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Accident Causation Theories,
Accident Reporting
(Unit-I)
UNDERSTANDING ACCIDENTS
• Accident as an unplanned event that interferes with job or
task completion
• result in some kind of measureable loss such as personal
injury or property damage can cause interruption of
production or other operations & even someone will lose
valuable time dealing with the event
• Accident causes normally result from unsafe acts,
hazardous conditions, or both
• Accident prevention efforts must emphasize development
of necessary policies, procedures, and rules.
• The costs of accidents should provide motivation for senior
leaders to support hazard control efforts.
Common Myths about Accidents
• Accidents result from a single or primary cause.
• Accidents must generate injury or property damage.
• Accidents occur when random variables interact.
• Accidents can result from an act of God or nature.
• Accident investigations must determine fault.
Accident Costs
• We can determine the direct costs associated with an
accident.
• However, determining indirect costs can pose a challenge
to the best managers and hazard control managers.
• Traditionally, most hazard control and safety personnel held
the view that indirect costs of an accident far exceed the
calculated direct costs.
• Fred Manuele wrote a thought-provoking article entitled
Accident Costs, Rethinking Ratios of Indirect to Direct Costs,
which appeared in Professional Safety in January of 2001.
• His article encouraged safety to refrain from using any
ratios that data could not accurately support.
• He wisely pointed out that the direct costs of accidents did
increase significantly in recent years due to insurance and
rising medical costs.
ACCIDENT CAUSATION THEORIES
Henri Heinrich’s 5-Factor Accident Sequence
• Heinrich’s research in the area of accident causation
– 88% of investigated accidents resulted from unsafe acts.
– 10% to unsafe conditions.
– 2% as unpreventable.
• He suggested that and an individual’s life experiences and background
could predispose them to take risks during job accomplishment.
• He believed that removing a single causal factor from a potential
situation could result in preventing an accident.
• Interrupting or breaking the accident cycle by preventing unsafe acts
or correcting an unsafe condition could reduce accident risks for
individuals engaging in risky behaviors.
• Heinrich proposed an accident sequence in which a single causal
factor could actuate the next step in the cycle process.
• He believed that a person’s background and social environment could
impact engagement in faulty behavior.
• Heinrich’s conclusions pointed to what we now refer to as multiple
causation theory.
Accident Causes
• System thinking views hazards and causal factors as
moving in logical sequences to produce accident
events.
• Classify causal factors as unsafe acts and unsafe
conditions
• Hazard control personnel should use root cause
analysis (RCA) to discover (information about system
operation, failure, and original design errors),
document, and analyze accident causal factors.
• System-related hazard control efforts focus on unsafe
system conditions and the interaction of human
factors with these.
• Hazard closings can also result in close calls, near hits,
or nearmiss events.
Hazard control efforts
• Hazard control management recognizes and acknowledges that
an accident event occurs at a specific point in time
• Many times, previously identified causal factors can interact
resulting in a mishap. These uncontrolled primary factors can
set the accident generation cycle into motion.
• Hazard control efforts must eliminate the hazard or dangerous
situation to reduce or eliminate the potential harm.
• System thinking promotes the concept of providing separation
between an individual and potential operational hazards.
• The hazard may remain within system but in a controlled state.
• Attempt to reduce hazardous exposures by providing controls
such as warning systems, monitoring equipment, and danger
information.
• Attempt to motivate safe behavior through education,
training, and supervision.
Multiple Causation Theory
• This theory promotes the idea that accidents result from
various hazards or other factors interacting in some
manner.
• Accident prevention professionals use different descriptors
to describe these factors. Some refer to the factors as
primary and secondary causes, while others use the terms
such as immediate and contributing causes, surface and
root causes, or causes and subcauses.
• Most investigators agree that accidents happen due to
multiple and sometimes complex causal factors.
• Causal factors seldom contribute equally in their ability to
trigger an event or contribute to accident severity.
• Causal factors-Human factors such as an unsafe act, error,
poor judgment, lack of knowledge, and mental impairment
can interact with other contributing factors creating an
opportunity for an accident to occur.
Biased Liability Theory
• Biased liability promotes the view that once
an individual becomes involved in an accident,
the chances of that same person becoming
involved in a future accident increases or
decreases when compared to other people.
• The accident proneness theory promotes the
notion that some individuals will simply
experience more accidents than others
because of some personal tendency.
Accident Pyramid
• Heinrich introduced the accident pyramid in his book,
Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach.
• This pyramid illustrated his accident causation theory.
• Heinrich believed that unsafe acts led first to minor
injuries and then over a period of time to a major injury
event.
• The accident pyramid proposed that 300 unsafe acts
produced 29 minor injuries and 1 major injury.
• The concept of the accident pyramid remained
unchallenged many years. However, some recent studies
challenge the assumed shape of the equilateral triangle
used by Heinrich. Some professionals now believe the
actual shape of the model would depend on organizational
structure and culture.
Prevention of Fatal Events
• The March 2003 edition of the journal of Professional
Safety contained an article entitled Severe Injury
Potential.
• The article, authored by Fred Manuele, suggested that
accident prevention efforts should focus more on
preventing fatal events.
• He highlighted some specific examples that lead to
fatalities in industrial settings.
– His list included not controlling hazardous energy,
– no written procedures for hazardous processes,
– failing to ensure physical safeguards,
– using unsafe practices for convenience (risk perceived as
insignificant),
– operating mobile equipment in an unsafe manner.
ACCIDENT REPORTING
• The timely and accurate reporting of accidents and injuries
permits an organization to collect and analyze loss-related
information.
• Help to determine patterns and trends of injuries and
illnesses.
• Organizations should encourage reporting by all members.
• Educate all personnel to understand the need for
maintaining a systematic process.
• The system must not only permit data collection but
provide for a means to display any measure of success or
failure in resolving identified hazards.
• Maintain records that enable managers at all levels to
access data.
Electronic reporting
• Technology makes reporting and analysis easier and
quicker than ever before.
• Organizations can no longer make excuses for not
accurately collecting, tracking, and evaluating accident,
hazard, and injury information.
• Many vendors offer accident/injury reporting and tracking
software to help the organization save time and money
• Processes permit the creation and printing of electronically
generated reports.
• Make all the forms accessible on your internal computer
network.
• A sample of a completed form will help illustrate and
remind users what information you need from them.
Include a phone number and e-mail address for the person
who can answer questions as they arise.
Continued…
• Provide instructions for where and how to submit the
report once completed.
• Electronic submission will save paper and retyping or
scanning.
• Input and track all safety incidents across your organization
through one centralized online portal accessible to all
employees and locations.
• Customize fields, drop-downs & dashboards
• Manage the entire accident life cycle of incident reporting,
responding, investigating, taking corrective action, tracking,
and developing summary reports.
• Incident reporting forms can trigger automatic, escalating
follow-up emails to employees responsible for corrective
actions ensuring prompt resolution.

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5.-accident-causation-theories-accident-reporting.pptx

  • 2. UNDERSTANDING ACCIDENTS • Accident as an unplanned event that interferes with job or task completion • result in some kind of measureable loss such as personal injury or property damage can cause interruption of production or other operations & even someone will lose valuable time dealing with the event • Accident causes normally result from unsafe acts, hazardous conditions, or both • Accident prevention efforts must emphasize development of necessary policies, procedures, and rules. • The costs of accidents should provide motivation for senior leaders to support hazard control efforts. Common Myths about Accidents • Accidents result from a single or primary cause. • Accidents must generate injury or property damage. • Accidents occur when random variables interact. • Accidents can result from an act of God or nature. • Accident investigations must determine fault.
  • 3. Accident Costs • We can determine the direct costs associated with an accident. • However, determining indirect costs can pose a challenge to the best managers and hazard control managers. • Traditionally, most hazard control and safety personnel held the view that indirect costs of an accident far exceed the calculated direct costs. • Fred Manuele wrote a thought-provoking article entitled Accident Costs, Rethinking Ratios of Indirect to Direct Costs, which appeared in Professional Safety in January of 2001. • His article encouraged safety to refrain from using any ratios that data could not accurately support. • He wisely pointed out that the direct costs of accidents did increase significantly in recent years due to insurance and rising medical costs.
  • 5. Henri Heinrich’s 5-Factor Accident Sequence • Heinrich’s research in the area of accident causation – 88% of investigated accidents resulted from unsafe acts. – 10% to unsafe conditions. – 2% as unpreventable. • He suggested that and an individual’s life experiences and background could predispose them to take risks during job accomplishment. • He believed that removing a single causal factor from a potential situation could result in preventing an accident. • Interrupting or breaking the accident cycle by preventing unsafe acts or correcting an unsafe condition could reduce accident risks for individuals engaging in risky behaviors. • Heinrich proposed an accident sequence in which a single causal factor could actuate the next step in the cycle process. • He believed that a person’s background and social environment could impact engagement in faulty behavior. • Heinrich’s conclusions pointed to what we now refer to as multiple causation theory.
  • 6. Accident Causes • System thinking views hazards and causal factors as moving in logical sequences to produce accident events. • Classify causal factors as unsafe acts and unsafe conditions • Hazard control personnel should use root cause analysis (RCA) to discover (information about system operation, failure, and original design errors), document, and analyze accident causal factors. • System-related hazard control efforts focus on unsafe system conditions and the interaction of human factors with these. • Hazard closings can also result in close calls, near hits, or nearmiss events.
  • 7. Hazard control efforts • Hazard control management recognizes and acknowledges that an accident event occurs at a specific point in time • Many times, previously identified causal factors can interact resulting in a mishap. These uncontrolled primary factors can set the accident generation cycle into motion. • Hazard control efforts must eliminate the hazard or dangerous situation to reduce or eliminate the potential harm. • System thinking promotes the concept of providing separation between an individual and potential operational hazards. • The hazard may remain within system but in a controlled state. • Attempt to reduce hazardous exposures by providing controls such as warning systems, monitoring equipment, and danger information. • Attempt to motivate safe behavior through education, training, and supervision.
  • 8. Multiple Causation Theory • This theory promotes the idea that accidents result from various hazards or other factors interacting in some manner. • Accident prevention professionals use different descriptors to describe these factors. Some refer to the factors as primary and secondary causes, while others use the terms such as immediate and contributing causes, surface and root causes, or causes and subcauses. • Most investigators agree that accidents happen due to multiple and sometimes complex causal factors. • Causal factors seldom contribute equally in their ability to trigger an event or contribute to accident severity. • Causal factors-Human factors such as an unsafe act, error, poor judgment, lack of knowledge, and mental impairment can interact with other contributing factors creating an opportunity for an accident to occur.
  • 9. Biased Liability Theory • Biased liability promotes the view that once an individual becomes involved in an accident, the chances of that same person becoming involved in a future accident increases or decreases when compared to other people. • The accident proneness theory promotes the notion that some individuals will simply experience more accidents than others because of some personal tendency.
  • 10. Accident Pyramid • Heinrich introduced the accident pyramid in his book, Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach. • This pyramid illustrated his accident causation theory. • Heinrich believed that unsafe acts led first to minor injuries and then over a period of time to a major injury event. • The accident pyramid proposed that 300 unsafe acts produced 29 minor injuries and 1 major injury. • The concept of the accident pyramid remained unchallenged many years. However, some recent studies challenge the assumed shape of the equilateral triangle used by Heinrich. Some professionals now believe the actual shape of the model would depend on organizational structure and culture.
  • 11.
  • 12. Prevention of Fatal Events • The March 2003 edition of the journal of Professional Safety contained an article entitled Severe Injury Potential. • The article, authored by Fred Manuele, suggested that accident prevention efforts should focus more on preventing fatal events. • He highlighted some specific examples that lead to fatalities in industrial settings. – His list included not controlling hazardous energy, – no written procedures for hazardous processes, – failing to ensure physical safeguards, – using unsafe practices for convenience (risk perceived as insignificant), – operating mobile equipment in an unsafe manner.
  • 13. ACCIDENT REPORTING • The timely and accurate reporting of accidents and injuries permits an organization to collect and analyze loss-related information. • Help to determine patterns and trends of injuries and illnesses. • Organizations should encourage reporting by all members. • Educate all personnel to understand the need for maintaining a systematic process. • The system must not only permit data collection but provide for a means to display any measure of success or failure in resolving identified hazards. • Maintain records that enable managers at all levels to access data.
  • 14. Electronic reporting • Technology makes reporting and analysis easier and quicker than ever before. • Organizations can no longer make excuses for not accurately collecting, tracking, and evaluating accident, hazard, and injury information. • Many vendors offer accident/injury reporting and tracking software to help the organization save time and money • Processes permit the creation and printing of electronically generated reports. • Make all the forms accessible on your internal computer network. • A sample of a completed form will help illustrate and remind users what information you need from them. Include a phone number and e-mail address for the person who can answer questions as they arise.
  • 15. Continued… • Provide instructions for where and how to submit the report once completed. • Electronic submission will save paper and retyping or scanning. • Input and track all safety incidents across your organization through one centralized online portal accessible to all employees and locations. • Customize fields, drop-downs & dashboards • Manage the entire accident life cycle of incident reporting, responding, investigating, taking corrective action, tracking, and developing summary reports. • Incident reporting forms can trigger automatic, escalating follow-up emails to employees responsible for corrective actions ensuring prompt resolution.