Eiropas Komisijas loma fiskālās disciplīnas stiprināšanā
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10.12.2015 Ekspertu saruna: Vai laiks eiro zonas Finanšu ministrijai? Eiropas Komisijas pārstāvniecības Latvijā vadītāja, Dr.habil.oec. Inna Šteinbuka: Eiropas Komisijas loma fiskālās disciplīnas stiprināšanā
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Eiropas Komisijas loma fiskālās disciplīnas stiprināšanā
- 1. Eiropas Komisijas loma fiskālās disciplīnas stiprināšanā Prof. Dr. Inna Šteinbuka Eiropas Komisijas pārstāvniecības Latvijā vadītāja
- 2. “Šī Eiropas Komisija būs ļoti politiska, tāpēc tai ir jauna arhitektūra, kurā viceprezidentiem dots uzdevums koordinēt, sintezēt un organizēt idejas." EK prezidenta Žana-Kloda Junkera mandāts balstās uz viņa 10 prioritātēm
- 3. Šī Komisija sastāv no politikas "smagsvariem" Pēc Eiropas Parlamenta apstiprinošā balsojuma Eiropas Komisija sāka darbu 2014.gada 1.novembrī ar: • 9 iepriekšējiem premjeriem vai vicepremjeriem • 19 iepriekšējiem ministriem • 7 iepriekšējiem Komisāriem • 8 iepriekšējiem EP deputātiem
- 4. Fiskālā atbildība - izaugsmes pamats
- 6. EK vērtējums par eiro zonas valstu budžeta plāniem
- 7. EK rudens makroekonomiskā prognoze Fiskālā konsolidācija turpināsies, mazāk ierobežojot izaugsmi
- 8. Makroekonomiskā uzraudzība: 11 indikatori Tekošā konta bilance Ārvalstu investīciju bilance Eksporta tirgus daļa Darba ražīgums Valūtas maiņas kurss Privātā sektora parāds Privātā sektora kredītu plūsma Mājokļu cenu izmaiņas Valsts sektora parāds Bezdarba līmenis Finanšu sektora saistības
- 9. Eiropas Fiskālā padome • EK 21.10.15. pieņēma lēmumu par neatkarīgas padomdevēja institūcijas - Eiropas fiskālās padomes veidošanu • Padome dos ieguldījumu EK fiskālās uzraudzības darbā un Stabilitātes un izaugsmes pakta (SIP) ievērošanā • Padomi vadīs 5 augsta līmeņa eksperti, sekretariātu veidos Eiropas galvenā ekonomikas analītiķa birojs • Padomei būs padomdevēja loma eiro zonas fiskālās politikas virziena noteikšanā; tā neaizvietos, bet papildinās nacionālās Fiskālās padomes
- 10. EK vērtējums par Francijas budžeta plānu • Francijas iesniegtais budžeta projekts kopumā atbilst Stabilitātes un izaugsmes pakta normām • Francija šobrīd piemērota pārmērīga deficīta procedūra • Francijai jāsamazina budžeta deficīts zem 3% no IKP līdz 2017.gadam, bet 2016.gadā jāsasniedz 3,4% • Paredzētie budžeta konsolidācijas pasākumi ir nepietiekami • EK skaidri pauž savas bažas par Francijas budžeta stratēģiju 2016.gadam
- 11. EK vērtējums par Itālijas budžeta plānu • Itālija ir lūgusi papildus elastīgumu savā budžeta plānā: 0,1% no IKP, izmantojot strukturālo reformu klauzulu, un 0,3%, izmantojot investīciju klauzulu • EK šajā brīdī nepiešķir Itālijai papildus elastīgumu • Papildus Itālija lūdz 0,2% elastīgumu, balstoties uz "neparedzētu gadījumu" klauzulas, ņemot vērā izmaksas saistībā ar bēgļu krīzi Vidusjūrā • EK veiks gala novērtējumu par reālajiem izdevumiem, kas tieši saistīti ar bēgļu krīzi, 2016.gada pavasarī, kad saņems informāciju no Itālijas atbildīgajām iestādēm
- 12. Paldies par uzmanību! Prof. Dr. Inna Šteinbuka Eiropas Komisijas pārstāvniecības Latvijā vadītāja
Editor's Notes
- In 2015, the aggregate deficit-to-GDP ratio of the euro area is expected to fall to 2.0%, thanks to past fiscal consolidation efforts, the cyclical strengthening of economic activity and, to a lesser extent, lower interest expenditure. By 2017, the deficit-to-GDP ratio of the euro area should fall to 1.5%. The fiscal stance of the euro area is expected to remain broadly neutral. The euro area’s debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to fall from its peak of 94.5% in 2014 to reach 91.3% in 2017. The deficit-to-GDP ratio for the EU as a whole is forecast to decline to 1.6% in 2017 from a forecast 2.5% this year, while its debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to fall to 85.8% in 2017 from 87.8% expected this year.
- It endeavors to avoid unsustainable booms in good times that will bring busts with highly costly consequences in terms of economic activity, financial stability and employment both in the domestic economy as well as in partner countries. The MIP has two arms – preventive and corrective – similarly to those in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). These two arms have different objectives: the preventive arm helps Member States to adopt good policies that will lead to balanced medium-term growth, jobs and financial stability. The corrective arm aims to identify and correct policy failures or address major macroeconomic risks that are harmful for the economic developments in the Member State concerned and may generate negative spillovers to other Member States. The yearly MIP cycle starts with a comprehensive economic analysis, the Alert Mechanism Report, which covers all EU Member States not benefiting from financial assistance with a view to distinguishing those economies that warrant detailed scrutiny before concluding if there is an imbalance or an excessive imbalance. The conclusions of the AMR are then discussed by the Council and the Eurogroup, enabling the Commission to get appropriate feedback from Member States. On this basis, the Commission decides for which countries it will prepare country-specific in-depth reviews. The purpose of the in-depth reviews (IDRs) is to assess whether imbalances and excessive imbalances exist in the Member States identified in the Alert Mechanism Report. The IDRs discuss issues such as the evolution of Member States' external accounts, savings and investment balances, effective exchange rates, export market shares, cost- and non-cost competitiveness, productivity, private and public debt, housing prices, credit flows, financial systems, unemployment and other variables An in-depth review will lead to one of the following results: MIP categories 1 No imbalance 2 Imbalances, which require monitoring and policy action 3 Imbalances, which require monitoring and decisive policy action 4 Imbalances, which require specific monitoring and decisive policy action 5 Excessive imbalances, which require specific monitoring and decisive policy action 6 Excessive imbalances, leading to the Excessive Imbalance Procedure If an Excessive Imbalance Procedure is launched the Member State concerned is obliged to present a corrective action plan (CAP) setting up a roadmap to implement corrective policy actions. The CAP should be a detailed plan for corrective actions with specific policy measures and implementation timetable. After submission of the CAP by the Member State, the Council assesses the CAP with two possible outcomes as illustrated below: 1) If the Council considers the CAP to be insufficient, the Council adopts a recommendation to the Member State to submit a new CAP. If the new CAP is still considered to be insufficient, a fine (0.1% of GDP) can be imposed (with RQMV, see below) for having failed twice in a row to submit a sufficient CAP. Thus the Member State cannot stall the procedure by not presenting a good CAP. 2) If the Council considers the CAP to be sufficient, it will endorse the CAP through a recommendation that lists the corrective actions and their implementation deadlines.
- Public debt levels have risen substantially over the last years as a consequence of the economic and financial crisis. The average ratio of public debt to GDP in the euro area stands at over 90% today, compared with below 70% before the crisis. The graph shows the rise of debt levels in the past 20 years. Public finances are expected to face significant pressures in the years to come as a result of demographic trends, including ageing populations. Among euro area Member States, healthy public finances and sound fiscal policies are essential as problems in one Member State can easily spill over to others. While each Member State needs to follow appropriate fiscal policies, it is also important that the overall direction of fiscal policy is suitable for the euro area as a whole. The European Fiscal Board will cooperate closely with national fiscal councils and will benefit from their expertise in fiscal matters, as well as from their particular local knowledge. The cooperation is expected to benefit both the European Fiscal Board and the national fiscal councils by promoting exchange of best practices and common understanding on EU fiscal matters. Following the recommendations of the "Five Presidents' Report", the Commission proposes to set up an European Fiscal Board as an advisory body on the overall direction of fiscal policy in the euro area and in the Union and an independent evaluator of how the EU’s fiscal framework is being implemented. The European Fiscal Board will feed into the Commission's work of surveillance and enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It will advise on the overall direction of fiscal policy of the euro area and evaluate how the fiscal governance framework was executed. The Board would neither replace national fiscal councils nor duplicate the Commission's work on applying the Stability and Growth Pact. The European Fiscal Board will provide advice and evaluation to the Commission. The board will be composed of five renowned international experts with credible competence and experience in macroeconomics and practical budgetary policy-making. In line with best practices, these experts will be nominated by the Commission in consultation with several key stakeholders such as the European Central Bank, the Eurogroup Working Group and the national fiscal councils. While necessarily linked to the Commission for practical administrative purposes, the European Fiscal Board will carry out its tasks autonomously.
- FR paredzētā korekcija: 0,1% - 2015.gadā, 0,3% - 2016.gadā, nepieciešams: 0,5% - 2015.gadā, 0,8% - 2016.gadā FR balstās uz paredzamu optimistiskāku ekonomikas izaugsmi, nekā EK rudens prognoze
- On the substance of the requests, the fulfilment of the eligibility criteria for the Investment Clause is borderline. According to ECFIN’s assessment, only 0.2% of expenditures could be eligible under this clause. Concerning the structural reform clause, 0.4% of flexibility was already granted in the spring under this clause. The Commission would therefore not grant further flexibility at this stage. Instead, it would indicate in its Opinion that in the context of an overall assessment to be made of Italy's compliance with the Pact, notably taking into account the Stability Programme to be submitted next April, it will assess the extent to which Italy would have been eligible for one or more of these clauses. Particular attention will be paid to whether the announced investments are underway. The Commission will also carefully assess whether progress with the structural reform agenda is in line with the Council recommendations. Italy has also requested to avail of the 'unusual event' clause on the account of higher costs due to the refugee crisis amounting to 0.2% of GDP. The Italian authorities estimated their costs against an expenditure baseline calibrated over the period 2011-2013. However, the baseline envisaged by the Commission for the calculation of the additional costs, in line with SGP rules, is the previous year. The Commission estimates the additional costs in 2015 with respect to 2014 at below 0.1% of GDP. At this stage, no additional costs are estimated for 2016 with respect to 2015. We will make a final assessment of the fulfilment of the conditions and the eligible amounts on the basis of observed data as provided by the Italian authorities.