This document discusses human factors engineering and safety. It defines an accident, provides accident statistics from the UK, and discusses conceptual models of the accident process including the chain of multiple events model, epidemiological model, energy exchange model, behavioral models, and systems safety model. It also covers human error classification schemes, categories of human errors including mistakes and slips, and speed-accuracy tradeoffs in human performance.
Acs0005 Patient Safety In Surgical Care A Systems Approachmedbookonline
This document discusses patient safety in surgical care from a systems approach. It begins by defining key terms related to patient safety such as adverse events, errors, and preventable events. Several studies are cited that estimate the incidence of adverse events in surgery, finding rates between 3-4% resulting in half being preventable. Common preventable complications included infections, bleeding, and technical errors. Creating a just culture that views errors as systems failures rather than individual faults is important for improving safety.
Workplace accidents cost billions annually and theories of accident causation aim to understand why accidents happen to prevent them. The document outlines several theories including: the Domino Theory which views accidents as resulting from a series of factors; the Human Factors Theory which attributes accidents to human error from overload, inappropriate responses or activities; and the Systems Theory which sees accidents as outcomes of interactions between people, machinery and the environment. A combination of theories may provide the best approach to solving safety problems.
Accident Investigation Training and Assessment Modulessuser2c065e
The document discusses accident causation and investigation. It begins by outlining the session objectives which are to discuss accident causation theory, importance of investigation, difference between dangerous occurrences and imminent danger, and accident investigation procedures. It then provides an introduction to accidents, defining them as unplanned events that disrupt normal function. Accident causation is explained using the People, Environment, Machine, Materials model and Heinrich's domino theory is presented. The primary causes of accidents are identified as unsafe acts and unsafe conditions. The four step process of accident investigation is outlined as controlling the scene, gathering data, analyzing data, and writing a report. Key aspects of each step like interviewing witnesses, evidence collection, and diagramming are also discussed
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not understand probabilities and therefore can't complete it's duty of licensing renewal. A Dirty Math Trick - see page 13-18.
The document discusses the reasons for investigating accidents and incidents in the workplace. Key reasons include: to prevent future accidents by identifying their root causes; to fulfill legal requirements; to address liability issues if problems are not corrected; and most importantly, to improve workplace safety and protect employee health. A thorough investigation process is an important part of any safety program.
This document discusses the history and evolution of human factors analysis and just culture in aviation incident investigation. It provides details on:
- The shift from solely focusing on human-machine interfaces to recognizing broader organizational and cultural causes of human error.
- Advances in understanding why errors occur rather than just classifying them, driven partly by reduced hardware errors with technological changes.
- Types of errors (active vs. latent) and Reason's Swiss cheese model of defenses with holes that must align for accidents to occur.
- Challenges investigating errors but importance of reports, including near misses, for understanding underlying causes even if reconstructed versus objective.
- Just culture aims to balance accountability with open reporting by focusing
This document discusses accident causation theories and accident reporting. It describes several theories of accident causation including Heinrich's accident sequence theory, multiple causation theory, and biased liability theory. It also discusses accident costs, common myths, and the importance of identifying and analyzing contributing factors through root cause analysis. The document emphasizes the importance of accurate, timely accident reporting and how electronic reporting systems can help organizations collect, track, and analyze accident data.
STH 2017_Day 3_Track 1_Session 1_Caralis_Preventing Medical Errors Compatibil...Benghie Hyacinthe
The document discusses medical errors and strategies to reduce them. It defines medical errors and notes that they are common, causing thousands of deaths annually in the US. Root cause analysis seeks to identify underlying factors in the healthcare system that contribute to errors in order to implement fixes. Strategies discussed include improving communication, using checklists, increasing staff supervision, and optimizing workload and resources to reduce risk. The goal is to learn from errors by examining the system failures that led to them, rather than blaming individuals.
Acs0005 Patient Safety In Surgical Care A Systems Approachmedbookonline
This document discusses patient safety in surgical care from a systems approach. It begins by defining key terms related to patient safety such as adverse events, errors, and preventable events. Several studies are cited that estimate the incidence of adverse events in surgery, finding rates between 3-4% resulting in half being preventable. Common preventable complications included infections, bleeding, and technical errors. Creating a just culture that views errors as systems failures rather than individual faults is important for improving safety.
Workplace accidents cost billions annually and theories of accident causation aim to understand why accidents happen to prevent them. The document outlines several theories including: the Domino Theory which views accidents as resulting from a series of factors; the Human Factors Theory which attributes accidents to human error from overload, inappropriate responses or activities; and the Systems Theory which sees accidents as outcomes of interactions between people, machinery and the environment. A combination of theories may provide the best approach to solving safety problems.
Accident Investigation Training and Assessment Modulessuser2c065e
The document discusses accident causation and investigation. It begins by outlining the session objectives which are to discuss accident causation theory, importance of investigation, difference between dangerous occurrences and imminent danger, and accident investigation procedures. It then provides an introduction to accidents, defining them as unplanned events that disrupt normal function. Accident causation is explained using the People, Environment, Machine, Materials model and Heinrich's domino theory is presented. The primary causes of accidents are identified as unsafe acts and unsafe conditions. The four step process of accident investigation is outlined as controlling the scene, gathering data, analyzing data, and writing a report. Key aspects of each step like interviewing witnesses, evidence collection, and diagramming are also discussed
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not understand probabilities and therefore can't complete it's duty of licensing renewal. A Dirty Math Trick - see page 13-18.
The document discusses the reasons for investigating accidents and incidents in the workplace. Key reasons include: to prevent future accidents by identifying their root causes; to fulfill legal requirements; to address liability issues if problems are not corrected; and most importantly, to improve workplace safety and protect employee health. A thorough investigation process is an important part of any safety program.
This document discusses the history and evolution of human factors analysis and just culture in aviation incident investigation. It provides details on:
- The shift from solely focusing on human-machine interfaces to recognizing broader organizational and cultural causes of human error.
- Advances in understanding why errors occur rather than just classifying them, driven partly by reduced hardware errors with technological changes.
- Types of errors (active vs. latent) and Reason's Swiss cheese model of defenses with holes that must align for accidents to occur.
- Challenges investigating errors but importance of reports, including near misses, for understanding underlying causes even if reconstructed versus objective.
- Just culture aims to balance accountability with open reporting by focusing
This document discusses accident causation theories and accident reporting. It describes several theories of accident causation including Heinrich's accident sequence theory, multiple causation theory, and biased liability theory. It also discusses accident costs, common myths, and the importance of identifying and analyzing contributing factors through root cause analysis. The document emphasizes the importance of accurate, timely accident reporting and how electronic reporting systems can help organizations collect, track, and analyze accident data.
STH 2017_Day 3_Track 1_Session 1_Caralis_Preventing Medical Errors Compatibil...Benghie Hyacinthe
The document discusses medical errors and strategies to reduce them. It defines medical errors and notes that they are common, causing thousands of deaths annually in the US. Root cause analysis seeks to identify underlying factors in the healthcare system that contribute to errors in order to implement fixes. Strategies discussed include improving communication, using checklists, increasing staff supervision, and optimizing workload and resources to reduce risk. The goal is to learn from errors by examining the system failures that led to them, rather than blaming individuals.
The document discusses several theories of accident causation:
1. Petersen's accident theory which extends the human factors theory and adds elements like overload, ergonomic traps, decision to err, and system failures.
2. Epidemiological theory which studies the relationship between environmental factors and accidents, looking at predisposition and situational characteristics.
3. Systems theory which views accidents as resulting from interactions within a system consisting of the host, agent, and environment.
4. Firenzie's systems theory focuses on information gathering, risk assessment, decision making, and task performance, and how stressors can impact these.
5. Bird and Loftus's loss causation theory which
1. The document discusses several accident theories including the Domino Theory, Energy Theory, and Multiple Factor Theories. It also outlines different approaches to hazard avoidance such as enforcement, psychological, engineering, and analytical.
2. Key accident causes mentioned include unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, human factors like overload and inappropriate responses. Accident costs can be direct such as medical expenses or indirect like lost productivity.
3. Successful hazard avoidance requires considering factors like management, the individual, equipment, and their interactions, with an emphasis on engineering controls and an analytical approach supported by top management.
A Pyramid ofDecision ApproachesPaul J.H. Schoemaker J. E.docxransayo
There are four general approaches to decision making outlined in the pyramid model, ranging from intuitive to highly analytical. Intuition, while sometimes effective, is prone to random inconsistency and systematic distortion. Rules are more structured but can also be distorted and fail to adapt to changes. Case-based reasoning examines prior similar situations but risks poor analogies. The most analytical approach is quantitative modeling, which minimizes biases but requires significant data and analysis. Overall the pyramid suggests combining approaches based on the situation, with more analytical methods used for high-stake or complex decisions.
accident prevention and theories of accidentsatheeshsep24
1. Several theories of accident causation are described, including the Domino Theory, Human Factors Theory, Accident/Incident Theory, Epidemiological Theory, and Systems Theory.
2. The Domino Theory proposes that accidents are caused by a series of preceding factors, and removing the central unsafe act or hazardous condition can prevent accidents.
3. The Human Factors Theory attributes accidents to a chain of events ultimately resulting from human error due to overload, inappropriate responses, or inappropriate activities.
MEDTECH 2013 Closing Plenary, Andy Shaudt, Director of Usability Services, Na...MedTechAssociation
MEDTECH 2013 Closing Plenary, Andy Shaudt, Director of Usability Services, National Center for Human Factors in Healthcare, MedStar Institute for Innovation, presents on Design and Development of Medical Devices through a Human Factors and Usability Lens on October 8, 2013
Medical errors are common, resulting in thousands of unnecessary deaths each year in the US and other countries. Errors often stem from systemic issues rather than individual failings, such as complex systems, lack of training and oversight. To improve patient safety, healthcare systems must focus on system design and policies that reduce complexity, automate processes, and establish a culture of reporting and learning from errors without blame.
This document provides an analysis of the Mansfield Crisis Manual, which outlines procedures for responding to various emergency situations at Mansfield schools. The manual covers responses to people crises like medical emergencies or deaths, physical plant failures involving utilities or infrastructure, and natural disasters. However, some contact information in the manual is outdated. While the layout is clear, the analyst was unfamiliar with the specific manual or any previous emergency plans for the district. The handbooks provide shortened versions of key procedures but lack the depth of information in the full manual.
The document discusses engineering responsibilities and concepts around safety. It covers how safety is a subjective concept defined by acceptable risk levels. Absolute safety cannot be achieved and risk is inherent in many activities. Engineers must balance safety, responsibilities to clients and the public, and consider how risks and benefits are perceived. Methods to assess risk include scenario analysis, failure mode analysis, and cost-benefit analysis with the goal of continually improving safety.
Ethics is the discipline concerned with moral principles of good and bad, right and wrong. Risk is the potential for unwanted, harmful consequences and includes dangers from events like accidents, economic losses, or environmental harm. The acceptability of risk depends on factors like voluntary vs involuntary nature, short and long term effects, probability, and reversibility. While some risks like traffic accidents are commonly accepted, reducing risks through measures like security systems, fire prevention, and medical care can decrease losses. Risk analysis involves identifying hazards, evaluating failure risks and scenarios, and assessing consequences, while risk reduction techniques actively work to prevent or lessen the chance of losses occurring.
[DOCUMENT]:
HUMAN ERROR José Luis Garc í a-Chico (jgarciac@email.sjsu.edu) San Jose State University ISE 105 Spring 2006 April 24, 2006 “ To err is human...” (Cicero, I century BC) “... to understand the reasons why humans err is science” (Hollnagel, 1993) What is important to know about human error? Human error is in our nature
OSH AccidentREVISED for OSH Parctitioners guidessuser8748142
The document discusses principles of incident prevention and accident causation. It aims to define incidents, explain their causes and management's role, and list three accident causation theories. Specifically:
- It defines an incident as an unexpected event causing harm, damage, or a near-miss due to a combination of causes.
- Causes of incidents include unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, and lack of management control over selection, equipment, work systems, training and supervision.
- Three accident causation theories discussed are: Heinrich's five stage sequence linking social factors to injury; the three basic causes of accidents model involving management, personal and environmental factors; and the multiple cause theory compatible with loss causation.
The document discusses condition-based maintenance optimization and its application to breast cancer screening. It describes how machine failure models using hazard rates can be applied similarly to cancer risk modeling using incidence and mortality rates. The author leads an interdisciplinary project applying maintenance optimization principles to determine breast cancer risk factors and optimize mammography screening policies. The goal is to minimize cancer risk and deaths by understanding risk factors and screening schedules.
The document discusses two major incidents, the Pike River Mine disaster in 2010 and the Dreamworld tragedy in 2016, and identifies common pattern failures that led to both incidents. Ten recurring causal pathways are identified from past failures, including design flaws, failure to address warning signs, inadequate risk assessment, poor management systems, production pressures overriding safety, and regulatory failures. Both cases involved concerns raised prior to the incidents by workers and safety experts that were not adequately addressed. The lessons indicate the need for comprehensive risk assessment, prioritizing safety over production, learning from past incidents, and robust regulatory oversight and enforcement.
2007 North Wales OHS - Human factors overviewAndy Brazier
This document provides an introduction to human factors and its role in safety by Andy Brazier, a chemical engineer and risk consultant specializing in human factors. Over three sentences, it outlines that Brazier aims to introduce human factors and what has been learned about it in major hazard industries, and give ideas on how it applies to lower hazard activities based on his experience in the field and qualifications.
2012.02.18 Reducing Human Error in Healthcare - Getting Doctors to Swallow th...NUI Galway
Dr Paul O'Connor, Whitaker Institute, NUI Galway presented this seminar "Reducing Human Error in Healthcare - Getting Doctors to Swallow the Blue Pill" as part of the NUI Galway Research Office Lunchtime Seminar Series on 18th January 2012.
This document discusses workplace health and safety. It begins by listing common causes of workplace accidents such as slips, trips, falls and injuries from sharp objects. It then provides examples of real workplace accidents and their injuries. The document emphasizes that most accidents are due to human error like poor judgment, carelessness or forgetfulness. It also notes that management deficiencies are often underlying causes. It then lists many common workplace hazards and how they can injure workers. The document discusses moral, legal and safety reasons for preventing accidents. It provides an overview of UK health and safety law and employers' duties to protect workers.
DEEP LEARNING FOR SMART GRID INTRUSION DETECTION: A HYBRID CNN-LSTM-BASED MODELgerogepatton
As digital technology becomes more deeply embedded in power systems, protecting the communication
networks of Smart Grids (SG) has emerged as a critical concern. Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3)
represents a multi-tiered application layer protocol extensively utilized in Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA)-based smart grids to facilitate real-time data gathering and control functionalities.
Robust Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are necessary for early threat detection and mitigation because
of the interconnection of these networks, which makes them vulnerable to a variety of cyberattacks. To
solve this issue, this paper develops a hybrid Deep Learning (DL) model specifically designed for intrusion
detection in smart grids. The proposed approach is a combination of the Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) and the Long-Short-Term Memory algorithms (LSTM). We employed a recent intrusion detection
dataset (DNP3), which focuses on unauthorized commands and Denial of Service (DoS) cyberattacks, to
train and test our model. The results of our experiments show that our CNN-LSTM method is much better
at finding smart grid intrusions than other deep learning algorithms used for classification. In addition,
our proposed approach improves accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score, achieving a high detection
accuracy rate of 99.50%.
The document discusses several theories of accident causation:
1. Petersen's accident theory which extends the human factors theory and adds elements like overload, ergonomic traps, decision to err, and system failures.
2. Epidemiological theory which studies the relationship between environmental factors and accidents, looking at predisposition and situational characteristics.
3. Systems theory which views accidents as resulting from interactions within a system consisting of the host, agent, and environment.
4. Firenzie's systems theory focuses on information gathering, risk assessment, decision making, and task performance, and how stressors can impact these.
5. Bird and Loftus's loss causation theory which
1. The document discusses several accident theories including the Domino Theory, Energy Theory, and Multiple Factor Theories. It also outlines different approaches to hazard avoidance such as enforcement, psychological, engineering, and analytical.
2. Key accident causes mentioned include unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, human factors like overload and inappropriate responses. Accident costs can be direct such as medical expenses or indirect like lost productivity.
3. Successful hazard avoidance requires considering factors like management, the individual, equipment, and their interactions, with an emphasis on engineering controls and an analytical approach supported by top management.
A Pyramid ofDecision ApproachesPaul J.H. Schoemaker J. E.docxransayo
There are four general approaches to decision making outlined in the pyramid model, ranging from intuitive to highly analytical. Intuition, while sometimes effective, is prone to random inconsistency and systematic distortion. Rules are more structured but can also be distorted and fail to adapt to changes. Case-based reasoning examines prior similar situations but risks poor analogies. The most analytical approach is quantitative modeling, which minimizes biases but requires significant data and analysis. Overall the pyramid suggests combining approaches based on the situation, with more analytical methods used for high-stake or complex decisions.
accident prevention and theories of accidentsatheeshsep24
1. Several theories of accident causation are described, including the Domino Theory, Human Factors Theory, Accident/Incident Theory, Epidemiological Theory, and Systems Theory.
2. The Domino Theory proposes that accidents are caused by a series of preceding factors, and removing the central unsafe act or hazardous condition can prevent accidents.
3. The Human Factors Theory attributes accidents to a chain of events ultimately resulting from human error due to overload, inappropriate responses, or inappropriate activities.
MEDTECH 2013 Closing Plenary, Andy Shaudt, Director of Usability Services, Na...MedTechAssociation
MEDTECH 2013 Closing Plenary, Andy Shaudt, Director of Usability Services, National Center for Human Factors in Healthcare, MedStar Institute for Innovation, presents on Design and Development of Medical Devices through a Human Factors and Usability Lens on October 8, 2013
Medical errors are common, resulting in thousands of unnecessary deaths each year in the US and other countries. Errors often stem from systemic issues rather than individual failings, such as complex systems, lack of training and oversight. To improve patient safety, healthcare systems must focus on system design and policies that reduce complexity, automate processes, and establish a culture of reporting and learning from errors without blame.
This document provides an analysis of the Mansfield Crisis Manual, which outlines procedures for responding to various emergency situations at Mansfield schools. The manual covers responses to people crises like medical emergencies or deaths, physical plant failures involving utilities or infrastructure, and natural disasters. However, some contact information in the manual is outdated. While the layout is clear, the analyst was unfamiliar with the specific manual or any previous emergency plans for the district. The handbooks provide shortened versions of key procedures but lack the depth of information in the full manual.
The document discusses engineering responsibilities and concepts around safety. It covers how safety is a subjective concept defined by acceptable risk levels. Absolute safety cannot be achieved and risk is inherent in many activities. Engineers must balance safety, responsibilities to clients and the public, and consider how risks and benefits are perceived. Methods to assess risk include scenario analysis, failure mode analysis, and cost-benefit analysis with the goal of continually improving safety.
Ethics is the discipline concerned with moral principles of good and bad, right and wrong. Risk is the potential for unwanted, harmful consequences and includes dangers from events like accidents, economic losses, or environmental harm. The acceptability of risk depends on factors like voluntary vs involuntary nature, short and long term effects, probability, and reversibility. While some risks like traffic accidents are commonly accepted, reducing risks through measures like security systems, fire prevention, and medical care can decrease losses. Risk analysis involves identifying hazards, evaluating failure risks and scenarios, and assessing consequences, while risk reduction techniques actively work to prevent or lessen the chance of losses occurring.
[DOCUMENT]:
HUMAN ERROR José Luis Garc í a-Chico (jgarciac@email.sjsu.edu) San Jose State University ISE 105 Spring 2006 April 24, 2006 “ To err is human...” (Cicero, I century BC) “... to understand the reasons why humans err is science” (Hollnagel, 1993) What is important to know about human error? Human error is in our nature
OSH AccidentREVISED for OSH Parctitioners guidessuser8748142
The document discusses principles of incident prevention and accident causation. It aims to define incidents, explain their causes and management's role, and list three accident causation theories. Specifically:
- It defines an incident as an unexpected event causing harm, damage, or a near-miss due to a combination of causes.
- Causes of incidents include unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, and lack of management control over selection, equipment, work systems, training and supervision.
- Three accident causation theories discussed are: Heinrich's five stage sequence linking social factors to injury; the three basic causes of accidents model involving management, personal and environmental factors; and the multiple cause theory compatible with loss causation.
The document discusses condition-based maintenance optimization and its application to breast cancer screening. It describes how machine failure models using hazard rates can be applied similarly to cancer risk modeling using incidence and mortality rates. The author leads an interdisciplinary project applying maintenance optimization principles to determine breast cancer risk factors and optimize mammography screening policies. The goal is to minimize cancer risk and deaths by understanding risk factors and screening schedules.
The document discusses two major incidents, the Pike River Mine disaster in 2010 and the Dreamworld tragedy in 2016, and identifies common pattern failures that led to both incidents. Ten recurring causal pathways are identified from past failures, including design flaws, failure to address warning signs, inadequate risk assessment, poor management systems, production pressures overriding safety, and regulatory failures. Both cases involved concerns raised prior to the incidents by workers and safety experts that were not adequately addressed. The lessons indicate the need for comprehensive risk assessment, prioritizing safety over production, learning from past incidents, and robust regulatory oversight and enforcement.
2007 North Wales OHS - Human factors overviewAndy Brazier
This document provides an introduction to human factors and its role in safety by Andy Brazier, a chemical engineer and risk consultant specializing in human factors. Over three sentences, it outlines that Brazier aims to introduce human factors and what has been learned about it in major hazard industries, and give ideas on how it applies to lower hazard activities based on his experience in the field and qualifications.
2012.02.18 Reducing Human Error in Healthcare - Getting Doctors to Swallow th...NUI Galway
Dr Paul O'Connor, Whitaker Institute, NUI Galway presented this seminar "Reducing Human Error in Healthcare - Getting Doctors to Swallow the Blue Pill" as part of the NUI Galway Research Office Lunchtime Seminar Series on 18th January 2012.
This document discusses workplace health and safety. It begins by listing common causes of workplace accidents such as slips, trips, falls and injuries from sharp objects. It then provides examples of real workplace accidents and their injuries. The document emphasizes that most accidents are due to human error like poor judgment, carelessness or forgetfulness. It also notes that management deficiencies are often underlying causes. It then lists many common workplace hazards and how they can injure workers. The document discusses moral, legal and safety reasons for preventing accidents. It provides an overview of UK health and safety law and employers' duties to protect workers.
DEEP LEARNING FOR SMART GRID INTRUSION DETECTION: A HYBRID CNN-LSTM-BASED MODELgerogepatton
As digital technology becomes more deeply embedded in power systems, protecting the communication
networks of Smart Grids (SG) has emerged as a critical concern. Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3)
represents a multi-tiered application layer protocol extensively utilized in Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA)-based smart grids to facilitate real-time data gathering and control functionalities.
Robust Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are necessary for early threat detection and mitigation because
of the interconnection of these networks, which makes them vulnerable to a variety of cyberattacks. To
solve this issue, this paper develops a hybrid Deep Learning (DL) model specifically designed for intrusion
detection in smart grids. The proposed approach is a combination of the Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) and the Long-Short-Term Memory algorithms (LSTM). We employed a recent intrusion detection
dataset (DNP3), which focuses on unauthorized commands and Denial of Service (DoS) cyberattacks, to
train and test our model. The results of our experiments show that our CNN-LSTM method is much better
at finding smart grid intrusions than other deep learning algorithms used for classification. In addition,
our proposed approach improves accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score, achieving a high detection
accuracy rate of 99.50%.
Presentation of IEEE Slovenia CIS (Computational Intelligence Society) Chapte...University of Maribor
Slides from talk presenting:
Aleš Zamuda: Presentation of IEEE Slovenia CIS (Computational Intelligence Society) Chapter and Networking.
Presentation at IcETRAN 2024 session:
"Inter-Society Networking Panel GRSS/MTT-S/CIS
Panel Session: Promoting Connection and Cooperation"
IEEE Slovenia GRSS
IEEE Serbia and Montenegro MTT-S
IEEE Slovenia CIS
11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC AND COMPUTING ENGINEERING
3-6 June 2024, Niš, Serbia
A SYSTEMATIC RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH FOR SECURING THE SMART IRRIGATION SYSTEMSIJNSA Journal
The smart irrigation system represents an innovative approach to optimize water usage in agricultural and landscaping practices. The integration of cutting-edge technologies, including sensors, actuators, and data analysis, empowers this system to provide accurate monitoring and control of irrigation processes by leveraging real-time environmental conditions. The main objective of a smart irrigation system is to optimize water efficiency, minimize expenses, and foster the adoption of sustainable water management methods. This paper conducts a systematic risk assessment by exploring the key components/assets and their functionalities in the smart irrigation system. The crucial role of sensors in gathering data on soil moisture, weather patterns, and plant well-being is emphasized in this system. These sensors enable intelligent decision-making in irrigation scheduling and water distribution, leading to enhanced water efficiency and sustainable water management practices. Actuators enable automated control of irrigation devices, ensuring precise and targeted water delivery to plants. Additionally, the paper addresses the potential threat and vulnerabilities associated with smart irrigation systems. It discusses limitations of the system, such as power constraints and computational capabilities, and calculates the potential security risks. The paper suggests possible risk treatment methods for effective secure system operation. In conclusion, the paper emphasizes the significant benefits of implementing smart irrigation systems, including improved water conservation, increased crop yield, and reduced environmental impact. Additionally, based on the security analysis conducted, the paper recommends the implementation of countermeasures and security approaches to address vulnerabilities and ensure the integrity and reliability of the system. By incorporating these measures, smart irrigation technology can revolutionize water management practices in agriculture, promoting sustainability, resource efficiency, and safeguarding against potential security threats.
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...gerogepatton
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Applications (NLAIM 2024) offers a premier global platform for exchanging insights and findings in the theory, methodology, and applications of NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and their applications. The conference seeks substantial contributions across all key domains of NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and their practical applications, aiming to foster both theoretical advancements and real-world implementations. With a focus on facilitating collaboration between researchers and practitioners from academia and industry, the conference serves as a nexus for sharing the latest developments in the field.
Electric vehicle and photovoltaic advanced roles in enhancing the financial p...IJECEIAES
Climate change's impact on the planet forced the United Nations and governments to promote green energies and electric transportation. The deployments of photovoltaic (PV) and electric vehicle (EV) systems gained stronger momentum due to their numerous advantages over fossil fuel types. The advantages go beyond sustainability to reach financial support and stability. The work in this paper introduces the hybrid system between PV and EV to support industrial and commercial plants. This paper covers the theoretical framework of the proposed hybrid system including the required equation to complete the cost analysis when PV and EV are present. In addition, the proposed design diagram which sets the priorities and requirements of the system is presented. The proposed approach allows setup to advance their power stability, especially during power outages. The presented information supports researchers and plant owners to complete the necessary analysis while promoting the deployment of clean energy. The result of a case study that represents a dairy milk farmer supports the theoretical works and highlights its advanced benefits to existing plants. The short return on investment of the proposed approach supports the paper's novelty approach for the sustainable electrical system. In addition, the proposed system allows for an isolated power setup without the need for a transmission line which enhances the safety of the electrical network
Harnessing WebAssembly for Real-time Stateless Streaming PipelinesChristina Lin
Traditionally, dealing with real-time data pipelines has involved significant overhead, even for straightforward tasks like data transformation or masking. However, in this talk, we’ll venture into the dynamic realm of WebAssembly (WASM) and discover how it can revolutionize the creation of stateless streaming pipelines within a Kafka (Redpanda) broker. These pipelines are adept at managing low-latency, high-data-volume scenarios.
Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024Sinan KOZAK
Sinan from the Delivery Hero mobile infrastructure engineering team shares a deep dive into performance acceleration with Gradle build cache optimizations. Sinan shares their journey into solving complex build-cache problems that affect Gradle builds. By understanding the challenges and solutions found in our journey, we aim to demonstrate the possibilities for faster builds. The case study reveals how overlapping outputs and cache misconfigurations led to significant increases in build times, especially as the project scaled up with numerous modules using Paparazzi tests. The journey from diagnosing to defeating cache issues offers invaluable lessons on maintaining cache integrity without sacrificing functionality.
A review on techniques and modelling methodologies used for checking electrom...nooriasukmaningtyas
The proper function of the integrated circuit (IC) in an inhibiting electromagnetic environment has always been a serious concern throughout the decades of revolution in the world of electronics, from disjunct devices to today’s integrated circuit technology, where billions of transistors are combined on a single chip. The automotive industry and smart vehicles in particular, are confronting design issues such as being prone to electromagnetic interference (EMI). Electronic control devices calculate incorrect outputs because of EMI and sensors give misleading values which can prove fatal in case of automotives. In this paper, the authors have non exhaustively tried to review research work concerned with the investigation of EMI in ICs and prediction of this EMI using various modelling methodologies and measurement setups.
Embedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoringIJECEIAES
Car accident rates have increased in recent years, resulting in losses in human lives, properties, and other financial costs. An embedded machine learning-based system is developed to address this critical issue. The system can monitor road conditions, detect driving patterns, and identify aggressive driving behaviors. The system is based on neural networks trained on a comprehensive dataset of driving events, driving styles, and road conditions. The system effectively detects potential risks and helps mitigate the frequency and impact of accidents. The primary goal is to ensure the safety of drivers and vehicles. Collecting data involved gathering information on three key road events: normal street and normal drive, speed bumps, circular yellow speed bumps, and three aggressive driving actions: sudden start, sudden stop, and sudden entry. The gathered data is processed and analyzed using a machine learning system designed for limited power and memory devices. The developed system resulted in 91.9% accuracy, 93.6% precision, and 92% recall. The achieved inference time on an Arduino Nano 33 BLE Sense with a 32-bit CPU running at 64 MHz is 34 ms and requires 2.6 kB peak RAM and 139.9 kB program flash memory, making it suitable for resource-constrained embedded systems.
Understanding Inductive Bias in Machine LearningSUTEJAS
This presentation explores the concept of inductive bias in machine learning. It explains how algorithms come with built-in assumptions and preferences that guide the learning process. You'll learn about the different types of inductive bias and how they can impact the performance and generalizability of machine learning models.
The presentation also covers the positive and negative aspects of inductive bias, along with strategies for mitigating potential drawbacks. We'll explore examples of how bias manifests in algorithms like neural networks and decision trees.
By understanding inductive bias, you can gain valuable insights into how machine learning models work and make informed decisions when building and deploying them.
2. 2
Topics of the Course SYSE-812
Handout Contents
1 Introduction to HFE
2 Human Centric System Analysis & Design
3 Investigation Techniques in HFE
4 Affective Design in HFE
5 Cognitive & Mental Workload Analysis
6 Physical Workload Assessment
7 Safety in HFE
8 Job Satisfaction
9 Social Implications in HFE
10 Future of HFE
3. 3
What is an Accident?
◼ Something without apparent cause, unexpected,
unintentional act, mishap, chance occurrence, act of
God
◼ Chen (1972). “An error with sad consequences”.
Implies human error
◼ Arbous and Kerrick (1981). “Unplanned event in a
chain of planned and/or controlled events.” Implies
sequential development
◼ Schutzinger (1954). “Resulting from the integration of
a constellation of forces.” Implies mechanical or other
forces
4. 4
What is an accident?
◼ Haddon (1964). “Occurrence of an unexpected
physical or chemical damage to living or non-living
structures.” Implies unexpected event
◼ Suchman (1961). “It is doubtful that any single
definition will cover all types of events or interests.”
Generally to qualify as in accident, there should be:
❑ 1. Low degree of expectedness
❑ 2. Low degree of avoidability
❑ 3. Low degree of intention
❑ 4. Quick occurrence
5. 5
Myths, Misconceptions & Problems in Safety
Analysis
◼ 1. Semantic confusion: A drops something on B,
then B has an accident
◼ 2. Accidents happen to other people – they are
accident prone – I am not. This means that safety
propaganda or safety programs at work has little effect
6. 6
Accident Statistics from UK
Could be any country
Place Deaths Serious Injuries Slight Injuries
Home 7,561 120,000 1,500,000 (est)
Road 6,810 88,563 253,835
Rail 216 920 11.570
Aircraft 147 ? ?
Water transporter 158 ? ?
Factory 628 ? 11,805 (3+days away)
Farm 136 ? 8,945 (3+days away)
7. 7
What do we learn from this?
◼ Home vs. Roads and Road vs. Work
◼ Compare to Heinrich’s theory. Stated for aircraft: Out
of 330 mishaps are produced, 29 minor injuries and 1
major injury
◼ Difficult to get data with high reliability. Number of
deaths are usually a bit more correct – but it depends
on the country/culture
◼ What about trends? Technology brings its own
problems. In 1870, 8% of the accidents in UK were
traffic accidents – today 40%. Powered hand tools,
nuclear power plants, etc.
◼ Society matures with time. In general, the trend is
downwards, C. F. Smeed’s Law
9. 9
Smeed’s Law (1972) – Revalidated several times
◼ Increasing experience with greater motorization
◼ The more vehicles, the less miles per vehicle
◼ Improvements in legislation, roads, and vehicles
◼ In developing countries, the drivers get more
experienced over time
◼ Social protest regarding high death rates
◼ The dynamics of these factors are unknown. But it is
clear that large scale actions such as left-right
switching in Sweden improved traffic safety the first
year
10. 10
Conceptual Models of the Accident Process
◼ 1. Chain of Multiple Events
◼ Each accident is the result of a series of events. No single
cause exists – many factors influence the accident.
◼ The probability p of an accident is a function of several
different variables p=f(x1,x2,x3,….xn).
◼ This model is also used in epidemiological models, see below.
◼ 2. Epidemiological Model
◼ Originated from the study of disease. (Water supplies and
cholera in London).
◼ The host (accident victim) is described in terms of age, sex,
economic status, intelligence, behavior, etc. The agent (injury
deliverer) is described in terms of type, potential hazard,
method of use, etc. The environment is described in terms of
the effects on the host and agent: e.g. temperature, noise,
social climate.
◼ Useful for classifying accidents, but is not so helpful for
analyzing cause and effect
11. 11
Epidemiology Origin
◼ Investigation of Cholera Epidemics in London in 1855
Water
Company
Number
of
Houses
Deaths
from
Cholera
Deaths
per
10,000
Houses
Southwark
and
Vauxhall
40,046 1,263 315
Lambeth 26,107 98 37
Rest of
London
256,423 1,422 59
12. 12
Conceptual Models of the Accident Process
◼ 3. Energy Exchange model
❑ Injuries produced by energy exchange: e.g. mechanical,
chemical, thermal, electrical, etc.
❑ For example: A blow from a moving object crushed a
passengers leg in a car.
❑ This concept is a bit naïve, since all physical events
involve energy exchange.
❑ It is difficult to understand about causation.
❑ But the classification can be useful to suggest barriers
against accidents
13. 13
Conceptual Models of the Accident Process
◼ 4. Behavioral Models
❑ A. Risk-taking models: Whenever a decision is made,
it is affected by the degree of risk. Risk taking is affected
by the amount of uncertainty and the amount of danger.
The assumption is that those taking higher risks have
more accidents. But sometimes people are not aware of
risks at all.
❑ B. Accident Proneness: Proposes that some persons
are more liable, due to their personality, to have more
accidents. There has been a tremendous amount of
research. The notion of accident proneness has proven
not to be useful
❑ C. Concept of Overloading: Due to information, etc.
Matching environmental requirements with operator
capabilities
14. 14
Conceptual Models of the Accident Process
◼ 5. Systems Safety
❑ Safety is a systems problem and the person must be
understood in the context of the total system
Equipment
Factors
Task Factors
Environmental
Factors
Failure of Part
of System
Operator
Response to
the Failure
Accident or
Accident
Avoided
Predisposing
Factors
Precipitating
Factors
Example of a systems approach to accident analysis.
There are predisposing factors such as worn tires, wet
road, and glare. These can lead to precipitating factors
and eventually an accident
15. 15
Conceptual Models of the Accident Process
◼ 6. Combined Models. Surry classified the process by
analyzing a series of questions
Predisposing Characteristics
Situational
Characteristics
Accident Conditions
Susceptible host
Hazardous environment
Injury-producing agent
Risk taking
Appraisal of hazard
Margin of error
Unexpected
Unavoidable
Unintentional
16. 16
Ramsey’s Model
◼ Old lady sees water
puddle when crossing
the road
◼ She recognizes the
slipping hazard
◼ She decides to avoid
the puddle
◼ But she does not step
to side quickly enough
◼ She slips and falls!
17. 17
Human Error Classification Scheme. Rouse (1983)
◼ 1. Observation of System State: Incorrect reading of
appropriate state variables; Erroneous interpretation of
correct readings; Failure to observe sufficient number of
variables; Observation of inappropriate state variables;
◼ 2. Choice of Hypothesis: Hypothesis does not
functionally relate to variables observed. Hypothesis
could not cause the values of the state variables
observed; Formulate better hypotheses
◼ 3. Testing of Hypothesis: Hypothesis not tested.
Stopped before reaching a conclusion; Reached wrong
conclusion; Considered but discarded correct
conclusion;
18. 18
Human Error Classification Scheme. Rouse (1983)
◼ 4. Choice of goal: Goal not chosen. Insufficient
specification of goal. Choice of counter-productive
◼ 5. Choice of procedure: Procedure not chosen.
Choice would not achieve goal. Choice would achieve
incorrect goal; Choice unnecessary for achieving goal
◼ 6. Execution of procedure: Unrelated inappropriate
step executed; Required step omitted; Unnecessary
repetition of required step; Unnecessary step added;
Steps executed in wrong order; Step executed too
early or too late; Control in wrong position or range;
Stopped before procedure complete
19. 19
Human Error
◼ Human error is the primary cause of 60-90 percent of
major accidents. Doctors and nurses make in average
1.7 errors per patient
◼ Thirty percent errors in command selection in word
processing (Card et al., 1980)
◼ But many of these errors are the results of bad system
design and bad organization rather than irresponsible
actions
◼ 1. Many reasons of errors:
❑ Poor discriminability
❑ Memory lapses
❑ Communication breakdown
❑ Biases in decision making
❑ Selection of compatible, but incorrect response
20. 20
Human Error
◼ 2. Speed-Accuracy Trade Off
❑ It is impossible to work very fast and accurate at same
time
❑ Fast and sloppy OR Slow and accurate
◼ 3. Signal Detection Theory
❑ Assumes two kinds of human errors: false alarms and
misses
❑ The study of human errors has become a science by
itself
21. 21
Categories of Human Errors by James Reason
◼ Mistakes & Slips
◼ Mistakes
❑ Failure to formulate the right intention, due to
shortcomings in: Perception, memory and cognition
❑ James Reason used Rasmussen’s distinction between:
◼ Knowledge-based mistakes
◼ Rule-based mistakes
22. 22
Categories of Human Errors
◼ Knowledge-Based Mistakes
◼ These are due to failure to understand the situation. The
operator may not be able to consider alternative decisions,
since she is overwhelmed by the complexity of evidence
and cannot interpret it correctly
◼ Rule-Based Mistakes
◼ Example of rules: It is correct to turn the wheels in the
direction you want to go – unless you are skidding on ice.
Formulated as IF-THEN rules. There may be exceptions or
qualifications that are overlooked – the THEN part may be
wrong. The choice of rule is guided by frequency and
reinforcement – Rules that have been successful are
chosen again
◼ Rule-based mistakes tend to be done with much
confidence “Strong but Wrong”
◼ But there is less confidence in knowledge-based situations,
maybe because this involves a more conscious effort
23. 23
Categories of Human Errors
◼ Slips
❑ The right intention is carried out – but incorrectly. A
common class of slips are “capture errors”. These may
happen when
◼ a. The intended action is almost the same as routine action
◼ b. The action sequence is relatively automatic
◼ e.g. Pouring orange juice in the coffee cup while reading
the morning paper during breakfast
◼ These routine situations are not attended, and the
errors are produced because the stimulus and the
response are similar
◼ In flying, controls for flaps and landing gears have
both similar feels, appearance, direction, and location,
and are both relevant for take-off and landing
24. 24
Categories of Human Errors
◼ Lapses
❑ Failure to carry out an action – due to forgetfulness
❑ Sometimes an interruption may cause a sequence to be
stopped (What was I saying?)
◼ Mode Errors
❑ An action that is appropriate in one mode of operation is
not appropriate for another
❑ Example: Raising landing wheels, although aircraft is still
on the runway – but the pilot thought it was airborne
❑ Mode errors are of great concern in flying and HCI,
where the same key may have different meanings
❑ Mode errors are a joint consequence of relatively
automated performance and improperly conceived
systems design.
25. 25
Remedial Actions of Errors
Potential Error Error Type Action
Loco not returned to service bay for 24 hr. Check Violation Organization /
Management
Setting off with parking brake on Slip Design
Driving locos despite earth tester warning on Violation Design / Training
Drivers leaning out of cab when traveling Violation Design / Training
Inadequate use of warning horns Violation Design
Misreading of displays Slip Design
Guards leaning out of cabs when travelling Violation Design / Training
Insufficient warning of objects/people on track Slip Design
Instability to effectively use fire extinguishers Mistake Design
Incorrect control operations Mistake Training / Design
26. 26
How to deal with Mistakes?
◼ What can we do about Knowledge-based mistakes,
Rule-based mistakes, Slips, and lapses?
❑ Knowledge-based: Train the operator
❑ Rule-based: Training and redesign
❑ Slips: Redesign the task / environment
❑ Lapses: Redesign the task
27. 27
Conclusion
◼ There are several ways to remedy causes of human
error
◼ In industry, it is common to implement work
procedures and training of operators
◼ In supervisory control, we try to redesign the
workplace and tools – and train the operator
This approach has been adopted by many
organizations – e.g. military. It is now common in
nuclear power plants and other complex
environments. Lately it has also been adopted by
industry
28. 28
Reason’s Cheese Model of Accidents
◼ James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of
Organizational Accidents
29. 29
Errors in Organizational Context
◼ Reason thinks that human errors represent only a
small part of the deficiencies in an organization
◼ Accidents are visible, and therefore analyzed. Less
visible organizational errors are often performed in
management decision making
❑ Example: Industrial managers have limited resources –
often not enough to allocate to both productivity and
safety
❑ Managers get positive reinforcement from production,
but safety is considered a “show stopper”, and is usually
characterized by absence of evidence
30. 30
Consequences of Reason’s Model of Human Error
◼ Training
❑ Lack of knowledge can lead to mistakes. Training is
therefore helpful. But operators must also train at
correcting errors – this is naturalistic. Error-free training
is not
◼ Memory aids and rules
❑ For example, use memory aids for procedures (e.g.
checklists)
❑ Rules must be logical. The “band aid” approach to
human error make the situation worse
31. 31
Consequences of Reason’s Model of Human Error
◼ Error-Tolerant Systems
❑ There is one positive aspect of errors – the opportunity
for the operator to correct them. This gives the operator
a sense of control. Driving a car involves continuous
error correction (of lateral and longitudinal position).
❑ Often there are many strategies and the operator must
be allowed to act in an opportunistic fashion. The
operator must be allowed to respond differently
according to the conditions of the moment. Operators
must be given a chance to explore the functionality of
the system. Is there an undo button?
❑ In an error-tolerant system, one can recover by undoing
an action – there is a back-up option
32. 32
Starr (1969) risk taking model
◼ The horizontal line represents the natural death rate
due to old age
33. 33
Human Errors are Commonplace
◼ But many of the errors people commit in operating
systems are the result of bad system design or bad
organizational structure rather than irresponsible
action (Norman 1988; Reason, 1990, 1997; Woods &
Cook, 1999)
◼ Although human error may be statistically defined as a
contributing cause to an accident, usually human error
is only one in a complex chain of breakdowns – many
of them are of mechanical or organizational nature
◼ They affected the system and weaken its defenses
(Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1997)
34. 34
Stop Blaming the Operator
◼ By minimizing human error, we can improve both
safety and industrial production. This is a matter of
design and training
◼ The notion that the operator should be punished or
personally made responsible is unwarranted – (unless
there is a clear violation of regulations).
◼ Accident proneness is not a viable concept (Shaw and
Sichel). Therefore the blame for accidents and poor
quality falls on poor design, poor procedures, poor
training and in the end poor management!
35. 35
Fault Tree Analysis
◼ Has been used extensively in space-craft design,
analysis of nuclear power plant, safety etc.
❑ 1. The fault tree starts with a specific failure (the top of the
tree). Choice of failure is important. If it is too general, it
cannot be analyzed, it is too specific, the analysis will not
produce enough information
❑ 2. The purpose is to find all credible ways in which the
undesirable event can occur. (Very expensive analysis)
❑ 3. It is a graphical model of various parallel and sequential
faults that will result in the occurrence of the undesired fault
(at the top of the tree)
❑ 4. Primary events are caused by inherent characteristics of
component, such as failure of light bulb due to worn
filament. Secondary events are caused by external
sources–such as excessive voltage, which burns out
filament
36. 36
Construction of a fault tree
◼ A. By analysis (top-down)
❑ 1. Select one head event that is to be prevented
❑ 2. Determine all primary and secondary events that may
cause the head event
❑ 3. Determine relationships between causal events and
the head event in terms of AND and OR Boolean
operators
❑ 4. Determine the value and need for further analysis
according to steps 2 and 3
❑ 5. Continue to reiterate steps 2-4 until all events are
basic, or until it is not desirable to go further.
❑ 6. Diagram the events using the symbols below
❑ 7. Perform qualitative and quantitative analyses
37. 37
Fault-Tree Analysis
Top event – Cannot
be developed further
Basic Event
Event to be further
developed
Normal Event is
normal, but can
become a fault
Inconsequential
Event Or Insufficient
data to develop
AND Gate. Several
input events must
occur to cause
output event
OR Gate. At least
one input event must
occur to cause
output event