Presented to: Kentucky Chemical Demilitarization Citizens’ Advisory Commission and Chemical Destruction Community Advisory Board Secondary Waste Working Group Presented by: Dr. John Barton Systems Contractor Chief Scientist

1. Cyanide mitigation
and worker protection
May 7, 2014
Presented to: Kentucky Chemical
Demilitarization Citizens’ Advisory
Commission and Chemical Destruction
Community Advisory Board
Secondary Waste Working Group
Presented by:
Dr. John Barton
Systems Contractor Chief Scientist

2. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
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Agenda
 Potential agent and industrial chemical hazards
 Health Hazard Assessment methodology and approach
 Worker Safety and Occupational Medicine Program
– Personal Reliability Program
– Medical baseline screening
 Cyanide challenge for energetics neutralization process
 Cyanide treatment during energetics neutralization process
 Cyanide exposure limits vs. BGCAPP levels
 Hydrolysate Storage Area design, construction, operations
 Supercritical Water Oxidation (SCWO) Process Building

3. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
 GB
 VX
 H
 aluminum hydroxide
 ammonia
 carbon monoxide
 carbon dioxide
 Dicyclohexyl carbodiimide
 diisopropylcarbodiimide
 diisopropyl methlyphosphonate
 diisopropanolamine
 diisopropyl urea
 EA2192
 ethanol
 sulfuric acid
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Potential agent and
industrial chemical hazards
 tributylamine
 tetrytol
 tetryl
 Composition B
 trinitrotoluene
 RDX; hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-
1,3,5 triazine (cyclonite)
 M28
 HCN
 hexane
 methylene chloride
 compressed air
 helium
 hydrogen
 phosphoric acid
 hydrochloric acid
 hydrogen fluoride
 isopropanol
 nitrogen
 methyl phosphonate
 methyl phosphonic acid
 sodium hypochlorite
 sodium hydroxide
 oxygen
 phosphorus pentoxide
 dithiane
 sulfur
 chloroform
Chemical Agents
Hydrogen Cyanide

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Health Hazard Assessments
 Preliminary Hazard Assessment
completed during design phase
 Health Hazard Assessments and
Job Hazard Analyses identify
potential exposure hazards
– Completed to Project System
Safety Program Plan standards
– Completed after procedure
development initiated
– Completed to appropriate phases of
the project (Design, Construction,
Systemization, Operations, Closure)
A Construction worker (above) wears
personal protective equipment.
Systemization workers (below), inspect
energized lock-out/tag-out systems.

5. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
Hazard tracking and communication
 Health Hazard Inventory updated after
Health Hazard Assessment
 Documents shared with Medical Director and
emergency preparedness
 Hazards identified during analyses are
tracked in Hazard Tracking Log
 BGCAPP has formal Hazard Communication Program and
Hazardous Waste and Emergency Response Program
 Employees are educated and trained for potential exposure
to hazards
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Worker Safety
and Occupational Medicine Program
Personal Reliability Program
 Workers’ activities involving
the potential exposure to
nerve agents receive a medical
examination to document
1. Exhibit no physical, mental, or
emotional impairment that may
result in a higher vulnerability to
nerve agent exposure
2. Are physically/mentally able to wear
and use the required protective
clothing and equipment
 Individual baseline nerve-
agent testing and ongoing
surveillance dependent
on type of work categories
Medical Screening Program
 Medical and Industrial
Hygiene programs are in
place for industrial work
activities depending on
potential exposures
 As part of ongoing Health
Hazard Assessment, the
extent of potential exposures
identified determine which
programs are required for
each worker

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The Technical Challenge
 Neutralizing rocket warhead explosives poses
unique technical challenge at Blue Grass
 Cyanide formation expected during
energetics neutralization process, trapped
in caustic liquid energetics hydrolysate
 Cyanide produced during energetics neutralization
process isn’t a public risk, but if not treated, could
require additional protective measures during future
plant operations in some work locations
(Supercritical Water Oxidation Process feed preparation)
 BGCAPP has focused on engineering controls and
treatment of hazards, to provide better protection for
workers during operations
Small piece of Composition B
in an aluminum pan

8. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
Technical Background:
Energetics Neutralization Process
HSS
Off-gas to MDB
filter banks
Hydrolysate Storage Area
(HSA)
EBH – Energetics Batch Hydrolyzer ENR – Energetics Neutralization Reactor SCWO – Supercritical Water Oxidation OTE – Off-gas treatment for
EBH (acid scrubber) OTM – Off-gas Treatment System APR – Aluminum Precipitation Reactor AFS – Aluminum Filtration System
ENR
Munitions Demilitarization
Building (MDB)
OTE
effluent
Off-gas
to OTE
Off-gas
to OTM
EBH
216°F, 1 atm
240°F, 1.7 atm
AFS
Air
Acid
Off-gas to
carbon
canister
Off-gas to
atmosphere
Filter cake
APR
Waste
Packaging
SCWO
Feed
System
Supercritical Water Oxidation (SCWO) Processing Building
(SPB)
Off-gas to
SCWO
building
140°F, 1 atm
Scrubber condensate
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9. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
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Treatment Approach
 Year long collaborative effort among
BGCAPP scientists, engineers and
corporate subject matter experts
 Mission focused on safely and efficiently
treating cyanide hazard during
energetics neutralization processing
 Focus on energetics neutralization
process
– Portion of process where cyanide first occurs
– Un-manned, automated process
(i.e. no workers)
– Upstream before Supercritical Water Oxidation
Process (where cyanide might have posed
worker hazard)
Mettler RC1® Calorimeter Reactor
at Battelle’s HERLA Used to
Simulate BGCAPP
EBH and ENR Operations

10. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
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A Safe Solution
 Enhance auxiliary systems to Energetics
Neutralization Reactors (ENRs) to
increase operating temperature
– Safely and efficiently destroys cyanide
– Does not change neutralization process
– Does not alter Supercritical Water
Oxidation process
– Does not impact weapons destruction
baseline schedule
 Auxiliary systems enhancements
– Insulating jacket placed around reactors
– Heat exchanger to increase temperatures
– Heat exchanger to cool sampling line
Munitions Demilitarization Building,
ENRs (above). A representative heat
exchanger (below).

11. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
Without Treatment With Higher Temperature Treatment
Liquid
(mg/L)
Air/Headspace
(mg/m3)
Liquid
(mg/L)
Air/Headspace
(mg/m3)
Energetics Batch
Hydrolyzers
600 non-detect 600 non-detect
Energetics
Neutralization
Reactors
350 non-detect 15 non-detect
Aluminum
Precipitation
Reactors
40 > 25 5 < 5
Aluminum Filtration
System
20 > 25 < 1 non-detect
Anticipated Cyanide Concentrations
cyanide treatment occurs during this step
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Pilot Plant cyanide levels are below worker safety regulatory standards
 National Institute of Occupational Safety & Health assigns short-term maximum limit
15-minute time-weighted average, of 5 mg/m3 for hydrogen cyanide in air
 Centers for Disease Control assign an Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health limit
of 25 mg/m3 for hydrogen cyanide in air

12. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
Hydrolysate Storage Area tanks
 Both energetics hydrolysate tanks may be
in service simultaneously
 Tanks are designed with both spill and
overfill prevention controls
 Spill containment = content of a tank +
regulatory defined rainfall (25-year,
24-hour maximum rainfall) and freeboard
 Spill response procedures define actions
for rapid response to contain leaks
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Hydrolysate Storage Area (above)
construction is nearing completion.
The Storage Area is designed and built
(below) to environmental regulations.
Hydrolysate Storage Area design,
construction and operations regulated by
Kentucky Department for Environmental
Protection, Environmental Protection Agency
and in accordance with the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).

13. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
Supercritical Water Oxidation (SCWO)
Process Building
 Separate HVAC systems service control area,
reverse osmosis room, processing area and
relief tank room, Aluminum Precipitation/
Aluminum Filtration room
 HVAC in AP/AF room designed to pull air from
worker breathing zone and out facility roof at
height greater than 30 feet
 Further dilution achieved in HVAC air stream
and outside building
 SCWO Process Building largely unoccupied by
workers except to perform maintenance
activities and remove filtercake bins
 Based on the automation used in the process,
exposure durations expected to be much less
than 8 hours/day
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The SCWO Process Building (above).
Workers will access filtercake bins using
large rollup doors (below).

14. A Partnership for Safe Chemical Weapons Destruction
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Questions/Discussion