Venezuela is currently undergoing the worst economic crisis in its history. By the end of 2016, more than 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP) it had three years ago will be lost. Poverty has soared to record levels. Monthly inflation rates are gradually approaching hyperinflation. Shortages of basic food staples and medicines are rampant. A three-tier exchange rate system prevails, with black market rates surpassing the lowest official rate by a factor of one-hundred. After more than a decade of massive expropriations and state control, the small, surviving, private industrial apparatus is nearly paralyzed, trapped in a web of regulations, without access to foreign currency to purchase parts or raw materials, and their operations are technologically obsolete.
In order to promote a better understanding of the causes, magnitudes, and possible remedies of the crisis, the Center for International Development (CID) at Harvard University launched a research initiative on Venezuela at the end of 2015.
Venezuela is undergoing one of the worst economic losses ever registered by any country in a three-year period, either by Latin American or world standards. Poverty rates have skyrocketed and stand today beyond 80%. We define two landmarks for recovery, and revise how much would Venezuela need to grow - oil and non-oil sectors - and how likely are those rates from the Venezuela and the world´s experience. We end up by outlining some of the adaptive challenges Venezuela would need to tackle to engine a sustainable recovery.
The literature on external default has stressed the existence of the so-called debt-intolerance puzzle: developing nations tend to default at debt-to-GDP ratios well bellow those of developed countries. The underestimation or plain omission of domestic debt may account for a fraction of that puzzle. We calculate fiscal revenues coming from financial repression using different methodologies for the case of Venezuela, and look at their correspondence with comprehensive measures of capital flight. In particular, we add to the standard measure of capital flight the over-invoicing of imports, rife in periods of exchange controls. We find that financial repression accounts for public revenues similar to those of OECD economies, in spite of the latter having much higher domestic debt-to-GDP ratios. We also find that financial repression and capital flight is significantly higher in years of exchange controls and interest rate caps. We interpret this as significant evidence suggesting a link between domestic disequilibrium and a weakening of the net foreign asset position via capital flight.
Venezuela Macroeconomic Outlook: A summary on the main statistics of the Venezuelan economy, the Hugo Chavez poignant legacy, and the root of the massive protests taking place in Venezuela right now
Much of the achievements in poverty and inequality reduction do not respond to Hugo Chavez social programs, but rather to higher public expenditure, fueling an import consumption boom. OIl was not enough, foreign debt increased fourfold. This presentation evaluates current state of Venezuelan economy under Maduro and draft some guidelines to achieving equitable growth
Devaluations may have an impact on multinational stock prices depending on the size of the particular country and whether they are anticipated or not. In an efficient market, predictable devaluations on small countries should not impact stock prices of large multinational companies. We analyze cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) to five devaluations in Venezuela within the context of stiff exchange controls. Our event study covers a period of five years and uses daily stock prices for up to 122 multinationals with Venezuelan subsidiaries. We find evidence of significant negative impacts on stock prices on various devaluations, reaching up to -1.75% over the event window. We interpret these results as evidence of market myopia, as they are driven by retained earnings on financial statements being converted into dollars at highly overvalued official rates, in spite of subsidiaries not having access to dollars at these prices for years prior to the devaluations.
For three years Harvard CID has been working on a plan to rescue Venezuela and get the country on a path of sustainable, inclusive growth, and development. We have teamed with Venezuelan experts at home and abroad, worked with international institutions, and have started the process of building consensus around the plan among the opposition parties that control the Venezuelan National Assembly. The Venezuelan Caucus at the Kennedy School will be hosting a series of talks on Venezuela: The morning after, by different members of our team and on different topics. You can follow on their Facebook webpage. More coming soon, stay tuned!
Venezuela is undergoing one of the worst economic losses ever registered by any country in a three-year period, either by Latin American or world standards. Poverty rates have skyrocketed and stand today beyond 80%. We define two landmarks for recovery, and revise how much would Venezuela need to grow - oil and non-oil sectors - and how likely are those rates from the Venezuela and the world´s experience. We end up by outlining some of the adaptive challenges Venezuela would need to tackle to engine a sustainable recovery.
The literature on external default has stressed the existence of the so-called debt-intolerance puzzle: developing nations tend to default at debt-to-GDP ratios well bellow those of developed countries. The underestimation or plain omission of domestic debt may account for a fraction of that puzzle. We calculate fiscal revenues coming from financial repression using different methodologies for the case of Venezuela, and look at their correspondence with comprehensive measures of capital flight. In particular, we add to the standard measure of capital flight the over-invoicing of imports, rife in periods of exchange controls. We find that financial repression accounts for public revenues similar to those of OECD economies, in spite of the latter having much higher domestic debt-to-GDP ratios. We also find that financial repression and capital flight is significantly higher in years of exchange controls and interest rate caps. We interpret this as significant evidence suggesting a link between domestic disequilibrium and a weakening of the net foreign asset position via capital flight.
Venezuela Macroeconomic Outlook: A summary on the main statistics of the Venezuelan economy, the Hugo Chavez poignant legacy, and the root of the massive protests taking place in Venezuela right now
Much of the achievements in poverty and inequality reduction do not respond to Hugo Chavez social programs, but rather to higher public expenditure, fueling an import consumption boom. OIl was not enough, foreign debt increased fourfold. This presentation evaluates current state of Venezuelan economy under Maduro and draft some guidelines to achieving equitable growth
Devaluations may have an impact on multinational stock prices depending on the size of the particular country and whether they are anticipated or not. In an efficient market, predictable devaluations on small countries should not impact stock prices of large multinational companies. We analyze cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) to five devaluations in Venezuela within the context of stiff exchange controls. Our event study covers a period of five years and uses daily stock prices for up to 122 multinationals with Venezuelan subsidiaries. We find evidence of significant negative impacts on stock prices on various devaluations, reaching up to -1.75% over the event window. We interpret these results as evidence of market myopia, as they are driven by retained earnings on financial statements being converted into dollars at highly overvalued official rates, in spite of subsidiaries not having access to dollars at these prices for years prior to the devaluations.
For three years Harvard CID has been working on a plan to rescue Venezuela and get the country on a path of sustainable, inclusive growth, and development. We have teamed with Venezuelan experts at home and abroad, worked with international institutions, and have started the process of building consensus around the plan among the opposition parties that control the Venezuelan National Assembly. The Venezuelan Caucus at the Kennedy School will be hosting a series of talks on Venezuela: The morning after, by different members of our team and on different topics. You can follow on their Facebook webpage. More coming soon, stay tuned!
Published: 1/2014
Any recollection of the performance of the Latin American economies during the so-called "Lost Decade" of the 1980s should suffice to convince us how much the region has progressed over the last two decades. Particularly during the last ten years the region has enjoyed, for the most part, financial and price stability, reasonable economic growth, a substantial reduction in poverty rates, and improvements in income distribution.
As this report makes clear, however, it would be a terrible mistake for Latin American governments and societies to be complacent about the challenges in front of them. The report provides an excellent description of the challenges that will have to be overcome, but also rightly identifies the significant strengths that the Latin American economies already have.
- Download Latin America: The Long Road (PDF): http://bit.ly/1j8jdcL
- Order the print version of GLatin America: The Long Road: http://bit.ly/1e2QSxR
Visit the Credit Suisse Research Institute website: http://bit.ly/18Cxa0p
Worked as a small team to study, translate, and prepare a presentation on business culture in Costa Rica. Used library research tools (i.e. National Climate Data Center, A to Z World Culture, and Reference Universe) to generate and present proper second-hand data.
Argentine economic depression was a major downturn in Argentina's economy. It began in 1999 with a decrease of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The crisis caused the fall of the government, default on the country's foreign debt, widespread unemployment, riots, the rise of alternative currencies and the end of the peso's fixed exchange rate to the US dollar.
By 2002 GDP growth had returned, surprising economists and the business media.
Raimundo Soto: Catholic University of Chile
ERF 24th Annual Conference
The New Normal in the Global Economy: Challenges & Prospects for MENA
July 8-10, 2018
Cairo, Egypt
Chiapas is not only Mexico's poorest state, but also the one displaying the lowest rate of economic growth. As a consequence, the income gap between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico continues to widen. Usual suspects like education, infrastructure, or financial constraints, are not to blame for Chiapas' dismal performance. To the contrary, over the previous decade Chiapas has improved its relative position within Mexico in terms of average years of schooling, infrastructure - roads, ports, and airports; and access to credit. The state's poor economic record also contrasts with the macroeconomic and institutional stability that has prevailed in Mexico over this period. Harvard's Center for International Development (CID) teamed with the Mexican Ministry of Finance to launch a research initiative in the quest for the causes underlying Chiapas' backwardness.
Un grupo de profesores e investigadores de Harvard, con el auspicio del Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo, ha pasado 8 meses analizando el extraordinario período de crecimiento acelerado de Panamá, sus principales motores, los principales desequilibrios que se han ido creando y las potenciales restricciones al crecimiento sostenido de Panamá.
Un diagnóstico de la grave situación económica de Venezuela y algunos lineamientos de política para el diseño de un programa de reconstrucción nacional
Published: 1/2014
Any recollection of the performance of the Latin American economies during the so-called "Lost Decade" of the 1980s should suffice to convince us how much the region has progressed over the last two decades. Particularly during the last ten years the region has enjoyed, for the most part, financial and price stability, reasonable economic growth, a substantial reduction in poverty rates, and improvements in income distribution.
As this report makes clear, however, it would be a terrible mistake for Latin American governments and societies to be complacent about the challenges in front of them. The report provides an excellent description of the challenges that will have to be overcome, but also rightly identifies the significant strengths that the Latin American economies already have.
- Download Latin America: The Long Road (PDF): http://bit.ly/1j8jdcL
- Order the print version of GLatin America: The Long Road: http://bit.ly/1e2QSxR
Visit the Credit Suisse Research Institute website: http://bit.ly/18Cxa0p
Worked as a small team to study, translate, and prepare a presentation on business culture in Costa Rica. Used library research tools (i.e. National Climate Data Center, A to Z World Culture, and Reference Universe) to generate and present proper second-hand data.
Argentine economic depression was a major downturn in Argentina's economy. It began in 1999 with a decrease of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The crisis caused the fall of the government, default on the country's foreign debt, widespread unemployment, riots, the rise of alternative currencies and the end of the peso's fixed exchange rate to the US dollar.
By 2002 GDP growth had returned, surprising economists and the business media.
Raimundo Soto: Catholic University of Chile
ERF 24th Annual Conference
The New Normal in the Global Economy: Challenges & Prospects for MENA
July 8-10, 2018
Cairo, Egypt
Chiapas is not only Mexico's poorest state, but also the one displaying the lowest rate of economic growth. As a consequence, the income gap between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico continues to widen. Usual suspects like education, infrastructure, or financial constraints, are not to blame for Chiapas' dismal performance. To the contrary, over the previous decade Chiapas has improved its relative position within Mexico in terms of average years of schooling, infrastructure - roads, ports, and airports; and access to credit. The state's poor economic record also contrasts with the macroeconomic and institutional stability that has prevailed in Mexico over this period. Harvard's Center for International Development (CID) teamed with the Mexican Ministry of Finance to launch a research initiative in the quest for the causes underlying Chiapas' backwardness.
Un grupo de profesores e investigadores de Harvard, con el auspicio del Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo, ha pasado 8 meses analizando el extraordinario período de crecimiento acelerado de Panamá, sus principales motores, los principales desequilibrios que se han ido creando y las potenciales restricciones al crecimiento sostenido de Panamá.
Un diagnóstico de la grave situación económica de Venezuela y algunos lineamientos de política para el diseño de un programa de reconstrucción nacional
Esta presentación resume el estado actual de la economía venezolana y sus perspectivas, cerrado el año 2012 y cuatro meses (estadísticamente reportados) del 2013. Está dividida para fines didácticos en 1) Sector real, 2) Restricción fiscal, 3) Restricción de divisas, y 4) Perspectivas
Stephen Tapp's (Deputy Chief Economist at Export Development Canada) presentation to open the Canadian Global Affairs Institute's 4th Annual State of Trade Conference held virtually on February 9th, 2021.
The macroeconomic outlook following the COVID-19 pandemic is gloomy, ranging between 3-10% in GDP decline for 2020. Recovery will depend heavily on how fast consumer confidence, employment and global trade can rebound. As a business leader, understanding how the macro outlook will impact your business is critical – especially if you are exposed to export markets.
In this short webinar, we will present the latest views on both global and Scandinavian macroeconomic outlooks, including scenarios to consider in the short, mid and long term, as well as a practical macro toolkit for evaluating your company’s exposure to key economic factors.
Francisco Monaldi, Baker Institute and Harvard University
ERF and AFESD conference on: Monetary and Fiscal Institutions in Resource-Rich Arab Economies
Kuwait, November 4-5, 2015
For more info, please visit www.erf.org.eg
Session on: Oil, Rents and Politics:
Forty-five years after Hossein Mahdavy developed the modern concept of a “rentier state,” hundreds of studies have been conducted on the ways that oil wealth seems to influence governance. This session will give an overview of some key insights about state-building, development policies, accountability and conflict, particularly those that cast light on the oil-rich Arab states during a period of low prices. Venezuela, under chavismo, offers a good political economy illustration of how a country can economically underperform during commodity booms, largely thanks to spending bonanzas related to electoral cycles.
We are pleased to release the April 2016 Africa Market Update covering economic trends in Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Angola, Uganda and Rwanda. The report also includes a snapshot of the deals landscape in Africa (YTD) as well as insights into what South Sudan's admission to the East African Community portends.
Securing Economic Resilience under the New Oil Order: The Need for ReformEconomic Research Forum
Allison Holland - International Monetary Fund
ERF Conference on “Arab Oil Exporters: Coping with a New Global Oil Order”
Kuwait, November 26-27, 2017
www.erf.org.eg
The Growth Lab at Harvard CID prepared this presentation to be shared with Namibia's High Panel for Economic Growth, established by President Hage Geingob.
In the decade 1999-2009, Jordan experienced an impressive growth acceleration, tripling its exports and increasing income per capita by 38%. Since then, a number of external shocks that include the Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009), the Arab Spring (2011), the Syrian Civil War (2011), and the emergence of the Islamic State (2014) have affected Jordan in significant ways and thrown its economy out of balance. Jordan’s debt-to-GDP ratio has ballooned from 55% (2009) to 94% (2018). The economy has continued to grow amidst massive fiscal adjustment and balance of payments constraints, but the large increase in population – by 50% between 2008 and 2017 – driven by massive waves of refugees has resulted in a 12% cumulative loss in income per capita (2010-2017). Moving forward, debt sustainability will require not only continued fiscal consolidation but also faster growth and international support to keep interest payments on the debt contained. We have developed an innovative framework to align Jordan’s growth strategy with its changing factor endowments. The framework incorporates service industries into an Economic Complexity analysis, utilizing the Dun and Bradstreet database, together with an evaluation of the evolution of Jordan’s comparative advantages over time. Combining several tools to identify critical constraints faced by sectors with the greatest potential, we have produced a roadmap with key elements of a strategy for Jordan to return to faster, more sustainable and more inclusive growth that is consistent with its emerging comparative advantages.
The literature on income gaps between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico revolves around individual factors, such as education and ethnicity. Yet, twenty years after the Zapatista rebellion, the schooling gap between Chiapas and the other Mexican entities has shrunk while the income gap has widened, and we find no evidence indicating that Chiapas indigenes are worse-off than their likes elsewhere in Mexico. We explore a different hypothesis. Based on census data, we calculate the economic complexity index, a measure of the knowledge agglomeration embedded in the economic activities at a municipal level in Mexico. Economic complexity explains a larger fraction of the income gap than any individual factor. Our results suggest that chiapanecos are not the problem, the problem is Chiapas. These results hold when we extend our analysis to Mexico’s thirty-one federal entities, suggesting that place-specific determinants that have been overlooked in both the literature and policy, have a key role in the determination of income gaps.
El colapso económico de Venezuela no tiene precedentes en la historia económica posterior a la segunda guerra mundial. La caída paralela de la producción (49%) e importación per cápita (84%), conjuntamente con la hiper-inflación más alta registrada en doce meses consecutivos (200.005% en los doce meses previos a Agosto 2018), conforman un cuadro único de la catástrofe que le ha caído al país tras veinte años de socialismo.
Esta es una presentación compartida con el Frente Amplio de Venezuela en Julio de 2018, resultado del trabajo de un conjunto de investigadores del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Universidad de Harvard.
¿Cómo ha llegado Venezuela a la situación actual, y qué tan grave es el colapso que ha sufrido en función de otras catástrofes económicas registradas en el mundo?
On March 5th I had the privilege to host Lant Pritchett in my econometrics class at @Kennedy_School, sharing his work: "The RCT debate is over. We won. They lost." Nothing substitutes for listening to Lant, but here is a link to his compelling presentation".
Panama has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world over the previous decade. In that short but vibrant time span, the country managed to double its income per capita. Growth has been spearheaded by the development of a modern service sector on the activities surrounding the Canal, and non-residential construction. Large public infrastructure projects and the private provision for infrastructure demanded by the service sector, have fueled growth and expanded job opportunities for non-skilled workers.
Two warning signals hover over Panama’s stellar performance. The construction sector has been growing at a rate equivalent to doubling its stock of structures every four years. The demand for non-residential construction cannot grow indefinitely at a higher rate than the rest of the economy. Once the stock of infrastructure required by the service sector is set and large infrastructure projects are completed, the rate of growth will recede and other sectors shall take the leading role. The deceleration of construction, characterized by a lower demand of non-skilled labor, will feed into the second warning signal: Income inequality. In spite of the minor improvements registered over the accelerated-growth spell, Panama remains amongst the world's top five most unequal countries. Both warning signals point to the need of further diversifying the Panamanian economy, and promoting economic activity in the provinces so as to deconcentrate growth and make it more inclusive.
¿Cuánto tiempo le tomará a Venezuela recuperarse la catástrofe económica sufrida? Tomando en cuenta la propia experiencia de Venezuela y la del resto del mundo, establecemos la probabilidad de recuperación para diferentes escenarios y plazos.
Bajo el patrocinio del Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo y en el marco del programa de Ciudades Emergentes y Sostenibles, un equipo de Centro para el Desarrollo de la Universidad de Harvard pasó la segunda parte del 2017 trabajando en Hermosillo, Sonora. Nuestra meta es analizar el desempeño económico reciente del lugar y su potencial económico, e identificar las restricciones más importantes al crecimiento.
Venezuela ha sufrido entre 2013-2017 el colapso más grande que haya registrado cualquier economía de América Latina en su historia, en época de paz o guerra. La caída de los precios y la producción petrolero, en combinación con el endeudamiento salvaje de la República en los tiempos de bonanza, ha dejado a la República exangüe y forzado una caída en las importaciones que ha llevado al país al borde de una crisis humanitaria. Aquí se simulan los impactos de algunos reformas económicas en el evento de una transición, desde el punto de vista de la balanza de pagos. En conclusión, aún haciendo supuestos muy optimistas, se hace imposible sacar al país adelante sin una combinación de ayuda internacional (asistencia extraordinaria del Fondo Monetario Internacional) Y una reestructuración de deuda muy agresiva.
We know diversification, extending production into more complex and higher value added goods and services, is they key to the process and development. And yet diversification implies doing things you currently don´t know how to do. Countries need to add new capabilities, which they cannot possibly have. We also know that it is easier to “move brains” to new locations, than to move knowhow into brains, i.e. moving experienced workers into a new location is faster than building experienced workers. Is this easier or even feasible to do? We find this is highly contingent on the “Sense of Us” as it regards policy areas like immigration and business travel. The "Sense of Us" is the collective illusion defining a place sense of who they are. Here we present three examples of three different policy engagements in Panama, Saudi Arabia and Chiapas (México), to show how did we stumble into the sense of us enthuse places, and how understanding it and be able to shape in a more inclusive way is cornerstone in the efforts to develop and grow out of poverty.
Un recorrido por los 50 casos de desastres económicos que se han registrado desde 1960: ¿En cuánto tiempo se recuperaron? ¿Buscaron asistencia internacional? ¿Los petroleros salieron más rápido? Algunas notas sobre los retos adaptativos que nos plantea la recuperación de la economía venezolana.
Una recorrido por la economía venezolana durante la revolución bolivariana: La fase de expansión basada en el boom petrolero y el acelerado endeudamiento externo, y el colapso. Una hoja de ruta para salir adelante entres fases: Emergencia, estabilización, y reforma estructural.
Venezuela llega a 2015 sin reservas internacionales, con las importaciones al mínimo, los mercados financieros internacionales cerrados, y una deuda externa aproximada de 100% del PIB.
More from Center for International Development, Harvard University (18)
Financial Assets: Debit vs Equity Securities.pptxWrito-Finance
financial assets represent claim for future benefit or cash. Financial assets are formed by establishing contracts between participants. These financial assets are used for collection of huge amounts of money for business purposes.
Two major Types: Debt Securities and Equity Securities.
Debt Securities are Also known as fixed-income securities or instruments. The type of assets is formed by establishing contracts between investor and issuer of the asset.
• The first type of Debit securities is BONDS. Bonds are issued by corporations and government (both local and national government).
• The second important type of Debit security is NOTES. Apart from similarities associated with notes and bonds, notes have shorter term maturity.
• The 3rd important type of Debit security is TRESURY BILLS. These securities have short-term ranging from three months, six months, and one year. Issuer of such securities are governments.
• Above discussed debit securities are mostly issued by governments and corporations. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITS CDs are issued by Banks and Financial Institutions. Risk factor associated with CDs gets reduced when issued by reputable institutions or Banks.
Following are the risk attached with debt securities: Credit risk, interest rate risk and currency risk
There are no fixed maturity dates in such securities, and asset’s value is determined by company’s performance. There are two major types of equity securities: common stock and preferred stock.
Common Stock: These are simple equity securities and bear no complexities which the preferred stock bears. Holders of such securities or instrument have the voting rights when it comes to select the company’s board of director or the business decisions to be made.
Preferred Stock: Preferred stocks are sometime referred to as hybrid securities, because it contains elements of both debit security and equity security. Preferred stock confers ownership rights to security holder that is why it is equity instrument
<a href="https://www.writofinance.com/equity-securities-features-types-risk/" >Equity securities </a> as a whole is used for capital funding for companies. Companies have multiple expenses to cover. Potential growth of company is required in competitive market. So, these securities are used for capital generation, and then uses it for company’s growth.
Concluding remarks
Both are employed in business. Businesses are often established through debit securities, then what is the need for equity securities. Companies have to cover multiple expenses and expansion of business. They can also use equity instruments for repayment of debits. So, there are multiple uses for securities. As an investor, you need tools for analysis. Investment decisions are made by carefully analyzing the market. For better analysis of the stock market, investors often employ financial analysis of companies.
What website can I sell pi coins securely.DOT TECH
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But you can still easily sell pi coins, by reselling it to exchanges/crypto whales interested in holding thousands of pi coins before the mainnet launch.
Who is a pi merchant?
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This is because pi network is not doing any pre-sale. The only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners and pi merchants stands in between the miners and the exchanges.
How can I sell my pi coins?
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+12349014282
STREETONOMICS: Exploring the Uncharted Territories of Informal Markets throug...sameer shah
Delve into the world of STREETONOMICS, where a team of 7 enthusiasts embarks on a journey to understand unorganized markets. By engaging with a coffee street vendor and crafting questionnaires, this project uncovers valuable insights into consumer behavior and market dynamics in informal settings."
BONKMILLON Unleashes Its Bonkers Potential on Solana.pdfcoingabbar
Introducing BONKMILLON - The Most Bonkers Meme Coin Yet
Let's be real for a second – the world of meme coins can feel like a bit of a circus at times. Every other day, there's a new token promising to take you "to the moon" or offering some groundbreaking utility that'll change the game forever. But how many of them actually deliver on that hype?
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Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
4. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 4
In a typical pro-cylical fashion, financial markets were willing to
lend massively over the boom, Venezuela went ahead and
multiplied foreign debt five-fold in 6 years
Venezuelan Foreign Debt
(1998-2012, current US dollars, billions)
5. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 5
Debt was hired away from the Central government:
PDVSA increased its debt 15X in 8 years
Producción de petróleo, deuda financiera e inversiones EyP
(2006 - 2015)
Oil production, Financial debt and Exploration investments
(2006-2015)
6. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 6
Debt hired away from the Central government: China-Venezuela
Fund (FCCV)
• FCCV loans total US$54.000 (no inventory of projects or reports on use of proceeds)
• Long term projects (in the best case) financed with short-term oil shipments
• FCCV loans come in a mix of US$ and remimbi, forcing Venezuela to import from China
34,766
116,181 110,533
123,966
103,607
150,279
193,144
347,829
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Servicio de deudaa China
(barrilespordíaequivalente)
3,200
5,259
11,899
21,829
23,374 23,579
21,887
25,512
1,101
2,413 2,889
4,570
3,914
5,551
6,232
5,675
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Saldo Deuda Fondo Conjunto China-Venezuela (FCCV
(millones de dólares, 2008-2014)
Saldo de la deuda Serviciode deuda
7. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 7
And leveraged these to promote a consumption boom that did not
have a counterpart in production
GDP, private and public consumption
(per capita, 1997=100)
Private consumption Public consumption GDP
0.0%
1.9%
2.3%
8. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 8
In parallel the State gradually increased its control over the
supply of goods, both through means of production and imports
CAGR::
Public GDP: 3,9%
Private GDP: -0,6%
From 2006 onwards,
the State increased its
role as an importer
going from a 15%
share to 50%
Evolution of Private
and Public GDP (Base
2006=100)
Imports of Goods: Public and
Private (Quarterly, US$ Millions)
9. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 9
In spite of the massive oil bonanza, the public sector
accumulated double-digit fiscal deficits
-25.0
-20.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
%ofGDP
Consolidated Public Sector Primary and Financial balance
(% of GDP)
Primary balance Financial balance
10. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 10
Massive dollar inflows coming from oil and foreign debt were
used to finance a spectacular increase in imports
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Venezuela: Exports and Imports per cápita
(constant 2015 US$ )
Exports real per capita Imports real per capita
12. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 12
Large consumption boom fueled by imports financed
with oil and foreign debt halved poverty levels
% of Population under the poverty
line 1989-2015
13. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 13
However, the end of the oil boom exposed the economic model’s
shortcomings whilst accelerating the economy’s deterioration
16.2
26.0
20.2
22.0
25.7
32.6
45.3
56.4
64.6
86.8
56.9
71.6
101.0
103.5
101.2
88.4
44.7
31.2
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00
Enero-99
Julio-99
Enero-00
Julio-00
Enero-01
Julio-01
Enero-02
Julio-02
Enero-03
Julio-03
Enero-04
Julio-04
Enero-05
Julio-05
Enero-06
Julio-06
Enero-07
Julio-07
Enero-08
Julio-08
Enero-09
Julio-09
Enero-10
Julio-10
Enero-11
Julio-11
Enero-12
Julio-12
Enero-13
Julio-13
Enero-14
Julio-14
Enero-15
Julio-15
Enero-16
(dólaresporbarril)
Cesta Venezolana
(dólares corrientes)
Venezuelan oil basket
(current US dollars)
14. • Collapse in imports
• Collapse in production
• Fiscal deficit and monetary financing
• Acceleration of inflation
• Acceleration of poverty
Five symptoms
15. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 15
Venezuela spread had been significantly higher than LATAM since
the financial crises, but once oil prices started to fall it
skyrocketed
Venezuelan and Latin American risk spreads
(basic points)
16. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 16
In 2015, amidst a 50% drop in oil prices, Venezuela chose to cut
its imports by 21% and extinguished a large portion of its foreign
assets
2015 External Accounts
(US$ billions)
37.1
Exports
47.5
Imports2014
12.5
Services
0.4
Rent(others)
6.2
Interest
5.4
Amort.
China
9.8
Fallin
Imports
5.0
ChinaFCV4
3.7
DescuentoDeuda
Oil
2.0
DeudaCITGO
6.0
Amort.
4.0
ChinaFCV2
6.7
Liquidacióndeotrosactivos
Reservas
líquidas
3.0
2.7
SDRIMF
3.5
Goldswap
4.0
17. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 17
By the end of 2015, Venezuela’s foreign reserves reached an 18-
year minimum and the country lacked any stabilization funds
International Reserves
18. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 18
During 2016 the main adjustment mechanism carried out by the
government to tackle foreign currency deficit was massive import
cuts
• The estimated imports level for
2016 laid out by the government
is US$ 21 billions
• If such figure is achieved, real
imports per capita would drop
46% with respect to 2015 and
71% with respect to peak year
2012
• The drop in imports has been
more pronounced in intermediate
goods and raw supplies, which
have de facto halted production in
the national economy
• Oil imports are far more inelastic,
dropping “only” 25%, which
translates into an even larger drop
in private imports (50%)
914
988
977
979
1,036
1,322
741
641
894
1,065
905
643
871
683
900
959
801
970
1,068
712
539
832
1,115
1,496
1,988
2,081
1,595
1,566
1,886
2,291
1,927
1,563
1,211
654
250
750
1,250
1,750
2,250
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Importacionesper cápita
(dólares reales de2016)
Imports per capita
(US$, real)
Government goal
for 2016
19. • Collapse in imports
• Collapse in production
• Fiscal deficit and monetary financing
• Acceleration of inflation
• Acceleration of poverty
Five symptoms
20. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 20
PDVSA increased it’s debt stock X15 while keeping its investments on
exploration and production constant = a significant decrease in oil
production
Producción de petróleo, deuda financiera e inversiones EyP
(2006 - 2015)
Oil production, Financial debt and Exploration investments
(2006-2015)
21. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 21
PDVSA was significantly burdened to finance non-oil activities,
social programs and extra-budgetary discretional spending
Fiscal burden on PDVSA as a % of GDP
(2010-2014)PDVSA transferred US$
$83 billions to the extra
budgetary fund
“FONDEN”
22. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 22
During the years of oil boom the economy underwent a massive
switch from tradables to non-tradables: No alternative sources of
foreign exchange
297.7%
233.6%
56.0%
43.5%
21.4%
14.6%
13.9%
8.2%
2.5%
-9.0%
-14.4%
-35.0%
-47.2%
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Instituciones financieras y seguros
Comunicaciones
Serv. comunitarios, soc. y personales
Produc. servicios del Gobierno General
Electricidad y agua
Comercio y servicios de reparación
Servicios inmobiliarios
Construcción
Transporte y almacenamiento
Agricultura, resturantes y hoteles, otros
Manufactura
Actividad petrolera
Minería
Tasa de crecimiento per cápita 2000-2015
TradeablesNon-tradeables
Growth rate per capita 2000-2015
23. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 23
Even the most incipient productive capabilities, alternative to oil,
have disappeared
1998
Product Space Venezuela (RCA>0.2)
2014
Product Space Venezuela (RCA>0.2)
24. • Collapse in imports
• Collapse in production
• Fiscal deficit and monetary financing
• Acceleration of inflation
• Acceleration of poverty
Five symptoms
26. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 26
The worsening deficits gradually dried most financing sources
and increased dependence on deficit monetization
0
5
10
15
20
25
2008* 2009* 2010* 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015*
%ofGDP
Fiscal deficit and monetary financing (% of GDP)
Fiscal deficit (-Financial balance) Central Bank Financing
27. • Collapse in imports
• Collapse in production
• Fiscal deficit and monetary financing
• Acceleration of inflation
• Acceleration of poverty
Five symptoms
28. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 28
Deficit monetization led to a strong acceleration of inflation
(official figures)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
200%
Dec-08
Mar-09
Jun-09
Sep-09
Dec-09
Mar-10
Jun-10
Sep-10
Dec-10
Mar-11
Jun-11
Sep-11
Dec-11
Mar-12
Jun-12
Sep-12
Dec-12
Mar-13
Jun-13
Sep-13
Dec-13
Mar-14
Jun-14
Sep-14
Dec-14
Mar-15
Jun-15
Sep-15
Dec-15
Evolution of National Index of Consumer Prices
(YoY price increase)
29. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 29
During 2016, the price of staple goods has been increasing at a
monthly rate of 24%, which is equivalent to 1237% annually
Monthly inflation for basket of staple goods
(January 1st to September 30th 2016)
30. • Collapse in imports
• Collapse in production
• Fiscal deficit and monetary financing
• Acceleration of inflation
• Acceleration of poverty
Five symptoms
31. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 31
High inflation has eroded the purchasing power of households
Evolution of Real Wages (Constant 2015 Bs.)
32. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 32
Where does the Venezuelan average monthly wage in US$ stand
within the LATAM context? You choose
359 347
217 215 203
140
120
55
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
Guatemala Chile Peru Brazil Colombia Vzla @650 Mexico Vzla @1650 Vzla @10
USDpermonth
2016 Monthly Minimum Wage
$9,081 per
month!
33. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 33
According to independent surveys, between 2014 and 2015, all the
advancements in the reduction of poverty have reversed
% of Population under the poverty
line 1989-2015
34. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 34
The crisis has its origin in the imposition of model of social
domination, where the State substitutes the market as a
mechanism of social organization
Examples
• Oil and derivatives
• Agroindustry
• Processed foodstuffs
• Gold, iron ore, aluminum
The State
produces
•Exchange rate
•Differential interest rates
•Public credit
The State
assigns
resources
•Price controls
•Import controls
•Mobilization guides
•Strict labor laws
The State
controls
State substitutes the
market as mechanism
of social organization
36. November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 36
The technical solution: Main elements of a new policy
framework
Reestablish market mechanisms Substitute indirect subsidies for direct
subsidies
Reestablish sustainable international finance Curb deterioration of oil industry
• Unify exchange rate
• Liberalize price and interest rate controls
• Privatize small and medium SOEs in the short
term & regulate larger ones
• Secure international financial assistance (IMF
exceptional access, WB for structural reforms
and budget support, IDB and CAF for projects)
• Reprofile debt and address arrears (CACs for
CG, Bankruptcy protection for PDVSA, China
renegotiation, Tax credit for commercial debt)
• Reestablish credit lines (EximBanks, Bilateral)
• Launch new oil policy with corresponding
regulatory changes
• Revamp relationships with JV partners and
service providers
• Audit finances, optimize expenditures and
review cooperation agreements
• Reform regressive indirect subsidies
(Gasoline, electricity, water, gas, telecom, food
and medicine)
• Improve provision of public goods
• Supplement income through direct subsidy
systems (i.e.: electronic transfers)
39. Venezuela has been stagnant since 1977: One of the most
spectacular growth failures turn itself into a growth
nightmare
50
70
90
110
130
150
170
190
210
230
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Venezuela: GDP per capita 1950-2015
(1950=100)
40. 0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1975 1982 1988 1990 1992 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001
Años
Population segmented by income
High income Middle class
Poverty Extreme poverty
As income per capita collapsed from 1977 onwards,
poverty levels rose from low 30% to 70%
41. Venezuela is not going to export its way out of this crisis
Too many claims on too little resources:
– Foreign financial debt
– Commercial debt
– ICSID demands
– Social debt!
Need of a new social contract:
What does the State does for its citizens…
and what the citizens do for the State and for themselves
Reform will take place within the context of:
– large institutional destruction and State fragmentation
– significant social unrest and chaos
– some characteristics of failed state
November, 2016 CID Speaker Series 41
The adaptive challenges