We study the interactions between capital income tax and social security in the context of longevity. On the one hand, taxing capital income gains reduces capital accumulation and slows down economic progress. On the other hand, increasing life expectancy raises incentives for capital accumulation, which makes capital relatively less responsive to the tax hikes. Under longevity, reforming social security from a defined benefit system to a defined contribution system limits the extent of fiscal imbalance in the long run, thus further raising efficiency.
The existing view in the literature states that the insurance motive dominates the efficiency gains when evaluating the welfare effects of social security reform with stochastic income shocks. We show, under plausible calibration of the US economy, that the efficiency gain resulting from the interaction of social security and capital income taxation in the context of longevity provide welfare gains sufficient to outweigh the loss of insurance. By analyzing a variety of fiscal closures, we reconcile our result with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support for capital income taxation is feasible.
The role for capital income taxation in social security privatizationGRAPE
Taxing capital or capital income is inefficient in a standard representative agent model. However, when choosing which tax to raise, an important concern is related to the elasticity of response to taxation. A growing body of the literature demonstrates that inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is quantitatively relevant for the magnitude of capital adjustment in response to capital taxation, hence affecting the size of the efficiency loss . For example, if agents have to save, optimal capital income tax is actually positive, as is the case in setups with idiosyncratic income shocks. With longer life expectancy, rational agents generally raise savings, which makes capital potentially an interesting candidate for taxation when longevity increases. In this paper, we study taxation of capital in the contexts of pension systems balance and reforms with particular attention devoted to the role of longevity.
capital (income) taxation and pension system reformGRAPE
The paper studies the interaction between capital (income) taxation and pension system reform in the context of rising longevity. In an economy with idiosyncratic income shocks and uncertainty about life duration, defined benefit pension plans with redistribution (similar to the current US pension system) provide some insurance against these risks. The existing view in the literature states that the current pension system in the US introduces distortions to labor supply decisions and reduces capital accumulation, but reducing this distortion by the means of introducing (partially) funded defined contribution system involves loss of insurance and transitory fiscal gap, which dominate the benefits of reform. Prior financed the transitory costs of the reform by taxing consumption. We show that in the context of longevity, capital income taxation provides a superior alternative: welfare gains are sufficient to outweigh the loss of insurance and transitory funding costs. Our approach builds on optimal taxation literature: taxes should be levied on the least responsive tax base, and growing life expectancy raises incentives for capital accumulation. Further, higher risk exposure amplifies incentives for precautionary savings. These two mechanisms -- the rising longevity and the stronger precautionary motive -- make capital accumulation relatively less responsive to the tax hikes, thus reducing the dead-weight loss from increased taxation. In the long run, privatizing social security permits lower taxation, thus boosting capital income gains, accelerating capital accumulation, and economic progress. We reconcile our results with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support for capital income taxation is feasible.
The document discusses the changing financial landscape and opportunities with life insurance. It notes that fees can significantly reduce retirement savings over time. Life insurance is positioned as a better alternative due to lower fees, tax advantages, living benefits and ability to access funds penalty-free. The document argues that with the right strategy, life insurance can provide greater returns and income than other options like 401ks. It also discusses opportunities for referral agents.
How to eliminate market risk with the potential to earn up to 15% per year tax-free, have the option to borrow tax-free with no need to repay the loan and take monies out tax-free before or after retirement.
Efficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pr...GRAPE
The document discusses the role of fiscal policy in social security privatization reforms. It motivates the analysis by noting that defined benefit social security systems face viability issues due to increasing longevity. Any reform redistributes costs and benefits both between and within generations. Previous research has examined the tradeoff between efficiency gains and transition costs, or efficiency and insurance provision in stochastic settings. The authors contribute by introducing new fiscal policy options to accompany reforms, with the goals of boosting efficiency while maintaining insurance. They develop an overlapping generations model with income shocks to analyze how different fiscal policies impact the welfare and political support of social security privatization reforms.
This document discusses retirement planning and alternatives to traditional 401(k)s and IRAs. It argues that 401(k)s have high fees and are a poor investment for retirement. Alternative options presented include index universal life insurance policies that allow tax-free growth and access to funds for retirement income, critical illnesses, or chronic conditions. The document claims these policies provide better returns and guarantees than traditional retirement accounts while avoiding taxes and market risk. Disclosures note that withdrawals are subject to surrender penalties and tax liability.
Efficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pr...GRAPE
This document discusses the role of fiscal policy in social security privatization reforms. It motivates the analysis by noting that defined benefit pension systems face viability issues due to longevity increases. Any reform redistributes costs and benefits between and within generations. Previous literature has considered efficiency gains against transition costs or insurance losses, but not compared different fiscal policy options. This paper develops an overlapping generations model with income shocks to evaluate how different fiscal policies, like labor taxes or public debt, can accompany a reform from defined benefit to partially funded individual accounts in order to offset insurance losses, boost efficiency, or smooth transition costs. It calibrates the model to the US economy and analyzes how welfare and political support are impacted under various policy combinations.
The document discusses alternative strategies for financing large purchases and saving for retirement compared to traditional bank loans and qualified retirement plans. It introduces the concept of an "IRC 7702(a) Private Plan", which allows savings to grow tax-free and be withdrawn tax-free, unlike qualified plans. The plan is presented as a way for baby boomers to better plan for retirement outside of the current system, which many have not saved enough through. Contact information is provided to learn more about setting up a private plan.
The role for capital income taxation in social security privatizationGRAPE
Taxing capital or capital income is inefficient in a standard representative agent model. However, when choosing which tax to raise, an important concern is related to the elasticity of response to taxation. A growing body of the literature demonstrates that inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is quantitatively relevant for the magnitude of capital adjustment in response to capital taxation, hence affecting the size of the efficiency loss . For example, if agents have to save, optimal capital income tax is actually positive, as is the case in setups with idiosyncratic income shocks. With longer life expectancy, rational agents generally raise savings, which makes capital potentially an interesting candidate for taxation when longevity increases. In this paper, we study taxation of capital in the contexts of pension systems balance and reforms with particular attention devoted to the role of longevity.
capital (income) taxation and pension system reformGRAPE
The paper studies the interaction between capital (income) taxation and pension system reform in the context of rising longevity. In an economy with idiosyncratic income shocks and uncertainty about life duration, defined benefit pension plans with redistribution (similar to the current US pension system) provide some insurance against these risks. The existing view in the literature states that the current pension system in the US introduces distortions to labor supply decisions and reduces capital accumulation, but reducing this distortion by the means of introducing (partially) funded defined contribution system involves loss of insurance and transitory fiscal gap, which dominate the benefits of reform. Prior financed the transitory costs of the reform by taxing consumption. We show that in the context of longevity, capital income taxation provides a superior alternative: welfare gains are sufficient to outweigh the loss of insurance and transitory funding costs. Our approach builds on optimal taxation literature: taxes should be levied on the least responsive tax base, and growing life expectancy raises incentives for capital accumulation. Further, higher risk exposure amplifies incentives for precautionary savings. These two mechanisms -- the rising longevity and the stronger precautionary motive -- make capital accumulation relatively less responsive to the tax hikes, thus reducing the dead-weight loss from increased taxation. In the long run, privatizing social security permits lower taxation, thus boosting capital income gains, accelerating capital accumulation, and economic progress. We reconcile our results with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support for capital income taxation is feasible.
The document discusses the changing financial landscape and opportunities with life insurance. It notes that fees can significantly reduce retirement savings over time. Life insurance is positioned as a better alternative due to lower fees, tax advantages, living benefits and ability to access funds penalty-free. The document argues that with the right strategy, life insurance can provide greater returns and income than other options like 401ks. It also discusses opportunities for referral agents.
How to eliminate market risk with the potential to earn up to 15% per year tax-free, have the option to borrow tax-free with no need to repay the loan and take monies out tax-free before or after retirement.
Efficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pr...GRAPE
The document discusses the role of fiscal policy in social security privatization reforms. It motivates the analysis by noting that defined benefit social security systems face viability issues due to increasing longevity. Any reform redistributes costs and benefits both between and within generations. Previous research has examined the tradeoff between efficiency gains and transition costs, or efficiency and insurance provision in stochastic settings. The authors contribute by introducing new fiscal policy options to accompany reforms, with the goals of boosting efficiency while maintaining insurance. They develop an overlapping generations model with income shocks to analyze how different fiscal policies impact the welfare and political support of social security privatization reforms.
This document discusses retirement planning and alternatives to traditional 401(k)s and IRAs. It argues that 401(k)s have high fees and are a poor investment for retirement. Alternative options presented include index universal life insurance policies that allow tax-free growth and access to funds for retirement income, critical illnesses, or chronic conditions. The document claims these policies provide better returns and guarantees than traditional retirement accounts while avoiding taxes and market risk. Disclosures note that withdrawals are subject to surrender penalties and tax liability.
Efficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pr...GRAPE
This document discusses the role of fiscal policy in social security privatization reforms. It motivates the analysis by noting that defined benefit pension systems face viability issues due to longevity increases. Any reform redistributes costs and benefits between and within generations. Previous literature has considered efficiency gains against transition costs or insurance losses, but not compared different fiscal policy options. This paper develops an overlapping generations model with income shocks to evaluate how different fiscal policies, like labor taxes or public debt, can accompany a reform from defined benefit to partially funded individual accounts in order to offset insurance losses, boost efficiency, or smooth transition costs. It calibrates the model to the US economy and analyzes how welfare and political support are impacted under various policy combinations.
The document discusses alternative strategies for financing large purchases and saving for retirement compared to traditional bank loans and qualified retirement plans. It introduces the concept of an "IRC 7702(a) Private Plan", which allows savings to grow tax-free and be withdrawn tax-free, unlike qualified plans. The plan is presented as a way for baby boomers to better plan for retirement outside of the current system, which many have not saved enough through. Contact information is provided to learn more about setting up a private plan.
This document summarizes a study that examines the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension schemes (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and funded defined contribution) using overlapping generations models. It finds that increasing the retirement age leads to overall welfare gains in all schemes. The mechanisms through which welfare increases differ across schemes, with labor supply, pensions, taxes, and other macroeconomic variables changing to different degrees depending on the pension design. The study aims to better understand how macroeconomic effects and welfare impacts may vary when the retirement age is increased under different existing pension-benefit linkages.
Effciency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pri...GRAPE
Pension system reforms imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within cohorts. They also implicitly affect the scope of risk sharing in societies. Linking pensions to individual incomes increases efficiency but reduces the insurance motive implicit in Beveridgean systems. The existing view in the literature argues that the insurance motive dominates the efficiency gains when evaluating the welfare effects. We show that this result is not universal: there exist ways to increase efficiency or compensate for the loss of insurance, assuring welfare gains from pension system reform even in economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. The fiscal closure, which necessarily accompanies the changes in the pension system, may boost efficiency and/or make up for lower insurance in the pension system. Indeed, fiscal closures inherently interact with the effects of pension system reform, counteracting or reinforcing the original effects. By analyzing a variety of fiscal closures, we reconcile our result with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support is feasible depending on the fiscal closure.
Eficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pri...GRAPE
Pension system reforms imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within cohorts. They also implicitly affect the scope of risk sharing in societies. Linking pensions to individual incomes increases efficiency but reduces the insurance motive implicit in Beveridgean systems. The existing view in the literature argues that the insurance motive dominates the efficiency gains when evaluating the welfare effects. We show that this result is not universal: there exist ways to increase efficiency or compensate the loss of insurance, assuring welfare gains from pension system reform even in economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. The fiscal closure, which necessarily accompanies the changes in the pension system, may boost efficiency and/or make up for lower insurance in the pension system. Indeed, fiscal closures inherently interact with the effects of pension system reform, counteracting or reinforcing the original effects. By analyzing a variety of fiscal closures, we reconcile our result with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support is feasible depending on the fiscal closure
Welfare effects of fiscal closures when implementing pension reformsGRAPE
This document discusses modeling pension reforms in Poland using an overlapping generations model. It aims to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closures used to finance gaps in the social insurance fund resulting from pension reforms. The model will examine five potential fiscal closures: lump sum taxes, labor taxes, consumption taxes, debt financing plus labor taxes, and debt financing plus consumption taxes. The results will help determine which fiscal closure has the best or worst effects on welfare, savings, labor supply, and economic output.
Evaluating welfare and economic effects of raised fertilityGRAPE
In the context of second demographic transition many countries consider pro-natalistic policies as viable solutions to the fiscal pressure stemming from longevity and declining fertility. However, increased number of births implies immediate economic costs and delayed economic gains. Moreover, quantification of these gains remains a challenge. We develop an overlapping generations model with family structure and utilize this model to quantify the effects in the increases in birth rates. We show the overall welfare and macroeconomic effects as well as distribution of these effects across cohorts. We also show how the distribution of children across families affects those estimations for a given birth rate.
The Sooner The Better - The Welfare Effects of the Retirement Age Increase Un...GRAPE
This document summarizes a study that analyzes the macroeconomic and welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension systems (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and funded defined contribution). It finds that increasing the retirement age has universally positive welfare effects and increases aggregate labor supply. These effects are largest under a funded defined contribution system and enhanced when productivity increases with age. Various robustness checks considering alternative demographic and productivity assumptions confirm these overall conclusions.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial adjustments in between cohort and within cohort redistribution. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we show that fiscal closure is crucial for determining the welfare effects of the pension system reforms as well as political support for introducing it. We analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that in general, fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. We show the role of the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems for determining the welfare effects of the reform and point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of this motive for determining the welfare effects.
Inequality in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
This document discusses inequality in an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systems. It motivates the study by noting that wealth inequality has increased due to demographic transitions and pension reforms from defined benefit to defined contribution systems. The document outlines an overlapping generations model with ex ante heterogeneity in endowments and preferences within cohorts to examine the distributional effects of pension reforms and policy instruments. Key results presented are that a reform from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions increases both wealth and consumption inequality, and that a minimum pension reduces inequality from the reform by 40-50% by affecting the endowments margin.
The document discusses a 2009 reform in Poland that gradually increased the retirement age. It presents the following:
1) The reform eliminated early retirement eligibility for most workers born after 1954 (women) and 1949 (men), increasing the retirement age to 55-60 or 55-65 respectively.
2) Using a regression discontinuity design on longitudinal data, it finds a statistically significant but small discontinuity in transitions to early retirement around the cutoff dates.
3) Placebo tests find similar sized discontinuities in other time periods, suggesting the observed effect may not be caused solely by the reform. The reform had a small impact on retirement behavior relative to its scope.
This document analyzes the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension schemes (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and fully funded) using overlapping generations models. The key findings are:
1) Increasing the retirement age leads to welfare gains for all cohorts under all pension schemes by increasing aggregate labor supply and lifetime earnings.
2) The sources of gains differ by pension scheme, for example in fully funded schemes it decreases capital per worker and increases interest rates.
3) Raising the retirement age reduces pension deficits, lowers taxes, and boosts pensions and welfare compared to baseline projections.
- Equity harvesting involves removing equity from a personal residence through refinancing and using the funds to purchase a cash value life insurance policy.
- It allows people to leverage home equity at a lower interest rate than they could earn through taxable investments, building wealth in a tax-advantaged manner.
- An example shows a couple earning over $30,000 per year in tax-free income from ages 66-85 by funding a life insurance policy with $100,000 from equity harvesting, compared to just $14,000 from taxable investments.
Inequality in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
The document analyzes how inequality changes in an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systems. It finds that wealth and consumption inequalities increase due to demographic transitions and a pension reform from defined benefit to defined contribution systems. Minimum pensions can reduce inequality increases from the reform by 40-50% by raising incomes at the bottom, but have little effect on preferences. Contribution caps have a negligible impact on inequality. Overall, demographic changes contribute more to rising inequalities than the pension system reform.
On the optimal introduction of a funded pension pillarGRAPE
Jan Woźnica, Marcin Bielecki, Krzysztof Makarski and Joanna Tyrowicz Group for Research in APplied Economics (GRAPE)
15th International Pension Workshop
Paris, May 2017
Efficiency of the pension reform: The welfare effects of various fiscal closuresGRAPE
- The document discusses modeling the welfare effects of various fiscal closures (ways of financing) for a pension reform in Poland that moves from a defined benefit to a partially funded defined contribution system.
- It develops an overlapping generations model to compare steady states before and after the reform under different fiscal closures like lump sum taxes, labor taxes, consumption taxes, and debt.
- Preliminary results show the pension reform leads to small net welfare gains of around 0.5-1% of permanent income depending on the fiscal closure and degree of time inconsistency in preferences. Lump sum taxes have among the highest welfare gains.
This document discusses concerns over longevity risk in retirement among actuaries in Australia, the UK, and the US. These three actuarial associations expressed concern that citizens in their countries do not have the tools or training to make defined contribution retirement savings last a lifetime. While these countries approach retirement income differently, they all recognize the risk that retirees could outlive their savings. The joint paper by these groups identifies five principles that should be part of government frameworks to address longevity risk, including ensuring adequacy of retirement savings and facilitating lifetime income solutions.
[ARCHIVE] Aviva Real Retirement report, March 2012Aviva plc
The Aviva Real Retirement Report is a quarterly analysis of the finances and related concerns of people in three stages of retirement, 55-64, 65-74, and over 75.
Effiency of the pension reform: the welfare effetcs of various fiscal closuresGRAPE
This document describes a model developed to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closures (ways of financing) for pension reforms in Poland. The model is an overlapping generations model that considers household optimization of consumption and leisure over a lifetime, as well as a production sector. The document outlines the baseline scenario, pension reform scenario, and three fiscal closure options analyzed: labor tax increases, lump sum taxes, and debt accumulation. Preliminary results suggest that while all reforms increase long run GDP and capital, a labor tax increase leads to the smallest reduction in labor supply and is most efficient according to a lump sum redistribution analysis.
The document discusses strategies for creating a self-funded pension using index universal life insurance and index annuities. These products offer death benefits and the potential for higher returns than fixed products while protecting against losses in market downturns. They can provide fixed income in retirement until age 120 and allow for tax-deferred growth and tax-free income, helping to create a pension-like retirement plan outside of traditional employer-sponsored plans.
This document provides an overview of health care reform proposals in the United States Congress in 2009. It discusses proposals for a public health insurance option, modernizing employer-sponsored insurance, expanding individual choices, and targeting the $250 billion health insurance tax break. It also notes debates around the size of insurance exchanges, expanding employee choices, omitting Medicaid reform, and ensuring any public option does not unfairly compete in the private market. The document compares different legislative proposals and argues the Healthy Americans Act proposal covers everyone with no new taxes.
Efficiency versus insurance: Capital income taxation and privatizing social s...GRAPE
We study the interactions between capital income tax and social security privatization in the context of rising longevity. In an economy with idiosyncratic income shocks, redistributive defined benefit pay-as-you-go social security provides some insurance against income uncertainty. However, this redistribution makes social security contributions distortionary. Reforming such social security to (partially funded) defined contribution involves on the one hand loss of insurance, and on the other hand reduced distortions associated with contributions, and raised pension wealth. Furthermore, it necessitates fiscal adjustment: transition costs in the medium term and reduction in the overall taxation in the long term. The current view in the literature states that such reform would reduce welfare. We show that capital income taxation provides a superior alternative, especially in the case of longevity whereas compared to fiscal closures utilized in earlier studies attenuate them. We explain the mechanism behind this result and reconcile our results with the earlier literature.
Efficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pr...GRAPE
This document discusses the role of fiscal policy in social security privatization. It motivates the need to reform pay-as-you-go defined benefit pension systems due to increasing longevity and decreasing fertility. While previous literature finds privatization reduces welfare due to loss of insurance, the authors argue this result depends on the fiscal closure used and consider different fiscal policies. They develop an overlapping generations model to compare 81 combinations of pension reforms and fiscal closures, examining the welfare and political support implications. New closures studied include taxes on capital income, progressive labor taxes, and adjustments within the pension system.
This document summarizes a study that examines the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension schemes (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and funded defined contribution) using overlapping generations models. It finds that increasing the retirement age leads to overall welfare gains in all schemes. The mechanisms through which welfare increases differ across schemes, with labor supply, pensions, taxes, and other macroeconomic variables changing to different degrees depending on the pension design. The study aims to better understand how macroeconomic effects and welfare impacts may vary when the retirement age is increased under different existing pension-benefit linkages.
Effciency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pri...GRAPE
Pension system reforms imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within cohorts. They also implicitly affect the scope of risk sharing in societies. Linking pensions to individual incomes increases efficiency but reduces the insurance motive implicit in Beveridgean systems. The existing view in the literature argues that the insurance motive dominates the efficiency gains when evaluating the welfare effects. We show that this result is not universal: there exist ways to increase efficiency or compensate for the loss of insurance, assuring welfare gains from pension system reform even in economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. The fiscal closure, which necessarily accompanies the changes in the pension system, may boost efficiency and/or make up for lower insurance in the pension system. Indeed, fiscal closures inherently interact with the effects of pension system reform, counteracting or reinforcing the original effects. By analyzing a variety of fiscal closures, we reconcile our result with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support is feasible depending on the fiscal closure.
Eficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pri...GRAPE
Pension system reforms imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within cohorts. They also implicitly affect the scope of risk sharing in societies. Linking pensions to individual incomes increases efficiency but reduces the insurance motive implicit in Beveridgean systems. The existing view in the literature argues that the insurance motive dominates the efficiency gains when evaluating the welfare effects. We show that this result is not universal: there exist ways to increase efficiency or compensate the loss of insurance, assuring welfare gains from pension system reform even in economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. The fiscal closure, which necessarily accompanies the changes in the pension system, may boost efficiency and/or make up for lower insurance in the pension system. Indeed, fiscal closures inherently interact with the effects of pension system reform, counteracting or reinforcing the original effects. By analyzing a variety of fiscal closures, we reconcile our result with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support is feasible depending on the fiscal closure
Welfare effects of fiscal closures when implementing pension reformsGRAPE
This document discusses modeling pension reforms in Poland using an overlapping generations model. It aims to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closures used to finance gaps in the social insurance fund resulting from pension reforms. The model will examine five potential fiscal closures: lump sum taxes, labor taxes, consumption taxes, debt financing plus labor taxes, and debt financing plus consumption taxes. The results will help determine which fiscal closure has the best or worst effects on welfare, savings, labor supply, and economic output.
Evaluating welfare and economic effects of raised fertilityGRAPE
In the context of second demographic transition many countries consider pro-natalistic policies as viable solutions to the fiscal pressure stemming from longevity and declining fertility. However, increased number of births implies immediate economic costs and delayed economic gains. Moreover, quantification of these gains remains a challenge. We develop an overlapping generations model with family structure and utilize this model to quantify the effects in the increases in birth rates. We show the overall welfare and macroeconomic effects as well as distribution of these effects across cohorts. We also show how the distribution of children across families affects those estimations for a given birth rate.
The Sooner The Better - The Welfare Effects of the Retirement Age Increase Un...GRAPE
This document summarizes a study that analyzes the macroeconomic and welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension systems (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and funded defined contribution). It finds that increasing the retirement age has universally positive welfare effects and increases aggregate labor supply. These effects are largest under a funded defined contribution system and enhanced when productivity increases with age. Various robustness checks considering alternative demographic and productivity assumptions confirm these overall conclusions.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Most reforms of the pension systems imply substantial adjustments in between cohort and within cohort redistribution. Fiscal policy, which accompanies these changes may counteract or reinforce this redistribution. In an OLG model with uncertainty, we show that fiscal closure is crucial for determining the welfare effects of the pension system reforms as well as political support for introducing it. We analyze two sets of fiscal adjustments: fiscally neutral adjustments in the pension system (via contribution rate or replacement rate) and balancing pension system by a combination of taxes and/or public debt. We find that in general, fiscally neutral pension system reforms are more likely to yield welfare gains. Many adjustments obtain sufficient political support despite yielding aggregate welfare losses and vice versa. We show the role of the insurance motive implicit in some pension systems for determining the welfare effects of the reform and point to fiscal closures which attenuate and reinforce the relevance of this motive for determining the welfare effects.
Inequality in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
This document discusses inequality in an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systems. It motivates the study by noting that wealth inequality has increased due to demographic transitions and pension reforms from defined benefit to defined contribution systems. The document outlines an overlapping generations model with ex ante heterogeneity in endowments and preferences within cohorts to examine the distributional effects of pension reforms and policy instruments. Key results presented are that a reform from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions increases both wealth and consumption inequality, and that a minimum pension reduces inequality from the reform by 40-50% by affecting the endowments margin.
The document discusses a 2009 reform in Poland that gradually increased the retirement age. It presents the following:
1) The reform eliminated early retirement eligibility for most workers born after 1954 (women) and 1949 (men), increasing the retirement age to 55-60 or 55-65 respectively.
2) Using a regression discontinuity design on longitudinal data, it finds a statistically significant but small discontinuity in transitions to early retirement around the cutoff dates.
3) Placebo tests find similar sized discontinuities in other time periods, suggesting the observed effect may not be caused solely by the reform. The reform had a small impact on retirement behavior relative to its scope.
This document analyzes the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under different pension schemes (defined benefit, notional defined contribution, and fully funded) using overlapping generations models. The key findings are:
1) Increasing the retirement age leads to welfare gains for all cohorts under all pension schemes by increasing aggregate labor supply and lifetime earnings.
2) The sources of gains differ by pension scheme, for example in fully funded schemes it decreases capital per worker and increases interest rates.
3) Raising the retirement age reduces pension deficits, lowers taxes, and boosts pensions and welfare compared to baseline projections.
- Equity harvesting involves removing equity from a personal residence through refinancing and using the funds to purchase a cash value life insurance policy.
- It allows people to leverage home equity at a lower interest rate than they could earn through taxable investments, building wealth in a tax-advantaged manner.
- An example shows a couple earning over $30,000 per year in tax-free income from ages 66-85 by funding a life insurance policy with $100,000 from equity harvesting, compared to just $14,000 from taxable investments.
Inequality in an OLG economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systemsGRAPE
The document analyzes how inequality changes in an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous cohorts and pension systems. It finds that wealth and consumption inequalities increase due to demographic transitions and a pension reform from defined benefit to defined contribution systems. Minimum pensions can reduce inequality increases from the reform by 40-50% by raising incomes at the bottom, but have little effect on preferences. Contribution caps have a negligible impact on inequality. Overall, demographic changes contribute more to rising inequalities than the pension system reform.
On the optimal introduction of a funded pension pillarGRAPE
Jan Woźnica, Marcin Bielecki, Krzysztof Makarski and Joanna Tyrowicz Group for Research in APplied Economics (GRAPE)
15th International Pension Workshop
Paris, May 2017
Efficiency of the pension reform: The welfare effects of various fiscal closuresGRAPE
- The document discusses modeling the welfare effects of various fiscal closures (ways of financing) for a pension reform in Poland that moves from a defined benefit to a partially funded defined contribution system.
- It develops an overlapping generations model to compare steady states before and after the reform under different fiscal closures like lump sum taxes, labor taxes, consumption taxes, and debt.
- Preliminary results show the pension reform leads to small net welfare gains of around 0.5-1% of permanent income depending on the fiscal closure and degree of time inconsistency in preferences. Lump sum taxes have among the highest welfare gains.
This document discusses concerns over longevity risk in retirement among actuaries in Australia, the UK, and the US. These three actuarial associations expressed concern that citizens in their countries do not have the tools or training to make defined contribution retirement savings last a lifetime. While these countries approach retirement income differently, they all recognize the risk that retirees could outlive their savings. The joint paper by these groups identifies five principles that should be part of government frameworks to address longevity risk, including ensuring adequacy of retirement savings and facilitating lifetime income solutions.
[ARCHIVE] Aviva Real Retirement report, March 2012Aviva plc
The Aviva Real Retirement Report is a quarterly analysis of the finances and related concerns of people in three stages of retirement, 55-64, 65-74, and over 75.
Effiency of the pension reform: the welfare effetcs of various fiscal closuresGRAPE
This document describes a model developed to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closures (ways of financing) for pension reforms in Poland. The model is an overlapping generations model that considers household optimization of consumption and leisure over a lifetime, as well as a production sector. The document outlines the baseline scenario, pension reform scenario, and three fiscal closure options analyzed: labor tax increases, lump sum taxes, and debt accumulation. Preliminary results suggest that while all reforms increase long run GDP and capital, a labor tax increase leads to the smallest reduction in labor supply and is most efficient according to a lump sum redistribution analysis.
The document discusses strategies for creating a self-funded pension using index universal life insurance and index annuities. These products offer death benefits and the potential for higher returns than fixed products while protecting against losses in market downturns. They can provide fixed income in retirement until age 120 and allow for tax-deferred growth and tax-free income, helping to create a pension-like retirement plan outside of traditional employer-sponsored plans.
This document provides an overview of health care reform proposals in the United States Congress in 2009. It discusses proposals for a public health insurance option, modernizing employer-sponsored insurance, expanding individual choices, and targeting the $250 billion health insurance tax break. It also notes debates around the size of insurance exchanges, expanding employee choices, omitting Medicaid reform, and ensuring any public option does not unfairly compete in the private market. The document compares different legislative proposals and argues the Healthy Americans Act proposal covers everyone with no new taxes.
Efficiency versus insurance: Capital income taxation and privatizing social s...GRAPE
We study the interactions between capital income tax and social security privatization in the context of rising longevity. In an economy with idiosyncratic income shocks, redistributive defined benefit pay-as-you-go social security provides some insurance against income uncertainty. However, this redistribution makes social security contributions distortionary. Reforming such social security to (partially funded) defined contribution involves on the one hand loss of insurance, and on the other hand reduced distortions associated with contributions, and raised pension wealth. Furthermore, it necessitates fiscal adjustment: transition costs in the medium term and reduction in the overall taxation in the long term. The current view in the literature states that such reform would reduce welfare. We show that capital income taxation provides a superior alternative, especially in the case of longevity whereas compared to fiscal closures utilized in earlier studies attenuate them. We explain the mechanism behind this result and reconcile our results with the earlier literature.
Efficiency versus insurance: The role for fiscal policy in social security pr...GRAPE
This document discusses the role of fiscal policy in social security privatization. It motivates the need to reform pay-as-you-go defined benefit pension systems due to increasing longevity and decreasing fertility. While previous literature finds privatization reduces welfare due to loss of insurance, the authors argue this result depends on the fiscal closure used and consider different fiscal policies. They develop an overlapping generations model to compare 81 combinations of pension reforms and fiscal closures, examining the welfare and political support implications. New closures studied include taxes on capital income, progressive labor taxes, and adjustments within the pension system.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension system - ASSA 2018 ...GRAPE
This document analyzes the welfare effects of fiscal policy reforms to pension systems. It challenges the view that pension system privatization reduces welfare in stochastic frameworks. The authors provide an overview of interactions between pension reforms and fiscal policies, and decompose the overall effect of reforms into changes in insurance and efficiency. Their results show that capital tax increases have the highest welfare gains due to improved efficiency, while progressive taxation has the smallest welfare losses due to maintaining insurance. They also find that reforms can improve welfare and gain political support, depending on the fiscal policies used. Insurance losses from reforms are important but not decisive factors when evaluating privatization.
Welfare effects of fiscal policy in reforming the pension systemGRAPE
Pension system reforms imply substantial redistribution between cohorts and within cohorts. They also implicitly affect the scope of risk sharing in societies. Linking pensions to individual incomes increases efficiency but reduces the insurance motive implicit in Beveridgean systems. The existing view in the literature argues that the insurance motive dominates the efficiency gains when evaluating the welfare effects. We show that this result is not universal: there exist ways to increase efficiency or compensate the loss of insurance, assuring welfare gains from pension system reform even in economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. The fiscal closure, which necessarily accompanies the changes in the pension system, may boost efficiency and/or make up for lower insurance in the pension system. Indeed, fiscal closures inherently interact with the effects of pension system reform, counteracting or reinforcing the original effects. By analyzing a variety of fiscal closures, we reconcile our result with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support is feasible depending on the fiscal closure.
Effiency versus insurance: The role for capital income taxation in privatizin...GRAPE
The existing view in the literature states that the insurance motive dominates the efficiency gains when evaluating the welfare effects of social security reform with stochastic income shocks. We show, under plausible calibration of the US economy, that the efficiency gain resulting from the interaction of social security and capital income taxation in the context of longevity provide welfare gains sufficient to outweigh the loss of insurance. By analyzing a variety of fiscal closures, we reconcile our result with the earlier literature. We also study the political economy context and show that political support for capital income taxation is feasible.
The document discusses political support for social security systems and reforms from defined benefit (DB) to funded defined contribution (FDC) plans. It reviews literature on three factors influencing political support: 1) existence of intergenerational transfers, 2) size of transfers, and 3) political economy of social contracts. The literature concludes social security becomes politically stable if initially feasible. The document then models a pension reform from DB to a hybrid DB-FDC system in Poland, examining the distribution of costs and gains and whether the FDC pillar becomes politically stable over time through majority voting.
This document discusses factors that shape wealth inequality in the US. It summarizes existing explanations for rising wealth inequality, including rising income inequality and insufficient redistribution. It also notes the observation of rising longevity. The authors aim to study the role of rising longevity for wealth inequality using an overlapping generations model that incorporates changing demographics, income inequality, tax policies, and other economic drivers from 1960-2020. The model calibrates preferences, income processes, and other parameters to replicate the US economy over this period.
Stimulating old-age savings under incomplete rationalityGRAPE
Fully rational agents respond to old-age savings incentives with complete crowing out, hence any effects of such incentives stem from second order general equilibrium adjustments. However, agents facing constraints in obtaining optimal savings profiles experience also first order effects, i.e. substantial changes to the lifetime profiles of assets accumulation. We develop a fully-fledged overlapping generations model with intra-cohort heterogeneity. In addition to fully rational agents, each generation has also agents with other types of preferences. In this economy we introduce a variety of tax incentivized old-age savings schemes with endogenous participation. We analyze macroeconomic and welfare effects of such instruments.
This document summarizes 6 pension issues that should be concerning:
1) Inflation and its impact on current and future pensioners.
2) The case for retail collective defined contribution pensions.
3) Creating a value for money measure the public can understand.
4) Where additional voluntary contributions still make sense in the Local Government Pension Scheme.
5) The 655,000 economically inactive older workers.
6) Whether Russia has undermined environmental, social, and governance investing.
1. The document analyzes the political stability of pension reforms that transition defined benefit systems to partially funded defined contribution systems in Poland.
2. Through an overlapping generations model calibrated to Poland, it finds that abolishing the funded pillar and shifting back to a purely PAYG system would have majority political support at every vote, as voters prefer lower taxes even if it means lower future pension benefits.
3. Contrary to some prior literature, the model does not find a coalition forming between low-productivity workers and retirees to preserve the status quo. Introducing altruism toward future generations increases stability of the reform.
Fiscal incentives to pension savings -- are they efficient?GRAPE
Financing consumption of the elderly in the face of the projected increase in life expectancy is a key challenge for economic policy. Moreover, standard structural models with fully rational agents suggest that about 50-60 percent of old-age consumption is financed with voluntary savings, even in the presence of a fairly generous public pension system. This is clearly inconsistent with either the data, or the alarming simulations of old-age poverty in the years to come. Old-age saving (OAS) schemes are widely used policy instruments to address this challenge, but structural evaluations of such instruments remain rare. We develop a framework with incompletely rational agents: lacking financial literacy and experiencing commitment difficulties. We study a broad selection of OAS schemes and find that they raise welfare of financially illiterate agents and to a lesser extent improve welfare of agents with a high degree of time inconsistency. They also reduce the incidence of poverty at old age. Unfortunately, these instruments are fiscally costly, induce considerable crowd-out and direct fiscal transfers mostly to those agents, who need it the least.
Stimulating old-age savings under incomplete rationalityGRAPE
1) Government-subsidized voluntary old-age saving schemes reduce poverty and increase welfare compared to raising payroll taxes or reducing pension benefits alone under incomplete rationality.
2) However, the subsidies disproportionately benefit households who need them least.
3) While capital accumulation increases overall, crowd-out of private savings is large, limiting macroeconomic gains.
Demographic transition and the rise of wealth inequalityGRAPE
We study the contribution of rising longevity to the rise of wealth inequality in the U.S. over the last seventy years. We construct an OLG model with multiple sources of inequality, closely calibrated to the data. Our main finding is that improvements in old-age longevity explain about 30% of the observed rise in wealth inequality. This magnitude is similar to previously emphasized channels associated with income inequality and the tax system. The contribution of demographics is bound to raise wealth inequality further in the decades to come.
Evaluating an old-age voluntary saving scheme under incomplete rationalityGRAPE
This document summarizes a presentation evaluating Poland's new voluntary retirement savings scheme called Employee Capital Plans (ECPs) using an overlapping generations model that includes both fully rational and hand-to-mouth consumers. The model finds that ECPs lead to over 90% crowding out of private savings and major fiscal costs from lower capital income tax revenue. While hand-to-mouth consumers benefit, fully rational consumers lose welfare. Overall welfare would be higher if ECP benefits were paid as annuities rather than lump sums.
Health Access California presents an April 2015 update of the state's efforts to implement and improve the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and additional efforts, including state and county initiatives to cover the remaining uninsured, regardless of immigration status.
Stimulating old-age savings under incomplete rationalityGRAPE
We study macroeconomic and welfare effects of old-age savings incentives (OAS incentives). Fully rational agents respond to OAS incentives with complete crowding out, hence any effects of such incentives stem from second order general equilibrium adjustments. Meanwhile, agents with incomplete rationality face constraints in obtaining optimal savings profiles, and thus experience also first order effects in presence of OAS incentives. We develop an overlapping generations model with intra-cohort behavioral heterogeneity. In addition to fully rational agents, each generation has also agents with variety of incompletely rational preferences. In this economy we introduce tax incentivized old-age savings schemes with endogenous participation.
SEIU Healthcare is launching a new retirement plan called My65+ to address the lack of retirement savings options for its lower-income members who earn less than $50,000 annually and have no employer pension plan. My65+ will have very low fees of 0.22% for investments and $7 per month for administration. It uses a TFSA structure to avoid the "clawback" of government benefits that occurs with RRSPs for lower-income seniors. Modeling shows My65+ can deliver 3-4 times more retirement income than a typical RRSP due to lower fees and preserving benefits. The plan will be governed by a non-profit board and use low-cost index funds from Vanguard for investments
Political (in)stability of pension system reformOliwia Komada
We analyze the political stability of social security reforms that involve a funded pillar (a.k.a.privatizations of social security). We employ an overlapping generations model with intracohort heterogeneity. The (partial) privatization of social security is efficient in Kaldor-Hickssense and has political support. Subsequently, agents vote on abolishing the funded pillar, capturing the accumulated pension assets, and replacing it with the pay-as-you-go scheme,i.e. \unprivatizing" the pension system. We show that even if such reform reduces welfare in the long run, the distribution of benefits across cohorts along the transition path implies that \unprivatizing" social security is always politically preferred. We conclude that the correct assignment of property rights over retirement assets may be of crucial importance for
determining the stability of pensions systems with a funded pillar.
This document discusses pensions and aging. It covers how population aging due to increased longevity and lower birth rates increases the costs of pensions. It also discusses efficiency and equity considerations in pension provision, including consumption smoothing over a lifetime and reducing pensioner poverty. Government interventions in pensions, including direct provision, regulation of private markets, and subsidies are examined.
Similar to Efficiency versus insurance: The role for capital income taxation in social security privatization (20)
Seminar: Gender Board Diversity through Ownership NetworksGRAPE
Seminar on gender diversity spillovers through ownership networks at FAME|GRAPE. Presenting novel research. Studies in economics and management using econometrics methods.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large new Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economy, we quantify the extent to which demographic changes over the last three decades have contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate. Our findings yield important implications for the future evolution of unemployment given the anticipated further aging of the working population in Europe. We also quantify the implications for optimal monetary policy: lowering inflation volatility becomes less costly in terms of GDP and unemployment volatility, which hints that optimal monetary policy may be more hawkish in an aging society. Finally, our results also propose a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle due to the fact that the share of young workers is expected to remain robust in the US.
Revisiting gender board diversity and firm performanceGRAPE
Cel: oszacować wpływ inkluzywności władz spółek na ich wyniki.
Co wiemy?
• Większość firm nie ma równosci płci w organach (ILO, 2015)
• Większość firm nie ma w ogóle kobiet we władzach
(Gender) tone at the top: the effect of board diversity on gender inequalityGRAPE
The research explores to what extent the presence of women on board affects gender inequality downstream. We find that increasing presence reduces gender inequality. To avoid reverse causality, we propose a new instrument: the share of household consumption in total output. We extend the analysis to recover the effect of a single woman on board (tokenism(
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with various managerial theories, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited
effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
This document introduces a framework for analyzing contracts between a principal and multiple agents who have interdependent preferences. It begins with a simple example involving two agents who can choose between working and shirking, and whose outputs are either success or failure. The agents have interdependent utility that depends on both their own material payoff and their conjecture of the other agent's utility.
The document then outlines the research agenda, which is to characterize optimal contracts when agents have interdependent preferences and to provide recommendations for contract design based on whether preferences are positively or negatively interdependent. Finally, it presents some general results, finding that independent contracts are no longer optimal when preferences are interdependent, and that contracts should incorporate both individual performance bonuses and team
Tone at the top: the effects of gender board diversity on gender wage inequal...GRAPE
We address the gender wage gap in Europe, focusing on the impact of female representation in executive and non-executive boards. We use a novel dataset to identify gender board diversity across European firms, which covers a comprehensive sample of private firms in addition to publicly listed ones. Our study spans three waves of the Structure of Earnings Survey, covering 26 countries and multiple industries. Despite low prevalence of female representation and the complex nature of gender wage inequality, our findings reveal a robust causal link: increased gender diversity significantly decreases the adjusted gender wage gap. We also demonstrate that to meaningfully impact gender wage gaps, the presence of a single female representative in leadership is insufficient.
Gender board diversity spillovers and the public eyeGRAPE
A range of policy recommendations mandating gender board quotas is based on the idea that "women help women". We analyze potential gender diversity spillovers from supervisory to top managerial positions over three decades in Europe. Contrary to previous studies which worked with stock listed firms or were region locked, we use a large data base of roughly 2 000 000 firms. We find evidence that women do not help women in corporate Europe, unless the firm is stock listed. Only within public firms, going from no woman to at least one woman on supervisory position is associated with a 10-15\% higher probability of appointing at least one woman to the executive position. This pattern aligns with the Public Eye Managerial Theory, suggesting that external visibility influences corporate gender diversity practices. The study implies that diversity policies, while impactful in public firms, have limited effectiveness in promoting gender diversity in corporate Europe.
The European Unemployment Puzzle: implications from population agingGRAPE
We study the link between the evolving age structure of the working population and unemployment. We build a large New Keynesian OLG model with a realistic age structure, labor market frictions, sticky prices, and aggregate shocks. Once calibrated to the European economies, we use this model to provide comparative statics across past and contemporaneous age structures of the working population. Thus, we quantify the extent to which the response of labor markets to adverse TFP shocks and monetary policy shocks becomes muted with the aging of the working population. Our findings have important policy implications for European labor markets and beyond. For example, the working population is expected to further age in Europe, whereas the share of young workers will remain robust in the US. Our results suggest a partial reversal of the European-US unemployment puzzle. Furthermore, with the aging population, lowering inflation volatility is less costly in terms of higher unemployment volatility. It suggests that optimal monetary policy should be more hawkish in the older society.
This document discusses how labor market inequality may push disadvantaged groups like women into entrepreneurship out of necessity. It presents a theoretical framework showing how greater gender employment gaps could increase the prevalence of female self-employment. The authors test this using data on gender wage and employment gaps matched with survey data on entrepreneurship. Their results show a robust positive effect of gender employment gaps on necessity-driven female entrepreneurship but little effect of wage gaps. This provides empirical support that labor market discrimination can push disadvantaged groups into self-employment when other employment options are limited.
Evidence concerning inequality in ability to realize aspirations is prevalent: overall, in specialized segments of the labor market, in self-employment and high-aspirations environments. Empirical literature and public debate are full of case studies and comprehensive empirical studies documenting the paramount gap between successful individuals (typically ethnic majority men) and those who are less likely to “make it” (typically ethnic minority and women). So far the drivers of these disparities and their consequences have been studied much less intensively, due to methodological constraints and shortage of appropriate data. This project proposes significant innovations to overcome both types of barriers and push the frontier of the research agenda on equality in reaching aspirations.
Overall, project is interdisciplinary, combining four fields: management, economics, quantitative methods and psychology. An important feature of this project is that it offers a diversified methodological perspective, combining applied microeconometrics, as well as experimental methods.
- The document discusses the optimal assignment of property rights when a social planner cannot commit to future trading mechanisms. This lack of commitment results in ex-post inefficiency and inefficient investment decisions due to hold-up problems.
- The social planner chooses property rights to alleviate these frictions. The paper proposes a framework to characterize the optimal property right using a mechanism design approach. The main result is that the optimal property right is simple but flexible, often featuring an option to own the property.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights using mechanism design. It discusses how property rights determine agents' outside options in economic interactions and impact ex-post efficiency and investment incentives when the social planner cannot commit to future mechanisms. The authors analyze how to design property rights to alleviate these frictions in a setting with one-sided private information and bargaining power. A key result is that the optimal property right is often simple but flexible, featuring an option to own the resource.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights. It discusses how property rights determine agents' outside options in economic interactions and impact ex-post efficiency and investment incentives when a social planner cannot commit to future mechanisms. The authors' contribution is characterizing the optimal property right from a non-parametric class in a setting with one-sided private information and bargaining power, finding that flexible rights featuring an option to own are often optimal.
The document presents a framework for studying the optimal design of contractual property rights. It discusses how property rights determine parties' outside options in economic interactions and impact efficiency and investment incentives. The framework models an interaction where a property rights holder participates in a trading mechanism. The optimal property right balances ex-post inefficiency and hold-up problems arising from the planner's inability to commit. The paper contributes by characterizing the optimal right from a non-parametric class of options and provides a foundation for why option-to-own contracts are attractive.
Abhay Bhutada, the Managing Director of Poonawalla Fincorp Limited, is an accomplished leader with over 15 years of experience in commercial and retail lending. A Qualified Chartered Accountant, he has been pivotal in leveraging technology to enhance financial services. Starting his career at Bank of India, he later founded TAB Capital Limited and co-founded Poonawalla Finance Private Limited, emphasizing digital lending. Under his leadership, Poonawalla Fincorp achieved a 'AAA' credit rating, integrating acquisitions and emphasizing corporate governance. Actively involved in industry forums and CSR initiatives, Abhay has been recognized with awards like "Young Entrepreneur of India 2017" and "40 under 40 Most Influential Leader for 2020-21." Personally, he values mindfulness, enjoys gardening, yoga, and sees every day as an opportunity for growth and improvement.
Fabular Frames and the Four Ratio ProblemMajid Iqbal
Digital, interactive art showing the struggle of a society in providing for its present population while also saving planetary resources for future generations. Spread across several frames, the art is actually the rendering of real and speculative data. The stereographic projections change shape in response to prompts and provocations. Visitors interact with the model through speculative statements about how to increase savings across communities, regions, ecosystems and environments. Their fabulations combined with random noise, i.e. factors beyond control, have a dramatic effect on the societal transition. Things get better. Things get worse. The aim is to give visitors a new grasp and feel of the ongoing struggles in democracies around the world.
Stunning art in the small multiples format brings out the spatiotemporal nature of societal transitions, against backdrop issues such as energy, housing, waste, farmland and forest. In each frame we see hopeful and frightful interplays between spending and saving. Problems emerge when one of the two parts of the existential anaglyph rapidly shrinks like Arctic ice, as factors cross thresholds. Ecological wealth and intergenerational equity areFour at stake. Not enough spending could mean economic stress, social unrest and political conflict. Not enough saving and there will be climate breakdown and ‘bankruptcy’. So where does speculative design start and the gambling and betting end? Behind each fabular frame is a four ratio problem. Each ratio reflects the level of sacrifice and self-restraint a society is willing to accept, against promises of prosperity and freedom. Some values seem to stabilise a frame while others cause collapse. Get the ratios right and we can have it all. Get them wrong and things get more desperate.
Optimizing Net Interest Margin (NIM) in the Financial Sector (With Examples).pdfshruti1menon2
NIM is calculated as the difference between interest income earned and interest expenses paid, divided by interest-earning assets.
Importance: NIM serves as a critical measure of a financial institution's profitability and operational efficiency. It reflects how effectively the institution is utilizing its interest-earning assets to generate income while managing interest costs.
Discover the Future of Dogecoin with Our Comprehensive Guidance36 Crypto
Learn in-depth about Dogecoin's trajectory and stay informed with 36crypto's essential and up-to-date information about the crypto space.
Our presentation delves into Dogecoin's potential future, exploring whether it's destined to skyrocket to the moon or face a downward spiral. In addition, it highlights invaluable insights. Don't miss out on this opportunity to enhance your crypto understanding!
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Falcon stands out as a top-tier P2P Invoice Discounting platform in India, bridging esteemed blue-chip companies and eager investors. Our goal is to transform the investment landscape in India by establishing a comprehensive destination for borrowers and investors with diverse profiles and needs, all while minimizing risk. What sets Falcon apart is the elimination of intermediaries such as commercial banks and depository institutions, allowing investors to enjoy higher yields.
Economic Risk Factor Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]Commonwealth
May’s reports showed signs of continued economic growth, said Sam Millette, director, fixed income, in his latest Economic Risk Factor Update.
For more market updates, subscribe to The Independent Market Observer at https://blog.commonwealth.com/independent-market-observer.
Falcon stands out as a top-tier P2P Invoice Discounting platform in India, bridging esteemed blue-chip companies and eager investors. Our goal is to transform the investment landscape in India by establishing a comprehensive destination for borrowers and investors with diverse profiles and needs, all while minimizing risk. What sets Falcon apart is the elimination of intermediaries such as commercial banks and depository institutions, allowing investors to enjoy higher yields.
"Does Foreign Direct Investment Negatively Affect Preservation of Culture in the Global South? Case Studies in Thailand and Cambodia."
Do elements of globalization, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), negatively affect the ability of countries in the Global South to preserve their culture? This research aims to answer this question by employing a cross-sectional comparative case study analysis utilizing methods of difference. Thailand and Cambodia are compared as they are in the same region and have a similar culture. The metric of difference between Thailand and Cambodia is their ability to preserve their culture. This ability is operationalized by their respective attitudes towards FDI; Thailand imposes stringent regulations and limitations on FDI while Cambodia does not hesitate to accept most FDI and imposes fewer limitations. The evidence from this study suggests that FDI from globally influential countries with high gross domestic products (GDPs) (e.g. China, U.S.) challenges the ability of countries with lower GDPs (e.g. Cambodia) to protect their culture. Furthermore, the ability, or lack thereof, of the receiving countries to protect their culture is amplified by the existence and implementation of restrictive FDI policies imposed by their governments.
My study abroad in Bali, Indonesia, inspired this research topic as I noticed how globalization is changing the culture of its people. I learned their language and way of life which helped me understand the beauty and importance of cultural preservation. I believe we could all benefit from learning new perspectives as they could help us ideate solutions to contemporary issues and empathize with others.
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South Dakota State University degree offer diploma Transcriptynfqplhm
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Understanding how timely GST payments influence a lender's decision to approve loans, this topic explores the correlation between GST compliance and creditworthiness. It highlights how consistent GST payments can enhance a business's financial credibility, potentially leading to higher chances of loan approval.
Efficiency versus insurance: The role for capital income taxation in social security privatization
1. Efficiency versus insurance:
The role for capital income taxation in social security privatization
Joanna Tyrowicz (GRAPE, IAAEU, UW and IZA)
Oliwia Komada (GRAPE and WSE)
Krzysztof Makarski (GRAPE and WSE)
RCEA
Waterloo, September, 2019
1 / 35
2. Motivation – pension systems
Longevity hazards DB viability: deficit ↑ 1.4% of GDP → reforms
Feldstein, BEA, SSA
• between generations −→ timing of costs vs gains
• within generations −→ insurance
• aggregate change in the economy −→ efficiency
2 / 35
3. Motivation – pension systems
Longevity hazards DB viability: deficit ↑ 1.4% of GDP → reforms
Feldstein, BEA, SSA
• between generations −→ timing of costs vs gains
• within generations −→ insurance
• aggregate change in the economy −→ efficiency
• Consensus:
• Deterministic setup: efficiency wins over the loosers
• Stochastic setup: insurance drags efficiency boost down
Nishiyama & Smetters (2007, QJE) and subsequent literature
2 / 35
4. Motivation – capital (income gains) taxation
τk > 0 is efficient in an OLG economy
Garriga (2001), Findeisen & Sachs (2017), Krueger & Ludwig (2018)
• Is taxing capital a good idea for pension system reform?
• longevity −→ saving less elastic on price
• privatized pensions −→ precautionary savings
• pension system balanced −→ taxation decline
3 / 35
5. Motivation – capital (income gains) taxation
τk > 0 is efficient in an OLG economy
Garriga (2001), Findeisen & Sachs (2017), Krueger & Ludwig (2018)
• Is taxing capital a good idea for pension system reform?
• longevity −→ saving less elastic on price
• privatized pensions −→ precautionary savings
• pension system balanced −→ taxation decline
Our contribution
Q1: Is it ok to raise τk?
3 / 35
6. Motivation – capital (income gains) taxation
τk > 0 is efficient in an OLG economy
Garriga (2001), Findeisen & Sachs (2017), Krueger & Ludwig (2018)
• Is taxing capital a good idea for pension system reform?
• longevity −→ saving less elastic on price
• privatized pensions −→ precautionary savings
• pension system balanced −→ taxation decline
Our contribution
Q1: Is it ok to raise τk? ←− Transitory
3 / 35
7. Motivation – capital (income gains) taxation
τk > 0 is efficient in an OLG economy
Garriga (2001), Findeisen & Sachs (2017), Krueger & Ludwig (2018)
• Is taxing capital a good idea for pension system reform?
• longevity −→ saving less elastic on price
• privatized pensions −→ precautionary savings
• pension system balanced −→ taxation decline
Our contribution
Q1: Is it ok to raise τk? ←− Transitory
Q2: Is it ok to reduce τk?
3 / 35
8. Motivation – capital (income gains) taxation
τk > 0 is efficient in an OLG economy
Garriga (2001), Findeisen & Sachs (2017), Krueger & Ludwig (2018)
• Is taxing capital a good idea for pension system reform?
• longevity −→ saving less elastic on price
• privatized pensions −→ precautionary savings
• pension system balanced −→ taxation decline
Our contribution
Q1: Is it ok to raise τk? ←− Transitory
Q2: Is it ok to reduce τk? ←− Permanent
3 / 35
9. Motivation – capital (income gains) taxation
τk > 0 is efficient in an OLG economy
Garriga (2001), Findeisen & Sachs (2017), Krueger & Ludwig (2018)
• Is taxing capital a good idea for pension system reform?
• longevity −→ saving less elastic on price
• privatized pensions −→ precautionary savings
• pension system balanced −→ taxation decline
Our contribution
Q1: Is it ok to raise τk? ←− Transitory
Q2: Is it ok to reduce τk? ←− Permanent
Q3: Does it matter for pension systems if we close with τk?
3 / 35
10. Motivation – capital (income gains) taxation
τk > 0 is efficient in an OLG economy
Garriga (2001), Findeisen & Sachs (2017), Krueger & Ludwig (2018)
• Is taxing capital a good idea for pension system reform?
• longevity −→ saving less elastic on price
• privatized pensions −→ precautionary savings
• pension system balanced −→ taxation decline
Our contribution
Q1: Is it ok to raise τk? ←− Transitory
Q2: Is it ok to reduce τk? ←− Permanent
Q3: Does it matter for pension systems if we close with τk? Yes!
3 / 35
11. What we do
OLG model with idiosyncratic income shocks, US
Baseline: Stylized US system: AIME and caps
with longevity → deficit
4 / 35
12. What we do
OLG model with idiosyncratic income shocks, US
Baseline: Stylized US system: AIME and caps
with longevity → deficit
Reform: Individual DC, 50% funded
4 / 35
13. What we do
OLG model with idiosyncratic income shocks, US
Baseline: Stylized US system: AIME and caps
with longevity → deficit
Reform: Individual DC, 50% funded
• tax on capital income gains
4 / 35
14. What we do
OLG model with idiosyncratic income shocks, US
Baseline: Stylized US system: AIME and caps
with longevity → deficit
Reform: Individual DC, 50% funded
• tax on capital income gains
• compare it with the literature
4 / 35
15. What we do
OLG model with idiosyncratic income shocks, US
Baseline: Stylized US system: AIME and caps
with longevity → deficit
Reform: Individual DC, 50% funded
• tax on capital income gains
• compare it with the literature
• 2 pension system adjustments: contribution or benefits
4 / 35
16. What we do
OLG model with idiosyncratic income shocks, US
Baseline: Stylized US system: AIME and caps
with longevity → deficit
Reform: Individual DC, 50% funded
• tax on capital income gains
• compare it with the literature
• 2 pension system adjustments: contribution or benefits
• 2 alternative tax closures: tax on labor income, consumption (with or without
debt)
4 / 35
17. What we do
OLG model with idiosyncratic income shocks, US
Baseline: Stylized US system: AIME and caps
with longevity → deficit
Reform: Individual DC, 50% funded
• tax on capital income gains
• compare it with the literature
• 2 pension system adjustments: contribution or benefits
• 2 alternative tax closures: tax on labor income, consumption (with or without
debt)
• study welfare effect and political support
4 / 35
18. What we do
OLG model with idiosyncratic income shocks, US
Baseline: Stylized US system: AIME and caps
with longevity → deficit
Reform: Individual DC, 50% funded
• tax on capital income gains
• compare it with the literature
• 2 pension system adjustments: contribution or benefits
• 2 alternative tax closures: tax on labor income, consumption (with or without
debt)
• study welfare effect and political support
• decompose welfare change into insurance and efficiency
4 / 35
19. Preview of findings
• Nishiyama & Smetters is NOT universal: reform + τk −→ welfare ↑
5 / 35
20. Preview of findings
• Nishiyama & Smetters is NOT universal: reform + τk −→ welfare ↑
• boost efficiency more
5 / 35
21. Preview of findings
• Nishiyama & Smetters is NOT universal: reform + τk −→ welfare ↑
• boost efficiency more
• low elasticity of response to taxation
5 / 35
22. Preview of findings
• Nishiyama & Smetters is NOT universal: reform + τk −→ welfare ↑
• boost efficiency more
• low elasticity of response to taxation
• insurance motive actually rather small
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23. Preview of findings
• Nishiyama & Smetters is NOT universal: reform + τk −→ welfare ↑
• boost efficiency more
• low elasticity of response to taxation
• insurance motive actually rather small
5 / 35
24. Preview of findings
• Nishiyama & Smetters is NOT universal: reform + τk −→ welfare ↑
• boost efficiency more
• low elasticity of response to taxation
• insurance motive actually rather small
• Public debt often “buys” political support
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25. Preview of findings
• Nishiyama & Smetters is NOT universal: reform + τk −→ welfare ↑
• boost efficiency more
• low elasticity of response to taxation
• insurance motive actually rather small
• Public debt often “buys” political support
• Welfare gains and political support only sometimes overlap
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28. The model
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for 16 periods, with survival rate πj,t < 1
• uninsurable earnings risk: endogenous labor supply + income shocks
AR(1) process approximated by Markov chain
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29. The model
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for 16 periods, with survival rate πj,t < 1
• uninsurable earnings risk: endogenous labor supply + income shocks
AR(1) process approximated by Markov chain
• pay taxes (progressive on labor, linear on consumption and capital gains)
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30. The model
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for 16 periods, with survival rate πj,t < 1
• uninsurable earnings risk: endogenous labor supply + income shocks
AR(1) process approximated by Markov chain
• pay taxes (progressive on labor, linear on consumption and capital gains)
• contribute to pensions
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31. The model
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for 16 periods, with survival rate πj,t < 1
• uninsurable earnings risk: endogenous labor supply + income shocks
AR(1) process approximated by Markov chain
• pay taxes (progressive on labor, linear on consumption and capital gains)
• contribute to pensions
• no annuity financial markets with (risk free) interest rate
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32. The model
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for 16 periods, with survival rate πj,t < 1
• uninsurable earnings risk: endogenous labor supply + income shocks
AR(1) process approximated by Markov chain
• pay taxes (progressive on labor, linear on consumption and capital gains)
• contribute to pensions
• no annuity financial markets with (risk free) interest rate
7 / 35
33. The model
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for 16 periods, with survival rate πj,t < 1
• uninsurable earnings risk: endogenous labor supply + income shocks
AR(1) process approximated by Markov chain
• pay taxes (progressive on labor, linear on consumption and capital gains)
• contribute to pensions
• no annuity financial markets with (risk free) interest rate
Competitive producers
• Cobb-Douglas production function, with capital depreciation rate d
• Profit maximization implies
wt = (1 − α)Kα
t zt(ztLt)−α
and rt = αKα−1
(ztLt)1−α
− d
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34. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
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35. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
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36. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
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37. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
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38. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
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39. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
• pensions remain high
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40. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
• pensions remain high
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41. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
• pensions remain high
Reform scenario: partially funded DC (τ = τP AY G
+ τF
)
• individual pension accounts ⇒ no insurance
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42. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
• pensions remain high
Reform scenario: partially funded DC (τ = τP AY G
+ τF
)
• individual pension accounts ⇒ no insurance
• b ¯J,t = bP AY G
+ bF
= accrued ‘savings’
life expectancyt
+ accrued savings
life expectancyt
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43. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
• pensions remain high
Reform scenario: partially funded DC (τ = τP AY G
+ τF
)
• individual pension accounts ⇒ no insurance
• b ¯J,t = bP AY G
+ bF
= accrued ‘savings’
life expectancyt
+ accrued savings
life expectancyt
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44. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
• pensions remain high
Reform scenario: partially funded DC (τ = τP AY G
+ τF
)
• individual pension accounts ⇒ no insurance
• b ¯J,t = bP AY G
+ bF
= accrued ‘savings’
life expectancyt
+ accrued savings
life expectancyt
• longevity ↑ −→ pensions ↓ ⇒ private voluntary savings ↑
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45. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
• pensions remain high
Reform scenario: partially funded DC (τ = τP AY G
+ τF
)
• individual pension accounts ⇒ no insurance
• b ¯J,t = bP AY G
+ bF
= accrued ‘savings’
life expectancyt
+ accrued savings
life expectancyt
• longevity ↑ −→ pensions ↓ ⇒ private voluntary savings ↑
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46. The pension system
Baseline scenario: PAYG DB with progressivity
• AIME: regressive replacement rate on life-time contributions ⇒ insurance
• b ¯J,t = ρ · ¯wt
• longevity ↑ −→ deficit ↑ ⇒ permanent fiscal closure
• pensions remain high
Reform scenario: partially funded DC (τ = τP AY G
+ τF
)
• individual pension accounts ⇒ no insurance
• b ¯J,t = bP AY G
+ bF
= accrued ‘savings’
life expectancyt
+ accrued savings
life expectancyt
• longevity ↑ −→ pensions ↓ ⇒ private voluntary savings ↑
• funding generates deficit ⇒ transitory fiscal closure
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55. The literature differs in terms of financing the reform
• Financing within pension system
• contribution rates (20 papers)
Kumru & Thanopoulos (2011, JPE), Bruce & Turnovsky (2013, JPE)
• replacement rate (8 papers)
Boersch-Supan et al. (2014, AER), Kitao (2014, RED)
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56. The literature differs in terms of financing the reform
• Financing within pension system
• contribution rates (20 papers)
Kumru & Thanopoulos (2011, JPE), Bruce & Turnovsky (2013, JPE)
• replacement rate (8 papers)
Boersch-Supan et al. (2014, AER), Kitao (2014, RED)
• Financing via fiscal policy
• labor tax (3 papers)
Bouzahzah et al. (2002, JEDC)
• consumption tax (10 papers)
Nishiyama & Smetters (2007, QJE), Diaz-Gimenez & Diaz-Saavedra (2009, RED)
• debt (5 papers )
Song, et al. (2015, AEJ) Lindbeck & Persson (2003, JEL)
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57. The literature differs in terms of financing the reform
• Financing within pension system
• contribution rates (20 papers)
Kumru & Thanopoulos (2011, JPE), Bruce & Turnovsky (2013, JPE)
• replacement rate (8 papers)
Boersch-Supan et al. (2014, AER), Kitao (2014, RED)
• Financing via fiscal policy
• labor tax (3 papers)
Bouzahzah et al. (2002, JEDC)
• consumption tax (10 papers)
Nishiyama & Smetters (2007, QJE), Diaz-Gimenez & Diaz-Saavedra (2009, RED)
• debt (5 papers )
Song, et al. (2015, AEJ) Lindbeck & Persson (2003, JEL)
No papers with comparisons across fiscal closures
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58. Fiscal policy: capital income taxation
• capital income gain tax, τk,t
τk,t =
1
rtAt
· τl(1 − τ)wtLt + τcCt + Υ
J
j=1
Nj,t − Gt − subsidyt − rtDt + ∆Dt
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59. Fiscal policy: capital income taxation
• capital income gain tax, τk,t
τk,t =
1
rtAt
· τl(1 − τ)wtLt + τcCt + Υ
J
j=1
Nj,t − Gt − subsidyt − rtDt + ∆Dt
• smoothing tax adjustments with public debt, with a fiscal rule
τk,t = (1 − )τfinal
k + τk,t−1 + D
Dt
Yt
−
D
Y
final
• debt in the final SS = debt in the initial SS
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60. Fiscal policy: capital income taxation
• capital income gain tax, τk,t
τk,t =
1
rtAt
· τl(1 − τ)wtLt + τcCt + Υ
J
j=1
Nj,t − Gt − subsidyt − rtDt + ∆Dt
• smoothing tax adjustments with public debt, with a fiscal rule
τk,t = (1 − )τfinal
k + τk,t−1 + D
Dt
Yt
−
D
Y
final
• debt in the final SS = debt in the initial SS
Baseline: finance permanent gap (∀t : subsidyt > 0)
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61. Fiscal policy: capital income taxation
• capital income gain tax, τk,t
τk,t =
1
rtAt
· τl(1 − τ)wtLt + τcCt + Υ
J
j=1
Nj,t − Gt − subsidyt − rtDt + ∆Dt
• smoothing tax adjustments with public debt, with a fiscal rule
τk,t = (1 − )τfinal
k + τk,t−1 + D
Dt
Yt
−
D
Y
final
• debt in the final SS = debt in the initial SS
Baseline: finance permanent gap (∀t : subsidyt > 0)
Reform: finance transitory gap (t → T : subsidyt = 0)
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62. For comparison: other fiscal policy accompanying the reform
• Two closures within pension system details
• contributions → labor supply
• pensions → consumption (of retirees)
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63. For comparison: other fiscal policy accompanying the reform
• Two closures within pension system details
• contributions → labor supply
• pensions → consumption (of retirees)
• Two closures outside pension system details
• consumption tax (+ debt) → consumption (of all cohorts)
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65. Calibration to replicate US economy (2015)
Preferences
• Preference for leisure φ matches average hours 33%
• Discounting rate δ matches interest rate 5.5%
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66. Calibration to replicate US economy (2015)
Preferences
• Preference for leisure φ matches average hours 33%
• Discounting rate δ matches interest rate 5.5%
Idiosyncratic productivity shock based on Kruger and Ludwig (2013):
• Persistence η = 0.95
• Variance ση = 0.375
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67. Calibration to replicate US economy (2015)
Preferences
• Preference for leisure φ matches average hours 33%
• Discounting rate δ matches interest rate 5.5%
Idiosyncratic productivity shock based on Kruger and Ludwig (2013):
• Persistence η = 0.95
• Variance ση = 0.375
Pension system
• Replacement rate ρ matches benefits as % of GDP 5.2%
• Contribution rate balances pension system in the initial steady state
• Pension eligibility age at 65 (¯j = 9)
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68. Calibration to replicate US economy (2015)
Preferences
• Preference for leisure φ matches average hours 33%
• Discounting rate δ matches interest rate 5.5%
Idiosyncratic productivity shock based on Kruger and Ludwig (2013):
• Persistence η = 0.95
• Variance ση = 0.375
Pension system
• Replacement rate ρ matches benefits as % of GDP 5.2%
• Contribution rate balances pension system in the initial steady state
• Pension eligibility age at 65 (¯j = 9)
Taxes {τc, τk, τl} match revenue as % of GDP {2.8%, 5.4%, 9.2%}
Depreciation rate d matches investment rate of 22%
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69. Calibration to replicate US economy (2015)
Demography is based on UN projections.
number of 20-year-olds mortality rates
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71. No reform: if longevity ↑, economy adjusts K/L
capital labor supply
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72. Major effects of the reforming
Pensions linked to contributions
1. reduced labor supply distortion (efficiency ↑)
2. income shocks carry over to retirement ( insurance ↓ )
Intuition: fiscal policy can reinforce or attenuate these effects
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73. Major effects of the reforming
Pensions linked to contributions
1. reduced labor supply distortion (efficiency ↑)
2. income shocks carry over to retirement ( insurance ↓ )
Intuition: fiscal policy can reinforce or attenuate these effects
Eventually taxes decline
(relative to baseline scenario of permanent pension system deficit)
Intuition: long run effects are surely positive
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76. Welfare effects of the pension system reform
Fiscal closure
Reform to DC Reform to DC with partial funding
fixed longevity growing longevity fixed longevity growing longevity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τk 0.83 0.89 0.47 0.06
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77. Welfare effects of the pension system reform
Fiscal closure
Reform to DC Reform to DC with partial funding
fixed longevity growing longevity fixed longevity growing longevity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τk 0.83 0.89 0.47 0.06
τc 0.72 0.57 0.13 -0.04
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86. Welfare effects of reform depend on fiscal policy
1. efficiency effects of fiscal policy can be big
2. smoothing by public debt buys political support
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87. Welfare effects of reform depend on fiscal policy
1. efficiency effects of fiscal policy can be big
2. smoothing by public debt buys political support
Features of this literature
• Labor has a roughly 10% reaction to reduced distortions
• Savings have a roughly 10% reaction to longevity
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88. Welfare effects of reform depend on fiscal policy
1. efficiency effects of fiscal policy can be big
2. smoothing by public debt buys political support
Features of this literature
• Labor has a roughly 10% reaction to reduced distortions
• Savings have a roughly 10% reaction to longevity
Why is capital tax so nice? −→ relatively less responsive to the tax hikes
capital accumulation ↑ with longevity + funding + less insurance
Under longevity: capital tax better than consumption tax
Without longevity: funding and DC reduce welfare regardless of fiscal closure
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89. Thank you and
I am happy to take questions!
w: grape.org.pl
t: grape org
f: grape.org
e: j.tyrowicz@grape.org.pl
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90. Fiscal closures within pension system, subsidyt = 0
GO BACK
To keep pension system balanced government may adjust:
• contribution rate τ
• benefits bj (as a tax on benefits)
J
j= ¯Jt
Nj,t(1 − τb,t)bj,t = τt ¯wtLt and subsidyt = 0
91. Fiscal closures outside pension system, subsidyt = 0
GO BACK
• consumption tax, τc,t
Tt = Taxl,t + τk,trtAt + τc,tCt + Υt
J
j=1
Nj,t
Gt + subsidyt + rtDt = Tt + ∆Dt
• smoothing tax adjustments with public debt via a fiscal rule: ∀tax ∈ {l, c}
τtax,t = (1 − )τfinal
tax + τtax,t−1 + D (D/Y )t − (D/Y )final
• public debt: the final SS = the initial SS
92. Model solving
• Gauss-Seidel iterative algorithm
• Guess an initial value for k = K/(zL) and compute prices
• Solve individual problem and aggregate it to find new K and L , thus k
• iterate until convergence
93. Model solving
• Gauss-Seidel iterative algorithm
• Guess an initial value for k = K/(zL) and compute prices
• Solve individual problem and aggregate it to find new K and L , thus k
• iterate until convergence
• Consumer problem (backward policy function iterations)
94. Model solving
• Gauss-Seidel iterative algorithm
• Guess an initial value for k = K/(zL) and compute prices
• Solve individual problem and aggregate it to find new K and L , thus k
• iterate until convergence
• Consumer problem (backward policy function iterations)
• implicit tax to reduce state space, Butler (2002)
• policy function iterations with picewise linear interpolation
• within period problem solved with Newton-Raphson
• given initial distribution at age j = 1, transition matrix for idiosyncratic
productivity and the policy functions compute the distribution in any successive
age j.
• aggregation done with Gaussian quadrature
95. Model solving
• Gauss-Seidel iterative algorithm
• Guess an initial value for k = K/(zL) and compute prices
• Solve individual problem and aggregate it to find new K and L , thus k
• iterate until convergence
• Consumer problem (backward policy function iterations)
• implicit tax to reduce state space, Butler (2002)
• policy function iterations with picewise linear interpolation
• within period problem solved with Newton-Raphson
• given initial distribution at age j = 1, transition matrix for idiosyncratic
productivity and the policy functions compute the distribution in any successive
age j.
• aggregation done with Gaussian quadrature
• Transition path, goes between the initial and final steady state