The Islamic State (IS)

The Islamic State (IS): An Exploration of What IS is and How It Can Be Stopped 1
The Islamic State (IS):
An Exploration of What IS is
and How It Can Be Stopped
Amanda K. Rauh
Oklahoma State University

Abstract
This paper explores the events that led up to the formation of IS, who IS is, what they believe,
what their goals are, and how this dangerous extremist terrorist group might be dismantled. I will
primarily refer to this radical terrorist group as IS, but in some texts, they may still be referred to
as ISIS or ISIL. ISIS stands for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham. ISIL means Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Levant is a historical term for the region
around Syria, and it includes Lebanon, Israel, Palestine and Jordan. Da’ish is the Arabic-derived
term that the French government uses, which is shorthand for the full Arabic name for the
Islamic State group, al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa ash-Sham. IS stands for Islamic State
(Ross, September 23, 2014). Throughout this paper, I will examine IS in relation to previous
terrorist groups, look at its goals, and provide countermeasures that have been proposed, from
both military and non-military viewpoints.

The Factors Leading to the Formation of IS
IS is committing mass atrocities in the Middle East in the name of Islam. Yet Muslims
are the majority of their victims. According to recent UN reports, in the first eight months of
2014, at least 24,000 civilians were injured or killed. As of August 2014, an estimated 1.8
million Iraqis had been displaced by the ongoing violence, largely caused by IS (OHCHR, 2014).
The number of dead in Syria’s civil war more than doubled in the past year to at least 191,000
since IS has taken control of the region (Cumming-Bruce, 2014). As the United States and much
of the rest of the world has become increasingly aware, IS has become a significant power.
IS is classified as a religious terrorist group even though most Muslims uphold that this
group does not uphold Islamic principles. For example, IS claims that their movement is part of
jihad, as outlined by the Quran, even though fundamental Islamic principles say that one can
only wage violence if being fought, or killed, or if there is religious persecution. Furthermore,
the enemy is supposed to be informed, one cannot fight non-combatants, one must have
legitimacy, and there is to be no looting or plundering (Duff-Toft, et. al, 2011). IS abides by
none of these principles. IS proclaims their legitimacy comes from Allah, but regardless of their
claims, most Muslims completely denounce IS.
For years, the media has portrayed Islamic terrorists—any terrorists actually--as irrational
extremists who commit indiscriminate acts without any larger goal, but the evidence suggests
otherwise. Most terrorist attacks are carefully calculated, and the terrorists have clear
motivations and goals that they are trying to achieve. This is the case with IS as we will
demonstrate.

When IS formed, according to Berger, they were initially acting in a way quite similar to
Mohammad and his followers, regarding conversion to Islam (2014). It seemed they extended
the traditional protection to Christians since they are “People of the Book”. They had the option
to pay a poll tax, convert, or they would be executed. The new IS authorities changed their
minds, however, and now there are these three options: conversion to Radical Islam, exile or
execution (2014).
As Bruce Hoffman states, in his book Inside Terrorism, “Terrorism is designed to create
power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little” (2006, p. 41).
Failed states are an easy target for such terrorism. There was a perfect environment for IS to rise
to power, and to gain support, in the form of easy territory to capture in failing states, and gain
quick access to financing. At this time of writing, people are still joining in significant numbers.
According to The Economist, IS originated as an offshoot of Al-Qaeda (2014). The Frontline
documentary, “The Rise of ISIS,” notes that al-Qaeda had previously been decimated, and the
force that remained was the most battle-hardened al-Qaeda militants—“A collection of very
hardened killers” (Frontline, October 28, 2014). Then there was a complete breakdown of the
state in Syria, and they were able to operate once again.
Syria is what made ISIS, ISIS in the 2011-2012 timeframe. Nouri Al-Maliki, former
Prime Minister of Iraq, was purging many Sunnis in Iraq in their regions, which greatly helped
ISIS’s message to gain traction with the Syrian Sunnis, who were looking to wage a war against
the Syrian regime. Another major factor that helped IS, was former members of an old power in
the country—Saddam Hussein’s former Baath Party and his Army (Fadel, 2014). They were
well trained and they knew the territory. “Assistance is also coming from smaller groupings of
Saddam loyalists from the old military and security apparatus, men who are valued for the

tactical experience and intelligence-gathering they perfected under Saddam's iron-fisted rule.”
(2014). These factors made them perfect candidates to help IS gain more territory and power.
Interestingly, according to former Baath Party military officer as interviewed by Fadel, ISIS is
just the “tip of the iceberg,” and primarily serves as the face of the movement. Furthermore, he
stated that ISIS is but one of the five factions opposing the government. Former Iraqi interior
minister, Falah al-Naqib, agreed with that statement, declaring that ISIS is perhaps no more than
15 percent of the anti-government forces (Fadel, 2014).
The day after the last of the U.S. Army left Iraq, according to the Frontline documentary
The Rise of ISIS, there was a warrant for Hashimi’s arrest (previous moderate Sunni vice-
president of Iraq), and next his bodyguards were tortured. Then thousands of Sunnis suspected
of subversion were arrested and held in prison. Many Sunnis did not even make it to jail, and
were instead killed in the streets of Baghdad.
To provide a bit more background as to why Maliki was purging the Sunnis, many of his
close relatives were arrested and tortured by Saddam’s followers and his Baathist regime, and so
he acted out of fear and paranoia—“the ghost of Saddam Hussein” is how it was referred to in
the video. Shiites replaced Sunnis in many positions the latter had previously held. As a result,
many people felt that they were being excluded, and they were (Frontline, October 28, 2014).
Defining Terrorism

Before one can begin to begin to seek solutions to stopping IS, one must first define what
terrorism is as it applies to IS. The word “terrorism” has been around for centuries. It was first
used to describe the Reign of Terror phase of the French Revolution, which occurred from 1793-
1794 (Love, 2011). The definition of terrorism is constantly evolving, and as such has always
been a challenge to pin down. A general modern definition of terrorism is, “the use of violence
against civilians by non-state actors to attain political goals,” (Kydd & Walter, 2006, p. 52). The
National Institute of Justice defines terrorism as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience.” (September 13, 2011).
The use of the word terrorism is very dependent on which side one is one. For example,
Pakistan considers those fighting for autonomy in Kashmir as freedom fighters, yet India
contends that they are terrorists. Terrorism evokes images of fear, destruction, chaos, and
bloodshed (Hoffman, 2006). Al Qaeda argues that all of the deaths and mass destruction the
United States caused in Iraq against civilian populations were acts of terrorism, as were the
dropping of the atomic bombs in 1945 on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Love, 2011). These
instances, the U.S. would likely refer to as civilian casualties, not acts of terrorism.
Bruce Hoffman, author of Inside Terrorism, believes there are three main categories of
terrorism. There are national liberation or separatist movements, ideologically motivated small
groups, and those tied into a major segment of religious belief or broader ideology. Some
examples of national liberation or separatist movements were the Palestine Liberation
Organization, Kurdish Liberation Movement, and the Irish Republican Army. An example of
ideologically motivated small groups is the Red Brigade. The third category of terrorists can be
described as being tied into a major segment of religious belief or a broader ideology, groups

interested in eradicating those that oppose them (Hoffman, 2006). IS could be classified into all
of these categories, creating a much more lethal brand of terrorist group. IS is described by
many as specifically an Islamic terrorist group. Piazza (2009) explains this as “…terrorist
attacks committed by groups that are primarily motivated by interpretations of Islamic political
principles or by a Muslim religious and communal identity” (p. 64).
Goals of Terrorism
What are the ultimate goals of terrorism? Kydd and Walter list what they believe the five
goals are: territorial change, regime change, social control, status quo maintenance and policy
change (2006). Territorial change, according to Kydd and Walter, is taking territory away from a
state either to establish a new state, or to reclaim old territory. One example would be the Tamil
Tigers, or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE, a guerrilla organization
sought to accomplish territorial change by making Eelam, in northeast Sri Lanka, a Tamil state
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014).
The second ultimate goal of terrorism, according to Kydd and Walter, is regime change.
Regime change is the overthrowing of a government, and the terrorists placing one into power of
their liking. Social control occurs when the behavior of individuals, rather than the state, is
controlled. A good example of this provided by Kydd and Walter is how the Ku Klux Klan
sought to oppress African Americans, even after the Civil War (2006). In this case, there is a
status quo arrangement that supports an existing regime or territorial arrangement against a
political group seeking to change it.
A different category is, “…al-Qaida's demand that the United States drop its support for
Israel and corrupt Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia,” (Kydd & Walter, 2006, p. 53), which is

an example of a status-quo arrangement that the group wants changed. IS has overthrown the
regimes in Iraq and Syria, and have placed themselves in charge. They are using social control,
striving to control the behavior of individuals killing Shiites and anyone who does not ascribe to
the IS form of Islamic fundamentalism.
Unlike previous terrorist groups with less lofty goals, as the example of al-Qaeda’s
demands mentioned above, IS has a plan to establish an entity that recognizes no political
borders. By Salafists declaring the Caliphate that people had to follow, IS did something no
other terrorist group has ever attempted. ISIS is trying to create something that functions
completely as a real state. After the leader of IS gave a sermon in an Iraqi mosque, thousands
more flocked to Syria and Iraq to join them. One of the interviewees in the Frontline
documentary made the statement, “This is the al-Qaeda that Osama bin Laden only dreamed of
building.”
Motivations to Join IS
Research shows that terrorists tend to be young single men. Anderlini, author of Women
Building Peace, noted, “Corruption and repression foment anger and increase the vulnerability of
young people—oftentimes men—to recruitment by militias” (2007, p. 11). There are many
reasons for this, depending on the situation in that region. As was stated in “Rise of ISIS,” youth
unemployment was running as high as 40%...so young men were free to gather (October 28,
2014). Furthermore, as I will go into more detail below, many Sunnis joined ISIS ranks after
Maliki’s massacre of Iraqi Sunnis at a protest that was primarily peaceful.
A very important event was the declaration of the Caliphate. A Caliphate is a religious
obligation according to some interpretations. As was stated previously, IS did something else

that had never before been done. The leader of ISIS, Baghdadi, gave a sermon in newly occupied
Mosul, inciting thousands more jihadists to join Syria and Iraq to join ISIS. Many recruits were
people who had been marginalized with little hope in their lives, both men and women, who
wanted to be a part of something special. They saw ISIS had taken over vast swaths of land, and
wanted to be a part of this major movement (Frontline, October 28, 2014).
Terrorist Tactics
The two key elements of terrorism are fear and destruction. The hope is that by instilling
fear, the system will crack and revolution will occur. Religiously motivated terrorist groups are
more likely to commit attacks which result in a higher number of casualties. While religious
terrorism does appear to be the primary type occurring currently, it is important to keep in mind
that religion is often used as a scapegoat for terrorism (Duffy-Toft, et. al, 2011). “Even the
religious terrorism that exists today,” Toft et al. contend, “ rarely involves religion alone; social,
political, economic, and environmental factors are often in play as well” (p. 127).
Hoffman cites the frequencies of definitional elements of terrorism. The top four, from
ascending order are: violence/force, political, fear/terror emphasized), and threat. IS introduces
all of these elements into their tactics. It is evident that IS is successful in instilling fear. By
using tactics such as beheading, IS both scares and shocks the viewers, and thus fear and shock
play an essential role in IS achieving their goals. Moreover, the threat that they pose is immense.
Unlike al-Qaeda, and previous terrorist groups, IS has fully established themselves in two
different states—Iraq and Syria (2006). According to Berger, when ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria) changed to IS (Islamic State), it was significant because it claimed that all of the

territory on the borders of Syria and Iraq, formerly sovereign states, are now the Islamic State,
potentially within universal jurisdiction (August 6, 2014).
Costly signaling plays a prominent role in terrorist acts. I will outline five distinct forms
of strategic logic for costly signaling, which according to Kydd and Walter (2006), are crucial
not only for understanding terrorism but also for designing effective antiterrorism policies. The
five strategic logics are: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. Terrorists
can, of course, use more than one strategy at a time. For example, al-Qaeda, in the attacks on
September 11, 2001, used both attrition and provocation strategy—attrition first, to gain support
for the attack, and then provocation by inducing the United States to respond with violence. I
contend that IS utilizes all strategies of costly signaling.
Attrition is perhaps the most important task for any terrorist group. Terrorists need to
“persuade the enemy that the group is strong and resolute enough to inflict serious costs, so that
the enemy yields to the terrorists’ demands,” says Kydd and Walter (2006, p. 59). By using
attrition, IS has strived to persuade the enemy (Shi’ites and the West) that the group is strong
enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy. By using
intimidation, terrorists try to convince the population that they are strong enough to punish
disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop them, so that people give in to terrorist
demands (Kydd & Walter, 2006).
Two ways IS has made use of intimidation are through their policy to either convert to
radical Islam, die, or exile, as well as the use of videos of beheadings of American journalists.
An effective way IS mobilizes populations is by utilizing provocation. One scholar, as Kydd and
Walter mentions, argues that provocation is the strategy of terrorism. A major way IS achieves

provocation is by inducing the enemy (in this case the Shi’ites and the West), to respond to
terrorism with indiscriminate violence. By using this method, IS effectively moves populations
to support them. Spoilers undermine attempts to reach a peace settlement by attacking in a way
to persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists' side are weak and untrustworthy. It is
likely that IS is using the strategy by blurring the lines of who the enemy is and who the “good
guys” are. IS has undoubtedly used outbidding, which is classified by Kydd and Walter (2006)
as using violence to convince the public that a group “has greater resolve to fight the enemy than
rival groups, and are therefore worthy of support” (p. 51). A prime example of how outbidding
can begin is after Maliki sent in Iraqi soldiers to a Sunni protest, which was mainly a peaceful
one, in which they were calling for their rights, and the Iraqi soldiers opened up fire, leaving
hundreds of Sunnis dead. At that point, many of the Sunnis reached the conclusion, with the
encouragement of IS, that peaceful protest was not enough, and that violence was needed to
make change. Next, the Sunni’s began to see IS murder what remained of the Iraqi Army, and
eventually take over Iraq. IS has exhibited that they have greater resolve to fight the enemy than
other rival groups.
Talk Is Cheap
Since talk is cheap, costly signaling is often the only effective method that terrorists and
states know to employ when trying to influence their adversary. Furthermore, costly signals are
so costly that someone or a group who is lying or bluffing, will be unwilling to take such
extreme actions. In order to obtain their goals, terrorists need to provide credible information to
the audiences whose behavior they hope to influence. There are two key audiences: the
government and their followers or those they are seeking obedience from (Kydd & Walter,
2006). In the case of IS, they have committed many acts which show that they are indeed

committed to their cause—they are willing to die for their cause, and willing to kill thousands for
this cause. The way they took over Iraq, and then murdered hundreds of Iraqi soldiers, sent a
clear message that they would not spare any oppositional people’s lives. Beheading the two
American journals got the majority of America’s attention—much more attention than the
thousands of Muslims IS had already killed. The beheadings frightened many people, and it was
one of many actions that the White House used as ammunition for sending airstrikes and sending
in troops into Syria. Just as IS wished to instill fear into the world, so the White House used this
fear as motivation to attack IS. In this way, IS used intimidation, and was seemingly quite
successful.
The Consequence of Prolonged Inaction of the United States
Obama’s ambassador to Iraq had warned Maliki that this needed to be contained. The
President and the rest of the country did not think that going back to war in Iraq was a good idea,
and so the Obama Administration told Maliki that they wanted him to play by the democratic
rules, in order to win the population over. But they failed to place any costs or put pressure on
him, according to some interviewed in the “Rise of ISIS” documentary. Rhodes said that they
were in fact pushing them, and that at the end of the day it was going to be Iraqi leaders who had
to make the decisions (Frontline, October 28, 2014).
The Sunnis were having demonstrations against Maliki, while Iraq’s Shia were
encouraging and supporting Maliki. When Maliki moved against Sunnis he found himself
becoming more popular among the Shi’ites. Support for Sunni resistance poured in from around
the Sunni-Arab world, especially from a man in Jordan, by the name of Khamis al-Khanjar, who
had ties to Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime. Establishment of pro-Sunni television channels

were funded. In the beginning, al-Qaeda (which became IS) was getting donations largely from
Gulf States that were Sunni-opposition groups. As al-Qaeda gained territory, they needed fewer
donations, especially once they gained control of Syrian oil wells (Frontline, October 28, 2014).
While the ambassador to Syria strongly encouraged the Obama administration to provide
aid to pro-Western Syrian groups (otherwise IS would likely dominate), the Syrian president
chose not to provide the rebels arms, because he thought it would lead to more disaster and the
weapons getting into the wrong hands. The more moderate Syrian rebels struggled without
adequate weapons and supplies. IS launched many attacks on Iraq prisons. The freed prisoners
increased their numbers (Frontline, October 28, 2014).
Then in April 2013, at a Sunni protest (mainly peaceful) in the town of Hovega, where
Sunnis were calling for their rights, Maliki responded with massive force. The Iraqi soldiers and
security forces killed hundreds of people. ISIS at that point argued that you need to use some
measure of violence because peaceful protest was not working. IS gained many people after this.
According to interviewees in the Frontline documentary, Iraq’s leadership was full of peaceful,
liberal, moderated people, but no one was protecting them…except ISIS. So even though many
people did not like them per say, there was no better option. After this massacre of peacefully
protesting Sunnis, many more Sunnis joined ISIS. ISIS-lead Sunnis was making major gains. It
became clear that the Iraqi Army could not contain ISIS. Maliki went to Washington D.C., and
asked the U.S. for help. Naturally, the U.S. did not trust Maliki, nor feel comfortable to give him
more weapons, etc. Things got much worse after the visit. Then in December 2013, Maliki
struck again, against a hard-lined Sunni politician, who gave angry speeches against Maliki’s
government, only giving the Sunnis more motivation to join IS.

Iraqi forces staged a raid on the hard-lined Sunni’s house, killing his brother, and next,
the soldiers dismantled the year-old protest camp. Maliki’s move provoked an Arab Sunni
uprising. Because the Shiites did not allow the Sunni’s to participate, they “created the
monster.” The Iraqi Army was seen as a Shiite militia, and with no support, they disserted,
making it easy for ISIS to take over. Even ISIS was surprised that they were able to take over
Mosul, because there were no opposition forces there. Their original plan was to just break some
people out of prison. ISIS was able to get a great deal of U.S. weapons, and they rounded up and
executed hundreds of Iraqi soldiers (Frontline, October 28, 2014).
Low Risk of Being Killed in U.S. by a Terrorist
On an encouraging note regarding the safety of Americans, current research shows that
just one in twenty million Americans have a chance of dying from a terrorist attack in the United
States right now (Vinson, 2014). Furthermore, one should keep in mind that terrorists rarely
attack well-defended targets (Love, 2011), and that no democratic state has ever been taken over
by terrorists. Of course, just because there is a low chance of being attacked in the United States
by IS, does not mean that we should not develop strategies to combat and dismantle them.
Solutions
The current situation with IS is a very complex one, in which there is no “fix all
solution.” Miller, from Foreign Policy, summed up the complexity of the situation with IS rather
well when he concluded his recent article titled, “The Consequences of Misunderstanding the
Middle East,” with this bold statement,
Our notion that we can fix things -- that we are the single driving force in seeking change
at the top; the ones who create a moderate center; who can foster confessional harmony,

delegitimize the jihadi narrative, get Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds to play nicely with one
another -- not only just doesn't add up, it's delusional. If these happy outcomes were to
come about, they need real ownership on the part of the locals, driven by local interests
and timetables, not by U.S. slogans or policies (November 18, 2014).
Solutions: Military
The U.S. said they would send in air strikes against IS if Maliki resigned, so he did. “The
only way you are going to solve this problem is if you get the countries and governments of the
regions invested in it,” commented one of the Frontline interviewees. The U.S. is hoping the
Iraq’s new Shiite prime minister, can gain the trust of the Sunnis. Furthermore, every
campaign’s assumptions need to be revisited as the situation evolves (Frontline, October 28,
2014).
One of the main methods IS employs is attrition. Counterstrategies in regards to a war
with attrition, provided by Kydd and Walter are: 1). “First, the targeted government can concede
inessential issues in exchange for peace,” a strategy that they believe is frequently pursued
though rarely admitted (2006, p. 64); 2). Provided that the issue under dispute is important
enough to the targeted state that it does not want to grant any concessions, the government could
engage in targeted retaliation, which in the case of IS, may involve targeting the leaders or their
assets (oil); 3). A state can harden likely targets, making the targets both less likely to be hit and
less desirable, since the attack would not yield much cost to the target; 4). States can seek to
deny terrorists access to weapons, particularly the most destructive ones, such as biological and
nuclear weapons; 5). States can strive to decrease the negative psychological effects terrorism
has on the people and help them to not overact (Kydd & Walter, 2006).

To combat IS, the U.S. has launched more than 150 airstrikes and deployed over 1,100
ground troops over the past couple months. It seems that that U.S. believes that they can
somehow get rid of IS of they just send enough airstrikes and drones.
Strategies: Alternatives to military solutions
Win Without War as an organization poses the question, “Is American military force
really the smartest way to address the threat we face from ISIS?” (September 10, 2011). They
provide the following as alternatives to going back to war in the Middle East: 1. Cut off ISIS
funding; 2. Crack down on ISIS weapons supply and supply routes; 3. Address the underlying
political grievances of the local populations; 4. Provide humanitarian assistance; and finally, 5.
Lead a truly multilateral international response.
Initially, a large portion of IS funding came from donations. Now IS gets most of their
funding from smuggling oil from fields it controls in Iraq and Syria. The fields need to be
retaken by the local forces; the problem cannot be addressed on the supply side alone. “Cracking
down on Turkish, Iraqi, and other oil dealers who are purchasing the oil on the black market
would cut ISIS off from one of its most important revenue streams,” Win without War contends
(September 10, 2011). This cannot be accomplished without hard diplomacy and significant
international cooperation, but it could ultimately prove more costly to ISIS than any bomb. It is
especially urgent that we do this because if we do not cut off their cash flow, they will be able to
replace any weapons the U.S. military destroys and any militants they kill.
The second issue is that IS is surrounded on all sides by enemies who can and should do
more to cut off its supply routes from the outside. A primary culprit that Win without War notes
is Turkey. Win Without War declares that America should force them to crack down on the flow

of fighters and weapons across its border with Syria. In regards to the third strategy mentioned,
by most estimates, IS maintains approximately 20,000 fighters, while the Sunni population
which IS is primarily comprised of, is at about 25 million. As long as IS maintains popular
support, there is no way they can be defeated. By ending Syrian civil war and bringing Sunnis
back into the Iraqi political process, a wedge can be driven between IS and the local population.
Win Without War further points out that American bombs will only drive Sunnis further into the
hands of ISIS and their false claims of ‘protection’ (September 10, 2011).
Providing humanitarian assistance is the fourth strategy mentioned. There are millions of
displaced Iraqis and Syrians, and the lack of access to water, food, and other essential items
threatens to cost many more lives than bombs or bullets. Helping to address these imminent
needs is much more than kindness or way to save lives—it is an important way to prevent further
radicalization and instability, including more people joining the IS fighters. We must lead a
multilateral, international response. In their final recommendation, Win Without War states,
“ISIS thrives because of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, which are fueled by foreign interests.
Resolving these conflicts ultimately depends on American diplomacy – not American bombs –
involving all the parties including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and others” (September 10, 2014). As is
noted by The Economist, simply bombing areas where the emerging powers appear dangerous
and corrupt, and hoping that a better sort of a power replaces them, is not promising (August 28,
2014).
IS is a lethal Islamist terrorist group that has been forming for years. It is comprised
primarily of Sunnis, including former hardened al-Qaeda members, former Baathist regime
members, former prisoners, and average citizens who saw no better option than to join IS, either
because their life was threatened, or because they felt called to this religious jihad. IS seeks to

establish an Islamic state, and has already done so in Iraq and Syria. Because of their financial
support and popularity, they will continue to take more territory if not stopped. While there is no
simple solution to IS, many strategies have been suggested in this paper. The bottom line is that
military effort alone will not get rid of this terrorist group, and that the contrary may be true.
The more the United States seeks to destroy IS, the stronger IS can become, because of increased
support from Sunnis around the world. By cutting off IS funding, both from the smuggled oil
wells and private donations, IS will not be able to purchase more weapons, and furthermore, will
have less appeal to the marginalized individuals who would otherwise consider joining their
ranks. Furthermore, the grievances of local populations need to be addressed; the supply of
weapons cut, and a multilateral international effort needs to be made. Furthermore, the U.S. and
Western powers can provide humanitarian aid to address the urgent needs of the people,
preventing further radicalization and instability, which were some of the primary reasons IS
ranks swelled in the first place.
IS did not gain the power and control they now have overnight, and they will not be
destroyed overnight. But through a multilateral effort, and most importantly a multi-pronged
effort that includes many critical nonviolent tactics that we have outlined, IS can be contained,
and eventually dismantled.
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