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https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920516649418
Critical Sociology
2017, Vol. 43(3) 429 –448
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0896920516649418
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Neoliberal Education Reform and
the Perpetuation of Inequality
Jessica Brathwaite
Temple University, USA
Abstract
New York has some of the most segregated high schools in the
country, and schools serving
low-income and minority students have the lowest graduation
rates. This paper discusses
changes in inequality between New York City high schools
during a period of neoliberal
education reform. Neoliberal education reforms are intended to
improve schooling through
choice and accountability policies. I find that segregation has
increased in the best performing
schools during this era of reform, and that race and class
maintain a negative impact on

graduation rates despite the implementation of neoliberal
policies. I argue that these policies
not only fail to reduce inequality, but exacerbate and reproduce
existing class and race
inequalities in schooling.
Keywords
neoliberalism, education policy, New York City, high schools,
inequality, high school graduation,
segregation, school choice, accountability, dissimilarity index,
growth curve model
Introduction
Education has the potential to elevate the life chances and
opportunities of those born into poverty
and disadvantage. Horace Mann created the first public
education system on this principal, in
hopes that an equal availability of schooling for all would
reduce social divisions. Mann (cited in
Cremin, 1957) states that ‘education, then, beyond all other
divides of human origin, is a great
equalizer of conditions of men – the balance wheel of the social
machinery’.
If education is to have its intended effect, all students must
have access to an education that
prepares them for success. Unfortunately, poor, black, Hispanic
and non-native English speakers
are least likely to have such access, and they are most likely to
attend segregated low-quality
schools. Throughout the history of public schooling, reforms
have been implemented to improve
access to educational opportunities. This research will provide
an understanding of whether access
and equality has improved during a neoliberal reform era in

New York City. In addition to
Corresponding author:
Jessica Brathwaite, Department of Sociology, Temple
University, 713 Gladfelter Hall, 1115 West Polett Walk,
Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA.
Email: [email protected]
649418CRS0010.1177/0896920516649418Critical
SociologyBrathwaite
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430 Critical Sociology 43(3)
analyzing factors that impact graduation rates, this work
examines the racial segregation of stu-
dents by school quality.
This research uses high school graduation rates as a measure of
school quality because high
school graduation rates are a national priority in our effort to
have a globally competitive work-
force. The global market calls for more advanced skills and
technology than it did decades ago, and
high schools are tasked with introducing students to these skills.
To this end, there is a push to
reduce dropout rates and improve graduation rates. Research has
focused on high schools that do

not graduate more than 40% of their freshmen (Balfanz and
Legters, 2004). These schools, dubbed
dropout factories, are qualitatively different in demographic
composition. They are segregated and
more likely serve mostly poor, black and Hispanic students.
Dropout factories are the focus of
policy and interventions designed to improve educational
opportunities for all students. Increasing
graduation rates is a signal to reformers and to the public that
school quality is improving and more
American youth are being prepared for the global labor force.
The number of diplomas awarded by a high school is a sign of
how many of their students leave
prepared for postsecondary life. Schools serving mostly black
and Hispanic students are least
likely to prepare their students for postsecondary life.
Neoliberal reforms are intended to raise
standards and attainment for all groups. Under neoliberal
reforms, high school graduation rates are
used in accountability systems to determine whether a school is
meeting its expected progress
targets. Schools with persistently low graduation rates are
subject to sanctions and may eventually
close. Graduation rates are also a symbol of school quality for
parents and students. High school
graduation rates are made available on high school websites, in
the NYC high school directory
(which students receive and use to pick high schools), and they
are used to rank high schools’
desirability.
In education, neoliberal strategies focus on high-stakes
accountability, increased assessment,
and school choice. Under neoliberal reform, schools are
mandated to increase the number of

assessments they administer and are penalized or rewarded
according to student performance.
Schools are then classified by this performance, and this
classification serves as a measure of
school quality for parents when selecting schools.
Neoliberal reforms rely on parents having complete information
about schools and their right to
choose schools rather than attend a zoned school. Choice is
intended to reduce the connection
between neighborhood of residence and school quality, so that
students living in poor or segregated
neighborhoods are not relegated to the worst schools. Neoliberal
reforms are not directly aimed at
reducing inequality. Neoliberalism assumes that when all
schools are improved and all families
have school choice, they will have a better system of schools to
choose from and that they will
choose the school that best suits their needs. I argue that this
indirect focus does not reduce inequal-
ity, and does not create a system of schools in which all
students have equal access to a high-quality
education. Furthermore, I suggest that these reforms may do
more harm than good. There is evi-
dence showing that they may exacerbate inequality in low-
performing schools (Booher-Jennings,
2005; Jennings and Sohn, 2014).
Neoliberal reforms require extensive changes to data collection,
testing, staffing, and opera-
tions. A great deal of tax money and time has been allocated to
the implementation of these reforms.
Using school-level public data, this research will examine
changes in inequality during a period of
neoliberal reform in New York City between 2000 and 2013.

This paper will begin by explaining the problem of inequality
between high schools. It will then
consider the history and implementation of neoliberal policy as
a solution to this problem. After an
explanation of my methods, I will discuss my findings and their
implications for understanding
educational inequality. Findings suggest that segregation and
inequality of outcomes are not
reduced during an era of neoliberal reform.
Brathwaite 431
Education Inequality
The national graduation rate is above 80% for the first time in
history (Balfanz et al., 2014). While
graduation rates have increased over time, inequalities by race
have persisted. The graduation rates
of non-Hispanic whites and Asians have exceeded those of
blacks and Hispanics since 1972
(Chapman et al., 2011). A high school diploma increases one’s
chances to be socially mobile, but
those most in need of this mobility have been least likely to
benefit.
A high school diploma has become the minimum credential
required for occupational success
and financial security. Declines in domestic manufacturing
during the 1970s and 1980s led to the
closure of many urban factories. The loss of manufacturing jobs
limited employment opportunities
for uneducated urban workers and increased the need for
educational credentials (Wilson, 1996;
Bettis, 1994). This increased demand for educational credentials

has negatively impacted black
and Hispanic men (Wilson, 1996). Black and Hispanic students
are least likely to earn a high
school diploma and most likely to be unemployed. As of 2010,
the national unemployment rate for
whites is 8.7, compared to 16.0 and 12.5 for blacks and
Hispanics respectively.
Black and Hispanic students are both more likely than whites
and Asians to be poor and to
attend low-performing schools. Black and Hispanic youth are
more likely to earn a GED instead of
a conventional high school diploma. They are also more likely
to take more than four years to
graduate (Murnane, 2013). This inequality of opportunity is
linked to the type of schools they
attend. ‘In 2008, one-half of all high school dropouts attended
one of the 1746 high schools with
high dropout rates’ (Murnane, 2013). Black and Hispanic
students are isolated in the worst per-
forming urban schools. Balfanz et al. (2014) refer to these
schools as dropout factories, those in
which less than 60% of the 9th grade class is still enrolled four
years later. In 2004, half of all black
and 40% of all Hispanic students nationwide were enrolled in
dropout factories. By 2012, 23% of
black and 15% of Hispanics were enrolled in dropout factories.
Progress has been made, but half
of the remaining dropout factories are located in urban areas
that serve mostly black and Hispanic
students (Balfanz et al., 2014).
The school one attends has an impact on their long-term
outcomes as well. Goldsmith (2009)
finds that attending a minority concentrated school is associated
with lower educational attainment

later in life. Black and Hispanic students who attend these
schools are less likely to earn a high
school diploma or a bachelor’s degree. When students from
these schools do go to college, they
identify gaps in their high school education that disadvantaged
them in their college courses (Reid
and Moore, 2008). African American students are less likely to
be ready for college, especially
those coming from high-poverty schools (Moore et al., 2010).
Urban schools serving mostly black, Hispanic or poor students
suffer from a host of issues,
which may help explain their unequal outcomes. These schools
have fewer qualified teachers
(Darling-Hammond, 2004, Lankford et al., 2002; Clotfelter et
al., 2010). These schools also have
fewer monetary resources (Carter, 1984; Condron and Roscigno,
2003). In addition, teachers in
these low-income schools often report a low sense of
responsibility for student learning (Diamond
et al., 2004). For a host of reasons, urban schools have a lower
capacity to educate their students.
Neoliberal reforms have been implemented to improve the
quality of all schools. The next sec-
tion will explain what neoliberal reform is and how it has been
implemented. This section will end
with a discussion of the empirical literature studying the impact
of these policies on inequality.
Neoliberal Education Reform
Neoliberalism is the ideology that currently guides the reform
of public services. The hallmark of
neoliberal reform is the effort to limit the public distribution of
goods and services and to privatize

services such as hospitals, education, transportation, welfare,
and social security. Neoliberals argue
that public goods and services are delivered most effectively
when service providers compete for
clients in a free market, as they do in the private sector.
The neoliberal argument rests on a strong faith in free market
competition, which relies on
choice and rational individualism (Apple, 2006). Neoliberals
believe that all individuals are self-
interested and rational, and that given complete information,
they will make the choice that is in
their best interest. In a free market, people must have the power
to choose between several options
for all social transactions. Freedom of choice creates
competition between service providers, such
that they all strive to maximize the quality and efficiency of
services available. Neoliberals assume
that individuals will not choose service providers or businesses
that are failing, and that failing
businesses will not survive. In free market competition,
organizations that survive do so based on
their own merit and effort.
Free market competition is beneficial to the consumer because it
requires businesses to con-
stantly innovate and improve. Free market competition is also
seen as an effective way to insure
that public funds are being used efficiently. The role of the state
under neoliberal reforms is to
insure that public services are maximizing their potential, and

to regulate their improvement or
facilitate their termination.
The application of neoliberal values to education reform began
in the 1970s in response to finan-
cial crises, the civil rights movement, and the social
improvement programs implemented under
President Lyndon B. Johnson. The 1960s and 1970s reform
climate was characterized by compensa-
tory and redistributive policies. The civil rights era sought to
provide equal access to public institu-
tions and opportunities for all races. The Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 provided
funding, called Title 1 funding, to schools that serve high
percentages of children from low-income
families. President Johnson also implemented a set of programs
to eliminate inequality and racial
injustice. These programs included the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964, which created the social
welfare programs Job Corps and Head Start. America was in a
prosperous phase during the 1960s
and federal reforms aimed to redistribute some of the money to
the most impoverished groups.
In 1964, James Coleman of Johns Hopkins University was
commissioned to study the associa-
tion between resource disparities in schools and achievement
gaps. This research was conceived
based on the assumption of the great society, that reducing
inequality of opportunity would solve
social problems (Hanushek and Kain, 1972). This research was
expected to support the implemen-
tation of Title 1 funding, by showing that inadequate resources
would negatively impact student
performance (Karsten, 1999). Unfortunately, Coleman’s results
did not show this expected rela-

tionship. He found that the biggest influences on student
outcomes were social background and
peers. Coleman’s research was used to question the premise of
the great society (Gamoran and
Long, 2006, Britez et al., 2010). Coleman’s research was used
to argue that public spending on
social programs was not an effective use of resources.
Social welfare spending was at its highest during the late 1960s
and early 1970s. American
manufacturing began to slow during the 1970s, creating a
financial crisis that lasted into the 1980s.
Criticisms of welfare spending rose as tax receipts, jobs, wages
and America’s overall international
prowess declined. Milton Friedman’s work was used to invoke
the shift from a welfare state to a
neoliberal state. Friedman argues against centralized
government economic programs and spend-
ing. He argues that ‘centralized economic planning is consistent
with its own brand of chaos and
disorganization and that centralized planning may raise far
greater barriers to free international
intercourse than unregulated capitalism ever did’ (Friedman,
1951: 4). Conservative anti-welfare
rhetoric rose consistently through the 1970s and reached a peak
with the election of President
Ronald Reagan. Reagan was a proponent of deregulating and
privatizing public services as well as
drastically decreasing spending on public services like
education, health care, and transportation.
Brathwaite 433
President Reagan commissioned a study of American high

schools to assess the quality of
course offerings and outcomes. A Nation at Risk (ANAR) was
published in 1983 under the Reagan
administration. ANAR decried public education for failing to
provide a rigorous and competitive
education to American students. The report states that
Americans will not be internationally com-
petitive unless students are held to higher standards and taught
a more challenging curriculum. The
release of ANAR led to a spike in public disapproval of the
public education system. There was an
overall sentiment that public schools were failing America
because they were not creating compe-
tent students who could join the increasingly technical
workforce.
The release of A Nation at Risk marks a shift from the US as a
welfare state concerned with
improving the lives of all citizens to a neoliberal state
concerned with maximizing the potential of
individuals, the efficiency of social institutions, and America’s
global prowess. The democratic
purpose of schooling is to reduce inequality between people,
create critical thinkers and to develop
competent members of society. Civil Rights reforms focused on
making sure that schools had the
resources and materials necessary to do so. During the 1970s
and 1980s, there was an increased
focus on outputs, and measuring the performance and ability of
students. Following the release of
ANAR, there was a massive increase in testing, measurement,
and evaluation of schooling out-
comes as a measure of school quality. Schools were seen less as
a vehicle for democratic citizen-
ship and more as institutions with an obligation to maximize
student performance and the number

of credentials awarded.
This shift towards a neoliberal education system makes students
and families consumers and
schools businesses that are in competition with each other to
attract consumers. In 1990, Chubb
and Moe published Politics, Markets, and American Schools. In
this book, the authors build on the
finding that private schools have better performance than public
schools (Coleman et al., 1982).
They argue that private schools perform better because they
attract high-performing students, but
also because they are better organized. The authors note that
private schools are accountable to
parents rather than the rules of the bureaucratic public
education system or teachers unions. A pri-
vate school that does not meet the demands of parents will close
eventually, while a public school
may remain open. They argue that public school parents don’t
have the power to choose schools,
which prevents competition between schools. Without
competition there is no incentive for public
schools to continually improve.
The key to improving schools, for Chubb and Moe, is that
parents should have the same power
over public schools that they have in private schools and in
private business: the power to choose.
Chubb and Moe promote a new and more privatized type of
school that has little state involvement
and limited bureaucratic control. These schools can accept and
expel anyone they choose and there
is no tenure for teachers. These schools are accountable to
parents, not the state. Essentially, the
authors argue that by treating the schools as businesses and
families as clients, the quality of public

education will be improved. This argument reshaped educational
discourse so that school reform is
now dominated by the use of market logic, specifically the logic
of choice and competition.
The Implementation of Neoliberal Reform
The early 1990s was an ideal time for the work of Chubb and
Moe to be released and for the imple-
mentation of neoliberal reform. The ideas of Chubb and Moe
provided a solid explanation and
solution to improve what was perceived to be a failing public
education system. It also catalyzed a
shift towards the privatization of public education. Reducing the
public control of education allows
schools to be controlled by market forces, reducing them to a
commodity whose value lies in test
scores and attainment rates (Giroux, 2012). Reform efforts to
increase choice began during the late
1980s and early 1990s with the standards-based reform
movement led by Presidents Bush and
Clinton. These presidents sought to implement statewide
learning standards and to expand choice,
with little success (Lubienski, 2005).
These reforms were followed by the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2002 under President George
W. Bush. No Child Left Behind (NCLB) is notably the first
federally-implemented neoliberal pol-
icy. NCLB increased testing, choice and accountability for
schools with the intention of reducing

racial and socioeconomic gaps in achievement. New York City
implemented a set of reforms that
were aligned with this new neoliberal agenda. Neoliberal
reforms do not make schools accountable
to parents in the exact way Chubb and Moe envisioned, because
schools are still public entities
under a public governance structure. Despite this deviation,
neoliberal reforms have increased
privatization and created competition between schools using
choice and accountability systems.
In 2005, Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Joel Klein
implemented a full high school choice
program in New York City. Under this new system, 8th graders
must rank their school preferences
and an algorithm is used to match students to a school on their
list. This choice system is intended
to equalize access to high-quality schools, so that disadvantaged
students are not relegated to the
low-quality high schools in their neighborhoods. In 2015,
approximately 48% of the 76,000 appli-
cants were matched to their top choice, and over 75% were
matched to one of their top three
choices (Schoolbook, 2015).
In addition to matching students to the school of their choice,
the Bloomberg administration
sought to create a better system of schools to choose from.
Large failing high schools were closed,
and replaced by as many as nine small themed schools in the
same building. These small themed
schools were opened as partnerships with larger private
organizations like the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation and New Visions. By 2009, 200 small schools
had been opened and 20 large
comprehensive high schools were closed (Baker, 2013). This

reform was intended to increase com-
petition most amongst schools serving the most disadvantaged
students. Most of the closed schools
were in low-income neighborhoods in Brooklyn and the Bronx,
and many of the new schools were
created to serve low-performing minority students.
In addition, graduation requirements were increased during this
reform era. In 2005, New York
State increased high school graduation requirements by making
the regents exams mandatory for
graduation. The stated purpose of exit exams was to increase the
labor market value and integrity
of a New York State diploma. By requiring students to pass
exams in a number of subjects, New
York State attempts to insure that their high school graduates
have mastered a specific set of skills.
The exams are intended to improve achievement, attainment,
and postsecondary outcomes. The
scores on these exams are used to determine college course
placement in the New York City uni-
versity system (CUNY, 2016).
In 2007, Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein implemented
an A-F accountability grading
system for all schools. Each school is required to submit data
about its progress, performance and
quality. These data are then compiled to create a letter grade.
Schools that receive an F or a C three
times in a row are subject to accountability sanctions and
support. These supports include profes-
sional development and supplemental services such as
instructional and curricular coaches.
Sanctions include replacing more than half of the entire staff, or
closure. This reform is intended to
hold schools accountable to the administration and to parents

for improving student performance.
This reform also creates a visible indicator of a school’s
performance, which can be used by parents
to choose schools.
Neoliberal policy assumes that choice and competition between
schools will lead to reduced
inequality. Neoliberal policies do not provide a direct
mechanism for reducing inequalities
between school outcomes or for reducing segregation. The
assumption of neoliberalism is that if
parents have information about which schools are best, they will
avoid failing schools and these
schools will either close or be forced to improve. This indirect
strategy to reduce inequality
Brathwaite 435
places the onus on families to insure that their children receive
a high quality education. This
research will examine whether this indirect method is effective.
This research asks: has inequal-
ity between schools’ graduation rates and in segregation
between schools improved or worsened
during this reform era? Studies have found that increased
graduation requirements and account-
ability pressure do not reduce inequality, but that small schools
do have the potential to reduce
inequality.
Accountability
Accountability systems are intended to create a measurable
target and incentivize schools to meet

it. Sanctions are applied when schools do not meet these targets.
Research shows that schools may
resort to gaming and other practices used to dishonestly boost
accountability grades. To insure that
schools perform well and meet accountability requirements,
research finds that resources are chan-
neled primarily toward the grades where students take
standardized exams (Booher-Jennings,
2005; Diamond et al., 2004). These grades receive more money
for books and other learning mate-
rials to pass exams. Within benchmark grades, schools target
‘bubble kids’ (Ho, 2008). These are
the students who score right beneath the passing score. Rather
than improving all schools, account-
ability systems may drive schools to prioritize students who are
further beneath the cut-off, with
the hopes that the school will meet accountability measures if
they can get these kids over the
passing threshold.
McNeil, Coppola, Radigan and Vasquez Heilig (2008) study
dropouts in Texas high schools
following the implementation of an accountability system that
uses graduation rates as a metric.
The authors find that disaggregating outcomes by subgroup did
not lead to more equity – it identi-
fied students to be ‘pushed out’ in order to meet accountability
standards. In Texas, waivers were
granted to schools that allowed schools to hold a student back if
they fail at least one class in 9th
grade. This is done to avoid having those students counted in
the 10th grade TAAS assessments.
Instead of improving high school outcomes, accountability
systems may result in gaming of the
system in order to boost test scores. The authors found that
dropout rates increased during this

reform era, thus expanding educational inequalities.
Haney (2000) finds that GED rates rose following the
implementation of an accountability sys-
tem in Texas, and the number of students in special education
doubled. The author finds that the
improvement in test scores that Texas was famous for can
actually be attributed to their referral of
problematic students to special education and to GED programs.
The positive intentions of account-
ability systems can cause schools to manipulate their student
population in order to meet account-
ability standards. This research will examine schools’ response
to the threat of accountability
sanctions in New York City schools during this neoliberal era.
Exit Exams
Research indicates that while exit exams may have met their
goal of increasing rigor, they have
also led to a decline in graduation rates. Research has focused
on how graduation rates change and
for whom across New York State and in other states, but this
research will examine the impact of
exit exams in New York City while various neoliberal reforms
were being implemented. Exit
exams decreased graduation rates and increased dropout rates,
especially for disadvantaged groups.
Using Common Core Data, Dee and Jacob (2007) examine how
statewide implementation of exit
exams impacts attainment and labor market outcomes. The
authors find that exit exams increase
the dropout rate for black students, students in high poverty,
high minority schools, and for stu-
dents in urban or rural schools.

Gotbaum (2002) found that higher graduation requirements are
leading to increased discharges
in New York City. Discharges are students who leave school but
do not graduate, yet are not
counted as drop outs. Discharges may be students who leave the
school system, attend another
school, or attend a GED program. Schools use this
categorization as a way to mask students who
leave school, without a negative impact on their graduation or
dropout rates. Gotbaum finds that
problematic students are being encouraged to leave and not
informed of their right to stay in school.
Increasing graduation rates may have the unintended
consequence of decreasing graduation rates,
especially for disadvantaged student populations.
Small Schools of Choice
The small school movement was designed to provide better
schooling options to all students. The
small school of choice (SSC) movement in New York City has
had a notably positive impact on
graduation. This research will examine whether good schools
become more diverse, and how small
school status impacts the schools in this NYC sample over time.
Bloom and Unterman (2012) do
a random assignment study of small schools of choice (SSC) in
New York City. The authors find
that SSCs improved graduation rates across cohorts by a
combined 8.6 percentage points.
Enrollment in an SSC improves the graduation for all
subgroups, and improves college readiness

in English but not math. Stiefel et al. (2012) find that small
schools are most likely to serve Hispanic
and Asian students, as well as students with limited English
proficiency. They also find that gradu-
ation, regents taking rates, and regents passing rates improved
for all schools, but improved most
for small schools.
The open high school choice policy has not had an equalizing
impact. Nathanson, Corcoran, and
Baker Smith (2013) examine the high school matching process.
They find that low-performing
black or Hispanic students tend to choose lower-performing
schools than their high-performing
peers. Low-performing students are also less likely to select a
specialized high school. The high
school match process does not appear to redirect disadvantaged
students away from low-perform-
ing schools.
Segregation
Kucsera and Orfield (2014) find that segregation is on the rise,
especially for Hispanics. Nationwide,
the typical black student is now in a school where two-thirds of
their classmates are low-income,
nearly double the levels in schools of the typical white or Asian
student. New York, Illinois, and
Michigan are the most segregated states for black students
(2014: 7). Orfield, Losen, Wald and
Swanson (2004) find that Asians are least likely to be in school
with other Asians and less likely to
be around blacks and Hispanics.1 This research will examine
trends in segregation to see if black,
Hispanic and poor students continue to be isolated in the
lowest-performing schools

Neoliberal Education Reform and Inequality
This research adapts a critical perspective on the impact of
neoliberal policy. I argue that neoliberal
policy is not likely to reduce inequality because individuals
have varying levels of power and capi-
tal. In addition, I argue that neoliberal policy does not include a
direct mechanism for reducing
inequality, and that the indirect methods are not likely to be
effective.
Eduardo Bonilla Silva (2009) argues that ‘choice is based on the
fallacy that racial groups have
the same power in the American polity’ (p. 36). Neoliberalism
assumes that everyone is a rational
actor who makes the best decision for their self. This assumes
that all people have equal knowledge
Brathwaite 437
to make the best decision and equal power to execute their
choice. Bonilla Silva further argues that
‘because Whites have more power, their unfettered, so-called
individual choices help reproduce a
form of White supremacy in neighborhoods, schools, and in
society in general’ (p. 36). White and
wealthy parents have more political and economic power, and
can achieve better results for their
children.
Neoliberalism ignores structural inequalities in access and
opportunity, and shifts responsibility
for high-quality education from the state to the individual.

Neoliberal policy creates an illusion of
meritocracy, where all students are perceived to have equal
access to a high-quality education.
Given this perceived equality of opportunity, poor outcomes are
attributed to individual decision-
making and not the state or any existing racial or socioeconomic
inequalities. Good outcomes are
attributed to individual merit and hard work. The lifelong
learning movement is another educa-
tional example of such policy. This movement advocates
constant occupational training as a per-
sonal responsibility to remain employable. This movement
shifts the responsibility of training
employees from employers to the individual (Olssen, 2006).
This type of policy also creates an
illusion of meritocracy, where the most prepared individual is
most employable. Individuals have
unequal access to professional and workforce development, but
the spread of lifelong learning
policies will create a system where those with the most access
to personal development excel, thus
reproducing existing inequalities. In New York City,
advantaged parents are more successful at
advocating for their child, and at gaining admission to the best
schools (Ravitch, 2013). Upper-
class students also tend to live in neighborhoods with good
schools and many K-8 schools privilege
local residents in their admissions. A system of school choice
can result in advantaged groups
receiving the same advantages that they have had historically,
rather than an equal playing field
where all families have equal access to good schools.
Increased choice may work best for middle-class students.
Middle-class parents tend to be more
aggressive and knowledgeable when dealing with the school

system. These parents tend to have
more flexible hours and more time to visit schools, and they can
also afford to travel long distances
to take their children to school (Apple, 2001). This leads to a
concentration of more advantaged
students in the best-performing schools and the reproduction of
inequality. Despite universal access
to the best public high schools, middle-class students are still
more likely to attend high-perform-
ing schools (Mead and Green, 2012). Choice policy that does
not directly address racial and socio-
economic inequality can result in a perpetuation of inequality,
where all students have access to
better schools but advantaged groups are more able to secure
spots in the best schools.
Scholars have argued that reforms using accountability and
choice systems are an attempt by the
middle class to alter the rules of competition in education, in
order to provide an advantage for their
children in the face of rising economic uncertainty (Henig,
1994; Darling-Hammond, 2000).
Giroux and Schmidt (2004) argue that education is now a
private good used to gain an advantage
rather than a public benefit to be consumed by all. Constantly
raising the bar and increasing exclu-
sion from educational opportunity is a mechanism by which low
income and minority students are
continually denied access to the potential for social mobility
that is afforded by increasing one’s
educational attainment (Bourdieu, 1973).
While the rules surrounding school choice reflect an increase in
required knowledge that bene-
fits advantaged students, neoliberal reforms result in a
decreased level of skills for disadvantaged

students. Bowles and Gintis (2002) argue that schools do more
than educate students, that they
teach students how to think and how to see the world (also see
Hill Collins, 2009: 33). Schools
implicitly impart educational skills and ideas that reproduce
social inequalities. Under neoliberal
reforms, the prevalence of testing reshapes the curriculum in
low-performing schools to focus
primarily on basic skills, while students in better-performing
schools are exposed to a wider variety
of knowledge and critical thinking skills (Giroux, 2012).
In addition to creating citizens with unequal levels of
knowledge, neoliberal policies have the
harshest impact on the most disadvantaged schools. Blum
(2015) argues that poorly resourced
districts will experience more accountability pressure and have
fewer resources to actually imple-
ment the data and measurement requirements that exist under
neoliberal reforms. He argues that
the marketization of schools creates winners and losers, and the
losing schools are more likely to
be in low-resourced areas with concentrated poverty and
segregation, which is exacerbated by the
choice system.
Market logic privileges those with higher levels of knowledge,
material resources, and power
(Apple, 2006). Lisa Delpit (1995) argues that in order to
eliminate achievement gaps and social
inequalities as they relate to education, we must address the
‘larger power differentials that exist in

our society between schools and communities, between teachers
and parents, between poor and
well-to-do, between whites and people of color’ (p. 133).
Neoliberal policies indirectly address the
greater social inequalities that exist, and I argue that they are
more likely to perpetuate these ine-
qualities as they rely on decisions and knowledge that are most
abundant among those in power.
Data and Methods
The data for this paper comes from the School-Level Master
File (SCHMA) developed by the
Research Alliance for New York City Schools at New York
University. The SCHMA was created
by compiling publicly available data from the New York City
Department of Education (DOE) and
the US Department of Education. The file is updated annually
with new data. It includes data from
the 1995–6 academic year through 2012–13.
This analysis will use data from the year 2000 until 2013,
because the graduation rate2 is miss-
ing for most schools from 1996 to 1999. I excluded transfer and
alternative schools because their
students are not held to the same admissions requirements, and
some are not seeking a traditional
high school diploma. Students in these schools may be over
traditional high school age, seeking a
GED, or disabled.
Due to the nature of the reform, several schools are missing
data. A large part of the missing data
occurs because the school was not yet open or it has been closed
within the time span under study.
The dissimilarity index is designed to account for changing

samples, and the estimate of segrega-
tion is not affected by missing data. Imputation methods were
not used for the growth curve model
because this assumes the data is missing at random.3 This data
is suitable for growth curve mode-
ling because there are no observable patterns in the missing data
in terms of size, race, or gradua-
tion rates. The majority of schools have no missing data. The
schools with missing data tend to be
smaller, which makes sense because part of the reform was to
implement new small schools. These
schools do not have data for all of the years in which they were
open. There is no substantial dif-
ference between the racial composition or graduation rate of
schools with missing data and those
without (Table 1).
The dissimilarity index is a measure of unevenness, as it
measures the extent to which racial
groups are unevenly distributed across schools. For this
analysis, a dissimilarity index is created to
measure black-white, Hispanic-white, and Asian-white
unevenness within and across each perfor-
mance third. The within index indicates the percentage of
students in each school who would have
to switch schools in order to achieve racial balance within that
third. This index is created using the
population of each racial group in each school in a given third
and the total population of that racial
group across the schools in that third. Racial balance is
achieved when the proportion of a race
group in each school is equal to the proportion of that group in
the entire third.
The across third dissimilarity index is also calculated to
measure the extent to which racial

groups are attending schools of different quality. This index
indicates the percentage of students
Brathwaite 439
that would need to switch thirds in order to achieve the racial
balance of the district as a whole.
This index is created using the population of each racial group
in each third and the total population
of that racial group across the entire district (the NYC district
includes all high schools). This index
will equal zero when the proportion of a race group in each
third is equal to their proportion dis-
trict-wide. Together, these measures show how segregation has
changed within and between per-
formance thirds.
The dissimilarity index does not account for high or low
proportions of a particular racial group
in a third; it only measures if the proportion is the same across
schools or thirds. If the proportion
is not the same, the index indicates the proportion of students
that would need to be redistributed.
For example, an index of 36% means that 36% of black or white
children would need to switch
schools in order to achieve racial balance. The analysis of
changes in the dissimilarity index shows
us the extent to which students are segregated within and across
performance categories, but it does
not explain the extent to which attending a segregated school
impacts graduation rates for those
students.
A growth curve model is estimated to understand whether the

impact of race and class on gradu-
ation rates declines over time as expected. Traditional
regression models, such as Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS), are not sufficient because there are repeated
observations within each school and
OLS does not account for these correlated error terms. If OLS
was used for this analysis, the stand-
ard errors would be underestimated but the coefficients would
be similar. Growth curve modeling
is a type of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) that accounts
for repeated observations by allow-
ing each school to have its own intercept and coefficient (Singer
and Willett, 2003). The coefficient
of this model estimates the relationship between the initial
status of graduation rates in 2000 and
time, and with school composition measures and policy
indicators.
This model uses a random slope for time. The indicator
variables used in this model may have
a different effect on graduation rates each year, as other reforms
are being implemented or other
factors are changing in the city or district. Using a random
effect for year allows you to account for
the systematic within-school variation. Random effects allow
each school to have its own personal
slope. A random slope is a deviation from the mean intercept
for each school, resulting in a group
of parallel regression lines for each school. Conversely, this
model uses fixed effects for all other
variables, where a population mean is used for all schools.
I model the growth in the average graduation rate and how
racial composition, socioeconomic
composition, and indicators of neoliberal reform affect this
growth. To operationalize neoliberal

reform I use indicators that reflect the implementation of
neoliberal reforms, which include: an
indicator for the year that exit exams were implemented, an
indicator for having failed accountabil-
ity, and an indicator for being a small school of choice. I also
include a measure of Full-Time
Table 1. Analysis of missing graduation observations, 2000–
2013.
Percentage of
Observations
# of
Schools
Size Average Black
Hispanic
Average
Graduation Rate
Missing 0 years of data 46% 123 1322 78% 63.1
Missing 4 years of data 0.9% 2 1268 81% 57.1
Missing 7 years of data 0.4% 1 401 97% 47.4
Total Dataset 100.0% 304 1140 80% 65.8
Teacher Equivalency (FTE) to control for variations in school
quality that are independent of the

factors I am interested in (Vos, 1996). FTE is used as a measure
of school quality under the theory
that having teachers and adults in a school is a resource and
those schools with a lower FTE are
under-resourced.
The race variables are calculated from the total enrollments for
black, Asian, Hispanic, and
white students in each school in each year. I identify schools in
which black and Hispanic students
are over-represented. Black and Hispanic students are most
likely to be over-represented in schools
with low graduation rates, whereas Asians are more evenly
distributed by performance and have
similar outcomes as whites. Black and Hispanic enrollments are
combined and converted to per-
centages. These percentages are then dichotomized. This
variable is equal to one if a school’s
percentage of black and Hispanic students exceeds the average
percent of black and Hispanics
across all schools for that year. The socioeconomic composition
variable is equal to one when the
school has above the average percent of students eligible for
free and reduced lunch.
I measured racial and socioeconomic composition in this way to
determine whether there are
statistical differences between schools serving more and less
than the average proportion of
black, Hispanic and poor students. Overall these measures help
to understand changes in seg-
regation and inequality during a neoliberal reform era. I also
include an interaction between
race and socioeconomic status to understand the combined
effect of being poor, black and
Hispanic, which is quite likely. This variable is equal to one

when a school has above the aver-
age percent of black and Hispanic students and above the
average percent of students eligible
for free and reduced lunch.
Segregated High Schools and Unequal Graduation Rates under
Neoliberal Reform
Black and Hispanic students have historically been segregated
in the schools with the worst out-
comes. Neoliberal reforms should indirectly eliminate
inequalities using choice, competition and
accountability. The first analysis in this paper uses school level
public data to measure whether
racial segregation by school performance has persisted in NYC
high schools. In the second analy-
sis, I estimate whether racial and socioeconomic composition
maintains a significant impact on
graduation rates when accounting for the presence of neoliberal
reforms.
Using high school graduation rate as a measure of school
quality, I divided all schools into three
equal groups based on their high school graduation. This creates
high, medium/average, and low
classifications for each year. The dissimilarity index will be
used to understand the extent to which
students are segregated by school quality. The median
graduation rate for each third is displayed in
Figure 1 to provide a sense of how different these performance
thirds are from each other. There is
about a 20 percentage-point gap between each third, and the
lowest-performing schools have a
median graduation rate of around 45%. This means that the
lowest-performing schools are failing
to graduate more than half of their incoming freshmen. The

highest-performing schools graduate
80% or more of their freshmen, while the medium/average
group graduates about two-thirds of
their freshmen. Balfanz et al. (2014) find that black, Hispanic
and poor students are most likely to
be in the lowest performance category.
This research examines changes in school segregation during a
neoliberal reform era. It asks
whether black and Hispanic students continue to be segregated
in the schools with the lowest
graduation rates. Segregation can occur in two forms. First,
black and Hispanic students may attend
segregated schools within a given level of school quality. For
example, in the worst performance
category, black and Hispanic students may attend schools in
which they are segregated from white
and Asian students. Second, students may be segregated by
performance such that black and
Brathwaite 441
Hispanic schools attend schools that are of better or worse
quality than those attended by white and
Asian students. Both scenarios provide an understanding of
whether increased choice and account-
ability impacts school segregation. In 2000, black and Hispanic
students were most segregated
from white and Asian students in the worst performing schools.
By 2013, segregation was highest
in the best performing schools. The degree to which black and
Hispanic students are attending
schools that are of a different quality than white and Asians has
slightly decreased (see Figure 2).

In 2000, 28 percent of black and Hispanic students in the worst
performance category would
have to switch schools in order to achieve racial balance.
Segregation declined consistently until it
spiked in 2010. It is not clear why segregation increased in
2010, but it declined in 2012 and 2013
to 23%, for an overall decline of 15%. Students attending
schools in the worst performance cate-
gory experienced less segregated schools in 2013 than they
would have in 2000.
There is variation in the average performance category but little
net change. There is a net
increase of 2 percentage points during this reform era (27% less
25%). In contrast to the sharp 2010
increase in the lowest category, the average category
experiences a sharp decline in 2010. Students
in this performance category are 7% less likely to attend a
segregated school in 2013 than they
were in 2000.
Figure 1. Median graduation rate by performance category.
Figure 2. Black-Hispanic and white-Asian dissimilary index,
2000–2013.
Segregation in the best performing schools has increased at a
magnitude greater than the changes
in the worst and average categories. In 2000, 16% of black and
Hispanic students would have to
switch schools in order to achieve racial balance. By 2013, this

value increases by 59% to 25%. By
2013, one in four students in the city’s best high schools would
have to switch schools to achieve
racial balance. Enrollment in these schools grew more than any
other performance group, but these
admitted students are attending more segregated schools than
they would have in the past.
While it is true that the best performing schools have become
more segregated and the worst
performing schools have become less segregated, there is
convergence such that all performance
categories have relatively equal levels of segregation in 2013
(see Figure 3). In 2013, students have
a similar rate of segregation regardless of whether they attend a
poor, average or high-performing
school. Despite similar levels of segregation within
performance categories, are black and Hispanic
students attending different quality schools than their white and
Asian peers?
In 2000, 17% of black and Hispanic students would have to
switch performance categories
(attend a school in a different third) in order to achieve racial
balance. This number stays relatively
stable, and begins to decline in 2005. This rate of segregation
rises again to 15% in 2013 for a 2%
overall decrease in segregation across categories. Students are
slightly less likely to be segregated
by performance during this reform era. These segregation levels
are lower than those within cate-
gories. Black and Hispanic students are more likely to be
segregated by school within a given
quality category than they are to be segregated by quality
category. In Table 2, I examine the
impact of several policy indicators on graduation rates and I

include a random effect of year to
understand how these impacts change over time.
In Table 2 I use nested modeling to predict the impact of policy
indicators on graduation rates.
I begin with an empty model (model 1), which allows for the
estimation of the average graduation
rate across schools and years. I add my control variable of
school quality in model 2. In models
3–8, I successively add indicators of race, school poverty, a
race and poverty interaction, account-
ability, a small school indicator and an exit exam
implementation indicator to see how each of these
indicators cumulatively impacts graduation rates. I also provide
a set of models that do not include
the interaction term, to show the independent effect of each
variable (see models 6b–8b). The ran-
dom effect of year is listed in the bottom row and can be added
for each additional year to under-
stand how the impact varies from 2000 to 2013.
The positive coefficient of year shows that the graduation rate
increases each year. The coeffi-
cient 3.27 in m2 shows that if school quality remains constant,
the graduation gate will increase by
1.93 points each year (.327+1.6) and will continue to increase
by 1.6 for each additional year. This
Figure 3. Across quartile dissimilarity index.
Brathwaite 443
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increase remains fairly steady as additional variables are added
to the model, except for an increase
to .687 in model m8b. We also see that the intercept increases
as variables are added to the model.
The intercept is the graduation rate if all other variables equal
zero and the year is 2000. The con-
trol variable of school quality has no significant impact on
graduation rates.
Model 4 shows the impact of race and poverty without the
interaction variable. The effect of
having above average black and Hispanic students has a
significant negative impact on graduation
rates. A school with above average minorities has a graduation
rate that is 7.3 points lower than a
school with below average minorities, if all other variables stay
constant. Having above average

free lunch does not have a significant impact on graduation
rates in the absence of the interaction
variable.
The race and poverty interaction effect is introduced in model 5,
and it measures the impact on
graduation rates when both the percent of minorities and school
poverty are above average. The
main effect of race in this model is the effect of race when
poverty is equal to zero, meaning that it
is below average. Likewise, the main effect of poverty is the
effect of poverty when race is below
average. Above average minorities has a significant negative
effect when poverty is below average.
Above average free lunch has a significant negative impact
when a school does not have above
average minority students (see models 5–8). The interaction
term shows us that when a school has
above average minorities and poverty the graduation rate will
increase by about 4 percentage
points (see models 5–8).
It is not intuitive that race and poverty have a negative effect on
graduation independently but
together they have a positive effect. One explanation may be
that these schools are more likely to
receive additional federal or local aid because they serve the
most disadvantaged populations and
that this aid leads to higher graduation rates. Models 6 through
8 add the policy indicators of
accountability, small schools and exit exam implementation.
The coefficients for these indicators
are slightly higher in the models without the interactions
(models 6b–8b), but generally similar.
Failing school accountability has a significant negative effect
on graduation rates. This negative

effect becomes insignificant in the 8th model when the exit
exam indicator is added. Failing
accountability decreases graduation rates by 5 or 6 percentage
points. This is the opposite intended
impact of accountability systems.
There is a significant positive impact of being a small school.
This supports the existing litera-
ture on the positive impact of small schools on graduation rates.
Lastly, the implementation of exit
exams in 2005 has a significant negative impact on graduation
rates. This coefficient means that
graduation rates drop by about 10 percentage points post-2005,
as compared to pre-2005. This is
an unintended consequence of exit exams. Making graduation
requirements more difficult makes
it harder to graduate, thus decreasing the graduation rate in the
years following this increase.
Conclusion
In New York City and across the country, neoliberal education
reforms have identified failing
schools and created accountability systems to track the progress
of these schools. Failing schools
have received sanctions and many have been closed. In addition
to accountability systems, which
are intended to improve schools, a system of choice has been
implemented so that families can
choose the school that best suits their need. Neoliberal policy is
believed to indirectly eliminate
inequalities between students under the assumption that all
families have the right to choose high
quality schools. This research examines changes in inequality
during a neoliberal reform era.

This research examines changes in graduation rates and
segregation during a neoliberal reform
era. This research asks whether black, Hispanic and poor
students continue to be segregated in the
worst performing schools, as they have historically been. It also
asks how school composition and
Brathwaite 445
particular features of neoliberal reforms impact graduation
rates, a key indicator of a high school’s
quality. This research is descriptive, not causal, because there is
no pre-reform period.
This research finds that segregation of students in the worst
performing schools declines, and it
increases in the best performing schools. The black and
Hispanic population in the worst perform-
ing category declined during this reform era, and it increased in
the best performance category. It
seems that the segregation has shifted with this change. In the
earlier years of this reform era, one
in four black or Hispanic students was segregated in low-
performing schools. Black and Hispanic
students are now attending better performing schools but one in
four is now segregated in the high-
est performance category. Whatever category black and
Hispanic students may be in, they are
likely to be segregated there. There is a systemic effort to avoid
diverse schools, regardless of qual-
ity. A system of school choice makes this effort more feasible,
as families can view racial composi-
tion as a deterrent when choosing schools.

Segregation has a negative impact on the educational experience
of all students, especially black
and Hispanic students. Despite receiving a better education,
these students continue to lack the
advantages afforded by diversity, such as exposure to different
people and ways of life, and expo-
sure to whites and Asians who they are likely to encounter and
be unfamiliar with in their postsec-
ondary life. Students of all races perform better when they
attend diverse schools (Siegel-Hawley,
2014). As Lisa Delpit (1996) argues, this trend will not change
until the broader societal inequalities
are diminished and black and Hispanic spaces are no longer
viewed as low quality or threatening.
Although black and Hispanic graduation rates have improved on
average, and they are attending
better schools, there is still a negative impact of having a high
percentage of black and Hispanic stu-
dents. There is also a negative impact of poverty. These facts
point to the larger societal inequalities
that exist, such as lower teacher quality, fewer resources, and
lower expectations that exist in schools
that serve primarily black, Hispanic or poor students. Neoliberal
policies, excluding the creation of
small schools, seem to exacerbate this negative impact by
further decreasing graduation rates.
Anyon (2006) argues that policies to eliminate poverty and
other societal issues are necessary if
there is to be a true meritocracy with true equality of
opportunity. Until this is the case, race and
class will continue to disadvantage particular groups and result
in achievement gaps. Lynch and
Moran (2006) argue for a more substantive focus on how class
operates within schools and neigh-

borhoods and intersects with economic and social policies to
reproduce inequalities.
Together these analyses show that despite a host of positive
outcomes for black and Hispanic
students, race still matters very much for the outcomes of
students. While the magnitude of these
differences is moderate, the persistence of historical racial and
socioeconomic educational inequal-
ities cannot be understated. Neoliberal reforms argue that
choice and accountability will give fami-
lies of all races equal access to a high-quality education, but
this is not the case. Black and Hispanic
students are still attending segregated schools, majority black
and Hispanic schools still have the
lowest outcomes, and minorities still attend schools that are
different from their white and Asian
peers. While neoliberal policies did allow some minority
students to choose better schools, it did
not impact the patterns on inequality that public schools have
historically suffered from.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding
agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit
sectors.
Notes
1. In many districts, Asian students have outcomes similar to
whites and the highest performing Asian
students are likely to attend schools with mostly white students.
For this reason, this analysis does not
include Asians as racially disadvantaged along with blacks and
Hispanics.

2. This analysis uses the New York State method to calculate
graduation. This calculation includes all stu-
dents who entered a school in the 9th grade cohort, not
excluding self-contained classrooms and special
district schools. Graduates are defined as those earning a Local
or Regents diploma, excluding those who
earn a special education diploma (IEP) or GED. This graduation
rate is most often separated into June
and August graduates and into four and six-year graduation
rates, and I use the four-year rate.
3. To insure that I have a consistent sample, I ran my very last
model with all variables in it and created a
sample including only those cases and used that sample for all
of my models. This sample includes 281
schools, 1634 observations with an average of 5.8 of 11 years of
data.
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© 2005 by Society for the Study of Social Problems, Inc. All
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copy or reproduce article content through the University of
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School Choice, Charter Schools, and
White Flight
LINDA A. RENZULLI,
University of Georgia
LORRAINE EVANS,
University of Georgia

The “choice” movement of the 1990s culminated in a
proliferation of charter schools. However, school
choice and charter school options may have future consequences
for racial segregation given the potential for
white flight similar to that which occurred in the 1960s and
1970s. Drawing from racial competition theory, this
article contributes to literature on education and stratification in
a broader sense by examining white enrollment
in charter schools and its possible consequences for racial
segregation. Data are drawn from the Schools and
Staffing Survey (SASS), the Common Core of Data (CCD), and
a unique dataset on district academic quality.
Analyses suggest that relatively even distributions of white and
nonwhite students within districts and corre-
sponding competitive pressures spur white charter school
enrollment. We suggest that such racial competition
within the educational arena may indeed be bolstering the
“return to school segregation.”
Political and public debates concerning the implementation of
school choice policies
are more often based on beliefs than on empirical evidence
(Fowler 2003; Manno, Vanourek,
and Finn 2000). Supporters of school choice often suggest that
school options will create a
system where all parents can select “effective” schools to
educate their children. Moreover,
supporters argue that schools of choice can be effective
regardless of their racial composi-
tion or access to resources (Chubb and Moe 1990; Coons and
Sugarman 1978; Holt 2000).
In contrast, opponents of choice in the public school system
suggest that choice policies

will only exacerbate inequalities already manifest in our schools
and threaten the very fabric of
public education (Henig et al. 1999; Saporito and Lareau 1999;
Wells 1993).
Charter schools are clearly an important case in point.
Although they are public and
secular, they elude the bureaucratic constraints of school
districts, thereby evoking contro-
versy.
1
Proponents argue that charter schools significantly improve
public education because
they create: (1) choice in curriculum, structure, and discipline;
(2) accountability for educa-
tional outcomes and student progress; and (3) autonomy for
teachers, parents, and administra-
tors (Center for Educational Reform 1999; Nathan 1996).
Proponents suggest that bolstering
choice, accountability, and autonomy will result in high quality
schools for all children, most
notably those of poor and minority backgrounds (Nathan 1996).
Opponents, in contrast, fear
The authors wish to thank E. M. Beck, Jeremy Reynolds,
Elizabeth Stearns, Jody Clay-Warner, and Natalie Lacireno-
Paquet for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this

article. This research was supported by a grant from the
American Education Research Association, which receives
funds for its “AERA Grants Program” from the U.S. Department
of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics and the
Office of Educational Research and Improvements under
NSF Grant #REC-9980573. Opinions reflect those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect those of the granting agen-
cies. Direct correspondence to: Linda Renzulli, University of
Georgia, Department of Sociology, Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA
30602. E-mail: [email protected]
1. The precise definition of charter schools—as well as their
accountability measures, teacher certification, and
enrollment guidelines—vary by state. Although there are
different types of charter schools, in this article, we do not dis-
tinguish between market and non-market charter schools.
Though charter schools are public schools, we parsimoni-
ously refer to traditional public schools as public schools and
public charter schools as charter schools.
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abstract/52/3/398/1631762
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School Choice, Charter Schools, and White Flight
399

that charter schools cannot fix broader educational problems
and, if anything, have become
instruments of elitism that deplete public school resources
(Alexander 1997; Berliner and
Biddle 1995; Cobb and Glass 1999; Henig et al. 1999; Weiher
and Tedin 2002; Wells 1993).
Recent work by the American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
concurs: charter schools may
be no better able to educate students than are traditional public
schools (Nelson, Rosenberg,
and Van Meter 2004).
Despite conflicting interpretations over their impact, charter
schools have emerged as
the fastest growing educational innovation in the United States.
As of 2004, charter schools
were operating in 38 of the 42 states with charter school
legislation (Renzulli and Roscigno
Forthcoming). According to the Center for Educational Reform,
charter schools educate
nearly 700,000 students in 2,996 charter schools. As they
continue to grow in number and
as the percentage of children who attend them swells, the
potential for charter schools to
change the system of public education in the United States
increases (Manno et al. 2000).
One such change may be the resegregation of schools and
school districts, as indicated by
some initial evidence from the Civil Rights Project
(Frankenberg and Lee 2003).
This article examines more closely the conditions under which
we might see “pockets
of white segregation” (Frankenberg and Lee 2003) and, in
particular, instances wherein charter

schools become primarily populated by white students.
However, rather than simply confirm-
ing that whites attend relatively segregated charter schools, we
question the circumstances
under which charter schools enroll a high percentage
of white students. For example, does
the educational arena witness processes of racial competition
and inequality that researchers
have documented in other contexts. Analyses of race-specific
outcomes such as lynching
(Beck and Tolnay 1990), riots (Olzak, Shanahan, and
McEneaney 1996), and (un)employ-
ment (Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno 1996) indicate that
economic and political competi-
tion between whites and blacks cause responses such as social
control and discrimination
(Olzak, Shannahan, and West 1994). Schooling may be no
different.
Drawing on recent racial competition research, particularly that
of Olzak (1990, 1992;
Olzak et al. 1996; Olzak et al. 1994), we argue that racial
competition in school districts will
affect white enrollment in—and thus white flight into—local
charter schools. Analyses of data
gathered from various sources allow us to assess how the
distribution of nonwhite students in
a school district influences patterns of white enrollment in
charter schools. Data are drawn
from the charter school component of the Schools and Staffing
Survey (SASS), the Common
Core of Data (CCD), a collection of charter school legislative

statutes (Jennings et al. 1998),
and a dataset we gathered that includes a measure of district
academic quality. We conclude
by discussing the implications of our findings for understanding
racial competition, white
flight, and stratification in public education more generally.
Racial Dynamics, White Flight, and School Segregation
Competition theorists argue that the roots of collective action
and resource mobiliza-
tion lie in competition for scarce resources, including status and
institutional access (Olzak
1992; Olzak et al. 1994). According to Douglas S. Massey and
Nancy A. Denton’s landmark
book
American Apartheid
(1993), “White apprehension about racial mixing is associated
with
the belief that having black neighbors undermines property
values,” which implies that
“whites perceive blacks to be a direct threat to their social
status” (p. 94). Whites get social
status not only from the neighborhoods they live in (Massey and
Denton 1993), but also
from the quality of the schools their children attend (Bankston
and Caldas 2002). Within
this context of education, competition “can be generated
objectively by growing minority
enrollments in schools” and can be seen as a “threat to the

status of the majority ethnic
community” (Olzak et al. 1994:196–97). Though competition
theory has not been used
abstract/52/3/398/1631762
on 19 January 2018
400
RENZULLI/EVANS
extensively to understand white flight, it would suggest that for
whites, nonwhite enroll-
ments lower the status and desirability of schools, and
ultimately cause whites to flee.
Whites may avoid individuals they perceive to be low-status,
whether by moving to
all-white or mostly white neighborhoods or enrolling their
children in all-white or mostly
white schools. Researchers in the 1970s began to examine the
unintended consequences of
mandated busing and desegregation on neighborhood schools
(Coleman, Kelly, and Moore
1975; Farley 1975; Giles 1978; Sly and Pol 1978). Such
analyses found, by and large, a strong
relationship between black enrollment in public schools and
white flight.

Schools and districts
with black populations over 30 percent experienced greater loss
of white students than those
below 30 percent. Moreover, segregation between districts was
greater than segregation
within districts, indicating that the response to desegregation
was the out-migration of whites
to the suburbs, leaving primarily black central-city school
districts (Wilson 1987).
Contemporary investigations of white flight and its relation to
increased patterns of
segregation reveal that the mechanisms visible in the 1960s and
1970s continued to operate
into the 1980s and 1990s. Even today, much of the research on
white flight supports David R.
James’s (1989) finding that “white parents make decisions
based on the actual or potential
exposure of their children to blacks” (cited in Clotfelter
2001:202).
2
In fact, Charles T. Clot-
felter (2001) and Kyle Crowder (2000) suggest that white flight
is positively related to the
minority student population and the ability to find desirable
residential areas with a lower
proportion of minority residents. The ease with which whites
can find predominately white
schooling in nearby areas increases the likelihood that they will

exercise school choice
through residential mobility, despite the fact that they may
incur costs such as increasing the
commute time to work (Clotfelter 2001; Frey 1979; Morgan and
England 1984).
However, some white families can exercise flight without
residential mobility by moving
their children from racially heterogeneous public schools into
more racially homogenous
private schools, as has been the case historically. For instance,
Kenneth Andrews (2001) reviews
the desegregation policies of Mississippi from 1968 to 1971 and
concludes that private acad-
emy attendance increased dramatically as the proportion of
black school-age children in
public schools increased. Research generally shows that, like
residentially mobile families,
those who transfer schools but do not change homes tend to be
affluent and white. Moreover,
they maintain status by avoiding nonwhite schools (Fairlie and
Resch 2002; Lankford and
Wyckoff 2001; Levin 1999; Morgan and England 1984; Saporito
and Lareau 1999).
Charter Schools’ Racial Enrollment: White Flight without
Residential Mobility?
Charter schools add another option to the school choice menu,
one that helps parents
avoid residential mobility costs and private school fees.
Furthermore, national-level research
offers potentially encouraging evidence for those who hoped
that charter schools would

provide choice to those who historically have been unable to
choose their schools: 52 per-
cent of students in charter schools are nonwhite compared to 41
percent in traditional pub-
lic schools (Frankenberg and Lee 2003; Gill 2001). However,
national-level demographics
tell us little about (1) the local concentrations of whites and
nonwhites in charter schools
and (2) how the racial composition and distributions of charter
schools compare to the
racial composition and distribution of local schools. Even if
some charter schools are serving
nonwhites, other charter schools may be largely populated by
white students (Frankenberg
and Lee 2003; Gill 2001). Below we outline the empirical
findings about race and charter
schools conducted at the state- and district-levels of analysis,
which help supplement the
potentially misleading findings of national-level studies.
2. Declining white populations in urban schools may also be
attributed to both immigration rates and differences
in birth rates (Frey 1995).
abstract/52/3/398/1631762
on 19 January 2018
School Choice, Charter Schools, and White Flight

401
Since charter school laws and other educational reforms are
delegated to states, evaluat-
ing charter schools’ racial enrollment at the state level may be
more accurate than national
averages. In fact, some researchers who have limited the scope
of their analyses to the state
level have found that charter schools tend to segregate students
by race (Frankenberg and
Lee 2003; Wamba and Ascher 2003). They show that, in some
cases, white charter school
students attend charter schools that are more homogenously
white than are their public
school counterparts. In California, Amy Stuart Wells (1998)
found that Latinos were
underrepresented in charter schools. Furthermore, although
blacks went to charter schools
in the same proportion as they attended public schools, charter
schools themselves are often
segregated: thirty-seven percent of charter schools were
predominantly white (that is, 80 to
100 percent white). Robert E. Crew and Mary R. Anderson
(2003) report that Florida charter
schools are more segregated than traditional public schools (82
percent white compared to
51 percent white). Similar patterns were found in Arizona
school districts where Casey D.
Cobb and Gene V. Glass (1999) found charter school enrollment
was 20 percent more
white than traditional schools (see also Miron, Nelson, and
Risley 2002 on Pennsylvania).
Lance Fusarelli (2002) found that Texas charter schools
disproportionately served minorities
(43 of 89 schools) because the charter schools there were

created explicitly to meet the needs
of minority and at-risk children. Accordingly, Texas charter
schools mostly serve minorities
in segregated contexts and do not serve whites and minorities
together
at the same rate as
the public schools. In sum, state analyses largely suggest that
charter schools create greater
segregation of whites and nonwhites. They do indeed serve
minorities, but mostly in segregated
contexts.
Charter school laws vary by state, so state analyses may
accurately reflect conse-
quences of state policy. Nevertheless, many state laws require
charter schools to consider
district-level characteristics when accepting and recruiting
students. For example, in 1998,
15 of the 34 states with charter school legislation had direct
provisions for district racial bal-
ance (Jennings et al. 1998). The racial balance provisions
specifically assert that charter
schools must reflect the racial make-up of their district rather
than the racial make-up of
their state. Research conducted at the district level, therefore,
may paint a more accurate
picture of the racial composition of charter schools given their
local context. In Texas,
researchers found that there was more segregation among
charter schools than among the
schools within the district and thus did not necessarily reflect
district racial composition

(Weiher and Tedin 2002). Wells (1998) and Wells and
associates (1999a; 1999b) found sim-
ilar segregation patterns in 17 school districts they examined in
California where racial
groups were either overrepresented or underrepresented in
charter schools compared to
their local district demographics.
Taken together, the three levels of analyses—national, state,
and district—offer differ-
ent depictions of charter schools. At the national level, charter
schools seem to be serving
minorities adequately; while state- or district-level analyses
reveal that minority charter
school enrollments occur in largely segregated contexts.
Nevertheless, little previous work
investigates why charter schools attract the student populations
they do, how racial bal-
ance among charter schools has been affected (Gill 2001), or the
ways in which racial com-
petition within local educational contexts may be shaping the
enrollment and segregation
patterns we find.
Racial Competition and Charter Schools
Racial competition theory provides a useful, although typically
overlooked, framework
for addressing educational segregation processes in general, and
the more specific foci and
questions pertaining to charter schools raised previously. As
noted by competition scholars,
the dynamics of competition typically occur in localized
contexts. For example, lynchings

abstract/52/3/398/1631762
on 19 January 2018
402
RENZULLI/EVANS
in the South were a result of economic threats felt by whites
from blacks in the local labor
market (Beck and Tolnay 1990). Furthermore, interracial
exposure in schools in the 1960s
was associated with race riots in some cities (Olzak et al. 1994).
In both cases, threat and
competition occurred in contexts in which whites and blacks
encountered one another. We
believe that interracial competitive processes in the educational
arena, including those relating
to enrollment patterns, are similarly created at the local level.
Because charter schools operate
within a limited school catchment area in an educational
market, competitive process will
occur at the district and school level. While school choice
decisions may be influenced by
parental resources and based on calculated decisions by parents
pertaining to what constitutes
a high-achieving school, recent work suggests that cultural
processes and perceptions—even
those that are localized—may ultimately have a large impact.

Certainly, race perceptions,
local racial competition, and any ensuing antagonism may play
a role (Bulman 2004).
Our analyses take this insight into account by examining charter
schools in their local
context. First, we use a national dataset of charter schools to
analyze the schools in relation
to their school districts. Rather than using case studies of
districts, we use data that allow us
to look more systematically at the racial enrollment of charter
schools across districts in
the United States, thus bolstering our ability to generalize.
Second, our school district data
gauge the degree to which nonwhites and whites attend schools
together. We do not simply
compare the racial make-up of all charter schools in a district
with the racial composition
of the school districts in which these schools are situated.
Instead, we push the analysis fur-
ther by attempting to predict racial enrollment for individual
charter schools embedded
within school districts that have unique school-level patterns of
enrollment, while control-
ling for important district, state, and charter school
characteristics. Furthermore, we ana-
lyze the distribution of nonwhite students among schools and
utilize competition theory—
specifically, expectations regarding white flight in racially
competitive environments—to
explain why charter schools vary in their racial composition.
Building on competition theory, we suspect that some of the
very same competitive pres-
sures that prompted white parents to move their children out of
integrating schools and dis-

tricts in the 1960s will affect enrollment choices and white
utilization of charter schools today.
Specifically, where white and nonwhite students are distributed
equally among schools (i.e., a
more racially competitive environment), we expect to find
greater white utilization and
enrollment in charter schools. In contrast, white flight into
charter schools will be less pro-
nounced in districts within which schools are already
significantly racially separated. Contact
and integration, two structural attributes of districts and their
schools discussed in the white
flight literature (Clotfelter 2001; Coleman 1975; Taeuber and
James 1982), may increase
white enrollment in charter schools.
Data and Measurement
One of the main limitations of charter school research is the
inability to match charter
schools to their surrounding school districts (Lin 2001). We
overcame this obstacle by link-
ing the Schools and Staffing Charter School Survey 1999–2000
(SASS) to the Common
Core of Data 1998–1999 (CCD); both are national datasets
collected by the National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES). The SASS provides restricted-
use data on charter schools
operating in the United States during the 1999–2000 school
year. The sampling frame was
the population of 1,100 charter schools. A response rate of
about 79 percent yields a sample of
870 charter schools (see NCES 2004). The CCD is an annual,
national database of the uni-

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