mid term essay

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StudentI.D:200778264
Bernard Haykel described ISIS as ‘untamed Wahhabism’. Do you agree
with his assessment? Why (not)?
PIED – 3403: Politics of Islamism
Tutor: Dr Lars Berger
Student I.D: 200778264
Word Count: 3,125

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Introduction:
This paper argues that Haykel’s application of the label ‘untamed Wahhabism’ to the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a reasonable and accurate depiction
concerning ISIS’s religious outlook and aspirations. Doctrinal similarities between
early Wahhabi thought and ISIS show ISIS to be a more aggressive and
uncompromising form of Wahhabism. I argue within this that Wahhabism is
predominantly derived from Ibn Taymiyyah’s ideas on Islamism. However,
Wahhabism is the political vessel that has exported the key tenets of Salafism,
Hanbalism and Tawhid despite being largely derived from Taymiyyah. Additionally
there is a difference between the political composition of the ‘caliphate’ and the initial
and contemporary Saudi Arabian (SA) state which highlights the aim of ISIS to avoid
any emulation of a Western government. However it is the high level of homogeneity
in religious interpretation as seen in ISIS’s execution of these desired religious-
political aims that make ISIS an ‘untamed’ form of Wahhabism. In order to explain
this it would be necessary to define Wahhabism in its political and religious functions
historically.
Firstly, I will define Wahhabism and compare the doctrinal affiliation with ISIS and
how Ibn Taymiyyah relates to both. Secondly, after outlining how ISIS has
appropriated Wahhabism I will show how Saudi Arabia’s governmental conduct of
Wahhabism and the institutional entrenchment of Wahhabism is not as acute as
ISIS. Then, the ikhwan will be a focus considering they represent the earliest and
most violent manifestation of a modern Wahhabist military unit, thus potentially
harbouring a major influence of ISIS. The last section introduces the pragmatic
analysis of the growth of Wahhabism through the transnationalization of Wahhabi
activism and how it effectively transformed international Islamist groups into new
‘hybrids’ of Wahhabi ideology.
What is Wahhabism and how does it compare with ISIS ideology?
Wahhabism has distinct features that make the ideology stand out from other
Islamist ideologies of the 20th century thinkers such as Qutb, Mawdudi and al-Banna.
Wahhabism and these key Islamists of the 20th Century are often referenced as the
primary source of modern Islamist thinking. However the apparent behaviour and
aims of ISIS resonate with the early tendencies of Wahhabi thought and practice, for

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the most part the latter borrows its ideas from Sheikh Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–
1328).
There is a requirement to choose a definition of Wahhabism for convenience as
ambiguity of what it is may confuse the aim of this essay. Concerning the theological
and jurisprudence theory of Wahhabism, Mandeville (2014) forms a triangular
understanding of Wahhabism, entailing; Salafism, Tawhid and Hanbalism. Salafism
being understood as the importance of following Islam under the command of the
original righteous descendants of the Prophet Muhammad; Tawhid regarded as
being one with God through the application of monotheist rule instigating the
sovereignty of God and maintaining the uncompromising unitary worship of God; and
Hanbalism which is the legal methodology corresponding to Sunni law, largely tied to
Taymiyyah’s ideas (Ibid). These are primarily the key notions of Wahhabism as
expressed by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), the founder of
Wahhabism.
Salafism in Wahhabism has been credited for enshrining the will to prevent bida
(innovation), including false worship of graves, false idols or superstitious practices
(Dakhil, 2009). ISIS has undoubtedly adopted such a tendency especially in the
large-scale policy of demolishing Mesopotamian art, culture and anything that fails to
conform to unitary worship (Crooke, 2015). ISIS is literally aspiring to erase history to
ensure there cannot be any perceived misguided manifestations of unislamic traits in
the ‘caliphate’. Dakhil (2009) argues this facet of Wahhabism to be largely tied to the
will to combat culture in Islam and apply Tawhid in the fullest way possible.
Wahhabi doctrine is heavily influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah - Wahhabism refines
Taymiyyah’s idea of takfir and the importance of obedience to the ruler in return for
the protection of Islamic principles (Commins, 2009). Despite this observation,
Commins argues that Taymiyyah’s writings and Wahhabism are not synonymous
(ibid). However, Taymiyyah in his doctrinal affiliation with the ideas of Al-Wahhab in
Wahhabism’s early emergence do not differ significantly in discourse usage or
central concepts from Taymiyyah’s writings. Challenging Commins here, Bahari &
Ahmad (2012) argues how Al-Wahhab had simply made Ibn Taymiyyah’s arguments
on Islam’s interpretations ‘operational’. The prime facets of Wahhabism are nothing
entirely unique to Islamist discourse but it was Al-Wahhab’s political

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operationalization of the concepts through state formation is what attributes
Wahhabism with its originality in approach (Dakhil, 2009).
The notion of othering through discourse usage of shirk, meaning polytheistic takfir
Muslims (Aaron, 2008), as abandoners of Quranic principles, claiming they did not
follow literal interpretation of Islam were Takfir or infidels whilst the pious are
venerated as ahl al-tawhid or followers of wahhabism (Mandaville, 2014). ISIS have
used notion of Tawhid, central to Wahhabism, making it ‘operational’ through the
political circumstances of Iraq and Syria, entrenching monotheism as a system of
government, law and morality for unification of the ummah. The similarity of this
operational usage of tawhid by Wahhabists in the early period of the Saudi state
formation is found in the ikhwan, this explored in the next section.
The primacy of the notion of Takfir in explaining ISIS’s political violence against
Non-Sunni groups and infidels who stray from the righteous path of Tawhid is
especially significant in relation in their implicit rebellion against Saudi Arabia as a
state. ISIS accuse Saudi Arabia as Takfir in an ironic manner considering the
concept stems from Wahhabi thought from which was founded by the forefather of
Wahhabist ideas, Ibn Taymiyyah. Takfir is strongly emphasized in Mohammad bin
Abdel Wahhab’s fatwas and messages (Al-Ibrahim, 2012) and the usage of Takfir
within ISIS is amplified and far more exclusionary towards Shiism, which has been
argued to be the legacy of Al-Zarqawi of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Bunzel, 2014). The
discourse usage of Takfir by ISIS mirrors Wahhabism, again, in ISIS’s aim to
galvanise the ummah into sectarian warfare to ensure the separate of the pious and
true followers from the unfaithful. Allen comments how this trait of wariness of Shiites
in Wahhabism is not underestimation but is the most “remarkable characteristic” of
the Najdi Wahhabi tribes of the early 20th Century (Allen, 2006, p.244),
Since identifying the central beliefs and aspirations of Wahhabism as an ideology
it is fair to claim the link between the thinking of Taymiyyah and Al-Wahhab’s
doctrine of Islamism. In light of this, Taymiyyah’s narrative can reasonably be used
synonymously along with Wahhabism to describe the inherent fundamentalism of
ISIS that resonates with traditional salafist notions of justice and nobility. However
Wahhabism as a political ideology that has been constantly expanding since Saudi

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Arabia’s rise as a regional power has been the vehicle that has exacerbated
Wahhabi beliefs in cases like ISIS.
Political Wahhabism – a comparison
Saudi Arabian society is largely perceived as condoning Wahhabism through the
state’s broadening of religious influence throughout institutions and wider society,
thus entrenching religion holistically throughout society. Saudi has rather been
ambivalent in its political administration of Wahhabism in education and court
proceedings. It would hereby be accurate the equate ISIS’s political administration to
Saudi Arabia in calling it ‘untamed wahhabism’, as Wahhabism’s original aims are
more closely related to the governmental structure of ISIS than Saudi’s government.
Division between statutory and religious courts in early Saudi Arabia in the 1930s
that constitutes some leverage for civil body decision-making that is not directly
articulated by Islamic law (Commins, 2009). Parallel court systems in early Saudi
Arabian society in the 20th Century when the nation-state was first established
suggests an initial desire to partially maintain some aspects of Western judicial
customs. However legal institutions established outside of ulama’s jurisdiction in
1926 but were later abolished in 1955 and were incorporated into the ulama’s
authority (Commins, 2009). The significance of this change is that Wahhabism, being
noted to be the ideological dedication to ensuring the rule of law is dependent on the
sharia, was initially compromised. This is quite contrary to ISIS’s holistic application
of the Tawhid shows the opposite, complete certainty with no compromise of
monotheistic Islamic aspirations.
Contrary to the argument that Saudi and ISIS maintain different judicial
arrangements, Crooke (2015) argues that the unitary authority of a caliph under ISIS
is directly an influence of Wahhabi political arrangements. He also claims that the
Monarchical rule of Saudi Arabia directly resembles the formation of the ISIS state.
This does not accurately depict ISIS, ISIS have advanced the notion of a unitary
ruler which resembles the original caliphate more so. Tribe lineages during and since
the 7th Century Caliphate have been a proclamation of legitimacy has been a
common feature of salafist groups of the early Saudi era and now the ISIS era. ISIS
has a tendency to follow Salafism as a method of arranging political roles - arguably
the most crucial example of this the perceived Salafist credentials of Abu Bakr Al-

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Baghdadi (the leader of ISIS) who claimed to be a descendent of the prophet, hailing
from the Prophetic tribe Quraysh (Bunzel, 2014). Saudi Arabia’s division of power
through power-sharing of a temporal authority, the royal family, and a spiritual
authority, the ulama – they maintain a relationship that ensures political protection
and the upholding of the sharia (Mandeville, 2014). Therefore ISIS’s governmental
organisation shares greater resemblance to the original Caliphate which Wahhabi
tribe like the ikhwan hoped to establish.
The ulama conduct much of the religious authority whilst the monarchy protects
their Islamic interests through state protection. This is hardly the structure of ISIS
when considering the lack of constitution and central command of power that is Abu
Bakr Al-Baghdadi who simply co-ordinates Quranic principles to discipline and
organise society. The function of the caliph is highly differentiated as a role than the
Saudi monarchy, the sharia being a central demand of Wahhabi legal methodology
that administers law based on Quranic interpretation is explicitly applied by ISIS as
an all-encompassing legal system that is not intervened by the ‘state’.
Despite differences concerning political composition of the state between ISIS and
Saudi the doctrine of Wahhabism is highly visible in many aspects of both ‘societies’.
Religious law and discipline and similar in regards to literal interpretation of the
Quranic principles, implicated with “on-the-spot” punishment by the Mutawaa
(religious Police), a semi-autonomous institution in SA are often likened to ISIS’s
sharia court proceedings in their strict and puritanical nature (Bunzel, 2014).
The main political difference between ISIS and SA’s arrangement of government
despite having such similar principles reflecting Wahhabist beliefs is their pillars of
power and their arrangement. The explicit assertion of Wahhabi credentials by Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi and the caliphate shows a ‘purer’ dedication to Wahhabi ideology
and a lack of compromise when compared to the ‘tamed’ Saudi establishment. The
next section explores the nature of Ikhwan as an early and more volatile form of a
Wahhabi military unit that resembles ISIS not only in political violence but in their
aspirations as Wahhabist jihadis.
The Ikhwan legacy

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The factions of al-Wahhab’s military combatants who were derived from tribal units,
known as the ikhwan, who fought in an alliance with the Saud family during the
Saudi state project, using coercion to advance allegiance towards the state that was
subsequently legitimized by this violence (Mandeville, 2014). Eventually the Ikhwan
rebellion occurred due to the King Aziz’s compromise of a potential caliphate
resulting in a tacit social contract between the Royal Family, the hard-line Wahhabi
ikhwan and wider society to ensure the maintenance of the state in order to protect
religious interests (Mandeville, 2014).
Not only likened to ISIS but Mandeville (2014) suggests the formation of the Saudi
state can be likened to the Prophet Mohammed’s expansion of a Caliphate, which in
itself directly influenced the political aspiration of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Abdul Aziz
ibn Saud similarly drew on violent methods of expansion for political gain in similar
circumstances but with different motivations to ISIS. The relation between early
Wahhabist political aspirations of the ikhwan tribes, ISIS’s nascent state formation
and the original caliphate of the Prophet Muhammad is a link identifying the far-
reaching ramifications of a re-emerging salafist movement that has roots in
Wahhabism.
Al-Ibrahim (2015) claims that the reason the ikhwan or the Royal family could not
establish the Caliphate they implicitly desired by the doctrine of Wahhabism was due
to historical impediments, such as the influence of imperial powers. The recent
power vacuum in Syria and Iraq coupled with the process of the growing
Wahhabisation of Sunni Islam globally (which will be detailed later on) has
engineered a prime environment for the rise of a new Wahhabi caliphate. The
inherent character of the caliphate is to attempt to recreate the glory of the 7th
Century Islamic Caliphate that experienced prosperity and glory (Bunzel, 2014).
Despite similarities in the nature of state formation and methods, ISIS is in perpetual
rebellion against the ‘takfir’ political establishment of Saudi Arabia due to their affairs
with the U.S.A and implicit tolerance to aspects of Westernization in the Dar al-Islam.
Supporting the view of ISIS sharing characteristics with the ikhwan is Crooke and
what he calls “revived ikhwans”. The seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979 by
Juhayman from the Otaybi tribe, which derived from the original elements of a 1920s
ikhwan group, are described as Wahhabists with the same violence tendencies of

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the Ikhwan of the first Saudi state (Crooke, 2015). There is a danger of equating ISIS
to the ikhwan as replications of ikhwan political roles, however, the similarity
between the two lies in their usage of political violence and aspiration of an Islamic
state that transcended geographical borders. As discussed earlier, the influence of
Taymiyyah upon ISIS remerges again as his call for all Muslims to take up the noble
cause, the duty of jihad, in an offensive War distinguishes ISIS ideology (Aaron,
2008). As the next section will detail, the link between the nobility of jihad originating
from Taymiyyah has re-merged on a transnational scale due to the intra-state and
extra-state nurturing of Wahhabism as a political move for soft power by Saudi
Arabia.
Wahhabism from Al-Qaeda to ISIS
The political and economic development within Saudi Arabia has resulted in a re-
invigoration of Wahhabi ideology and the demand for an intensification of religious
rule and conduct in Saudi Arabia since the Sahwa movement. The legacy of Al-
Qaeda in these developments is argued here as directly funding and supporting
Wahhabi offshoot groups in Iraq and Syria that eventually, due to particular
circumstances, Wahhabism was to be enshrined with such ‘purity’ Al-Qaeda
themselves refuted the groups.
An organisation called Group of Unity and Jihad led by al-Zarqawi focused on
extreme sectarian violence against Shiites eventually alienates AQ from AQI
(Bunzel, 2015). As well as other Sunni group members ISIS originated from the
prevalence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Qaeda has distanced itself from ISIS and
declared war on them, although there is conflict, the influences and sources of Al-
Qaeda and ISIS have similar origins. Transnationalised activism arose when the
sahwa movement of the 1990s grew outside of Saudi Arabia and Al-Qaeda became
closely affiliated with the movement itself (Meijer, 2008). The West’s alliance with SA
has dispersed Wahhabist soft power on a global scale through what has been
dubbed the “Wahhabisation of Sunni Islam” (Cockburn, 2015, p.108). A European
Union report had also confirmed SA’s donations to developing states as a result of
wealth generated by Western trade and oil deals leading to Saudi actors materially
empowering Wahhabi activists (EU Policy Department). Transnational sponsoring of
Wahhabism has in effect provoked hybrid ideologies, combining facets of

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Wahhabism with other Islamist thinkers through interconnecting and aiding global
allies of Wahhabi offshoot groups (Mandeville, 2015). Bahari & Ahmad (2012)
supports these claims and additionally asserts how Wahhabi groups have been
undergoing transformation due to political circumstances and events, such as
Western occupation, have induced a more conservative brand of Wahhabism.
Yusuf al-Uyairi is a prominent example of the transnationalization of Wahhabism
through the Sahwa movement, appeared to resemble an early form of what could be
called the untamed Wahhabism in the terms of the aspiration to intensify the
Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi and abroad. Uyairi was part of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and later became vocal about the duty of Muslims to wage Jihad and how
the successes of jihad can be measured by damage to the enemy, and he described
the Iraq War as a “great opportunity” in relation to the justification to carry out jihad
(Meijer, 2008). Al-Qaeda’s affiliation with violent methods to attack the Takfir and
infidels could be seen as deriving from hybrid ideologies but are rooted in the
historical development of Wahhabism and the exacerbation of its ideas through
circumstances.
So how has exactly Wahhabism mutated from AQ into ISIS? Al-Zarqawi’s role in
ISIS’s pre-caliphate emergence as a prominent jihadi-salafist organisation spawned
from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Celso, 2015). The ideological shift into a group whose
viewpoint intensified in the exclusion and intolerance of Shiism is largely the legacy
of former head of AQI, al-Zarqawi (Bunzel, 2014). Al-Zarqawi also relied heavily on
medieval fatwas to shun Shiite Muslims as Takfiri polytheists. Many of citations used
by AQ prior to ISIS directly quoted Ibn Taymiyyah highlighting the reliance on
traditional interpretations of Islam (Celso, 2015). Popular media outlets have
consistently attempted to create an ahistorical explanation of ISIS by suggesting they
are simply motivated by their on religious interpretation and not been proselytised by
any former ideology in history (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). The evidence between the
Wahhabist influence of Al-Qaeda and the intensification of intolerance due to
processes of Wahhabisation reaffirm the origins of ISIS being an intensified form of
Wahhabi thought.
Conclusion:

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This paper asserts Wahhabism to be mostly an operationalized version of Ibn
Taymiyyah’s doctrine, ISIS in this respect have intensified this doctrine as a result of
Saudi Arabia’s regional Wahhabisation of Sunni Islam. Wahhabism’s key premises
are deeply shared with that of ISIS but some aspects, such as Salafism are far more
explicit than Saudi Arabia’s form of Wahhabism. The Ikhwan of early Saudi society
largely represent the violent manifestation of Wahhabism and the aggressive
assertion of Tawhid and the attacks on the Takfir. ISIS shares commonalities with
the ikhwan in their aspirations of a Caliphate and religious doctrine. Unlike the Saudi
establishment, ISIS share little in common with their affiliations with the West and the
relatively lax nature of some laws and customs. Toleration of Shiism is particularly
elevated by ISIS than by Saudi Arabia.
Export of Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia through jihadi networks and state-
sponsored investment, directly and indirectly, has culminated a multitude of Wahhabi
offshoot groups, some of which have amplified aspects of the doctrine. Al-Qaeda’s
legacy is largely evidence of these transformations and emergence of a Wahhabism
in Iraq and Syria that appears ‘untamed’.

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Al-Ibrahim, B. 2015. ISIS, Wahhabism and Takfir. Contemporary Arab Affairs.
Volume No. 8(3). Pp. 408-415.
Allen, C. 2006.God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the hidden roots of modern
jihad. London: Abacus.
Aaron, D. 2008. Chapter 3: Seeds of jihad. In their own words: Voices of Jihad.
Santa Monica, CA; RAND Corporation. Pp. 45-51
Bahari, B. & Ahmad, M.B.S. 2012, Neo-Wahhabism: Ideological basis of Islamic
Military Groups, GSTF Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS), vol. 1, no. 1, pp.
20-23.
Bunzel, C. 2014. Understanding the Islamic State (of Iraq and al-sham). NOREF:
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Crooke, A. 2015. You Can't Understand ISIS If You Don't Know the History of
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Dakhil, Khalid (2009), Wahhabism as an Ideology of State Formation, in Mohammed
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Mandaville, P. 2014. Chapter 5: Islam as the system: Islamic State and “Islamisation”
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Meijer, R. 2008. Chapter: Yusuf al-uyrairi and the transnationalization of Saudi
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religious and media frontiers, London: Hurst

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