Here are some discussion questions: 1. What are the main arguments made in these readings regarding our obligations to future generations? 2. Do future generations have rights in the present on Parfit and Baier's views? Why or why not? 3. What are the key differences between presentism and the view that the interests of future generations matter? 4. How do utilitarianism and the "wrongs require victims" view approach our duties to future persons? 5. What are some of the challenges in determining what we owe to future generations who we cannot identify? 6. Do these readings change your views on intergenerational justice and climate change policy? If so, how?

1. Future generations
Week 10

2. Chernobyl nuclear disaster
https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/3bb1d6eba4a8459abc3d58a263eeade4
https://web.archive.org/web/20121005150746/http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/chornobyl-nuclear-power-plant-site-
to-be-cleared-b-56391.html
https://medium.com/usaid-2030/remembering-the-worlds-worst-nuclear-disaster-33359ed71863

3. Ethics and future generations
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/live/2019/apr/12/youth-climate-change-protests-across-britain-live?page=with:block-5cb05b738f08bc7376aebcdc
https://www.google.com/search?q=climate+change+protest+future+generations&rlz=1C5CHFA_enZA821ZA821&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=2ahUK
Ewi1jpvgso_oAhUSmRoKHcg2BSIQ_AUoAXoECA0QAw&biw=1370&bih=798
https://www.groundup.org.za/article/climate-strike/

4. Some ethical questions raised by the existence of future persons
1. What ought we to provide to future generations – may we leave as much and as good resources,
or are we required to leave the world improved (and if so by how much)?
2. We exist now but future persons do not. Can we have duties to non-existent beings?
3. A change of policy may cause different individuals to be born. It may therefore not be possible
to say that a given policy improves the lives of particular future persons. Does this affect our
obligation to future persons?
4. We cannot know future persons (either their identity or their preferences). How might our
obligations (or future persons’ rights) be affected by this?
5. Can non-existent beings have rights (in the present)?
6. Who is entitled to act on behalf of future persons?
See E. Partridge 2001. ‘Future Generations’, in D. Jamieson (ed.) Companion to Environmental Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 378-9.

5. Two positions on question 1: Marx and Hardin
Marx’s stewardship view
‘From the standpoint of a higher economic form of society, private ownership of the globe by single
individuals will appear quite as absurd as private ownership of one man by another. Even a whole
society, a nation, or even all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the owners of
the globe. They are only its possessors, its usufructuaries, and, like boni patres familias, they must
hand it down to succeeding generations in an improved condition.’ (Capital Vol. 3, p. 567)
Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-III.pdf
Hardin
‘Using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the public under frontier conditions, because there
is no public; the same behaviour in a metropolis is unbearable. A hundred and fifty years ago a
plainsman could kill an American bison, cut out only the tongue for his dinner, and discard the rest
of the animal. He was not in any important sense being wasteful.’ (Hardin, p. 1245)
G. Hardin 1968. ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 162 (no. 3859), p. 1245.
Available at: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243

6. Rawls on ‘the problem of justice between generations’
‘Once the difference principle is accepted, however, it follows that the minimum is to be set at that
point which, taking wages into account, maximizes the expectations of the least advantaged group …
The appropriate expectation in applying the difference principle is that of the long-term prospects of
the least favored extending over future generations. Each generation must not only preserve the gains
of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but it
must also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation … These
comments about how to specify the social minimum have led us to the problem of justice between
generations. Finding a just savings principle is one aspect of this question’ (J. Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, p. 252; the whole of section 44 of A Theory of Justice, i.e. pp. 251-258, is of interest here)
Suppose T1 = lifetime of present generation, T2 = all time after present generation
There are two scenarios, each with one relatively well off group, and one less well off group:
A. Wealth in T1 = (20, 10), wealth in T2 = (20, 7)
B. Wealth in T1 = (20, 9), wealth in T2 = (20, 9)
Q: Which scenario will Rawls favour?
Q: How is Rawls’s position similar or dissimilar to that of Marx?

7. Rawls on ‘the problem of justice between generations’
‘[W]hen the parties consider this problem they do not know to which generation they belong or,
what comes to the same thing, the stage of civilization of their society. They have no way of
telling whether it is poor or relatively wealthy … The veil of ignorance is complete in these
respects … [But] the parties know that they are contemporaries … to achieve a reasonable result,
we assume first, that the parties represent family lines, say, who care at least about their more
immediate descendants; and second, that the principle adopted must be such that they wish all
earlier generations to have followed it. These constraints, together with the veil of ignorance, are
to ensure that any one generation looks out for all … the parties are to ask themselves how much
they would be willing to save at each stage of advance on the assumption that all other
generations have saved, or will save, in accordance with the same criterion’
(J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 254-255)

8. Presentism: the preferences of the present generation should determine the formulation
and evaluation of public policy
Q: Is presentism compatible with the interests of future generations having any weight?
Q: Is presentism compatible with the recognition that we have obligations towards future
generations?
Q: Is presentism compatible with the recognition that future generations have rights?
Q: Is utilitarianism or Kantian ethics a version of presentism? If not, why not?
R. B. Howarth 2011. ‘Intergenerational Justice’, in J. S. Dryzek et al (eds) Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 338.
Presentism

9. [1] The higher the balance of people’s happiness over suffering, the better the world is
[2] We have a moral duty not to make the world worse, but to make it better or even the best that
we can
[3] Therefore, we have a moral duty not to reduce utility, but to increase or even maximize it
[4] The fewer environmental resources people have, the less effectively they can satisfy their needs
and desires
[5] The less effectively people can satisfy their needs and desires, the lower the utility
[6] Therefore, we have a moral duty not to reduce people’s environmental resources, but to
increase or even maximize them
[7] The interests of future people matter just as much as the interests of existing people.
[8] Therefore, we have a moral duty not to reduce future people’s environmental resources, but to
increase or even maximize them
See A. Brennan, Y. S. Lo 2010. Understanding environmental philosophy, Durham: Acumen, p. 22.
The utilitarian argument

10. The Nuclear Technician: ‘Some technician lazily chooses not to check some tank in
which nuclear wastes are buried. As a result there is a catastrophe two centuries later.
Leaked radiation kills and injures thousands of people.’
D. Parfit 2010. ‘Energy Policy and the Further Future’, in S. Gardiner et al (eds) Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, p. 112.
‘The Nuclear Technician’

11. The Risky Policy: ‘Suppose that, as a community, we have a choice between two
energy policies. Both would be completely safe for at least two centuries, but one would
have certain risks for the further future. If we choose the Risky Policy, the standard of
living would be somewhat higher over the next two centuries. We do choose this
policy. As a result there is a similar catastrophe two centuries later, which kills and
injures thousands of people.’
Q: Is the choice of the risky policy worse for anyone?
D. Parfit 2010. ‘Energy Policy and the Further Future’, in S. Gardiner et al (eds) Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, p. 112.
‘The Risky Policy’

12. Q: Does this make a moral difference?
In other words, does it make a difference to how we evaluate the choice of risky policy that
choosing the risk policy will not make the life of anyone who lives worse?
There are three possible views:
[1] It will make all the difference. Wrongs Require Victims: Our choice cannot be wrong if we
know that it will be worse for no one.
[2] It will make no difference. Wrongs Do Not Require Victims: Our choice is still wrong even
though we know that it will be worse for no one.
[3] It will make some difference. Wrongs Do Not Require Victims: Our choice is wrong but it is
not as wrong as it would be if it made some people’s lives worse
D. Parfit 2010. ‘Energy Policy and the Further Future’, in S. Gardiner et al (eds) Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.
112.
‘The Risky Policy’

13. Depletion: ‘Suppose that, as a community, we must choose whether to deplete or conserve
certain kinds of resources. If we choose Depletion, the quality of life over the next two centuries
would be slightly higher than it would have been if we had chosen Conservation, but it may later
be much lower. Life at this much lower level would, however, still be well worth living’.
The effects are:
D. Parfit 2010. ‘Energy Policy and the Further Future’, in S. Gardiner et al (eds) Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 115.
‘Depletion’

14. ‘It is bad if those who live are worse off than those who might have lived’
If this is the idea, then our judgment refers to both:
(i) People who live in the future; and
(ii) People who would have lived in the future, if we had chosen otherwise
D. Parfit 2010. ‘Energy Policy and the Further Future’, in S. Gardiner et al (eds) Climate
Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 118.
Parfit on future generations

15. Q: Which of the following statements is compatible with the ‘wrongs do not require
victims’ view?
(A) It is bad if and only if people are affected for the worse
(B) If the same number of lives would be lived either way, it would be bad if people are
worse off than people might have been
Parfit on future generations

16. Q: Do we need to be able to identify individuals in the future, to speak of bad policies?
To identify an individual is to denote them using a singular referring expression
E.g. the person who was named ‘John Smith’ on March 10, 2020 in St. Joseph’s hospital;
Or: the person who would result if Kay and David mate at 8pm on March 10, 2020
Personal identity

17. Q: What difference is made if we say that future generations have rights now, rather
than that they will have rights?
A. Baier 1981. ‘The Rights of Past and Future Persons’, in E. Partridge (ed.) Responsibilities to Future Generations,
Prometheus. http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/muniz/intergen/Baier.pdf
Can future generations have rights in the present? (Baier)

18. For Baier, to say that someone has a right is to say that:
[a] there is an individual interest to be protected
[b] at least one other person has an obligation to the right-holder
[c] the right-holder, or their proxy, has (or should have) the means to take action if the obligation be
neglected (e.g. belated discharge of the obligation; punishment if this is not done; compensation)
[d] by implication, the claim is compatible with the recognition of all other rights that are taken to
exist (because one could not enforce conflicting rights)
[e] the right-holder can waive a right (= voluntarily renounce it without transferring it)
As future generations cannot select a proxy, any rights they have must relate to things any human
being has a reason to want (i.e. be independent of any special knowledge about their identity)
‘Our ignorance of precisely who future generations will be, and uncertainty of how numerous they
will be … is not relevant to the reality of obligations to future persons’ (p. 173)
A. Baier 1981. ‘The Rights of Past and Future Persons’, in E. Partridge (ed.) Responsibilities to Future Generations, Prometheus.
http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/muniz/intergen/Baier.pdf
Can future generations have rights in the present? (Baier)

19. One argument for the view that future generations have rights in the present runs as follows:
[1] We think that we had rights vis-à-vis the past generation that they not deliberately increased their
non-renewed wealth at our expense
[2] No one generation can be said to be any more important than any other generation
[3] It follows, from [2], we cannot consistently deny that any relation of obligation between the past
generation and ourselves does not also hold between ourselves and the future generation
[4] It follows, from [1] and [3], that we cannot consistently deny that we have obligations to the
future generation in respect of how we deal with resources
We are, in other words, committed in our thinking to a conception of ourselves as members of a
cross-generational moral community
‘I see no reason in principle why we should not speak of rights of future generations as well of our
obligations to them, but on the other hand I see nothing very important to be gained by doing so’
(p.181)
A. Baier 1981. ‘The Rights of Past and Future Persons’, in E. Partridge (ed.) Responsibilities to Future Generations, Prometheus. http://profs-
polisci.mcgill.ca/muniz/intergen/Baier.pdf
Why should future generations have rights in the present? (Baier)

20. Class discussion
Read:
[1] D. Parfit 2010 [1983]. ‘Energy Policy and the Further Future’, in S. Gardiner et al
(eds) Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 112-121.
[2] R. B. Howarth 2011. ‘Intergenerational Justice’, in J. S. Dryzek et al (eds) Oxford
Handbook of Climate Change and Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 338-352.