This document summarizes a thesis on the evolution of adaptive leadership in the military. It discusses how the asymmetric threats of terrorism have created a need for more adaptive leadership styles. It examines how the Army is developing adaptive leaders and the difference between task leaders and social specialists. It also explores developing leadership theory and adapting leadership styles to different situations.

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Evolution of Adaptive Military Leadership
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Shaun S. Lott
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Submitted to the El Paso Campus
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the
Degree of Master of Arts in Leadership
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University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso Campus
February 2008
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ABSTRACT
Researcher: Shaun S. Lott
Title: Evolution of Adaptive Military Leadership
Institution: University of Texas at El Paso
Degree: Master of Arts in Leadership
Year: 2008
Over the decades the United States Army has participated in
major and minor wars, conflicts, as well as stability and
support operations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the
devastating defeat of the Iraqi Army during Desert Storm has
yielded at different type of threat Army leadership has been
forced to adapt to---the asymmetric threat of terrorist or
Taliban tactics. These relatively new terrorist tactics have
created a paradigm shift in the training, managing, and
leadership traits throughout the ranks of the Army which has
created the rise of adaptive leadership. I will address the
following questions:
1. How did adaptive leadership evolve in the military
ranks?
2. Is doctrine driving the change for adaptive
leadership or is it toady’s threat?
3. How has decentralized, adaptive leadership impact
organizational behavior?

3. 4. How have leaders dealt with the change from
regimented formations and written doctrine to
ambiguous situations and little to no doctrine?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract 1
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Chapter
I Why Adaptive Leadership? 4
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II Is the Army developing adaptive leaders? 9
III Task Leaders versus Social Specialist 13
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IV Developing Leadership Theory 20
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V Biographical Statement 26
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References
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CHAPTER I
Why Adaptive Leadership?
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Adaptive leadership in today's Army is increasingly
important with technological changes and the force-structure
downsizing that all military services are experiencing.
Adaptive leadership is necessary in today's complex and
ambiguous military environment. Technology and the
availability and flow of information contribute to a very
fluid operational situation. US Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22,
Army Leadership, has added transactional and transformational
leadership styles of directing, participating, and delegating.
These styles add to the leader's arsenal of leadership styles
that can be used to shape behavior, emotions, and the
organizational climate. Leaders are not limited to one style
in a given situation and, with the nature of the battlefield
today and tomorrow, being able to adapt appropriate styles
will influence soldiers' success. Techniques from different
styles are used to motivate people and accomplish the mission.
A leader's judgment, intelligence, cultural awareness, and

5. self-control "play major roles in helping you choose the
proper style and the appropriate techniques for the task at
hand." One of the serious problems in planning the fight
against U.S. Army doctrine is that soldiers do not read their
manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their
doctrine.
The U.S. Army has a great history of innovation, from
the use of irregular tactics during the American Revolutionary
War to improvised vehicle armor in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Continuing in this tradition and recognizing its value, the
former Secretary of the United States Army, the Honorable
Louis Caldera, stated at a press conference in October 1999:
"We are working on producing leaders for change, not just
leaders who are doctrinally capable and competent leaders for
war fighting, but leaders also for all kinds of missions with
the capability to deal with an evolving global situation in
which the array of threats faced goes across the entire
spectrum."
Army Leadership makes numerous references to the need to
adapt as a leader: "You must adapt and improvise"; "no exact
blue print will exist for success in every context; leadership
and the ability to adapt to the situation will carry the day";
"adapt to and handle fluid environments"; "envision, adapt,
and lead change." What Army leadership doctrine does not offer
is a true definition of adaptive leadership; it offers only

6. random imperatives of the importance to adapt. Recognizing the
need for a new type of leadership (and perhaps recognizing the
inadequacy of FM 6-22), the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)
Organizational and Operational (O&O) Concept defines an
adaptive leader as "[a] leader who can influence people--by
providing purpose, direction, and motivation--while operating
in a complex, dynamic environment of uncertainty and ambiguity
to accomplish the mission and improve the organization."
Leadership is a process by which a person influences
others to accomplish an objective and directs the organization
in a way that makes it more cohesive and coherent. Leaders
carry out this process by applying their leadership
attributes, such as beliefs, values, ethics, character,
knowledge, and skills. Leadership differs in that it makes the
followers want to achieve high goals, rather than simply
issuing orders for people to follow.
The basis of good leadership is honorable character and
selfless service to your organization. People want to be lead
by those who they respect and who possess a clear sense of
direction and purpose. To gain respect, they must be ethical.
A sense of direction is achieved by conveying a strong vision
of the future. Different people require different styles of
leadership. For example, a new hire or recruit requires more
supervision than an experienced employee or soldier. Likewise,
a person who lacks motivation requires a different approach

7. than one with a high degree of motivation. The fundamental
starting point is having a good understanding of human nature,
such as needs, emotions, and motivation. You must learn to
know your employees' be, know, and do attributes.
Every organization has a particular work environment,
which dictates to a considerable degree how its leaders
respond to problems and opportunities. This is formed by its
heritage of past leaders and its present leaders. Successful
organizations have leaders who set high standards and goals
across the entire spectrum, such as strategies, market
leadership, plans, meetings and presentations, productivity,
quality, and reliability.
Additionally, values reflect the concern the
organization has for its employees, customers, investors,
vendors, and surrounding community. These values define the
manner in how business will be conducted. Concepts define what
products or services the organization will offer and the
methods and processes for conducting business. These goals,
values, and concepts make up the organization's "personality"
or how the organization is observed by both outsiders and
insiders. This personality defines the roles, relationships,
rewards, and rites that take place.
In an effective leadership situation, the leader is the
social architect whose leadership style is analysis and
design. While in an ineffective leadership situation, the

8. leader is a petty tyrant whose leadership style becomes
suppressed in the details of all subordinates. In contrast,
structural leaders are more effective by focusing on
structure, strategy, environment, implementation,
experimentation, and adaptation.
In an effective leadership situation, the leader is a
catalyst and servant whose leadership style is supporting,
advocating, and empowering. Human Resource Leaders believe
effective leaders are able to communicate belief by being
visible and accessible to change; they are empowering,
increase participation, support, share information, and move
decision making down into the organization. The effective
leader is an advocate of empowerment, whose leadership style
is coalition and building. While in an ineffective leadership
situation, the leader is a hustler, whose leadership style is
predicated on manipulation. For example, some political
leaders clarify what they want and what they can get; they
assess the distribution of power and interests; they build
linkages to other stakeholders, use persuasion first, and then
use negotiation and coercion only if necessary to achieve a
political end. One critical constant to both effective and
ineffective leadership styles is adaptation. Surviving both
ambiguous and unambiguous situations through adaptive
leadership is key to the survival of the modern day leader.
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CHAPTER II
Is the Army developing adaptive leaders?
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With this definition of adaptive leadership, which more
clearly identifies the characteristics that foster change in
an operating environment, the question becomes, Is the Army
developing adaptive leaders? If not, how can the current
development system be refined to do so? As leaders and
managers face rapidly changing environments and
circumstances--at a pace accelerated by the dramatic influx of
information that literally assails decision makers in the
digital age--the search for new methods leads to a rethinking

10. of leadership approaches needed to exercise command and
control in our increasingly information oriented Army.
Maximizing these skills within the context of adaptive
thinking, it is evident that adaptive leaders are proactive
and exert influence over their environment, not merely
reacting to situations. Adaptive leaders use available
information and their knowledge of their units to generate
creative solutions to complex problems. By encouraging
innovation and junior leader/soldier involvement in solving
problems (rather than merely dictating top-down solutions),
they create the conditions where their units actually grow and
get stronger while meeting challenges. But how does adaptive
leadership apply to the engineer leader? Arguably, engineers
traditionally perform well-defined tasks and missions. Our
success is often predicated on what some consider near-
mechanical execution. Do we need adaptive leaders? To see a
need for adaptive leadership and the need to develop adaptive
leaders, we must identify the changing environment and
situations that face our engineer leaders and then see how
adaptive leadership can help.
If Army engineers only had to deal with their mission-
training-plan-based tasks, then our need for adaptive
leadership would perhaps be limited. All we'd need to do is
train each soldier and subordinate leader to be a cog in a
well-oiled machine. Most engineers would only embark upon

11. tasks within the limits of their technical specialty. Combat-
heavy engineers perform construction. Sappers prepare to
breach and conduct demolitions. Perhaps an over-
simplification, but by and large, engineers have often
occupied and acted within a very well-defined and highly
evolved niche within the military organization--deliberate
operations in highly static environments that intentionally
minimize ambiguity. Adaptiveness requires leader versatility.
Nowhere is this more certain than in the engineers.
Unfortunately, we often do not spend time developing
versatility. Rather, engineer units often intentionally narrow
their training focus. The drive toward specialization--perhaps
overspecialization--is strong, particularly when so many of
our units occupy "one-mission niches" in training environments
such as the combat-training centers.
The Army has pursued the idea of adaptive leadership
since the formation of the Continental Army. Because
organization, control, discipline, and teamwork were lacking,
General George Washington sought the aid of Baron Frederich
von Steuben, a former Prussian staff officer of Frederick the
Great, to write drill movements and regulations to instill
discipline in "an Army of several thousand half starved,
wretched men in rags." From the beginning of U.S. military
psychology almost 100 years ago, there has been a
preoccupation with predicting effective military behavior,

12. particularly in leaders. Most of the early military
classification and qualification tests sought to predict
behavior under the common assumption that certain ideal
behavior would inevitably lead to highly desirable performance
as a leader. Military leaders must make use of the studies and
histories of military units and figures, and not repeat
mistakes of the past. Leaders should learn from the past and
focus on issues that concern soldiers simultaneously with
mission accomplishment. Leadership effectiveness cannot be
overemphasized in leader development and training, especially
leader effectiveness in combat. Military leadership studies
must focus on military leadership instead of management.
Behaviors of corporate managerial leaders do not correlate
directly to the behaviors of military leaders although the
correlation has been assumed in military leader development
programs. Modern military training for combat leaders tends to
stress the managerial functions of the officer and his
abilities to manage materiel and personnel. This managerial
training generally receives greater emphasis than tactics.
Military leaders are different from leaders in other types of
organizations because they are appointed and not emergent. The
military leader's authority to lead derives from the
Constitution. If he cannot pull his followers by force of
character, he can push them by force of law. Military
leadership is essentially autocratic and operates in a wheel

13. rather than an all channel communication net. The flow of
communication, or essential information, is between the leader
and his subordinates rather than among all the members of his
group. The wheel net, though no doubt gratifying to autocratic
leaders, produces more errors, slower solutions, and reduced
gratification to the group than does the more democratic all
channel net. Effective leaders are able to adjust
communication flow by adapting situationally appropriate
leadership styles.
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CHAPTER III
Task Leaders versus Social Specialist
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In light of these considerations, military leadership
has been effective. The military leader, like any other
leader, has two roles: the task specialist and the social
specialist. His primary concern is to achieve the group's goal
of defeating an enemy in combat. For such a role, being

14. likable is a less-important trait than being more active, more
intelligent, or better informed than his followers. As a
social specialist, a leader's main function is preserving good
personal relations within the group, maintaining morale, and
keeping the group intact. In a military environment, the
functions of a successful social specialist prevent mutiny and
reduce such symptoms of low morale such as absenteeism,
desertion, malingering, and crime. The social function
achieves cohesion as a team or unit. The ideal military leader
combines excellence as a task specialist with an equal flair
for social or heroic leadership. Predictors of successful
combat leadership include having first-level leadership
experience, time in the unit, unit relationships, job
knowledge, and the concomitant security of knowing the right
thing to do. All these lead to the confidence required to
perform well under threatening conditions. Social support is
more important for successful and effective leadership at
lower levels than at higher ones. The characteristics that
earmark the effective combat leader may not be the same as
those that identify the appointed leader.
The leader must continuously seek alternatives to apply
to new situations. Leaders at lower levels must have more
initiative and foresight and decreased sensitivity to rank
differences. This shifts the leader's focus from who is right
to what is right, an adaptive view that relies on information

15. to meet technical challenges. Leaders all levels must possess
higher technical competence and have the ability to apply that
expertise while maintaining cohesive units. Because of stress
in the military environment, leaders must generate high unit
cohesion before hostilities begin. Leaders must be able to
operate autonomously, building respect and values for
maintaining the purpose and will of their units in combat.
They need greater flexibility and adaptability to deal with
surprise. Units must be able to operate expediently to meet
the challenge of unanticipated events. Flexibility must be a
unit norm and an individual characteristic. Also, units must
have the opportunity to train in unfamiliar situations, to
learn from mistakes, and to learn the process of thorough
thinking so that the initial shock of combat stress does not
cause cognitive freezing. Leaders must have the capacity to
create a climate for more junior leaders that permits rational
risk taking. The climate must foster training, coaching, and
developing subordinate leaders. The increasing level of
sophistication in military hardware, tactics, and techniques
require the military leader to empower the subordinate to take
on more complex tasks with fewer resources. The leader must be
aware of power and politics, which previously have been a
prerequisite for only the most senior leaders.
However, the private sector left the Army behind in the
use of developmental feedback from peers and subordinates.

16. Leaders can improve by combining conceptual training,
developmental feedback, an environment for continuous
learning, a performance appraisal system that attends to both
development and selection, and a system of promoting leaders
based on more than written reports. This combination has
proven effective in the private sector but is deficient in
developing military leaders in the field. To improve
leadership, one must define an effective leader. An effective
leader should be someone who exercises transactional
leadership and puts leadership theory into practice. There
must be a focus on selecting programs that identify personal
leadership traits related to leader effectiveness. The concept
of leadership that most consistently matches the military
ideal seems to emphasize transformational leadership training.
The common themes of military leadership training are a focus
on contingency leadership principles, followership that
precedes leadership activities, leadership experiences
combined with feedback, and formal classroom training designed
to provide the theoretical basis for leadership experiences. A
variety of empirical studies have demonstrated that
transformational leadership augments or supplements
transactional leadership, and training in that area would be a
beneficial addition to leadership training programs. Personal
traits, attitudes, values, and past experience influence
leadership style and performance. Situational factors and the

17. ability and motivation of one's followers also influence
leadership style and performance. A leader must correctly
assess situational factors and adapt the most appropriate and
effective leadership style for that situation. A leader must
also augment transactional leadership behavior with
transformational behavior to impact his followers
significantly.
The situational leadership model rests on two concepts:
one, that leader effectiveness results from using a behavioral
style that is appropriate to the demands of the environment;
and two, that leader effectiveness depends on learning to
diagnose that environment. Diagnosing the environment is the
first of the three competencies of leadership. Adapting to the
environment with the appropriate leadership style and
communicating that style to subordinates are the other two
leader competencies.
Appropriate leadership style is determined by the
leader's assessment of an individual's maturity level relative
to the task at hand. Once the leader identifies the maturity
level, he can identify the appropriate leadership style (the
curve determines the appropriate leadership style).
Fundamental to the theory is the leader's ability to adjust
his style to meet the maturity of the followers. The
indication that the leader is using the appropriate style will
be performance or results. There has been much discussion and

18. some good papers presented regarding what theory is and how
theories are developed. Therefore, a detailed discussion here
would not illuminate the matter any better, if at all.
Regarding development of a theory of military leadership, it
is safe to say that the phenomenon has been identified and
that collection and codification of some knowledge has
occurred. A rough set of expectations has been developed. That
is, we expect military leaders to prepare for and act
successfully in violent military conflict. It is difficult to
go much beyond these rough abstractions, however. More
detailed expectations about military leadership begin to
divide along cultural, geographic and even time lines. For
example, in the United States today, we would not expect a
brigade or division commander to go into battle at the head of
his men, although we expect him to become personally involved
in combat to lead his men if the need arises. During the
American Civil War, Grant was often at the front, but usually
took care to stay out of range of small arms and cannon. By
contrast, subordinate Union commanders were regularly at the
head of their attacking formations, or at the most dangerous
place in a defensive line. For Alexander the Great, it would
have been unthinkable for him to be anywhere but at the van of
his army for any battle. The cultural ethos of Macedonia at
the time was such that he would have lost his throne had he
done otherwise.

19. Despite apparent differences in leadership expectations
across time and space, it is likely that additional common
expressions of expectations can be developed. This is one of
the elements that must be examined in future research. Theory
should be comprehensive and must be coherent, and at the same
time it should also be simple. Theory must explain practice.
Since military conflict is an extremely complex domain, one
that is neither art nor science but an amalgam of the two, it
might be expected that any comprehensive theory of military
leadership would be complex instead of simple. Future research
might be based on a general guide: it is better to get
something about right (with less detail), than to get it
precisely wrong (with so much detail that the object is lost).
Ideally, theory will provide cause and effect relationships.
However, initial research may only show associations of
factors, and fails to adequately explain the underlying
relationship. For practical purposes, theory must explain
practice in terms of outcomes; interwoven processes can be
investigated once a general set of principles has been
established. Although military conflict dates back as far as
5,000 years, there has been little scientific analysis of
quantitative, objective data. Early statistical records of
battles date to about 1600. However, most of the recorded work
on military conflict and military leadership is qualitative
and subjective. This is not necessarily bad, for subjective

20. analysis can help to explain cause and affect relationships,
but it is less helpful in support of scientific examinations
of the phenomena.
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CHAPTER IV

21. Developing Leadership Theory
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Scientific approaches to developing leadership theory
can rely on four things: data from the historical record (that
is, data of "real" experiences); the knowledge of experts (be
they military leaders, analysts or historians); rational
thought; and experimentation. For research regarding military
conflict it is impractical to conduct experimental wars. For a
theory of military leadership, however, the situation is
somewhat modified. Military leaders perform in peacetime as
well as in war, and their peacetime performance can be more
easily assessed and evaluated; then, it could be compared to
wartime performance, and a set of performance criteria
established. This thought is hardly a new one, but it can (and
should) be the basis for more scientific investigation in the
future. The recent advent of (Western) military
professionalism over the past 200 years is a hopeful sign.
Combined with advances in technology, particularly
communication and computer technology, professional militaries
have a good capability to capture, record and store data
relevant to scientific examinations of military conflict.
Although we may be slow to catch on, we should begin to
capitalize on this source of information for future analysis.
Leadership has been described simply as "the process of
influencing others.” It is probably correct to say that

22. leadership has been a feature of all cultures throughout
history. It has certainly been an indispensable quality in all
cultures that have survived and flourished. Despite its
ubiquitous nature, however, a full understanding of leadership
remains elusive. Military leadership is defined as "the art of
direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the
conditions for organizational success to accomplish missions
effectively." In general, junior leaders exercise their
influence directly, while senior leaders must employ both
direct and indirect influencing methods. Although this
definition is an abstraction, closer examination helps
discover some important aspects of military leadership.
Influence can be direct (i.e., personal contact) or indirect
(i.e., sending orders down the chain of command, regulations,
standing operating procedures). Leadership must focus on an
object, or mission. The process of leading relies on creating
conditions so that an organization may function. With the
exception of the term "mission," which has military
connotations, the definition of leadership could apply equally
to business and industrial leadership and to political
leadership. It should be noted that whoever coined the
foregoing definition did so by relying on a base of knowledge
and by applying reasoning to some sort of theoretical
construct, whether they realized it or not.

23. The leader makes several decisions in determining the
appropriate leadership style. The first is the objective and
the individual or group activities that the leader wants to
influence. The next is determining the group's readiness
level, followed by determining the appropriate leadership
style. The leader then assesses results and reassesses the
accomplishment of objectives and determines if further
leadership is indicated. If there is a gap between expected
performance and actual performance, then additional leadership
interventions are in order and the cycle is repeated. Tasks,
readiness, and results are dynamic, and leadership is a
fulltime job. Military leadership is not new, nor are models
relating to it. There are macro and micro models of
leadership. It is taught in schools. It is codified in
manuals. Officer and noncommissioned officer efficiency
reports are, in themselves, a set of leadership expectations.
"Fit the OER model," one is told, "and you'll do well." Why,
then, is there a need for a theory of military leadership?
Doesn’t one already exist? The answer is "Yes," or practically
so, at least for specific militaries of various countries. The
problem is that an overall theory of military leadership is
desirable, rather than nation-specific theories or models. In
addition, theory should explain bad as well as good behavior.
The body of knowledge that exists, that forms the basis for
courses on leadership and evaluations of leader performance,

24. provides an invaluable point of departure for developing and
expressing a theory of military leadership that should be
universally applicable. Whether it will prove correct or not,
many of the constructs that currently exist in leadership
course literature in the United States have been applied in
this work, as we shall see.
The design uses the leader style/subordinate maturity
match, outcome measures of performance, satisfaction with
supervision, and job satisfaction. The military environment
provides a clear delineation of relationships between
subordinate and superior relationships where the superior is
responsible for developing subordinate's maturity. The study
uses a 360-degree evaluation of the perceptions of leader
effectiveness and provides an organizational leadership
effectiveness average or composite that is correlated with the
outcome measures. Feedback on the leader's effectiveness is
provided with self, peer, and subordinate as well as superior
evaluations. The military services use this type of feedback
for leader training in academic settings but not in the field
or fleet. Following the recruiting challenge comes the
retention challenge. Deployment burnout, doing more with less,
and the new Army culture's lack of support for family
togetherness has soldiers leaving the Army. Soldiers who leave
the service are not afraid of being jobless, and a new Army
program guarantees positions in major corporations for

25. recruits who complete their enlistments. Retention is a morale
and cohesion issue, both of which are outcomes of effective
leadership. Important in this leader development process is
feedback from peers, subordinates, and supervisors as well as
continuous self assessment. The thorough study of other
leaders provides leaders a perspective to analyze
effectiveness and to take what works and incorporate it into
their own self-development process. Critical leader
development includes a thorough understanding of subordinates'
strengths, weaknesses, and professional goals. The leader must
be aware of his subordinates' readiness.
Military leadership and command are two closely linked
elements. It is difficult, if not impossible, to consider one
without considering the other. Command and leadership are
almost the same, but not quite. For a theory of military
conflict to be coherent, supporting theories of command and
leadership must integrate into a coherent whole. Ultimately,
military leadership must deal with fighting an opposing force,
and do this through generation and application of combat
power. This is the object that drives military leaders, and it
results in a condition of battle signified by both casualties
and fear in a lethal environment. There are many other
military objects, of course. Their range can seem daunting,
particularly now in the so-called "new era." Militaries have
to reckon with roles and missions that often appear far

26. removed from the battlefield. Nevertheless, the cornerstone of
military existence remains as it always has, the preservation
of national existence and protection of vital interests. If
necessary this preservation is achieved through war as
directed by national, political leaders.
The term "paradigm" has been subject to undisciplined
use, but it has come to mean a "fundamental image of the
subject matter within a scientific or a field of knowledge. In
its’ broadest unit of consensus within the field, and it
serves to differentiate one community (or sub community) from
another. It defines what should be studied, what questions
should be asked, and what rules should be followed in
interpreting the answers obtained." The study of leadership
dynamics and its’ adaptation over the years can be summed up
in two words---experience and intuition. The demands of
leadership throughout the military ranks exercise the
proverbial leadership muscle. Organizational leadership will
continue to adapt in order to meet mission accomplishment at
all levels. The evolution continues.

27. CHAPTER V
BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT
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Shaun S. Lott
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I was born on October 30, 1969 in Laurel, Mississippi to
Sidney (retired Army Sergeant Major) and LaBarbara Lott. I
met and married my wife Dianna from Tampa, Florida in 1990.
We have five beautiful kids, four boys and one girl.
In 1987, I graduated from Fulda American High School in
Germany and attended Mississippi State University. After one
year of college, I enlisted in the Army in 1988. Over a
period of three years, I was promoted from the rank of private
to specialist. In 1991, I applied for the Army’s Green to
Gold Scholarship which allows soldiers to be released from the
military to earn a bachelors degree. Upon acceptance, I
attended Tuskegee University in Alabama from 1991-1995.
After graduating with a bachelor’s degree in history, I
was commissioned as an Air Defense Artillery officer in 1995.
I have held numerous leadership positions to date to include:
platoon leader, company executive officer, battalion
maintenance officer, battalion assistant operations officer,
battery commander, Joint Readiness Training Center observer,
Captain’s Career Course Instructor/Chief, Secretary to the
General Staff, and battalion operations officer.

28. Additionally, I have deployed overseas to serve in Germany,
Korea, and Bosnia.
I’m currently serving as the battalion operations
officer for over 600 Soldiers while deployed to Korea. Upon
completion of my assignment in Korea, I will be assigned as a
student in Leavenworth to attend the Command and General Staff
College.
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References
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Henricks, Mark (2004) Good Business: Leadership, Flow and the
Making of Meaning. Entrepreneur
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Dr. Karol G. Ross, "Training Adaptive Leaders. Are We Ready?,"
Field Artillery Journal, September-October 2000, p. 16.
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FM 6-22, Army Leadership. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army
Combined Arms Center, 06 October 2006.
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"Strategic Culture: The American Mind," a chapter in Essays on
Strategy IX, Thomas C. Gill, ed., National Defense
University Press, Washington, D.C., August 1993.
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On War, Karl von Clausewitz, O. J. Matthijs Jolles, trans.,
Random House, New York, 1943.
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