Complete Dissertation

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Dissertationtitle: Doesthe Financial System of Daesh Suggest Notions
of State-building?
DissertationSupervisor: Dr. WinnieKing
Candidate Number: 11047
Academic Year: 2015/2016
A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements
for the award of the degree of MSc in International Relations in the Faculty of Social
Sciences and Law

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Abstract
This dissertation will address the question of whether the financial system of
Daesh suggests notions of state-building. Daesh has claimed to be a state since
2014, and reports from the group suggest that it has been performing state-
building activities. Using the existing literature on state-building theory, this
dissertation will analyse the ways Daesh acquires and spends its wealth in order to
assess its state-building claims. Daesh extracts resources from its citizens through
taxation, but also gains a considerable amount of its revenue from oil. How Daesh
spends that revenue is key to finding out if the group are behaving like state-
builders. The provision of security, rule of law and education by the group will
therefore be analysed. This will not only shed light on whether Daesh’s state-
building claims hold water, but also question who can perform state-building
activities.
Word Count: 14 872

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Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations......................................................................................................4
1. Introduction................................................................................................................5
2. Daesh: A History........................................................................................................8
3. States and State-building....................................................................................13
3.1. Definingand DifferentiatingBetween States....................................13
3.2. State-building..................................................................................................17
4. Daesh’s Financial Acquisition...........................................................................22
4.1. Finance Through Taxation.........................................................................24
4.2. Finance and State Resources....................................................................29
5. State Expenditure...................................................................................................33
5.1. Military State-building and Security.....................................................34
5.2. Law and Order in the Islamic State........................................................40
5.3. Education: Public Good or Indoctrination?........................................44
6. Conclusion.................................................................................................................50
References.......................................................................................................................55

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
AQA Al Qaeda in Iraq
Daesh Arabic abbreviation of ‘The Islamic State’
FSA Free Syrian Army
IS Islamic State
ISI Islamic State in/of Iraq
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Sham
ISW Institute for the Study of War
JN Jabhat Al Nusra
UN United Nations
UNICEF United NationsInternational Children’sEmergency Fund
USSR Soviet Union

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1. Introduction
This dissertation will address the question of whether the financial system of
Daesh suggests notions of state-building. Daesh has proclaimed itself a state since
2014 and has taken control of a significant amount of territory (Fisher and
Beauchamp 2014). However, not only has Daesh acquired land, but it has also been
performing state-like activities (Ford 2015). This has required substantial
revenues, and Daesh is widely regarded as the wealthiest terrorist organisation to
have ever existed (Lock 2014). There has been significant attention to how Daesh
has achieved this wealth. It is now understood that oil and taxation are its main
sources of revenue, with more illicit means such as theft and ransom still prevalent
(Gilsinan 2015b). Less attention has been given to how this wealth is being spent;
this is undoubtedly an important question in understanding how much truth there
is in Daesh’s state-building claims. I will therefore begin by describing the way
Daesh generates its revenue before analysing how this is spent to assess if notions
of state-building can be found. Due to the nature of the group and how recently its
state-building began, I will predominantly use resources from the media, think
tanks and NGOs in addition to those from governments. Where possible, I will also
use academic resources on state-building theory as a means to analyse and assess
Daesh’s financial system. Whilst media sources may be difficult to verify, they also
contain the most up-to-date reports on Daesh as well as interviews with people
who have first-hand experience of life in Daesh’s state. For this reason, they
provide insight into Daesh which academic resources are unable to do as yet.
Throughout the dissertation I shall use the term ‘Daesh’ to refer to the group
referred to as ‘ISI’, ‘ISIS’ and ‘The so-called Islamic State’. The other names or
acronyms used for Daesh refer to specific times in the group’s history whereas

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Daesh is the Arabic way of calling the group ‘IS’, the abbreviated form of ‘The
Islamic State’. Therefore, for continuity, Daesh will be used to refer to the group in
general; I will use other terms only in the introduction in order to explain its
evolution. I will refer to Daesh’s territory as its state during this research however
this is simply to refer to the territory it controls, not to debate whether it should be
declared a state. Furthermore, whilst my research is interested in Daesh as a state-
builder, what is far more significant is what this means for state-building in
general.
The structure of this dissertation will be as follows. In the introduction, I will
explore the background of Daesh, giving a history of the group from its creation up
until the declaration of its state. This will contextualise the rest of the dissertation
and help to explain some of the features of Daesh’s financial system and state-
building that will be encountered later. Following this will be the theory chapter,
where the concept of state-building will be explained. I will start by answering the
question of what a state is and how we can differentiate between states in terms of
their strength. This is important since it will help to define which states require
state-building. Following this I will look at what state-building is and how it can be
used to analyse Daesh’s financial system. Chapter four will explain the ways in
which Daesh acquires its wealth and analyse these for notions of state-building.
There will be particular focus on taxation and oil revenue as these both represent
the main two ways in which Daesh generates wealth, and have the most relevance
to state-building. Chapter five will continue the analysis of Daesh’s financial
system, however the focus will be on how Daesh spends the revenue it generates.
In these two chapters I will particularly focus on Daesh from late 2013 to early
2016, as this encompasses the time Daesh began its state-building tasks, through

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its height and ending with the period in which the US-led campaign on Daesh’s
state-building has targeted Daesh’s financial system (Carter 2016). I will focus my
analysis on Daesh’s state-building in Syria and Iraq since this is where the groups
most concerted efforts at state-building have taken place. Finally, I will conclude by
summarising the points made in chapters four and five in order to answer the
question of whether Daesh’s financial system suggests notions of state-building.
This will lead to a discussion of what this means for our understanding of state-
builders.

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2. Daesh: A History
Daesh began life as an off-shoot of Al-Qaeda known as ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’ and
was founded by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was a Jordanian who came to Iraq
in 2002 following the American invasion of Afghanistan, where he was previously
based. He was influenced by Jihadi-Salafism, which is the ideological heart of
modern day Daesh. Jihadi-Salafism is a school of thought which argues for the
return of the caliphate as the only true way to unite and govern the world’s
Muslims (Bunzel 2015: 8). Further to this, it also calls for the purification of the
faith, particularly the elimination of idolatry, ‘shirk’ in Arabic, and “affirming God’s
oneness” (ibid). Salafists are anti-Shi’a Muslims because they revere the Prophet
Muhammad’s family. It is this that separates the ideology of Zarqawi, and therefore
Daesh, from many other Islamic extremists such as Al-Qaeda. Whilst Al-Qaeda and
Zarqawi both wanted to restore the caliphate, Zarqawi’s views were far more
sectarian than that of Al-Qaeda. Due to this stricter theology it took until 2004 for
him to swear loyalty, or bay’a, to the then leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden
(Faraj 2004). Upon doing so, Zarqawi’s group became ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’ (AQI)
(Bunzel, 2015: 13-14). Whilst this meant that AQI were technically an affiliate of
Al-Qaeda, Zarqawi’s group targeted and killed other Muslims in a way that shows
even then that they did not adhere to the head directives orders (Celso 2015: 24).
Nonetheless, in one important aspect it was aligned with Al-Qaeda; the groups
worked together to attempt to build a caliphate starting in Iraq (Bunzel 2015: 15).
This became particularly evident in 2006 when AQI united with five other jihadi
groups operating in Iraq to form the Mujahidin Shura Council, a precursor for an
Islamic state (ibid: 16). On June 7th of that year, Zarqawi was killed in a American
airstrike (Celso 2015: 25-6).

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Zarqawi was succeeded as leader of the AQI by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, an
Egyptian Jihadi-Salafist. He continued the strategy of joining forces with other Iraqi
jihadist groups, leading to the establishment of ‘the Islamic state of/in Iraq’ (ISI) in
October 2006 (Bunzel 2015: 17). The group officially went by two names; firstly
‘The Islamic State of Iraq’ which suggested that it was a state for the Sunni
population of Iraq (ibid). The second name ‘The Islamic State in Iraq’ hints at the
wider mission to create a global caliphate which modern-day Daesh has always
stated is its aim (Wood 2015, Bunzel 2015). The man appointed leader of IQI was
Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, a former police officer, who proclaimed Iraq’s Sunnis had
to pay bay’a to him or be deemed sinners (Bunzel 2015: 18). He was given the title
‘Commander of the Faithful’, a term historically given to caliphs (ibid). Following
the declaration of a state and caliph came the announcement of its first cabinet of
ministries, including war, public security, health and agriculture ministries, in April
2007 (Al Tamimi 2015). Whilst this suggests that ISI was attempting to act as a
state, there is little evidence that it could administer real governance to any areas
in Iraq at this point (ibid). Instead, ISI established Shari’a courts and claimed the
ending shirk in Iraq through violence and the destruction of relics (Bunzel 2015:
19). ISI was effectively undone by its own scriptural rigor; according to
counterterrorism research fellow Brian Fishman its imposition of Shari’a law and
targeted campaign against tribal leaders and Shi’a Muslims caused a backlash
(Celso 2015: 26). This not only included Western forces in the area but also the
Sawha or ‘Awakening Movement’, a tribal Sunni movement, which helped push ISI
back from 2007 until 2009 (Al Tamimi 2015). With the combined effort of the
Sunni tribes and American troops, ISI proved incapable of holding territory and
attracting large scale support from Iraq’s Sunnis. For these reasons it would be fair

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to describe Daesh’s first attempt to establish a caliphate as ISI between the period
of 2006 to 2010 as a complete failure. In 2010 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu
Hamza al-Muhajir died. As one researcher puts it ‘by the time that Abu Umar al-
Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir were killed...the Islamic State had lost any
semblance of statehood’ (Bunzel 2015: 22).
Within a month of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi’s death came the appointment of a
new emir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who had served as a deputy in ISI’s command
until that point (Bunzel 2015: 23, Zelin 2014). According to Die Spiegel journalist,
Christoph Reuter, Baghdadi was appointed as he was an educated cleric and could
give the group a religious face (2015). Furthermore, a biography of Baghdadi
written in 2013 stated that his roots can be traced all the way to the prophet
Muhammad, a requirement of any prospective caliph (Zelin 2014). This may be
true however it could equally be evidence that the group were attempting to
legitimise its caliph to the world’s Sunnis. Despite the announcement of a new
leader, Baghdadi made no public address until 2011 (Bunzel 2015: 23). This
changed as the policies of Iraq’s then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki created
resentment amongst Iraq’s Sunnis (ibid: 24). Al-Maliki used ‘de-Baathification’
policies to keep his opponents, particularly Sunnis, from power whilst his special
forces reportedly detained members of Sawha and political activists (Al Ali 2014).
Speeches in 2012 by Baghdadi and other ISI members centred on the grievances of
Sunnis and claims of Shi’a expansionism; this helped fuel sectarian conflict and
draw more support to ISI (Bunzel 2015: 24). Coupled with the American
withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, this gave ISI a perfect opportunity to expand and
strengthen its control in parts of Iraq (Celso 2015: 22). At the same time, the Arab
Spring which took place across several countries in the Middle East presented the

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group with an opportunity to expand. As the uprising against the Assad regime
during the Arab Spring in Syria gained momentum, areas in the north of the
country were taken over by rebel brigades (Reuter 2015). In April 2013 Baghdadi
officially announced ISI’s expansion into Syria, stating that a popular Syrian rebel
group Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) was an extension of ISI (Lister 2015a: 20). He therefore
declared that the name ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ would now become ‘Islamic State of
Iraq and Sham’, Sham being the Arabic name for greater Syria (Bunzel 2015: 25).
Whilst the leader of JN refuted this claim, choosing to reaffirm its bay’a to Al-Qaeda
instead, ISIS did enter Syria in 2013 (Lister 2015b: 124). Initially comprising
mostly of former JN fighters, ISIS started its Syrian campaign by “aggressively
expanding across northern and eastern Syria” (Lister 2015a: 20). This naturally
created conflict between ISIS and the other rebel groups in Syria, particularly as it
targeted them for assaults, assassinations and executions (Celso 2015: 34). In
February 2014, Al-Qaeda’s central leaders expelled ISIS, declaring that Al-Qaeda
had “no organisational relationship with it” and was not responsible for its actions
(Lister 2015a: 20-21). Despite this and the coalition of several Syrian rebel groups
against ISIS, the group managed to strengthen its hold over Raqqa and take key
Iraqi cities including Fallujah and Ramadi (Celso 2015: 27). In June 2014, ISIS took
control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city (Chulov 2014).
On June 29th 2014 ISIS’s official spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani gave
an address declaring its caliphate; henceforth the group would be known simply as
‘The Islamic State’ (Bradley 2014). Adnani stated that Daesh possessed all the
required elements to be an Islamic state such as fundraising, almsgiving, penalties,
and prayers (ibid). This seems to fit with reports that suggest that by this time
Daesh had already begun governance activities such as creating its own courts,

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providing humanitarian aid and enforcing its own form of Islam in Syria (Caris and
Reynolds 2014: 4). Furthermore, Al-Adnani declared that Baghdadi fit the
requirements of a caliph and therefore all Sunnis had to give bay’a to him (Bunzel
2015: 31). In a Foreign Policy Centre briefing doctors Simon Mabon and Lucia
Ardovini state:
Daesh is seemingly attempting to build a system of governance that is
both administrative and service-oriented, aimed at providing its
citizens with religious guidance, security, education and healthcare,
along with infrastructural projects and a judiciary system (Mabon
and Ardovini 2015: 3).
In essence, the report argues that Daesh’s intention is to create a caliphate which
can replace the traditional state.

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3. States and State-building
In this chapter I will outline the theoretical approach which I will use to
analyse whether Daesh’s financial system suggests notions of state-building. I will
start by defining what a state is, beginning from the classic definitions given by
sociologists Charles Tilly and Max Weber. I will then explain the difference
between strong, weak and failed states. This is a necessary first task, as without
knowing what a state is it is impossible to understand what is meant by state-
building. Furthermore, the literature on different types of state is important in
understanding when the need for state-building occurs. Following this I will
explain state-building theory and describe the debate between international
relations and development scholars on who should perform state-building. Finally,
I will look explain some of the specific aspects of state-building theory and how
they will be used to analyse Daesh’s state-building claims.
3.1. Defining and Differentiating Between ‘States’
According to the German sociologist Max Weber, a state should be
understood as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber in Fukuyama
2004: 21). In this definition we can see a focus on a defined territory and
particularly on force. Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of authority by those who
must obey; therefore it is clear that only one actor, the state, can use physical
violence within the territory it possesses in a manner regarded as acceptable. The
acclaimed political scientist Francis Fukuyama takes from Weber’s quote that “the
essence of stateness is enforcement” (2004: 21). The American sociologist Charles
Tilly argued that an organisation which controls a population in a given territory

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can be considered a state if it meets four criteria. These are: that it is differentiated
from other organisations in the same area, autonomous, centralised, and its
divisions are formally coordinated with one another (Fritz and Rocha Menocal
2007: 11). In their definitions of a state, both Tilly and Weber suggest that a key
element of ‘stateness’ is that it has a form of centralised authority; this is
something we can see in all modern states. While Weber mentions the use of
physical force, neither focus on the functions which a state is expected to perform
but rather the organisational structure which identifies them (ibid).
These definitions give a very broad idea of what a modern state is; in
actuality states vary significantly. One way in which to differentiate between states
is explained by governance professor Robert Rotberg. He writes, “[n]ation-states
exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to
persons living within designated parameters (borders)” (2004: 2). A public good is
a commodity or service which is provided for the benefit of the society. Examples
of public goods include rule of law, welfare and security. Rotberg asserts that it is
by a state’s performance in delivering the most important public goods such as
security that we can distinguish between them (ibid). In this vein, a continuum of
strong, weak, failed and collapsed states has been put forward which shall now be
explained.
A ‘strong’ state is one that has cross-penetration between state and society.
What this means is that society has access to the state and vice versa which means
that decision making “is not isolated from social concerns” (Robinson 2007: 3).
This allows the state to make decisions which are deemed legitimate by the society
they rule over. This cross-penetration is known as infrastructural power, and
allows strong states to be adaptive and organic with relation to their societies’

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needs (ibid). Strong states can extract resources from its society without the need
to coerce its citizens in order to provide public goods. This ‘social contract’
between state and society means that society agrees to the legitimate rule of the
state in exchange for public goods (Rotberg 2004: 3).
By comparison, weak states are unable to adapt and must enforce their
policies through coercive and oppressive measures. As sociologist Michael Mann
writes, a weak state “does not have the capacities to penetrate society, regulate
social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in
determined ways” (Mann in Robinson 2007: 3). According to state-building scholar
Neil Robinson, “under these circumstances the rule of law and stable property
rights do not develop and power is not institutionalised...or accountable” (2007: 4).
What we can understand from these two quotes is that since weak states don’t
have infrastructural power, the decisions over how to use the state’s resources are
not made by state and society mutually. For this reason, some fundamental public
goods in weak states are not adequately provided, if at all, causing a breakdown in
the social contract. Typically, the elites of weak states are more concerned with
shoring up their unstable rule than providing for society. Rotberg argues that there
are both permanent and temporary circumstances that can make a state weak
(2004: 4). The permanent circumstances are largely based on the geographical
position of the state and the resources this gives the state access to. Temporary
circumstances which can cause state weakness can largely be classed as
mismanagement by the elites in power. A state can also be weak due to a
combination of these issues; they may have limited access to resources and elites
which misuse or steal these resources. Regardless of the reasons, what this means
for weak states is that, either due to a lack of capacity, legitimacy or both, they are

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unable to perform the duties expected of a state without resorting to coercive
measures.
Whilst weak states may struggle to provide public goods, they are still able to
provide rudimentary security for their citizens. When this is no longer the case,
they fall into the category of failed states. Beyond this, what exactly constitutes a
failed state is debatable. Rotberg writes that failed states “are tense, deeply
conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions” and that most
feature civil wars between the government and armed militias (2004: 5). He
argues that there is no failed state without disharmony between the communities
present within it. Robinson points out that a failed state exhibits exaggerated
qualities of a weak state but has lost the ability to govern its borders (2007: 6).
This can lead to calls for independence from parts of the territories or civil war as
the state loses legitimacy. A final quality which is typical in a failed state is an
extremely high level of predation by elites. This means that the finances of the
state are being mismanaged, leading to poor institutions and degrading
infrastructures (Rotberg 2004: 6-7). The most extreme form of a failed state is a
collapsed state, in which we see a vacuum of authority where goods are obtained
through private means and rule of the strong is law (ibid: 9). From these
definitions there are some facts we can take away which will be important in
understanding state-building, especially regarding Daesh. Firstly, both strong and
weak states are functioning states, weak states are merely unable to efficiently use
power and effectively rule. Secondly, a state’s ‘strength’ is not necessarily fixed;
strong states can become weak, weak states can become strong and so on. For this
reason, the four types of state that are addressed in state-building are thought of as
being on a continuum (Robinson 2007: 6). This means that weak or failed states

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can be strengthened to avoid collapse; this is where the concept of state-building
comes in.
3.2. State-building
Fukuyama argues that state-building can be understood as “the creation of
new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones” (2004: 17).
In a paper by the Overseas Development Institute, state-building is described as
being “about constructing the foundations of the very (government) edifice within
which governance ought to operate” (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007: 4). What is
meant by this is that state-building is focused on creating the fundamentals of a
state, which include the provision of security, the establishment of rule of law and
the delivery of public goods and services in a manner which is routine and
formalised (ibid: 13). Furthermore, state-building aims to build institutions to this
end which are regarded as legitimate; meaning that their authority is accepted by
both the political elites and society which are being governed (McCullough 2015:
15). Legitimacy is a complex concept and there is no one way for it to be created.
Typically, states achieve legitimacy by providing public goods and services, strong
economic performance, ideology, populism or through the political process (Fritz
and Rocha Menocal 2007: 15). A state may be considered legitimate by doing just
one of these actions, or it may do a multitude of them. As previously mentioned,
legitimacy is important if a state is to have institutional power. For this reason, the
integrity and quality of government is a key focus of state-building (ibid: 13). It is
important to point out that state-building is not the same as nation-building, which
is the creation of a community with shared values; whilst social division is often a

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contributing factor in state failure, the goal of state-building is not to create a
shared national identity but instead strong state institutions (Robinson 2007: 13).
From here, there is a major divide in the literature on state-building. Whilst some
scholars argue that state-building should be performed by an external body, others
believe that this does not build an effective, legitimate state; therefore, it must
happen from within. At the end of the Cold War, state-building became at
important agenda on the international stage (Robinson 2007: 3). This is partly
because states such as Ethiopia, which had previously received financial aid from
the USSR, began to fail (ibid: 9). State weakness and failure became linked to
humanitarian disasters; in some cases the states themselves were actually seen as
the cause or contributing factor to these disasters (Paris and Sisk 2008: 3).
Furthermore, as states began to fail a variety of international security concerns
became linked to state failure, such as drug and gun trafficking (Rotberg 2004: 10).
These security concerns typically occurred as militias began to take control of
some areas due to governance gaps created by state-failure (Fukuyama 2004: 17).
State-building became a focal point of interventions in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks, which highlighted the dangers that state weakness and failure
could entail for the international community (Cunliffe 2007: 54). As David
Chandler, founder of The Journal of Intervention and State-building writes, external
actors needed to intervene to stop terrorists “operating with impunity where
states are too weak to police their borders and enforce rule of law” (Chandler
2007: 70). Scholars such as Roland Paris believed that the focus of state-building
had to be different to the quick fixes applied in the years previously. He argued
that before elections and the ability to self-manage can take place, it is necessary to
institutionalise the state in question (Chandler 2007: 74). What he meant by this is

19
that strong institutions, the rule of law and human rights must be in place before
politics take place in order to hold the state accountable. If this is not done,
conflicts can easily be renewed due to political divides, money can fall back into
the hands of black marketers, and rule can again become despotic (Paris and Sisk
2008: 2). The way that external administration has generally been administered is
through the UN. This is because as a non-state actor it has generally been regarded
as both legitimate and impartial (Robinson 2007: 16).
Despite its widespread application in the modern world, many academics
have found externally-led state building to be highly problematic. Firstly, in
comparison with previous quick fix approaches such as snap elections state-
building requires longer missions from non-domestic personnel. The issue with
this is that these missions have been perceived as intrusive and have often led to a
lack of local ownership (Chandler 2004: 328). This is thought to limit the ability for
strong connections to be created between the state and society (Robinson 2007:
18). If an external party is responsible for the creation of rule of law, security and a
functioning economy, society has no reason to feel loyalty or have confidence in
the state. The state is therefore unable to create legitimacy in the eyes of its people;
it is only through the political process that that the state and society can become
bound to one another (Chandler 2007: 74). Since legitimacy is fundamental in
building a strong state, scholars in the development field tend to favour locally-led
state-building projects.
Thus far I have focused on state-building in the general sense to give an
understanding of what it is and what it attempts to achieve. Now I will look at one
aspect of state-building which focuses specifically on the extraction of resources by
the state in order to perform state-building tasks.

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Resource extraction is at the heart of state-building in predation theory,
which is based on the work of Charles Tilly. Tilly gave four central activities of
early modern Europe state-building (Lu and Thies 2013: 239). Firstly, state-
making meant that states neutralised domestic competitors so that they could
create their borders. War making followed this in order to deter external rivals
from attacking the state. Next states would protect those who supported their rule
from predation by internal or external rivals. Finally, states would extract
resources from their populations to fund the other three activities. These four
activities occurred in a cycle, which allowed the state to remain in power. If the
state is unable to extract resources from the society it governs then it ceases to
exist (Thies 2007: 717). As the author Cameron Thies writes “[s]tate building
can...usefully be examined through a focus on extraction, since the state’s need for
resources generates so much of its institutional infrastructure” (ibid). This
institutional infrastructure may include tax collection and a means of creating and
enforcing laws, e.g. police/armed forces. For these reasons it makes logical sense
that a state would want to increase resource extraction as much as possible.
However, this is not a simple task as it may create internal tensions and spark
competition from potential rivals (ibid). Predation theory argues that war and the
threat of war can increase a state’s ability to extract resources from society; this
happens regardless of whether the competitor to the state is internal or external.
The state can do this because the citizens’ tolerance for extraction increases as
their need for protection does (Lu and Thies 2013: 240). The state can therefore
increase tax revenues or debt to augment its state-building activities and ward off
the threat (Thies 2007: 717).

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In this dissertation, I will look at Daesh’s resource extraction for signs that
Daesh does not need to coerce its citizens in order to extract resources from
society. This will be useful in showing that Daesh has infrastructural power and
support from its society. I will also see if Daesh is able to increase resource
extraction based on the needs of its citizens as seen in predation theory and strong
states. I will also assess the ways in which Daesh uses the revenue it generates in
accordance with the literature on state-building. I will do this firstly by assessing
whether there is evidence that Daesh is spending the revenue it generates in order
to perform state-building activities such as the provision of security and other
public goods. If evidence that public goods are being provided is found I will look
at the way in which it is provided in order to assess if Daesh is able to provide it in
a routinised manner. It will also be useful to assess whether Daesh has attempted
to create legitimacy for itself through its state-building endeavours. Evidence of
predation by Daesh’s elites and any misuse of resources will also be assessed; this
could prove that Daesh members are more interested in lining their pockets than
providing public goods. Whilst no one of these points alone is evidence that Daesh
is or is not a state-builder, looking at the elements collectively should help to
answer the question of whether Daesh’s financial system suggests notions of state-
building.

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4. Daesh’s Financial Acquisition
This chapter will explore the primary ways in which Daesh acquires wealth.
According to the celebrated economist Douglass North the state provides three key
functions, “exchange of services for revenues, design of property rights to
maximise revenues and revenue extraction” (Lu and Thies 2013: 240). Revenue
extraction is particularly important as it provides the funds for the state to
perform the other two state-building tasks. Therefore, revenue extraction is key in
analysing Daesh’s financial system with regard to state-building. I will particularly
focus on two areas of Daesh’s revenue extraction: its taxation system and natural
resource extraction. The reasons that these two aspects have been chosen are two-
fold. Firstly, the two areas represent the most significant means of acquiring
financial wealth for Daesh (ibid: 241). Secondly, taxation and natural resources are
two forms of resource extraction which are discussed in state-building theory.
These are not the only means which Daesh uses to obtain wealth; Daesh is known
to use a variety of illicit means to fill its coffers such as selling stolen antiquities,
and kidnapping for ransom (Hansen-Lewis and Shapiro 2015, Levitt 2014: 9).
However, for the purposes of this research these means will not be discussed here.
I will begin by explaining Daesh’s taxation system with reference to state-building
theory. Taxation, the ‘lifeblood’ of a state, is what allows states to perform their
necessary duties by funding them (Lu and Thies 2013: 240). As mentioned in the
third chapter, strong states are able to extract taxes from their citizens due to the
fact that they have infrastructural power (Hehir and Robinson 2007: 3). When a
society, and the state which it belongs to, are interconnected in this way it allows
the state to claim that is working for the common good, permitting it to extract
resources in a “regularised, routinised fashion” (ibid: 4). Weak states must resort

23
to coercion to obtain taxes from their citizens since there is no cross-penetration of
society and state (ibid). For this reason evidence of coercion in Daesh’s taxation
system could be used to argue that it lacks legitimacy and is not behaving as a
state-builder, since the aim of state-building is to make weak states stronger. If
Daesh’s taxation occurs sporadically or in an uneven manner it would also suggest
that Daesh is not able to extract revenue in the fashion of a state further
discrediting the state-building thesis.
Regarding natural resource extraction, oil represents the most significant
method of financial acquisition for Daesh. Scholars are divided on whether natural
resource wealth helps or hinders state-building. Historically, richness in natural
resources has tended to boost the economy of states which had strong state
institutions before the discovery of that resource (Norman 2012: 173). This seems
logical; if a country is rich in a resource it should be able to use that wealth to its
benefit (Wick and Bulte 2006: 457). However, for weak states resource wealth has
generally been regarded by political scientists as a curse (Norman 2012: 173). The
discovery of natural resources in weak states has been linked to governance issues,
reduced economic growth and even civil war (ibid). This argument rests on the
idea that resource wealth leads to a reduced quality of institutions due to rent
seeking, where resource wealth is used to benefit oneself and not society, as well
as other forms of corruption by elites (Wick and Bulte 2006: 457). This is possible
because the wealth created by natural resources reduces the need for taxation and
therefore stops the development of infrastructural power that we find in strong
states (Lu and Thies 2013: 249). Daesh’s position in Syria and Iraq has put it in
control of vast amounts of oil wells, with some reports in August 2014 suggesting
it could produce 80,000 barrels of oil per day (Levitt 2014: 3). It is worth

24
considering what this abundance of high value natural resource has meant for
Daesh in terms of its self-proclaimed state-building agenda. If Daesh is using this
wealth to build strong state institutions or to provide public goods than it will be
possible to argue that Daesh is behaving as a state-builder. If, however, evidence of
high ranking ‘elite’ members of Daesh misappropriating this wealth can be found
then this would suggest Daesh is behaving in accordance with a weak state at best.
4.1. Finance through Taxation
Taxation has generated considerable wealth for Daesh, with reports stating
that income from taxation reached $900 million in 2015 (Williams-Grut 2015).
Daesh has a complex taxation system, including charges for import taxes, rent for
businesses, fines for breaking laws, utility bills, and a religious tax (ibid). For
example, farmers that work in Daesh’s territory pay between 5% and 10% of their
income based on whether their crops are irrigated or rain-fed (Solomon and Jones
2015). Parties that wish to trade with Daesh or travel safely through its territory
must also pay tax (Sullivan 2015b). Large trucks with goods are reported to pay
$400, whereas smaller ones pay $100 (Levitt 2014: 10). Non-muslims from
Abrahamic religions that live in Daesh territory are required to pay Jizya if they
wish to continue to do so; Jizya is a Quranic tax suggesting the subordination of the
one who is paying (Caris and Reynolds 2014: 16). According to reports, there is a
set amount of Jizya to pay each year, estimated to be $720 per adult male, which is
collected at two points in the year (Caris and Reynolds 2014: 16, Levitt 2014: 10).
Those that decide not to pay, or are wanted by Daesh for other reasons, often have
their assets seized by the group (Levitt 2014: 10). This is often sold off for profit or
given to Daesh members whose homes the group subsidize (Mecham 2015: 21,

25
Weiss 2015c). The use of Jizya further embeds the authority of Daesh, as it seeks to
strengthen its legitimacy by acting in accordance with Quranic practices (Wood
2015: 8-9). It also shows the varying degree of extraction between different
peoples which occurs in Daesh territory (Mecham 2015: 21). However, whilst this
does suggest that Daesh has created an unequal society, it also shows a degree of
regularity.
The Sunni citizens of Daesh’s ‘state’ pay Zakat, an obligatory form of
almsgiving dating back to the times of the prophet Mohammed (Solomon and Jones
2015). Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam and is focused on the community: the
poor are given money by the rich in order to make society more equal (Raphaeli
2003: 62). Every Muslim who meets the financial conditions to do so is required to
pay Zakat (Muslim Aid 2015). Note, however, that only six of the Muslim majority
countries of the world have a mandatory Zakat collection system: Libya, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Hasan 2015: 130). Nimrod Raphaeli
from The Middle East Media Research Institute explains that for religious reasons
states like Saudi Arabia cannot collect income tax therefore Zakat takes on “a
particularly significant role” (Raphaeli 2003: 62). Since Daesh follows a similarly
strict form of Islam it is logical that Daesh uses mandatory Zakat collection to fund
its state activities too. The typical sum given by every Muslim that pays Zakat
worldwide is 2.5% of their total annual income; this is in accordance with Islamic
regulations (Muslim Aid 2015). This percentage applies to both companies and
individuals in Saudi Arabia (Brill 1987: 92). Some reports suggest that, like Saudi
Arabia, Daesh has a typical rate of Zakat of 2.5% of one’s annual earnings (Solomon
and Jones 2015). However, interviews conducted by The Washington Post with
people who either live in or have fled Daesh-held territory suggest that this

26
percentage is more variable. According to those reports the figure can be
anywhere between 2.5% to 10% of one’s salary (Sullivan 2015b). Other reports
indicate that tax can be much higher than this depending on the source of one’s
income. Civil servants in Iraq who were in Daesh territory were still being paid a
salary by the Iraqi government until August 2015 (Keatinge 2015). A report by
Associated Press states that the Iraqi government estimated this money was being
taxed at between 20% and 50%, which is what led to the money being cut off
(Hinnant, Karam and George 2016). This variation in rates is not in fitting with
Saudi Arabia, the most similar state to that which Daesh is attempting to create, at
least with regard to their shared belief system. This could mean that Daesh’s
taxation system is not characteristic of a state, since a state should extract
resources in a regular fashion across its territory. If Daesh’s citizens are being
charged different rates this could also be an indication that there is corruption
within its taxation system. This is supported by claims made in one article that that
foreign fighters are exempt from paying Zakat (Sullivan 2015b). However, these
claims are not widespread and whilst it is possible that there is corruption in
Daesh’s taxation system there are other explanations for the variation in taxation
rates. According to an IHS report, although taxation in Daesh territory is imposed
by a central governing body, regional governors are allowed flexibility in how
much they demand (IHS 2016a). This could therefore explain why there are
variations in the rates of taxation between different areas. Another explanation for
variation in taxation rates could simply be the timing of the reports. A second IHS
press release stated that in the spring of 2016 Daesh’s monthly revenue had fallen
by almost 30% from what it was in mid-2015 (IHS 2016b). This has led to an
increase in both the number and value of fines given by Daesh members as the

27
group attempts to boost its funds (ibid). This is particularly necessary since as
people flee Daesh the amount of people from which it can draw taxes from is
reduced and therefore it needs to take more from those who remain in order to
generate the same revenue.
As previously mentioned, the intention of Zakat is that it is used as a
charitable donation to aid the poor. However, it is the giver of Zakat who chooses
where the money goes. Unfortunately, in Saudi Arabia this has led to Zakat money
being used to fund extremist groups or terrorist activities (Raphaeli 2003: 62), and
in 2015, The Washington Post reported that it is widely believed that Daesh uses
Zakat to pay the salaries of its fighters (Sullivan 2015b). From the perspective of
those giving Zakat in this way it could be argued that Jihad is a legitimate Muslim
cause and therefore people are able to give Zakat in order to fund this. For this
reason, the use of Zakat to pay the salaries of its soldiers can still be understood to
be a legitimate use of the tax Daesh receives. The reason that Daesh’s citizens are
still willing to pay taxes to the group even as the rates increase can also be
explained using predatory theory, which states that war making plays a vital role
in state-building. This is because the threat of war from either internal or external
actors increases society’s tolerance for extraction; this typically occurs in the form
of increased taxation (Lu and Thies 2013: 240). The reason that society’s tolerance
for extraction increases is simply because its need for protection from the state
grows substantially during wartime. The increased funds raised through taxation
allows the state to increase state-building activities to deal with the threat (ibid).
Referring this back to Daesh, citizens may be willing to pay a higher rate of
taxation since mid-2015 because Daesh’s territory is increasingly under attack
from the West and its allies in the region. For Daesh to continue to provide

28
protection, citizens may be willing to give more in taxes to guarantee their safety.
This allows Daesh to buy arms and pay fighters, something which shall be looked
at further in the next chapter. This sort of relationship is hard to prove; however, it
could be useful in explaining why so many people have remained in Daesh
territory.
The way in which Daesh collects and enforces this taxation is more
problematic. Like the collection of tax in most states, the giving of Zakat by
businesses is strictly controlled by Daesh. However, in an interview with journalist
Michael Weiss, one former member of Daesh said attempting to evade or cheat the
tax collectors leads to severe punishments which are not state-like (Weiss 2015c).
Matthew Levitt from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy writes that
reports from Mosul suggest you can be executed for not paying Zakat (Levitt 2014:
10). With this in mind, it is no surprise that people are willing to pay. It does
however call into question the reason that people are paying Zakat to Daesh. If
Zakat is to be understood as a means of legitimate revenue extraction by the state
from society then it is given due to the social contract that these two parties have
made. This social contract means that society is willing to give the state resources
in exchange for services provided by the state. If, however, the tax is being paid not
in exchange for services but instead due to fear this may be more indicative of
extortion. A report by the Financial Action Task Force stated the Daesh taxation
system is “a sophisticated protection racket where involuntary ‘donations’
purchase momentary safety or temporary continuity of business” (FATF 2015).
This has been a feature of revenue extraction by dictators of weak states in the
Middle East and parts of Africa, with regimes using war and the threat of war to
create a ‘protection racket’ (Lu and Thies 2013: 249). Resorting to threat, the use

29
of violence and extortion suggests that Daesh is behaving in a way which is more
akin to a weak state rather than a strong state. As the aim of state-building is to
create a strong state this means Daesh cannot be seen to be acting as a state-
builder in this regard.
4.2. Finance and State Resources
Of course, taxation is not the only way that Daesh funds its caliphate; oil
revenue has also been significant in generating significant financial gains.
According to political scientists Lingyu Lu and Cameron Thies, Middle Eastern
state-building is ‘tied’ to oil wealth (2013: 241). This is because there are many oil
wealthy, ‘rentier’, states in the region but also many ‘non-rentier’ states which do
not have oil and rely on the rentier states for this. As briefly mentioned, there is
some debate among state-building scholars as to whether oil wealth helps or
hinders state-building. One camp argues that wealthy oil producing states can use
oil wealth to build “huge and coercive state security apparatus” (ibid). This is
achieved “by extracting from resource, winning the support of great powers in
combat with domestic rebels, and redistributing oil rents for the purchase of
loyalty” (ibid). Essentially, a resource like oil can be sold for profit in order to fund
state-building activities but also to avoid unrest and gain allies. In the case of
Daesh, many of its enemies in the region require the oil that Daesh has and
therefore forced to trade with the group (Schori Liang 2015). In mid-2015 Daesh
was allegedly able to produce between 30 and 40 000 barrels of oil per day and
controlled ten oil fields in Syria and Iraq (Butter 2015, Schori Liang 2015). While
reports vary, it is thought that Daesh was bringing in between $1-3 million a day or
$50 million a month due to its oil trade at that time (Williams-Grut 2015, Laub

30
2016). This not only provided Daesh with a means of financing state-building
activities by selling the oil to its rivals, but also to exploit them by making other
demands. According to Dr. Valérie Marcel from Chatham House, Daesh was able to
sell oil to the Assad regime in Syria in exchange for immunity against aerial strikes
(2014). Daesh has also used oil as a means of garnering favour with tribes in Syria.
According to Al-Monitor, Daesh offered tribes in oil-wealthy Deir ez-Zor a far better
oil-revenue deal than its rivals such as Jabhat Al-Nusra (Salama 2014). By offering
these tribes a better financial incentive to side with Daesh, it was able to buy the
loyalty of the tribes and cement control in these areas (ibid).
The arguments against the virtues of oil wealth for state-building are twofold.
Firstly some scholars argue that it creates incentives for rent seeking and only fills
the coffers of those in positions of power (Lu and Thies 2013: 241). Naturally, this
can lead to the retardation of institution building and weakens the claim that
Daesh can be seen as building a state. In an article in The Financial Times, the
writers firmly state that money from oil revenue goes straight to the top-ranking
officials in Daesh (Solomon and Jones 2015). This claim was based on information
obtained in interviews by the journalists with Daesh defectors, and was also
confirmed by western security officials (Solomon 2016, pers. comm.). Whilst it has
not been widely reported, this does suggest that high ranking officials in Daesh are
abusing their positions for personal gain, or rent-seeking. The second argument
against oil wealth as a boost for state-building is that because of this the state does
not have to tax society heavily in order to perform state activities. This allows it to
make policy choices without the need for political bargaining with society and
therefore the necessary social contract to form a strong state is never created (Lu
and Thies 2013: 249). One example of this is Iran under the second Shah. It became

31
a rentier state in the 1950s and therefore could rely more heavily on revenue
gained from the sale of gas and oil than on revenue extraction from its citizens. As
sociologist Theda Skocpol writes, this meant that the state was “[s]uspended above
its own people” and not in alliance with them (Skocpol 1982: 269). Skocpol
explains that the Iranian state was able to buy its people off, rearrange their lives
and repress any dissent because it did not rely on them (ibid). In Iraq and Syria,
Daesh has reportedly attempted to create a durable internal market for oil by
offering it to its citizens at a low price. In his paper on Daesh’s oil revenue, Charles
Lister claims that Daesh wants to create “a source of dependence between civilians
and its capacity to provide them cheap oil” (2014). In terms of state-building, it
could be inferred that Daesh wanted to create a need for the group from those that
it ruled over, strengthening its position in the region. However, it could equally
indicate that Daesh feels it needs society on its side for its continued success in the
area. This could be a suggestive of a two-way relationship; Daesh relies on support
from its society, and society relies on Daesh for public goods such as fuel.
However, oil wealth may also weaken the social contract between Daesh and
its citizens. Daesh can use the revenue it generates from oil sales to purchase
weapons and pay fighters without the need to rely as heavily on taxation. This
means that its citizens are less likely to dissent against Daesh’s economic decisions
since they don’t directly fund these purchases. Finding a connection between
Daesh’s state-building activities and oil revenue will be vital in understanding
whether Daesh is creating a social contract with society or not. If no link can be
found, this will indicate a lack of social contract since Daesh is not using the
revenue it earns to the benefit of society.

32
Until mid-2015 oil revenue was believed to be Daesh’s main source of
income. From this point the US-led campaign to target Daesh’s finances began to
truly take effect and therefore profits from oil fell (Schori Liang 2015: 77). It is also
important to note the collapse of global oil prices will have inevitably had a
negative impact price Daesh can sell oil for as it has done for rentier states such as
Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, for Daesh oil revenue has been an important means of
funding its state-building but also a political tool. It has helped create support for
the group internally as well as protecting it somewhat from the attacks of its rivals.
With this in mind, it could be argued that natural resources have been a source of
state-building for Daesh as it has theoretically provided the group with a means to
fund state activities and protect its state. However, if the claims made in The
Financial Times are credible, as they appear to be, oil wealth has also been a source
of rent seeking. Elites in Daesh have financially benefited from this resource
without using it to provide public goods.
Clearly how Daesh uses the revenue it generates is hugely significant to the
question of whether there are notions of state-building in its financial system. In
order to truly assess whether Daesh’s financial system suggests notions of state-
building it is necessary to analyse if the money generated through taxation and oil
revenue is being used to provide public goods and build institutions. This will be
the goal of the fifth chapter.

33
5. State Expenditure
In the previous chapter, I looked at the two main methods through which
Daesh acquires wealth. This chapter will analyse the ways which Daesh uses this
revenue in order to find notions of state-building. As Hehir and Robinson state in
their book on state-building, officials in weak states tend to use the resources
available to strengthen their hold on power rather than for social benefit (2007: 4).
This is because they feel insecure in their position and likely do not care about the
long-term running of the state. With this in mind, the provision of public goods and
institution building to this end are significant markers for notions of state-building.
This is because the provision of public goods by Daesh would suggest that the
officials in Daesh are using the state’s resources for society’s benefit rather than to
merely keep power. Evidence that Daesh is building and strengthening institutions
involved in the provision of public goods would also suggest that the group is
concerned with the long-term running of the state.
Daesh is known to provide public goods in several key areas, with one paper
arguing its governance system is “aimed at providing its citizens with religious
guidance, security, education and healthcare, along with infrastructural projects
and a judiciary system” (Mabon and Ardovini 2015: 3). This is supported by other
research which indicates that Daesh uses its revenue for war-making but also to
enhance its state-building efforts in public service areas (Marcel 2014). In a report
by The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), it is argued that Daesh has a clear
structural break down for its state-building efforts (Caris and Reynolds 2014: 4). In
this chapter, I will look at Daesh’s provision of three public goods that are
significant goals of state-building. Firstly, I will look at Daesh’s military efforts in
order to show how it has institutionalised its military and used it to provide

34
security to its populace. The ability to defend one’s border is a key distinction
between a weak and a failed state and a fundamental role a state must play. It is
also an area which requires significant extraction and demand from society, both
in terms of finance and personnel. Secondly I will assess how Daesh provides rule
of law in its territory by exploring both its police forces and its judicial system.
Finally, I will look at how Daesh has attempted to provide education in its territory
and whether this is a sign of state-building or indoctrination.
5.1. Military State-building and Security
According to Charles Tilly, state-building in early Europe consisted of four
main activities: neutralising domestic competitors, deterring external threats by
war-making, protecting citizens from predation by others and revenue extraction
to fun the other activities (Lu and Thies 2013: 239). Daesh has arguably performed
all of these activities, and therefore has been performing military activities to
create, strengthen and protect its state. No better illustration of the this can be
found than in Raqqa, a city which the Syrian regime lost control of in 2013 and
which has become the prime example of Daesh governance and state-building
(Caris and Reynolds 2014: 11). In early 2013 both Daesh and Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN),
a rival group, had a large presence in the city. Daesh spent the summer and autumn
of 2013 targeting activists and rival rebel groups, including those associated with
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and JN for execution and threats (Celso 2015: 34). This
prompted JN to leave Raqqa, allowing Daesh to consolidate power (Syria Untold
2014). Both the removal of JN and the targeted campaign against those who would
be hostile towards Daesh can be seen as examples of the first stage of Early-
European state-building. Daesh neutralised and removed its opponents in the city

35
in order to take control. Once in control of the city, Daesh was able to tax the
citizens and businesses of the city, gaining finances that could be used for
protection against external threats (ibid).
These threats came on the 3rd of January 2014 when rebel groups related to
the FSA and JN attacked Daesh, almost completely removing it in Raqqa (Chulov
2014). However, by the 10th of January, Daesh had already taken back one district
of Raqqa and by the 12th a large amount of reinforcements from other locations
arrived for a major ground offensive (Caris and Reynolds 2014: 12). As early as
January 14th Daesh was reported to have taken full control of the city. Not only this
but it attacked several rebel strongholds near the city, seizing control of them and
thus deterring any rivals from attempting to attack Raqqa (ibid). The retaking of
Raqqa and subsequent attacks on local areas can be seen as attempts by Daesh to
perform the second state-building task. After being caught unawares once, the
group attacked local rivals outside of Raqqa to discourage any new assaults on its
city. As the report on Daesh Governance by the ISW states:
The ISIS response to the rebel uprising was sophisticated, well-
executed, and conducted in parallel to a large ISIS offensive operation
in Fallujah, Iraq. The organization managed…to withdraw forces
quickly from multiple fronts and array them defensively in strategic
locations. From these staging areas, ISIS undertook offensive
operations to reassert itself in northern and eastern Syria (ibid: 12-
13).
From this account it is clear that Daesh had an organised military with good
communication its territory at that time. Its army attacked several locations in a
coordinated fashion and manoeuvred effectively to take and hold territory.

36
According to a NATO parliamentary report in late 2015, this manoeuvrability
comes from a three-levelled structure of Daesh military command aimed at
enhancing the independence of military units on the battlefield (Manciulli 2015: 6).
The core of Daesh’s military structure consists of 12 to 13 members including the
Caliph and the heads of security and intelligence forces. The second tier is made up
of 27 members whose job it is to communicate between the core and regional
levels. The regional level is the third tier of Daesh’s military and is in charge of
ground operations on a provincial scale (ibid, Nakhoul 2015). In the most part, this
final level is formed of former Iraqi Army officers who are thought to only be able
to communicate with one person from the second level. This is an attempt to avoid
infiltration by Daesh’s enemies (Manciulli 2015: 6). Daesh’s military clearly seems
capable of coordinating large-scale military operations which are both centrally
controlled whilst allowing flexibility on the ground. The group’s military has a
clear organisational structure which suggests that the group has made efforts to
institutionalise its military forces. With this is mind it seems evident that Daesh’s
military could be used as evidence of state-building.
The third act of state-building, that of protecting one’s citizens against
internal and external predation, is a difficult subject with regard to Daesh. It is well
documented that Daesh is a brutal organisation which, according to an Amnesty
International report, has been guilty of war crimes against its own citizens
(Amnesty International 2013: 1). Nonetheless, there are those who feel that Daesh
does provide protection. In an interview with journalists from The Guardian, one
Syrian refugee is quoted as saying, “You will not find anyone in this camp...who
supports Isis…[b]ut most of them accept that at least they tried to protect us,
Syrian Sunnis, who the world has abandoned” (Luhn, Chulov and Graham-Harrison

37
2016). Daesh has defended its territories and therefore citizens fiercely against
rivals such as the Syrian Assad regime and JN. For many, Daesh provides
protection against other evils, such as the Assad regime. The same can be seen in
Iraq. Before the ousting of Saddam Hussein, Sunni Muslims were the more
powerful of the two strands of Islam in Iraq. However, since elections took place in
Iraq in 2005 and again in 2007, Sunnis have found themselves with less political
power. Indeed, some Sunni Muslims in Iraq may genuinely fear discrimination and
persecution at the hands of the Shia government, particularly under the former
Prime-Minister Nuri al-Maliki (Bunzel 2015: 24). Therefore, the idea of being ruled
over by a Sunni leader, regardless of how brutal they may be, may seem better
than the idea of facing discrimination by the Shia government. This considered, it is
not hard to believe that Daesh could be regarded as a protector for them.
The last of Tilly’s state-building activities which Daesh performs is resource
extraction in order to fund these activities. Resource extraction in this sense not
only refers to financial revenues to fund military activities but also the labour force
necessary to carry out these tasks (Becham 2015: 21). Evidence of large-scale
recruitment and expenditure should therefore indicate that Daesh has been able to
extract resources in order to fund state-building activities. Whilst it is impossible
to calculate an exact cost of Daesh’s military operations, it is possible to get some
idea of how significant its military expenses must be. According to a series of
interviews conducted by Michael Weiss, a senior editor at The Daily Beast and
writer of the book ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, Daesh members in 2015 earnt a
high salary. He stated that the former Daesh member he interviewed earned $100
a month as his basic salary (Weiss 2015c). Further to this, there were a series of
bonuses that Daesh members received, including free housing and electricity.

38
Members also received $50 per month if they had a wife, $50 per month per living
parent and $35 per month for each child they had (ibid). Altogether this meant that
Daesh members typically made approximately $400 (Cockburn 2014, Laub 2016).
This is significantly more than the average Syrian or Iraqi would receive as a
monthly salary and particularly those who live in Daesh territory but have not
joined the group (Laub 2016). For this reason, the salary and benefits that Daesh
offered its ranks were hugely significant in its recruitment drive. People in Daesh’s
territory found themselves in financial difficulty due to the economic situation
there and, with nowhere else to turn, they joined Daesh (Bender 2015, Weiss
2015c, Laub 2016). Together with the vast numbers of foreign fighters that joined
Daesh in 2014 and 2015, this led to a considerable swelling of Daesh’s ranks.
Whilst figures on Daesh troops vary, most agree that the number is somewhere
between 30 000 and 100 000 (Al Jazeera 2014, Cockburn 2014, Nakhoul 2015),
although David Gartenstein-Ross states that the low figures are highly unlikely and
reports of around 100,000 fighters are most accurate (2015). This is due to the size
of territory and population which Daesh has had to take, possess and protect
(Gartenstein-Ross 2015). Assuming the figure of 100 000 soldiers is correct, the
average salary of $400 per soldier can be used to create an estimate of the amount
Daesh pays monthly for its soldiers. This figure is $40 million per month,
approximately half of Daesh’s monthly revenue according to an IHS report from
December 2015 (IHS 2015).
In regard to state-building this constitutes a considerable spend on war-
making and security. Considering the fact that resource extraction through either
taxation or oil revenue is thought to be upwards of 80% of Daesh’s revenue, it
therefore must be assumed that resource extraction has been used in order to fund

39
these activities. This therefore suggests a link between resource extraction and the
provision of public goods, something which we see in both strong states and state-
building. However, more recently both the salaries of Daesh members and the
number of recruits joining Daesh have been significantly affected by airstrikes and
assaults against the group. According to Aymenn Jawed Al Tamimi, a Daesh blogger
and fellow at The Middle East Forum, a document signed by Daesh’s treasury
minister shows that fighters’ salaries have been cut by 50% (2016). This document
was supposedly written at the end of 2015, and the information from Al Tamimi
has been widely used in the media. Other reports suggest even basic benefits that
fighters received are no longer forthcoming; this is having a knock-on effect on
Daesh’s recruitment drive and troop morale (Hinnant, Karam and George 2016).
Whilst this does not necessarily bring into doubt whether Daesh’s financial system
indicates notions of state-building, it does question the group’s ability to augment
resource extraction in the face of increased conflict or difficulties. This is
something strong states are able to do as they are more adaptive than weak states
and have a social contract between state and society (Hehir and Robinson 2007: 4).
Taken together, it is evident that Daesh performs all four of Tilly’s state-
building activities. Daesh has exterminated its rivals to take territories, made war
in order to deter attacks, protected its citizens against internal and external threats
and used taxation and oil revenue to fund these activities. Not only that, but Daesh
has been able to recruit large numbers of local and foreign fighters to its cause,
indicating the ability to extract labour forces from its society too. In state-building
theory, the provision of security is the most fundamental functions that a state
performs. Therefore, the willingness of Daesh to spend vast amounts of resources
on this is arguably a sign of state-building. In addition, the group has created

40
organisation and a hierarchical structure which is more indicative of a state-style
military than a militia (Mecham 2015: 22). Since institution building is often
associated with state-building this provides further indication that Daesh is acting
in the way of a state-builder. However, control of a state’s borders is not evidence
of a strong state but merely a sign that it is not a failed state. Nonetheless, it seems
evident that Daesh has provided security for the Sunni population that live in its
territory, even if its future ability to do so may be in question. What is more
problematic is the clear attempts by Daesh to target minority groups in its
territory for detention and executions. As Middle East expert Quinn Mecham
explains, Daesh create strong domestic security for the group and its Sunni
population by creating intense insecurity for those it perceives as hostile (ibid).
Whilst this is troubling, providing security for these groups has never been the
objective for Daesh and therefore from the group’s perspective would not affect its
claim to be state-building.
5.2. Law and Order in the Islamic State
Rule of law is considered to be one of the fundamental public goods a state
must provide once a satisfactory level of security has been achieved (Rotberg
2004: 3-4). Typically, a state achieves this by creating a police force to maintain
public order and prevent crime, and a judiciary system to uphold the laws of the
state. Daesh is reported to have done both of these things. In addition, it has also
created a religious police, known as Al-Hisbah. Al-Hisbah’s mandate is to ensure
that all citizens of Daesh’s state follow Shari’a law and to document any alleged
violations; a similar form of religious police operates in Saudi Arabia (Caris and
Reynolds: 15-16). According to some reports “a female police force is deployed to

41
enforce rules for women and orders to keep hospitals, schools and other public
places strictly segregated by gender” (Sullivan 2015d). Daesh can be seen to have
invested a considerable amount of resources to this part of its policing. The ISW
report finds that during a period of one week, Al-Hisbah conducted 60 patrols in
Raqqa (Caris and Reynolds: 16). The same report states that 470 violations were
documented in its first month of operations in the city, all of which then had to be
compiled into reports and sent off to the district leadership, which occurs on a
weekly basis (ibid). Al-Hisbah are given patrol vehicles and are equipped with a
megaphone for broadcasting religious guidance. With Daesh reporting in 2014 that
it had ten Al-Hisbah headquarters in Aleppo province alone, there is a clear
indication of an attempt to enforce Shari’a and govern its state. An article in The
Guardian reported that it had interviewed people in Mosul, Raqqa and Deir Ez-
Zour, all of which had confirmed the presence of Al-Hisbah (Mahmood 2015). What
this suggests is that Al-Hisbah can be found across Daesh’s state and are therefore
a feature of the group’s governance. This requires a significant amount of
manpower and therefore cost to Daesh, reflecting the importance of Al-Hisbah to
Daesh’s state-building strategy. The maintaining of law and order, particularly
with regard to religion, is a key task for Daesh in creating its Islamic State. For this
reason it has proved willing to dedicate a considerable amount of its human
resources and financial power to this end. However, according to claims made by a
blog called Mosul Eye, this willingness to dedicate funds to Al-Hisbah has dwindled
in the face of falling revenues. In fact, the blog claims that Al-Hisbah has increased
the number of fines that it gives out in order to self fund its existence (Mosul Eye
2015). Whilst this claim is hard to verify, reports suggest that fines and penalties in
Daesh territory have increased which may give credence to this idea (IHS 2016b).

42
If the claim is true, it would indicate that as financial pressures start to show Daesh
is less willing to spend on public goods such as public order.
As briefly mentioned, Daesh also has a local police force. Whilst the local
police office performs patrols like Al-Hisbah, its mandate is much more similar to
that of a western police force: maintain internal security and carry out the state’s
legal rulings (Caris and Reynolds 2014: 19). Included in this work is the overseeing
of large detention centres, which number seven in Raqqa and Aleppo province
alone (ibid). These detention centres are thought to hold dissenting activists and
civilians (Amnesty International 2013: 1). Local police officers are also known to
perform public punishments in order to create fear and avoid dissent (Mecham
2015: 22). Like Al-Hisbah, Daesh’s local police officers are provided with branded
uniforms and patrol cars; in 2014 there were reportedly ten police stations in
Aleppo province, and more in the city of Raqqa itself (Caris and Reynolds 2014:
19). Although it is impossible to know the exact cost of policing to Daesh, having
two distinct police forces, each with its own personnel, attire, equipment and
vehicles suggests a significant expenditure of resources.
Daesh establishes Islamic courts as soon as it wins control of a territory; a
logical first step as it illustrates Daesh’s ability and intent to govern (Caris and
Reynolds 2014: 18). Like many states, Daesh does not simply have one courthouse
for all forms of offence, it has established separate courthouse offices for different
kinds of dispute. Examples of this can be found in the ISW report which states that
Daesh has separate offices for personal disputes and divorce in addition to a court
of grievances (ibid: 19). Each office is thought to have its own personnel which,
coupled with the number of courthouses and offices in them, means that Daesh

43
must have invested heavily in its legal system. This strategy seems to have had the
effect of winning support from local populations:
In interviews, some people said the Islamic State’s criminal justice
system was less corrupt than the Syrian government’s institutions
under President Bashar al-Assad. And in Iraq, some people have joined
the Islamic State because Sunnis often see the Sunni Islamic State as
preferable to the Shiite government in Baghdad (Sullivan 2015d).
The support for Daesh comes from the belief, promoted by the group, that
everyone is equal before the law. This is illustrated in a story told by an ex-
member of Daesh to an interviewer in Turkey that the caliph himself was once
taken to court for a car accident and ordered to pay a fine by a judge (Weiss
2015b). Whilst this is merely an anecdote, evidence that Daesh members are
accountable to the laws the group sets does exist. In January 2015, a high-ranking
Daesh member was beheaded for smoking, a crime in Daesh’s state (Smith 2015).
The fact that Daesh members can be held accountable for their actions seems to
provide strong evidence that Daesh is true to its statement that everyone is equal
before the law. This is because if it was not, surely Daesh members would be able
to do as they please without fear of repercussions. Further evidence that rule of
law exists is the standardisation of punishments which crimes receive. According
to a paper from The George Washington University, Daesh’s judiciary house in
Mosul has a list of violations with fixed penalties (Al Aqeedi 2016: 7). These
penalties have been formally set by the judiciary house in accordance with Shari’a
law. The paper further states that for more serious crimes, a judge’s verdict is
required, creating the possibility that the same crime may be punished in different

44
ways depending on the circumstance (ibid). This is typical of a legal system as the
circumstance of a crime and the person perpetrating it often influence sentencing.
As previously asserted, rule of law is one of the most fundamental public
goods that a state can provide. Daesh has evidently created and strengthened
institutions of law and order in its territories, suggesting it really is concerned with
the long-term running of its state. The standardisation of penalties in accordance
with Shari’a law also indicates how Daesh seeks to legitimate itself to its citizens
using the provision of a public good in accordance with religion. As previously
mentioned, legitimacy has a high significance in state-building since it is a
requirement in building the social contract between state and society. In the case
of Daesh, it seems plausible that the citizens of its state believe that the group is
using the money provided through taxation in order to maintain law and order.
Although hard to prove, it does seem that Daesh uses revenue from taxation and oil
in order to fund these activities. Therefore, whilst the brutality of Daesh’s
punishments cannot and should not be ignored, there is certainly an argument
from a financial perspective that Daesh’s actions suggest a state-building mission.
5.3. Education: Public Good or Indoctrination?
The final area of Daesh’s administrative offices that I shall explore is its
education sector. Like rule of law, education is one of the fundamental public goods
a state is expected to provide and therefore a key goal of state-building (Rotberg
2004: 3-4). Investment in institutions of education indicates a long term vision by
the state and is paramount to a state’s continued success and improvement. For
this reason, the provision of education to its citizens is arguably a good marker by
which to judge if Daesh’s financial system suggests notions of state-building.

45
Daesh’s state-building mission in a new territory often begins with religious
outreach and education (Caris and Reynolds 2014: 15). This is firstly achieved
through a form of religious outreach known as Da’wa. The ISW report on Daesh’s
governance states that these events feature recitations of the Quran and various
other events intended to ‘call’ people to Daesh’s form of Islam such as study
sessions (ibid). As early as 2013, Daesh were reported to be holding Da’wa forums
in Aleppo, al-Bab, al-Dana, Jarabulus, Azaz, as well as other cities (Zelin 2013).
These events would be inexpensive and therefore a logical place to begin for Daesh
when entering a new territory. However, Daesh has shown a level of resource
investment in this practice. According to a report by The Washington Institute,
“[t]he group has also put up billboards in various areas to reinforce its da’wa
message, bearing slogans such as ‘Yes to the rule of sharia in Manbij’” (Zelin 2013).
Da’wa headquarters are located in Raqqa and, as the group’s control expands,
offices are created elsewhere. (Caris and Reynolds 2014: 15). Further to this,
Daesh’s outreach programme includes Shari’a institutes, designed to educate
adults in its teachings (ibid). The fact that Da’wa offices appear across Daesh’s
territory indicates the important role religious education plays for Daesh in
winning support and creating legitimacy in its new territories. The fact that Daesh
creates Da’wa offices also shows that it is attempting to institutionalise its religious
educational outreach programme.
Whilst Da’wa is Daesh’s first step in educating its citizens it does not
constitute a concerted education programme. Like in other nations, children are
seen as the future and thus educating them at school and university is vital (Weiss
2015c). Daesh’s first curriculum was for children of primary school age and was
focused on religious education; for this reason, Daesh made courses of Shari’a

46
mandatory in its schools in Raqqa (Al Jablawi 2016). Photos released in 2013
showed a class of almost 50 young students being educated by Daesh, with
backpacks branded with the Daesh logo, Daesh headbands and “all clutching a
personal Quran” (Caris and Reynolds 2014: 17). Daesh’s second curriculum which
it released in 2014 is for students of middle school age. A report by The Atlantic
Council claims that this curriculum includes further religious studies but also some
of the typical scholarly courses such as mathematics, sciences and language studies
(Al Jablawi 2016). The report also states that in late 2014 Daesh reopened the
University of Mosul as well as others in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor (ibid). In theory,
what this means is that Daesh offers practically the full range of education a
normal state provides for its citizens across large proportions of its territory. This
would suggest a considerable expenditure to provide a fundamental public good
and therefore clear evidence that Daesh financially behaves similarly to a state-
builder.
Despite indications that Daesh has been unrolling its education programme
across its territory, it does not appear to have done so with much success.
According to one article “the Islamic State has failed to attract much popular
support for its education system, which appears to be largely separate and
unequal” (Sullivan 2015c). It continues, “[l]ocal youths stay out of school, while
foreign fighters send their children to institutions that indoctrinate them in Islamic
State ideology” (ibid). Another report states that despite calls by Daesh for parents
to send their children to schools many don’t through due to the fear of bombings
(Al Jablawi 2016). Whilst Daesh has worked hard to address this issue by
attempting to enrol more students into its religious education schools, a report by
Save the Children in 2015 found that school enrolment is Syria has reduced from

47
nearly 100% before the war to 50% (Sullivan 2015c). This is partly due to the fact
that whilst Daesh was creating its school curriculums, it closed the schools in the
territories it controlled. According to a report by UNICEF, this meant that
approximately 670 000 children in Syria alone were denied the right to an
education at that time (Al Akhbar 2015). Daesh also charges its students fees in
order to attend school. The cost is reportedly the equivalent of $12 for primary
school, $18 for secondary school and for university $50 per person (Niqash 2015).
Whilst this may not seem like much, for families in areas such as Mosul this puts
extra financial strain on them in already very difficult times (NBC 2014).
Further to these issues, reports from Mosul suggest that whilst Daesh had
created a new syllabus it initially sent this to schools in the form of a CD (The Daily
Beast 2015). The schools were then asked to distribute the CDs to the students
who would then have to print the material at their own cost. This does not seem to
indicate a large resource expenditure on Daesh’seducation programme. The
salaries for teachers too are an area which seems to suggest that Daesh has not
spent a considerable sum. Reports by The Atlantic Council suggest that the average
salary for a teacher is between 50 and 60 silver dirhams per month; this is
equivocal to between $75 and $90 (Al Jablawi 2016). The article also states that in
Raqqa a teacher's salary is only enough for a family’s bread supply for a month
(ibid).
Daesh has clearly attempted to create a concerted education programme; it
has reopened schools and universities, created its own curriculums and actively
attempts to educate both adults and children through its Da’wa offices. Based on
just this information alone, it would be hard to argue against the fact that Daesh
has invested in strengthening and creating institutions involved in the delivery of a

48
public good. However, when looking at the details of Daesh’s education system
there are some obvious flaws and concerns. Firstly, Daesh has failed to convince a
large number of parents in its territory to send their children to its schools. This
seems evident given the claims that Daesh is having to use threats of violence and
enticement in order to persuade children to attend school (Al Jablawi 2016). There
may be several reasons why this is the case but essentially it implies that families
do not believe it is worth sending their children to Daesh’s educational facilities.
Secondly, there does not appear to be considerable evidence that Daesh has
invested a significant sum of its resources into providing education. Teachers
receive a low salary, schools are expected to print their own materials and
students must pay to attend school. Most damning to claims that Daesh is
providing a public good through its reopening of schools and Da’wa offices are
suggestions that Daesh is less concerned with education than indoctrination. The
focus on religious, and particularly Wahhabist, teachings in Daesh’s syllabus is
evidence of this. This is only compounded by reports that Daesh encourages
recreational activities which involve children fighting and preparing to participate
in Jihad (Al Jablawi 2016). This seems to indicate that Daesh is training the next
generation of its ranks, an idea which is supported by a report by a Human Rights
Watch report. In the report, it claims that children as young as 10 are recruited by
Daesh to perform roles such as whipping prisoners and serving in brigades and
battalions (Motaparthy 2014). According to one of the children in the report,
Daesh recruited him during additional lessons on Islam and Jihad (ibid). This
clearly indicates that Daesh’s educational programme provides a means for
indoctrination. In regard to state-building this suggests that Daesh is more

49
concerned with keeping power by training the next generation of fighters than it is
with providing genuine public goods such as real education.

50
6. Conclusion
The aim of this dissertation was to answer the question of whether Daesh’s
financial system suggests notions of state-building. To this end, finding evidence
that Daesh has generated revenue through oil and taxation and used it to provide
public goods was key. Any evidence that Daesh has behaved similarly a strong
state rather than a weak state was also important since the end goal of state-
building is to create a strong state. I believe Daesh’s financial system does suggest
notions of state-building, however there are clearly some contradictions to this
idea as well.
One of Daesh’s main means of acquiring wealth is through a complex taxation
system in which tax collection occurs in a routinised manner. Whilst there appear
to be some inconsistencies in the rates of tax paid by citizens, there could be
various explanations for this and this does not necessarily mean that tax rates are
not regulated. Based on this information Daesh appears to be acting similarly to
strong states, which are characterised by regulated and taxation. It is also evident
that as the campaign against Daesh has begun to severely affect the group’s
finances, it has been able to increase the amounts of tax charged. As discussed in
predation theory, this could suggest that as society’s need for protection increases,
people are willing to give more to fund it. It could also mean that Daesh can be
adaptive to its society’s needs, much as a strong state is able to be. One major point
against the idea that Daesh behaves like a state-builder financially is that the group
uses coercion and violence to enforce its taxation system. Death threats and
execution are used to coerce citizens into paying tax and prove a useful tool for
Daesh in collecting Zakat; this is not how a strong state would behave. With this in
mind it could be argued that Daesh is failing to act as a state-builder in this regard.

51
Daesh also gains wealth through oil revenue. This has been used to garner
support and create favourable conditions for Daesh’s state with its rivals as seen in
the example with the Assad regime. It also uses oil as a means of creating
dependency from society on the group. This strengthens Daesh’s position in the
area but also suggests that the group relies on popular support, indicating a form
of social contract between state and society. However, Daesh’s oil wealth could
also mean that the group is detached from its society’s needs since it doesn’t
necessarily rely on taxation to fund its activities. Whilst this may be true, it appears
that Daesh’s state-building activities have been directly affected by the American
led campaign against it, suggesting a link between state-building and oil revenue.
The fact that salaries for fighters and Daesh members have been severely
reduced following military action by Western forces indicates that oil revenue and
taxation are clearly linked to state-building in Daesh. Indeed, by funding fighters,
Daesh is able to participate in war-making and protection of its citizens, one of the
most fundamental public goods a state can provide, this is a good indication of an
attempt by Daesh to perform state activities. The falling numbers of recruits that
are signing of to join Daesh’s ranks seem to contradict the fact that Daesh is able to
extract more resources during times of threat. As the strain from the campaign
against the group seems to be showing, Daesh seems less able to extract personnel
from its society. Furthermore, despite increased taxation Daesh appear unable to
provide adequately for those have already joined through taxation and oil revenue.
Similar issues can be seen when looking at Daesh’s provision of another
public good, rule of law. It seems apparent that Daesh has spent a considerable
sum on its police forces. As the enforcers of law in Daesh’s state they play a vital
role in the group’s state-building mission. Daesh has courts which can pass

52
sentence on suspected criminals which, while Draconic, do appear to have a
standardised system of punishment for many crimes. However, the funding for
Daesh’s religious police has been significantly cut and may no longer feature in
Daesh’s budget. Whilst I have found no evidence that funding for its local police
forces and courts have been reduced, it seems likely given the increasing use of
fines rather than physical punishment by Daesh (IHS 2016b).
Taken together, this indicates that Daesh has been using revenue generated
through taxation and oil in order to fund its state-building activities. There are
clearly visible knock-on effects of the military campaign against Daesh which has
targeted its oil revenue and considerably reduced Daesh’s population size. This has
meant that the group has less to tax and therefore has had to increase taxes and
give more fines to those who have remained. This link between oil and tax revenue
and the provision of public goods is a significant sign that Daesh’s financial system
suggests notions of state-building. Revenue generated through these means has
been used to fund the provision of public goods and build judiciary and military
institutions.
The building of educational institutions in Daesh’s state is slightly more
problematic from a state-building perspective. Daesh has clearly tried to
institutionalise education in its state, however it would be very difficult to argue
that it has strengthened or rebuilt these institutions. Its schools appear not to have
popular support from its citizens who in large numbers are choosing not to send
their children to Daesh schools despite the group’s threats. This may be because
Daesh’s education system is a means of indoctrinating the next generation of Daesh
fighters rather than in providing a genuine public good. In addition, there appears
to be very little, if any, evidence that Daesh has significantly invested in the

53
provision of this particular public good. Whilst this brings Daesh’s efforts to
provide a real education for its citizens into question, it does not mean that there
has not been an attempt to institutionalise religious education in Daesh’s state.
With all of this in mind, I think it can certainly be argued that Daesh’s
financial system suggests at least notions of state-building. What, then, does that
mean for the definition of a state-builder and the debate between externally-led
state-building versus state-building from within? Daesh, as a group with strong
origins in the Middle East, has built a significant degree of legitimacy for its state-
building mission. In part, this is because of the weak and predatory nature of the
recent governments in Iraq and Syria; Daesh didn’t have to do much in the way of
providing public goods to legitimise itself because the people in these areas were
used to chaos (Caris and Reynolds 2014: 5). Nonetheless, Daesh has used revenue
extraction to fund the provision of public goods such as security, rule of law and to
a lesser extent, education, in order to create a social contract between Daesh and
its citizens. This would arguably not have been possible if Daesh were providing
for its society using money which was being given to the group by a third party as
we see in externally-led state-building. In addition, Daesh has also used its
scriptural rigor to unite Sunni Muslims under its banner. Daesh has done this by
creating Shari’a courts, preaching its own form of Islam and acting in accordance
with the ancient religious texts of Islam. This is a technique which has been used
by states but also by non-state actors in order to gain popular support and
legitimacy for their state-building (McCullough 2015: 15). An example of this can
be found in Somalia where Al Shabaab which has used Islam as a means of uniting
people of different clans to its cause (ibid: 18). Whilst the group has been guilty of
atrocities against minorities in its state, it has also been successful in bringing

54
many people to its cause and winning local support. This shows how significant
legitimacy is in state-building; Daesh has achieved legitimacy in the eyes of many
of Sunni citizens and this has led to continued support for its state-building
mission despite its many failings. That Daesh has struggled to provide public goods
after the American led campaign against the group shows something more obvious
but no less significant; financial power is essential in state-building. For Daesh,
wealth has allowed it to build institutions, prove public goods and create a degree
of legitimacy for its state. As the group’s wealth appears to be dwindling, it seems
far less able to do achieve these goals. This seems to suggest that without financial
power, it is impossible to become a strong state.

55
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