check mechanisms, the European Union has closed off its
borders to migrants
and therefore would-be asylum seekers from Africa and Asia,
revealing the biopolitical
patterns of European migration and asylum policies. Thus,
despite the Schengen
Borders Code Regulation encompassing a clause stating that
‘by way of derogation from paragraph 1[...] (c) third-country
nationals who do
not fulfil one or more of the conditions laid down in paragraph
1 may be
authorised by a Member State to enter its territory on
humanitarian grounds,
on grounds of national interest or because of international
obligations’,
77
those attempting to reach Europe from Africa and Asia are

prevented from obtaining the
opportunity to reach EU territory in advance, in most cases, as
Figure 1 in the Annex
shows.
76
Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European
Borders Code)
77
Article 5(4) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European
Borders Code)
22
The Stockholm Programme
The Stockholm Programme claims to be set out to achieve an
Open and Secure Europe

Serving and Protecting Citizens. Therefore it should come an no
surprise that national
interests prevail in the Regulation, as a Europe of
Responsibility, Solidarity and
Partnership in Migration and Asylum as Article 6 describes the
Union as, turns into a
mechanism for stemming asylum flows as the, already described
as inefficient Dublin
System ‘remains a cornerstone in building a Common European
Asylum System
(CEAS)’
78
. The idea of regional approaches is echoed again, as the
Programme calls for
the creation of Regional Protection Programmes to be
incorporated into the Global
Approach to Migration
79
. Additionally, migration and asylum are further externalised,
placed in Article 7, Europe in a Globalised World – The
External Dimension of Freedom,
Security and Justice, with return and readmission agreements
with third countries placed
as a priority in the Union’s external relations

80
.
The mentioned regional programmes are elaborated further
within the external
dimension. Again, a different pattern is applied to different
regions. Hence, in the
Western Balkans the focus is placed on Stabilisation and
Association Agreements
through which issues such as visa policy facilitation and
readmission agreements are
slowly developed. Regarding Turkey, priorities are set on
concluding the negotiations on
readmission agreements. Engagement with the Black Sea Region
aims at supporting
stability and security, alongside border and migration
management. In terms of the
Russian Federation the focus is placed on cooperation within
the framework of the visa
dialogue, legal migration, tackling organised crime and the
improvement of judicial
cooperation. Only for the Mediterranean Region is there a sense
of alarm, highlighting
that it is necessary to enhance the work regarding migration
(maritime) border

surveillance, and a stronger partnership with countries of transit
and of origin based on
reciprocal requirements and operational support, including
border control, fight against
organised crime, return and readmission.
81
Reaching swift conclusions with Algeria,
78
Article 6(2) of The Stockholm Programme – An Open and
Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens
2010/C 115/01
79
Article 6(2.3) of The Stockholm Programme – An Open and
2010/C 115/01
80
2010/C 115/01
81
2010/C 115/01

23
Morocco, Egypt and Libya is placed as high priority and
portrayed as a matter of
exceptional urgency.
Even regarding countries with recognised high numbers of
refugees, many of which
seek refuge in the EU - Afghanistan and Iraq - the position of
the European Union
seems more at ease, stating that focus should be kept on
effectively addressing the
refugee situation through a comprehensive approach and efforts
should be made to
address illegal immigration flows and conclude readmission
agreements
82
, but there is
no sense of panic. As a result, the adjustments undertaken to
accommodate national
executives’ beliefs and interests in the process of setting
migration and asylum laws, and

priorities in the Stockholm Programme
83
, portray a picture of mechanisms developed to
stem the flow of migrants and asylum seekers especially from
North Africa, constructing
the European refugee regime as a biopolitical apparatus created
to manage populations
and serve the purpose of closing down EU borders for any form
of protection to these
specific group.
82
2010/C 115/01
83
Kostakopoulou, D. (2010) An open and secure Europe? Fixity
and fissures in the area of freedom, security
and justice after Lisbon and Stockholm, European Security,
vol.19 no.2 p.161-2
24

5.4 Other principles, actions and tools
The early tools set out to deal with issues of asylum have been
seen as a failure as, for
example, the workings of the HLWG on Asylum and Migration
set up in 1998 focus not
on root causes such as ‘human rights violation and poverty, or
on protection of refugees,
but instead on measures to prevent entry into Europe’
84
. Until now, little has changed.
The only advancement of the current system is that it becomes
more obvious which
ethnic group’s containment takes priority.
Global Approach to Migration
The European Union continuously justifies its actions based on
notions of universal
values, claiming that due to its ‘humanitarian traditions, Europe
will also continue
showing solidarity with refugees and persons in need of
protection’
85
. What official

documents do not state is the plethora of mechanisms developed
to reduce and prevent
the arrival of those in need of protection. Were these
mechanisms developed actually
driven by notions of humanitarianism and non-discrimination,
there would be no need for
the IFRC to issue a report highlighting the need for all claims to
be seen as ‘unique’ and
thus ‘accordingly processed individually and considered on
their individual merits without
resort to generalised assessments based on e.g. nationality’
86
. It is essentially such
generalisation that are inherent in the Global Approach to
Migration, seeing regions
outside the European Union as blocks producing irregular
migrants and refugees which
are to be contained outside the Union’s borders.
Analysing prospects of a Common Immigration Policy for
Europe, the Commission
remains consistent in its insistence on maintaining the
principles set out in the Global
Approach to Migration, and the mechanism of partnerships with
third countries. Again, it

specifically highlights the importance of engaging closely with
the African partners to
jointly implement plans on migration and mobility
87
. Similarly, in a Communication from
84
Chimni, B. S. (2002) Aid, Relief and Containment: The First
Asylum Country and Beyond, International
Migration, vol.40 no.5 p.87
85
Introduction, paragraph 12 of the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions: A Common
Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools
COM(2008) 359final
86
Plan on Asylum, p.3
87
Article 6 of the Communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: A Common Immigration Policy for Europe:
Principles, actions and tools COM(2008) 359final
25
the Commission on the topic of Strengthening the Global
Approach to Migration, a
regional division is maintained. For the Eastern and South-
Eastern regions neighbouring
the EU, it is emphasised that dialogue and cooperation on
migration are already
underway through various frameworks, ascertaining that there
would be an added value
in developing cooperation in ‘the areas of labour migration
management, development-
enhancing remittances, voluntary return and reintegration of
migrants and diaspora
networks’
88
. On the other hand, regarding Southern migratory routes, there
is again a

sense of exceptional measures, calling for ‘new forms of
dialogue and cooperation
between countries from various regions and settings, beyond the
traditional boundary
lines of relations between the European Union and these
countries’
89
.
Therefore, the Global Approach to Migration supplements other
mechanisms of the
European asylum apparatus, reinforcing the idea that migrants
and asylum seekers from
other regions can be managed through further development of
existing agreements,
whilst only those originating from Africa specifically, need to
be controlled through the
adoption of measures beyond the traditional lines of existing
agreements.
Border Surveillance System
With notions of prevention shifting from preventing the root
causes of migration,
assuming a new meaning – ‘preventing the influx of refugees
and immigrants into the
EU’

90
, even the Union itself published a number of reports
emphasising the negative
effects such developments have on refugees, arguing that the
‘legitimate measures
introduced to curb irregular migration and protect external
borders should avoid
preventing refugees’ access to protection in the EU’
91
. Acknowledging that the issue of
asylum seekers’ access to the EU has increasingly come into
question, the Commission
proposed the development of mechanisms capable of allowing
for the differentiation
between persons in need of protection and other categories of
migrants before they
88
Article 3(2) of the Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of Regions Strengthening the Global Approach
to Migration: Increasing coordination, coherence and synergies
COM(2008) 611 final
89

Article 3(1) of the Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the
of Regions Strengthening the Global Approach
to Migration: Increasing coordination, coherence and synergies
COM(2008) 611 final
90
91
Article 2 of the Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions
Policy Plan on Asylum: An integrated approach
to protection across the EU COM(2008) 360 final
26
reach the border of potential host States
92
. How such a mechanism would work, for the
Southern Maritime Border, rigorously patrolled by FRONTEX

with an aim of intercepting
and returning vessels carrying migrants back to third countries,
is not clear.
Meanwhile, the creation of a European Border Surveillance
System began, stating that it
is set out to allocate priority ‘to examining the creation of a
European Surveillance
System for the southern maritime borders’
93
. The Communication sets out an ambitious
plan of creating an ‘integrated network of reporting and
surveillance systems for border
control and internal security purposes covering the
Mediterranean Sea, the southern
Atlantic Ocean (Canary Islands) and the Black Sea’
94
, presumably as a general
approach to Europe’s borders in cooperation with FRONTEX.
However, a Report on
progress made in developing the European Border Surveillance
System, despite
maintaining the Black Sea region in the heading of Phase 3,
Step 7, contains no

reference to it, focusing instead solely on the Southern
Maritime Border referring to a
‘proposal for a pilot project on the integration of maritime
surveillance in the
Mediterranean Sea and its Atlantic approaches’
95
. Respectively, FRONTEX maritime
operations remain focused on the Mediterranean, and have not
experienced any
significant development towards encompassing patrols and
border protection operations
in the Black Sea Region, as Figures 3 and 4 in the Annex
demonstrate. Thus, once
again, priority is placed on guarding the Southern Borders, and
therefore strategies to
effectively stem the flows of the ethnically-different migrants
and asylum seekers from
the African continent.
92
Article 5(2.3) of the Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the Council, the
of Regions Policy Plan on Asylum: An integrated

approach to protection across the EU COM(2008) 360 final
93
Introduction, paragraph 2 of the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions Examining the
creation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)
COM(2008) 69final
94
Article 4(3.1, Step 7) of the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions Examining the creation of a
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) COM(2008)
69final
95
Article 2(3.1.2) of a Commission Staff Working Paper: Report
on Progress Made in Developing the European
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) SEC(2009) 1256final
27
Readmission Agreements
Readmission agreements between the European Union and third
countries, encompass

no specific procedure for the ‘examination of the human rights
record of countries people
are being returned to,’
96
. Nevertheless, readmission agreements have been signed
between the European Union and a number of third countries,
with a diverse set of
human rights and refugee protection records. What is more
important for the purpose of
this paper is the fact that regional differentiation within these
agreements is once more
present. The AENEAS Programme for financial and technical
assistance to third
countries in the area of migration and asylum provides an
example. With a global
approach, the programme is divided into regions – the African
and Mediterranean; the
South-Eastern European; the Eastern; the Southern and Eastern
Asia; and the Latin
America and Caribbean migratory routes
97
. Only two African countries, Morocco and
Algeria, ‘have been given priority as regards their eligibility

under the AENEAS
programme
98
’ regarding negotiating readmission agreements with the
European
Commission. Thus again, the focus is clearly placed on African
migrants and asylum
seekers, with calls for reaching readmission agreements with
North African states
continuously finding place in EU strategy papers, and their
return to where they came
from, away from the European Union, no matter the
consequences.
Regional Protection Programmes
Regional protection Programmes serve the purpose of
containment most clearly. A
common justification offered by Member States for their
preference for containment is
that ‘the primacy of overseas resettlement, the exilic bias, of
post-war refugee policy
must be reversed’
99
, employing an ironic twist of the human rights discourse. The

Commission also suggested that by screening asylum seekers
outside of European
borders might ‘constitute an efficient tool in combating
sentiments of racism and
xenophobia as the public would recognise that they have valid
reasons for applying for
96
2004, ECRE, p.23
97
AENEAS programme: Programme for financial and technical
assistance to third counties in the area of
migration and asylum, Overview of projects funded 2004-2006,
European Commission
98
Administration, vol.39 no.6 p.597-8
99
International Journal of Refugee Law, vol.5 no.5 p.522-3

28
protection within the Union’
100
. However, comparing examples of asylum seekers from
Kosovo and Zimbabwe, Schuster highlights the fact that, whilst
Kosovans received a
considerably warmer reception in Europe compared to other
groups, in case of
Zimbabwe it took a fierce struggle of campaigning to put an end
to deportations of
asylum seekers from Europe back to the country
101
. Despite recognition that both groups
were facing persecution, it was the African asylum seekers
whose suffering was harder
to acknowledge and provide protection for. The Communication
and Schuster’s
research, offer evidence firstly, of xenophobic sentiments
present towards asylum
seekers in Member States, and secondly, suggest that those
arriving from Africa are in

advance placed in an unfavourable position through a
mechanism guided by ethnic
sentiments.
The external reception centres, proposed on the basis of a
Global Approach to
Migration, set the path for a complete externalisation of the
asylum procedure, with
asylum seekers detained while their claims are assessed
102
. Two pilot projects were
authorised, in the African Great Lakes region and in Eastern
Europe. Once an asylum
claim is determined, the applicant is repatriated to the home
country, where there is no
longer need for protection or integrated locally into the
community of a host country,
whilst only in cases where these two are not possible, the
applicant is resettled in the
European Union
103
. Whilst approving the pilot projects, the UNHCR emphasised
that
such a programme can by no means serve the purpose of

replacing the possibility of
obtaining asylum in the EU. There is thus a general concern that
‘European policies on
border control contradict the aim at making human rights
protection one of the flags of
European security governance outwards’
104
. With the growing number of refugee camps
and detention centres at the outer borders of the Union,
especially in North Africa, as
Figure 2 in the Annex shows, this concern seems valid.
Regional Protection
Programmes thus serve the purpose of stipulating a mechanism
that circumvents
100
Chapter 1(16) of the Communication from the Commission to
the Council and the European Parliament on
the Managed Entry in the EU of Persons in Need of
International Protection and the Enhancement of the
Protection Capacity of the Regions of Origin: ‘Improving
Access to Durable
Solution

s’ COM(2004) 410 final
101
Schuster, L. (2003) Common sense or racism? The treatment of
asylum-seekers in Europe, Patterns of
Prejudice, vol.37 no.3 p.237
102
Lavenex, S. (2006) Shifting Up and Out: The foreign policy of
European immigration control, West European
Politics, vol.29 no.2 p.343
103
104
Ceccorulli, M. (2010) Security and Migration: The
development of the Eastern dimension, European
Security, vol.19 no.3 p.504-5

29
international refugee law as the Statute of the Office of the
UNHCR and the UN Refugee
Convention and its Protocol maintain that ‘victims of
persecution must be outside their
country of origin in order to be recognised and protected bona
fide as refugees’
105
.
Therefore, by erecting RPPs, and negotiating cooperation
agreements with third
countries, as is increasingly the case with African states, the
European Union manages,

by a thin line, to avoid directly violating international refugee
law, controlling populations
by preventing asylum seekers from leaving their host regions in
the first place and,
essentially, from placing foot on European soil.
5.5 FRONTEX
Amongst the earliest tasks that FRONTEX was allocated by the
European Commission
was to investigate the feasibility of improving coordinated
monitoring of the
Mediterranean, quickly followed by another study - BORTEC -
which considered the
associated challenge of establishing a surveillance system
covering the entire southern
maritime border alongside the open sea beyond
106

. From its very outset therefore, the
Agency was focused on controlling Europe’s Southern Border.
The Regulation
establishing FRONTEX allocated it the following tasks:
‘a) coordinate operational cooperation between Member States
in the field of
management of external borders; (b) assist Member States on
training of
national border guards, including the establishment of common
training
standards; (c) carry out risk analyses; (d) follow up on the
development of
research relevant for the control and surveillance of external
borders; (e)
assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased
technical and

operational assistance at external borders; (f) provide Member
States with the
necessary support in organising joint return operations’
107
There is no specific provision granting FRONTEX the task of
continuously patrolling
Europe’s Mediterranean Border, not to mention provisions
setting out procedures
regarding asylum. With its involvement in rescue operations at
sea, FRONTEX has
posed as an Agency with humanitarian concerns. However,
having in mind that
FRONTEX operations encompass interception and diversion of
vessels, potentially
105

International Journal of Refugee Law, vol.5 no.5 p.527-8
106
Lodge, A. (2010) Beyond the Frontiers: Frontex: the First Five
Years, Frontex, p.39
107
Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26
October 2004 establishing a European Agency for
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member States of the European
Union
30
carrying asylum seekers on board as well, the proposed
‘humanitarian benefit -
preventing the loss of life at sea - trumps a human right - the

right to leave and seek
asylum’
108
. In fact, apart from actual rescue operations at sea, Member
States’ and
FRONTEX officials ‘have avoided coming into contact with the
people on board
intercepted vessels’
109
, as diversion preventing access to territorial water of the Union
is
utilised as a primary form of interception. This means that
potential asylum seekers are
not given the chance to seek asylum, treated instead as illegal
migrants and returned to
third countries outside the EU. In this way Member States,
according to Sirtori and

Coelho, circumvent their responsibilities under international
refugee and human rights
law, as ‘control exercised over those on board amounts to
jurisdiction’
110
, in effect
amounting to responsibility for potential asylum seekers on
board as well. Nevertheless,
Member States are found to ‘attribute responsibility for possible
breaches of human
rights and refugee law which occur in the course of, or as a
result of joint operations
exclusively to the third country in whose territorial waters the
operation was carried
out’
111

. And with the EU asylum regime increasingly taking place
outside the borders of
the Union, this means that responsibility has the potential of
being fully shifted outwards.
FRONTEX thus poses as an incomparable mechanism for
controlling and containing
various forms of migration, including asylum seekers. With its
specific focus on the
Mediterranean Border it is the embodiment of the biopolitical
ethnic-separatist project, as
‘never before has there been such a high level of sophistication
in the coordination of
operation aiming to expel certain groups of migrants amongst
such a large group of
states’
112
. It is important to note at this point that FRONTEX is mainly a

‘coordinator of
EU Member States’ activities’
113
, meaning the actions espoused by the Agency are the
result of Member States’ interests. And the primary focus is,
once again, placed on
groups of migrants, including asylum seekers, coming from
Africa, as an assessment of
FRONTEX’s first five years states that ‘there was no doubt in
anyone’s mind where the
108
Pushed Back, Pushed Around (2009) Human Rights Watch,
p.37
109
Sirtori, S. and Coelho, P. (2007) Defending Refugees’ Access
to Protection in Europe, ECRE, p.38-9

110
Sirtori, S. and Coelho, P. (2007) Defending Refugees’ Access
to Protection in Europe, ECRE, p.38-9
111
112
through practices, European Security, vol.19 no.2 p.246
113
through practices, European Security, vol.19 no.2 p.248

31
[future] focus of maritime attention lay: the Mediterranean Sea’
114
. Despite Article 31 of
the 1951 Refugee Convention recognising that asylum seekers
may enter the territory of
a signatory State without authorisation
115
, their very attempt to reach the territories of the
European Union is prevented, with their illegal status used to
disqualify their rights
116
.

Through Joint Operation HERA, aimed at preventing irregular
migration to the Canary
Islands, ‘bilateral agreements have been negotiated by Spain to
allow interception not
just on the high seas but also inside Senegalese and Mauritanian
territorial waters’
117
,
allowing for interception and diversion of boats back to their
points of departure.
Similarly, in 2010 the European Commission signed a Migration
Cooperation Agenda
with Libya, agreeing to ‘jointly address the challenge of
managing migration and
protecting refugees by offering 50 million Euros in aid to stop
migrants and would-be

refugees transiting through Libya on their way to Europe’
118
. With border control
operations financed by both the European Union and Italy,
Libya has instituted a regime
of containment of African migrants and asylum seekers, who are
intercepted at sea and
returned to Libya without being given a chance to reach
European land and claim
protection.
114
Lodge, A. (2010) Beyond the Frontiers: Frontex: the First Five
Years, Frontex, p.38
115
Article 31(1) of the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to

the Status of refugees, UNHCR
116
117
118
Noll, G. and Giuffre, M. (2011) EU Migration Control: Made
by Gaddafi? International Relations and Security
Network
32

5.6 Thematic Programmes
The Thematic Programmes of the European asylum regime are
erected with the aim of
setting clear principles and objectives for the Union’s
engagement with third countries. At
the same time, they serve the purpose of reducing ‘the burden of
control at their
[Member States’] immediate borders and increases the chances
of curtailing unwanted
inflows before they reach the common territory’
119
. As such, by analysing where the
focus of these is placed and what kind of action is prescribed, a
better understanding of
the Union’s objectives concerning specific regions, and thus

populations can be
obtained.
Thematic Programmes are conducted through the AENEAS
Programme, whose annual
working programmes provide a breakdown of regions,
specifying the objectives and
activities the EU aims to pursue. For Eastern Europe, Southern
Caucasus and Central
Asia, the aim is to improve international protection by
improving the conditions of
reception and of the capacity of registration and documentation
of their asylum seekers
and refugees as well as integration in the host country. The
same approach is applied to
Turkey. In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, activities to be
assumed encompass

reinforcing the capacity of protection in the host regions
especially in order to support
the management of national authorities, develop registration and
documentation
systems for refugees and tackle the problems concerning their
integration in the host
regions. Again, only in the case of North Africa, exceptional
measures are called for and
elaborated through the objectives of improving conditions of
reception of refugees in the
region, improving international protection, complying with
international conventions and
reinforcing legal structures in the regions, alongside promoting
regional cooperation in
the field of management of migratory flows, especially transit
migration, illegal migration
and trafficking in human beings. Hence, the types of activities

to be adopted include a
plethora of measures aimed at developing regional dialogue on
asylum and
strengthening of the legislative capacities and of the expertise
available in the region,
developing and setting up of a protocol defining short and
medium term immediate
responsibility for the victims of shipwreck and clandestine
passage as well as developing
a network of liaison officers for harbour and airport control of
migration
120
. Thus,
119
Haddad, E. (2008) The External Dimension of EU Refugee
Policy: A New Approach to Asylum? Government

and Opposition, vol.43 no.2 p.197
120
Annex II: AENEAS Working Programme 2005 in the
Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council: Thematic programme for the
cooperation with third countries in the area of
migration and asylum COM(2006) 26final
33
regulating migration flows, which include asylum seekers as
well, is placed on a highly
elaborated level in the context of the greatest transit zone for
African migration - North
Africa, whilst other regions are assumed to continue gradual
development of their

migration management systems.
The importance attributed to instituting control mechanism
across the Southern
Mediterranean by the European Union is highlighted by its
determination to reach an
agreement with Libya despite the fact the Tripoli is not
officially committed to protecting
refugees and asylum seekers, as it is not party to the 1951
Refugee Convention and its
Protocol, nor has it transposed the 1974 OAU Convention
Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa into official law, despite
ratifying the document in
1981. This seems to have had little effect upon it reaching an
agreement with the
European Union in 2004, encompassing ‘modern border control
equipment, joint patrols,

and the establishment of reception centres to intercept would-be
immigrants and asylum
seekers’
121
. This raises two important points. Firstly, it shows that the
European Union is
primarily concerned with stemming the flow of refugees
irrespective of whether their
safety can be guaranteed at the borders that the European
asylum regime has created.
Secondly, it demonstrates, once again, how important
strengthening Europe’s Southern
and exclusionary Border is for the European Union.
Despite calls for Libyan authorities to ‘demonstrate a genuine
commitment to fulfil their
obligations under the OAU Convention’ and stressing that until

advancements in this
field take place cooperation with Libya can only be ‘limited in
scope and take place on a
technical ad hoc basis’, the European Presidency nevertheless
calls for an extension of
such cooperation to other countries of origin and transit on the
African continent ‘in close
relation with the relevant regional organisations to develop a
wider approach to
migration management on the African continent’
122
. Therefore, human and refugee rights
are sidelined against efforts to control the movement of African
populations towards
Europe and, essentially, given the application of such control so
far, prevent African

asylum seekers from reaching the European Union. The politics
of power thus become
embodied in the biopolitical nature of European asylum law,
leading Europe, as a result,
to create a paradox through the process of defining its territorial
and social boundaries
121
122
Note from the Presidency to the Council: Draft Council
Conclusions on initiating dialogue and cooperation
with Libya on migration Issues, 9413/1/05 REV1

34
as ‘failure to adhere to human rights norms excludes states from
membership of the EU,
but individuals excluded from access or membership frequently
are denied those core
constitutive protections in the process’
123
. This process of articulating and practicing
restrictive migration and asylum policy not only leads to
questions concerning the fate of
refugees, it also poses as ‘a reflection of the kind of society that
the European Union is
building’
124
. It is a direct application of what Sarkozy has called for,
claiming that there

was insufficient concern ‘about the identity of the country that
was receiving’
125
. The EU
asylum regime allows such calls for ethnic nationalism to be
expressed, allowing as a
result Member States to mechanism based on such identitarian
concerns against those
perceived as ethnically-Others, ultimately, as a result, stemming
the flow of African
asylum seekers attempting to reach Europe.
123
Human Rights Quarterly, vol.20 no.3 p.612

124
Statement by Bjarte Vandvik, ECRE Secretary General (2008)
The European asylum system: ‘common
shouldn’t mean mediocre’, ECRE, p.4
125
Nicolas Sarkozy declares multiculturalism had failed (2011)
Telegraph
35
6. Case Study: Italy
Considering the Italian perspective on notions of asylum is
important in order to provide
a Member State’s view, with the aim of generating a more
comprehensive understanding
of the overall European response, as the Union remains an

intergovernmental
organisation in this sphere. With measures to contain asylum
seekers primarily focused
on the Southern Mediterranean, and thus the regions of greatest
concern for the EU,
using the example of Italy which ‘because of its geographical
position, is the natural
landing space for all the migration flows coming from Northern
Africa’
126
, seems rational.
Italian cooperation with African states, especially Libya, on
asylum is more developed
than that of the European Union
127
. Article 19 of the 2008 Friendship Treaty calls for two

things regarding migration and asylum - previous agreements
and protocols on migration
to be implemented with 2000km of Libyan coast patrolled by
mixed crews on patrol
boats provided by Italy; and Libyan land borders to be
controlled by a satellite detection
system jointly financed by Italy and the European Union
128
. It is essential to keep in mind
that operations agreed between Italy and Libya serve general
interests of the Union as
well in terms of controlling the Southern Border. Thus, two
months after the agreement,
the European Union lifted its eighteen-year arms embargo on
Libya so that the country
could import equipment to control its borders and limit the
migration flow

129
, towards
Europe.
In 2010 FRONTEX reported only 150 detections of illegal
migration in the first three
months of the year in Malta and Italy, down from 5,200 in the
corresponding period of
2009, attributing the drop to the agreement between Italy and
Libya which allows the
return of illegal migrants to Libya, without screening for
refugees
130
. In reality, statistics
reveal that ‘over 50% of asylum seekers arriving in Italy are
recognised as refugees’
131

.
Italian authorities have in fact ‘acknowledged officially that
they do not proceed with the
126
Franceschelli, R. (2002) Recent Developments in the Italian
Refugee Legislation: How do they Fit in a
European Migration and Refugee Policy? The Cicero
Foundation,
127
and Refugees(2006) Human Rights Watch,
vol.18 no.5, p.99
128
Ronzitti, N. (2009) The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and
Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New
Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?, Istituto Affari
Internazionali, p.5

129
and Refugees(2006) Human Rights Watch,
vol.18 no.5, p.102
130
Business Middle East: Migration Phobia (2010), The Economist
Intelligence Unit Limited
131
Press release: EU shouldn’t shift its responsibility for refugees
to Africa (2009) ECRE
36
formal identification of migrants who are pushed back’
132
, and therefore potential asylum

seekers are not given the opportunity to lodge an application for
protection. Even if such
action was taking place, the CPT Report highlights that even if
protection was requested
aboard an Italian vessel, ‘there is no procedure in place capable
of referring him/her to a
protection mechanism’
133
. Meanwhile, Berlusconi was quoted by the Italian media saying
that the Italian idea it to ‘take only those citizens who are in a
position to request political
asylum [...] referring to those who put their feet down on our
[Italian] soil’
134
. This is
apparently a shared view across the Union demonstrated by the

measures adopted both
by Member States as well as at EU level.
Once again, neither Italy, nor the European Union, have been
prevented in erecting
restrictive asylum regimes in light of human and refugee rights
violations. Instead, the
Italian government signed a cooperation agreement with Libya,
whilst negotiations with
the European Union are taking place outside of the Barcelona
Process which calls for
respect of human rights and international obligations
135
. It seems that containing African
migrants and refugees away from Italy and Europe takes
precedence over all other
issues. In this light, Berlusconi’s statement provides an

explanation and a suitable
conclusion for such an extensive approach to achieving this
goal:
‘The Left’s idea is that of a multiethnic Italy. That is not our
idea. We don’t
want Italy to become a multiethnic, multicultural country. We
are proud of our
culture and of our traditions’
136
132
Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried
out by the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT) from 27 to 31 July 2009
CPT/Inf(2010)14

133
Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried
out by the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT) from 27 to 31 July 2009
CPT/Inf(2010)14
134
Italy: Berlusconi Misstates Refugee Obligations, Human Rights
Watch
135
Della Giovanna, M. (2010) The European Union and Libya:
Strange Bedfellows? Paper presented for the
conference: „Belgique, Europe et mondialisation: quelles
équations?‟ , Institut de Sciences Politiques
Louvain-Europe, Louvain-la-Neuve 13-14 October 2010, p.16
136
Pushed Back, Pushed Around (2009) Human Rights Watch,
p.26

37
7. Conclusions
What this paper shows is that groups such as ‘refugee’, ‘asylum
seeker’, ‘irregular
migrant’, ‘illegal migrant’, and other identities, have been
blurred ‘into an indistinct and
negative category of irregular migration’
137
, by the current European migration and
asylum regime. Determining who belongs to which group has
become inherently difficult
and increasingly irrelevant from the European perspective.
Despite a plethora of asylum
and refugee laws in place, all claiming an unbiased and

humanitarian basis, ‘Europe is
not providing refugees with an alternative to dangerous
journeys, placing themselves in
the hands of smugglers and traffickers in their attempt to reach
protection’
138
, only to be
rejected as illegal migrants on this basis. Therefore the Europe
of Protection has
become a Europe of Containment and Exclusion. While
acknowledging that the effects
of policies aimed at improving conditions in countries of origin
and host countries is a
long term project, it is nevertheless obvious that ‘current policy
instruments work to
establish legitimacy for the denial of protection and the
conclusion of readmission

agreements, with a view to shifting responsibility away from the
European territorial
core’
139
.
With increased calls against multiethnic societies, states feel
obliged to react, and
closing down borders seems as the first logical step in stemming
the flow of the
ethnically-different ‘Others’ towards their own boundaries.
Thus 2010 has seen a heated
debate in Germany over the issue of multiculturalism, a row
within the UK coalition
government over a proposed immigration cap, and the elections
of a far-right party into
Swedish Parliament for the first time, all culminating with

Angela Merkel arguing that the
vision of a multicultural Germany has absolutely failed
140
. With such developments at the
home front it only seems logical for states to close off their
borders to those who seem
likely to threaten the fragile situation and deepen the tensions,
asylum seekers or not.
Unfortunately, this places Europe as a beacon of containment of
refugee flows, rather
than a Union led by solidarist and humanitarian notions offering
protection to those
seeking it. With the threat of potentially losing these values
from sight, the current
137

Duffield, M. (2008) Global Civil War: The Non-Insured,
International Containment and Post-Interventionary
Society, Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.21 no.2 p.154
138
Press release: EU shouldn’t shift its responsibility for refugees
to Africa (2009) ECRE
139
140
Business Middle East: Migration Phobia (2010) The Economist
Intelligence Unit Limited
38

asylum regime, focused on containment is framed within a
humanitarian discourse, as
the ‘emphasis on prevention and protection has appealed to the
ethical side of state
actors, seeing it as a way to be seen to be advocating human
rights and refugee
protection’,
141
, with the end result of actually reducing the pressure of
numbers arriving
within European borders.
European politics of asylum, operating in a regional and
thematic apparatus whereby
certain groups receive preferential treatment in comparison to
others, institute a
mechanism in which states on the Eastern and South-Eastern

Borders of the European
Union are given breathing space to develop their own
mechanisms for asylum
management despite these being constructed on the basis of
European standards.
Meanwhile, the states on the Southern Border are placed into
exceptional mechanisms
specially designed the third countries of the Mediterranean, and
thus for controlling
migration and asylum flows from Africa. This paper clearly
demonstrates this by
analysing the regional provisions of projects such as the Global
Approach to Migration,
the European Border Surveillance System, Readmission
Agreements, Regional
Protection Programmes, Thematic Approaches as well as the
spread, scope and content

of FRONTEX operations administered under the auspices of the
European Union.
Comparing the reception Africans receive to other groups in the
EU, as well as the
mechanisms erected to stem the various flows of migration,
including asylum seekers,
demonstrates the bias present in the European asylum regime. If
immigration laws
‘shape who we are as a people because they function as a
mirror, reflecting and
displaying the qualities we value in others’
142
, then European migration and asylum law
shows an alarming image of a society primarily focused on
erecting a wall between itself
and migration flows from the African continent, including

asylum seekers. It paints a
picture of a society placed on a dangerously thin line between
applying biopolitical
measures to control migrant and asylum seeking populations,
and sinking into the
depths of modern racism, bound up with the technique of power
and the working of a
State which, following its interests, is obliged to use race, the
elimination of races and
the purification of the race to exercise its sovereign power
143
.
141
Haddad, E. (2008) The External Dimension of EU Refugee
Policy: A New Approach to Asylum? Government
and Opposition, vol.43 no.2 p.200

142
and asylum in the EU, Routledge, p.109
143
Foucault, M. (2003) Society Must Be Defended, Penguin Books
Ltd., p.258
39
Delineating a cultural identity is thus part of the current project
of drawing a perimeter
between Europe and non-Europe
144
. For the grave numbers of African migrants which
perish each year attempting to reach Europe’s southern coasts,
Europe’s asylum regime

proves that the Union is not a welcoming place for them to seek
refuge from suffering.
Sentiments for the need of a clear identity present in Member
States prevailed over the
Union’s humanitarian mission, erecting a Europe which,
compared to the 1900s when
there were many states in Europe without a single
overwhelming dominant nationality,
by 2007 triumphed the separatist project of maintaining the
domestic ethnic balance of
power
145
, with exclusionary migration and asylum laws as the primary
tools. The refugee
regime of the European Union has thus been fundamentally
changed by a resurgence of

ethnic nationalism and calls for greater social cohesion,
instituting a biopolitical
apparatus and shifting from a ‘system designed to welcome
Cold War refugees from the
East and to resettle them as permanent exiles in new homes, to a
non-entree regime,
designed to exclude and control asylum seekers, [especially]
from the South’
146
.
144
Human Rights Quarterly, vol.20 no.3 p.598
145

146
the EU and policy responses, IPPR, p.45-6
40
8. List of Abbreviations
CEAS Common European Asylum System
ECRE European Council of Refugees and Exiles
EU European Union/Union
FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the

External Borders of the member States of the European Union
HLWG High Level Working Group
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IFCR International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
RPP Regional Protection Programme
OAU Organisation of African Unity
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
41
9. Bibliography

Official documents:
1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
refugees, UNHCR, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [accessed March 2,
2012]
AENEAS programme: Programme for financial and technical
assistance to third counties
in the area of migration and asylum, Overview of projects
funded 2004-2006, European
Commission, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/migration-
asylum/documents/aeneas_2004_2006_overview_en.pdf
[accessed April 15, 2012]
Commission Staff Working Paper: Report on Progress Made in
Developing the
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) SEC(2009)

1256final
Communication from the Commission: A Strategy on the
External Dimension of the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice COM(2005) 491 final
Parliament and the Council:
Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2010) COM(2011)
291final
Parliament and the Council:
Thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in
the area of migration and
asylum COM(2006) 26final
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on
the Managed Entry in the EU of Persons in Need of

International Protection and the
Enhancement of the Protection Capacity of the Regions of
Origin: ‘Improving Access to
Durable

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