This document summarizes key points from a paper on how complex systems fail. It discusses that complex systems are inherently hazardous due to multiple potential failure points, but have many defensive layers that generally prevent failures. It notes that catastrophes occur when small, disconnected failures combine in unexpected ways. Complex systems also constantly operate with some degraded functionality and latent failures, requiring operators to adapt over time to changing conditions in order to maintain safety.
This document discusses using the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) approach to stimulate commercial spaceflight capabilities and achieve low-cost access to space. The NACA successfully built a world-leading aeronautics industry in the US in the early 20th century by partnering with government agencies and industry, conducting broad research, and openly publishing results without picking specific winners. The document argues NASA could adopt this approach of building an entire commercial space industry through partnerships and by addressing priority technical needs, rather than centrally-planning programs to pick winners. This may help achieve the Obama Administration's goal of stimulating commercial spaceflight where previous large, centrally-planned programs have failed.
This document discusses the importance of strengthening the connection between technical and financial managers on projects. Traditionally, these managers operate independently with the technical manager focused on requirements and the financial manager on funding. However, this can lead to problems like cost overruns, missed deadlines, and inconsistent information. To overcome these issues, the document recommends that the managers improve communication, develop a trusting relationship, work together on reviews, and share basic knowledge so technical changes are assessed for their budget impacts and funding issues are addressed jointly. Regular communication and cooperation between these critical roles is needed for a project's success.
The goal of implementing Earned Value Management (EVM) in the EVA Systems Project Office (ESPO) was to utilize existing products and processes where possible to make them compatible with EVM. The presentation covered the Work Breakdown Structure, Organizational Breakdown Structure, Responsibility Assignment Matrix, Control Accounts, Work Packages, Planning Packages, Integrated Master Plan, and schedule integration using Primavera and Deltek Cobra tools. It also discussed interfaces with other processes and EVM integration with the prime contractor.
This document discusses trends in project management (PM) and systems engineering (SE) costs for NASA space missions. It finds that PM and SE costs have been increasing over time as a percentage of total mission costs, driven by factors like increasing technical complexity, scale of projects, and specialization. Data is presented showing trends in PM and SE costs for NASA-funded APL space missions and other NASA robotic missions from 1996-2018. While instrument management costs have declined for some missions since 2002, overall the data indicates PM and SE costs are growing and additional resources are needed to ensure project success in the current environment.
This document summarizes a presentation about lessons learned from NASA's Stardust comet sample return mission. The Stardust mission returned the first solid samples from a comet in 2006. Key lessons included the value of detailed pre-flight measurements and instrumentation that were not included due to budget and schedule constraints. Future missions could benefit from more proactive "planning for learning" approaches rather than just reactive "lessons learned." Careful recovery operations are also important for preserving samples and data about the heatshield's condition upon reentry.
This document discusses integrated predictive performance management as a method for effective project management. It involves developing an integrated baseline for technical scope, schedule, and budget that serves as a shared plan. Performance is measured by comparing work completed to the baseline. This allows for predicting future performance and taking early actions to positively impact outcomes. Benefits include integrated performance measurement, a disciplined planning methodology, and improved visibility, accountability, and risk management. The key is for projects to own their baselines which are then status reported and maintained through a change control process.
The document discusses integrated architecture assessments for future crewed missions to the moon. It summarizes:
1) Experience has shown integrated architecture assessments are crucial to establish stable configurations that meet performance, cost and risk goals.
2) The analyses allow for mission-level trades to ensure efficient vehicle designs, allocation of design margins, and elimination of overlooked elements.
3) Preliminary analyses indicate the Ares V 51.0.47 and 51.0.48 concepts with the Altair lunar lander can achieve global access to the lunar surface through trades of delta-V, low lunar orbit loiter time, and temporal availability over the lunar nodal cycle.
This document summarizes key points from a paper on how complex systems fail. It discusses that complex systems are inherently hazardous due to multiple potential failure points, but have many defensive layers that generally prevent failures. It notes that catastrophes occur when small, disconnected failures combine in unexpected ways. Complex systems also constantly operate with some degraded functionality and latent failures, requiring operators to adapt over time to changing conditions in order to maintain safety.
This document discusses using the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) approach to stimulate commercial spaceflight capabilities and achieve low-cost access to space. The NACA successfully built a world-leading aeronautics industry in the US in the early 20th century by partnering with government agencies and industry, conducting broad research, and openly publishing results without picking specific winners. The document argues NASA could adopt this approach of building an entire commercial space industry through partnerships and by addressing priority technical needs, rather than centrally-planning programs to pick winners. This may help achieve the Obama Administration's goal of stimulating commercial spaceflight where previous large, centrally-planned programs have failed.
This document discusses the importance of strengthening the connection between technical and financial managers on projects. Traditionally, these managers operate independently with the technical manager focused on requirements and the financial manager on funding. However, this can lead to problems like cost overruns, missed deadlines, and inconsistent information. To overcome these issues, the document recommends that the managers improve communication, develop a trusting relationship, work together on reviews, and share basic knowledge so technical changes are assessed for their budget impacts and funding issues are addressed jointly. Regular communication and cooperation between these critical roles is needed for a project's success.
The goal of implementing Earned Value Management (EVM) in the EVA Systems Project Office (ESPO) was to utilize existing products and processes where possible to make them compatible with EVM. The presentation covered the Work Breakdown Structure, Organizational Breakdown Structure, Responsibility Assignment Matrix, Control Accounts, Work Packages, Planning Packages, Integrated Master Plan, and schedule integration using Primavera and Deltek Cobra tools. It also discussed interfaces with other processes and EVM integration with the prime contractor.
This document discusses trends in project management (PM) and systems engineering (SE) costs for NASA space missions. It finds that PM and SE costs have been increasing over time as a percentage of total mission costs, driven by factors like increasing technical complexity, scale of projects, and specialization. Data is presented showing trends in PM and SE costs for NASA-funded APL space missions and other NASA robotic missions from 1996-2018. While instrument management costs have declined for some missions since 2002, overall the data indicates PM and SE costs are growing and additional resources are needed to ensure project success in the current environment.
This document summarizes a presentation about lessons learned from NASA's Stardust comet sample return mission. The Stardust mission returned the first solid samples from a comet in 2006. Key lessons included the value of detailed pre-flight measurements and instrumentation that were not included due to budget and schedule constraints. Future missions could benefit from more proactive "planning for learning" approaches rather than just reactive "lessons learned." Careful recovery operations are also important for preserving samples and data about the heatshield's condition upon reentry.
This document discusses integrated predictive performance management as a method for effective project management. It involves developing an integrated baseline for technical scope, schedule, and budget that serves as a shared plan. Performance is measured by comparing work completed to the baseline. This allows for predicting future performance and taking early actions to positively impact outcomes. Benefits include integrated performance measurement, a disciplined planning methodology, and improved visibility, accountability, and risk management. The key is for projects to own their baselines which are then status reported and maintained through a change control process.
The document discusses integrated architecture assessments for future crewed missions to the moon. It summarizes:
1) Experience has shown integrated architecture assessments are crucial to establish stable configurations that meet performance, cost and risk goals.
2) The analyses allow for mission-level trades to ensure efficient vehicle designs, allocation of design margins, and elimination of overlooked elements.
3) Preliminary analyses indicate the Ares V 51.0.47 and 51.0.48 concepts with the Altair lunar lander can achieve global access to the lunar surface through trades of delta-V, low lunar orbit loiter time, and temporal availability over the lunar nodal cycle.
The document summarizes lessons learned from international partnerships between agencies like NASA and ESA. It discusses that successful partnerships require:
1) Early and clear definition of project baselines and interfaces to avoid surprises
2) Regular communication and recognition of differences in processes between agencies
3) Involving various capacities beyond just project management like external relations and legal
International cooperation for projects like the International Space Station require managing political changes that can impact programs and diplomatic skills to manage relationships between equal partners. Flexibility and understanding are essential for international exploration partnerships.
The document discusses the development of requirements for a vehicle through model-based systems engineering. It provides examples of models that can be used to capture a vehicle's operational concept, including a design reference mission diagram, a phase model, and an activity model. The models aim to depict how the vehicle and crew interact during different mission activities and phases to achieve objectives. They are used to identify vehicle capabilities and functions needed to implement the operational concept.
The document provides an integrated master schedule (IMS) for the Ares I-X flight test. It lists the IMS manager and project integration manager. The IMS details activities for various elements from 2008 to 2009, including delivery dates for components to the assembly facility and timelines for assembly, integration testing, and launch. The overall schedule aims to provide 60 days of margin and reduce rework through integrated planning.
The document summarizes the goals and approach of the Software Architecture Review Board (SARB). The SARB aims to help NASA missions achieve higher reliability and cost savings by managing flight software complexity through better software architecture. It will do this by engaging with flight projects in the early stages of software architecture development to provide constructive feedback. The board will also help spread best practices across NASA and contribute to lessons learned. The summary discusses the typical architecture review process used, including preparation, meetings, and follow-up reports. It also outlines common issues identified in reviews and perceived impediments to software architecture at NASA.
The document discusses influencing culture change within an organization. It outlines a process that includes initial planning, establishing a framework, rollout, and making the change stick. The process is then illustrated through an example of restructuring a NASA safety and mission assurance division during the transition away from the space shuttle program. The case study describes dreaming up a new vision, analyzing roles and structure, communicating the changes, and taking actions to continually reinforce the new culture.
The NASA Schedule Management Handbook provides guidance on developing and maintaining an integrated master schedule for NASA projects. It outlines roles and responsibilities, considerations for schedule management tools, and processes for pre-schedule development, developing the integrated master schedule, and ongoing status updates and maintenance. The handbook aims to help project managers and teams adhere to NASA requirements for sound schedule management practices.
The document discusses NASA's technology protection program, which aims to identify and protect mission critical information (MCI) from foreign threats. It outlines the technology protection process, which involves assessing technologies to identify MCI, evaluating vulnerabilities, selecting initial and final controls, and developing implementation plans. The process is facilitated by the Technology Protection Working Group and aims to balance security with continued information sharing and the NASA mission.
This document discusses keys to making virtual communication work. It begins with an overview of communication challenges in general and for virtual teams specifically. It then provides tips for virtual teams such as establishing clear standards and norms, developing team charters, communicating vision and goals effectively, understanding different communication styles, and using structures like TREOA for presentations. The document concludes with references for further resources on virtual team management.
NASA is transforming its aging facility portfolio into next generation centers through a strategic renewal process using the Kotter change model. The agency established a sense of urgency around renewing assets as 40% will be over 40 years old. A powerful guiding coalition was formed including agency leadership, center leadership, and project teams. A vision of renewing and modernizing facilities to sustain capabilities in efficient facilities was created. Communication of the vision and empowering others to act through center master plans and project teams is occurring. Short term wins are planned through visible renewal projects that expand stakeholder buy-in and consolidate improvements to further transform the agency's facilities portfolio.
The document discusses systems engineering challenges and opportunities, including:
1) Growing mission complexity is exceeding our ability to manage risk, and system designs emerge from pieces rather than sound architectures, resulting in brittle systems.
2) Technical and programmatic sides of projects are poorly coupled, hampering decision making and increasing risk.
3) Too much focus on process comes at the expense of design quality, driving up costs and risk.
The document proposes addressing these with model-based systems engineering, architecture frameworks, and integrating technical and programmatic considerations through architecture.
This document discusses how to apply systems engineering principles to small, fast-paced projects with limited resources. It recommends tailoring systems engineering processes by deciding in advance how key elements will be addressed rather than questioning if they will be addressed. Checklists from NASA standards can help ensure critical items are considered. Organizational support, collaboration, and focused peer reviews are also important enablers.
This document discusses important considerations for forming effective project teams. It emphasizes selecting the right team members, establishing a shared vision and goals, clarifying roles and expectations, and ensuring the team understands its purpose. Specifically, it recommends selecting candidates based on their knowledge, skills, and abilities; developing a mission statement to guide the team's work; setting SMART goals to facilitate success; defining each member's responsibilities; and discussing the team's objectives during formation to set the stage for high performance. Forming the team carefully at the outset is critical to setting the foundation for successful collaboration.
The document discusses building communities of engineers to share technical expertise. It describes how NASA has established communities of practice on the NASA Engineering Network to facilitate knowledge sharing across distributed engineering disciplines. Specifically, it provides examples of communities of practice in fault management and autonomous rendezvous and docking that bring together experts from across NASA to collaborate on challenges in those fields.
The document discusses the systems engineering approach applied to the SOFIA program to address issues and help make it successful. It describes assessing the program's SE&I and identifying deficiencies. An incremental development approach was taken, breaking the work into phases. This allowed requirements and SE activities to catch up over time while continuing development and obtaining early science data for support. Risk management was also emphasized through identifying and tracking priority risks.
NASA is working to foster innovation and commercial partnerships through its Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP). IPP provides funding, expertise, facilities, and partnerships to advance technologies that can help achieve NASA's mission. It supports programs like SBIR/STTR that fund hundreds of small businesses annually, as well as seed funds, technology incubators, and prizes that leverage external resources to develop game-changing technologies. The goal is to bridge the gap between research and operational use, and to stimulate innovation that benefits both NASA and private industry.
This document discusses the use of social media at NASA. It begins with an introduction to social media, defining it as internet-based applications that allow for the rapid creation and sharing of user-generated content. The document then discusses the relevance of social media for NASA projects and individuals. It provides examples of NASA's use of three major social media platforms: Twitter, Facebook, and blogs. It describes how NASA utilizes each platform and the benefits they provide for sharing information with the public. The document aims to demonstrate how NASA advocates for the use of social media to further engagement and outreach goals.
The NASA Schedule Management Handbook provides guidance on developing and maintaining an integrated master schedule for NASA projects. It outlines roles and responsibilities, considerations for schedule management tools, and processes for pre-schedule development, developing the integrated master schedule, and ongoing status updates and maintenance. The handbook aims to help project managers and teams adhere to NASA requirements for sound schedule management practices.
The SOFIA program was undergoing a replan and development phase while also having to address multiple new planning requirements and initiatives. This presented a juggling act challenge of managing everything simultaneously without impacting technical progress. The program leveraged existing functional groups and integrated new processes like a threat database to help sequence and prioritize new requirements. This allowed the program to focus on key priorities like flight testing while still addressing other reviews and audits. Coordinating across groups through techniques like tossing "balls" back and forth helped integrate schedules, budgets, and risk management to help manage the many moving parts.
This document summarizes a human factors engineering pathfinder activity for improving ground system designs. It discusses the importance of considering ground crew factors in system design. Sessions were held with design teams to identify human factors issues. Recommendations focused on improving workspaces, accessibility, controls and reducing potential for errors. The activity found that applying human factors principles early in design can help create safer, more usable ground systems.
The document discusses an update to NASA's software engineering requirements in NPR 7150.2. It provides an overview of the topics to be covered, including the NPD/NPR architecture, lessons learned from the previous NPR, updates to NPR 7150.2, and future work. It then summarizes lessons learned from developing the original NPR 7150.2, such as forming a strong core team, selecting the target audience wisely, understanding where the NPR fits in directives, setting inclusion/exclusion criteria early, and getting professional help. The document outlines changes between the 2004 and 2009 versions, including some added and deleted requirements. It concludes by noting innovations incorporated in the updated NPR 7150.2
The document compares the operational complexity and costs of the Space Shuttle versus the Sea Launch Zenit rocket. [1] The Space Shuttle was designed for performance but not operational efficiency, resulting in costly ground, mission planning, and flight operations. [2] In contrast, the Zenit rocket was designed from the start to have automated and robust processes to keep operations simple and costs low. [3] The key lesson is that designing a launch system with operational requirements in mind from the beginning leads to much more efficient operations long-term.
The document provides an overview of project management and procurement at NASA. It discusses the key skills required for project managers, including acquisition management. It notes that 80-85% of NASA's budget is spent on contracts, and procurement processes are complex and constantly changing. The document outlines some common contract types and how they allocate risk between the government and contractor. It also discusses the relationship between contracting officers and project managers, and how successful procurement requires effective communication rather than direct control or authority.
The document summarizes lessons learned from international partnerships between agencies like NASA and ESA. It discusses that successful partnerships require:
1) Early and clear definition of project baselines and interfaces to avoid surprises
2) Regular communication and recognition of differences in processes between agencies
3) Involving various capacities beyond just project management like external relations and legal
International cooperation for projects like the International Space Station require managing political changes that can impact programs and diplomatic skills to manage relationships between equal partners. Flexibility and understanding are essential for international exploration partnerships.
The document discusses the development of requirements for a vehicle through model-based systems engineering. It provides examples of models that can be used to capture a vehicle's operational concept, including a design reference mission diagram, a phase model, and an activity model. The models aim to depict how the vehicle and crew interact during different mission activities and phases to achieve objectives. They are used to identify vehicle capabilities and functions needed to implement the operational concept.
The document provides an integrated master schedule (IMS) for the Ares I-X flight test. It lists the IMS manager and project integration manager. The IMS details activities for various elements from 2008 to 2009, including delivery dates for components to the assembly facility and timelines for assembly, integration testing, and launch. The overall schedule aims to provide 60 days of margin and reduce rework through integrated planning.
The document summarizes the goals and approach of the Software Architecture Review Board (SARB). The SARB aims to help NASA missions achieve higher reliability and cost savings by managing flight software complexity through better software architecture. It will do this by engaging with flight projects in the early stages of software architecture development to provide constructive feedback. The board will also help spread best practices across NASA and contribute to lessons learned. The summary discusses the typical architecture review process used, including preparation, meetings, and follow-up reports. It also outlines common issues identified in reviews and perceived impediments to software architecture at NASA.
The document discusses influencing culture change within an organization. It outlines a process that includes initial planning, establishing a framework, rollout, and making the change stick. The process is then illustrated through an example of restructuring a NASA safety and mission assurance division during the transition away from the space shuttle program. The case study describes dreaming up a new vision, analyzing roles and structure, communicating the changes, and taking actions to continually reinforce the new culture.
The NASA Schedule Management Handbook provides guidance on developing and maintaining an integrated master schedule for NASA projects. It outlines roles and responsibilities, considerations for schedule management tools, and processes for pre-schedule development, developing the integrated master schedule, and ongoing status updates and maintenance. The handbook aims to help project managers and teams adhere to NASA requirements for sound schedule management practices.
The document discusses NASA's technology protection program, which aims to identify and protect mission critical information (MCI) from foreign threats. It outlines the technology protection process, which involves assessing technologies to identify MCI, evaluating vulnerabilities, selecting initial and final controls, and developing implementation plans. The process is facilitated by the Technology Protection Working Group and aims to balance security with continued information sharing and the NASA mission.
This document discusses keys to making virtual communication work. It begins with an overview of communication challenges in general and for virtual teams specifically. It then provides tips for virtual teams such as establishing clear standards and norms, developing team charters, communicating vision and goals effectively, understanding different communication styles, and using structures like TREOA for presentations. The document concludes with references for further resources on virtual team management.
NASA is transforming its aging facility portfolio into next generation centers through a strategic renewal process using the Kotter change model. The agency established a sense of urgency around renewing assets as 40% will be over 40 years old. A powerful guiding coalition was formed including agency leadership, center leadership, and project teams. A vision of renewing and modernizing facilities to sustain capabilities in efficient facilities was created. Communication of the vision and empowering others to act through center master plans and project teams is occurring. Short term wins are planned through visible renewal projects that expand stakeholder buy-in and consolidate improvements to further transform the agency's facilities portfolio.
The document discusses systems engineering challenges and opportunities, including:
1) Growing mission complexity is exceeding our ability to manage risk, and system designs emerge from pieces rather than sound architectures, resulting in brittle systems.
2) Technical and programmatic sides of projects are poorly coupled, hampering decision making and increasing risk.
3) Too much focus on process comes at the expense of design quality, driving up costs and risk.
The document proposes addressing these with model-based systems engineering, architecture frameworks, and integrating technical and programmatic considerations through architecture.
This document discusses how to apply systems engineering principles to small, fast-paced projects with limited resources. It recommends tailoring systems engineering processes by deciding in advance how key elements will be addressed rather than questioning if they will be addressed. Checklists from NASA standards can help ensure critical items are considered. Organizational support, collaboration, and focused peer reviews are also important enablers.
This document discusses important considerations for forming effective project teams. It emphasizes selecting the right team members, establishing a shared vision and goals, clarifying roles and expectations, and ensuring the team understands its purpose. Specifically, it recommends selecting candidates based on their knowledge, skills, and abilities; developing a mission statement to guide the team's work; setting SMART goals to facilitate success; defining each member's responsibilities; and discussing the team's objectives during formation to set the stage for high performance. Forming the team carefully at the outset is critical to setting the foundation for successful collaboration.
The document discusses building communities of engineers to share technical expertise. It describes how NASA has established communities of practice on the NASA Engineering Network to facilitate knowledge sharing across distributed engineering disciplines. Specifically, it provides examples of communities of practice in fault management and autonomous rendezvous and docking that bring together experts from across NASA to collaborate on challenges in those fields.
The document discusses the systems engineering approach applied to the SOFIA program to address issues and help make it successful. It describes assessing the program's SE&I and identifying deficiencies. An incremental development approach was taken, breaking the work into phases. This allowed requirements and SE activities to catch up over time while continuing development and obtaining early science data for support. Risk management was also emphasized through identifying and tracking priority risks.
NASA is working to foster innovation and commercial partnerships through its Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP). IPP provides funding, expertise, facilities, and partnerships to advance technologies that can help achieve NASA's mission. It supports programs like SBIR/STTR that fund hundreds of small businesses annually, as well as seed funds, technology incubators, and prizes that leverage external resources to develop game-changing technologies. The goal is to bridge the gap between research and operational use, and to stimulate innovation that benefits both NASA and private industry.
This document discusses the use of social media at NASA. It begins with an introduction to social media, defining it as internet-based applications that allow for the rapid creation and sharing of user-generated content. The document then discusses the relevance of social media for NASA projects and individuals. It provides examples of NASA's use of three major social media platforms: Twitter, Facebook, and blogs. It describes how NASA utilizes each platform and the benefits they provide for sharing information with the public. The document aims to demonstrate how NASA advocates for the use of social media to further engagement and outreach goals.
The NASA Schedule Management Handbook provides guidance on developing and maintaining an integrated master schedule for NASA projects. It outlines roles and responsibilities, considerations for schedule management tools, and processes for pre-schedule development, developing the integrated master schedule, and ongoing status updates and maintenance. The handbook aims to help project managers and teams adhere to NASA requirements for sound schedule management practices.
The SOFIA program was undergoing a replan and development phase while also having to address multiple new planning requirements and initiatives. This presented a juggling act challenge of managing everything simultaneously without impacting technical progress. The program leveraged existing functional groups and integrated new processes like a threat database to help sequence and prioritize new requirements. This allowed the program to focus on key priorities like flight testing while still addressing other reviews and audits. Coordinating across groups through techniques like tossing "balls" back and forth helped integrate schedules, budgets, and risk management to help manage the many moving parts.
This document summarizes a human factors engineering pathfinder activity for improving ground system designs. It discusses the importance of considering ground crew factors in system design. Sessions were held with design teams to identify human factors issues. Recommendations focused on improving workspaces, accessibility, controls and reducing potential for errors. The activity found that applying human factors principles early in design can help create safer, more usable ground systems.
The document discusses an update to NASA's software engineering requirements in NPR 7150.2. It provides an overview of the topics to be covered, including the NPD/NPR architecture, lessons learned from the previous NPR, updates to NPR 7150.2, and future work. It then summarizes lessons learned from developing the original NPR 7150.2, such as forming a strong core team, selecting the target audience wisely, understanding where the NPR fits in directives, setting inclusion/exclusion criteria early, and getting professional help. The document outlines changes between the 2004 and 2009 versions, including some added and deleted requirements. It concludes by noting innovations incorporated in the updated NPR 7150.2
The document compares the operational complexity and costs of the Space Shuttle versus the Sea Launch Zenit rocket. [1] The Space Shuttle was designed for performance but not operational efficiency, resulting in costly ground, mission planning, and flight operations. [2] In contrast, the Zenit rocket was designed from the start to have automated and robust processes to keep operations simple and costs low. [3] The key lesson is that designing a launch system with operational requirements in mind from the beginning leads to much more efficient operations long-term.
The document provides an overview of project management and procurement at NASA. It discusses the key skills required for project managers, including acquisition management. It notes that 80-85% of NASA's budget is spent on contracts, and procurement processes are complex and constantly changing. The document outlines some common contract types and how they allocate risk between the government and contractor. It also discusses the relationship between contracting officers and project managers, and how successful procurement requires effective communication rather than direct control or authority.
The document introduces the NASA Engineering Network (NEN), which was created by the Office of the Chief Engineer to be a knowledge management system connecting NASA's engineering community. The NEN integrates various tools like a content management system, search engine, and collaboration tools. It provides access to key knowledge resources like NASA's Lessons Learned database and engineering databases. The NEN is working to expand by adding more communities, engineering disciplines, and knowledge repositories.
Laptops were first used in space in 1983 on the Space Shuttle, when Commander John Young brought the GRiD Compass portable computer on STS-9. Laptops are now widely used on the Space Shuttle and International Space Station for tasks like monitoring spacecraft systems, tracking satellites, inventory management, procedures viewing, and videoconferencing. Managing laptops in space presents challenges around cooling, power, and software/hardware compatibility in the harsh space environment.
Laptops were first used in space in 1983 on the Space Shuttle, when Commander John Young brought the GRiD Compass portable computer on STS-9. Laptops are now widely used on the Space Shuttle and International Space Station for tasks like monitoring spacecraft systems, planning rendezvous and proximity operations, inventory management, procedure reviews, and communication between space and ground via software like WorldMap and DOUG. Managing laptops in space presents challenges around hardware durability, cooling, and software/data management in the space environment.
This document discusses the use of market-based systems to allocate scarce resources for NASA missions and projects. It provides examples of how market-based approaches were used for instrument development for the Cassini mission, manifesting secondary payloads on the space shuttle, and mission planning for the LightSAR Earth imaging satellite project. The document finds that these applications of market-based allocation benefited or could have benefited from a decentralized, incentive-based approach compared to traditional centralized planning methods. However, it notes that resistance to new approaches and loss of managerial control are barriers to adoption of market-based systems.
The Stardust mission collected samples from comet Wild 2 and interstellar dust particles. It launched in February 1999 and encountered Wild 2 in January 2004, collecting dust samples in aerogel. It returned the samples to Earth safely in January 2006. The spacecraft used an innovative Whipple shield to protect itself from comet dust impacts during the encounter. Analysis of the Stardust samples has provided insights about comet composition and the early solar system.
This document discusses solutions for integrating schedules on NASA programs. It introduces Stuart Trahan's company, which provides Earned Value Management (EVM) solutions using Microsoft Office Project that comply with OMB and ANSI requirements. It also introduces a partner company, Pinnacle Management Systems, that specializes in enterprise project management solutions including EVM, project portfolio management, and enterprise project resource management, with experience in the aerospace, defense, and other industries. The document defines schedule integration and describes some methods including importing to a centralized Primavera database for review or using Primavera ProjectLink for updates, and challenges including inconsistent data formats and levels of detail across sub-schedules.
The document discusses NASA's implementation of earned value management (EVM) across its Constellation Program to coordinate work across multiple teams. It outlines the organizational structure, current target groups, and an EVM training suite. It also summarizes lessons learned and the need for project/center collaboration to integrate schedules horizontally and vertically.
This document summarizes a presentation about systems engineering processes for principle investigator (PI) mode missions. It discusses how PI missions face special challenges due to cost caps and lower technology readiness levels. It then outlines various systems engineering techniques used for PI missions, including safety compliance, organizational communication, design tools, requirements management, and lessons learned from past missions. Specific case studies from NASA's Explorers Program Office are provided as examples.
This document discusses changes to NASA's business practices for managing projects, including adopting a new acquisition strategy approach and implementing planning, programming, and budget execution (PPBE). The new acquisition strategy involves additional approval meetings at the strategic planning and project levels to better integrate acquisition with strategic and budgetary planning. PPBE focuses on analyzing programs and infrastructure to align with strategic goals and answer whether proposed programs will help achieve NASA's mission. The document also notes improvements in funds distribution and inter-center transfers, reducing the time for these processes from several weeks to only a few days.
Spaceflight Project Security: Terrestrial and On-Orbit/Mission
The document discusses security challenges for spaceflight projects, including protecting space assets from disruption, exploitation, or attack. It highlights national space policy principles of protecting space capabilities. It also discusses trends in cyber threats, including the increasing capabilities of adversaries and how even unskilled attackers can compromise terrestrial support systems linked to space assets if defenses are not strong. Protecting space projects requires awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, and strategies to defend, restore, and increase situational awareness of space assets and supporting systems.
Humor can positively impact many aspects of project management. It can improve communication, aid in team building, help detect team morale issues, and influence leadership, conflict management, negotiation, motivation, and problem solving. While humor has benefits, it also has risks and not all uses of humor are positive. Future research is needed on humor in multicultural teams, its relationship to team performance, how humor is learned, and determining optimal "doses" of humor. In conclusion, humor is a tool that can influence people and projects, but must be used carefully and spontaneously for best effect.
The recovery of Space Shuttle Columbia after its loss in 2003 involved a massive multi-agency effort to search a wide debris field, recover crew remains and evidence, and compensate local communities. Over 25,000 people searched over 680,000 acres, recovering 38% of Columbia's weight. Extensive engineering investigations were conducted to identify the causes of failure and implement changes to allow the safe return to flight of Discovery in 2005.
This document summarizes research on enhancing safety culture at NASA. It describes a survey developed to assess NASA's safety culture based on principles of high reliability organizations. The survey was tailored specifically for NASA and has been implemented to provide feedback and identify areas for improvement. It allows NASA to benchmark its safety culture within and across other industries pursuing high reliability.
This document summarizes a presentation about project management challenges at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. The presentation outlines a vision for anomaly management, including establishing consistent problem reporting and analysis processes across all missions. It describes the current problem management approach, which lacks centralized information sharing. The presentation aims to close this gap by implementing online problem reporting and trend analysis tools to extract lessons learned across missions over time. This will help improve spacecraft design and operations based on ongoing anomaly experiences.
This document discusses leveraging scheduling productivity with practical scheduling techniques. It addresses scheduling issues such as unwieldy schedule databases and faulty logic. It then discusses taming the schedule beast through using a scheduler's toolkit, schedule templates, codes to manipulate MS Project data, common views/filters/tables, limiting constraints, and other best practices. The document provides examples of using codes and custom views/filters to effectively organize and display schedule information.
This document describes Ball Aerospace's implementation of a Life Cycle and Gated Milestone (LCGM) process to improve program planning, execution, and control across its diverse portfolio. The LCGM provides a standardized yet flexible framework that maps out program activities and products across phases. It was developed through cross-functional collaboration and introduced gradually across programs while allowing flexibility. Initial results showed the LCGM supported improved planning and management while aligning with Ball Aerospace's entrepreneurial culture.
This document discusses the importance of situation awareness (SA) for project team members. It defines SA as having three levels: perception of elements in the current situation, comprehension of the current situation, and projection of the future status. Good team SA is achieved by turning individual SAs into shared SA through communication. Teams with strong SA prepare more, focus on comprehending and projecting, and maintain awareness through techniques like questioning assumptions and seeking additional information.
This document discusses theories of leadership and how a project manager's leadership style may impact project success depending on the type of project. It outlines early hypotheses that a PM's competence, including leadership style, is a success factor on projects. It presents a research model linking PM leadership competencies to project success, moderated by factors like project type. Initial interviews found that leadership style is more important on complex projects, and different competencies are needed depending on if a project is technical or involves change. Certain competencies like communication skills and cultural sensitivity were seen as important for different project types and contexts.