Panama has experienced rapid economic growth over the past decade by developing its service sector centered around the Panama Canal. Growth has been led by construction and competitive modern services like finance and trade. However, inequality remains high and education quality needs improvement. Restrictions on skilled immigration prevent skills and knowledge from spreading beyond special economic zones to the wider economy, which would benefit Panamanians. Loosening immigration policies could help address skill shortages and further economic development.
We know diversification, extending production into more complex and higher value added goods and services, is they key to the process and development. And yet diversification implies doing things you currently don´t know how to do. Countries need to add new capabilities, which they cannot possibly have. We also know that it is easier to “move brains” to new locations, than to move knowhow into brains, i.e. moving experienced workers into a new location is faster than building experienced workers. Is this easier or even feasible to do? We find this is highly contingent on the “Sense of Us” as it regards policy areas like immigration and business travel. The "Sense of Us" is the collective illusion defining a place sense of who they are. Here we present three examples of three different policy engagements in Panama, Saudi Arabia and Chiapas (México), to show how did we stumble into the sense of us enthuse places, and how understanding it and be able to shape in a more inclusive way is cornerstone in the efforts to develop and grow out of poverty.
Panama has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world over the previous decade. In that short but vibrant time span, the country managed to double its income per capita. Growth has been spearheaded by the development of a modern service sector on the activities surrounding the Canal, and non-residential construction. Large public infrastructure projects and the private provision for infrastructure demanded by the service sector, have fueled growth and expanded job opportunities for non-skilled workers.
Two warning signals hover over Panama’s stellar performance. The construction sector has been growing at a rate equivalent to doubling its stock of structures every four years. The demand for non-residential construction cannot grow indefinitely at a higher rate than the rest of the economy. Once the stock of infrastructure required by the service sector is set and large infrastructure projects are completed, the rate of growth will recede and other sectors shall take the leading role. The deceleration of construction, characterized by a lower demand of non-skilled labor, will feed into the second warning signal: Income inequality. In spite of the minor improvements registered over the accelerated-growth spell, Panama remains amongst the world's top five most unequal countries. Both warning signals point to the need of further diversifying the Panamanian economy, and promoting economic activity in the provinces so as to deconcentrate growth and make it more inclusive.
In the decade 1999-2009, Jordan experienced an impressive growth acceleration, tripling its exports and increasing income per capita by 38%. Since then, a number of external shocks that include the Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009), the Arab Spring (2011), the Syrian Civil War (2011), and the emergence of the Islamic State (2014) have affected Jordan in significant ways and thrown its economy out of balance. Jordan’s debt-to-GDP ratio has ballooned from 55% (2009) to 94% (2018). The economy has continued to grow amidst massive fiscal adjustment and balance of payments constraints, but the large increase in population – by 50% between 2008 and 2017 – driven by massive waves of refugees has resulted in a 12% cumulative loss in income per capita (2010-2017). Moving forward, debt sustainability will require not only continued fiscal consolidation but also faster growth and international support to keep interest payments on the debt contained. We have developed an innovative framework to align Jordan’s growth strategy with its changing factor endowments. The framework incorporates service industries into an Economic Complexity analysis, utilizing the Dun and Bradstreet database, together with an evaluation of the evolution of Jordan’s comparative advantages over time. Combining several tools to identify critical constraints faced by sectors with the greatest potential, we have produced a roadmap with key elements of a strategy for Jordan to return to faster, more sustainable and more inclusive growth that is consistent with its emerging comparative advantages.
Boosting private investment for growth and competitiveness in Argentina. A view from the OECD
OECD EMnet Business Meeting on Latin America
Buenos Aires, 14 November 2017
We know diversification, extending production into more complex and higher value added goods and services, is they key to the process and development. And yet diversification implies doing things you currently don´t know how to do. Countries need to add new capabilities, which they cannot possibly have. We also know that it is easier to “move brains” to new locations, than to move knowhow into brains, i.e. moving experienced workers into a new location is faster than building experienced workers. Is this easier or even feasible to do? We find this is highly contingent on the “Sense of Us” as it regards policy areas like immigration and business travel. The "Sense of Us" is the collective illusion defining a place sense of who they are. Here we present three examples of three different policy engagements in Panama, Saudi Arabia and Chiapas (México), to show how did we stumble into the sense of us enthuse places, and how understanding it and be able to shape in a more inclusive way is cornerstone in the efforts to develop and grow out of poverty.
Panama has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world over the previous decade. In that short but vibrant time span, the country managed to double its income per capita. Growth has been spearheaded by the development of a modern service sector on the activities surrounding the Canal, and non-residential construction. Large public infrastructure projects and the private provision for infrastructure demanded by the service sector, have fueled growth and expanded job opportunities for non-skilled workers.
Two warning signals hover over Panama’s stellar performance. The construction sector has been growing at a rate equivalent to doubling its stock of structures every four years. The demand for non-residential construction cannot grow indefinitely at a higher rate than the rest of the economy. Once the stock of infrastructure required by the service sector is set and large infrastructure projects are completed, the rate of growth will recede and other sectors shall take the leading role. The deceleration of construction, characterized by a lower demand of non-skilled labor, will feed into the second warning signal: Income inequality. In spite of the minor improvements registered over the accelerated-growth spell, Panama remains amongst the world's top five most unequal countries. Both warning signals point to the need of further diversifying the Panamanian economy, and promoting economic activity in the provinces so as to deconcentrate growth and make it more inclusive.
In the decade 1999-2009, Jordan experienced an impressive growth acceleration, tripling its exports and increasing income per capita by 38%. Since then, a number of external shocks that include the Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009), the Arab Spring (2011), the Syrian Civil War (2011), and the emergence of the Islamic State (2014) have affected Jordan in significant ways and thrown its economy out of balance. Jordan’s debt-to-GDP ratio has ballooned from 55% (2009) to 94% (2018). The economy has continued to grow amidst massive fiscal adjustment and balance of payments constraints, but the large increase in population – by 50% between 2008 and 2017 – driven by massive waves of refugees has resulted in a 12% cumulative loss in income per capita (2010-2017). Moving forward, debt sustainability will require not only continued fiscal consolidation but also faster growth and international support to keep interest payments on the debt contained. We have developed an innovative framework to align Jordan’s growth strategy with its changing factor endowments. The framework incorporates service industries into an Economic Complexity analysis, utilizing the Dun and Bradstreet database, together with an evaluation of the evolution of Jordan’s comparative advantages over time. Combining several tools to identify critical constraints faced by sectors with the greatest potential, we have produced a roadmap with key elements of a strategy for Jordan to return to faster, more sustainable and more inclusive growth that is consistent with its emerging comparative advantages.
Boosting private investment for growth and competitiveness in Argentina. A view from the OECD
OECD EMnet Business Meeting on Latin America
Buenos Aires, 14 November 2017
Alberto Trejos - América Latina | A look at Central America
O Instituto Brasileiro de Economia (IBRE), da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), realizou, no dia 19 de setembro de 2014, o seminário internacional A América Latina e as Novas Condições Econômicas Mundiais.
O evento abordou a questão das perspectivas latinoamericanas diante das mudanças impostas, entre outros fatores, pela desaceleração da China e pela gradual normalização da política monetária dos EUA.
O encontro foi organizado em três painéis, que incluiram desde estudos de casos nacionais — Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colômbia e México — a apresentações mais abrangentes da economia da região como um todo ou parte dela.
Confira as fotos do evento e mais informações no site do FGV/IBRE: http://bit.ly/YdyhyL
This presentation shows some of the most important positive changes that the Colombian economy has undergone, and it shows investors the ease of doing businesses in Colombia.
Venezuela is undergoing one of the worst economic losses ever registered by any country in a three-year period, either by Latin American or world standards. Poverty rates have skyrocketed and stand today beyond 80%. We define two landmarks for recovery, and revise how much would Venezuela need to grow - oil and non-oil sectors - and how likely are those rates from the Venezuela and the world´s experience. We end up by outlining some of the adaptive challenges Venezuela would need to tackle to engine a sustainable recovery.
Apresentação de Benigno Rojas, Governo de Alberta, no Canadá, durante evento promovido pelo Sistema FIEB, Fundamentos da Exploração e Produção de Não Convencionais: a Experiência Canadense.
Chiapas is not only Mexico's poorest state, but also the one displaying the lowest rate of economic growth. As a consequence, the income gap between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico continues to widen. Usual suspects like education, infrastructure, or financial constraints, are not to blame for Chiapas' dismal performance. To the contrary, over the previous decade Chiapas has improved its relative position within Mexico in terms of average years of schooling, infrastructure - roads, ports, and airports; and access to credit. The state's poor economic record also contrasts with the macroeconomic and institutional stability that has prevailed in Mexico over this period. Harvard's Center for International Development (CID) teamed with the Mexican Ministry of Finance to launch a research initiative in the quest for the causes underlying Chiapas' backwardness.
Devaluations may have an impact on multinational stock prices depending on the size of the particular country and whether they are anticipated or not. In an efficient market, predictable devaluations on small countries should not impact stock prices of large multinational companies. We analyze cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) to five devaluations in Venezuela within the context of stiff exchange controls. Our event study covers a period of five years and uses daily stock prices for up to 122 multinationals with Venezuelan subsidiaries. We find evidence of significant negative impacts on stock prices on various devaluations, reaching up to -1.75% over the event window. We interpret these results as evidence of market myopia, as they are driven by retained earnings on financial statements being converted into dollars at highly overvalued official rates, in spite of subsidiaries not having access to dollars at these prices for years prior to the devaluations.
Alberto Trejos - América Latina | A look at Central America
O Instituto Brasileiro de Economia (IBRE), da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), realizou, no dia 19 de setembro de 2014, o seminário internacional A América Latina e as Novas Condições Econômicas Mundiais.
O evento abordou a questão das perspectivas latinoamericanas diante das mudanças impostas, entre outros fatores, pela desaceleração da China e pela gradual normalização da política monetária dos EUA.
O encontro foi organizado em três painéis, que incluiram desde estudos de casos nacionais — Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colômbia e México — a apresentações mais abrangentes da economia da região como um todo ou parte dela.
Confira as fotos do evento e mais informações no site do FGV/IBRE: http://bit.ly/YdyhyL
This presentation shows some of the most important positive changes that the Colombian economy has undergone, and it shows investors the ease of doing businesses in Colombia.
Venezuela is undergoing one of the worst economic losses ever registered by any country in a three-year period, either by Latin American or world standards. Poverty rates have skyrocketed and stand today beyond 80%. We define two landmarks for recovery, and revise how much would Venezuela need to grow - oil and non-oil sectors - and how likely are those rates from the Venezuela and the world´s experience. We end up by outlining some of the adaptive challenges Venezuela would need to tackle to engine a sustainable recovery.
Apresentação de Benigno Rojas, Governo de Alberta, no Canadá, durante evento promovido pelo Sistema FIEB, Fundamentos da Exploração e Produção de Não Convencionais: a Experiência Canadense.
Chiapas is not only Mexico's poorest state, but also the one displaying the lowest rate of economic growth. As a consequence, the income gap between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico continues to widen. Usual suspects like education, infrastructure, or financial constraints, are not to blame for Chiapas' dismal performance. To the contrary, over the previous decade Chiapas has improved its relative position within Mexico in terms of average years of schooling, infrastructure - roads, ports, and airports; and access to credit. The state's poor economic record also contrasts with the macroeconomic and institutional stability that has prevailed in Mexico over this period. Harvard's Center for International Development (CID) teamed with the Mexican Ministry of Finance to launch a research initiative in the quest for the causes underlying Chiapas' backwardness.
Devaluations may have an impact on multinational stock prices depending on the size of the particular country and whether they are anticipated or not. In an efficient market, predictable devaluations on small countries should not impact stock prices of large multinational companies. We analyze cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) to five devaluations in Venezuela within the context of stiff exchange controls. Our event study covers a period of five years and uses daily stock prices for up to 122 multinationals with Venezuelan subsidiaries. We find evidence of significant negative impacts on stock prices on various devaluations, reaching up to -1.75% over the event window. We interpret these results as evidence of market myopia, as they are driven by retained earnings on financial statements being converted into dollars at highly overvalued official rates, in spite of subsidiaries not having access to dollars at these prices for years prior to the devaluations.
Un grupo de profesores e investigadores de Harvard, con el auspicio del Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo, ha pasado 8 meses analizando el extraordinario período de crecimiento acelerado de Panamá, sus principales motores, los principales desequilibrios que se han ido creando y las potenciales restricciones al crecimiento sostenido de Panamá.
Venezuela is currently undergoing the worst economic crisis in its history. By the end of 2016, more than 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP) it had three years ago will be lost. Poverty has soared to record levels. Monthly inflation rates are gradually approaching hyperinflation. Shortages of basic food staples and medicines are rampant. A three-tier exchange rate system prevails, with black market rates surpassing the lowest official rate by a factor of one-hundred. After more than a decade of massive expropriations and state control, the small, surviving, private industrial apparatus is nearly paralyzed, trapped in a web of regulations, without access to foreign currency to purchase parts or raw materials, and their operations are technologically obsolete.
In order to promote a better understanding of the causes, magnitudes, and possible remedies of the crisis, the Center for International Development (CID) at Harvard University launched a research initiative on Venezuela at the end of 2015.
Un diagnóstico de la grave situación económica de Venezuela y algunos lineamientos de política para el diseño de un programa de reconstrucción nacional
The literature on external default has stressed the existence of the so-called debt-intolerance puzzle: developing nations tend to default at debt-to-GDP ratios well bellow those of developed countries. The underestimation or plain omission of domestic debt may account for a fraction of that puzzle. We calculate fiscal revenues coming from financial repression using different methodologies for the case of Venezuela, and look at their correspondence with comprehensive measures of capital flight. In particular, we add to the standard measure of capital flight the over-invoicing of imports, rife in periods of exchange controls. We find that financial repression accounts for public revenues similar to those of OECD economies, in spite of the latter having much higher domestic debt-to-GDP ratios. We also find that financial repression and capital flight is significantly higher in years of exchange controls and interest rate caps. We interpret this as significant evidence suggesting a link between domestic disequilibrium and a weakening of the net foreign asset position via capital flight.
Venezuela Macroeconomic Outlook: A summary on the main statistics of the Venezuelan economy, the Hugo Chavez poignant legacy, and the root of the massive protests taking place in Venezuela right now
Much of the achievements in poverty and inequality reduction do not respond to Hugo Chavez social programs, but rather to higher public expenditure, fueling an import consumption boom. OIl was not enough, foreign debt increased fourfold. This presentation evaluates current state of Venezuelan economy under Maduro and draft some guidelines to achieving equitable growth
Esta presentación resume el estado actual de la economía venezolana y sus perspectivas, cerrado el año 2012 y cuatro meses (estadísticamente reportados) del 2013. Está dividida para fines didácticos en 1) Sector real, 2) Restricción fiscal, 3) Restricción de divisas, y 4) Perspectivas
Harnessing Science and Technology: Reviving the Philippine Manufacturing SectorNEDAhq
Keynote address of Socioeconomic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General Arsenio M. Balisacan during the 35th Annual Scientific Meeting of the National Academy of Science and Technology (NAST), Manila Hotel,10 July 2013
Keynote Speech III: Chinese Economic Slowdown and New Sources of Economic Dev...ssuserd649a2
Keynote Speech by Tony Fang (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada) at the 1st International Workshop on the Chinese Development Model organized at IQS School of Management, Universitat Ramon Llull in Barcelona on July 8th, 2022
VCG Info-graphic of the Nearshore Outsourcing ModelJake Ryan
VCG uses a hybrid nearshore outsourcing model to reduce costs of custom application development projects. A hybrid nearshore approach allows for cost reduction but with less risk because we all work in the same timezones.
Naomi Alboim - Planning for the Future: Immigration and Labour Market TrendsMaytree
Immigration policy in Canada is complex and is driven by both federal and provincial interests. Naomi Alboim, a leading expert in the field, will shed light on current trends in Canadian immigration, share insights on foreign qualification recognition, and suggest potential new directions for mentoring.
In presentation made at the annual ALLIES conference, immigrant integration expert, Naomi Alboim describes the shifting trends in immigration and labour markets and the implication of these shifts for employers, service providers, and policy makers.
This report offers a comprehensive overview of the situation in Malaysia focusing on the business perspective. Malaysia in Southeast Asia has a robust economy. Its GDP per capita ranked 54th in 2019. In the same year, the Malaysian population increased by 1.3% and reached a total of 32 million. Corruption controls are moderate in Malaysia, whereas its level of regulatory quality ranks high: #56 out of 160 countries
What's included?
Economic conditions (incl. COVID-19 economic impact), public finances, and detailed information on the labor force
Demographics, consumption, and income
Imports, exports, foreign direct investments
Fitch Solutions operational risk indexes
Business culture and local habits
Government structure, overview of stability and threats, and the political environment
Territorial CO2 emissions, energy shares, and PM2.5 exposure
The Growth Lab at Harvard CID prepared this presentation to be shared with Namibia's High Panel for Economic Growth, established by President Hage Geingob.
The literature on income gaps between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico revolves around individual factors, such as education and ethnicity. Yet, twenty years after the Zapatista rebellion, the schooling gap between Chiapas and the other Mexican entities has shrunk while the income gap has widened, and we find no evidence indicating that Chiapas indigenes are worse-off than their likes elsewhere in Mexico. We explore a different hypothesis. Based on census data, we calculate the economic complexity index, a measure of the knowledge agglomeration embedded in the economic activities at a municipal level in Mexico. Economic complexity explains a larger fraction of the income gap than any individual factor. Our results suggest that chiapanecos are not the problem, the problem is Chiapas. These results hold when we extend our analysis to Mexico’s thirty-one federal entities, suggesting that place-specific determinants that have been overlooked in both the literature and policy, have a key role in the determination of income gaps.
For three years Harvard CID has been working on a plan to rescue Venezuela and get the country on a path of sustainable, inclusive growth, and development. We have teamed with Venezuelan experts at home and abroad, worked with international institutions, and have started the process of building consensus around the plan among the opposition parties that control the Venezuelan National Assembly. The Venezuelan Caucus at the Kennedy School will be hosting a series of talks on Venezuela: The morning after, by different members of our team and on different topics. You can follow on their Facebook webpage. More coming soon, stay tuned!
El colapso económico de Venezuela no tiene precedentes en la historia económica posterior a la segunda guerra mundial. La caída paralela de la producción (49%) e importación per cápita (84%), conjuntamente con la hiper-inflación más alta registrada en doce meses consecutivos (200.005% en los doce meses previos a Agosto 2018), conforman un cuadro único de la catástrofe que le ha caído al país tras veinte años de socialismo.
Esta es una presentación compartida con el Frente Amplio de Venezuela en Julio de 2018, resultado del trabajo de un conjunto de investigadores del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Universidad de Harvard.
¿Cómo ha llegado Venezuela a la situación actual, y qué tan grave es el colapso que ha sufrido en función de otras catástrofes económicas registradas en el mundo?
On March 5th I had the privilege to host Lant Pritchett in my econometrics class at @Kennedy_School, sharing his work: "The RCT debate is over. We won. They lost." Nothing substitutes for listening to Lant, but here is a link to his compelling presentation".
¿Cuánto tiempo le tomará a Venezuela recuperarse la catástrofe económica sufrida? Tomando en cuenta la propia experiencia de Venezuela y la del resto del mundo, establecemos la probabilidad de recuperación para diferentes escenarios y plazos.
Bajo el patrocinio del Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo y en el marco del programa de Ciudades Emergentes y Sostenibles, un equipo de Centro para el Desarrollo de la Universidad de Harvard pasó la segunda parte del 2017 trabajando en Hermosillo, Sonora. Nuestra meta es analizar el desempeño económico reciente del lugar y su potencial económico, e identificar las restricciones más importantes al crecimiento.
Venezuela ha sufrido entre 2013-2017 el colapso más grande que haya registrado cualquier economía de América Latina en su historia, en época de paz o guerra. La caída de los precios y la producción petrolero, en combinación con el endeudamiento salvaje de la República en los tiempos de bonanza, ha dejado a la República exangüe y forzado una caída en las importaciones que ha llevado al país al borde de una crisis humanitaria. Aquí se simulan los impactos de algunos reformas económicas en el evento de una transición, desde el punto de vista de la balanza de pagos. En conclusión, aún haciendo supuestos muy optimistas, se hace imposible sacar al país adelante sin una combinación de ayuda internacional (asistencia extraordinaria del Fondo Monetario Internacional) Y una reestructuración de deuda muy agresiva.
Un recorrido por los 50 casos de desastres económicos que se han registrado desde 1960: ¿En cuánto tiempo se recuperaron? ¿Buscaron asistencia internacional? ¿Los petroleros salieron más rápido? Algunas notas sobre los retos adaptativos que nos plantea la recuperación de la economía venezolana.
Una recorrido por la economía venezolana durante la revolución bolivariana: La fase de expansión basada en el boom petrolero y el acelerado endeudamiento externo, y el colapso. Una hoja de ruta para salir adelante entres fases: Emergencia, estabilización, y reforma estructural.
Venezuela llega a 2015 sin reservas internacionales, con las importaciones al mínimo, los mercados financieros internacionales cerrados, y una deuda externa aproximada de 100% del PIB.
More from Center for International Development, Harvard University (16)
US Economic Outlook - Being Decided - M Capital Group August 2021.pdfpchutichetpong
The U.S. economy is continuing its impressive recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and not slowing down despite re-occurring bumps. The U.S. savings rate reached its highest ever recorded level at 34% in April 2020 and Americans seem ready to spend. The sectors that had been hurt the most by the pandemic specifically reduced consumer spending, like retail, leisure, hospitality, and travel, are now experiencing massive growth in revenue and job openings.
Could this growth lead to a “Roaring Twenties”? As quickly as the U.S. economy contracted, experiencing a 9.1% drop in economic output relative to the business cycle in Q2 2020, the largest in recorded history, it has rebounded beyond expectations. This surprising growth seems to be fueled by the U.S. government’s aggressive fiscal and monetary policies, and an increase in consumer spending as mobility restrictions are lifted. Unemployment rates between June 2020 and June 2021 decreased by 5.2%, while the demand for labor is increasing, coupled with increasing wages to incentivize Americans to rejoin the labor force. Schools and businesses are expected to fully reopen soon. In parallel, vaccination rates across the country and the world continue to rise, with full vaccination rates of 50% and 14.8% respectively.
However, it is not completely smooth sailing from here. According to M Capital Group, the main risks that threaten the continued growth of the U.S. economy are inflation, unsettled trade relations, and another wave of Covid-19 mutations that could shut down the world again. Have we learned from the past year of COVID-19 and adapted our economy accordingly?
“In order for the U.S. economy to continue growing, whether there is another wave or not, the U.S. needs to focus on diversifying supply chains, supporting business investment, and maintaining consumer spending,” says Grace Feeley, a research analyst at M Capital Group.
While the economic indicators are positive, the risks are coming closer to manifesting and threatening such growth. The new variants spreading throughout the world, Delta, Lambda, and Gamma, are vaccine-resistant and muddy the predictions made about the economy and health of the country. These variants bring back the feeling of uncertainty that has wreaked havoc not only on the stock market but the mindset of people around the world. MCG provides unique insight on how to mitigate these risks to possibly ensure a bright economic future.
What price will pi network be listed on exchangesDOT TECH
The rate at which pi will be listed is practically unknown. But due to speculations surrounding it the predicted rate is tends to be from 30$ — 50$.
So if you are interested in selling your pi network coins at a high rate tho. Or you can't wait till the mainnet launch in 2026. You can easily trade your pi coins with a merchant.
A merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold massive quantities till mainnet launch.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
when will pi network coin be available on crypto exchange.DOT TECH
There is no set date for when Pi coins will enter the market.
However, the developers are working hard to get them released as soon as possible.
Once they are available, users will be able to exchange other cryptocurrencies for Pi coins on designated exchanges.
But for now the only way to sell your pi coins is through verified pi vendor.
Here is the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins on Bitmart crypto exchangeDOT TECH
Yes. Pi network coins can be exchanged but not on bitmart exchange. Because pi network is still in the enclosed mainnet. The only way pioneers are able to trade pi coins is by reselling the pi coins to pi verified merchants.
A verified merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell it to exchanges looking forward to hold till mainnet launch.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins at high rate quickly.DOT TECH
Where can I sell my pi coins at a high rate.
Pi is not launched yet on any exchange. But one can easily sell his or her pi coins to investors who want to hold pi till mainnet launch.
This means crypto whales want to hold pi. And you can get a good rate for selling pi to them. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor below.
A vendor is someone who buys from a miner and resell it to a holder or crypto whale.
Here is the telegram contact of my vendor:
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins effectively (from 50 - 100k pi)DOT TECH
Anywhere in the world, including Africa, America, and Europe, you can sell Pi Network Coins online and receive cash through online payment options.
Pi has not yet been launched on any exchange because we are currently using the confined Mainnet. The planned launch date for Pi is June 28, 2026.
Reselling to investors who want to hold until the mainnet launch in 2026 is currently the sole way to sell.
Consequently, right now. All you need to do is select the right pi network provider.
Who is a pi merchant?
An individual who buys coins from miners on the pi network and resells them to investors hoping to hang onto them until the mainnet is launched is known as a pi merchant.
debuts.
I'll provide you the Telegram username
@Pi_vendor_247
Falcon stands out as a top-tier P2P Invoice Discounting platform in India, bridging esteemed blue-chip companies and eager investors. Our goal is to transform the investment landscape in India by establishing a comprehensive destination for borrowers and investors with diverse profiles and needs, all while minimizing risk. What sets Falcon apart is the elimination of intermediaries such as commercial banks and depository institutions, allowing investors to enjoy higher yields.
how to swap pi coins to foreign currency withdrawable.DOT TECH
As of my last update, Pi is still in the testing phase and is not tradable on any exchanges.
However, Pi Network has announced plans to launch its Testnet and Mainnet in the future, which may include listing Pi on exchanges.
The current method for selling pi coins involves exchanging them with a pi vendor who purchases pi coins for investment reasons.
If you want to sell your pi coins, reach out to a pi vendor and sell them to anyone looking to sell pi coins from any country around the globe.
Below is the contact information for my personal pi vendor.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
Falcon stands out as a top-tier P2P Invoice Discounting platform in India, bridging esteemed blue-chip companies and eager investors. Our goal is to transform the investment landscape in India by establishing a comprehensive destination for borrowers and investors with diverse profiles and needs, all while minimizing risk. What sets Falcon apart is the elimination of intermediaries such as commercial banks and depository institutions, allowing investors to enjoy higher yields.
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024 - Ricerca sulle Startup e il Sistema dell'Innov...Quotidiano Piemontese
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024
Una ricerca de il Club degli Investitori, in collaborazione con ToTeM Torino Tech Map e con il supporto della ESCP Business School e di Growth Capital
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024 - Ricerca sulle Startup e il Sistema dell'Innov...
Preliminary findings on the economic potential of Panama and the impacts of immigration
1. Center
for
International
Development
at
Harvard
University
Analyzing
the
Economic
Potential
of
Panama
November
4,
2016
2. Panama
has
been
growing
at
a
fast
pace,
doubling
its
income
per
capita
over
the
previous
decade
2
Income
per
capita
3. -‐0.3% 0.3% 0.8% 1.3% 1.8% 2.3% 2.8%
Construction
Wholesale,
retail,
trade
services
Transport
and
communications
Housing
Financial
intermediation
Public
utilities
Mining
Manufacturing
Restaurants
and
hotels
Other
social
services
Social
services
and
private
health
Private
education
Agriculture
Fishing
2005-‐2015 2010-‐2015
Growth
has
been
spearhead
by
construction,
and
the
development
of
a
competitive
modern
service
sector
on
activities
surrounding
the
Canal
3
Sector
Contribution
to
Growth
(CAGR
*
Average
sector
share
on
GDP)
Non-‐residential
construction
growing
at
10-‐year
CAGR
(20.25%)
equivalent
to
doubling
the
stock
of
structures
every
4
years
Transport
and
communications
Financial
intermediation
Wholesale,
retail,
trade
services
4. In
spite
of
some
improvements
over
the
previous
decade,
Panama
remains
among
the
most
unequal
countries
in
the
world
4
PAN
2030405060
GINI Index, year 2010
6 8 10 12
GDP per capita (logs)
Source: own calculations based on WDI (World Bank)
Gini
coefficient
(2013)
5. Panama
embarked
on
a
high-‐skilled
growth
strategy,
based
on
the
competitiveness
of
its
service
tradable
sector
5
Economic
Complexity
by
Industry
6. As
construction
recedes,
the
challenge
will
be
on
finding
enough
skill
labor
required
to
foster
growth
on
the
modern
service
sector
6
Economic
Complexity,
qualified
labor
and
share
of
employment
(2010)
7. The
government
has
made
significant
efforts
to
upgrade
their
skill-‐base
via
education,
and
so
far
has
achieved
some
quantitative
results…
7
Distribution
by
schooling
(%
of
total
labor
force),
2012
8. …
but
from
a
qualitative
standpoint
the
results
are
very
different
8
Program
for
International
Student
Assessment
(PISA,
2009)
# rank
Shanghai-‐China 575 1
OECD
average 501 24
Chile 447 45
Uruguay 427 49
Mexico 416 51
Brazil 405 54
Colombia 402 55
Argentina 401 58
Panama 376 63
Peru 369 65
science
country/economy
Science
# rank
Shanghai-‐China 600 1
OECD
average 496 24
Uruguay 427 48
Chile 421 50
Mexico 419 51
Argentina 388 56
Brazil 386 58
Colombia 381 59
Peru 365 64
Panama 360 65
mathematics
country/economy
Mathematics
# rank
Shanghai-‐China 556 1
OECD
average 493 27
Chile 449 45
Uruguay 426 48
Mexico 425 49
Colombia 413 53
Brazil 412 54
Argentina 398 59
Panama 371 63
Peru 370 64
reading
country/economy
Science
10. Special
Economic
Zones:
Import-‐Export,
Industrial
Park,
Technology
Park
10
Special
Economic
Zones
• Special Visa for:
• Investors
• Workers
• Dependents
• Allowed to hire
>10% immigrants
• Labor regime:
• Overtime rate (25%)
• Days-off rate (50%)
• Flexibility to operate
Sundays & holidays
• Special Custom Reg.
• One-stop shop
• Oldest in the world
• Largest in LATAM
• 2nd worldwide
• 2,527 companies
• 29,786 jobs
• Income tax
• Import-Export tax
• Sales tax
Import-‐Export
Colon
Free
Zone
(1948)
Characteristics Tax
exemptions
Immigration
incentives
Other
• Import tax
• Remittances tax
• ITBMS tax
• Income tax
• Dividend tax
• Import-Export tax
• Sales tax
• Remittances tax
• Commercial license
• Patent & ITBMX tax
Ciudad
del
Saber
Technology
Park
(2000)
Panama-‐Pacifico
Industrial
Park
(2007)
• 75 SMEs
• 1,290 direct jobs
• Focus: innovation
and technology
• 251 companies
(41% multinational)
• 2,305 jobs
• Master plan:
• 1,000,000 sq.mts
• 40,000 jobs
• Special Visa for:
• Workers
• Allowed to hire
>10% immigrants
• Allowed to hire
>10% immigrants
11. The
strategy
of
attracting
multinationals
has
raised
the
skill
bar
and
allowed
Panama
to
develop
a
modern
service
sector,
but
many
restrictions
remain
11
• There
is
a
list
of
27
occupations
that
are
legally
restricted
to
immigrants,
including
all
type
of
engineers,
dentists,
agriculture
scientists,
architects,
doctors,
economists,
lawyers,
chemists,
and
educators
in
the
areas
of
history
and
geography
• Significant
restrictions
to
foreigners
within
the
SEZs to
free
flow
across
firms,
or
move
into
the
local
economy
and
create
their
own
firms:
• Hefty
fees
for
visa
renewals
• Years
spent
on
SZEs
do
not
count
for
residence
purposes
• Visas
are
revoked
if
foreigners
leave
the
company
originally
sponsoring
them
• Firms
can
be
expelled
from
City
of
Knowledge
if
they
move
from
innovation
to
commercialization
and
sales,
falling
into
a
sort
of
legal
limbo
• Restricted
citizenships
(India,
China)
for
“national
security
reasons”
• All
these
restrictions
are
preventing
know-‐how
and
productive
capacities
accumulated
in
the
SEZ
from
spilling
over
to
the
rest
of
the
economy
12. A
sign
of
skill
scarcity: Wage
premiums
to
foreign
workers
are
very
high
on
average(50%),
and
positive
for
all
industries
and
occupations
12
Wage
premiums
to
foreigners
(2010)
13. Restricting
the
free
flow
of
highly
skilled
immigrants
is
a
policy
that
is
not
helping
the
Panamanians
(neither
low-‐skill
nor
high-‐skill)
13
14. Restricting
the
free
flow
of
highly
skilled
immigrants
is
a
policy
that
is
not
helping
the
Panamanians
(neither
low-‐skill
nor
high-‐skill)
14
16. Final
thoughts
16
• In
Panama
we
have
explored
how
and
where
skills
and
know-‐how
developed
in
competitive
services
can
be
redeployed
• Our
work
in
Panama
debunks
the
myth
of
immigrants
having
negative
impacts
on
natives:
The
most
benefited
are
low-‐skilled
Panamanians
• Structural
change
from
low-‐productivity
agriculture
and
construction
to
modern
competitive
service
sector
will
demand
a
skill
upgrade
• Massive
restrictions
to
migration
are
hindering
spillovers
and
maintaining
know-‐how
locked
into
the
gates
of
Special
Economic
Zones
• Further
research:
• Data
on
business
travelers
(to
Panama)
would
allow
us
to
address
causality
between
flow
of
immigrants
and
the
appearance
of
new
economic
activities
• Social
Security
data
would
allow
us
to
track
foreigners
that
flow
in
and
out
of
the
Special
Economic
Zones
or
multinational
headquarters,
and
assess
their
impact
in
the
domestic
economy