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FIM and System Call Auditing at Scale in a Large Container Deployment
The document discusses system call auditing and file integrity monitoring in large container deployments, focusing on the challenges of processing vast log data and selecting appropriate open-source tools. It emphasizes the importance of classifying event sources and employing machine learning techniques to enhance anomaly detection while also evaluating various tools, frameworks, and stacks. The presentation also outlines a structured approach to build a custom monitoring stack based on security insights, highlighting lessons learned and future possibilities in the domain.
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FIM and System Call Auditing at Scale in a Large Container Deployment
- 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC Ravi Honnavalli FIMAND SYSTEM CALL AUDITING AT SCALE IN A LARGE CONTAINER DEPLOYMENT CSV-R14 Staff Engineer Walmart Twitter handle: @ravi_honnavalli
- 2. #RSAC Disclaimer 2 NOTE: All contentdiscussed here are out of self learning and not related to the work I do at Walmart.
- 3. #RSAC Ever increasing amountof logs 3
- 4. #RSAC Overwhelming amount ofchoices 4 Too many options!! Static rules? ML? Event source ? Agent vs Agentless
- 5. #RSAC Flood of OSStools 5 Elasticsearch osquery journald ElastAlert TensorFlowUnstructured datastores fluentd
- 6. #RSAC GOAL: Demystifying thechoices we have 6 •Classifying event sources •Understand event source type •Evaluate open source stacks Understanding types of event sources •Understand the insights we are looking for •Build a stack based on the event classification •If needed customize existing open source tools •Build adaptors / tools that join the whole chain Build our own stack based on insight needed • The stacks discussed in this presentation are by no means the only stack availableMake an informed decision
- 7. #RSAC Quick poll 7 Use auditlogging to detect anomalies? How may implement it only to meet compliance? Take it further to use machine learning techniques?
- 8. #RSAC • kauditd • Inotify Kernel Possibilitiesof tools evaluated 8 • auditd • go-auditd • go-audit-container • osquery Data shippers • Logstash • Filebeat • Fluentd Sink • File • Syslog Deployment tools • Chef • Puppet • Ansible Fleet manager • Zentral • Kolide • Doorman • Hand crafted tool Unstructured data stores • Elasticsearch • MongoDB Graphing and reporting • Kibana • Grafana • ElastAlert • Custom tools based on query DSL/Lucene Data Preprocessing • Custom tool to build a training set ML • TensorFlow • Layer depth • Optimization algorithm • Learning rate • Gradient descent mechanisms
- 9. #RSAC Classification of eventsources 9 Event sources Event based syscall inotify Scheduled query agent
- 10. #RSAC Security insight basedon event source type 10 syscall Looking for specific outliers among mostly normal dynamic events. • Like identifying outliers • Monitoring constantly for a specific malicious system call along with other criteria (uid, etc) inotify Safe-guarding specific sensitive files / area in the file system • Watch for CREATE/ACCESS/MODIFY/ DELETE events on specific files agent Scheduled activities for static information • OS patch level queries, vulnerable kernel modules, mis- configuration
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- 12. #RSAC Why syscall? 12 Fundamental transit pointsbetween user land and kernel Every process makes system calls disclosing information of its activity Several user space tools that send audit information (auditd, go-audit, go-audit- container) Can provide deep insight when aggregated and drilled down Ideal candidate to build a machine learning training set as the volume of data is huge
- 13. #RSAC Audit component 13 User land Kernelland Kauditd Syscall interfaceNetlink socket Reporting daemon User space application
- 14. #RSAC Audit log togain insights at scale User land Kauditd Syscall interfaceNetlink socket go-audit- container User space application Elastics earch Grafana Kibana Pre- Processsink Email Pagerduty Slack TensorFlow Kernel
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- 17. #RSAC Inotify component 17 User land Kernel landInotifycomponent User space application Inotify_add_watch Watch list Inotify_event { } Inotify_event { } Inotify_event { } Inotify_event { } Event queue
- 18. #RSAC Why inotify? 18 Lesser CPU consumptionon an average Missing details in the reports Another parallel stack, a new and exciting stack to explore with osquery
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- 20. #RSAC inotify based stackfor FIM User land Kernel land Elasticsea rch Grafana Kibana Pre- Processsink Email Pagerduty Slack TensorFlow osquery Inotify component Register watch Notify event
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- 22. #RSAC osquery 22 osquery osqueryosqueryosquery Fleet Manager OSOSOS OS Distributed Query
- 23. #RSAC Osquery stack toget insights at scale Elasticsea rch Grafana Kibana Pre- Processsink Email Pagerduty Slack TensorFlow osquery OS Extension plugin
- 24. #RSAC Demo of tracinga ‘Dirty COW’ exploit 24
- 25. #RSAC Learning from usingfixed queries in Kibana, Grafana and custom tools 25 Robust rules need a lot of queries Fixed queries are good but only goes so far Any small variation of the rules is a false negative Using DNN based machine learning helps improve our ability to detect anomalies
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- 27. #RSAC High level differences 27 Unsupervised ElasticsearchML Anomaly detection Time series data Supervised Pre-processink-osquery Explicit labelling and pre-processing Explicit data classification on disparate info
- 28. #RSAC Picture credit: https://unsplash.com/@ripato 28 ElasticsearchML: Detecting outliers
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- 30. #RSAC Use case: Classifyingdisparate data 30 Classifying data from different event sources Broad classification into RED/YELLOW/GREEN Classifying to have a big picture of the security posture of the organization
- 31. #RSAC Supervised learning: Buildinga training set is key 31 Elasticsearch Preprocessink- osquery Labelling TensorFlow
- 32. #RSAC Pre-processink-osquery stages Stage 0 •Query one probe at a time from ES • Label into RED/YELLOW/GREEN • Write to stage_0.csv Stage 1 • Merge into existing stage_1.csv Manual Labeling • At this stage human administrator can manually label events that were not labeled or which were incorrectly labeled by the automated rules Stage 2 • Transform into numeric values, which will be the final training data set
- 33. #RSAC ML choices ifyou are building your own solution 33 Activation function Learning rate Depth of the network Batch size vs iterations Optimzers
- 34. #RSAC Results of ourexperiment 34 ReLU for hidden layers and softmax for activation Epoch vs Batch Size vs Iterations Adam optimizer Lower the learning rate the better
- 35. #RSAC Lessons learnt 35 With systemcall auditing, inotify, os level querying agents as foundations, combined with ability to aggregate at scale in Elasticsearch, we can achieve very deep security insights on the production environment. With anomaly detection discussed in this talk, we are just scratching the surface. Given that system calls are fundamental, possibilities are enormous. With static threshold and reporting configuration it is very easy to miss security insights DNN based machine learning helps in getting intelligent insights Based on parameters like platform support, CPU utilization, memory and disk space foot print, etc we looked at different choices of stack
- 36. #RSAC Apply 36 Start with asimple File Integrity monitoring implementation using audit log. Observe load of FIM events on the infrastructure Grow the solution to more detailed monitoring Try applying ML based on the rule based and manual labels Think of possibilities outside of what is discussed here today
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- 38. #RSAC Questions? 38 You can alsoreach out later: Twitter handle: @ravi_Honnavalli LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ravi- honnavalli-0535163/