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Moving from Logical Sharing of Guest OS
    to Physical Sharing of Deduplication on Virtual Machine


   Kuniyasu Suzaki, T hiki Y i K
   K i      S ki Toshiki Yagi, Kengo Iiji
                                       Iijima, N
                                               Nguyen Anh Quynh, C ill A th
                                                       A hQ      h Cyrille Artho
                       Research Center of Information Security
          National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology



                                        &
                               Yoshihito Watanebe
                                Alpha Systems Inc.
Contents
• Vulnerability of logical sharing (Dynamic-Link Shared
  Library and Symbolic Link)
• Propose replacement of logical sharing by physical sharing
   – Physical sharing
      • Deduplication on Memory and Storage
   – Self-contained binary
      • It is NOT static-Link binary.
• Experimental results
• Conclusions with discussing topics
Logical Sharing
• Logical sharing is OS technique to reduce consumption
  of memory and storage.
   – “Dynamic-Link Shared Library” for memory and storage
   – “Symbolic Link” for storage
• Unfortunately, they include vulnerability caused by
  dynamic management.
  d     i               t
   –   Search Path Replacement Attack
   –   GOT (Global Offset Table) overwrite attack
   –   Dependency Hell
   –   Etc.
Search Path Replacement Attack
• Dynamic-link searches a shared library at run time using
  a search path.
   – Search path is defined by environment variables.
       • Example: “LD_LIBRARY_PATH”
   – It allows us to change shared libraries in any directories.
• Unfortunately, the search path is easily replaced by an
  attacker and leads to malicious shared libraries.
   – Caller program has no methods to certify libraries.
• Static-link solves this problem but it wastes memory and
  storage.
GOT Overwrite Attack
• ELF format has GOT (Global Offset Table) to locate
  position-independent function address of shared library.
  The value of GOT is assigned at run time.
   – GOT is created on Data Segment and vulnerable for overwrite
     attack.
• Static link solves this problem but it wastes memory and
  storage.              Program           Library


                          Call              Routine
                                                      Code
              Code
                                                      Segment
              Segment                        PLT
                          PLT



              Data                                    Data
                         GOT                 GOT
              Segment                                 Segment


                                 Attack
Dependency Hell (DLL Hell in Windows)
• Dependency Hell is a management problem of shared
  libraries.
   – Package manager maintains versions of libraries. However, the
     version mismatch may occur, when a user updates a library
     without package manager.
   – Caller program has no methods to certify libraries
                                              libraries.
• Dependency Hell is escalated by symbolic-link, because
  most shared libraries use symbolic-link to manage minor
  updates.
   – /lib/libc.so.6 -> libc-2.10.1.so
   – # ln –s libc-2.11.1.so libc.so.6
• Static link solves this problem but it wastes memory and
  storage.
Solution, and further problems
• The problems are solved by static-link, but it increase
  consumption of memory and storage.
   – Fortunately, the increased consumption is mitigated by new
     technique, deduplication.
   – SLINY[USENIX’05] developed deduplication in Linux kernel.
   – It looks the problems are solved …
• Two trends
   – Current applications assume dynamic-link and are not re-compiled
     as static-link easily .
   – Current virtualization offers us deduplication.
      • SLINKY uses special Linux kernel. It is not applied on any OSes.
      • Using virtualization, guest OS only has to consider the solution
         without regard to physical consumption.
Static-Link is not easy
• Current applications deeply depend on dynamic-link shared
  libraries for flexibility and for avoiding license
  contamination problems.

• We tried to re-compile /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, and /usr/sbin
  dynamic-linked binaries (1,162) with static-link on Gentoo.
   – 185 (15.9%) binaries are re-compiled with static-link.


• Binary packages make it difficult to re-compile, because
  they are not easy to get all source code.
   – Commercial applications make problem more difficult.
Self-Contained Binaries
• Self-contained binary translator
      • It is developed to bring a binary to another machine.
      • It integrates shared libraries into an ELF binary file.
   – Advantage
      • Prevent Search Path Replacement Attack and Dependency
        Hell,
        Hell because it integrates all libraries.
                                       libraries
      • Mitigate GOT Overwrite Attack, because the addresses are
        prefixed for each execution.
   – Disadvantage
      • Consume more memory and storage than static-link
• Tools
   – Statifier, Autopacage, Ermine for Linux
   – VMWare “ThinApps(was Thinstall)” for Windows
Statifier (1/2)
• Statifier includes shared library into an ELF binary.
• On Normal binary
   ① _dl_start() of ld-linux.so
      • Reallocate dynamic link libraries and map them
   ② _dl_start_user() of ld-linux.so
      • Call initialization functions in libraries
• Statifier creates self-contained binary
   – Take snapshot before _dl_start_user() and analyze relocation
     information of functions of libraries from /proc/PID/maps.
   – The libraries and relocation information are embedded into the
     binary.
Statifier (2/2)
• Self-Contained Binary
   – Relocation information and shared libraries are loaded by the
     starter of statifier.
      • Includes special libraries: linux-gate.so, ld-linux.so
   – The ELF binary has no INTERP segment to call ld-linux.so
   – ldd command shows no dynamic-link shared libraries


• However, Statifier makes a larger binary than static link.
Deduplication
• Technique to share same-content chunks at block level
  (memory and storage).
• Same-content chunks are shared by indirect link.
   – It is easy to implement when a virtual layer exists to access a
     block device
            device.
   – Some virtualizations include deduplication mechanism.
Storage Deduplication
• Used by CAS (Content addressable Storage)
  – data is not addressed by its physical location. Data is addressed by
    a unique name derived from the content (a secure hash is used as
    a unique name usually)
  – Same contents are expressed by one original content (same hash)
    and addressed by indirected link.
     • Plan9 has Venti [USENIX FAST02]
     • NetApp Deduplication (Data Domain) [USENIX FAST08]
     • LBCAS (Loopback Content Addressable Storage) [LinuxSymp09]
         Virtual Disk                               CAS Storage Archive
                                         Indexing

                         Address         SHA-1
                         0000000-0003FFF 4ad36ffe8…              New block is
                         0004000-0007FFF 974daf34a…              created with
                         0008000-000BFFF 2d34ff3e1…              new SHA-1
                         000C000-000FFFF 974daf34a…
                         …
                         …                       sharing
                                Deduplication
Memory Deduplication
• Memory deduplication is mainly used for virtual machines.
• Very effective when same guest OS runs on several virtual machines.
• On Virtual Machine Monitor
    – Disco[OSDI97] has Transparent Page Sharing
    – VMWare ESX has Content-Based Page Sharing [SOSP02]
    – Xen has Satori[USENIX09] and Differential Engine[OSDI08]
• On Kernel
    – Linux has KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging)
      from 2.6.32 [LinuxSymp09]                            Guest Physical Memory
                                                     VM1          VM2              VM(n)
         • Memory of Process(es) are deduplicated
         • KVM uses this mechanism
• These targets are virtual machines, but our
  proposal uses memory deduplication on a
  single OS image, which increase same pages
  with copy of libraries (self-contained binary). Real Physical Memory
Evaluation
• Evaluate the effect of moving form logical sharing to
  physical sharing.
   – Effect of Statifier
      • Applied on binaries under /bin,/sbin,/usr/bin,/usr/sbin of
         Gentoo (installed on 32GB virtual disk for KVM virtual
                 (
         machine)
   – Memory Deduplication
      • KSM (Kernel Samepage merging) of Linux with KVM virtual
         machine (758MB).
   – Storage Deduplication
      • LBCAS (Loopback Content Addressable Storage)
Static Analysis of Statifier
• Gentoo was customized by statifier.
   – The ELF (1,162) binaries under /bin (82 files), /sbin (74),
     /usr/bin (912), /usr/sbin (94) were customized by statifier.
                          Original            Statifier        Increase
                          (Dynamic-link)
       Total                   87,865,480     3,572,936,704       40.66
       Average                       75,615        3,074,816      40.66
       Max (gnome-open)               5,400        8,732,672    1617.16
       Min (qmake)               3,426,340         6,094,848        1.78



• The disk image (includes non-statifiered files) was
  expnaded from 3.75GB to 7.08GB (1.88 times).
Effect of Memory Deduplication
• Memory usage at the end of login
• Statifier expanded memory consumption from the view of
  GuestOS,
• but Deduplication reduced physical memory consumption.
               80000                                                     34.4%
        4KB                                       GuestOS
                                                  View
        page   70000

               60000

               50000   GuestOS       93.0%                      45 332
                       View                                                             Duplicated
               40000                                    86056
                                                                            8.9%        Deduplicate
                                 22 96          17.3%
               30000                     48 1
                                                                 44 41      29732       Unique
                                                                                 physical
               20000   32706                    30410                            memory
                                   2 9929        physical
                                                                25 291
               10000                             memory


                  0
                            Normal Gentoo                   Statifier Gentoo
Effect of Storage Deduplication
• Storage usage (static) and total read data at boot (dynamic) .
• Statifier expanded storage consumption from the view of
  GuestOS on both cases, but Deduplication reduced physical
  storage consumption in static and dynamic.
• Smaller chunk is easy to be deduplicated but time overhead is
  large.
                      Static                            Dynamic (
                                                                (boot)
                                                                     )
                      normal          statifier         normal          statifier
    On Loopback            3,754MB         7,075MB          151.7MB          341.0MB
    (Guest OS View)                           (1.88)                            (2.25)

                                            4352MB
                            268,454
    LBCAS 16KB                             [278,499]              ---               ----
                          [4195MB]
                                              (1.04)

                                              83,863                           304MB
                             74,679                           218MB
    LBCAS 64KB                             [5241MB]                            [4,866]
                          [4667MB]                            [3,481]
                                               (1.12)                           (1.40)

                                            6723MB                             505MB
                             22,806                          390MB
    LBCAS 256KB                             [26,892]                           [2,019]
                          [5701MB]                           [1,560 ]
                                              (1.18)                            (1.29)
Trace of memory consumption
                    Normal Gentoo             Statifer Gentoo
Loopback




                                                GuestOS View
                                   Physical                      Physical
                                  Mem View                      Mem View
                  GuestOS View


                                    Auto                           Auto
                                    login                          login
LBCAS (256KB)




                                                 GuestOS View
                                   Physical
                   GuestOS View   Mem View                      Physical
                                                               Mem View

                                    Auto                          Auto
                                    login                         login
Time overhead at boot
• Statifier reduced the boot time, because it eliminated
  dynamic reallocation overhead.
• Deduplication increased the boot time. The overhead
  of KSM and LBCAS was less than 37%.
   – The overhead is a penalty to remove the vulnerabilities of
     logical sharing.
                    Without KSM                  With KSM
                    Normal         Statifier     Normal     Statifier

         Loopback            95s           84s        95s          105s
                             Reduced
         LBCAS           107s            108s        115s          130s
         (256KB)
Conclusion & Discussion (1/2)
• Self-Contained binaries strengthen OS security.
   – Prevent Search Path Replacement Attack, GOT (Global Offset
     Table) overwrite attack, Dependency Hell
   – Easy to apply on normal OS. It does not require source code
     and re-compile.
   – Increase consumption of memory and storage.
• Deduplication mitigates the consumption of memory and
  storage caused by self-contained binary.
   – Encourage moving from Logical sharing to Physical Sharing

• Deduplication is utilized to increase security on single OS.
Conclusion & Discussion (2/2)
• Deduplication will be mainly used on IaaS type (multi-tenants)
  Cloud Computing.
• Two directions of research
  • Increase code sharing
      – “R t
        “Return-Oriented P
                O i t d Programming” style b
                                   i ” t l becomes popular?l ?
         » Tools: Return Oriented Rootkit [USENIX Security 09]
   • Keep security
      – Code sharing will increase a chance to attack
      – Attack for deduplication will be presented in Rump Session of USENIX
        Security.

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Hot sec10 slide-suzaki

  • 1. Moving from Logical Sharing of Guest OS to Physical Sharing of Deduplication on Virtual Machine Kuniyasu Suzaki, T hiki Y i K K i S ki Toshiki Yagi, Kengo Iiji Iijima, N Nguyen Anh Quynh, C ill A th A hQ h Cyrille Artho Research Center of Information Security National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology & Yoshihito Watanebe Alpha Systems Inc.
  • 2. Contents • Vulnerability of logical sharing (Dynamic-Link Shared Library and Symbolic Link) • Propose replacement of logical sharing by physical sharing – Physical sharing • Deduplication on Memory and Storage – Self-contained binary • It is NOT static-Link binary. • Experimental results • Conclusions with discussing topics
  • 3. Logical Sharing • Logical sharing is OS technique to reduce consumption of memory and storage. – “Dynamic-Link Shared Library” for memory and storage – “Symbolic Link” for storage • Unfortunately, they include vulnerability caused by dynamic management. d i t – Search Path Replacement Attack – GOT (Global Offset Table) overwrite attack – Dependency Hell – Etc.
  • 4. Search Path Replacement Attack • Dynamic-link searches a shared library at run time using a search path. – Search path is defined by environment variables. • Example: “LD_LIBRARY_PATH” – It allows us to change shared libraries in any directories. • Unfortunately, the search path is easily replaced by an attacker and leads to malicious shared libraries. – Caller program has no methods to certify libraries. • Static-link solves this problem but it wastes memory and storage.
  • 5. GOT Overwrite Attack • ELF format has GOT (Global Offset Table) to locate position-independent function address of shared library. The value of GOT is assigned at run time. – GOT is created on Data Segment and vulnerable for overwrite attack. • Static link solves this problem but it wastes memory and storage. Program Library Call Routine Code Code Segment Segment PLT PLT Data Data GOT GOT Segment Segment Attack
  • 6. Dependency Hell (DLL Hell in Windows) • Dependency Hell is a management problem of shared libraries. – Package manager maintains versions of libraries. However, the version mismatch may occur, when a user updates a library without package manager. – Caller program has no methods to certify libraries libraries. • Dependency Hell is escalated by symbolic-link, because most shared libraries use symbolic-link to manage minor updates. – /lib/libc.so.6 -> libc-2.10.1.so – # ln –s libc-2.11.1.so libc.so.6 • Static link solves this problem but it wastes memory and storage.
  • 7. Solution, and further problems • The problems are solved by static-link, but it increase consumption of memory and storage. – Fortunately, the increased consumption is mitigated by new technique, deduplication. – SLINY[USENIX’05] developed deduplication in Linux kernel. – It looks the problems are solved … • Two trends – Current applications assume dynamic-link and are not re-compiled as static-link easily . – Current virtualization offers us deduplication. • SLINKY uses special Linux kernel. It is not applied on any OSes. • Using virtualization, guest OS only has to consider the solution without regard to physical consumption.
  • 8. Static-Link is not easy • Current applications deeply depend on dynamic-link shared libraries for flexibility and for avoiding license contamination problems. • We tried to re-compile /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, and /usr/sbin dynamic-linked binaries (1,162) with static-link on Gentoo. – 185 (15.9%) binaries are re-compiled with static-link. • Binary packages make it difficult to re-compile, because they are not easy to get all source code. – Commercial applications make problem more difficult.
  • 9. Self-Contained Binaries • Self-contained binary translator • It is developed to bring a binary to another machine. • It integrates shared libraries into an ELF binary file. – Advantage • Prevent Search Path Replacement Attack and Dependency Hell, Hell because it integrates all libraries. libraries • Mitigate GOT Overwrite Attack, because the addresses are prefixed for each execution. – Disadvantage • Consume more memory and storage than static-link • Tools – Statifier, Autopacage, Ermine for Linux – VMWare “ThinApps(was Thinstall)” for Windows
  • 10. Statifier (1/2) • Statifier includes shared library into an ELF binary. • On Normal binary ① _dl_start() of ld-linux.so • Reallocate dynamic link libraries and map them ② _dl_start_user() of ld-linux.so • Call initialization functions in libraries • Statifier creates self-contained binary – Take snapshot before _dl_start_user() and analyze relocation information of functions of libraries from /proc/PID/maps. – The libraries and relocation information are embedded into the binary.
  • 11. Statifier (2/2) • Self-Contained Binary – Relocation information and shared libraries are loaded by the starter of statifier. • Includes special libraries: linux-gate.so, ld-linux.so – The ELF binary has no INTERP segment to call ld-linux.so – ldd command shows no dynamic-link shared libraries • However, Statifier makes a larger binary than static link.
  • 12. Deduplication • Technique to share same-content chunks at block level (memory and storage). • Same-content chunks are shared by indirect link. – It is easy to implement when a virtual layer exists to access a block device device. – Some virtualizations include deduplication mechanism.
  • 13. Storage Deduplication • Used by CAS (Content addressable Storage) – data is not addressed by its physical location. Data is addressed by a unique name derived from the content (a secure hash is used as a unique name usually) – Same contents are expressed by one original content (same hash) and addressed by indirected link. • Plan9 has Venti [USENIX FAST02] • NetApp Deduplication (Data Domain) [USENIX FAST08] • LBCAS (Loopback Content Addressable Storage) [LinuxSymp09] Virtual Disk CAS Storage Archive Indexing Address SHA-1 0000000-0003FFF 4ad36ffe8… New block is 0004000-0007FFF 974daf34a… created with 0008000-000BFFF 2d34ff3e1… new SHA-1 000C000-000FFFF 974daf34a… … … sharing Deduplication
  • 14. Memory Deduplication • Memory deduplication is mainly used for virtual machines. • Very effective when same guest OS runs on several virtual machines. • On Virtual Machine Monitor – Disco[OSDI97] has Transparent Page Sharing – VMWare ESX has Content-Based Page Sharing [SOSP02] – Xen has Satori[USENIX09] and Differential Engine[OSDI08] • On Kernel – Linux has KSM (Kernel Samepage Merging) from 2.6.32 [LinuxSymp09] Guest Physical Memory VM1 VM2 VM(n) • Memory of Process(es) are deduplicated • KVM uses this mechanism • These targets are virtual machines, but our proposal uses memory deduplication on a single OS image, which increase same pages with copy of libraries (self-contained binary). Real Physical Memory
  • 15. Evaluation • Evaluate the effect of moving form logical sharing to physical sharing. – Effect of Statifier • Applied on binaries under /bin,/sbin,/usr/bin,/usr/sbin of Gentoo (installed on 32GB virtual disk for KVM virtual ( machine) – Memory Deduplication • KSM (Kernel Samepage merging) of Linux with KVM virtual machine (758MB). – Storage Deduplication • LBCAS (Loopback Content Addressable Storage)
  • 16. Static Analysis of Statifier • Gentoo was customized by statifier. – The ELF (1,162) binaries under /bin (82 files), /sbin (74), /usr/bin (912), /usr/sbin (94) were customized by statifier. Original Statifier Increase (Dynamic-link) Total 87,865,480 3,572,936,704 40.66 Average 75,615 3,074,816 40.66 Max (gnome-open) 5,400 8,732,672 1617.16 Min (qmake) 3,426,340 6,094,848 1.78 • The disk image (includes non-statifiered files) was expnaded from 3.75GB to 7.08GB (1.88 times).
  • 17. Effect of Memory Deduplication • Memory usage at the end of login • Statifier expanded memory consumption from the view of GuestOS, • but Deduplication reduced physical memory consumption. 80000 34.4% 4KB GuestOS View page 70000 60000 50000 GuestOS 93.0% 45 332 View Duplicated 40000 86056 8.9% Deduplicate 22 96 17.3% 30000 48 1 44 41 29732 Unique physical 20000 32706 30410 memory 2 9929 physical 25 291 10000 memory 0 Normal Gentoo Statifier Gentoo
  • 18. Effect of Storage Deduplication • Storage usage (static) and total read data at boot (dynamic) . • Statifier expanded storage consumption from the view of GuestOS on both cases, but Deduplication reduced physical storage consumption in static and dynamic. • Smaller chunk is easy to be deduplicated but time overhead is large. Static Dynamic ( (boot) ) normal statifier normal statifier On Loopback 3,754MB 7,075MB 151.7MB 341.0MB (Guest OS View) (1.88) (2.25) 4352MB 268,454 LBCAS 16KB [278,499] --- ---- [4195MB] (1.04) 83,863 304MB 74,679 218MB LBCAS 64KB [5241MB] [4,866] [4667MB] [3,481] (1.12) (1.40) 6723MB 505MB 22,806 390MB LBCAS 256KB [26,892] [2,019] [5701MB] [1,560 ] (1.18) (1.29)
  • 19. Trace of memory consumption Normal Gentoo Statifer Gentoo Loopback GuestOS View Physical Physical Mem View Mem View GuestOS View Auto Auto login login LBCAS (256KB) GuestOS View Physical GuestOS View Mem View Physical Mem View Auto Auto login login
  • 20. Time overhead at boot • Statifier reduced the boot time, because it eliminated dynamic reallocation overhead. • Deduplication increased the boot time. The overhead of KSM and LBCAS was less than 37%. – The overhead is a penalty to remove the vulnerabilities of logical sharing. Without KSM With KSM Normal Statifier Normal Statifier Loopback 95s 84s 95s 105s Reduced LBCAS 107s 108s 115s 130s (256KB)
  • 21. Conclusion & Discussion (1/2) • Self-Contained binaries strengthen OS security. – Prevent Search Path Replacement Attack, GOT (Global Offset Table) overwrite attack, Dependency Hell – Easy to apply on normal OS. It does not require source code and re-compile. – Increase consumption of memory and storage. • Deduplication mitigates the consumption of memory and storage caused by self-contained binary. – Encourage moving from Logical sharing to Physical Sharing • Deduplication is utilized to increase security on single OS.
  • 22. Conclusion & Discussion (2/2) • Deduplication will be mainly used on IaaS type (multi-tenants) Cloud Computing. • Two directions of research • Increase code sharing – “R t “Return-Oriented P O i t d Programming” style b i ” t l becomes popular?l ? » Tools: Return Oriented Rootkit [USENIX Security 09] • Keep security – Code sharing will increase a chance to attack – Attack for deduplication will be presented in Rump Session of USENIX Security.