Cybercrime—A Primer
9/8/2020
Frederick Scholl
MS Cybersecurity Program Director
• Lies, damn lies and statistics
• Sometimes cyber crime statistics can
be overwhelming
• Cyber crime research through stories
• Research done by using court
transcripts
• Breaches caused by people lapse +
technology lapse
How do we prevent cybercrime?
• Loss of privacy
• Trade secret theft
• Business Email Compromise
• PII breaches (Personally Identifiable
Information)
• Ransomware
Five Perspectives of Cybercrime
 Cell phone subscriptions = 7.5 B
 Internet access = 3.9 B people
 GDP per capita per year
 Quatar = $138,910
 Central African Republic = $700
 Population of sub-Saharan Africa = 2 X China by 2099
Cybercrime is Here to Stay
• US v. AK 2016-17: Maryland district
• JK gets romantically involved with AK; they break up 5/2016
• AK took over following accounts: Facebook, Yahoo, Instagram, Nelnet, Apple,
TurboTax
• Sent spoofed threatening messages from JK to himself
• Had JK’s clients discontinue their insurance
• Had JK arrested and jailed 6 times; filed protective order against her
Protecting Your Privacy
• Monitor privacy of all social media platforms
• Use password manager (LassPass, DashLane, etc.)
• Use Multi Factor Authentication
• Protect even accounts without financial impact
• Jumbo Privacy (www.jumboprivacy.com)
Protecting Your Privacy
• One Time Password
• Send time token protected by
• Secret Key (QR code)
Google Authenticator for MFA
• Internal and External
• US and China agree to not “conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of
intellectual property” for commercial gain! (2015)
• Nationwide Children’s Hospital, Columbus Ohio
• YZ and LC worked at NCH from 2007-2017 doing exosome research and…
• Started Chinese company offering exosome research and services in 2015
• Started US company offering exosome research and services in 2016
• Worked for the Chinese State Administration of Foreign Expert Affairs Agency
• Sent NCH trade secrets to Chinese and personal email accounts
Trade Secret Theft: Robbing Children
• Attack went on for years
• Technology: Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
• Middle management requirements
• More training on how to manage risk
• Supervision of employees
• Privileged Access Management Systems
• DLP
Solutions: Trade Secret (Insider) Theft
• Use of email to steal funds from corporate accounting
• The $15m “emergency” that needed to be addressed
BEC (Business Email Compromise)
Hackers
Chuck Elsea
Controller: Kevin
McMurtry
Outside attorney
Hackers’
Bank
• Sender: hacker
• From address: ft-809@outlook.com
• Spoofed sender: Chuck Elsea, CEO
• To address: kmcmurtry@scuolar.com
• Body: “I have assigned you to manage file FT 809. This is a
strictly confidential operation to which takes priority over other
tasks”. Regards, Chuck Elsea
#1: Email to Controller
Non-standard address
Bad English
• Sender: hacker
• From address: ft-809@outlook.com
• Spoofed sender: Chuck Elsea, CEO
• To address: kmcmurtry@scuolar.com
• Body: “For the last months, we have been working on acquiring a
Chinese company. Please reach out to attorney Rodney Lawrence
for information on where the funds need to be deposited
Rodney.Lawrence@kpmg-office.com”
#2: Second Email to Controller
Non-standard address
Bad English
Non-standard address
• Sender: hacker
• From address: Rodney.Lawrence@kpmg-office.com
• Spoofed sender: Chuck Elsea, CEO
• To address: kmcmurtry@scuolar.com
• Body: “Please see here the below wire details. Shanghai Pudong
Development Bank, Amount USD $780,000. Regards, Rodney
Lawrence, KPMG”
#3: Third Email to Controller
Non-standard address
Started small
• Sender: hacker
• From address: ft-809@outlook.com
• Spoofed sender: Chuck Elsea, CEO
• To address: kmcmurtry@scuolar.com
• Body: “SEC require us to close the deal by Monday. In order to
avoid any penalties, we will execute the wire immediately. Balance
to pay: $7,020,000. Please proceed asap with the wire. Chuck”
#4: Fourth Email to Controller
Non-standard address
Bad English
• Check email addresses and content!
• Don’t publicize your back office staff
• Management authorizations and signature level
• Office 365 has “Advanced Threat Protection” but it
doesn’t stop account takeovers
Lessons Learned
• Started in Woolford, MD as credit reporting service
• Equifax—145 million records breached 2017
• US charges PLA members with the crime (2/2020)
PII* Breaches: Fixing Technical Vulnerabilities
Dispute Resolution System: ACIS
Running on “Apache” software
* PII = Personally
Identifiable Information
• On March 8, US DHS publishes a bulletin about critical vulnerability (fix within 48
hours) in Apache software
• Process of fixing software vulnerabilities is “patching”
• March 9 Equifax security team notifies CIO (GP) that ACIS system needs
“patching”; CIO missed the email
• July 29 suspicious activity noted on ACIS from China
• Breach made public on September 19, 2017
What Happened?
• First American Title— 850 million documents exposed 2017-2019
• Started in Orange County, CA 1889
• Anyone user could see any other user’s information (SSN, finances, etc.)
PII Breaches: Fixing Technical Vulnerabilities
FAST: online title
document repository
• Vulnerability was created in 2014
• Discovered in December 2018 by FA’s Cyber Defense Team
• Report sent to application team management
• No action taken
• Misclassified security risk as low
• Didn’t fix within the required 90 days
• Journalist published this information in May 2019
What Happened: First American
• Fix your remediation process first, not your vulnerability
• Educate boards and senior management
• Keeping track of risks, not just vulnerabilities
Lessons Learned Fixing Vulnerabilities
Controlled Unclassified Information
If you want to do business
with the Federal
government
• A type of extortion
• SamSam Ransomware
• Atlanta spent $2.6 million to recover
• Mansouri and Sanvandi indicted Nov 2018 (Iran)
Ransomware Breach: Atlanta
Back Office
Data
Phishing
Web Portal
Remote Access
Managed
Service
Providers
Attack
Paths
• MAZE
• REvil
• Nemty
• DoppelPaymer
Ransomware Trends
Affiliates Target
GandCrab founder
arrested August in
Belarus
Bitcoin
Payment
• Not a special animal; attacks same as other threat
• Use same prevention methods
• Recovery: Use tried and true 3-2-1 backup method
• Three copies of data
• Two media types
• One copy offsite (not connected)
Ransomware: Lessons Learned
• People are partly responsible for security breaches, but also need to be the best
defense
• Executives: Culture, Strategy, Policy
• Middle Management: Execution, Tactics, Supervision, Controls
• Line workers: Follow Process, Procedures, Standards
• Technology matters, but is not “all important”
Information Security: A Team Sport
• More COVID related attacks; don’t rely exclusively on technology to protect
• Election related scams will exponentially increase
• Biggest risk is disinformation
Trends: The Near Future
Thank You

Cybercrime: A Primer

  • 1.
  • 2.
    • Lies, damnlies and statistics • Sometimes cyber crime statistics can be overwhelming • Cyber crime research through stories • Research done by using court transcripts • Breaches caused by people lapse + technology lapse How do we prevent cybercrime?
  • 3.
    • Loss ofprivacy • Trade secret theft • Business Email Compromise • PII breaches (Personally Identifiable Information) • Ransomware Five Perspectives of Cybercrime
  • 4.
     Cell phonesubscriptions = 7.5 B  Internet access = 3.9 B people  GDP per capita per year  Quatar = $138,910  Central African Republic = $700  Population of sub-Saharan Africa = 2 X China by 2099 Cybercrime is Here to Stay
  • 5.
    • US v.AK 2016-17: Maryland district • JK gets romantically involved with AK; they break up 5/2016 • AK took over following accounts: Facebook, Yahoo, Instagram, Nelnet, Apple, TurboTax • Sent spoofed threatening messages from JK to himself • Had JK’s clients discontinue their insurance • Had JK arrested and jailed 6 times; filed protective order against her Protecting Your Privacy
  • 6.
    • Monitor privacyof all social media platforms • Use password manager (LassPass, DashLane, etc.) • Use Multi Factor Authentication • Protect even accounts without financial impact • Jumbo Privacy (www.jumboprivacy.com) Protecting Your Privacy
  • 7.
    • One TimePassword • Send time token protected by • Secret Key (QR code) Google Authenticator for MFA
  • 8.
    • Internal andExternal • US and China agree to not “conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property” for commercial gain! (2015) • Nationwide Children’s Hospital, Columbus Ohio • YZ and LC worked at NCH from 2007-2017 doing exosome research and… • Started Chinese company offering exosome research and services in 2015 • Started US company offering exosome research and services in 2016 • Worked for the Chinese State Administration of Foreign Expert Affairs Agency • Sent NCH trade secrets to Chinese and personal email accounts Trade Secret Theft: Robbing Children
  • 9.
    • Attack wenton for years • Technology: Data Loss Prevention (DLP) • Middle management requirements • More training on how to manage risk • Supervision of employees • Privileged Access Management Systems • DLP Solutions: Trade Secret (Insider) Theft
  • 10.
    • Use ofemail to steal funds from corporate accounting • The $15m “emergency” that needed to be addressed BEC (Business Email Compromise) Hackers Chuck Elsea Controller: Kevin McMurtry Outside attorney Hackers’ Bank
  • 11.
    • Sender: hacker •From address: ft-809@outlook.com • Spoofed sender: Chuck Elsea, CEO • To address: kmcmurtry@scuolar.com • Body: “I have assigned you to manage file FT 809. This is a strictly confidential operation to which takes priority over other tasks”. Regards, Chuck Elsea #1: Email to Controller Non-standard address Bad English
  • 12.
    • Sender: hacker •From address: ft-809@outlook.com • Spoofed sender: Chuck Elsea, CEO • To address: kmcmurtry@scuolar.com • Body: “For the last months, we have been working on acquiring a Chinese company. Please reach out to attorney Rodney Lawrence for information on where the funds need to be deposited Rodney.Lawrence@kpmg-office.com” #2: Second Email to Controller Non-standard address Bad English Non-standard address
  • 13.
    • Sender: hacker •From address: Rodney.Lawrence@kpmg-office.com • Spoofed sender: Chuck Elsea, CEO • To address: kmcmurtry@scuolar.com • Body: “Please see here the below wire details. Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Amount USD $780,000. Regards, Rodney Lawrence, KPMG” #3: Third Email to Controller Non-standard address Started small
  • 14.
    • Sender: hacker •From address: ft-809@outlook.com • Spoofed sender: Chuck Elsea, CEO • To address: kmcmurtry@scuolar.com • Body: “SEC require us to close the deal by Monday. In order to avoid any penalties, we will execute the wire immediately. Balance to pay: $7,020,000. Please proceed asap with the wire. Chuck” #4: Fourth Email to Controller Non-standard address Bad English
  • 15.
    • Check emailaddresses and content! • Don’t publicize your back office staff • Management authorizations and signature level • Office 365 has “Advanced Threat Protection” but it doesn’t stop account takeovers Lessons Learned
  • 16.
    • Started inWoolford, MD as credit reporting service • Equifax—145 million records breached 2017 • US charges PLA members with the crime (2/2020) PII* Breaches: Fixing Technical Vulnerabilities Dispute Resolution System: ACIS Running on “Apache” software * PII = Personally Identifiable Information
  • 17.
    • On March8, US DHS publishes a bulletin about critical vulnerability (fix within 48 hours) in Apache software • Process of fixing software vulnerabilities is “patching” • March 9 Equifax security team notifies CIO (GP) that ACIS system needs “patching”; CIO missed the email • July 29 suspicious activity noted on ACIS from China • Breach made public on September 19, 2017 What Happened?
  • 18.
    • First AmericanTitle— 850 million documents exposed 2017-2019 • Started in Orange County, CA 1889 • Anyone user could see any other user’s information (SSN, finances, etc.) PII Breaches: Fixing Technical Vulnerabilities FAST: online title document repository
  • 19.
    • Vulnerability wascreated in 2014 • Discovered in December 2018 by FA’s Cyber Defense Team • Report sent to application team management • No action taken • Misclassified security risk as low • Didn’t fix within the required 90 days • Journalist published this information in May 2019 What Happened: First American
  • 20.
    • Fix yourremediation process first, not your vulnerability • Educate boards and senior management • Keeping track of risks, not just vulnerabilities Lessons Learned Fixing Vulnerabilities Controlled Unclassified Information If you want to do business with the Federal government
  • 21.
    • A typeof extortion • SamSam Ransomware • Atlanta spent $2.6 million to recover • Mansouri and Sanvandi indicted Nov 2018 (Iran) Ransomware Breach: Atlanta Back Office Data Phishing Web Portal Remote Access Managed Service Providers Attack Paths
  • 22.
    • MAZE • REvil •Nemty • DoppelPaymer Ransomware Trends Affiliates Target GandCrab founder arrested August in Belarus Bitcoin Payment
  • 23.
    • Not aspecial animal; attacks same as other threat • Use same prevention methods • Recovery: Use tried and true 3-2-1 backup method • Three copies of data • Two media types • One copy offsite (not connected) Ransomware: Lessons Learned
  • 24.
    • People arepartly responsible for security breaches, but also need to be the best defense • Executives: Culture, Strategy, Policy • Middle Management: Execution, Tactics, Supervision, Controls • Line workers: Follow Process, Procedures, Standards • Technology matters, but is not “all important” Information Security: A Team Sport
  • 25.
    • More COVIDrelated attacks; don’t rely exclusively on technology to protect • Election related scams will exponentially increase • Biggest risk is disinformation Trends: The Near Future
  • 26.