Global War Terror.ppt

In 2016, the world is dealing with not one but two g...
Today, violent extremists are active in about 40 countries
and there currently exist more terrorist safe havens than
at any time in history. Several groups have the ability to
control land and hold cities. The Islamic State has grown
more powerful in 2016 with affiliates across the globe,
and intelligence services have warned that the group
may attempt further international attacks.

Historical Terrorism
:
• Not a new phenomenon
“As old as civilization itself”.
Common usage of term emerged after French Revolution,
i.e. “Reign of Terror” (1789 – 1794) by Jacobins- Guillitine
•

.
 Terrorism has arguably been one of the defining
factors of our age. It frequently makes headlines,
threatening or attacking governments, private business
and ordinary citizens. And in many parts of the world,
it has been one of the most important threats to peace,
security and stability. But what does this exactly mean?
What is the nature of this threat? Who or what is
threatened, how, by whom and why? What can be done
about it or how can we at least limit the impact of
terrorism and make sure that terrorists do not make
headlines and manage to scare us?

.
 . But what does this exactly mean? What is the
nature of this threat? Who or what is threatened,
how, by whom and why

.
 War on Terror- Slide no. 01
 Pak’s role in Wot/ Foreign policy after
9/11- Slide no. 246

.
 “Everybody is worried about stopping
terrorism. Well, there’s a really easy way:
stop participating in it.”
(Noam Chomsky)

.
• Contemporary Terrorism
• Asymmetrical techniques

.
 Eg; The problem, whether on the battle fronts
or on the planned negotiations for a political
settlement in Syria, is the definition of who can
be described as a terrorist.
 Lack of agreement on this fundamental
definition is the biggest roadblock in the
creation of a critically required global anti-
terrorist architecture to bring to bear the will
and resources of the world against the threat.

Definition:
• 100+ definitions.
“The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of
unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or
intimidate govts or societies in pursuits of goals that are generally
political, religious or ideological.”
Separatist movements
• India- Nagaland
Asaam
• Tigers
• Baluchistan
Shiv Sena
LeJ
SSP
Communists
Maoists

.
 Terrorism is the weapon of the weaker.

4. MORALITY OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE:
a. “One person’s terrorist is another person’ freedom
fighter”.
b. “ One man willing to throw away his life is enough to
terrorize a thousand.”
c. “ Extremism in defense of liberty is no voice”.
d. “ It becomes necessary to destroy the town to save
it.”

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WORLD OVER
ORIGIN ORGANIZATION ESTB YEAR
France National Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) 1976
Germany Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) 1995
Italy NPC 2003
Spain ETA 1959
Turkey PKK 1978
UK IRA 1922
Russia Black Widows 1999
Israel Khane Chai / Kach 1990
Iran DPKI 1995
Iraq Al Dawa 1968
Afghanistan Al Qaeda 1988
Bangladesh HUJI 1992

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WORLD OVER
ORIGIN ORGANIZATION ESTB YEAR
India Shiv Sena, Ranvir Sena 1994
India Sanjukat Mukti Fouj 1996
India Unite Liberation Front of Assam 1979
Nigeria FNDIC 2003
Rwanda FDLR 2000
Congo RCD-GOME 1998
Sudan Sudan Liberation Movement 2003

Types of Terrorism……………
1. Group Terrorism.
2. State Terrorism
3.Non-State Actors/
( Transnational
organizations)

Modern terrorism
 Began 100 years ago
 4 waves.. (Rapoport)
1st. Anarchists- (Ideologies) Propaganda by deed.
political reformists, discontent with current
world order…. used political assassination of
leaders, religious leaders, monarchies as tool

The deadliest terrorist strike by time, number of fatalities

.
 2nd. Anti-Colonial- Algeria, IRA,CDM
 3rd. Communists/ Left wing terrorism-In the
third wave, radicalism was often combined with
nationalism, as in the Basque Nation and Liberty
(ETA), the Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Corsican
National Liberation Front (FNLC), and the IR
 Italian red brigades, Japanese red army, PLO

The Red Brigades (Italian: Brigate Rosse [briˈɡate
ˈrosse], often abbreviated BR) was a left-
wing[1] paramilitary organization, based in Italy,
responsible for numerous violent incidents,
including assassinations, kidnapping and
robberies during the so-called "Years of Lead".
Formed in 1970, the organization sought to
create a "revolutionary" state through armed
struggle, and to remove Italy from the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Red Brigades
attained notoriety in the 1970s and early 1980s
with their violent attempts to destabilise Italy by
acts of sabotage, bank robberies,
kidnappings [2] and murders.[3]
Models for the Red Brigades included the Latin
American urban guerrilla movements.

Anarchism is a political philosophy that advocates self-governed societies based on
voluntary institutions. These are often described as stateless societies,[1][2][3][4] although
several authors have defined them more specifically as institutions based on non-
hierarchicalfree associations.[5][6][7][8] Anarchism holds the state to be undesirable,
unnecessary, and harmful.[9][10] While anti-statism is central,[11] anarchism entails
opposing authority or hierarchical organisation in the conduct of all human relations,
including, but not limited to, the state system.[6][12][13][14][15][16][17][18]
Anarchism does not offer a fixed body of doctrine from a single particular world view,
instead fluxing and flowing as a philosophy.[19]Many types and traditions of anarchism
exist, not all of which are mutually exclusive.[20] Anarchist schools of thought can differ
fundamentally, supporting anything from extreme individualism to complete
collectivism.[10] Strains of anarchism have often been divided into the categories
of social and individualist anarchism or similar dual classifications.[21][22] Anarchism is
usually considered a radical left-wing ideology,[23][24] and much of anarchist
economics and anarchist legal philosophy reflects anti-authoritarian
interpretations of communism, collectivism, syndicalism, mutualism, or participatory
economics.[

Spanish Civil War (1936–1939).[129] In response
to the army rebellion, an anarchist-
inspired movement of peasants and workers,
supported by armed militias, took control
of Barcelona and of large areas of rural Spain
where they collectivised the land.[130][131] But even
before the fascist victory in 1939, the anarchists
were losing ground in a bitter struggle with
the Stalinists, who controlled much of the
distribution of military aid to the Republican
cause from the Soviet Union. According
to Noam Chomsky, "the communists were
mainly responsible for the destruction of the
Spanish anarchists. Not just in Catalonia—the
communist armies mainly destroyed the
collectives elsewhere. The communists basically
acted as the police force of the security system
of the Republic and were very much opposed to
the anarchists,

Around the turn of the 21st century, anarchism grew in popularity
and influence as part of the anti-war, anti-capitalist, and anti-
globalisation movements.[164] Anarchists became known for their
involvement in protests against the meetings of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), Group of Eight, and the World Economic
Forum. Some anarchist factions at these protests engaged in rioting,
property destruction, and violent confrontations with police. These
actions were precipitated by ad hoc, leaderless, anonymous cadres
known as black blocs; other organisational tactics pioneered in this time
include security culture, affinity groups and the use of decentralised
technologies such as the internet.[164] A significant event of this period
was the confrontations at WTO conference in Seattle in
1999.[164] According to anarchist scholar Simon Critchley,
"contemporary anarchism can be seen as a powerful critique of the
pseudo-libertarianism of contemporary neo-liberalism ... One might
say that contemporary anarchism is about responsibility, whether
sexual, ecological or socio-economic; it flows from an experience of
conscience about the manifold ways in which the West ravages the
rest; it is an ethical outrage at the yawning inequality, impoverishment
and disenfranchisment that is so palpable locally and globally."

Left-wing terrorism (sometimes
called Marxist–Leninist
terrorism or revolutionary/left-wing
terrorism) is terrorism meant to
overthrow conservative or capitalist
systems and replace them with liberal
or socialist societies

.
4th. Religious wave/ Jihadi wave –
 Iranian revolution,
 Soviet invasion in Afghanistan giving birth to
Alqaida & Taliban-
 Whatever the specific local causes, Sunni
terrorism soon appeared in many states with
large Islamic populations: Egypt, Syria, Tunisia,
Morocco, Algeria, the Philippines, and Indonesia

.
 4th wave is now virulently anti- Western Wahabi
Salafi interpretation of Islam.. ME particularly
Iraq
 Massive role of Alqaida & its global recruits

.
 Fourth wave groups, much more than their
counterparts in the third wave, have made
massive attacks against military and government
installations. Americans, in particular, became
frequent targets.
 Finally, the massive assaults on September 11
occurred, and the "war" against terror was
launched.

.
 9/11 signified the shift & trend in future
terrorism
 9/11 damage demonstrated the audacity of
terrorists to their determination to start a new
era of global terrorism- Post modern terrorism

Eras  Pre 9/11, 9/11 attack & Post 9/11 War on terror
1.Pre – 9/11
• Violence under the guise of Ideologies
 Freedom movements or Terrorism?
South Africa Algiers
Kashmir, Chechnya
IRA Palestine
 Ethnic/ Sub ethnic movements:
 Bosnia Tamils
Basque Abu-Sayyaf

.
9/11/ 2001 attack
 11 September 2001  Hijackers hijacked 4 planes
and crashed two of them into WTC, NY & 1
targeted Pentagon successfully while 4th aiming for
White house was unsuccessful and reached else
where (Pennsylvania)
 Terrorists identified by US as Al-Qaeda members
 An un- precedented event on US soil - US shaken to the
core & reacted like a wounded bear
War on Terror
& Role of Pak
“Foreign policy”

.
 Background
 Our foreign policy has always been
“Indian Centric/ Security oriented”
 In the same back drop Pakistan prepared/
supported Militants/ Taliban (To prevent Indian
hegemony in Afghanistan etc)

3. Post 9/11 - War on Terror:
1. US identified enemy as
“Non-state actors” (Al-Qaeda)
2. Bush declared War on Terrorism

US sought Pak support:
(a) Intelligence data on Taliban
(b) Pak’s geographical proximity with Afghanistan
(c) Significance of Pak’s bases.

Attack on Afghanistan:
In order to gain support US used categorical term “either with us or with them”
“Operation Enduring Freedom” launched by US alone initially
against Taliban regime in Kabul on October 7, 2001
1. Bush era
2001 - 2008

.
 Pakistan accepts American offer
 Takes U- turn on its foreign policy
 (Pakistan’s relationship to the “War on Terror” has
been highly ambivalent)

.
 Stops support to Taliban(?)
 Decides to target Taliban
 Stops support in Kashmir(?)
 Bans Militant organizations- (Musharraf accused
of bluffing the world)

.
 Pak offered Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbadin for logistics
support .
•
 Captured 100s of Alqaida members & Taliban

Pakistan has played a major role in eliminating a number of terror networks such
as the Al-Qaeda Anthrax network, the Alghuraba network, the UK-based Anglo-
Pakistani group and Jundullah. Prominent targets captured include Khalid Sheikh
Muhammad, Abu Alfaraj Alibi, Al Shib, Abu Zubaida, Abu Talha, Khalid bin
Attash or Walid bin Attish, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Mohammad Naeem Noor
Khan, Abu Laith al-Libi, Hasan Bana, Hamza Rabbi, Sharif Al Masri, Abu
Mushab Masri, Jaffar Uttayyar Alkashmiri Yassir Al-Jaziri, and Abdul Rehman Al-
Masri. Umar Patek was arrested in Abbottabad by Pakistani forces and may have
provided important leads to Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts.

.
 .
 The Taliban regrouped in western Pakistan and began
to unleash an insurgent-style offensive against Coalition
forces in late 2002.
Taliban Government was uprooted and new regime instated by end of 2001.
The remaining Alqaeda/ Taliban got refuge in tribal areas of Pakistan
Quetta which proved to be safe haven for them.
They reorganized themselves to conduct future operations.

… 2002 onwards
 War spreads to tribal areas of Pak
 Pak begins military operation
 2005 onwards- Drone attacks
Outcome
Situation got out of control… Terrorism expande…

.
 War spreads to other areas of Pak.

.
 2009- AF-PAK POLICY…..

.
 Doubtful role by Pak/ Cross border terrorism.
 Pak accused of playing double game
 Conditional aid (Kerry Lugar)

.
 Most U.S. and European policy makers believe that Pakistan is
providing a safe haven for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Western media is
full of stories about a presence of the Taliban leadership in Pakistan,
including of Mullah Omar’s alleged base in Quetta.
 Since the summer of 2008, U.S. military and intelligence agencies are
sharing minimal intelligence with its Pakistani counterparts, instead
focusing on drone attacks against suspected terrorist movements and
hideouts.

.
 Do more…
 Building pressure on Pak.
 Haqqani issue

.
 Mar. 2009-
 “AfPak” strategy- Pak disappointed

.
 May 2011- Osama operation damages Pak
credibility

.
 Efforts at dialogue with Taliban
 Taliban showed no inclination to negotiate
or reconcile

.
 Ghani Govt & Change of policy

Local repercussions
 Musharaf given protection-
 Institutional changes delayed.
 The war involved settled areas of Pak.
 The army may be embroiled endlessly.
 Collateral damage
 IDPs
 Zardari's regime in disarray.
 Rift in public & govt. exposed.
 Fear- Everybody’s headache. Life & business activities standstill.
 Economy in tatters-
 Over $ 40 bn loss.

Implications for Pak
 Security
 Worsening law & order situation. The war
involved settled areas of Pak.
 FATA becomes a real battle field
 Taliban backfire Army personnel's beheading/
kidnapping…
 Suicidal bombing
 Military convoys, security buildings
 Garrison state

.
 Taliban operate freely
 Cross border raids
 The army may be embroiled endlessly.
 Army & Govt not on the same page
 Indians fishing in troubled water

.
 7000 Military soldiers
 70000 civilians

Some major attacks
Federal Investigation Agency’s Lahore office,
the Naval War College in Lahore, the Marriott
Hotel in Islamabad, the Wah ordinance Factory,
the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, a police
training school, the GHQ Rawalpindi and the
Navy’s Mehran base in Karachi. It is also
involved in kidnapping for ransom, bank
robberies, forced taxes and drug trade.
450 terror attacks were recorded in 2012 in which at
least 39 were confirmed suicide attack

.
 Political
 Musharaf given protection-
 Institutional changes delayed.
 Political system in disarray
 Pressure
 Increased political instability
 Rift in public & govt. exposed.

.
 Economic
 $102 bn vs. $31 bn
 Growth rate
 FDI
 Infrastructure damage

.
 Social/ Psychological
 Collateral damage
 IDPs
 Fear- Everybody’s headache. Life & business
activities standstill.

.
 Yet;
 International community reluctant to admire
Pak’ sacrifices
 Our “negatives” over-projected.

.
 Pak fights its own war of survival-
 Zarb-e- Azb, June 2014
 No differentiation between good & bad guys
 Others still doubtful

.
 Pak saves the world from scourge of Terrorism

.
 Pak caught in its own blunders since Soviet war
1979
 Our policies have always backfired

.
 Army & Govt on same page?
 Taliban sympathizers- Govt cant name TTP
 Confusion all around

.
 The war is last option..
 Excessive military use erroneous. Terror
breeding terror.
 Root causes? Reconciliation? Rehabilitation?
 Complex war- lethal cocktail of Taliban , Al-
Qaeda militants, religious organizations &
other actors.
 Longevity of war has increased insecurity in
international politics.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. government has grown increasingly frustrated
with Pakistan; its support for the Taliban has frustrated American
military efforts in Afghanistan. But many Pakistani Islamists, especially
the Pushtun, condemn the Pakistani government for cooperating with
the United States at all. A Pakistani Taliban has arisen, mainly among
Pakistan’s Pushtun population, which has fought against Pakistani
government forces.
Pakistan’s too-clever-by-half policy of supporting the United States
against the Taliban and supporting the Taliban against the United States
has not only frustrated American efforts in Afghanistan; it has
contributed to the rise of a radical Islamist threat inside Pakistan itself.
At this point, a Pakistani government decision to turn against these
radical Islamist forces — or just end its support for them — might result
in accelerating the threat that they pose to the Pakistani government.

Despite this, the Pakistani leadership has, characteristically,
remained focused on its rivalry with India. With the United
States and NATO having announced that they will withdraw
from Afghanistan between mid-2011 and the end of 2014,
Pakistan seems more worried than ever that the Karzai
government will ally itself with India to the detriment of
Pakistan. And so, Pakistan has continued to support the hard-
line Afghan Taliban. The irony, of course, is that if the Taliban
returns to power in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s help, the
Taliban is hardly likely to be more amenable to Pakistani
influence after it has less need of it — just as occurred during
the 1990s. Indeed, if the Afghan Taliban decides to help its
Pushtun bretheren across the border in Pakistan, the Pakistani
government may find itself faced with its own very serious
Islamist insurgency — along with an unsympathetic
international community as a result of the policies Pakistan is
pursuing at present.

…. the Pakistani leadership has, characteristically,
remained focused on its rivalry with India
Pak Army’s selective perception of Haqqani,
LeT, & others… These forces wield such power
that they can destabilise the core of the nation.
(The Pakistan Paradox by Christophe Jaffrelot)

.
 Post- Modern Terrorism
 21st century
 Hijacking has become rare (9/11 Hijacking)

.
 Indiscriminate use of Non-conventional
weapons (WMD)
 Religious ideology spurred by radical leaders, so
called “end of the world” anarchist groups &
isolationists factions….not concerned with the
horrendous consequences of their actions
(Inside Alqaida & the Taliban)

.
 Saudi cleric fiery speeches & fatwah on the use
of WMD.,
 Capacity manipulated with “motivation”

.
 Asymmetrical methods
&
 Asymmetrical warfare
 Guerilla
 Proxy (Even used by States)
 Trans-national- ISIS,
 After-math in Afghanistan, Syria & Yemen
•Enhanced capabilities
•Immense damage
•Small & large targets
•Soft targets to cripple LEAs.

Ajmal Kansi- 1993
Fesal Shahzad, time square- 2010

Warning -
Video contains footage that should only be watch by an mature
audience.
The video provides viewers with the Islamist group’s perspective on its
history and objectives.
After releasing the trailer for the video, the Islamic State (IS) issued the
documentary-style production, "Flames of War: Fighting Has Just
Begun," promoting its cause and highlighting some of its major
operations in Syria. The 55 minute, 13 second video was produced by
the group's al-Hayat Media Center, and was distributed on Twitter on
September 19, 2014.
The video is narrated by an English-speaker, and the final shot in the
production shows an English-speaking fighter shooting to death bound
men, before which he states: "They said we abandoned the fronts and
stopped fighting the kuffar and turned our guns towards the Muslims.
They lied! By Allah, we are the harshest towards the kuffar, and the
flames of war are only beginning to intensify.
Posted September 20, 2014

.
 Increasing Capabilities of Terrorists
Terrorists are improving their sophistication and
abilities in virtually all aspects of their operations and
support. The aggressive use of modern technology for
information management, communication and
intelligence has increased the efficiency of these
activities. Weapons technology has become more
increasingly available, and the purchasing power of
terrorist organizations is on the rise. The ready
availability of both technology and trained personnel to
operate it for any client with sufficient cash allows the
well-funded terrorist to equal or exceed the
sophistication of governmental counter-measures.

.
 Likewise, due to the increase in information
outlets, and competition with increasing
numbers of other messages, terrorism now
requires a greatly increased amount of violence
or novelty to attract the attention it requires.
The tendency of major media to compete for
ratings and the subsequent revenue realized
from increases in their audience size and share
produces pressures on terrorists to increase the
impact and violence of their actions to take
advantage of this sensationalism.

.
 Today, most experts believe that certain parts of
the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan are
turning out to be the main power centers for
terrorism. Decades of lawlessness and
corruption have seen Islamic terrorist groups fill
the power vacuum in this region and continue to
turn out an alarming number of religiously
motivated terrorists.

IS- Capabilities
 Geographic reach, strength & power of IS
 It has most powerful network of radical
recruiters in Europe
 IS also
 European security agencies have yet to improve
a lot to deal with the trade-craft of IS.
 Developed a disciplined communication strategy
using the most encryption services in the
market.

Top 10 Countries (2000–2014)

2016
 In 2016, the world is dealing with not one but two g...
 Today, violent extremists are active in about 40
countries and there currently exist more terrorist safe
havens than at any time in history. Several groups have
the ability to control land and hold cities. The Islamic
State has grown more powerful in 2016 with affiliates
across the globe
 how modern terrorism is significantly expanding its
reach from territorial gains to covert attacks in global
cities
 how terrorist groups are enriching themselves within
criminal networks and markets

.
 The targets, tactics, and techniques of terrorists
have changed dramatically over the past couple
of years. In the past, terrorists were willing to
die, but not looking to die, for their cause.
Today, suicide attackers are much more
prevalent. New threats are more brutal and
violent than the past. From the Islamic State to
homegrown violent extremists, terrorists
continue to evolve their tactics to defeat security
measures.

.
 WPD (5 types of Non-conventional Terrorism)

.
1. Chemical-
 Used in Iraq, Syria…
 Nerve gas, Blood agents, choking agents,
 Chlorine, mustard gas, herbicides, Agent
orange,

.
2. Biological- Germ warfare
 Mass killing of humans, animals, plants,
 Epidemics, pandemics
 Toxins, poisonous compounds,
 Anthrax, Cholera, encephalitis, snake
extracts, Ricin

.
3. Radiological
 Radio-active material, radio-active waste
material, fuels from nuclear power plants
 Radiological material dispersed with
conventional explosives
 Also called dirty bomb

.
4. Nuclear
5. Cyber (Information warfare, Videos,
technology)
 .

.
 We need to re-visit our foreign policy
 Image building- Single track policy
 Need to build trust with all.
Fight- Talk- Build

.
 Selective use of force
 Reconciliation
 Reconstruction
 Rehabilitation

.
 Definition to be agreed upon
 Eg; The problem, whether on the battle fronts
or on the planned negotiations for a political
settlement in Syria, is the definition of who can
be described as a terrorist.
 Lack of agreement on this fundamental definition is
the biggest roadblock in the creation of a critically
required global anti-terrorist architecture to bring to
bear the will and resources of the world against the
threat.

Motivation??
violent acts of terror are idiosyncratic.
Stereo-type profiling is defective
Profiling communities/ ethnic
groups in counter-terrorism efforts
is ineffective
What about Saad Aziz, from IBA, Khi
Behind Sabeen Mahmud’s murder & the
Main accused of Safoora incident.
You need to study motivation factor
& the
Character/ human behavior

.
 De-radicalization
 David Cameron announced measures in parliament
proposing that any British citizens on the terror watch list known
as TPIMs (Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures) be
forced to attend "deradicalization" programs.

.
 "The fundamentalists pay no heed to borders, conventions,
sovereignty, and international niceties,“
 conception of deradicalization must include the embracing of "
values.“
 would-be terrorists must be cognitively dissuaded from radical belief
systems — for example, a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.
One common tactic is to have moderate imams encourage
alternative readings of Islam to undo extremist mindsets.
Disengagement, meanwhile, focuses on dissuading individuals from
engaging in terrorist activity
 there is no blueprint for successful disengagement.
 Sometimes it's a question of material circumstances — financial,
familial, or social incentives
 Crucially, there is no fix-all approach that has proven successful for
disengagement

.
 Focusing on rehabilitation, as opposed to ideological change, is
particularly sensible if it is acknowledged that committed
ideologues may never give up their beliefs but might change their
behavior. Even the Saudi rehabilitation program, which
historically treated religious dialogue as primary, has gradually
adopted more behavior-focused components, such as education,
vocational instruction, and pos trelease reintegration efforts.
 History of person; interviews with friends, relatives..
psychologists, and teachers -- greatly increases the likelihood that
the detainees will successfully reintegrate into society and avoid
returning to terrorism. Such one-on-one relationships have also
been shown to encourage detainees to reconsider the negative
opinions of government officials that, in many cases, contributed
to their initial radicalization.

.
 Anti- terrorism Laws- Execution/ enforcement
 Home Security Act. (Issues of citizens’ privacy,
human rights)
 Mass surveillance after Charlie incidence (Jan
2015) in France (Encroachment of civil liberties)
 Paris attack- Nov, 2015
Data of all whose names include Muhammad

.
 Intelligence- Data sharing
Intercepting the communication- Peshawar
terrorists (Dec, 2014) were taken continuous
instructions from Afghanistan…

.
 Funding net-work
 Freezing assets, bank accounts

.
 Technology
 Biometric technology
 Screening
 Security cameras
 RFID chips- Radio Frequency Identification
 Idea of a 'human barcode,' an electronic ID chip
assigned to every person at birth,

Nanotech
Microchip
Human
barcode

.
 U.S. Military and many other agencies around the world,
are already implementing the use of RFID chips. In
London, police authorities announced that they were
putting RFID chips on the entire police force. Citizens
have an ID card with a chip so that they can identify who
is in what part of the city at any point in time.
 ….. you should be able to go on Google and find out
where someone is at any time from chips on clothing, in
cars, cell phones, and also in people.
 These RFID Chips will be at the same time; your money,
medical monitor, license, passport, anti-terrorist solution,
locator for lost children or Alzheimer patients,...etc.

.
 The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)
was established by the Secretary-General in 2005 and endorsed by
the General Assembly through the United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy , which was adopted by consensus in 2006. The
mandate of the CTITF is to enhance coordination and coherence of counter-terrorism efforts
of the United Nations system. The Task Force consists of 34 international entities which by
virtue of their work have, have a stake in multilateral counter-terrorism efforts. Each entity
makes contributions consistent with its own mandate.
 While the primary responsibility for the implementation of the Global Strategy rests with
Member States, CTITF ensures that the UN system is attuned to the needs of Member States,
to provide them with the necessary policy support and spread in-depth knowledge of the
Strategy, and wherever necessary, expedite delivery of technical assistance.
 The primary goal is to maximize each entity‘s comparative advantage by delivering as one to
help Member States implement the four pillars of the Strategy, which are: measures to address
the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat
terrorism; measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen
the role of the United Nations system in that regard; measures to ensure respect for human
rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.
 CTITF organizes its work through Working Groups and counter-terrorism related projects in
areas where cooperation among United Nations system actors can add value for the
implementation of the Strategy.

.
 United Nations Counter-Terrorism-Strategy

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by
General Assembly resolution 60/288 in 2006, and states that terrorism
"constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and
security".
 UNODA is a member of the UN-system-wide Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and a leading member of the CTITF’s
working group on preventing and responding to weapons of mass destruction
attacks. ODA has been given the task to develop, together with Member
States, a single comprehensive database on biological incidents that is
complimentary to the biocrimes database contemplated by the International
Criminal Police (INTERPOL).

.
 Global Counterterrorism Forum
 The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) is a new multilateral
counterterrorism body with 30 founding members (29 countries plus the EU)
from around the world. Launched on September 22, 2011, the GCTF is a
major initiative within the Obama Administration's broader effort to build the
international architecture for dealing with 21st century terrorism. It will
provide a unique platform for senior counterterrorism policymakers and
experts from around the world to work together to identify urgent needs,
devise solutions and mobilize resources for addressing key counterterrorism
challenges. With its primary focus on capacity building in relevant areas, the
GCTF aims to increase the number of countries capable of dealing with the
terrorist threats within their borders and regions. In addition to the adoption
of the GCTF's founding political declaration and remarks from GCTF
Foreign Ministers, the launch included the announcement of two deliverables
– one on the rule of law and one on countering violent extremism – thus
highlighting the GCTF’s action-oriented focus from the outset. Please visit
theGCTF.org for more information.

.
 “conflicts, dehumanization of victims of
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack
of the rule of law and violations of human
rights, ethnic, national and religious
discrimination, political exclusion, socio-
economic marginalization and lack of good
governance” as key elements that are conditions
conducive to the spread of terrorism

.
 Political solutions
 Use of smart power ie. Using diplomacy backed
by development (limited use of power, if
necessary). As done in Thailand, Indonesia &
Philippines.
 Equitable distribution…

.
 Double standards
 Justice Tin-pot dictators
Puppet regimes
Minority over majority
Minority rights
People’s rights
Palestinians
Kashmiris
Basque
Ambivalent attitude toward Taliban
Delisting Taliban from
Terrorist network- UN (Ambivalence)
Racism- Blacks, Africans, Muslims

.
 Corruption
 NADRA,
 Immigration dept.

.
 De- radicalization
 All stake holders- Civil society, Clerics, NGOs…

.
 Addressing Ideological aspect of extremism
 Ideology is attractive. Motivation behind the
terrorist? It alters the brains…
 They have perverted Ideology

.
 Madrassa reforms
 Certification
 Audit
 Funding
 Curriculum

.
 Capacity building- Police, security forces
 identifying capability gaps

.
 Develops protection-related solutions
supporting Private and Public organizations
across multiple disciplines such as Emergency
Management and Critical Infrastructure
Protection.
 .

.
 Future Trends in Terrorism
 As a conflict method that has survived and evolved
through several millennia to flourish in the modern
information age, terrorism continues to adapt to meet
the challenges of emerging forms of conflict, and
exploit developments in technology and society.
 Terrorism has demonstrated increasing abilities to
adapt to counter-terrorism measures and political
failure.
 Terrorists are developing new capabilities of attack and
improving the efficiency of existing methods.

.
 Additionally, terrorist groups have shown
significant progress in escaping from a
subordinate role in nation-state conflicts, and
becoming prominent as international influences
in their own right. They are becoming more
integrated with other sub-state entities, such as
criminal organizations and legitimately chartered
corporations, and are gradually assuming a
measure of control and identity with national
governments.

Adaptive Capabilities of Terror Groups
Terrorists have shown the ability to adapt to the techniques
and methods of counter-terror agencies and intelligence
organizations over the long term.
The decentralization of the network form of organization
is an example of this. Adopted to reduce the disruption
caused by the loss of key links in a chain of command, a
network organization also complicates the tasks of security
forces, and reduces predictability of operations.

Period of dormancy, and re-emerge under
favorable conditions demonstrates the
durability of terrorism as a threat to modern
societies.

.
 The emerging counterterrorism ideology that
Washington is expressing is hazardous, illusory,
and sadly unchallenged.

.
 “Multi-generational struggle” with “no cheap
way to win this fight.”

.
 Although Obama once claimed that this war,
“like all wars, must end,” officials and
policymakers no longer pretend that the war on
terrorism will ever end; nor do they offer any
narrative for how this war would end.

Conclusion
 Forget the long war; We are now in the era of
perpetual warfare…
 Multi-generational war
 You have to live with it.

Few words about ISIS
 Created by US – policy of Bush to side with Shias in Iraq.
 De-baathification- Lakhs of (2006-14) Suunis expelled from jobs
 Million man Iraqi army sent home with out pensions & future
benefits.
 Iraqi Parliament- Shia dominated
 Iraqi Constitution
 2006- After death of Zarqawi (Alqaeda), Iraqis took over in
Mesopotamia & created IS- Break from Alqaeda
 Veterans holy warriors of Iraq & Afghanistan including
Syrians…. All joined IS.
 Ending Sunnis hope for pol reconciliation- 2014
 …paved way for IS fighters & local marginalized Sunnis
penetrated Iraq & Syria- 2014

X Operation- Aftermath
2001- 2011
 US deployed NATO forces.
 Pak forces deployed
… $ 8 bn a month,
… the surge,
… drone attacks &
… intensification of operation.
 Terrorism expands in various
shapes/ changing loyalties.
( Nexus of Taliban, Al Qaeda,
War-lords, Drug barons)
 Situation out of control

x
2. Obama’ era- 2009
 … Continuation of Bush policy
Ie. NATO operation in Afghn
Operation in Tribal area
Drone attacks

.
 –Mar. 2009-
 “AfPak” strategy
- An escalation, rather than a major tactical shift by the
United States. Drone strikes to be increased
- Dialogue & ROZ…
However the policy was defective
Both Pak & Afghanistan had their
reservations

.
 The most obvious is the physical shift from Iraq to Afghanistan.
Under George W. Bush the United States had an uncoordinated
strategy in Afghanistan, enabling the Taliban, defeated in 2001
and again in 2002, to first recover and then re-emerge. From
2004 onwards the Taliban and two independent allied
commanders – Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbaddin Hekmatyar –
swept into large swathes of southern and eastern Afghanistan
and parts of northern Afghanistan in a series of spring and
summer offensives.
 The idea of negotiating with less extremist elements in the
Taliban in Afghanistan
 The aim of the new differentiation between Al Qaeda and the
Taliban is to seek out what has been widely termed “moderate”
Taliban. The earlier strategy of treating Al Qaeda and the Taliban
as synonymous has brought these two diverse entities closer
together, both ideologically and practically. Al Qaeda earned
access to one of the most isolated regions on the planet –
Waziristan in Pakistan – and the Taliban, who before 2002 had
little or no experience in guerrilla warfare or suicide attacks,
learnt insurgency techniques. These days Taliban suicide attacks
are a weekly occurrence.

.
 For the more extremist elements in the Taliban and for Al
Qaeda, the new AfPak policy promises an escalation,
rather than a major tactical shift by the United States. Missile
strikes are expected to increase in scope and regularity within
Pakistan,
 The dilemma for Pakistan’s army with the new policy is two-fold.
First, it must cooperate with the United States in its pursuit of
Taliban in tribal areas to root out extremism and the militant
threat in the area. Military and non-military aid to Pakistan
promises to be more intricately tied to such cooperation than
ever before. Second, the army will either have to get hard on the
Taliban that it nurtured for so long in the 1980s or risk
Pakistan’s international isolation.
 While Pakistan’s infrastructure will surely get a makeover, it will
be challenging to develop institutional and social capacity in
Pakistan

.
 The most welcome aspect of the new policy is the emphasis on
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s civil institutions over individual
leaders like Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf. In what many
have described as a “civilian surge”, both countries will
receive massive injections of cash, projects and experts.
Development aid for new schools, roads and clinics has been
targeted for Pakistan’s tribal areas, around 7.5 billion US dollars
in non-military aid over five years if the Kerry-Lugar bill passes
through US Congress.
 “Reconstruction opportunity zones”, also proposed
for those areas along the Pak-Afghan border that are most
afflicted by Talibanisation. The hope is that by creating a free
trade and industry zone, employment opportunities will attract
young men away from the Taliban.
 The AfPak policy cannot succeed unless the poverty upon which
the militants prey is addressed. No matter what promises
Washington, Brussels or Islamabad makes, the simple things like
poverty which continue to pose the greatest challenges for
ordinary Pakistanis need to be overcome in order to instil faith in
a better society based on pluralism, democracy and equal rights

.
 2nd announcement -December 02, 2009
 Surge and Exit Strategy
 An additional 30,000 troops in rapid fashion — giving General McChrystal most of what he asked
for — but also announced an exit timetable that makes a successful counterinsurgency impossible

2nd Modification- Dec 2009
Surge & Exit policy
 Increase of 30,000 troops
1. Intensification of operation (+ drones)
2. Dialogue & development (with good Taliban)
 Withdrawal- July 2011 to 2014

Abbottabad operation May 2011
 Osama finally tracked down
 US wanted to prove its victory

Why Exit plan?
 blow to US prestige
 Face saving plan by US
 Congress questions purpose of war & expenditure
 Criticism
 Victory for Taliban….?
• Rising toll of deaths
• Huge expenditure
• Congress questions…
• US public

In fiscal year 2011, Congress authorized
$113 billion for the war in Afghanistan
and $46 billion for Iraq. The Pentagon's
2012 budget request is lower: $107
billion for Afghanistan and $11 billion
for Iraq.
Before leaving office last month as
defense secretary, Robert Gates ordered
his department to find ways to cut $400
billion from the defense budget over 12
years, under Obama's orders.
War costing $3.7
trillion

.
 Dec 11- Bonn conference
 Dialogue started
 Qatar
 Chicago conference
 Pick & choose policy
 Drawbacks…
US Taliban
Pak Karzai
India

Exit plan- A gamble…
Implications…
 Credibility of Karzai,
 ANA, (dramatic uptick in 2012 in green-on-blue
killings – prompting increasing concern)
 Institutions
 development,
 Dialogue with Taliban
 Regional actors

Although the international military is slated to end its combat mission in Afghanistan in
2014, the green on blue killings and the insurgent infiltration they likely represent, may
pose a serious threat for the long-term stability of Afghanistan.
“The issue of green on blue attacks is not only a tragic
issue for international forces and Afghan forces right now,
but post-2014 this could change into the collapse of one
or many of government institutions in various districts
and provinces,” says Waliullah Rahmani, executive director of the Kabul Center
for Strategic Studies. “There might be a risk of many elements of the Taliban and
insurgency or people who are loyal to them who spy for these groups inside the Afghan
government.”
Camp Bastion, a major air base in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand province.
The base serves as one of the central logistical hubs for the British military and is
attached to Camp Leatherneck, the central base for US Marines in southern
Afghanistan.The camps are one of the most heavily guarded areas in Afghanistan, but
on Friday, a group of 15 insurgents managed to breach the perimeter fence reportedly
wearing US military uniforms and carrying rifles, grenade launchers, and suicide vests.

Latest- 2012
 BBC News-13-Sep-2012
 … worried about the recent numbers of attacks
by Afghans on Western ... The gloomiest scenario
runs as follows: President Karzai will ...
 Afghanistan 'facing civil war when US troops
leave' ... The specter of civil war is the worst
case scenario envisaged by Nato commanders as
...

2012- 13.
 BBC World Affairs Editor John Simpson in Kabul says
there is not much optimism nowadays among Afghan
politicians, diplomats and soldiers.
 In a country which has known nothing but war for 40
years, the assumption is that it will just continue.
 The most serious danger is that a political vacuum will
build up.
 There are considerable anxieties about this among
Western governments.

.
 …Endangers the entire British and American
strategy for withdrawal from Afghanistan.
 Foreign countries would be reluctant to give
Afghanistan the aid they have promised.
 The Taliban, the scenario continues, will raise
their campaign to new heights, and wreck the
elections (2014) altogether.


.
 The political system will then implode. The
British and American troops are withdrawing…,
and Afghanistan is once more becoming a black
hole like in the 1990s: a situation, in which only
the most extreme elements could thrive.
 Afghanistan: high expectations of record
opium crop 15 Apr 2013: UN report

The Guardian- Latest…
 How does Afghanistan compare to the world's other conflicts?
 12 Apr 2013: Numbers released today analyse trends in civilian
casualties, including which of the world's conflicts are the deadliest for
non-combatants.
 Civil war is the price Afghans will pay for the criminals the west
installed
 12 Apr 2013: Lucy Morgan Edwards: This week civil war was
predicted, a result of giving so much power to warlords after the
Taliban's overthrow
 Afghanistan's future after Nato troops leave uncertain, admits
Hammond . Afghans will determine their own fate, says defence
secretary, as MPs warns country could descend into civil war within
years

.
 As for the Taliban, the Afghan experts say, they are not a united
force in any way. They fall into three broad groups:
 Those who enjoyed being in power, as they were from 1996 to
2001, and want to get back into government again
 Those who joined the Taliban to get rid of Western troops
 Those who want to keep on fighting, because it gives them a
purpose in life
 Muddle along Top government people in Kabul maintain they can do a deal with the first two of
these groups.
 Afghanistan is not going to become another Switzerland
 Jobs in government will be made available to the Taliban, and most Western troops are going
anyway.
 The only group they cannot come to terms with is those who are determined to keep on fighting.
 The Taliban are clever and daring, but they do not seem to have the capability to take over the
country again.
 A much more likely outcome after 2014 is that the new Afghan government, like the present one,
will control only the main cities and the air routes.
 The rest of the country will be dangerous, and largely in the
hands of Taliban groups or warlords.

How
Pak- India
War
ll be
Fought
In
Afghanistan
After US
withdrawal

Implications
.
.
Pakistan
 Security
 Political
 Economic
 Psychological
Fata- Peshawar- Quetta- Brohis (Khi)
Vacuum…& the terrorits have exploited..
Their inevitable reutrn…like tentacles
….Significant portion of alqaida holds up
in Fata
“The militants have clearly expanded
the theatre of war to all four corners
Of Pakistan.”
Army has been paralyzed.
(Daily Times; Sept 20, 2012)
Mar, 2013- TTP’s conditions

Conclusion
 Nasr concludes the following. “We have not
won this war on the battlefield nor have we
ended it at the negotiating table.
 A futile war.
 US has destroyed Afghanistan, it has to rebuild
it.
 Dialogue plus development
Fight- Talk- Build

.
 Taliban as developing into a proxy force for
Pakistan's regional interests

 International Security Assistance Force
 Main article: International Security Assistance Force
 Operating under United States General David Howell
Petraeus,[116] the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
includes soldiers from 46 countries with U.S. troops making up
about half its force.[117] ISAF had initially been established as a
stabilization force by the UN Security Council on 20 December
2001, to secure Kabul. Its mandate did not extend beyond this
area for the first few years.[118] On 11 August 2003, NATO
assumed political command and coordination of ISAF.[118] On
31 July 2006, ISAF assumed command of the south of the
country, and by 5 October 2006, of the east.

.
 According to Pakistani Afghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid,
"between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000
Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan" on the side
of the Taliban. Peter Tomsen stated that up until 9/11 Pakistani military and ISI officers
along with thousands of regular Pakistani armed forces personnel had been involved in the
fighting in Afghanistan.
 In 2001 alone, according to several international sources, 28,000-30,000 Pakistani nationals,
14,000-15,000 Afghan Taliban and 2,000-3,000 Al Qaeda militants were fighting against anti-
Taliban forces in Afghanistan as a roughly 45,000 strong military force.Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf – then as Chief of Army Staff – was responsible for sending thousands of Pakistanis to
fight alongside the Taliban and Bin Laden against the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Of the
estimated 28,000 Pakistani nationals fighting in Afghanistan, 8,000 were militants recruited in
madrassas filling regular Taliban ranks. A 1998 document by the U.S. State Department confirms
that "20–40 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers are Pakistani.“ The document further states that
the parents of those Pakistani nationals "know nothing regarding their child's military
involvement with the Taliban until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan.“According to the
U.S. State Department report and reports by Human Rights Watch, the other Pakistani nationals
fighting in Afghanistan were regular Pakistani soldiers especially from the Frontier Corps but also
from the army providing direct combat support.

 Under the Taliban, al-Qaeda was able to use Afghanistan as a place to train and
indoctrinate fighters, import weapons, coordinate with other jihadists, and plot
terrorist actions.[45] While al-Qaeda maintained its own establishments in Afghanistan,
it also supported training camps belonging to other organizations. Between 10,000 and
20,000 people passed through these facilities before 9/11, most of whom were sent to
fight for the Taliban against the United Front but a smaller number were inducted into
al-Qaeda.[46]
 After the August 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings were linked to bin Laden, President
Bill Clinton ordered missile strikes on militant training camps in Afghanistan. U.S.
officials pressed the Taliban to surrender bin Laden, and the international community
imposed sanctions on the Taliban in 1999, calling for bin Laden to be surrendered.
that "20–40 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers are Pakistani.“ The document further
states that the parents of those Pakistani nationals "know nothing regarding their
child's military involvement with the Taliban until their bodies are brought back to
Pakistan.“ According to the U.S. State Department report and reports by Human
Rights Watch, the other Pakistani nationals fighting in Afghanistan were regular
Pakistani soldiers especially from the Frontier Corps but also from the army providing
direct combat support. the demands, however.

.
 assassination in September 2011 of Burhanuddin Rabbani,
the former Afghan president and chairman of the Afghan
High Peace Council (APHC), a body responsible for
Negotiation with the Taliban, signaled the
re-assertion of a clear message by the Taliban and their
cohorts: They have no inclination to negotiate
or reconcile

.
 Background/ Why Dialogue??
 Taliban- Variety?
 Military strategy counterproductive
 Sept 13- APC-
Groups
60000- 100000

.
 Hanafi Sunni Islamic order
 Taliban’s belief system: it was the sum total
of Pashtun religious conservatism, which
had been radicalised during the anti-Soviet
jihad, combined with a violent, exclusivist
Islamic creed of Pakistani Deobandis, with
some attributes from Saudi Wahhabis.

.
 Progress so far……..(Since Feb.14)
 The current dialogue has greatly increased the
Taliban's military manpower, and they are a
serious threat to the country's already fragile
status
 38 major incidences & 70 explosions in Jan.
2012- 451 attacks…. 3400 deaths
2013- 355… 3270
(Courtesy: South Asia Terrorism Portal)

.
 February- Taliban’s activities continue
 16 th Feb- Dialogue suspended for 2 weeks

.
 Issues & Apprehensions
 Who is in commanding position?
 Trust deficit on both sides- Rebuffing

.
 Conditions/ Surge in attacks. (Start of 2014)…..
Backlash of the unilateral offer.
 Fabricated Taliban(US, India, Splinters),
sabotaging the dialogue??
15 demands by Taliban
4000 prisoners
Sharia
Constitution

.
 Doubtful role by Pak/ Cross border terrorism.
 Rehabilitation issue
 Development issue

.
 Parallels/ Outcome
 Chechnya
 Palestine
 Tamils in Sri Lanka
 IRA in Ireland
 East Timor
•TTP goal is whole country
•Global agenda
•Repudiated previous agreements

.
 Is the Afghan government's offer of peace
negotiation from a position of weakness or
strength?
 Do the Taliban and other insurgents have
the self-autonomy and willingness to
negotiate?
 Has the government adopted the right
approach to negotiate with the insurgents?
 What is and will be the backlashes of
unilateral negotiation offer?

.
 Pak arrested Baradar to stall peace efforts
 Taliban imposing their own preconditions
 Taliban regularly rebuffing…

.
 The current peace process in Afghanistan has
greatly increased the Taliban's military
manpower, and they are a serious threat to the country's
already fragile status. As Aziz Ariaey, pointed out to me, "The
unilateral call for negotiation with the Taliban provoked and
encouraged hesitant villagers, particularly in the south and
southeastern region to join the Taliban because they feel as if the
future of the country will be in the hand of the Taliban. So why
not join them now?" The Taliban believe that they are in a
position of strength and they have caused a major setback to the
Afghan government and its international allies, particularly the
US."

 2002: Operation Anaconda
 U.S. Army soldiers from Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division search for al-
Qaeda and Taliban fighters.
 Canadian soldiers from 3PPCLI move into the hills to search for al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters after an air assault onto an
objective north of Qualat, Afghanistan.
 An Anti-Taliban Forces (ATF) fighter wraps a bandolier of ammunition for his 7.62 mm PK machine gun around his body as
ATF personnel help secure a compound in Helmand Province in Afghanistan, January 2002.
 Main article: 2002 in Afghanistan
 Further information: Operation Anaconda and Tarnak Farm incident
 Following Tora Bora, Afghan forces and their U.S. allies consolidated their position in the country. Following a Loya jirga or
grand council of major Afghan factions, tribal leaders, and former exiles, an interim Afghan government was established in Kabul
under Hamid Karzai. U.S. forces established their main base at Bagram airbase just north of Kabul. Kandahar airport also became
an important U.S. base area. Several outposts were established in eastern provinces to hunt for Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives.
The number of U.S-led coalition troops operating in the country would eventually grow to over 10,000.
 Meanwhile, the Taliban and al-Qaeda had not given up. Al-Qaeda forces began regrouping in the Shahi-Kot mountains of Paktia
province throughout January and February 2002. A Taliban fugitive in Paktia province, Mullah Saifur Rehman, also began
reconstituting some of his militia forces in support of the anti-U.S. fighters. They totalled over 1,000 by the beginning of March
2002. The intention of the insurgents was to use the region as a base area for launching guerrilla attacks and possibly a major
offensive in the style of the Mujahideen who battled Soviet forces during the 1980s.
 U.S. allied to Afghan militia intelligence sources soon picked up on this buildup in Paktia province and prepared a massive push to
counter it. On 2 March 2002, U.S. and Afghan forces launched an offensive on al-Qaeda and Taliban forces entrenched in the
mountains of Shahi-Kot southeast of Gardez. The Mujahideen forces, who used small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and
mortars, were entrenched into caves and bunkers in the hillsides at an altitude that was largely above 10,000 feet (3,000 m).

 Post-Anaconda operations
 Following the battle at Shahi-Kot, it is believed that the al-Qaeda fighters established
sanctuaries among tribal protectors in Pakistan, from which they regained their
strength and later began launching cross-border raids on U.S. forces by the summer
months of 2002. Guerrilla units, numbering between 5 and 25 men, still regularly
crossed the border from their sanctuaries in Pakistan to fire rockets at U.S. bases and
ambush American convoys and patrols, as well as Afghan National Army troops,
Afghan militia forces working with the U.S-led coalition, and non-governmental
organizations. The area around the U.S. base at Shkin in Paktika province saw some of
the heaviest activity.
 Meanwhile, Taliban forces remained in hiding in the rural regions of the four southern
provinces that formed their heartland, Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand Province, and
Uruzgan. In the wake of Operation Anaconda The Pentagon requested that British
Royal Marines who are highly trained in mountain warfare, be deployed. They
conducted a number of missions over several weeks with varying results. The Taliban,
who during the summer of 2002 numbered in the hundreds, avoided combat with U.S.
forces and their Afghan allies and melted away into the caves and tunnels of remote
Afghan mountain ranges or across the border into Pakistan during operations

 After managing to evade U.S. forces throughout mid-2002, the remnants of the Taliban gradually
began to regain their confidence and started to begin preparations to launch the insurgency that
Mullah Muhammad Omar had promised during the Taliban's last days in power.[123] During
September, Taliban forces began a recruitment drive in Pashtun areas in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan to launch a renewed "jihad" or holy war against the Afghan government and the U.S-led
coalition. Pamphlets distributed in secret during the night also began to appear in many villages in
the former Taliban heartland in southeastern Afghanistan that called for jihad.[124]
 Small mobile training camps were established along the border with Pakistan by al-Qaeda and
Taliban fugitives to train recruits in guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, according to Afghan
sources and a United Nations report.[125] Most of the recruits were drawn from the madrassas or
religious schools of the tribal areas of Pakistan, from which the Taliban had originally arisen.
Major bases, a few with as many as 200 men, were created in the mountainous tribal areas of
Pakistan by the summer of 2003. The will of the Pakistani paramilitaries stationed at border
crossings to prevent such infiltration was called into question, and Pakistani military operations
proved of little use.[126]
 The Taliban gradually reorganized and reconstituted their forces over the winter, preparing for a
summer offensive. They established a new mode of operation: gathered into groups of around 50
to launch attacks on isolated outposts and convoys of Afghan soldiers, police, or militia and then
breaking up into groups of 5–10 men to evade subsequent offensives. U.S. forces in the strategy
were attacked indirectly, through rocket attacks on bases and improvised explosive devices.

 2006: NATO in southern Afghanistan
 A US Army soldier from 10th Mountain Division, patrols Aranas,
Afghanistan
 Main article: Coalition combat operations in Afghanistan in 2006
 Further information: 2006 in Afghanistan
 From January 2006, a NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
started to replace the U.S. troops of Operation Enduring Freedom in
southern Afghanistan. The British 16th Air Assault Brigade (later reinforced
by Royal Marines) formed the core of the force in Southern Afghanistan,
along with troops and helicopters from Australia, Canada and the
Netherlands. The initial force consisted of roughly 3,300 British,[128] 2,300
Canadian,[129] 1,963 from the Netherlands, 300 from Australia,[130] 290 from
Denmark,[131] and 150 from Estonia.[132] Air support was provided by U.S.,
British, Dutch, Norwegian and French combat aircraft and helicopters.

Abbottabad operation May 2011
 Osama finally tracked down
 Chain of questions/ conspiracy theories…
 However America controls the flow of information
 US… to regain international credibility
 Elections approaching…
 Maligning Pak & its institutions
 (Nobody asking for proof)
 nothing more than a symbolic victory in American war on terror.

June 11
 Barack Obama has announced the
withdrawal of 10,000 troops from
Afghanistan by the end of this year. He also
announced that 33,000 troops to be
withdrawn by the summer of 2012

.
US withdrawal: Implosion, or
peace for Afghanistan?
 July 14, 2011
 .

.
 All military campaigns have lifecycles. Some are short while
others drag on for years but the end is always inevitable. It is
this inevitability that currently overshadows American military
operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
 The war in Afghanistan has been America’s longest war. It
has been costly in terms of money and lives for all countries
involved. George W Bush invaded Afghanistan to avenge the
9/11 attacks; he also took the opportunity to take the war into
Iraq, to pre-empt Sadam Hussain from using his alleged
Weapons of Mass Destruction. After Bush’s two terms as the
‘war president,’ the public expected Barack Obama to find an
end to this and start bringing American soldiers home.

.
 The first step in Obama’s recipe to lay the Bush legacy to
rest, involved the reduction of the American footprint in Iraq
and to concentrate on Afghanistan. The stabilisation plan for
Afghanistan included enhancing military operations to disrupt
al Qaeda and the Taliban and building up the Afghan National
Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to replace
the multinational forces.
 It was visualised that the bulk of the American forces would
be withdrawn by 2014. Beyond that, the US presence in
Afghanistan would be limited to an advisory role. In order to
provide fresh impetus to the offensive operations before a
gradual pullout from Afghanistan, the American generals
wanted a ‘surge’ similar to the one they had conducted in Iraq.
To meet this demand Obama agreed to send 30,000 more
troops to Afghanistan in 2010.

.
 Announcing the surge numbers before the Corps of Cadets at West Point Military
Academy on December 1, 2009, Obama had declared his intent to start bringing
American forces home in the middle of 2011, since he was against an open-ended
commitment. His strategy to “bring this war to a successful conclusion,” was
premised on seeking a reversal to Taliban gains in large parts of Afghanistan,
increasing the pressure on Afghanistan to build its own military capacity and a more
effective government and stepping up attacks on al Qaeda in Pakistan.
 A year later, on June 22, 2011 Obama gave out the withdrawal schedule for the
surge troops: 10,000 soldiers to be pulled out by December 2011 and a further
23,000 by September 2012. Thereafter approximately 70,000 American troops would
still be left in Afghanistan for two more campaigning seasons. The American plan to
withdraw from Afghanistan was followed by pullout decisions by other allies like
France and Britain. The Canadians and Australians are already on their way home
and smaller European contingents are likely to follow suit.
 Anything can happen between now and 2014, hastening or delaying
American withdrawal plans, although the second option looks less likely.

.
 Three possible scenarios
 Barring a totally unexpected and unforeseen
situation, anyone of these scenarios can
materialise as the American military campaign
ends in Afghanistan:

.
 Scenario 1
 The Americans are able to disrupt and weaken al Qaeda and
the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the next two
campaigning seasons.
 The withdrawal takes place as per schedule in 2014.
 A residual force is left behind to oversee operations in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
 The ANA and ANP take over from the ISAF forces.
 Controlled normality, over watched by the Americans,
returns to Afghanistan.

.
 Scenario 2
 The operations against the al Qaeda and the Taliban prove
inconclusive.
 Domestic pressure and economic compulsions preclude the
possibility of any extension in combat operations and the
Americans withdraw as per schedule.
 The ANA and ANP are in a position to take over from the
departing foreign forces.
 The size of the residual forces is enhanced to bolster the
ANA and the ANP.
 Uneasy peace in Afghanistan.

Areas of Taliban presence in
Afghanistan plus fatal violent
incidents in 2008

Conditions deteriorate…
High intensity attacks….
Sept- Oct… 2011
Attack on US embassy in Kabul
Murder of Burhan ud Din Rabbani
Oct 2011- Biggest single attack on ISAF forces at
Kabul,,, 13 killed

.
 2011
 Estimated cost of post-9/11 wars: 225,000 lives, up to $4
trillion
 New estimates by the “Costs of War” project provide a
comprehensive analysis of the total human, economic, social,
and political cost of the U.S. War on Terror.
 The cost of wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan are estimated
at 225,000 lives and up to $4 trillion in U.S. spending, in a new
report by scholars with the Eisenhower Research Project at
Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies.
The group’s “Costs of War” project has released new figures for
a range of human and economic costs associated with the U.S.
military response to the 9/11 attacks.
 If the wars continue, they are on track to require at least another
$450 billion in Pentagon spending by 2020.


.
 Among the group’s main findings:
 The U.S. wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan will cost between $3.2 and $4
trillion, including medical care and disability for current and future war
veterans. This figure does not include substantial probable future interest on
war-related debt.
 More than 31,000 people in uniform and military contractors have died,
including the Iraqi and Afghan security forces and other military forces allied
with the United States.
 By a very conservative estimate, 137,000 civilians have been killed in Iraq and
Afghanistan by all parties to these conflicts.
 The wars have created more than 7.8 million refugees among Iraqis, Afghans,
and Pakistanis.
 Pentagon bills account for half of the budgetary costs incurred and are a
fraction of the full economic cost of the wars.
 Because the war has been financed almost entirely by borrowing, $185 billion in
interest has already been paid on war spending, and another $1 trillion could
accrue in interest alone through 2020.
 Federal obligations to care for past and future veterans of these wars will likely
total between $600-$950 billion. This number is not included in most analyses
of the costs of war and will not peak until mid-century

Mar. 2011
 “Afghan progress still fragile, irreversible”
 “Taliban resurgence expected this
spring…worries about karzai corruption &
the slow development of Afghan security
forces”.
 (US commander)

Latest….
 Oct/ Nov, 2011- Istanbul conference
 Dec 2011 - Bonn conference
 Apr 2012 - Local Afg police take
limited control. They are shaky &
demotivated

Analysis
 Objective of war remains mysterious.
 WOT, WOR or New world order?
 Whose war is this?
 Clash of civilization?
 Excessive military use erroneous. Terror breeding terror.
 Complex war- lethal cocktail of Taliban , Al-Qaeda militants, religious organizations & other
actors.
 Longevity of war has increased insecurity in international politics.
 Exit strategy- A clean chit to Taliban?
 US losses- A face saving announcement

.
Scenario 3- Most probable..
 The Taliban are able to expand their base in the
south and make ingress into other areas.
 The ANA and ANP lack the numbers and capability
to take over from the Americans.
 The Americans leave behind a larger force in garrisons like
Bagram.
 The chances of Afghanistan imploding increase.

.
 Clearly, the coming years will see a change in the
region. The American military operations will end
sooner or later. The toxic debris and detritus of the
war will take years to clean up. The Taliban may or
may not replace the current Afghan government.
Regional countries like Pakistan, Iran, India, China
and Russia will stake their claims and fill in the space
relinquished by departing Western powers, as best as
they can.

.
 The coming years will provide both
challenges and opportunities in the region now
dubbed as Af-Pak and whoever seizes the
initiative is going to give a new twist to the
current narrative.

Conclusion- Peace in Afghanistan
is a false assumption
 Absence of Taliban from Bonn & Tokyo conf.
 US blunders…
1. Taliban not part of conf.
2. No arrangement to fill vacuum
3. Insurgents have not been brought part of mainstream
4. Dialogue ignored… Incentives missing
5. Reconciliation & military cannot go hand in hand
6. Pak is crucial part of solution
7. Afghan insurgency is warlords’ war for pol & territorial
influence & has no real ideological foundation
8. Huge no of. weapons

.
 Assuming that with Osama s death the
terror phenomenon has ended would be
a big folly.
 “Alqaida’s mission ll continue…”
(Saleem Shahzad)

Is it end or a new beginning?
 Post soviet history . Ahghan is in constant state of
war…
 War goes on as contractors stay behind
 The Vietnam War had an end -- April 30, 1975. The
Afghanistan War has no end because there is simply no
army strong enough to push us out.
 The Taliban are ...
 Politics will bring it to an end. A political settlement …
 Now that Osama bin Laden is dead and Al Qaeda is
scattered around the globe, does it really make sense to
keep using over 100000 U.S

.
 Pathetic govt- Karzai is a puppet.
 Factions of Taliban.
 Regional actors repositioning themselves
 Al Qaeda has gone global. Global caliphate….
... A generation of new leaders & die-hards
(Clash of civilization/ Inside alqaeda &
Taliban)

Analysis
 Objective of war remains mysterious.
 WOT, WOR or New world order?
 Whose war is this?
 Clash of civilization?
 Excessive military use erroneous. Terror breeding terror.
 Complex war- lethal cocktail of Taliban , Al-Qaeda
militants, religious organizations & other actors.
 Longevity of war has increased insecurity in international
politics.
 Exit strategy- A clean chit to Taliban?
 US losses- A face saving announcement

Conclusion
 Osama filled the gap after fall of Soviet Union
 The demise of al-Qaeda s spiritual leadership
does not mean that the war on terror will be
over.

.
 As the Americans struggle to control the situation in
Afghanistan during the next two years, they are going to stick
with their
 strategy of drone strikes in the tribal areas and
 Covert/ unilateral operations in other parts of Pakistan
 . They will also enhance political and economic pressure on
Pakistani leadership, both civil and military, to step up ground
operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata).
 The demonising of the Pakistani military and intelligence
agencies will continue, providing the Americans with an excuse
to bring about a regime change. Whether they will be able to
pull off such an enterprise is debatable but cannot be
arbitrarily ruled out.

Negotiations- A complex issue
 Contradictions in US policy
 Talking to Taliban remain a mirage…
 Factions & defections in Taliban
 Hawkish military commanders-
Mistrust on Mullah umar..
 Hikmatyar (HI) vs Rabbani (Tajik)Pushtun vs
Tajiks, Opposition to Karzai (they want to
execute him like Najib ullah)
US still thinking
In terms of
weakening the
Taliban through
Military
Operations
to such an extend
that They Start
begging
for Peace talks..

Solution- Shamshad Ahmad
June 21, 2014
 Address the root causes
 Mis- governance
 Corruption
 Segregation
 Solution lies in political management not in
use of force.

Consequences of Military
operation Zarb ul Azb: June 14.
 Out- flux to Afghanistan. Cross border
terrorism
 Dispersal of militants
 Counter attacks by terrorists
 IDPs. Where they should go?

.
 Inside Al-qaida & the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden
& 9/11…. (Saleem Shahzad)
 Jihadi organization have nexus with Al-Qaeda & ISI.
 ISI using organizations for proxy wars in India.
 Alqaeda & organizations at the same time are also
extentions of Pak Army+ retired officers
 Trained by Army for Kashmir.
 6 lac youth prepared since 1979
 1 mn enrolled in Madrassas
 Thousands supporters in religious parties
 Musharraf tried to purge.

Sep- Oct…. 2011
 “Afghan wont tolerate terrorism, as an
instrument against its citizen” (Karzai)
 “How long Pak will treat Afghan as its
extension”?
 “Pak has been mal-treating Afghan…”
 “Taliban making Afghan future seem up for
grab… Intimidation campaigns by them.”
 “ Afghans are not feeling neighborly with Pak.”
(IT – Oct 06, 11)

2011
 Turkey’s role…
 Pro-govt lashkars/ tribes attacked by Taliban &
govt failed to provide security (Momand agency)
 Shift in policy
 Taliban? No now all are pushtuns fighting
against US
 US elections approaching so Obama wants to
withdraw with honor…

.
Post Bin Ladin World
(Consequences)

.
 Osama's death gives life to ailing US print media
 NYT’s communications department tweeted that 165,000 extra
copies of the “historic” newspaper that reported on the death of
the “emblem of evil” and “icon to the cause of terror” were
printed, two-and-a-half times the normal order. Mashable
reported The Washington Post also bumped up its print order as
did smaller presses like The Star-Ledger in New Jersey and New
York’s The Poughkeepsie Journal
 Will the photos remain suppressed when the media and US
conservatives are baying for their Abu al-Zarqawi moment? The
news of Obama’s photo decision was just out when Reuters
reported it had been sold photographs of three dead men at the
Bin Laden Abottabad compound. The photographs were said to
have been taken by an unnamed Pakistani security official,
however, Reuters added that none of the men in the pictures
looked like Bin Laden

Consequences- Pakistan
 Sovereignty….
 ISI & army’s role…
 Pak’s credibility seriously undermined… Statements by
India, Afghanistan, EU & other nations. (pliable state?)
 Trapping Pak to fulfill “strategic objective” & to ‘do
more”.
 Aid cut….
 Nuclear control threat
 More challenges- state of war…
 Divided nation
9/11 everyday….

.
 Pakistani Taliban threaten Pakistani state after Osama bin
Laden's death
The Pakistani Taliban have put the Pakistani state at the
top of their hit list after US special operations and CIA
forces killed Osama bin Laden at a fortified mansion in
Abbottabad.
 "Now Pakistani rulers, President Zardari and the army will
be our first targets. America will be our second target,"
Ihsanullah Ihsan, a spokesman (TTP),
 By April 2009, almost 10 percent of Pakistan was under
effective control of the Taliban, while wave after wave of
high-profile terror attacks were launched against security
forces, the government, and civilians alike.
US media hype against Pak

,
 THOSE WHO CLAIM THAT WE CAN
DISENGAGE FROM AFGHANISTAN NOW
THAT THE "EMIR" OF AL QAEDA IS DEAD
SEEM TO ASSUME THE WHOLE
ORGANIZATION WILL DISAPPEAR WITH
HIM. IT MIGHT, BUT IT MIGHT NOT.
OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS SUCH AS
HAMAS AND HEZBOLLAH HAVE SURVIVED
THE LOSS OF THEIR LEADERS.
(May,11: Wall Street Journal)

.
 OF GREATER IMMEDIATE CONCERN ARE AL QAEDA'S ALLIES: THE QUETTA SHURA TALIBAN,
THE HAQQANI NETWORK AND HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG), WHICH AMONG THEM
DEPLOY THOUSANDS OF HARDENED TERRORISTS. THESE GROUPS, IN TURN, ARE PART OF A
LARGER CONGLOMERATION OF EXTREMISTS BASED IN PAKISTAN INCLUDING THE TEHRIK-I-
TALIBAN PAKISTAN (THE PAKISTANI TALIBAN), LASHKAR-E-TAIBA AND JAISH-E-MOHAMMED.
 ALL OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS SHARE AN EAGERNESS TO SLAUGHTER CIVILIANS AND A
DESIRE TO CREATE A TOTALITARIAN REGIME MODELED ON TALIBAN-ERA AFGHANISTAN.
 THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE AMONG THEM, AT LEAST SO FAR, HAS BEEN ONE OF GEOGRAPHIC
FOCUS. THE TALIBAN, THE HAQQANI NETWORK AND HIG WANT TO SEIZE POWER IN
AFGHANISTAN. THE PAKISTANI TALIBAN ASPIRES TO RULE IN ISLAMABAD. LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
AND JAISH-E-MOHAMMED ARE PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON WRESTING KASHMIR AWAY FROM
INDIA, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF THE FORMER'S NETWORK
EXPANDING INTO BANGLADESH, NEPAL AND SRI LANKA. ONLY AL QAEDA HAS A
GLOBAL FOCUS—SO FAR.
 BUT WHATEVER THEIR TACTICAL DIFFERENCES, THESE GROUPS HAVE ESTABLISHED A
MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HELP OF PAKISTAN'S INTER-SERVICES
INTELLIGENCE.
 Should We Stay in Afghanistan?
 MISSION ACCOMPLISHED
BY LESLIE GELB
 WE CANNOT ALLOW THEM TO CREATE A FUNDAMENTALIST CALIPHATE STRETCHING FROM
KABUL TO KASHMIR AND BEYOND. THEIR TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN—A FIRST STEP
TOWARD THIS GRANDIOSE GOAL—WOULD GALVANIZE JIHADISTS AND COULD REVERSE THE
LOSS OF MOMENTUM THEY HAVE SUFFERED BECAUSE OF THE ARAB SPRING AND BIN LADEN'S
DEATH. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE GREATER IMPETUS TO TOPPLE THE NUCLEAR-ARMED
PAKISTAN NEXT DOOR.
 ISLAMISTS HAVE ALREADY MADE DANGEROUS INROADS IN PAKISTAN, AS SEEN FROM
THE FACT THAT OSAMA BIN LADEN WAS ABLE TO LIVE IN A MILITARY GARRISON TOWN JUST 35
MILES NORTH OF ISLAMABAD
 (Wall Street Journal)

May- June 11
 Obama announces the withdrawal of 33000
troops
 Consequences for;
1. Afghanistan
2. Pakistan

 Today Pakistan is in such a confused state
over supporting or destroying Taliban. It
seems many conservative forces believe that
Taliban are our Muslims brothers, would shield
Pakistan from Indian intrusion into Pakistan
through Afghan borders.

 The Taliban movement was no doubt a natural
response to atrocities committed by rival
commanders in the region. Local people
abhorred Afghan infighting, which was why the
Taliban did not face much resistance in
extending their writ beyond Kandahar and
disarming the conquered areas.

 Simultaneously, however, some worrisome signs were
visible in the Taliban movement right from the
beginning. Taliban leaders, including Mullah Umar,
were clear about enforcing a Hanafi Sunni Islamic
order in Afghanistan. Thus, in conquered areas, Shariah
was strictly enforced, and punishments awarded
accordingly. There was little doubt then about the
Taliban’s belief system: it was the sum total of
Pashtun religious conservatism, which had been
radicalised during the anti-Soviet jihad, combined with
a violent, exclusivist Islamic creed of Pakistani
Deobandis, with some attributes from Saudi
Wahhabis.

.
 The traditionally tolerant multi-ethnic society of Afghanistan does not
deserve to be ruled by [the] Taliban, who exercise a reign of terror in
the territories under their occupation. They have won global notoriety
for their maltreatment of women, who are denied the right to education,
work, move and speak freely. Those accused of illicit sexual ties are
stoned to death, and men accused of murder are shot dead by relatives
of the victim party, in case the latter refuse to accept the blood money,
and this deadly drama is played right before the eyes of hundreds of
people usually in sports stadiums. Hands or legs of the accused thieves
are amputated likewise. The Religious Force of the Ministry of
Fostering Virtue and Preventing Vice recently disrupted two friendly
football matches between Afghan and Pakistani teams in
Kandahar and Kabul—in July and October 2000,
respectively. In the first instance, the heads of Pakistani players were
shaved off—for they violated the dress code of Taliban by wearing
shorts; and, in the second case, the players were chased away from the
stadium by bearded thugs because the timing of the match violated a
recent edict of Taliban’s spiritual leader, which prohibits the people
from taking part in any sports activity after 4 pm.

 Of course, in the end, most conflicts end with a dialogue with
the enemy. So should be the case with Afghanistan. The
marginalization of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan’s post-
Taliban security, political and economic structure is a
reality, and the legitimate grievances of the country’s
majority population must be addressed effectively.
However, in the process of reconciling with the Taliban, extreme
care must be taken so as to preserve, even if not build upon, the
gains Afghanistan has made in the domains of human rights in
the last decade or so. Human rights violations have, indeed,
occurred in Afghanistan before the rise of the Taliban and
following their fall. The Taliban era was still exceptionally brutal
for the Afghans. If this is not enough, the decade-long war
may have produced a breed of Taliban who are believed to
be much harder and harsher than their older lot when it
comes to the rights of women, ethnic minorities and religious
dissidents.

.
 As the outside world proceeds to withdraw its combat
forces from Afghanistan, and rushes to reconcile with the
Taliban to smooth along an exit, it can learn a valid lesson
from Pakistan’s experience with the Taliban in Swat Valley.
In the spring of 2009, Pakistan’s provincial and federal
governments accepted the Taliban’s demand for enforcing a
‘system of justice’ in the region to be run on the basis of their
version of Islam. But it was a glaring mistake, made because
neither of them could understand what the real intensions of the
Taliban were. And these intensions became clear within days,
when the whole world saw the footage of a 17-year girl being
publicly lashed in the valley. The Taliban soon began expanding
the ‘system of justice’ to the rest of the country. Only a forceful
paramilitary operation could stop that march and prevent
Taliban excesses in other parts of Pakistan’s borderlands with
Afghanistan. It is a battle that continues unabated.

Regional
 More instability- Remote possibility of peace.
 Reaction by Al-Qaida & Taliban…
 The death may provide impetus for peace &
expedite the dialogue or
 The war may continue as Taliban have
announced that their struggle had no link with
Osama’s death
 Development projects…

.
 How to deal with the situation after exit
strategy?

Global
 Strong Anti-American sentiments
 Osama- A symbol…Left a trail of Osamas
 Global disorder
 UN marginalization

Regional Repercussions
 The region becomes cauldron of violence
 Increased Talibanization and reg. instability
 Involvement of India, Russia & Iran.
 Spill over in CARs & China
 Reconstruction projects in jeopardy.

three major anti-government factions' geographic centers of gravity:

Global Repercussions
 US ‘s vulnerability exposed- serious blow to its
prestige.
 It failed to win hearts of people
 Rift in coalition partners
 Strong anti- US sentiments particularly in
Muslim world.
 Increased radicalization.
 Global institutions like UN marginalized/
undermined.

2010- Rafia Zakaria
 Apr Marjah operation…failed as Taliban re-
emerging
 Kandhar offensive…Reversing of the situation.
 US building a case to expand its military
presence in Pak…The later finds itself in
difficult position where failure of the state on
militants may well be used as an excuse for
invasion of its territory.

July 05, 2010. Dawn
 Endgame in Afghanistan….
 US came as sole powerful country but has lost
suffered loss in its pre-eminence. No more in
commanding position in the region. Failed in her
vague mission.
 Pak in a bit autonomous position now…
 Are Pak & Afghan patching up by supporting
Haqqani network to be installed…
 TTP & other organizations recruiting new people
to fight after US pull in July 2011.

.
 All regional players repositioning themselves to
obtain the best possible deal.
 Pak in best position…It ll not allow India to play
key role there.
 Pak feels that premature withdrawal of Nato forces
could be catastrophic. Power vacuum may lead to
anarchy. Proxy wars may start with supports from
local warlords. What if anti-west forces dominate
the situation.
 Sustainable solution seems to be difficult.

July 17
 UK announced last week to withdraw from
Helmund.
 Mcrystal’s removal- a victory for Taliban.
 Kabul panicky as US deadline approaching.
 2010- the bloodiest year.
 Taliban emboldened to extend attack on
Kanduz, Badakhshan & Heart.
 Pak Taliban turning their guns against civilians.
10+ killed every day in Karachi & Quetta.

.
 MAPW President Dr Bill Williams : Prospects for peace in
Afghanistan
 Written 08/12/2009
 MAPW President Dr Bill Williams has written to Australian Minister for
Defence Senator John Faulkner, congratulating the Minister for not
committing additional Australian troops to Afghanistan. In the letter Dr
Williams outlines the human security and military costs of the
ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and gives MAPW proposals for building
towards a regional consensus for ending the conflict.
 Dr Williams writes, 'We believe that there are three essential
ingredients for long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan :
foreign military forces withdraw, neighbouring nations engage in a
regional peace process and Afghans regain control of their society.
To facilitate this, the UNi should convene an international conference
for the purpose of reaching a regional consensus on Afghanistan.
Negotiations must include all groups involved in the conflict,
including the Afghan government, other groups within
Afghanistan, and all of Afghanistan's neighbours. Given the failure
to date of military intervention, consideration must be given to re-
engaging the Taliban in negotiations

.
 Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan.
Ahmed Rashid
The author identifies
three key factors:
1. the resurgence of the Taliban,
2. 2. the leadership of President Karzai and
3. 3. the regional context. The war in Iraq was a costly distraction and it
was a mistake to focus nation-building on elections rather than on the
strengthening of proper institutions. Economic development,
especially agriculture, has not received sufficient attention, with the
result that drug production has increased. But there is an increasing
recognition that there needs to be some form of conversation with the
Taliban. They are now a more sophisticated military organisation, but
still an extremely unsophisticated social and political entity. They
do not have the answers to Afghanistan's problems. There are
many other groups with a stake in the future of the country so any
comprehensive negotiation will be very complicated. But it is a
positive element that Afghanistan is a tribal society with an enormous
capacity for forgiveness.

.
 Afghanistan: Prospects for Peace and
Democratic Governance and the ...
I examine the prospects and
challenges of establishing
democracy in Afghanistan. I do this with the
firm belief that a successful peace

How many more operations
will be required in Afghanistan?
Marjah
Opeartion
Feb, 10

.
 Its unlikely that ISI would be able to
controlAfghan (Haqqani network etc)
 Pro-pak Taliban/regime would be rejected by
Afghanistan.

.
 Afghan requires a regional approach.
 Zero interference
 Reckless bombing. US 300bn spent so far.
 Complete mess
 Division of Afghn into Pakhtun south & Non-pakhtun
north?
 US failed to convert impossible to possible.
 Taliban movement is predomimently pakhtun but also few
other linguistic groups joining.
 Movement spreading fast in north & west.
(Aug. 2010)

Reconciliation- an incremental
process…2010
 Thousands of militants in Afghn who were
promised amnesties in return for laying down
their weapons claim they are still being harassed
& have not been given any job & their areas
have not been rebuilt. No investment done.
Govt has reneged on all promises. So they
have to return to violence.
 “Peace process giving them unrealistic
expectations”.

US forces withdrawal- Aug 10
 Plan A- Incremental withdrawal
 Plan B- Precipitated withdrawal…dangerous
 50000 soldiers or so may be required for long
term in Afghn.
 Security responsibility has to be transferred first
to Afghn forces, may be distt by distt or
province by province according to conditions
(transition responsibility)

Lisbon conference, Nov 2010
 NATO future ?….
 Afghanistan future?….

/
 Manufactured Hysteria - War of Terror

 Toner Terror Threataganda Pushed by
Western Powers

Mar 2011
 Is America serious to talk to Taliban?
 In Vietnam it took 5 years to complete
negotiations (1968-73)
 Afghan war (1979-88)- a tedious process of
dialogue conducted by UN
 20 Taliban leaders, who have been de-listed as
terrorists by UN, visited US…
 Taliban- diverse groups…

Exit strategy
 Is US heading towards an exit strategy in Afghanistan?
The whole world is curious about this. It is a general
perception that America is facing a defeat in
Afghanistan.
 training the national army and improving the national
police can be one way of the exit strategy that America
is working on.
 Problems relating to governance and corruption are
also the key issues of the same exit strategy.
 Afghan national security forces, improvement in the
economic condition and capacity building of Afghan
forces are also areas of concern.

.
 President Hamid Karzai’s government lacks the
capacity to govern and needs to take action to
rein in corruption. That is solely resented by
Afghans.

.
 Nato chief: quick exit from Afghanistan will
unleash 'global jihad'
 Withdrawing from Afghanistan too quickly
would allow al-Qaeda to return and launch a
“global jihad” against the West, the head of
Nato has warned.

.
 The strategic policies of the US vis a vis Pakistan and
Afghanistan seem to be a conundrum.
 Afghanistan is currently facing a stalemate both
politically and economically.
 The foreign policy experts also meditate over the
repercussions that the political unrest in Afghanistan
may continue to have a spill over effect in Pakistan?
Does it relate to creating instability in Pakistan also? It
will pose most daunted problems and challenges for
US. President Barak Obama now is therefore strongly
convinced that the strategic policy of Washington
towards Afghanistan should be adaptable and flexible.

.
 The war in Afghanistan can threaten
Pakistani security situation also. The arms,
militants and so-called jihadis can enter Pakistan.
Secondly more and more Afghan refugees can find safe
havens in Pakistan especially Balochistan. Pakistan must
also have a clear agenda when Washington is showing a
soft corner. Pakistan is facing severe economic crisis.
Its areas like economic assistance, capacity building of
army, Afghanistan strategy and aid with reference to
insurgency should be addressed

Global War Terror.ppt

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