Russian cyber offense strategy development

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Russian cyber offense strategy
development and capabilities building
Seminar Research Paper for The Evolution of Cyber
Threat Course
Course Instructor: Hemi Pecker
Author: Yuri Livshitz. 306927862
Submitted on 28 April 2021

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Table of Contents
Intro................................................................................................... 3
Research Methodology ..................................................................... 4
Academic background overview ....................................................... 5
Development of Russian cyber warfare - Motivation........................ 6
Gerasimov Theory ............................................................................. 9
Russia's worldview and the birth of chaos ......................................14
The evolution of hybrid warfare......................................................18
Building unified network offensive network ...................................20
Russian cyber offensive international cooperation.........................21
U.S. retaliation and new Russian defense strategy .........................23
The role of FSB – Federal Security Service.......................................25
Conclusion .......................................................................................27
Bibliography.....................................................................................30

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Intro
Over the last twenty years, the expansion and development of cyber technologies added a new
dimension to international strategy, creating new threats and opportunities for next-gen warfare.
The emerging key actor in the cyber domain is the Russian Federation; cyber events associated
with Russian state and non-state actors have influenced the international environment, created
security challenges, and reshaped our core understanding of cyber power.
The fast pace of cyber development, however, has also resulted in gaps in the understanding of
cyber power is both an instrument of power and an element of national strategy.
The work aims to evaluate the role and posture of the Russian Federation in cyberspace. The aim
is to outline the key driving factors and triggers that led to the selection of cyber offense as a vital
tool of Russian international policy.
Russian cyber operations started in Latvia and Georgia during the Russian Georgian conflict.
Nevertheless, the most notable are multiple Russian cyber-attacks against the democratic party,
which demonstrate both the determination and good technical capabilities of Russian hackers,
which is also important because attacks continue despite significant publicity.
Russia also responsible (according to U.S. officials) for the latest supply chain attack on Fireye
via SolarWinds compromised software. Given the scale, the true impact of the attack is still to be
learned. Both attacks, however, clearly outline the vast attack capability created by the Russian
federation. Finally, a recent publication by NSA flags Russia as responsible for attacks on U.S.
government agencies.

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This paper will present an overview of existing literature of Russia-related cyber events, the
scholarly works that have examined Russian information warfare doctrine, and the record of
Russian engagement through international institutions.
Significant contribution to these paper provided by numerous research report produced by leading
cyber research companies like Crowdstrike and ESET.
Though individually, these subject areas provide a means of analysis and policy recommendations,
my aim is to offer a full perspective on Russia's behavior in cyberspace. The research will outline
Russian cyber capability creation. The research will cover both military philosophy (Gerasimov
Theory), which designed the Russian cyber warfare approach, and Russian practical steps to be
resilient against western retaliation by building independent Russian infrastructure. Finally, I will
discuss Russian international cyber cooperation with other regimes like Iran and Styria and other
countries which are under OFAC1
sanctions list.
Research Methodology
Most research preformed for this paper was qualitative in nature and involved the summary and analysis
of primary and secondary literature including publicly communications, academic journal articles and book
chapters, and reports from established research institutes and media organizations.
As true impact and precise offensive toolset used by Russia is obviously classified The paper will mainly
focus on Russian policies intent and strategy and less insight will be given to the tactical methods of the
1
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-
information/where-is-ofacs-country-list-what-countries-do-i-need-to-worry-about-in-terms-of-
us-sanctions

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attackers research aim is to understand the aim , evolution and possible future evolvement of Russian
offensive capabilities.
Academic background overview
My paper is based on multiple types of research on the subject of the core are principles of Russian
cyber capability one of the main sources I rely on is the extensive research performed by
Medvedev, Sergei A. "Offense-Defense Theory Analysis of Russian Cyber Capability" the article
present Russia policy and tries to predict Russian intent. At the same time, the article provides an
extensive historical review and great presentation of Gerasimov's Theory which this paper will
discuss in length later. The article fails to predict the intent of Russian foreign policy and, therefore,
misinterprets Russian cyber activity's key factors.
Additional research article which is essential on the topic is "What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense
Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment" by Rebecca Slayton. In her article Rebecca
Slayton present an extensive overview of defense offense equilibrium. The article provides an
extensive review of first-mover advantage as well as a detailed review of different technical cyber-
attacks. The conclusion regarding the cyber dilemma is "The most important policy implication of
these findings is that leaders should not presume that cyberspace favors the offense, but instead
recognize that any such advantage will depend on the complexity of the offensive goals and the
capabilities of the defender." 2
2
https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/41/3/72/12149/What-Is-the-Cyber-Offense-Defense-Balance

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Finally, James E. McGhee, in "Liberating Cyber Offense," provides an extensive overview.
Of cyber activity and make a very valid point by stating that "The misunderstandings regarding
cyber operations permeate the highest levels of U.S. decision making. Not only military
commanders but also civil political leaders"3
These statements jointly summarize the complexity of the West's problem when dealing with
Russian cyber offense. Before we discuss the potential threat to international order, we have first
to understand whom the Russian cyber strategy evolved to its current state
Development of Russian cyber warfare - Motivation
From 1991 to the present, the history of Russia began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union
(USSR) on 26 December 1991. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was
the largest republic within the USSR.
The Russian Federation was the largest republic that made up the USSR, accounting for over 60%
of the gross domestic product (GDP) and over 50% of the Soviet population. Before the dissolution
of the USSR, Boris Yeltsin had been elected President of Russia in June 1991 in the first direct
presidential election in Russian history. The elections ensured that Yeltsin would be the political
3
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271529?seq=14#metadata_info_tab_contents

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leader of the Russian successor state following dissolution. Yeltsin announced that Russia would
proceed with radical reforms, including market-oriented reform along the lines of Poland's "big
bang", also known as "shock therapy."4
For the most part, the Russian armed forces were in near-complete disarray by 1992, one year after
dissolution. This degraded military effectiveness would become all too clear during the 1994
Chechen War, but this posed some significant practical challenges for global security and arms
control in the interim.
With the collapse of the Soviet economy and the subsequent departure of large republics like
Gregoria and Ukraine. These were extremely challenging times for the Russian military which
suffered from a lack of budgeting and low public support. Supporters of democratic reforms and
Alliance with west Russia needed no nuclear weapons and colossal army of the Soviet Union
looked counterproductive and unneeded to the new democratic leadership of Russia.
Military budgets decreased sharply under the Yeltsin administration, and the military was
transferred to survival mode. This attitude, however, did not last for long. The Catastrophic War
in Chechnya (1994) provided a bitter example of why Russia still needs a military. Russian poor
military performance during the first Chechen war worried Kremlin as they damage the Russian
4
Greenberg, Andy. 2019. Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most Dangerous
Hackers. New York: Doubleday.

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reputation of a superpower and Yeltsin's image as a president and head of Stuff.5
Russia's shrinking
economy and multiple political and economic problems created a significant challenge for the
government. stability6
When Putin was nominated by Yeltsin and then elected to precedency, Putin found a weak army
and economy. Multiple examples can testify to the poor state of the Russian military during the
first years of Putin's rule, but the most remarkable example is Kursk's nuclear submarine tragedy
where due to failing test of rocket ammunition, the submarine sunk, and the Russian military was
not capable of saving the crew.7
The Russian army, in general, significantly lagged behind the West in modern ammunition and
aircraft capabilities. Putin, however, immediately invested significant budgeting in order to
recover the Russian military. During the investigation of military complex capabilities, one of the
areas that stood out was the cyber arena. The development of cyber capabilities, unlike the
development of rockets, does not require significant budgeting. Instead, it requires high-quality
technical human power. Russia managed to maintain strong academic and science capabilities.
Russia also managed to be one of the few countries to offer strong local alternatives to western
5
Krikunov, A. 2011. “Kiberprostranstvo vedushchikh gosudarstv v kontekste sovremennykh vyzovov i ugroz
[Cyberspace of Leading States in the Context of Contemporary Challenges and Threats]” Morskoy Sbornik 11
(November): 32-37
6
7
https://www.britannica.com/event/Kursk-submarine-disaster

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search engines and social groups. In fact, Russian Yandex search engine leads over Google in
Russia and V.K. present significant competition to Facebook.
Therefore, developing Cyber capabilities seemed to Russian leadership as an easy win. This led to
a search for a new theory of warfare that can potentially turn the odds in Russia's favor. The new
Theory was formulated by General Anatoly Gerasimov (head of Russian Stuff) and is currently
known as the Gerasimov theory.8
Gerasimov Theory
8
Greenberg, Andy. 2020. “The US Blames Russia’s GRU for Sweeping Cyberattacks in Georgia.” Wired, February
20, 2020. https://www.wired.com/story/us-blames-russia-gru-sweeping-cyberattacks-georgia/

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The first complete development of the "hybrid warfare" theory by Russia can be found in an article
by General Gerasimov, the Russian Armed Forces' Chief of Staff of the time, in an essay published
in the weekly magazine Corriere Military-Industrial Courier in February 2013.
The high-ranking officer of the Russian Command started from a simple consideration. That in the
post-Cold War period, and any regional or continental military action is increasingly closer to the
line in which peaceful operations and military operations in the proper sense of the term tended to
get mixed.
The post-Cold War experiences marked General Gerasimov's central idea: at the beginning of the
strategic Theory of the Russian General, however, there was the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA), i.e. the U.S. doctrine of the 2000s that placed the relationship between new technologies
and the overall reorganization of the North American Armed Forces at the core of the debate.9
Both Russia and China placed the RMA – which they saw operating well in Iraq – as the core of
their desired transformation of technologies with emphasis on military organizations.
Import to mention here a great Russian and Soviet General, Ogarkov, called the RMA- Military
Technological Revolution. Ogarkov claims that new technologies such as robotics and direct
energy weapons would design the whole new space of operations and even the political function
of war, thus marginalizing the vast masses of infantry that were once necessary to win.10
General Gerasimov states that the basic rules of war had changed: the role of the nonmilitary
structures useful to achieve goals that were previously reached exclusively by war increased out
9
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538
10
Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms
and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” Robert Coalson (ed.), in Military Review (January-February
2016), p. 24.

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of proportion. Here Russia had in mind the operations of Soft Power and economic and cultural
influence by the United States and NATO, but also, in many cases – and this is the point that gave
rise to the concept of "hybrid warfare" – the non-traditional means that achieved and sometimes
outperformed the effects of conventional weapons. Financial warfare? War of information
manipulation? War for raw materials? It depends on where you are.11
According to Gerasimov, in the new ware, victory comes above all from the covert work of many
organizations: local volunteers, allied military; the more or less "spontaneous" people's
organizations; companies' safety nets; criminal organizations, and large mass demonstrations.
General Gerasimov was an excellent prophet: the irregular forces in the Crimea, the other ones in
Chechnya, many other "little green men" in Georgia, and then in many peripheral areas of the new
Russian empire were successful in achieving Russian policy aims.
Technological superiority counts, and it is essential – but what really matters is the full and
absolute political power on the territory or on a specific technology, operation, influence, or Denial
Area action.12
According to Gerasimov, with its hybrid warfare, Russia will mainly carry out operations "from
weak to strong," blocking its enemy's information actions, backing their population and mixing
with them, thus becoming unrecognizable and, above all, carrying out entirely unconventional
operations.
11
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-2_Fridman.pdf?ver=2019-09-17-
231059-263
12
Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms
and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” Robert Coalson (ed.), in Military Review (January-February
2016), p. 28-32

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Either you take the radio and T.V. stations, like Nasser did at the beginning of his revolution with
his army, or currently you control social media remotely, either through fake news – which are
true instruments of "unorthodox" warfare, as it was called by NATO when a Marine officer, who
led it, found himself lured and tricked by a pretty girl from the GDR Intelligence Services – or
possibly even with the techniques of support, local manipulation and protection of the local
population.
Hence currently, Russia mainly plays the game of non-State actors, even imitating them, but there
is the whole panoply of the current nonstandard war. This type of nonstandard war is waged on a
small scale with the small countries and a large scale with the big ones.
In January 2000, the Russian President signed the first modern Gerasimov-style National Security
Concept, which listed the treat factors that are also those that Russia sees in the operations currently
existing in the East: ethnic, nationalist, and religious factionalism, a theme that is much far from
Western doctrine, which exalts precisely factionalism, as happened in the template of the hybrid
warfare of the time, the Second Yugoslav War.
Current mechanisms of international crisis control, which we see currently operating within the
United Nations and its peripheral organizations, have weakened significantly, mainly due to
discontent from the United States. United States no longer wants to participate in U.N.
international crisis control activity due to inefficient and fragmented U.N. operation.
The response of this Russian document was directly targeted to the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept,
in which the Russian side stated that only the U.N. Security Council could establish legal rules for
regional interventions. The Russian national interests, reaffirmed in the 2000 document, were still
the same: military cooperation in the CIS, on which Russia does not want foreign eyes; the creation

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of a unified military area (which is the basis for hybrid warfare), as well as stable unity with
Belarus.13
The unity is actively realized now with cyber activity as well during the recent
opposition uprising in Belarus.
Furthermore, NATO is creating a center for cyber operations to strengthen also "resilience" – now
a magic and fashionable word -in the countries concerned. Certainly, the Alliance is only
defensive, but it would be good to have a clear idea that, from old times to the present day, defense
and attack have always been closely connected.
Indeed, the western approach claims it has "bogged down" Putin in the Crimea, but it already
accepts the basic defeat in the Southern Flank where, however, there would be an enhanced "fight
against terrorism", regardless of what this expression means.
Hence "all-out war" cannot accept excuses. Even in times of peace and this is the real final goal of
"hybrid warfare," while the world war is today kept as a remote option by the U.S. outstanding
power of conventional or not conventional first and second strike. This might not last forever.
The only ones who are thinking about the new scenarios, leaving aside Italian lawyers in the
Intelligence Services and in other organizations are the French. General Thierry Burkhard, a man
of the Foreign Legion, is thinking of a new concept: after the defeat or, however, the
marginalization of the jihad, the real future clash will be the return of the old into the new, the
struggle between States and States.14
13
https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/russia-policy-towards-belarus-during-alyaksandr-lukashenka-s-
fifth-presidential-term-2020
14
Ibid p 67-81

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Russia's worldview and the birth of chaos
The chaos strategy and the tactical use of hybrid warfare emerged out of the perception of Putin
and the Russian leadership that Russia is locked in the form of great-power competition with the
United States and Europe and increasingly with China. The stakes are high: ultimately, it is about
the survival of the current Russian regime.
For decades since the end of the Cold War, Russian authorities have been feeding a sense of post-
Cold War “embarrassment” that Russia's security concerns were not sufficiently taken into
consideration, if not downright ignored. This storyline is reinforced by a "besieged fortress"
mentality at home fueled by a fear of squeeze by NATO forces and exclusion from the European
security architecture. This would have forced Russia to choose hostility over cooperation with the
West.
The Russian leadership believes that there is a window of opportunity to take action and make
foreign policy and security intentions a reality. The war with Georgia in 2008 was the beginning
of Russia's foreign policy activation and confrontation with the west. What followed were
calculated steps to do away with an international order since Kremlin leadership feels cheated and
disappointed with the West. For Russia, the problem remains that it cannot compete in a direct
contest of national power political or conventional military with its peer and near-peer competitors.
The Russian leadership fundamentally feels its conventional military is inferior to the West's, and

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especially NATO. Therefore, as Russia cannot compete symmetrically, it chooses to contest and
disrupt asymmetrically.15
It follows that Russia has selected chaos via asymmetrical means through cyberattacks, political
subversion, business ties, and economic warfare, among other tools. The approach has combined
both old and new, drawing on lessons from the successful use of Soviet-era asymmetric
strategies16
, but amplified with the power of modern technology and social media. Priority is given
to nonmilitary hybrid tools, like those being pondered by Russian military planners are part of
warfare.
Such means represent a coordinated and tailored effort at the strategic level to reshape the internal
course — be it political, economic, or societal — of target countries. Russia uses a complex and
combined toolkit of military and nonmilitary tactics17
In its extensive conflict with the West Russian power elite is united by a willingness to alter with
force, if necessary, the Western-led liberal international order. This effort also seeks to increase
15
Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows (6 July 2014),
accessed 5 May 2016, p23-29
16
Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of
Power, Research Paper (Chatham House, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016), pp. 37-40.
17
Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows (6 July 2014),
accessed 5 May 2016, p21-24

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Russia's international standing in relative terms as well as advance Russian interests against the
West.
Valery Gerasimov. In February 2013, Gerasimov articulated his Theory of modern warfare in a
now-famous article for the Military-Industrial Kurier. "Hybrid warfare" and the "Gerasimov
doctrine" were consequently coined as umbrella terms. To describe, often without context or
erroneously, Russia's nonlinear approach to conflict in the West. Indeed, the article was written in
the context of Russia's response to the Arab Spring and fears of the spread of color revolutions
against Kremlin-friendly regimes. Gerasimov fused methods from previous attempts to use
nonlinear competitive strategies against more powerful rivals with updated technology and
military concepts.
In this context, Russian operations must lead to information and psychological dominance of the
enemy. Therefore, seeding chaos is part of what Russian military strategists refer to as the "initial
period of war" — taking after Soviet military Theory but applied to modern warfare. These
concepts eradicate the line between peace and war, placing politics and armed conflict in the same
category.
In his text, Gerasimov described the way advanced military powers in the West engage in warfare
while outlining the importance of nonmilitary means to achieve military goals. He highlighted the

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primary threats to Russian sovereignty and suggested that the Kremlin's political leadership needed
to be more open to innovative ideas on future security challenges.11
Gerasimov's Theory is more a tactical application of how Russia understands modern warfare. It
reflects a pragmatic acceptance of the need to take what opportunities arise. What makes this chaos
strategy unique is the fact that the connection between nonlinear and nonmilitary tactics is no
longer an aid to the use of force but rather the equivalent of force itself. Of course, Russian military
thinkers did not exclude the use of conventional forces. On the contrary, they stressed Russia's
need for innovation and the wider modernization of its armed forces. Russia's "soft power"
(miagkaia sila)18
is here to prepare the ground for hard power.
Based on Western responses to their behavior patterns thus far, Russian leaders could conclude
that time is indeed on their side..
Disorientation and distraction in the West produce more one-
sided concessions and, therefore, purchase more time for Russia than victory on any battlefield.
Worse yet, the second lesson that Russian leaders could draw is that risk-taking works.
18
Mikryunov, V. Yu. 2015. “Kak protivostoyat’ agressii SSHA [How to Resist U.S. Aggression].” Vestnik
Akademii voennykh nauk 51, no. 2: 12-21.

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The evolution of hybrid warfare
Gerasimov doctrine is not entirely static. A significant event in the evolution of Russia's use of
Gerasimov doctrine to compete against the West occurred when Gerasimov delivered a keynote
speech to the Russian Academy of Military Science in March 2019. Gerasimov reported on
evolutions of military strategy and military-scientific developments. The address was important in
how it differed from his 2013 assessment on the use of nonlinear means to sow chaos. While
presenting operational lessons learned from recent deployments in Syria, Gerasimov insisted on
the use of military power as well as political-military coercion.19
Throughout his speech, Gerasimov insisted on two main "vectors" in the development of Russian
military strategy: limited action and active defense. These developments will influence military
19
The Gerasimov Doctrine -It’s Russia’s new chaos theory of political warfare. And it’s probably being used on
you.By MOLLY K. MCKEW September/October 2017 p23-34

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thinking and, subsequently, military procurement in the coming years and likely inform new
iterations of the Russian military doctrine. All these represent, in a way, Gerasimov's personal
military legacy.20
The strategy of limited action outside Russia's borders seeks to counter existing threats to Russian
national interests through limited out-of-area military intervention. This largely encompasses
lessons learned from operations in Syria, and to an extent, in eastern Ukraine.
The strategy of active defense aims to preemptively neutralize threats through active measures.
Accordingly, this would respond to Western interference, depicted by Gerasimov as a "Trojan
Horse."21
This reference to the West is more confrontational than ever: it frames the United States
as an "aggressor" and accuses it of developing interference strategies that combine fifth-column
political warfare and color revolutions with high-tech global strike capabilities. This is linked to
the preparation of the political environment through information superiority and the use of soft
power by US as the main nonlinear tactic.
Russia's military interventions in Syria, Venezuela, and, more recently, Libya raise the question
whether the Kremlin is still opportunistic or whether it has revised its military strategy to better
20
Ibid, p45-53
21
https://privacyinternational.org/learn/five-eyes

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project force around the globe based on a single playbook. These interventions have taken
advantage of preexisting political division and weakness that Russia did not directly created.
Together with its growing conventional power, Russia is now far more confident about using hard
power. Recent events in Ukraine only further emphasize this point.
Russian hybrid operations — mainly information Cyber operations — have been adapting in order
to infiltrate networks, destabilize internal norms, and ultimately create an environment conducive
to Russian interests in the West.
Building unified network offensive network
Russia allegedly is directly responsible for numerous high profile cyber-attacks;
1. Interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections - This operation by Russian GRU
illustrated the reach and power of cyber-enabled influence operations.
2. Disruption of the Ukrainian power grid in 2015: Russian cyber actors are credited with the
first publicly identified attack on a live power grid, which impacted an estimated 225,000
people.
3. Intrusions into the U.S. power grid: In 2018, the U.S. publicly accused Russia of
conducting a two-year-long coordinated campaign of cyber intrusions into the U.S. grid.
4. Targeting of COVID-19 research: In July 2020, the U.S., U.K., and Canada detailed
Russian-driven cyber intrusion campaigns directed against organizations conducting
COVID-19 vaccine development.

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Finally, the U.S. recently directly blamed Russia for conducting cyber operations on U.S. soil .
MOSCOW (Reuters) – U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Friday that “Russia was
responsible for a cyberattack that embedded malicious code inside U.S. government software
systems and those of other governments and companies across the world”.[23]22
Russia is previously mentioned, created an extensive network of proxies to deliver different types
of cyber operation. They are ranging from propaganda and fake news to direct technical
infiltration. Russia's cyber activity, however, does not stop at direct attacks on western
infrastructure; instead, Russia is trying now to mobilize allies to the effort.
Russian cyber offensive international cooperation
Russia recently isn't active only on the hidden cyber front instead significant energy invest by
Russian diplomacy to create its own alternative to the The "Five Eyes (FVEY)23
– alliance was
formed between five anglophone countries and their security agencies: the U.S. (NSA), the U.K.
22
https://www.cfr.org/blog/iran-russia-cyber-agreement-and-us-strategy-middle-east
23
https://privacyinternational.org/learn/five-eyes

22
(GCHQ), Australia (ASD), Canada (CSEC) and New Zealand (GCSB)". Russian is trying to do so
by leveraging cooperation with countries that are opposed to the U.S.
"2021 January, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif
signed a cooperation agreement on cybersecurity and information and communications technology
(ICT). The agreement includes cybersecurity cooperation, technology transfer, combined training,
and coordination at multilateral forums, like the United Nations."24
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A Russian military contingent that arrived in Venezuela over the
weekend, drawing U.S. condemnation, is believed by the U.S. government to be made up of special
forces including "cybersecurity personnel," a U.S. official told Reuters on Tuesday.25
Russia actively supports anti-western cyber activity and cooperation within countries that are in
direct confrontation with the U.S. This reflects Russian general strategy to jeopardize U.S. policy
as Russia sees the U.S. as its main rival on the international arena.
24
http://www.rt.com/politics/411156-russia-to-launch-independent-internet
25
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-russians-idUSKCN1R72FX

23
While the level of the cooperation isn't clear and in particular the commitment of the countries to
conduct the offensive cyber activity. It is groundless to assume that this partnership is created for
defense purposes only.
U.S. retaliation and new Russian defense strategy
U.S retaliation as response to Russian activity are of particular interest as they apparently empower
Russian cyber activity
“Obama also approved a previously undisclosed covert measure that authorized planting
cyberweapons in Russia’s infrastructure, the digital equivalent of bombs that could be detonated
if the United States found itself in an escalating exchange with Moscow. The project, which Obama
approved in a covert-action finding, was still in its planning stages when Obama left office.”26
Some of the tools planted where apparently used this created in Russian government strong
discontent with usage of western software and hardware. Russia defense agencies developed a plan
to replace western companies with local software providers they also require state owned
companies to replace software systems with Russian made ones.
26
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/national-security/obama-putin-election-hacking/

24
Russia is in particular worried regarding possible attack on its energy or banking sector. This leads
Russia which misses significant local cyber providers except of Kaspersky to attempt to build
internal and unknown to the west OS and network equipment.
Recently news emerged that Russian president Vladimir Putin had approved a plan to create an
independent Internet by 1 August 2018, first reported by the27
Russian news agency, R.T. The
alternate Internet would be used by BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa—and shield them from "possible external influence," the Kremlin's press secretary, Dmitry
Peskov, told R.T.
"We all know who the chief administrator of the global Internet is," Peskov said. "And due to its
volatility, we have to think about how to ensure our national security."
To create alternative Internet, Russia would need to duplicate the hardware and software that
currently manages Internet traffic. That would likely involve setting up computer servers, copying
existing databases, updating security features, and reconfiguring some existing technology—in
essence, they'd need their own Domain Name System (DNS), the essential technology that
underlies the existing Internet and, among other things, translates domain names.28
Once on Russia's Internet, users would have access to only those websites the alternative network
recognized. Let's assume Russia didn't want its users reading Georgian websites. It could eliminate
the country code top-level domain (TLD) .ge from its root server and essentially disappear
Georgia.
27
https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/internet/could-russia-really-build-its-own-alternate-internet
28
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System

25
Furthermore, when it comes to the Internet, trust is critical. Every network operator and every
Internet device developer trusts that when a phone, laptop, or computer queries a DNS server, it
will get a reliable and accurate response. If it doesn't, the Internet doesn't work.
For years, Russia, China, and other nations have complained about how the Internet is governed.
As members of the GAC, they have a vote on proposals. Nevertheless, they cannot veto decisions
made by the Internet Engineering Task Force, an independent international group of network
designers, operators, and researchers that oversee the Internet architecture and its operation.29
In the meantime, Russia is strong-arming the Internet in other ways. It's established a law that
forces foreign companies, such as LinkedIn, booking.com, and others, to store data about its
citizens on Russian servers.
The role of FSB – Federal Security Service
FSB's Russian intelligence agency and the successor of soviet KGB plays a central role in
orchestrating the cyber activity, both internal and external. Multiple researchers highlight the
agency extensive work in recruiting and developing Russian cyber capability. The influence of
FSB is huge in the Russian state it inherits authority from its processor, the KGB - Committee of
state defense.
29
Greenberg, Andy. 2020. “The US Blames Russia’s GRU for Sweeping Cyberattacks in Georgia.” Wired,
February 20, 2020. https://www.wired.com/story/us-blames-russia-gru-sweeping-cyberattacks-georgia/

26
FSB does the particular task of developing local cyber talent by allowing criminal cyber activity
and even endorsing it within some sandbox boundaries. Russia isn't known only for cyber activity
on the state level. In fact, Russian hackers are as famous for cyber actions, which are performed
for financial gain. Numerous high-profile Russian hackers were trailed and jailed recently in the
U.S. Russia federation actively opposed the detention of these individuals. Russian high level of
activity direct to prevent the extradition of cybercriminals to U.S. creates an assumption that
Russia fears they may expose information about state-level cyber activity.30
An extreme and somewhat bizarre example of this Russian policy is the "Burkov" case. Burkov
was arrested in Israel and extradite to the U.S. Burkov was wanted in the USA for criminal activity
against U.S. citizens mainly related to credit card fraud.
"Before Burkov was finally turned over to U.S. authorities, Russia had been seeking to free him
from Israeli custody in a proposed prisoner swap, according to Israeli media accounts. For its part,
Moscow offered to release the Israeli American woman, Na'ama Issachar, 26, who has been behind
bars in Russia since last spring."31
This small event exposes Russian “dependency” while performing cyber operation on criminal
organizations. While it isn’t clear if he was directly involved in any cyber activity orchestrated by
FSB or GRU. The high level of Russian involvement to release him clearly demonstrates that he
had access to sensitive data or knowledge regarding cyber operation. Pressure to release Burkov
30
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russian-government-spies-are-behind-a-broad-hacking-
campaign-that-has-breached-us-agencies-and-a-top-cyber-firm/2020/12/13/d5a53b88-3d7d-11eb-9453-
fc36ba051781_story.html
31
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/israel-extradites-accused-russian-computer-hacker-to-united-
states/2019/11/12/e40f84ca-057b-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html

27
reached heads of state level when president Putin and PM Netanyahu negotiated the possible terms
of his release.

Conclusion
As it seems current Russian power elite selected to challenge the West on numerous key questions
of international foreign policy. However, the real divide between Russia and the West is deeper it
is embodied in Russian total disrespect towards civil society, and the Russian government aims to
dismantle any cultural liberal transformation of Russian society.
The Russian government has a valid reason to worry that a strong civil society means citizens'
control over the government's function and policies. Russia's government and President believe it
seems in a more top-down approach where the government controls society on economic, mass
media, and even culture domains.
The Russian government uses cyber warfare mainly as a method to scare its enemies as it sees
them. None of the Russian cyber-attacks so far were aimed at critical infrastructure in the West
(Ukrainian power grid cyber-attack was performed as part of cyberwar with Ukraine). Although

28
Russia's level of attack tools improves the overall sophistication level of the attacks, the efficiency
is mixed. It is extremely hard to tell what is the benefit of alleged Russian cyber-attacks against
the Olympic games in Tokyo or WADA. The attacks again the democratic party are exceptional
in sophistication and penetration level, and yes, overall Russian attacks exhibit a degree of restrain.
For example, Russia avoids destroying data or creating unavoidable disruptions to an operation
like the Sony attack.
The reason for the Russian cyber offensive restrains the interconnected nature of the Internet.
Russia is currently dependent on western software and hardware. The Russian government is well
aware that the U.S. and NSA have significant cyber capabilities, as was revealed by Snowden.
Therefore, Putin and other decision-makers carefully calculate the consequences of the attacks and
possible western retaliation.
The realization of the West's possible consequences pushed the Russian government to realize
numerous projects to replace western hardware and software in government and private sectors.
Currently, Russia is actively developing a sovereign O.S. Russia's success in achieving its goal of
I.T. independence from the West can lead the Russian government to significantly bolder moves.
Western cyber deterrence is effective only as long as Russia is part of the I.T. ecosystem led by
Silicon Valley giants. Russia increasing control over the local Internet should worry the West no
less than Russian intervention in Ukraine. With sovereign cyber and its sector, Russia will present
a far more significant challenge and risk for the West and U.S. in particular.

29
Attacking modern software developed according to modern security practices will be a tremendous
challenge for the intelligence community and the NSA. Most of the applications used currently for
monitoring and security forensics will not operate on Russian OS. This can create a situation in
which Russia is less accountable and can operate without fear of western retaliation in the cyber
domain.
As for the West, losing the ability to retaliate with cyber to Russian actions leaves only the kinetic
option open. The kinetic option is, however, extremely costly and might be regarded as unjustified
by public opinion. Besides, Russia's possession of a large arsenal of nuclear weapons increases the
risks of any direct action taken against Russian decision-makers.

30
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