(revised) lecture for an upper-level philosophy course on Environmental Ethics [subject: John McPhee's essay, "A River"]

1. John McPhee’s essay, “A River” (from Encounters with the Archdruid), is an excellent and
accessible introduction to the conservation debate, but it’s also in many ways an
oversimplification. The piece centers around a conversation between Dave Brower, ex-executive
director of the Sierra Club, and Floyd Dominy, director of the Bureau of Reclamation. Their
argument is a sort of bare-bones or idealized version of the conservation debate, focusing on the
choice between either preserving what natural wilderness we have left, or using those natural
resources wisely rather than exploitatively. However, there are several complicating factors
involved in this debate that deserve discussion in more detail.
First, there are philosophical issues surrounding the concepts of nature and wilderness (I’ll use
these terms interchangeably from now on for simplicity), as raised by Cronon (1996) and
McKibben (2006), for example. When we talk about “preserving nature,” do we mean by “nature”
some ideal of pristine otherness, entirely untouched by humans? As both McKibben and Cronon

2. point out, if this is what we mean by “nature,” then we as would-be preservationists have already
failed: with, for example, our introduction of CFCs into the atmosphere, there’s nowhere left on
earth that humans haven’t already altered. This concept of nature also creates a certain irony in
the development and maintenance of national parks and wildlife reserves: by setting aside some
designated “natural” area and working to keep it exactly as it is, that area is transformed into the
opposite of our original untouched-by-humans ideal. It is because the area is touched by humans
that, for example, its ecological populations remain in equilibrium and its scenery remains static.
Moreover, this humans- free ideal allows for and encourages the forced removal of native peoples
from their historic homelands (e.g., Dowie (2005)).
Maybe, instead, what we mean or should mean by “nature” is something closer to the view
advocated by McKibben or Schmidtz & Willott (2012): something like the enormously
complicated and codependent global community of which we, too, are a part. This view of nature
makes it harder for us to distance ourselves from the environment and see nature as something
for us to use. It’s easy to slide from the view that humans are a part of nature to the view that
everything humans do is “natural,” as an attempt to somehow justify practices of dam-building
and stripmining and so on. (This latter position does not necessarily follow from the former,
though I won’t go into the details of potential arguments here.) Note, though, that even if all
human actions are “natural” in some sense of the term, this does not entail that all human actions
are morally good—for nature or for ourselves.
So, how is all this related to the conservation debate, again? Well, once we take into account
these conceptual issues, what’s up for debate when discussing conservation is no longer just
whether we should preserve nature or use it for our purposes, but also what counts as
preservation: when and if human action is required or allowed, when human inaction is action,
and so on.
The second complication for the conservation debate stems from the simplistic division of
options into preservation or use. Why should conservationists have to hold such a rigid either/or
position? Perhaps we shouldn’t or can’t apply a universal rule to all environmental situations:
something like, preserve nature exactly the way it is now, no matter what. Perhaps we have to

3. figure out the right thing to do on a case-by-case basis. This should be a familiar point, but it’s
important enough to bear repeating: when you’re doing applied ethics—when you’re trying to
decide what to do—don’t look for moral rules; look for principles (Schmidtz & Willott (2012)).
The simplified version of the conservation debate can sometimes mask this crucial point. A good
principle to work with might be something like the following: “Try to preserve nature as it is
unless the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits”—and note that what should be taken into
consideration here aren’t just economic costs and benefits but practical, social, and ethical ones
as well. Unfortunately, holding this kind of principle in mind doesn’t make our job as applied
ethicists any easier, because figuring out the relative weights of all these competing costs and
benefits is arguably the most difficult part.
The third and final complication I’ll raise here is possibly the most important, and it’s closely
related to my previous point: when debating conservation, there are never only two viewpoints to
consider. In McPhee’s depiction of the argument between Brower and Dominy, for example, the
focus is on two obviously oppositional points of view. To oversimplify their argument even
further: Dominy supports damming the Colorado because of the water and energy it makes
accessible; Brower argues against the dam because of the incredible natural beauty it destroyed.
Even if it’s possible to decide on a winner between these two, it’s much more difficult to
determine whether building the dam was right or wrong when the myriad other competing
interests are taken into consideration. Here are just a few of those factors, though there certainly
are others:
One consideration is the massive cost involved in building and maintaining the dam, not to
mention that of the inevitable repairs it requires over time. Money spent on a dam is a lost
resource that might have fueled alternative solutions: for example, developing and installing less
environmentally disruptive greywater collection or water reclamation equipment and facilities; or,
on the more extreme end of the spectrum, funding the relocation of settlers to areas naturally able
to sustain human and nonhuman animal life.
A second consideration is the complicated ethical tangle involved in the allocation of water
rights. Dominy points out that the dam makes water accessible to millions of people who, before

4. the dam, couldn’t reliably access enough to survive. However, what he fails to mention is that
it’s only some people who reap this benefit while others are left worse off and helpless. The
division between those who receive water and those who don’t lines up neatly with
socioeconomic status: so, the damming of the Colorado waters the casinos of Vegas and the golf
courses of Phoenix, but it simultaneously prevents a sustainable water source from reaching
northern Mexico.
Finally, while Brower mourns the loss of natural beauty in the canyons that now form the bottom
of Lake Powell, he doesn’t go into detail about the interests of the ecosystems constituting that
natural beauty. It wasn’t just spectacular vistas for human eyes that were destroyed by the dam,
but also entire ecological communities and populations. According to Brower, the area was
virtually unknown and unexplored. Perhaps these lost canyons were home to unique or
endangered species, or populations of known species distinct from other populations
interactionally if not genetically (e.g., Millstein (2013)). These issues raise questions about our
ethical obligations to nonhuman animals, or biodiversity, or the preservation of life.
So, now what do we do? I’ve raised more questions than answers here, as is so often the case in
environmental ethics. Our confused concepts of “nature” and “wilderness” complicate decisions
about what to conserve and how to do so. Preservation and wise use are points along a spectrum
of possible action rather than potential universal moral laws. And, in every case where the
environment is concerned, there are always more potential effects and interests than we might
originally have assumed. It’s only by facing up to and considering these kinds of complications,
though, that we can even hope to make progress on any ethical issues where the environment is
at stake.

5. References
Cronon, W. (1996). “The trouble with wilderness: Or, getting back to the wrong nature.”
Environmental History 1, 1: pp. 7-28.
Dowie, M. (2005). “Conservation refugees.” Orion. Available:
<http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/161/>.
McKibben, B. (2006). “The end of nature.” In The End of Nature. New York: Random House.
40-78.
McPhee, J. (1971). “A river.” In Encounters with the Archdruid. New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux. 153-245.
Millstein, R. (2013). “Endangered orcas and the concept of ‘population.’” New APPS: Art,
Politics, Philosophy, Science. Available:
<http://www.newappsblog.com/2013/09/endangered-orcas-and-the-concept-of-population.
html>
Schmidtz, D. & E. Willott (2012). “Rules, principles, and integrity: A general introduction.” In
Schmidtz, D. & E. Willott (Eds.), Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What
Really Works, 2nd ed. New York: OUP. xv - xxiii.