The document examines how semantics, through sense and reference relations, provides some guidance for word meaning but is limited. Pragmatics, through exploring possible interpretations and understanding context and speaker intent, provides additional insight. The study aims to investigate how semantics and pragmatics are related and whether sense and reference alone are sufficient for word meaning or if pragmatic factors like illocutionary force also contribute. It hypothesizes that sense and reference require additional "force relations" from pragmatics to fully determine word meaning.

1. CONTEXTUALIZATION AND WORD
MEANING
A SEMANTICO-PRAGMATIC STUDY
BY
ASSISTANT LECTURER
ALI KHALAF JAFAR AL-ZUBAIDY
-

3. I
ABSTRACT
It is not easy to stand at meanings of words by simply
giving their synonyms, antonyms , or whatever type of relation that
reveals part of word meaning. At the same time , it is important to
figure out the underlying meaning of what is being said by speakers.
This can be done through exploring the possible interpretations of
speech. Here lies the importance of the study in that it tries to find out
the validity of semantics in deciding word meaning, and the need for
pragmatics to solve insoluble problems. The study tries to discover
whether sense and reference relations are sufficient to give satisfactory
meaning to sentences , or they need the force of the speaker's
utterance.
The problem , then , is that semantics , in terms of sense
and reference relations, is relatively a poor guide to the study of the
exact meaning of utterances. For example, the sentence :
- I will go there tomorrow.
refers to futurity if interpreted in terms of sense and reference
relations. But , futurity is only one meaning of the utterance for it
implies more than that ; the speaker may express a promise or a threat
as well. Therefore, once the context , within which the utterance is
said , is known , the exact meanings of words will be made clearer
accordingly.
The study shows the one-to-one correspondence between
semantics and pragmatics. It aims at investigating the effect of
"force", in terms of Grice's Cooperative Principles , on the
determination of word-meaning , and exploring how much semantics
and pragmatics are related to each other.
It is hypothesized that sense and reference relations are not
enough to decide word-meaning , they need , in this respect , another
type of relations called " force relations " that are exploited by Grice
(1975) but within other labels , namely " principles " or " maxims."

4. Once the relationship between semantics and pragmatics is presented ,
the bound between force , on one hand , and sense and reference , on
the other hand , is revealed.
Since the particularities of the study are too wide , not
much detail is given to semantic relations ; only a brief account of
each relation is expounded. The meaning of sense is limited to its
general logical or conceptual meaning. The same is applied to
reference whose types receive not much detail. Grice's theory is
referred to only on occasions that serve the study.
The study concludes that force enhanced by Grice's maxims
is a decisive factor in deciding the meaning of sentences as a whole
and that sense and reference relations are not quite enough in solving
most of the mysteries and ambiguities that underlie speakers'
utterances. Finally, the study presents some recommendations related
to the study and some other recommendations for further studies.
II

5. 1
SECTION ONE
REFERENCE RELATIONS
1.1 Introduction
In order to have communication , there should be a mutual
understanding between the speaker and the hearer . This
understanding is achieved by means of being aware of what we say ,
as speakers , and aware of what is " meant " by what is said , as
hearers. It is very well-known that " meaning " represents the core of
semantics. Philosophers and linguists believe that in order to know the
meaning of a word, people must agree on their " diverse emotive and
other reactions to it " (Osgood , 1976 : 40). In other words , people
must agree on the " referent " of the linguistic sign; to narrow or
shorten the distances of semantic space among individuals in order to
reach high degree of referential agreement. That referent is reached at
via its " reference " , which is the relationship between words and
things, actions, events and qualities they refer to or " stand for "
( Lyons, 1968 : 424). Reference is believed to be the core of
semantics, but alone it is not enough in the determination of word-
meaning. Hence , a need arises to know the " sense " of the word
denoted; and that is why the core of semantics has been shifted into
the study of " sense relations ". One might think now that sense is the
same as meaning , whereas , in fact, sense refers to the " customary
usage " of one of the different meanings of a lexical item or
expression, when meaning of a lexical item or expression refers to the
collection of the senses it is said to have in the dictionary ( Katz ,
1972: 36).
Therefore , a distinction should be made between sense
relations and reference relations; but , this is not the end. Lyons (1977:
200) states that "…the distinction [ between sense and reference ] is
crucial once we take into account the utterance of sentences in actual
contexts ", a fact stressed by many semanticists and theorists , but not
given heavy reliance on the determination of word-meaning. Katz
( 1972 : 240 ) , for example , says that " sense has to do with

6. that part of the relation that is determined by inherent features of the
expressions as opposed to that part that is determined by aspects of the
nonlinguistic contexts." Again Lyons ( 1977 : 180) emphasizes the
fact that " reference is an utterance-dependent notion , and that
whenever we talk of an expression in a given sentence as having
reference , we are assuming that the sentence in question has been , or
could be , uttered with a particular communicative force in some
appropriate context of use …. " That is to say that sense and reference
are not the only factors which determine word-meaning , rather there
is the factor of " force " that plays an important role in determining
word-meaning. Once we realize that "force" is related to pragmatics ,
it becomes clear that word-meaning is not only determined by
semantics , via sense and reference relations, but by pragmatics as
well. This is clearly manifested in Austin's (1962) theory of "Speech
Acts " discussed in his work How to Do Things with Words , in
Searle's (1969) Speech Acts and in Sadock's (1974) Toward a
Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts.
1.2 Reference : Background
First of all , " reference " indicates the relationship
between words and the things , actions , events and qualities they refer
to or stand for. It is , sometimes , referred to as the " denotation "
meaning of words. Theories of meaning try to relate the meaning of
words to their reference. The traditional theory of reference conceives
of reference as the real existence of objects that are referred to by
words. In other words , they exist as human beings , animals and other
creatures. Thus , a distinction is made between " reference " and
" referent ", where the former refers to the name of the thing it stands
for, and the latter refers to the thing or object referred to (Lyons ,1968:
428). Contrastingly , Yule (1996 : 130) believes that " words
themselves don't refer to anything. People refer."
The "concept " theory has two versions , one is the " sign "
theory by Ferdinand de Saussure , and the other is the " semiotic
triangle " theory set by Ogden and Richards (1923) in their work The
2

7. Meaning of Meaning. According to Saussure a linguistic sign consists
of a " signifier " ( a sound image ) and a " signified " (a concept ) ,
which are connected by means of a psychological " associative
bond. " Ogden and Richards , on the other hand , present their idea in
a triangular form:
Thought or Reference
Referent symbol
The " symbol" stands for the linguistic item ( word , phrase ,etc.),
whereas the "referent" stands for the object in the outside world.
These two ( the symbol and the referent) are not directly linked (hence
dots are used in between) , therefore , a need for a linkage arises , and
this is achieved by the " concept " , referred to as" thought or
reference " ( Palmer ,1981:24).
However , these theories cannot account for all the words
in the language. For example , what is the referent of words like
" the "," if " and " so " ? They cannot give an answer at all. At the
level of sentences , the matter is not too much better. When one says
" John is a clerk " , he is referring to a particular individual by means
of the referring expression " John ". True reference means to the
hearer the correct identity of the individual in the sentence , i.e. , the
referent himself as an existing body or person in the world of
experience. Therefore , it is the speaker who refers to himself or other
entities in the environment ( Lyons , 1977 : 177 ). The more will be
said about sentences in the following point.
1.3 Types of Reference
Various types of reference should be put into consideration
once a study tackles the idea of reference. Each type is discussed
briefly due to the nature of the present study. Lyons ( 1977 : 179-87 )
3

8. presents most of these types. First of all, there is the " singular definite
reference ".In one of its manifestations , it refers to references known
by definite pre- and/or post-description to it. For example, " The tall
man over there " , the reference " man " is pre-described by " the tall ",
and post-described by " over there ".
Many philosophers try to subsume " reference " under
" naming ", but, it is , possible to refer to persons or places , without
knowing their names , satisfactorily via a definite description. For
instance , in the sentence , " The man who was here yesterday " , the
speaker is successful in referring o the referent " man " by means of
the relative clause " who was here yesterday ", making known to the
hearer which " man " is meant , and depending on the assumption that
the hearer knows that a man came here yesterday. In many cases , the
definite article " the " is enough to give a satisfactory description of
the referent , based on the shared knowledge between the speaker and
the hearer. For example , if one says to his wife " I haven't seen the cat
today ", where " the cat " is mentioned for the first time , she knows
which cat is meant. The same is true when an Englishman uses the
expression " the queen " within a context , he refers to the queen of
England and no other person.
The second type comprises the " correct reference " and
the " successful reference ." Here, the definite description of the
referent denotes its truthfulness , for if the description of the referent
is true , the reference is said to be " correct ". But , the reference is
successful even if the description is not true , i.e., " it does not depend
upon the truth of the description contained in the referring
expression". We my refer to somebody, incorrectly, but successfully,
as a teacher when he is a doctor.
The third type is the " non-referring definite noun-
phrase ". The noun-phrase is definite , though it is not preceded by a
definite article, referring to a specific person or individual. For
instance , " Smith " represents this type of reference in the sentence ,
" Smith's murder is insane ".
The fourth type can be represented in the sentence " Every
evening at six o'clock a buzzard flies over the house " , where two
4

9. interpretations can be elicited. First , if the speaker means by " a
buzzard " a particular buzzard , then he is referring to an ' indefinite ,
but " specific " , reference. Second , if he means " some buzzard or
other " , he is referring to a " non-specific " reference by means of the
indefinite noun-phrase " a buzzard ".
" Distributive and collective general " reference forms the
fifth type. It is best explained by the example ," Those books cost £5 ",
the phrase " those books " can be referred to as " each of those
books ", thus used distributively , or as " that set of books " , which is ,
therefore , used collectively.
The other type is " opaque " and " transparent " reference.
A context is non opaque , or referentially transparent , if the
statements are formed from this context by first filling the blank with
one term of a true identity statement , and , then , filling it with the
other , having the same truth value. For example , the context (2) is
transparent since (3) and (4) are either both true or false , given the
truth of (1) ( Katz, 1972:262 ):
(1) The girl living above John = the ugliest girl in the world.
(2) Bill kissed …………….
(3) Bill kissed the girl living above John.
(4) Bill kissed the ugliest girl in the world.
In the context " Mr. Smith is looking for the Dean " , " the
Dean " is an opaque reference if it refers to the speaker's description of
" the Dean " referentially , and not to Mr. Smith's description. This
happens under the assumption that the Dean is Professor Brown ,
when Mr. Smith thinks that Professor Green is the Dean as he says ,
" I am looking for the Dean ." The reference is still opaque even if the
speaker substitutes the coreferential expression " Professor Brown "
for " the Dean " as he says , " Mr. smith is looking for Professor
Brown " ( Lyons , 1977 : 192-3 ).
Finally , a reference is " generic " when it refers to the
whole class of the referent , not to this or that group of the referent ,
nor to any particular referent of the class. Consider the following :
5

10. - The lion is a wild animal.
- A lion is a wild animal.
- Lions are wild animals.
Each of these examples has a " generic " proposition. It is clear that
" generic reference " is timeless , tenseless and aspectless , for when
we say "Lions were wild animals" or " Lions have been wild
animals ", this suggests that lions are no more wild now , and this is
completely absurd (ibid : 194 ).
6

11. SECTION TWO
SENSE RELATIONS
2.1 What is " sense " ?
Sense is said to be the conceptual ( logical , denotative or
cognitive ) meaning in linguistic communication. It is the essential
meaning of language through which meanings of sentences , on their
natural conception , appear and are understood. This is due to the fact
that the conceptual meaning has an organization similar to that of
syntax and phonology (Leech , 1974 : 10 ). However , the conceptual
meaning gives the semantic interpretation of sentences. The semantic
interpretation of a lexical item is regarded as the set of semantic
representations of its senses. These semantic representations of the
sense of a lexical item , phrase , clause or sentence are referred to as
its " readings ". The semantic representation of one concept or another
is referred to as the " semantic marker " of a lexical item. Hence , a
" reading " is a set of semantic markers a lexical item is said to have ,
giving it the meaning by which it is known , and distinguishing it from
other lexical items ( Katz , 1972 : 37 ). For example , the word
" woman " can be symbolized in terms of its readings ( or distinctive
features , analogically with phonology ) :
Woman = [ + HUMAN ] [ - MALE ] [ + ADULT ]
as distinct from or in contrast with " boy " , " man " or " girl ".
There is a tendency hypothesizing the universality of
conceptual meaning , but tangible differences are observed among
languages. The different numbers of colours each language has is a
good example. In addition , some cultural variations in the perception
of the same lexical item are found among different languages. For
example , the word " owl " has a bad sense in some cultures , the Arab
world for instance , but a good sense in others. Even in the same
culture , a person may conceive of a lexical item positively in one
situation , and negatively in another. A countryman feels pleasant for
7

12. seeing a field of buttercups plants , but restless when seeing them in
his garden and considers them as weeds ( Leech, 1974 : 30-31 ).
Linguists , proponents of Relativism , believe that language
controls our minds and experience , but this idea has been revolted by
Chomsky's Universalism. Chomsky proposes that languages have the
same basic conceptual framework. He argues that languages share a
universal set of semantic features or categories , and the difference
between one language and another is in the choice among the subsets
of these categories. Such categories are like animate / inanimate ,
human / non-human , concrete / abstract , etc. He believes that all
human beings are endowed with an innate genetic ability to language.
In other words , it is the mind that controls the language , hence , the
mind realizes and distinguishes the meanings of concepts or senses of
the words.
2.2 Sense Relations
Sense is concerned with intralinguistic relations , those that
hold between one linguistic item and the other. There are two types of
sense relations , syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. Syntagmatic
relations refer to collocation , where one lexical item collocates or
goes with another , which is not replicable by any other lexical item
due to the force of these relations. For example , the lexical item
" bark " collocates only with " dogs " and no other lexical item.
Paradigmatic relations , on the other hand , include
synonymy, antonymy , hyponymy , relational opposites , polysemy
and homonymy. Synonymy refers to the sameness of meaning , where
it is assumed that one lexical item or phrase can replace the other
without any change in meaning. For instance," dead " and " deceased "
are said to be synonymous in " His deceased/dead friend ". But , there
is no complete synonymy.
Antonymy refers to the oppositeness of meaning. When
someone says, " It is cold " , this means that " It is not hot ". But, " not
hot " does not necessarily mean " cold " , for " It is not hot " almost
8

13. refers to a " nice weather " , but not " cold ". This is due to the
principle of gradability found between gradable antonyms , whereas ,
non-gradable antonyms yield to complete antonyms , for instance ,
" This cat is female " implies that " This cat is not male " ; " His
brother is alive " implies " His brother is not dead. "
Hyponymy is a relation of inclusion ,where one lexical
item is included in another wider lexical item. For example, " lion "
and " elephant " are included in " mammal " or " animal " ; " tulip "
and " rose " are included in " flower " and so on. It is a matter of class-
relationship ( Palmer ,1981:85). Relations of hyponymy may form
grading relations. This is virtually true when we realize that " rose " is
included in " flower " , and " flower " is included in " plant ". But, "
rose " is the immediate hyponym of " flower " and the latter is the
immediate hyponym of " plant ". Nevertheless, within hyponymy ,
there is a relation of entailment , for example , " This is a rose " entails
" This is a flower " (ibid:87).
Relational opposites are included within antonymy
relations. They display symmetry in their meaning such as" buy/sell " ,
" give/receive " , " husband/wife " , " examiner/examinee " , etc.
Polysemy means the difference in meaning of one lexical
item. For example , the lexical item " bank " is polysemic in the sense
that it means " a building where money is deposited or changed " , or
" a shore " or " a pool " , etc. homonymy , on the other hand , is
divided into " homophony " , where two lexical items have the same
pronunciation , though differ in spelling and meaning like
" knight/night " and " sea/see ", etc. , and " homography " , where two
lexical items have the same spelling , but differ in meaning and
pronunciation such as " lead/li:d/ " meaning " to guide " and " lead
/led/ " referring to a certain type of metal. However , polysemy and
homonymy are , sometimes , problematic and cannot be distinguished,
and this is not going to be tackled due to the limits of the study.
9

14. 2.3 Sense and Reference
It has been stated that sense explicates intralinguistic
relations that hold between linguistic items. Reference is concerned
with the relationship between these linguistic items and the ( non-
linguistic ) world of experience. In fact , reference relations form the
centre of semantics , as it has always been believed , but , sense
relations have occupied language a great deal. Dictionaries , for
example , depend on sense relations , where a new unknown word is
identified by defining it in terms of other lexical items whose sense
and reference are already known. Nevertheless , the recent tendency in
linguistics is to limit the study of semantics to sense relations only due
to their efficiency in determining the meaning of lexical items ,
individually or within larger units like a sentence , in any language
( Palmer , 1981 : 31-2).
Reference theory stipulates that lexical items have
meanings by denoting things in the world ; the object being the
meaning. However, such a theory cannot account for imagery objects
or lexical items and past events , or words like " the ", " if " or " and ",
which have no physical existence. Therefore, one has to speak about
the differentiation between the " reference " of the item and its
" sense." In other words , it is to distinguish between what a lexical
item denotes and what it connotes( Parkin , 1982 : 42).
The same object may be viewed differently , i.e. , one
reference has different senses. Frege's ( 1892) classic example shows
this difference :
- The Morning Star is the Evening Star.
Reference is the same since both " the Morning Star " and " the
Evening Star " refer to the same planet , but different senses for the
sentence conveys information referring to a fact that the hearer has not
been aware of ; otherwise , the sentence conveys nothing but a mere
tautology. Therefore , both expressions cannot be synonymous for
they do not have the same sense , rather the same reference
( Lyons, 1977 : 197).
Frege believes that proper nouns have sense and reference.
10

15. He hints at giving a description or definition to " personal names ",
relationship terms ", " pronouns " ," titles " , " cities " ," rivers " , etc.
This could be true for some , not all , languages, like Arabic . For
example, " " / sælɪ h / is a personal name which has the
connotation of an adjective referring to " a good man " in addition to
being his name , compare , " " / ɪ nnehu rædʒ ulun sælɪ h
/ and " " /ðehebə sælɪ h ɪ læ ?emelɪ hi /. A problem
arises in this respect , but not always is the case , when the bearer of
the name does not have, or may contrast with , the sense of the
adjective implied in his name , that is , the bearer is a villain , "
" / sælɪ h rædʒ ulun ʃ ərri:r/. The name has acquired a
bad sense although its connotation is good. And this is to conclude
that sense is not a good reflection of the connotation of proper names.
However , the problem of personal names is no more discussed for a
full study is needed to account for their relation with what they refer
to or represent and their sense. Moreover , such a relation is bound by
cultural variation , where names have sense and reference in some
cultures , whereas only reference in others. For example , what is the
meaning of , the connotation that coincides with , the proper nouns
" John , Jack , Bill, etc."?
Away from the problem discussed in the precedent
paragraph , let us consider the following example and see how sense
and reference are successful in attaining meaning :
- It is cloudy today.
In terms of reference " cloudy " refers to the speaker's experience of
the outside world, seeing clouds in the sky and , therefore , refers to
the weather as being " cloudy ". In other words , the lexical item
" cloudy " obtains its meaning from the physical existence of , and in
relation to , the materialistic clouds. " Today " denotes the date in
which the speaker sees the observable clouds , and it is the date in
which the saying takes place , the present time. But , can " today " be
seen or touched? A question that reference cannot answer.
In terms of sense , " cloudy " has in its connotation the
gathering of clouds, suggesting darkness, sunless or dim atmosphere ,
or somber , or muddy. " Today " , on the other hand , has the sense of
present day in which both the saying and the gathering of the clouds
11

16. take place. Yet , seeing the different senses suggested by the lexical
item " cloudy " , we do not know which sense is meant to be
conveyed. Then , how can we predict the meaning of the whole
sentence , and on what basis ? A question that sense can never answer.
But, once we know " who is speaking to whom, and in what context ",
the meaning of the sentence is restricted and understood, and can
easily be deduced. This would ,then , imply the speaker's " force " on
the choice of lexical items to have them mean the way he wants. The
idea of " force " is elaborated on in the following section.
12

17. SECTION THREE
FORCE AND GRICE'S COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE
3.1 Force and Sense
It is evident so far that " sense " resembles the core of
semantics. It will , then , be the main concern of the present
discussion. Leech (1980 : 80) relates sense to force , in an attempt to
relate semantics to pragmatics. " Sense " reflects the formal logic of
the deep structure of the sentence , whereas " force " entails a promise,
a command , a warn , a request , a permission and so on.
In his analysis of language , the linguist should rely on the
two media of language , i.e. , the spoken and the written. Actually ,
both media need contexts in order to stand on the meanings of the
sentences or utterance included, for otherwise no text or situation is
understood. Let us reconsider the last example in the light of what we
have here ;
- It is cloudy today.
If seen from a pragmatic point of view , this sentence is interpreted
differently according to the context in which it occurs , and , hence ,
different forces accordingly. The sentence could be a warn said by a
wife to her husband , advising him to take his umbrella for it might
rain; or it could be said by somebody to his friend implying that it is
not hot today , for there will be no sun; or it could be said by a mother
addressing her children , commanding them not to go out ; or it might
be said by a grandmother talking to her grandson , advising him to put
on heavy clothes lest he might catch cold. The list is open for more
interpretations , but , what do all these interpretations suggest ? A
question that " force " can answer easily , not like its partners ( sense
and reference ) which stop at a certain point . Once the context or
situation is unveiled , or the speaker and the hearer are identified , the
implied meaning of the sentence , or utterance , can easily be
predicted.
To assure what has been claimed so far , compare these
two pairs of sentences ;
13

18. 1. A. I will be here at 9 tomorrow.
B. You will be here at 9 tomorrow.
2. A. Can't you borrow the money ?
B. Can't I borrow the money ?
Semantically , the first two sentences have the sense of futurity , but
the person who " will be here at 9 tomorrow " is different , the speaker
in the first and the hearer in the second. However , the same sentences
are different in meaning , pragmatically speaking. The first sentence
has the force of a promise or a threat , whereas the second has the
force of a command.
The same can be said about the second pair. The first
sentence ( i.e., sentence 2.A. ) implies " possibility " , on semantic
basis , where it means " Isn't it possible for you to borrow the
money?" While , pragmatically , it has the force of an " impatient
suggestion ". The second sentence in the second pair ( sentence 2.B.)
has the sense of " permission " , but has the force of both
" permission " and " request " depending on the context. This simply
means that" can " has different senses but are not distinguished unless
the context is revealed ( Leech , 1980 : 81 ).
Another example is the following :
- Can you play the violin ?
Semantically , the sense of the sentence is to ask about the ability of
the hearer to play the violin , whereas , in fact , it implies an additional
meaning , representing a request to play the violin ( roughly speaking
" Please play the violin "). These two different meanings are acquired
due to the situation within which the sentence occurs.
However , sometimes , humorous effects might be the
result of misrecognition , when , for example , a visitor of a city ,
being lost, asks a passer-by :
Visitor : Excuse me , do you know where the Ambassador Hotel is ?
Passer-by : Oh sure , I know where it is (and walks away).
14

19. The passer-by answers the direct question (do you know….?) literally
( I know…), misrecognising the indirect request in the visitor's
question ( where the Ambassador Hotel is). The misunderstanding
results from the fact that the visitor tries to be more polite in directing
his request , and not using a command , but the visitor takes it as a
command not a request ( Yule , 1996 :133 ).
Contextualization , as it seems to be , tells us so much
about what is meant by a certain lexical item , and without which
lexical items lose their interpretive sense. It is made clear that
semantics alone does not give the complete meaning of what is said ,
and that the reconciliation between semantics and pragmatics , in
terms of sense and force , offers a good understanding to the meaning
of lexical items. A case that is clarified and expanded on in Grice's
Cooperative Principle.You might respond to a request or a question
but not in a satisfactory way , or you may give information , yet you
are not cooperative , a subject matter of the following section.
3.2 Gricean Cooperative Principles
Among the prominent theories and principles* in
pragmatics is Grice's Cooperative Principle. Grice has supplied
pragmatics with a list of so-called maxims which determine the
appropriateness of an utterance in a given situation ( excluding
exceptional situations like trials , exams , etc.). In order to go on a
cooperative conversation , interlocutors have to obey certain
principles. These principles make out Grice's maxims of quality ,
quantity , relevance and manner. Quality refers to the truthfulness of
the saying , false statements should be avoided. Quantity refers to the
informativeness of the speaker's response. He should be as informative
as required , not giving too little nor too much information to the other
participant in the conversation. Relevance assumes that turns between
participants should be clearly related. Manner assumes that speakers
have to be perspicuous : clear , orderly and brief , avoiding obscurity
and ambiguity (www.universalteacher.org.uk/lang/pragmatics.htm).
In addition to Politeness Principle ( Leech , 1983 ), the Relevance Theory by Sperber
and Wilson ( 1986 ) and Levinson's( 2000) GCI Theory ( Generalised Conversational
Implicatures).
15

20. Grice (1975 ) believes that utterances automatically create
expectations which lead the hearer to the speaker's intended meaning.
These expectations are depicted in terms of the maxims mentioned
above. In order for the hearer to be cooperative , he should choose an
interpretation that satisfies these expectations ( or maxims ). This
could pragmatically contribute to implicatures rather than to explicit ,
truth-conditional content. Thus , figurative speech , jokes , playing
with words, etc. violate these maxims ( Wilson , D. and D. Sperber ,
2004 : 250-51 ).
Examining the example above between the visitor and a
passer-by , we notice that the latter's response has relevance but lacks
quantity and this explains the deficiency in the conversation. The
passer-by is not cooperative and thus violates , but validates , Grice's
cooperative principle.
Grice's aim behind his principle is to discover the
mechanism by which we can distinguish between what is said and
what is meant. He is concerned with whether speakers know which
implicit meaning is conveyed and whether their addressees can
understand the intended meaning ( Davies , 2000 : 3 ). Consider the
following conversation ,
A: Is there another pint of milk ?
B: I'm going to the supermarket in five minutes.
Speakers of English would inferentially assume that there is no milk at
the moment , but it will be brought from the supermarket in a short
time. Such an implication is reached at by the Cooperative Principle.
Conversational implicatures are thus the core of Grice's
theory. They draw the distinction between words meaning , their
literal meaning when said by a speaker and the speaker's intention
when he uses them in a certain context , which , by no means , is far
from what is being said ( Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,
2006). When you are asked to lunch and you reply , " I have a one
o'clock a class I'm not prepared for." You indirectly reject this
invitation by giving reason for not coming to lunch and this is
implied in your response.
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21. SECTION FOUR
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 Conclusions
To know the relation between " sense " and " force " means
exploring the relation binding semantics to pragmatics. Semantics
( the study of the sense of words) studies the meaning of sentences as
structures in a given language , whereas pragmatics ( the study of
language use ) deals with the interpretation of the meaning of these
sentences in a given speech situation , i.e. , what they are to the
speaker and the hearer. We can simply say that semantics is the
" body" of the language and pragmatics is its " soul ". A body without
a soul does not have power or " force " , namely dead , and a soul
without a body cannot be " sensed " or felt.
It is evident that semantics is unavoidable in deciding
meanings of lexical items. Nonetheless , we still need the context
within which these lexical items are said to occur , otherwise , it is
misleading to rely on semantics alone. Semantics , for example , tells
us that the speaker of the following sentence :
- He will be here at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.
is expressing the " will " of another person , rather than the hearer , to
come " here at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning ." But , this is half of the
fact for semantics tells us nothing about the state of coming , is it to
strike a friendly appointment , a threat or a promise ( from the
speaker's side , where he wants to calm down the hearer , roughly
speaking " Don't worry , he will be here …." ) ?
Therefore , the force that underlies the statement decides
what is meant by what is said. It is the relation that holds between the
speaker and the hearer which expresses the force ; the force to
apologise , thank , promise , approve , congratulate , command , etc.
The choice among these is dependent on the implicatures of the
statement or the utterance. " I've got a headache " has the implicatures
17

22. of a warning , a request , or an apology , or it could be a plausible
answer to " How are you ? " (Kempson,1975:202-3). They depend on
how much truthfulness , informativeness , relevance and clarity that
speakers convey to hearers and addressees respond to addressers.
3.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that one should not decide on the
meaning of a word before knowing the context in which it occurs nor
decide on the meaning of a whole sentence without a pre-knowledge
of the situation in which it occurs in order to stand at the exact
interpretation.
The researcher recommends that force be studied in
Arabic, investigating the differences in the effect of context in both
English and Arabic. Misunderstanding leads to ambiguity , a subject
which can also be studied alone , comparing ambiguity in English and
Arabic.
It is also recommended that the practicality and validity of
Grice's Cooperative Principle could be explored in the Arabic
language by applying its maxims to selected texts or contexts.
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23. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Davies , Bethan (2000) " Grice's Cooperative Principle: getting the
Meaning across " in Nelson , D. and P. Foulkes ( eds.) Leeds
Working Papers in Linguistics 8 , pp 1-26.
Grice , H. Paul (1968) " Utterer's Meaning , sentence-meaning , and
Word-meaning" in Foundations of Language 4 , pp 225-242.
Fromkin , V. and Rodman , R. (1983) An Introduction to Language. New
York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Jaszczolt, K.M. (2002) Semantics and Pragmatics, London: Longman.
Katz , J.J. (1972) Semantic Theory. London : Harper and Row.
Kempson , Ruth M. (1975) Presupposition and the Delimitation of
Semantics. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
Leech , G. (1974) Semantics. Middlesex : Penguin.
……………. (1980) Explorations in Semantics and Pragmatics.
Amsterdam : John Benjamin.
Levinson , Stephen ( 1983 ) Pragmatics . Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press.
Lyons ,J. (1968) Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press.
………….. ( 1977) Semantics , Vol.ɪ . Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press.
Osgood , C.E. (1976) Focus on Meaning : Explorations in Semantic
Space. New York: Mouton.
Palmer ,F.R. (1981) Semantics , 2nd ed. Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press.
Parkin , D. (ed.) (1982) Semantic Anthropology. London : Harcourt ,
Brace , Jovanovich.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006) in
http://plato.stanford.edu/info.htm.
Wilson , D. and Sperber , D. (2004) " Relevance Theory " in Horn , L.
and G., Ward (eds.) The Handbook of Pragmatics. Oxford :
Blackwell , 607-632.
Yule , George (1996) The Study of Language , 2nd ed. Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press.
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24. INTERNET SOURCES
- http://www.asha.org/public/speech/development/pragmaticLangu-
age Tips.htm
- http://www.dan.sperber.com/relevance_theory.htm
- http://www.lotsofessays.com/viewpaper/1682525.html
- http://www.universalteacher.org.uk
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