Constitutional ambiguity and the dilemma of local government administration in nigeria

Nuhu Bamalli Polytechnic Multidisciplinary Journal 1 :( 1) 113-130 Yusuf Solomon Danbaki, (2016)
CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITY AND THE DILEMMA OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA
Yusuf Solomon Danbaki
Department of Public Administration,
Nuhu Bamalli Polytechnic, Zaria
ABSTRACT
The 1976 Local Government Reform in Nigeria and other subsequent reforms were geared
towards making Local Government a vehicle for socio-economic and political development.
However, the constitutional provision seems to have overridden the gains and aspirations of local
government with controversial sections undermining the autonomy of Local Government. This has
affected the good intention of the 1976 Local Government reforms and truncated the growth and
development of Local Government in Nigeria. The objective of this paper is to review the landmark
constitutional developments that have impacted positively or negatively on the Local Government
vis-à-vis the political and administrative implications on the nation. The crux of the paper
identified and explained the various flash points and problems of ambiguity in the 1979 and 1999
constitution of Nigeria with emphasis on Local Government Administration. It is devoted to
exposing the contradictions and how the 1999 constitution undermined the autonomy of local
government as well as the efficacy of grassroots development. The methodology employed is
documentary; hence the use of secondary source of data. The finding shows that the State
Governments took advantage of the constitutional lacuna to exploit the Local Governments and
shorten their tenure in office. In the end, the paper outlined some vital recommendations which
includes inter-alia the scraping of State and Local Government joint account so that Local
Government can receive their statutory allocation directly from Federal Government and elections
into the Local Government be conducted alongside the State House of Assembly, this the
researcher is convinced will lead to a viral and sustainable system of local government in Nigeria.
Keywords: Dilemma of local government, Constitutional ambiguity, Local government
administration
INTRODUCTION
The history of interference in the activities of Local Government can be traced back to the colonial
days of Indirect Rule when the then colonial administration hijacked the affairs of Local
Government and took over functions of the people oriented initiatives of local governance. At
independence, efforts were made to restore some of the functions that will be best handled by the
closest government to the people but it yielded little or no result. The Federal government at that
time was only transferring some of its powers to Local Government to act on behalf of the centre
in form of de-concentration.
The introduction of devolution of Local Governments began in the 1976 Local Government
Reform where the concept of local government as contained in the Guidelines for the Reform of
Local Government in Nigeria (1976:1) is elaborately conceived thus: government at the local
level, established by law to exercise specific powers within defined area (and) to initiate and direct
the provision of services and to determine and implement projects so as to complement the
activities of the state and federal government in their areas, and to ensure that local initiative and
response to local needs and conditions are maximized.
The objectives of the reform were to:

make appropriate services and development activities responsive to local wishes and initiatives by
devolving or delegating them to local representative bodies,
facilitate the exercise of democratic self-government close to the grass roots of our society and to
encourage initiative and leadership potential,
Mobilize human and material resources through the involvement of members of the public in their
local development, and
provide a two-way channel of communication between local communities and government (both
State and Federal)
The reform objectives were an attempt to grant Local Government its autonomy with minimal
interference by the State or Federal Government. This however failed due to lack of immediate
implementation of the provisions of the Reforms by successive government that never conducted
elections at the Local Government level. The effect was that Local Government has over the years
suffered from the continued whittling down of their power and State Government had continued
to encroach upon what would normally have been the exclusive preserves of the Local Government
and consequently there has been a divorce between the people and government at their most basic
level.
With the return of democratic government in 1999 one expected the dilemma to be salvaged by
the constitution, unfortunately it compounded the issues. Implicit in the foregoing local
government contain salient or central features that have been well articulated in the works of
Ezeani (2012). These features include the facts that a local government: Operates at the local or
grassroots level; Operates within a defined geographical area has a relative autonomy or
independence has a range of constitutionally delineated functions to perform and has its council
composed of elected representatives. In a federal system of government like Nigeria, local
government is usually the third tier government. In a unitary system, like Britain, it usually exists
as the second order government to the national level. It is important to point out that the
intergovernmental relations between Federal, State and Local Government has been characterized
by both co-operation and conflict; but it is conflict that dominated State/Local Government
relations over the years.
Statement of the Problem
The problems of local government in Nigeria include among other things, inadequate planning,
poor implementation of policies, inadequate revenue, corruption and mismanagement, lack of
adequate manpower, lack of autonomy, lack of participation by the people and intergovernmental
conflict (Ademolakun, 1983, Abubakar, 1980 & Orewa, 1991). This paper intends to concentrate
on the constitutional ambiguity as it affects financial and administrative autonomy of Local
Governments to deliver services and sustain development.
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the spirit of the 1976 Local
Government Reforms strategically position local governments as third-level of government to
provide public goods and services whose benefits and impacts are localized in nature (Egwaikhide,

2004:2). Thus, a well-managed and administered local government system is essential to national
transformation and development. However, certain provisions of the 1999 Constitution under
reference constitute a hindrance in the performance of local governments in the country.
The lack of financial and administrative autonomy started from the inception of the 1976 local
government reforms whose guidelines established the local government service commission and
state local government joint account just to mention but a few. The State Government through the
joint account exercise unrestricted control over Local Government finances. The State
Government also used the Local Government Service Commission for employment, training,
discipline and promotion of level 07 and above in the Local Government hence the most qualified
are reserved for the State Government and the less qualify are recruited to serve in the Local
Government. Whilst there is only one Federal Government for Nigeria, and 36 States in the
Country, there are 774 Local Governments. The Federal being the first tier and the State being the
second tier but the status of local governments as third tier in our constitutional arrangement is a
little bit unclear because of its autonomy without authority
In spite the provisions on local government autonomy in Nigeria by the 1989 Constitution in
section 7 (8) (a) subject to its provisions in section 7 (7), that the National Assembly shall make
provisions for statutory allocations of public revenue to the local governments in the Federation.
This air of optimism was short lived. This is because the situation of the local government
autonomy in Nigeria has been worsened by the subjugation of the fate of local governments to the
whims and caprices of the state governors by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
1999. Not only has this third tier of government been rendered docile by some state governors,
their functions have also been rendered moribund. This paper therefore is aimed at examining the
contradictions and how the 1999 constitution undermined the efficacy of grassroots governance
and proffer ways forward to enable this very important tier of government to achieve the lofty goal
of bringing governance very near to the people, provide effective service delivery for sustainable
development.
Objective of the Study
The general objective of the paper is to study the constitutional hindrances to the performance of
Local Government Administration in Nigeria and the specific objectives are to:
identify the Nigerian constitution that is ambiguous on the role of Local Government
point out the sections and sub-sections of ambiguity in the role of Local Government
establish the dilemma of the Nigerian Local Government
find out the areas of conflict between the Constitution and the Nigerian Local Government
Administration
ascertain the extend to which the constitution created inter-governmental conflict and
Research Questions
The following research questions were set for the study:

Is the Local Government a myth or a reality?
Do Federal and State government interfere in the affairs of Local Government?
Is there conflict in the inter-governmental relationship between Federal, State and Local
Government?
Are there contradictions in the 1999 Constitution as to who control the Local Government?
To what extent is Federal and State Government interference in Local Government affecting the
development of Local Government?
Is there conflicting role played between Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and
State Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) in the conduct of Local Government Elections?
What is the tenure of elected Local Government council?
Hypothesis
HO: There is no constitutional ambiguity in the 1999 constitution in respect to Local Government
H1: There is constitutional ambiguity in the 1999 constitution in respect to Local Government
HO: Local Government does not enjoy uniformity in the tenure of office like other tiers of
Government
H1: Local Government enjoys uniformity tenure in office like other tiers of Government
Research Methodology
This research is designed to be documentary, and as such it utilizes the secondary source of data.
The research is also descriptive because of the evaluation of the application of certain parts of the
constitution. Secondary sources of data such as newspapers, textbooks, magazines, official
documents, scholarly journals, articles and the internet were used. The use of secondary source is
justifiable on the ground of national coverage of the study.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The 1976 Local Government Reform
The 1976 Local Government Reform represented a far-reaching change in Nigeria’s local
government administration. It described the local government as: government at local level
exercised through representative council established by law to exercise specific powers within
defined areas. For the first time, the country was given a uniform, single-tier structure of local
government in place of the different structures of various states. The reform instituted statutory
allocations of revenues from the federation account with the intention of giving local
governments fixed proportions of both the federation account and each state’s revenue (Ekpo
and John, 1998).
The then Chief of Staff, noted in his forward to the Guidelines for Local Government Reform
(1976) that the reforms were necessitated by the Federal Government’s desire to stabilize and
rationalize government at the local level and that this of necessity entails the decentralization of

some significant functions of state governments to local levels in order to harness resources for
rapid development. (Guidelines to 1976 Local Government Reforms)
For the first time in the history of local government in Nigeria, a uniform system was developed
for the whole country. According to the then Chief of staff in his forward on the guidelines for
Local Government Reform (1976): “In embarking on these reforms, the Federal Military
Government was essentially motivated by the necessity to stabilize and rationalize Government at
the local level. This must of necessity entail the decentralization of some significant functions of
state governments to local levels in order to harness local resources for rapid development”
(Guidelines for Local Government Reforms, 1976)
Unlike previous reform measures, which were highly restricted in scope and range, the 1976
reforms conceptualized local government as the third tier of government operating within a
common institutional framework with defined functions and responsibilities. As the third tier of
government, the local government gets statutory grants from Federal and state governments, and
is expected to serve as agent of development especially in rural areas. According to the 1976
reform, 75 percent of members of the council are to be elected through the secret ballot on a no-
party basis under the direct and indirect systems of election. The remaining 25 percent are to be
nominated by the State government. Following the reform, the Federal Government in 1977,
allocated 5 percent of federally collected revenue to local government.
The intentions of the 1976 reform were debated by the constitution drafting Committee and the
Constituent assembly in 1978. The result is that the 1979 constitution reaffirmed the development
function as provide for in section 7, subsection 3.It shall be the duty of a local government council
within the State to participate in economic planning and development of the area referred to in
subsection (2) of this section and to this end an economic planning board shall be established by a
law enacted by the House of assembly of the State (The Constitution of the Federal republic of
Nigeria 1979).
In addition, section 7 of the 1979 Constitution provided for democratically elected local
government councils for the country. Unfortunately, during the AlhajiShehuShagari’s
administration (1979-1983), the constitutional provisions were neglected. No elections were held
and sole administrators were appointed. The MohammaduBuhari’s regime (1983-1984) continued
with the system of sole administrators. During Babangida’s regime (1984-1992) there were certain
reforms aimed at ensuring local government autonomy. These included the abolition of the
Ministry of Local Government; establishment of executive and legislative arms in local councils;
and direct allocation to local government without passing through State government. The regime
also increased local government statutory allocation from 15 percent to 20 percent with effect from
1992.
It is important to point out that the intergovernmental relations between the Federal, state and local
government has been characterized by both co-operation and conflict; but it is conflict that has
predominated State-local Government relations (Adamolekun, 1993). Some state governments
have been known to have hijacked and diverted Federal government’s allocation to local
governments. This is why one of the features of the reform during Ibrahim Babangida’s regime
was to make allocations directly to local governments without going through state government.

The Local Governments under 1979 Constitution
The introduction of Constitutional democracy in 1979 had meant that the functioning of local
governments in the federation would be operated along with the constitutional provisions guiding
its existence within the federal system of government (Awotokun, 2005). Therefore, for the very
first time under a democratic setting, the 1979 Constitution in Section 7 (1) expressly provided for
and guaranteed as “System of local government under democratically elected local government
councils…” Unfortunately though, no elections were held to elect council members based on the
provisions of the 1979 Constitution or during the Second Republic.
Recognizing the local government as a critical tier of government for development, the 1979
Constitution in Section7 (3) provided for the participation of the local government council in
economic planning and development of the area within the State and gave the House of Assembly
of a State mandate to establish an economic planning Board. Concerning fiscal matters, S. 149 (2)
of the constitution further provided for the distribution of the Federation Account among the
Federal and State governments and local councils in each state as may be prescribed by the
National Assembly.

Local Governments under 1999 Constitution
Like the 1979 constitutions, the 1999 constitution is purely military in terms of its conception. It
was not a people’s inspired constitution and that was one point which its detractors nursed against
it. It is our view the constitution contained the seed of its own destruction through the provisions
of some controversial sections as will be seen in this study. There is one important thing to note
from the onset, which is local government as a political institution has come to stay in the political
landscape of Nigeria. This is because the 1999 constitution has recognized its existence.
In as much as significant provisions have been made in the Constitution recognizing that local
governments are instruments of national development, they face enormous challenges. There are
some institutional and contextual factors that constitute serious impediments to their performance
ability. It is worthwhile to note at this juncture, the salient provisions in the 1999 constitution that
relates to the local government autonomy and control.
Discussions
Firstly, section 7 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria guarantees a system of a local government
by democratically elected local government councils. It also mandates the Government of every
State, subject to section 8 on State creation, to ensure the councils existence under a law which
provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils.
Recognizing that boundary or communal disputes and tribal differences have potentials to cause
disunity and hamper development, Section.7 (2) advocates for clear boundary delineation that
takes into consideration the common interest of the community in the area, traditional association
and administrative convenience. Also, apart from mandating the establishment of an economic
planning board Section 7 (4) directs the Government of a State to ensure that democratic process
is observed in local government council elections.
Secondly, the 1999 constitution by its provisions in section7 and 8 recognize the local government
as a third tier of government and also guarantee it, but gives the state the autonomy to lord over
the local government. Section 7 reads jointly with Section 8 provides that there shall be: The system
of local government by democratically elected councils (which) is by this Constitution guaranteed
and accordingly, the government of every State shall, subject to section 8 of this Constitution….
ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment; structure, composition,
finance and functions of such councils. The implication of these provisions is that local government
cannot exercise the functions assigned to it in section 1 schedule 4 of the Constitution until the
State House of Assembly had passed a law. The same Fourth Schedule of the Constitution also
provides for "the functions of the Local government Council to also include participation of such
Council in government of a state as in respect of the following matters, education, agricultural
material resources, healthcare and any other function assigned to it by the State House of
Assembly.
Thirdly, section 8(3)(4) of the 1999 constitution talks of the creation of new local government and
its boundary adjustment which bill must be passed by the state house of assembly. It is assumed
that these provisions will prevent the manipulations of local government boundaries and the
unwarranted proliferation of local government areas for purely partisan political reasons. This
tendency undoubtedly undermined the democratic process at the local government level in the
defunct Second Republic (Igbuzor, 2003). Recognizing that boundary or communal disputes and
tribal differences have potentials to cause disunity and hamper development, S.7 (2) advocates for
clear boundary delineation that takes into consideration the common interest of the community in

the area, traditional association and administrative convenience. Also, apart from mandating the
establishment of an economic planning board and since democracy impacts on good governance
and development, S. 7 (4) directs the Government of a State to ensure that democratic process is
observed in local government council elections.
Fourthly, another area of confusion is in terms of electing the Local government Council and their
tenure. Section 7(6) of the 1999 Constitution provides for a democratically elected Local
government Council. While the Constitution provides for four year tenure for Federal and State
political office holders, it was silent on the tenure of the Local government political office holders.
Section 7 (1) of the Constitution in focus very clearly guarantees the administration of local
governments by democratically elected councils, instances abound in which elections did not hold
as at when due and in which the local governments have been managed by appointed Caretaker
Committees. This scenario was regrettably introduced by the aforementioned long-drawn
controversy and legal tussles between the Federal Government over aspects of Electoral Act, 2001
on the tenure of local government councils. Even after the Supreme Court’s judgment necessitating
that the State Independent Electoral Commission, SIEC, of each State to conduct elections into the
Councils, they unfortunately still had to rely on the Independent National Electoral Commission
in the constitutional responsibility of updating the voters register and making same available to the
SIECs. Elections fixed by the SIECs for May 18, 2002 after the ruling was not to be because of
the failure of the INEC to produce and make voters register available to the SIECs. The SIECs
shifted the Council Elections to August 10, 2002 to allow INEC update and avail them the voters
register, a void which the governors cashed in to introduce Caretaker Committees (Ekweremadu,
2009).
Again, the Constitution in the concurrent legislative list gives the National Assembly the power to
make laws "with respect to the registration of voters and the procedures regulating election to a
Local Government Council. The same Constitution gave the powers to the State House of
Assembly to make "laws with respect of election into a Local Government Council. For instance,
in preparation for the Fourth Republic in 1999, local government elections were held on 5th
December, 1998. The elected officers however did not assume office until six months later in May,
1999. The electoral law under which the local government officials were elected (Basic
Constitutional and transitional provisions Decree No. 36 of 1998) provides for tenure of three
years. The local government officials later went to the Supreme Court to ask for the increase of
the tenure to four years. The apex court held on March 28, 2002 that “no law by the National
Assembly can increase or alter the tenure of elected officers of local government.” It ruled that
only the States through their Houses of Assembly could prescribe the tenure of the councils. This
judgment has the potentials to create uneven tenure and democratic instability at local level
because the States are at liberty to prescribe whatever tenure they desire for the local councils be
it one, two, three or four years.
Evaluation of Application
Furthermore, in collaboration with National Assembly, the Supreme Court however ruled that the
National Assembly did not have the power to increase or alter the tenure of elected officers of local
government. At the expiration of the three years which supposed to end in May, 2002, the State
Governments appointed Caretaker Committees for all the Local Government Councils in their
states to serve until another date of election was agreed upon. Subsequently, the election did not
take place as and when due as it was postponed twice due to the tussle between the State
Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) and the Independent Electoral Commission.

Another dimension of the confusion created by the 1999 Constitution, which affects Local
Government autonomy, was the provision that empowers the State to determine and create new
Local Government Areas. Section 8 (13) provides the modalities for the creation of new Local
government Areas and indeed vests the power to do so on various State Houses of Assembly.
Section 8 (6) of the Constitution however empowers the members of the National Assembly to
ratify them. This provision also brought about the tussle for the control of local government
administration between the States and the Federal government. Many States (for example, Kogi,
Lagos, Niger, Oyo, etc) created more Local Government Areas in line with the modalities
stipulated in the constitution, but the Federal Government refused to recognize them, backed by
the provision of the constitution that recognizes only 774 Local Government Areas. A state like
Lagos, decided to recognize and fund the new Local Government Areas it created. This generated
into a rift between Lagos State and the Federal government in which the Federal Government
stopped the statutory allocations for the State. Lagos State went to the Supreme Court to demand
for justice. The Supreme Court ruled that "States have the power to create new Local Government
Areas as far as the modalities for its creation as stipulated in the Constitution are followed". It also
ruled that the Lagos State Local government statutory allocations being withheld by the Federal
Government was illegal and unconstitutional. Despite the ruling, it took another 12 months for the
Federal Government to release the withheld allocations (Asaju, 2010).
Nwabueze (1983) in Ugwu (2003), had observed that the Constitutional power to establish local
government, define its structure, composition and functions, belong to the State governments. To
them, as far as it is so, the local government is a mere state agency or a creation of the State
government. It would therefore be erroneous to see it as an independent third tier of government.
As such, the issue of autonomy of local government becomes a myth and not a reality.
Another area of Local government autonomy has to do with the area of finance. The Constitution
empowers the State to scrutinize and approve Local government budgets, and expenditure through
the State House of Assembly, States here exercise arbitrary and undue control over Local
government finance through the establishment of the State Local government Joint Account. The
issue of State Local government Joint Account has been a thorny issue in Local government State
relationship in the Fourth Republic. This situation also brought to the fore the question of Local
government autonomy. The experience with many Local government areas was that their states
starve them of the statutory grant thus denying them of rendering essential services as required.
For instance, the defunct Comet Newspaper of October 23, (2003, p.7) reporting on the unlimited
and inordinate influences exerted by States on local government funds in Ondo State alleged that
the Council Chairmen had become so incapacitated by paucity of funds such that they were unable
able to handle any project or pay workers’ salaries without applying to the Deputy Governor for
funds.
Another problem that has plagued the development of local government system since 1999 is that
of irregular elections and administration. This is seen clearly in the local governments of Kaduna
State where care takers were appointed for six months and re-appointed for another six months
without conducting elections and some states where local government elections are long overdue,
but undermined by narrow political considerations. Can Councils appointed by and loyal to a few
serve the development interest of people as those elected on popular mandate and whose allegiance
is rooted in the electorate? While the Constitution made provisions for the tenure of federal and
state political office holders to be four years, it did not make provisions for the tenure of local
government office holders.

As a result of the singular omission or oversight of not providing for the tenure of local
governments in the 1999 constitution, the various state legislatures now determines the tenure of
its elected councils and therein lies the prescription for the unfolding chaos in Nigeria local
government system. The result is that we now have a situation where there is no uniformity of
tenure across the country of elected local government officials. For instance, Adamawa State
House of Assembly passed a controversial law which reduced the tenure of council Chairmen to
one year and Nasarawa State local councils served for just one year too. Is one year sufficient to
actualize any meaningful democracy and development project that will contribute to nation
building?
Local government have low internally generated revenue. The capacity of a local government to
generate internal revenue is one of the critical criteria for creation of local governments, Ekpo and
John (1998) at the end of their study declared that most of the local governments studied do not
have enough natural and human resources to survive on their own; they depend on statutory
allocations. Agbakobaet al (2004) attributes this anomaly to political considerations and also
agrees that over reliance by such local governments, most of them in rural communities, on
external revenues have hampered their ability to meet the needs of their people.
Section 162 of the 1999 Constitution deals with the allocation of public revenue, whereas it
maintained the 1979 traditions of fiscal allocation to local governments, sub-sections 5, 6, and 8
have left the local governments at the fiscal mercy of the State governments. Worse still, whereas
sub-section 6 in particular which provides for a State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA)
has been grossly abused by many State governments, sub-section 7 which provides that - each
State shall pay to Local Government Councils in its area of jurisdiction such proportion of its total
revenue on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly has
been roundly ignored by many State Governments. These developments have virtually rendered
the local governments financially impotent.
Contrary to the intent and letters of the constitution on the operation of the joint account i.e. state
government is not intended to be a beneficiary of the SJLGA, rather, it is a trustee of the
Account.State government under the guise of the joint account, has assumed and arrogated to
themselves, powers to completely usurp and manage local government funds under the same guise,
the state redistributes and reallocate monies already appropriated to local councils from the
federation account in the name of joint projects, resulting in various illegal deductions from local
government funds. At the end of such deductions what finally gets to the local councils is hardly
enough to cover overhead and recurrent expenditures, leaving little or nothing to embark on capital
projects and programmes that will alleviate the lives of the people in their communities. The
defunct Comet Newspaper of October 23, 2003, p.7 reporting on the unlimited and inordinate
influences exerted by States on local government funds in Ondo State quoted the Chairman of Irele
Council, Chief Akintoye Albert who spoke for his colleagues and asked: “If we are only given
money to pay salaries on monthly basis, how then can we do any other thing in the Local
Government Councils?” Media reports today also show that the story has not really changed.
The 1999 Constitution regrettably did not confer enough autonomy on the local councils in the
management of public funds, as at today, there is weak fiscal discipline in the management of even
the resources available to the local governments. There is no clear public procurement policy for
local governments.
Findings
There is intergovernmental conflict between the Federal and State Government over the ownership
of Local Government

Section 7 recognises Local Government as a third tier of Government yet section 8 gave the State
Government the power to lord over it
Section 8 (3) (4) saddled the responsibility of boundary adjustment of Local Government on State
Government conflict yet the state Government abuse the process in the second republic which led
to communal disputes, tribal differences due to non considerationconsideration of the common
interest of the community. The Buhari regime later reversed the creation of the Local Government
Areas
Local Government is being played around like ball by the Federal and State Government yet none
is scoring the goal unfortunately the 1999 constitution is the referee that gave especially State
Government unrestricted control over the finances, election, tenure of office and administration of
the Local Government.
Section 7 (1) guaranteed the administration of Local Government by democratically elected
council and is silent about their tenure of office
The constitution mandates the States to ensure that elections are held in the Local Government
and the same constitution in the concurrent legislative list gives the National Assembly the power
to make laws with respect to the registration of voters and the procedure regulating election to a
Local Government council
The climax of the tussle for control over Local Government is in the power given to the State
House of Assembly in section 8(13) to create new Local Government at the same time gave the
Federal Government in section 8(6) the power to ratify them
State Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) conducts election at the Local Government level
yet they depend of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) who has the national
responsibility to update data to feed them with information.
Test of Hypothesis 1
HO: There is no constitutional ambiguity in the 1999 constitution in respect to Local Government
H1: There is constitutional ambiguity in the 1999 constitution in respect to Local Government
Decision:
Section 7 (1) guaranteed the administration of Local Government by democratically elected
council and saddled the state with the responsibility to ensure its existence, establish its structure,
composition, finance and functions yet the same constitution on concurrent legislative list gives
the National Assembly the power to make laws with respect to the registration of voters and the
procedure regulating election into a Local Government Council.
Section 8 (13) gives the State House of Assembly the power create new local Government and
Section 8 (6) gives the National Assembly the power to ratify the new Local Government
Section 7 recognizes Local Government as the third tier of government
Section 8 gave the state authority to lord over them
Conclusion:
Therefore, with the above conflicting sections one can conclude as follows:
H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted
Test of Hypothesis 2
HO: Local Government does not enjoy uniformity in the tenure of office like other tiers of
Government
H1: Local Government enjoys uniformity tenure in office like other tiers of Government
Decision:

While the constitution provides four year tenure for Federal and State political office holders, the
constitution is silent about the tenure of office of Local Government political office holders
The Supreme Court on March 28th
, 2002 held that “No law by the National Assembly can increase
or alter the tenure of elected officials of Local Government” It ruled that only the States through
the Houses of Assembly could prescribe the tenure of the Local Government Councils. This
judgment has since then created an uneven tenure in the Local Governments because States are at
liberty to prescribe whatever tenure they desire for the Local Councils.
Conclusion:
Therefore, based on the silence of the constitution and the position of the apex Court the researcher
concludes as follows:
HO is accepted and H1 is rejected
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion
In conclusion, Local Governments undoubtedly is not just the most popular among the three tier
structure in the Federal Republic of Nigeria but it is also the oldest system of government and the
closest to the people. Restructuring this tier of government ought to be done in concert with the
generality of the people. The 1999 constitution needs a critical review most especially in the area
of local government councils. The recommendation of the immediate past national conference was
a great opportunity for Nigeria to achieve this since the Nigerian legislators have continued to be
blind on this matter more because of the influence of the State governors who are the major
beneficiaries of the constitutional lacuna. It is on this note that this paper recommends the
following:
Recommendations
Local Government Service Commissions in various states should be scraped together with state
and local government joint account. Local governments in Nigeria should rather be made to receive
their monthly statutory subventions from the federation accounts directly through the branch of
central bank closest to them. As was the practice during the Buhari’s regime.
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) instead of State Electoral Commission (SEC)
should be saddled with the responsibility of conducting elections at the local government level.
This will make local government less subservient to the states governments.
Local Government election into Local government Council should be held a week before State
Governors election. If possible, election into State House of Assembly and Local Government
Council should be held the same day.
The tenure of the Local government Chairmen/Councilors should be reviewed to four years, just
like other political office holders in the State and Federal level.
On Local government creation, although the process of Local government creation has been
liberalized as 2/3 of the population of intended area or community must agree to the creation by
consensus. The intended local government should be made to rely on its internally generated
revenue for a period of four years as a condition for its creation. Thus, any intended local
government Council that is able to sustain itself without any support from the Federation Account
for the period of four years can be allowed.
Lastly, Federal Government should assume the role of supervision and monitoring of local
government projects and programmes in order to maintain standard. It should also be that of
ensuring prudence and accountability, and effective Service delivery. With these in place, Local

government autonomy will be guaranteed and it will be able to effectively play its role as a catalyst
for Sustainable Rural Development.

REFERENCES
Abubakar, A.Y. (1980), The Role of Local Government in Social, Political and Economic
Development in Nigeria (1976-1979). Zaria, Department of Local Government Studies,
Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.
Adamolekun, L. (1983), Public Administration: A Nigerian and Comparative Perspective.
NewYork, Longman Inc.
Agbakoba, O. and Ogbonna, H. (2004) Local Government Administration and Development in
Nigeria, HURILAW (The Human Rights Law Service),
Asaju, K. (2010), Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria: Politics and Challenges of the 1999
Constitution. International Journal of Advance Legal Studies and Governance Vol.1
No.1
Awotokun, K. (2005). Local Government Administration under 1999 Constitution in Nigeria.
Journal of Social Science, 10(2), 129-134.
Comet Newspaper of October 23, 2003, p.7
Egwaikhide, F. Aiyede, R, et al (2004) Intergovernmental Relationships in Nigeria. Programme
on Ethnic and Federal Studies (PEFS) Department of Political Science, University of
Ibadan, Ibadan.
Ekpo, A. and John, N (1998), Local Governments Fiscal Operations in Nigeria, AERC Paper 73,
African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi, Kenya.
Ekweremadu, I. (2009) “Repositioning the Local Government System for Sustainable
Development through Constitution Review”: A seminar organised by the association of
local governments of Nigeria (ALGON) and the office of the SGF.
Ezeani, O. E. (2004), Local Government Administration, Enugu, Chika Printing Press.
Federal Government of Nigeria (1976). Guidelines for the Reform of Local Government in
Nigeria. Lagos; Federal Government Press.
Federal Government of Nigeria (1979). Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lagos:
Federal Government Press
Federal Republic of Nigeria (1976).Guidelines for Local Government Reforms. Kaduna:
Government Printers
Igbuzor, O. (2003), Local Government Reform and the 1999 Constitution, culled from
http://www.gamji.com/NEWS2676.htm (Accessed July 1, 2009)

Igbuzor, O. (2003). Local Government Reform and Constitutional Review in Nigeria" Lagos:
Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD).
Olisa, M. (1990) Government for Senior Secondary Schools, Onitsha: Africana Publishers.
Orewa, G. O. (1991), Principles of Local Government. Lagos, Administrative Staff College of
Nigeria.
Ugwu, S.C. (2001). Issues in Local Government and Urban Administration in Nigeria, Enugu:
Academic Publishing Company.

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