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Economies of Scale to
Exploit Quantity Discount
Economies of Scale to Exploit Quantity Discounts
There are two types of quantity discounts
๏ƒ˜ Lot Size based quantity discount:
๏ƒ˜ Volume Based quantity discount:
๏ƒ˜ What motivates for discounts?
๏ƒผ All-unit quantity discounts
๏ƒผ Marginal unit quantity discounts
Based on quantity
ordered in a single lot
โ€ข Improved coordination to increase total supply chain profits
โ€ข Extraction of surplus by suppliers through price discrimination
Based on total
quantity over a given
period (regardless of
number of lots)
Coordination in Supply Chain
A supply chain is coordinated if the decisions the retailer and supplier make maximize total
supply chain profits.
Supplier
Retailer
Distributor
All stages try to
maximize their own
profit, independently
This may results in
lack of coordination
Action that maximizes
retailers profit may not
maximize total supply
chain profit
What should manufacturer do to
maximize total supply chain profit?
๏ƒ˜ Quantity discounts (for commodity products):
When there is a large number of competitors in the market, the market sets the
price of that commodity and demand is fixed. (Ex. milk)
๏ƒ˜ Quantity discounts (for products for which the firm has market power):
When there are few competitors in the market, demand varies with price charged
by the retailer. (Ex. Herbal products)
โ– Two Part Tariff
โ– Volume based quantity discount
Coordination in Supply Chain
Manufacturer charges itโ€™s entire profit as an up-
front franchise fee (ff) from the retailer and sets
its wholesale price as CR = CM
Based on total quantity over a given period
(regardless of number of lots)
Quantity discount for commodity products
The Impact of Locally Optimal Lot Sizes on Supply chain:
Problem No.1 Given Data: Demand (D) = 10,000 bottles/month
Data Related To Retailer
SR= Rs.100/Lot
IR = 0.2
CR = Rs.3
Data Related To Manufacturer
SM= Rs.250/Lot
IM = 0.2
CM = Rs.2/Unit
โ— Evaluate the optimal lot size for retailer.
โ— What is the Annual fulfillment and holding cost incurred by the
manufacturer as a result of retailerโ€™s ordering policy?
Fixed order
placement,
transportation and
receiving cost
Price charged by
the manufacturer
Fixed order filling
cost
Production cost
Without Coordination
Solution:
๐‘„ ๐‘… =
2๐ท๐‘† ๐‘…
๐ผ ๐‘… ๐ถ ๐‘…
๐‘„ ๐‘… =
2 โˆ— 1,20,000 โˆ— 100
0.2 โˆ— 3
๐‘„ ๐‘… = ๐Ÿ”, ๐Ÿ‘๐Ÿ๐Ÿ“ ๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญ๐ฌ
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ =
๐ท
๐‘„ ๐‘…
โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… +
๐‘„ ๐‘…
2
โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— CR
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ =
1,20,000
6325
โˆ— 100 +
6325
2
โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 3
Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿโ€ฒ
๐‘  ๐‘‚๐‘๐‘ก๐‘–๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐ฟ๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘†๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’:
Without Coordination
Solution cont.. ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘…๐‘’๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = ๐‘น๐’”. ๐Ÿ‘, ๐Ÿ•๐Ÿ—๐Ÿ“
๐ผ๐‘“ ๐‘…๐‘’๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ ๐‘‚๐‘Ÿ๐‘‘๐‘’๐‘Ÿ๐‘  ๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘™๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘ ๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’ ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘„๐‘… = 6,325:
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer =
๐ท
๐‘„ ๐‘…
โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ +
๐‘„ ๐‘…
2
โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— ๐ถM
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘“๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ก๐‘ข๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘Ÿ =
1,20,000
6325
โˆ— 250 +
6325
2
โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 2
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘“๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ก๐‘ข๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = ๐‘๐ฌ. ๐Ÿ”, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ–
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Suply Chain ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก = 3,795 + 6,008 = ๐‘๐ฌ. ๐Ÿ—, ๐Ÿ–๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ‘
Solution cont..
๏ƒ˜ In the above Example Retailer picks the lot size of 6,325 with an objective of minimizing only its own
cost.
๏ƒ˜ From a supply chain perspective, the optimal lot size should account for the fact that both the retailer
and the manufacturer incur costs associated with each replenishment lot.
๏ƒ˜ The Total supply chain cost using a lot size Q is obtained as follows:
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘†๐‘ข๐‘๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ๐ถโ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› =
๐ท
๐‘„
โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… +
๐‘„
2
โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘… +
๐ท
๐‘„
โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ +
๐‘„
2
โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM
๐น๐‘œ๐‘Ÿ ๐‘œ๐‘๐‘ก๐‘–๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘™๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘ ๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’ ๐‘„
โˆ—
๐‘‘(๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ sup๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ ๐‘โ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› cos๐‘ก
๐‘‘๐‘„
= 0
Solution cont..
-
๐ท
๐‘„2 โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… +
๐ผ ๐‘…โˆ—๐ถ ๐‘…
2
โˆ’
๐ท
๐‘„2 โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ +
๐ผ ๐‘€โˆ—CM
2
=
0
๐ท
๐‘„2
โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘†M =
๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘…
2
+
๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM
2
๐‘„
โˆ—
=
2๐ท(๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘† ๐‘€
๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘… + (๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘€
โ‡’
โ‡’
โ‡’
Solution cont..
๐‘„
โˆ—
=
2๐ท(๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘† ๐‘€
๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘… + (๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘€
๐‘„
โˆ—
=
2 โˆ— 1,20,000 โˆ— (100 + 250
0.2 โˆ— 100 + (0.2 โˆ— 250
๐‘„
โˆ—
= ๐Ÿ—, ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ“ units
๐ผ๐‘“ ๐‘…๐‘’๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ ๐‘‚๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘‘๐‘’๐‘Ÿ๐‘  ๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘™๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘ ๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’ ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘„
โˆ—
= 9,165 units
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ =
๐ท
๐‘„
โˆ— โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… +
๐‘„
โˆ—
2
โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— CR
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ =
1,20,000
9165
โˆ— 100 +
9165
2
โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 3 = Rs. ๐Ÿ’๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ“๐Ÿ—
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer =
๐ท
๐‘„
โˆ— โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ +
๐‘„
โˆ—
2
โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer =
1,20,000
9165
โˆ— 250 +
9165
2
โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 2
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer = Rs. ๐Ÿ“, ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ”
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Supply chain cos๐‘ก = Rs. 4059 + Rs. 5,106 = Rs. ๐Ÿ—, ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ“
Solution cont..
Summary:
When QR= 6,325
Without coordination
When Q*= 9,165
With coordination
Raise or Down in
Cost (After coordination)
Annual cost of
Retailer (Rs.)
3795 4059 Raise of Rs.264
Annual cost of
Manufacturer (Rs.)
6008 5106 Down of Rs. 902
Total supply chain
cost (Rs.)
9803 9165 Down of Rs. 638
Quantity discount for commodity products
So, manufacturer must offer retailer a suitable incentive to raise
itโ€™s lot size to Q*=9,165 (as the total cost of retailer is raising by
Rs. 264 as he orders in lots of 9165)
Quantity discount for commodity products
Designing a suitable Lot size based quantity discount
Problem No.2: (Consider the data from previous problem)
Design a suitable quantity discount that gets retailer to order in lots of 9,165 units when it
aims to minimize only its own total costs.
Solution:
๏ƒ˜ CR = Rs.3/unit (CR: Price charged to retailer)
๏ƒ˜ Manufacturer should reduce the material cost by Rs 264/year (as retailerโ€™s total cost
increased by Rs. 264/year when he orders in lots of 9165) for the sales of 1,20,000
units/year.
= 3 โˆ’
264
1,20,000
โ‡’ Rs. 2.9978/unit
Quantity ordered by Retailer Unit price
If Q < 9165 units Rs. 3
If Q โ‰ฅ 9165 units Rs. 2.9978
Quantity discount for commodity products
Pricing Scheme:
Important points:
โ€ข For commodity products for which price is set by the market, manufacturer with large fixed cost per lot
can use lot size based quantity discount to maximize total supply chain profit.
โ€ข Lot size based discount, however, increase cycle inventory in the supply chain.
Problem: If manufacturer lowers itโ€™s fixed cost per order from Rs. 250 to Rs. 100 & SM=
Rs.100/ order (no coordination in supply chain)
when QR= 6,325โˆถ ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘…๐‘’๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = ๐‘…๐‘ . 3,795
Impact of lowering fixed cost per lot
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer =
๐ท
๐‘„ ๐‘…
โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ +
๐‘„ ๐‘…
2
โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer =
1,20,000
6325
โˆ— 100 +
6325
2
โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 2 = ๐‘…๐‘ . ๐Ÿ‘๐Ÿ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Supply chain cos๐‘ก = Rs. 3795 + Rs. 3162 = Rs. ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ—๐Ÿ“๐Ÿ•
From previous
example and not
affected by
change in SM
Problem: If manufacturer lowers itโ€™s fixed cost per order from Rs. 250 to Rs. 100 i.e. SM=
Rs.100/ order (with coordination in supply chain)
๐‘‚๐‘๐‘ก๐‘–๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐ฟ๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘ ๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’ ๐‘„
โˆ—
=
2๐ท(๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘† ๐‘€
๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘… + (๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘€
๐‘„
โˆ—
=
2 โˆ— 1,20,000 โˆ— (100 + 100
0.2 โˆ— 100 + (0.2 โˆ— 100
= ๐Ÿ”, ๐Ÿ—๐Ÿ๐Ÿ– ๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญ๐ฌ
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ =
๐ท
๐‘„
โˆ— โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… +
๐‘„
โˆ—
2
โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— CR
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ =
1,20,000
6928
โˆ— 100 +
6928
2
โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 3 = Rs. ๐Ÿ‘๐Ÿ–๐Ÿ๐Ÿ
Impact of lowering fixed cost per lot
Problem cont..
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer =
๐ท
๐‘„
โˆ— โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ +
๐‘„
โˆ—
2
โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘“๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ก๐‘ข๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘Ÿ =
1,20,000
6928
โˆ— 100 +
6928
2
โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 2 = Rs. ๐Ÿ‘๐Ÿ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ–
๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Supply chain cos๐‘ก = Rs. 3811 + Rs. 3118 = Rs. ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ—๐Ÿ๐Ÿ—
Impact of lowering fixed cost per lot
Summary:
No
coordination
(When SM=250)
Coordination
(When SM=250 )
No
coordination
(When SM=100)
Coordination
(When SM=100)
QR= 6325 Q*= 9165 QR= 6325 Q*= 6928
Total Supply
Chain Cost
Rs.9803 Rs. 9165 Rs.6957 Rs. 6929
Impact of lowering fixed cost per lot
All quantity discount can be removed if Sm is lowered
to Rs 100.
๏ƒ˜ Here price at which the retailer sells the product influences demand.
Problem: Let annual demand faced by retailer is given by Demand Curve: (3,60,000 - 60,000p)
Case 1. Policy: (When No coordination in supply chain)
Quantity discount for products for which firm has market
power
p = price at which retailer
sells products
โ€ข What should the manufacturer charge (CR) to the retailer?
โ€ข What should the retailer charge (p) to the customer?
Solution: Profit at Retailer (ProfR) = (p - CR) (3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p)
Profit at Manufacturer (ProfM) = (CR - CM) (3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p)
Price p at which Retailer maximizes its profit is obtained by
Quantity discount for products for which firm has market
power
๐‘‘(Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘…
๐‘‘๐‘
= 0
โ‡’
๐‘‘[(๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘… (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ ]
๐‘‘๐‘
= 0
โ‡’ 3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000๐‘ + (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘… (โˆ’60,000 = 0
โ‡’ ๐‘ = 3 +
๐ถ ๐‘…
2
Solution cont..
ProfM=
ProfM=
To maximize ProfM
So
๐ถ ๐‘… โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘€ (3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000(3 +
๐ถ ๐‘…
2
๐ถ ๐‘… โˆ’ 2 (1,80,000 โ€“ 30,000๐ถ ๐‘…
๐‘‘(Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€
๐‘‘๐ถ ๐‘…
= 0
1,80,000 โˆ’ 30,000๐ถ ๐‘… + (CR โˆ’ 2 (โˆ’30,000 = 0
๐ถ ๐‘… = Rs. 4
โ‡’
โ‡’
Where CM is
production cost
CM=Rs 2 per unit
๐‘ = 3 +
๐ถ ๐‘…
2
โ‡’ ๐‘ = 3 +
4
2
โ‡’ ๐‘ = Rs. 5
Quantity discount for products for which firm has market
power
Summary: When decisions are made independently it is optimal (No Coordination)
Price charged by manufacturer (CR) Rs.4
Price charged by retailer (p) Rs. 5
๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘Ÿ๐‘˜๐‘’๐‘ก ๐ท๐‘’๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ = 3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p
3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 5 = ๐Ÿ”๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ ๐’–๐’๐’Š๐’•๐’”
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (p โˆ’ CR) (3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p) โ‡’ 5 โˆ’ 4 (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 5 = ๐‘…๐‘ . ๐Ÿ”๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€ = ๐ถ ๐‘… โˆ’ 2 (1,80,000 โ€“ 30,000๐ถ ๐‘… โ‡’ (4 โˆ’ 2 (1,80,000 โˆ’ 30,000 โˆ— 4 = ๐‘…๐‘ . ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ
๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘†๐‘ข๐‘๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ ๐ถโ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“๐‘–๐‘ก = 60,000 + 1,20,000 = ๐‘…๐‘ . ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ–๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ
Quantity discount for products for which firm has market
power
Case 2. When There is coordination in supply chain: (Two stages coordinate their pricing decision to
maximize the supply chin profit
For optimal retail price
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“SC = (p โˆ’ CM (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000p
๐‘‘(Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘†๐ถ
๐‘‘๐‘
= 0
3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000๐‘ + (๐‘ โˆ’ CM (โˆ’60,000 = 0 ๐‘ = ๐‘๐ฌ. ๐Ÿ’/๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญโ‡’โ‡’
Quantity discount for products for which firm has market
power
๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘Ÿ๐‘˜๐‘’๐‘ก ๐ท๐‘’๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ = 3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p โ‡’ 3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 4 = ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ ๐’–๐’๐’Š๐’•๐’”
๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘ ๐‘ข๐‘๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ ๐‘โ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“๐‘–๐‘ก (Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘†๐ถ = (p โˆ’ CM (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000p โ‡’ (4 โˆ’ 2 (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 4
=Rs.2,40,000
CM=Rs 2/unit
Quantity discount for products for which firm has market
power
Summary:
๏ƒ˜ From summary table it is clear that when each stage of supply chain is setting its price independently
(i.e. no coordination) there is a loss of Rs. 6000 in supply chain profit.
๏ƒ˜ This phenomenon is called Double Marginalization.
๏ƒ˜ Double marginalization : Supply chain margin is divided into two stages but each stage makes its
pricing decision considering only its own local profit and this results in loss in profit.
Without
Coordination
With
Coordination
Loss due to lack
of coordination
Total supply chain
profit ProfitSC Rs. 1,80,000 Rs. 2,40,000 Rs. 6000
๏ƒ˜ New pricing schemes to achieve coordinated solution and maximize supply chain profit (Even if
decisions are made independently)
Quantity discount for products for which firm has market
power
I. Two Part Tariff
II. Volume based quantity discount
Manufacturer charges itโ€™s entire profit as an up-
front franchise fee (ff) and sets its wholesale
price as CR = CM
๏ƒ˜ Manufacturer can construct a two part tariff by which the retailer is charged an up-front franchise fee (ff )
๐‘“๐‘“ = Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘†๐ถ โˆ’ Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘…
From previous example
ProfSC = Rs. 2,40,000 (with coordination)
ProfR = Rs.60,000 (without coordination)
๐‘“๐‘“ = 2,40,000 โˆ’ 60,000
๐‘“๐‘“ = Rs. 1,80,000
Two part tariff constructed by manufacturer
๐‘“๐‘“ = Rs. 1,80,000
Material cost CR = CM =Rs. 2/unit
Two Part Tariff
๏ƒ˜ Retail pricing decision is based on maximizing profit.
Optimal Retail price
๏ƒ˜ Retailer gets the maximum profit when
Now
Two Part Tariff (Analysis)
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘… (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โˆ’ ๐‘“๐‘“
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถM (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โˆ’ ๐‘“๐‘“
Since
CR = CM
๐‘ = 3 +
๐ถ ๐‘€
2
As Derived in
previous example
๐‘ = 3 +
2
2
= Rs. 4/unit
Since
CM=Rs. 2/unit
๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘Ÿ๐‘˜๐‘’๐‘ก ๐ท๐‘’๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ = 360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โ‡’ 3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 4 = ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ ๐‘ข๐‘›๐‘–๐‘ก๐‘ 
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถM (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โˆ’ ๐‘“๐‘“ โ‡’ 4 โˆ’ 2 360000 โˆ’ 60000 โˆ— 4 โˆ’ 1,80,000 = Rs. ๐Ÿ”๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“M = ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ–๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ
Charged by manufacturer as an up-front
(Franchise fee)
๐‘‘(Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘…
๐‘‘๐‘
= 0 โ‡’
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“SC = 60,000 + 1,80,000 = Rs. 2,40,000
Without coordination Two part tariff
Rs.1,80,000 Rs. 2,40,000Pr๐‘œ๐‘“SC
Same as what we got when
supply chain is coordinated
Two Part Tariff (Analysis)
Problem: Total demand Dcoord = 1,20,000 units, Retail price (p) = Rs. 4/unit
๏ƒ˜ Manufacturer want to design a volume based quantity discount scheme that gets the retailer to buy
(sell) 1,20,000 units/year.
๏ƒ˜ Pricing scheme must be such that
Volume based quantity discount
From previous example when supply chain
stages are coordinated
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“R = At least Rs. 60,000
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“M = At least Rs. 1,20,000 From previous example
when supply chain stages
was not coordinated
๏ƒ˜ Analysis: Several schemes can be designed, one such scheme is when
D < 1,20,000 CR = Rs.4/unit
CR = Rs.3.50/unitD๐‘๐‘œ๐‘œ๐‘Ÿ๐‘‘ โ‰ฅ 1,20,000
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘… (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โ‡’ (4 โˆ’ 3.5 (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 4 = ๐‘…๐‘ . 60,000
Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€ = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถM (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โ‡’ (3.5 โˆ’ 2 (1,20,000 = ๐‘…๐‘ . 1,80,000
๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘†๐‘ข๐‘๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ ๐ถโ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“๐‘–๐‘ก (๐‘ƒ๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“SC = 60,000 + 1,80,000 = ๐‘…๐‘ . 2,40,000
Non coordinated Volume based
ProfSC Rs. 1,80,000 Rs. 2,40,000
Volume based quantity discount
Same as what we got when
supply chain is coordinated
Lot-size-based vs. volume based quantity discount
Lot-size-based quantity discount Volume based quantity discount
1. It is based on quantity purchased per lot. 1. It is based on rate of purchase or volume
purchased on average per specified time
period.
2. It tend to increase cycle inventory in the
supply chain
2. It is compatible with small lots that reduces
cycle inventory
3. It makes sense only when the manufacturer
incurs high fixed cost per period.
3. In all other instances it is better to have
volume based quantity discount.
Hockey Stick Phenomenon:
๏ƒ˜ In volume based discount orders from the retailer peak toward the end of a financial horizon, this is
referred to as the hockey stick phenomenon.
๏ƒ˜ As demand from retailer increases dramatically toward the end of a period, similar to the way a hockey
stick bends upward toward the end of the stick.
๏ƒ˜ Solution to hockey stick phenomenon : Base the volume discounts on a rolling horizon.
Volume based Quantity discount
For example, each week the manufacturer may offer retailer the volume
discount based on sales over the last 12 weeks.
Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits
Price discrimination is the practice whereby a firm charges differential prices to different segment of
customers to maximize profits.
๏ƒ˜ The goal of supplier is to price so as to maximize itโ€™s profit, by dividing its customer into segments.
Example: In Airlines, passengers travelling on the same plane often pay different
prices for their seats.
Problem: A contract manufacturer has identified two customer segments for its production capacity.
Production cost : c = Rs. 10/unit
(i) What price should the contract manufacturer charge each segment if its goal is to maximize profits?
(ii) If the contract manufacturer were to charge a single price over both segments, what should it be?
(iii) How much increase in profits does differential pricing provide?
Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits
Demand curve
First segment of customers ๐‘‘1 = 5000 โˆ’ 20๐‘ƒ1
Second segment of customers ๐‘‘2 = 5000 โˆ’ 40๐‘ƒ2
Total profit made
(with capacity constraint)
If there is no capacity constraint , for segment i the supplier attempts to maximize
To find the optimal price for each segment
Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits
๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘ฅ
๐‘–=1
๐‘˜
๐‘ƒ๐‘– โˆ’ ๐‘ (๐ด๐‘– โˆ’ ๐ต๐‘– ๐‘ƒ๐‘–
Profit made by
supplier per unit
๐‘ƒ๐‘– โˆ’ ๐‘ (๐ด๐‘– โˆ’ ๐ต๐‘– ๐‘ƒ๐‘–
]๐‘‘[(๐‘ƒ๐‘– โˆ’ ๐‘ (๐ด๐‘– โˆ’ ๐ต๐‘– ๐‘ƒ๐‘–
๐‘‘๐‘ƒ๐‘–
= 0
๐ด๐‘– โˆ’ ๐ต๐‘– ๐‘ƒ๐‘– + (๐‘ƒ๐‘– โˆ’ c (โˆ’๐ต๐‘– = 0 โ‡’ ๐‘ƒ๐‘– =
๐ด๐‘–
2๐ต๐‘–
+
๐‘
2
Optimal price for
each segment
Demand curve
for segment i
Solution:
(i) Without capacity constraints, the differential prices to be charged each segment are given by
Equation
Demand from two segments:
Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits
๐‘ƒ๐‘– =
๐ด๐‘–
2๐ต๐‘–
+
๐‘
2
๐‘ƒ1 =
๐ด1
2๐ต1
+
๐‘
2
๐‘ƒ2 =
๐ด2
2๐ต2
+
๐‘
2
โ‡’
โ‡’ ๐‘ƒ1 =
5000
2 โˆ— 20
+
10
2
๐‘ƒ2 =
5000
2 โˆ— 40
+
10
2
โ‡’
โ‡’
๐‘ƒ1 = Rs. 130
๐‘ƒ2 = Rs. 67.50
๐‘‘1 = 5000 โˆ’ 20P1 โ‡’ 5000 โˆ’ 20 โˆ— 130 โ‡’ ๐‘‘1 = 2,400 units
๐‘‘2 = 5000 โˆ’ 40๐‘ƒ2 โ‡’ 5000 โˆ’ 40 โˆ— 67.50 โ‡’ ๐‘‘2 = 2,300 units
Total profit of supplier :
(ii) If the contract manufacturer charges the same price p to both segments, he is attempting to maximize
Optimal price
๐‘‘1 โˆ— ๐‘ƒ1 + (๐‘‘2 โˆ— ๐‘ƒ2 โˆ’ [๐‘(๐‘‘1 + ๐‘‘2
2400 โˆ— 130 + (2300 โˆ— 67.50 โˆ’ [10(2400 + 2300
๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“๐‘–๐‘ก = ๐‘…๐‘ . 4,20,250
Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits
๐‘ƒ โˆ’ 10 5000 โˆ’ 20๐‘ƒ + (๐‘ƒ โˆ’ 10 (5000 โˆ’ 40๐‘ƒ
= ๐‘ƒ โˆ’ 10 10000 โˆ’ 60๐‘ƒ
๐‘ƒ =
10000
2 โˆ— 60
+
10
2
โ‡’ ๐‘ƒ = Rs. 88.33
Solution cont..
Demand for two customers
Total profit =
(iii) Increase in profit due to differential pricing
Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits
๐‘‘1 = 5000 โˆ’ 20 โˆ— 88.33 โ‡’ ๐‘‘1 = 3,323.40
๐‘‘2 = 5000 โˆ’ 40 โˆ— 88.33 โ‡’ ๐‘‘2 = 1,466.80
(๐‘ƒ โˆ’ ๐‘ (๐‘‘1 + ๐‘‘2
= (88.33 โˆ’ 10 (3323.40 + 1466.80
= ๐‘…๐‘ . 3,68,166.67
= 4,20,250 โˆ’ 3,68,166.67
= Rs. 52083.33
Conclusion: Setting a fixed price for all segment of customers or for all units will not maximize profits for
manufacturer.

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Economies of scale to exploit quantity discount

  • 1. Economies of Scale to Exploit Quantity Discount
  • 2. Economies of Scale to Exploit Quantity Discounts There are two types of quantity discounts ๏ƒ˜ Lot Size based quantity discount: ๏ƒ˜ Volume Based quantity discount: ๏ƒ˜ What motivates for discounts? ๏ƒผ All-unit quantity discounts ๏ƒผ Marginal unit quantity discounts Based on quantity ordered in a single lot โ€ข Improved coordination to increase total supply chain profits โ€ข Extraction of surplus by suppliers through price discrimination Based on total quantity over a given period (regardless of number of lots)
  • 3. Coordination in Supply Chain A supply chain is coordinated if the decisions the retailer and supplier make maximize total supply chain profits. Supplier Retailer Distributor All stages try to maximize their own profit, independently This may results in lack of coordination Action that maximizes retailers profit may not maximize total supply chain profit What should manufacturer do to maximize total supply chain profit?
  • 4. ๏ƒ˜ Quantity discounts (for commodity products): When there is a large number of competitors in the market, the market sets the price of that commodity and demand is fixed. (Ex. milk) ๏ƒ˜ Quantity discounts (for products for which the firm has market power): When there are few competitors in the market, demand varies with price charged by the retailer. (Ex. Herbal products) โ– Two Part Tariff โ– Volume based quantity discount Coordination in Supply Chain Manufacturer charges itโ€™s entire profit as an up- front franchise fee (ff) from the retailer and sets its wholesale price as CR = CM Based on total quantity over a given period (regardless of number of lots)
  • 5. Quantity discount for commodity products The Impact of Locally Optimal Lot Sizes on Supply chain: Problem No.1 Given Data: Demand (D) = 10,000 bottles/month Data Related To Retailer SR= Rs.100/Lot IR = 0.2 CR = Rs.3 Data Related To Manufacturer SM= Rs.250/Lot IM = 0.2 CM = Rs.2/Unit โ— Evaluate the optimal lot size for retailer. โ— What is the Annual fulfillment and holding cost incurred by the manufacturer as a result of retailerโ€™s ordering policy? Fixed order placement, transportation and receiving cost Price charged by the manufacturer Fixed order filling cost Production cost
  • 6. Without Coordination Solution: ๐‘„ ๐‘… = 2๐ท๐‘† ๐‘… ๐ผ ๐‘… ๐ถ ๐‘… ๐‘„ ๐‘… = 2 โˆ— 1,20,000 โˆ— 100 0.2 โˆ— 3 ๐‘„ ๐‘… = ๐Ÿ”, ๐Ÿ‘๐Ÿ๐Ÿ“ ๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญ๐ฌ ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = ๐ท ๐‘„ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘„ ๐‘… 2 โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— CR ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = 1,20,000 6325 โˆ— 100 + 6325 2 โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 3 Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿโ€ฒ ๐‘  ๐‘‚๐‘๐‘ก๐‘–๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐ฟ๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘†๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’:
  • 7. Without Coordination Solution cont.. ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘…๐‘’๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = ๐‘น๐’”. ๐Ÿ‘, ๐Ÿ•๐Ÿ—๐Ÿ“ ๐ผ๐‘“ ๐‘…๐‘’๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ ๐‘‚๐‘Ÿ๐‘‘๐‘’๐‘Ÿ๐‘  ๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘™๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘ ๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’ ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘„๐‘… = 6,325: ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer = ๐ท ๐‘„ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ + ๐‘„ ๐‘… 2 โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— ๐ถM ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘“๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ก๐‘ข๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = 1,20,000 6325 โˆ— 250 + 6325 2 โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 2 ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘“๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ก๐‘ข๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = ๐‘๐ฌ. ๐Ÿ”, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ– ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Suply Chain ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก = 3,795 + 6,008 = ๐‘๐ฌ. ๐Ÿ—, ๐Ÿ–๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ‘
  • 8. Solution cont.. ๏ƒ˜ In the above Example Retailer picks the lot size of 6,325 with an objective of minimizing only its own cost. ๏ƒ˜ From a supply chain perspective, the optimal lot size should account for the fact that both the retailer and the manufacturer incur costs associated with each replenishment lot. ๏ƒ˜ The Total supply chain cost using a lot size Q is obtained as follows: ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘†๐‘ข๐‘๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ๐ถโ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› = ๐ท ๐‘„ โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘„ 2 โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘… + ๐ท ๐‘„ โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ + ๐‘„ 2 โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM ๐น๐‘œ๐‘Ÿ ๐‘œ๐‘๐‘ก๐‘–๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘™๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘ ๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’ ๐‘„ โˆ— ๐‘‘(๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ sup๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ ๐‘โ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› cos๐‘ก ๐‘‘๐‘„ = 0
  • 9. Solution cont.. - ๐ท ๐‘„2 โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐ผ ๐‘…โˆ—๐ถ ๐‘… 2 โˆ’ ๐ท ๐‘„2 โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ + ๐ผ ๐‘€โˆ—CM 2 = 0 ๐ท ๐‘„2 โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘†M = ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘… 2 + ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM 2 ๐‘„ โˆ— = 2๐ท(๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘† ๐‘€ ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘… + (๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘€ โ‡’ โ‡’ โ‡’
  • 10. Solution cont.. ๐‘„ โˆ— = 2๐ท(๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘† ๐‘€ ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘… + (๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘€ ๐‘„ โˆ— = 2 โˆ— 1,20,000 โˆ— (100 + 250 0.2 โˆ— 100 + (0.2 โˆ— 250 ๐‘„ โˆ— = ๐Ÿ—, ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ“ units ๐ผ๐‘“ ๐‘…๐‘’๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ ๐‘‚๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘‘๐‘’๐‘Ÿ๐‘  ๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘™๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘ ๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’ ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘„ โˆ— = 9,165 units ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = ๐ท ๐‘„ โˆ— โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘„ โˆ— 2 โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— CR ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = 1,20,000 9165 โˆ— 100 + 9165 2 โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 3 = Rs. ๐Ÿ’๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ“๐Ÿ—
  • 11. ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer = ๐ท ๐‘„ โˆ— โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ + ๐‘„ โˆ— 2 โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer = 1,20,000 9165 โˆ— 250 + 9165 2 โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 2 ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer = Rs. ๐Ÿ“, ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ” ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Supply chain cos๐‘ก = Rs. 4059 + Rs. 5,106 = Rs. ๐Ÿ—, ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ“ Solution cont..
  • 12. Summary: When QR= 6,325 Without coordination When Q*= 9,165 With coordination Raise or Down in Cost (After coordination) Annual cost of Retailer (Rs.) 3795 4059 Raise of Rs.264 Annual cost of Manufacturer (Rs.) 6008 5106 Down of Rs. 902 Total supply chain cost (Rs.) 9803 9165 Down of Rs. 638 Quantity discount for commodity products So, manufacturer must offer retailer a suitable incentive to raise itโ€™s lot size to Q*=9,165 (as the total cost of retailer is raising by Rs. 264 as he orders in lots of 9165)
  • 13. Quantity discount for commodity products Designing a suitable Lot size based quantity discount Problem No.2: (Consider the data from previous problem) Design a suitable quantity discount that gets retailer to order in lots of 9,165 units when it aims to minimize only its own total costs. Solution: ๏ƒ˜ CR = Rs.3/unit (CR: Price charged to retailer) ๏ƒ˜ Manufacturer should reduce the material cost by Rs 264/year (as retailerโ€™s total cost increased by Rs. 264/year when he orders in lots of 9165) for the sales of 1,20,000 units/year. = 3 โˆ’ 264 1,20,000 โ‡’ Rs. 2.9978/unit
  • 14. Quantity ordered by Retailer Unit price If Q < 9165 units Rs. 3 If Q โ‰ฅ 9165 units Rs. 2.9978 Quantity discount for commodity products Pricing Scheme: Important points: โ€ข For commodity products for which price is set by the market, manufacturer with large fixed cost per lot can use lot size based quantity discount to maximize total supply chain profit. โ€ข Lot size based discount, however, increase cycle inventory in the supply chain.
  • 15. Problem: If manufacturer lowers itโ€™s fixed cost per order from Rs. 250 to Rs. 100 & SM= Rs.100/ order (no coordination in supply chain) when QR= 6,325โˆถ ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘ ๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘…๐‘’๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = ๐‘…๐‘ . 3,795 Impact of lowering fixed cost per lot ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer = ๐ท ๐‘„ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ + ๐‘„ ๐‘… 2 โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer = 1,20,000 6325 โˆ— 100 + 6325 2 โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 2 = ๐‘…๐‘ . ๐Ÿ‘๐Ÿ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Supply chain cos๐‘ก = Rs. 3795 + Rs. 3162 = Rs. ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ—๐Ÿ“๐Ÿ• From previous example and not affected by change in SM
  • 16. Problem: If manufacturer lowers itโ€™s fixed cost per order from Rs. 250 to Rs. 100 i.e. SM= Rs.100/ order (with coordination in supply chain) ๐‘‚๐‘๐‘ก๐‘–๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐ฟ๐‘œ๐‘ก ๐‘ ๐‘–๐‘ง๐‘’ ๐‘„ โˆ— = 2๐ท(๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘† ๐‘€ ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘… + (๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— ๐ถ ๐‘€ ๐‘„ โˆ— = 2 โˆ— 1,20,000 โˆ— (100 + 100 0.2 โˆ— 100 + (0.2 โˆ— 100 = ๐Ÿ”, ๐Ÿ—๐Ÿ๐Ÿ– ๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญ๐ฌ ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = ๐ท ๐‘„ โˆ— โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘… + ๐‘„ โˆ— 2 โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘… โˆ— CR ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Re๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘™๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = 1,20,000 6928 โˆ— 100 + 6928 2 โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 3 = Rs. ๐Ÿ‘๐Ÿ–๐Ÿ๐Ÿ Impact of lowering fixed cost per lot
  • 17. Problem cont.. ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ Manufacturer = ๐ท ๐‘„ โˆ— โˆ— ๐‘† ๐‘€ + ๐‘„ โˆ— 2 โˆ— ๐ผ ๐‘€ โˆ— CM ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ cos๐‘ก ๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘“๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ก๐‘ข๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘Ÿ = 1,20,000 6928 โˆ— 100 + 6928 2 โˆ— 0.2 โˆ— 2 = Rs. ๐Ÿ‘๐Ÿ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ– ๐ด๐‘›๐‘›๐‘ข๐‘Ž๐‘™ Supply chain cos๐‘ก = Rs. 3811 + Rs. 3118 = Rs. ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿ—๐Ÿ๐Ÿ— Impact of lowering fixed cost per lot
  • 18. Summary: No coordination (When SM=250) Coordination (When SM=250 ) No coordination (When SM=100) Coordination (When SM=100) QR= 6325 Q*= 9165 QR= 6325 Q*= 6928 Total Supply Chain Cost Rs.9803 Rs. 9165 Rs.6957 Rs. 6929 Impact of lowering fixed cost per lot All quantity discount can be removed if Sm is lowered to Rs 100.
  • 19. ๏ƒ˜ Here price at which the retailer sells the product influences demand. Problem: Let annual demand faced by retailer is given by Demand Curve: (3,60,000 - 60,000p) Case 1. Policy: (When No coordination in supply chain) Quantity discount for products for which firm has market power p = price at which retailer sells products โ€ข What should the manufacturer charge (CR) to the retailer? โ€ข What should the retailer charge (p) to the customer?
  • 20. Solution: Profit at Retailer (ProfR) = (p - CR) (3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p) Profit at Manufacturer (ProfM) = (CR - CM) (3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p) Price p at which Retailer maximizes its profit is obtained by Quantity discount for products for which firm has market power ๐‘‘(Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… ๐‘‘๐‘ = 0 โ‡’ ๐‘‘[(๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘… (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ ] ๐‘‘๐‘ = 0 โ‡’ 3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000๐‘ + (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘… (โˆ’60,000 = 0 โ‡’ ๐‘ = 3 + ๐ถ ๐‘… 2
  • 21. Solution cont.. ProfM= ProfM= To maximize ProfM So ๐ถ ๐‘… โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘€ (3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000(3 + ๐ถ ๐‘… 2 ๐ถ ๐‘… โˆ’ 2 (1,80,000 โ€“ 30,000๐ถ ๐‘… ๐‘‘(Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€ ๐‘‘๐ถ ๐‘… = 0 1,80,000 โˆ’ 30,000๐ถ ๐‘… + (CR โˆ’ 2 (โˆ’30,000 = 0 ๐ถ ๐‘… = Rs. 4 โ‡’ โ‡’ Where CM is production cost CM=Rs 2 per unit ๐‘ = 3 + ๐ถ ๐‘… 2 โ‡’ ๐‘ = 3 + 4 2 โ‡’ ๐‘ = Rs. 5 Quantity discount for products for which firm has market power
  • 22. Summary: When decisions are made independently it is optimal (No Coordination) Price charged by manufacturer (CR) Rs.4 Price charged by retailer (p) Rs. 5 ๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘Ÿ๐‘˜๐‘’๐‘ก ๐ท๐‘’๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ = 3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p 3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 5 = ๐Ÿ”๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ ๐’–๐’๐’Š๐’•๐’” Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (p โˆ’ CR) (3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p) โ‡’ 5 โˆ’ 4 (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 5 = ๐‘…๐‘ . ๐Ÿ”๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€ = ๐ถ ๐‘… โˆ’ 2 (1,80,000 โ€“ 30,000๐ถ ๐‘… โ‡’ (4 โˆ’ 2 (1,80,000 โˆ’ 30,000 โˆ— 4 = ๐‘…๐‘ . ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ ๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘†๐‘ข๐‘๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ ๐ถโ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“๐‘–๐‘ก = 60,000 + 1,20,000 = ๐‘…๐‘ . ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ–๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ Quantity discount for products for which firm has market power
  • 23. Case 2. When There is coordination in supply chain: (Two stages coordinate their pricing decision to maximize the supply chin profit For optimal retail price Pr๐‘œ๐‘“SC = (p โˆ’ CM (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000p ๐‘‘(Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘†๐ถ ๐‘‘๐‘ = 0 3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000๐‘ + (๐‘ โˆ’ CM (โˆ’60,000 = 0 ๐‘ = ๐‘๐ฌ. ๐Ÿ’/๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญโ‡’โ‡’ Quantity discount for products for which firm has market power ๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘Ÿ๐‘˜๐‘’๐‘ก ๐ท๐‘’๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ = 3,60,000 โ€“ 60,000p โ‡’ 3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 4 = ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ ๐’–๐’๐’Š๐’•๐’” ๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘ ๐‘ข๐‘๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ ๐‘โ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“๐‘–๐‘ก (Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘†๐ถ = (p โˆ’ CM (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000p โ‡’ (4 โˆ’ 2 (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 4 =Rs.2,40,000 CM=Rs 2/unit
  • 24. Quantity discount for products for which firm has market power Summary: ๏ƒ˜ From summary table it is clear that when each stage of supply chain is setting its price independently (i.e. no coordination) there is a loss of Rs. 6000 in supply chain profit. ๏ƒ˜ This phenomenon is called Double Marginalization. ๏ƒ˜ Double marginalization : Supply chain margin is divided into two stages but each stage makes its pricing decision considering only its own local profit and this results in loss in profit. Without Coordination With Coordination Loss due to lack of coordination Total supply chain profit ProfitSC Rs. 1,80,000 Rs. 2,40,000 Rs. 6000
  • 25. ๏ƒ˜ New pricing schemes to achieve coordinated solution and maximize supply chain profit (Even if decisions are made independently) Quantity discount for products for which firm has market power I. Two Part Tariff II. Volume based quantity discount
  • 26. Manufacturer charges itโ€™s entire profit as an up- front franchise fee (ff) and sets its wholesale price as CR = CM ๏ƒ˜ Manufacturer can construct a two part tariff by which the retailer is charged an up-front franchise fee (ff ) ๐‘“๐‘“ = Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘†๐ถ โˆ’ Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… From previous example ProfSC = Rs. 2,40,000 (with coordination) ProfR = Rs.60,000 (without coordination) ๐‘“๐‘“ = 2,40,000 โˆ’ 60,000 ๐‘“๐‘“ = Rs. 1,80,000 Two part tariff constructed by manufacturer ๐‘“๐‘“ = Rs. 1,80,000 Material cost CR = CM =Rs. 2/unit Two Part Tariff
  • 27. ๏ƒ˜ Retail pricing decision is based on maximizing profit. Optimal Retail price ๏ƒ˜ Retailer gets the maximum profit when Now Two Part Tariff (Analysis) Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘… (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โˆ’ ๐‘“๐‘“ Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถM (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โˆ’ ๐‘“๐‘“ Since CR = CM ๐‘ = 3 + ๐ถ ๐‘€ 2 As Derived in previous example ๐‘ = 3 + 2 2 = Rs. 4/unit Since CM=Rs. 2/unit ๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘Ÿ๐‘˜๐‘’๐‘ก ๐ท๐‘’๐‘š๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ = 360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โ‡’ 3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 4 = ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ ๐‘ข๐‘›๐‘–๐‘ก๐‘  Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถM (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โˆ’ ๐‘“๐‘“ โ‡’ 4 โˆ’ 2 360000 โˆ’ 60000 โˆ— 4 โˆ’ 1,80,000 = Rs. ๐Ÿ”๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ Pr๐‘œ๐‘“M = ๐Ÿ, ๐Ÿ–๐ŸŽ, ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ๐ŸŽ Charged by manufacturer as an up-front (Franchise fee) ๐‘‘(Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… ๐‘‘๐‘ = 0 โ‡’
  • 28. Pr๐‘œ๐‘“SC = 60,000 + 1,80,000 = Rs. 2,40,000 Without coordination Two part tariff Rs.1,80,000 Rs. 2,40,000Pr๐‘œ๐‘“SC Same as what we got when supply chain is coordinated Two Part Tariff (Analysis)
  • 29. Problem: Total demand Dcoord = 1,20,000 units, Retail price (p) = Rs. 4/unit ๏ƒ˜ Manufacturer want to design a volume based quantity discount scheme that gets the retailer to buy (sell) 1,20,000 units/year. ๏ƒ˜ Pricing scheme must be such that Volume based quantity discount From previous example when supply chain stages are coordinated Pr๐‘œ๐‘“R = At least Rs. 60,000 Pr๐‘œ๐‘“M = At least Rs. 1,20,000 From previous example when supply chain stages was not coordinated
  • 30. ๏ƒ˜ Analysis: Several schemes can be designed, one such scheme is when D < 1,20,000 CR = Rs.4/unit CR = Rs.3.50/unitD๐‘๐‘œ๐‘œ๐‘Ÿ๐‘‘ โ‰ฅ 1,20,000 Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘… = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถ ๐‘… (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โ‡’ (4 โˆ’ 3.5 (3,60,000 โˆ’ 60,000 โˆ— 4 = ๐‘…๐‘ . 60,000 Pr๐‘œ๐‘“ ๐‘€ = (๐‘ โˆ’ ๐ถM (360000 โˆ’ 60000๐‘ โ‡’ (3.5 โˆ’ 2 (1,20,000 = ๐‘…๐‘ . 1,80,000 ๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘†๐‘ข๐‘๐‘๐‘™๐‘ฆ ๐ถโ„Ž๐‘Ž๐‘–๐‘› ๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“๐‘–๐‘ก (๐‘ƒ๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“SC = 60,000 + 1,80,000 = ๐‘…๐‘ . 2,40,000 Non coordinated Volume based ProfSC Rs. 1,80,000 Rs. 2,40,000 Volume based quantity discount Same as what we got when supply chain is coordinated
  • 31. Lot-size-based vs. volume based quantity discount Lot-size-based quantity discount Volume based quantity discount 1. It is based on quantity purchased per lot. 1. It is based on rate of purchase or volume purchased on average per specified time period. 2. It tend to increase cycle inventory in the supply chain 2. It is compatible with small lots that reduces cycle inventory 3. It makes sense only when the manufacturer incurs high fixed cost per period. 3. In all other instances it is better to have volume based quantity discount.
  • 32. Hockey Stick Phenomenon: ๏ƒ˜ In volume based discount orders from the retailer peak toward the end of a financial horizon, this is referred to as the hockey stick phenomenon. ๏ƒ˜ As demand from retailer increases dramatically toward the end of a period, similar to the way a hockey stick bends upward toward the end of the stick. ๏ƒ˜ Solution to hockey stick phenomenon : Base the volume discounts on a rolling horizon. Volume based Quantity discount For example, each week the manufacturer may offer retailer the volume discount based on sales over the last 12 weeks.
  • 33. Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits Price discrimination is the practice whereby a firm charges differential prices to different segment of customers to maximize profits. ๏ƒ˜ The goal of supplier is to price so as to maximize itโ€™s profit, by dividing its customer into segments. Example: In Airlines, passengers travelling on the same plane often pay different prices for their seats.
  • 34. Problem: A contract manufacturer has identified two customer segments for its production capacity. Production cost : c = Rs. 10/unit (i) What price should the contract manufacturer charge each segment if its goal is to maximize profits? (ii) If the contract manufacturer were to charge a single price over both segments, what should it be? (iii) How much increase in profits does differential pricing provide? Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits Demand curve First segment of customers ๐‘‘1 = 5000 โˆ’ 20๐‘ƒ1 Second segment of customers ๐‘‘2 = 5000 โˆ’ 40๐‘ƒ2
  • 35. Total profit made (with capacity constraint) If there is no capacity constraint , for segment i the supplier attempts to maximize To find the optimal price for each segment Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits ๐‘€๐‘Ž๐‘ฅ ๐‘–=1 ๐‘˜ ๐‘ƒ๐‘– โˆ’ ๐‘ (๐ด๐‘– โˆ’ ๐ต๐‘– ๐‘ƒ๐‘– Profit made by supplier per unit ๐‘ƒ๐‘– โˆ’ ๐‘ (๐ด๐‘– โˆ’ ๐ต๐‘– ๐‘ƒ๐‘– ]๐‘‘[(๐‘ƒ๐‘– โˆ’ ๐‘ (๐ด๐‘– โˆ’ ๐ต๐‘– ๐‘ƒ๐‘– ๐‘‘๐‘ƒ๐‘– = 0 ๐ด๐‘– โˆ’ ๐ต๐‘– ๐‘ƒ๐‘– + (๐‘ƒ๐‘– โˆ’ c (โˆ’๐ต๐‘– = 0 โ‡’ ๐‘ƒ๐‘– = ๐ด๐‘– 2๐ต๐‘– + ๐‘ 2 Optimal price for each segment Demand curve for segment i
  • 36. Solution: (i) Without capacity constraints, the differential prices to be charged each segment are given by Equation Demand from two segments: Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits ๐‘ƒ๐‘– = ๐ด๐‘– 2๐ต๐‘– + ๐‘ 2 ๐‘ƒ1 = ๐ด1 2๐ต1 + ๐‘ 2 ๐‘ƒ2 = ๐ด2 2๐ต2 + ๐‘ 2 โ‡’ โ‡’ ๐‘ƒ1 = 5000 2 โˆ— 20 + 10 2 ๐‘ƒ2 = 5000 2 โˆ— 40 + 10 2 โ‡’ โ‡’ ๐‘ƒ1 = Rs. 130 ๐‘ƒ2 = Rs. 67.50 ๐‘‘1 = 5000 โˆ’ 20P1 โ‡’ 5000 โˆ’ 20 โˆ— 130 โ‡’ ๐‘‘1 = 2,400 units ๐‘‘2 = 5000 โˆ’ 40๐‘ƒ2 โ‡’ 5000 โˆ’ 40 โˆ— 67.50 โ‡’ ๐‘‘2 = 2,300 units
  • 37. Total profit of supplier : (ii) If the contract manufacturer charges the same price p to both segments, he is attempting to maximize Optimal price ๐‘‘1 โˆ— ๐‘ƒ1 + (๐‘‘2 โˆ— ๐‘ƒ2 โˆ’ [๐‘(๐‘‘1 + ๐‘‘2 2400 โˆ— 130 + (2300 โˆ— 67.50 โˆ’ [10(2400 + 2300 ๐‘‡๐‘œ๐‘ก๐‘Ž๐‘™ ๐‘๐‘Ÿ๐‘œ๐‘“๐‘–๐‘ก = ๐‘…๐‘ . 4,20,250 Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits ๐‘ƒ โˆ’ 10 5000 โˆ’ 20๐‘ƒ + (๐‘ƒ โˆ’ 10 (5000 โˆ’ 40๐‘ƒ = ๐‘ƒ โˆ’ 10 10000 โˆ’ 60๐‘ƒ ๐‘ƒ = 10000 2 โˆ— 60 + 10 2 โ‡’ ๐‘ƒ = Rs. 88.33 Solution cont..
  • 38. Demand for two customers Total profit = (iii) Increase in profit due to differential pricing Price Discrimination to Maximize Supplier Profits ๐‘‘1 = 5000 โˆ’ 20 โˆ— 88.33 โ‡’ ๐‘‘1 = 3,323.40 ๐‘‘2 = 5000 โˆ’ 40 โˆ— 88.33 โ‡’ ๐‘‘2 = 1,466.80 (๐‘ƒ โˆ’ ๐‘ (๐‘‘1 + ๐‘‘2 = (88.33 โˆ’ 10 (3323.40 + 1466.80 = ๐‘…๐‘ . 3,68,166.67 = 4,20,250 โˆ’ 3,68,166.67 = Rs. 52083.33 Conclusion: Setting a fixed price for all segment of customers or for all units will not maximize profits for manufacturer.