F 35 brief

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This is a brief about F-35 strike aircraft. Lockheed Martin had stated many things about it, but not many are correct. For details, see inside.

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F 35 brief

  1. 1. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
  2. 2. Requirements jungle● air superiority ● CTOL● fleet defense ● STOL● tactical bombing ● CATOBAR● ground attack / strike● CAS ● replaces F-16, AV-8, F-● reconnaissance 18, A-10, F-117, F-111, A-6, Tornado● air control ● closest foreign● intelligence gathering counterpart Dassault Rafale
  3. 3. Conflicting requirements● air superiority ● low-level strike – low wing loading – high wing loading – high thrust to weight ● tactical bombing ratio – high payload – small size ● stealth – ability to achieve quick kills – internal missile carriage – gun doors
  4. 4. Programme mismanagement● LRIP● no competetive prototyping● 30% parts commonality between different versions● cost increases – 197 million USD F-35A, 237,7 million USD F-35B, 236,8 million USD F-35B >> flyaway costs
  5. 5. Is it really the best multirole aircraft?● Establish important requirements● Compare it with most similar US and foreign aircraft – F-16 – Saab Gripen – Dassault Rafale – Eurofighter Typhoon
  6. 6. F-35 air combat philosophy● maneuverability is irrelevant = depends on radar missile BVR shots to shoot down opponent – AIM-7 ● promised Pk: 0,7 ● actual Pk: 0,08 – AIM-120 ● combat Pk: 0,46 ● ten recorded kills; 4 kills from WVR ● targets: – no sensors – no ECM – not maneuvering ● US had numerical superiority
  7. 7. BVR vs WVR● Vietnam Pk (vs maneuvering targets): – gun: 28% – IR missile: 15% – BVR missile: 8%● Deset Storm PK (vs non-maneuvering targets): – gun: 100% (A-10 vs helicopters) – IR missile: 67% – BVR missile: 34%
  8. 8. BVR vs WVR● Pk ratios have stayed the same: radar missile lethality 1/2 of IR missile lethality; IR missile lethality 1/2 of gun lethality● Even LPI radars vulnerable to detection and countermeasures● Result: WVR combat between capable opponents as important as ever
  9. 9. BVR vs WVR● BVR requirements add: – size – weight – cost – maintenance downtime● result: – smaller numbers – more vulnerable – less time for pilot training
  10. 10. LPI - frequency hopping
  11. 11. Combat requirements● first look● first shot● first kill● avoid getting bounced● outmaneuver opponent to fire● high cruise speed● outnumber enemy in the air
  12. 12. First look● F-117 VLO● 1 shot down, 1 irrepareably damaged from 1 300 sorties in Kosovo war● flew only at night● F-16 "legacy" aircraft● 1 shot down from 4 500 sorties in Kosovo war● flew both at day and at night● IRST can detect stealth aircraft completely passively, and at long range; radar gives away position
  13. 13. First look● F-35 assumptions: – LPI radar cannot be detected – F-35s IRST better than opponents – F-35s IR signature lower than opponents● Reality: – Russians and Europeans have advantage in IRST technology – F-35s visual and IR signature larger than that of F- 16, Gripen, Rafale and Typhoon – LPI radar can be detected and jammed by modern EW suites
  14. 14. First look
  15. 15. First shot● stealth requires internal weapons carriage – gun bay doors cause 0,5 seconds to time between pressing the button and first bullet leaving the gun – F-35s gun has 0,4 s spin-up time; F-16s 0,5 s, revolver guns 0,05 s ● result: F-35s gun needs almost full second to reach full rate of fire after pilot has pressed the trigger – IR missile has to be lowered by mechanism before being fired: at least 1 second delay
  16. 16. First shot● radar-guided missiles require 10 - 15 s acquisition for cooperative target● radar warns enemy and allows it to track and ID radar-using fighter● radar still has to penetrate any possible jamming● enemy can cue in BVR IR missile or use anti- radiation missile● unlike F-22, F-35 can use IRST: renders opponents radar LO measures meaningless
  17. 17. F-35: bounce● rearward visibility: angle obscured
  18. 18. Maneuverability● Operational/ultimate g limits: – F-35A: 9 g / 13,5 g – F-35B: 7 g / 10,5 g – F-35C: 7,5 g / 11,3 g● G limits for 4,5th generation aircraft: 9 g operational, 13,5 g ultimate – Rafale 9 g / 16,7 g, Gripen 9 g / 13,5 g, F-16 9 g / 13,5 g, Typhoon 9 g / 12,6 g● Instanteneous g limits for 3rd generation aircraft: 7- 8 g operational, 10,5-12 g ultimate
  19. 19. Maneuverability● Sustained g limits: – F-35A: 4,95 g @ M 0,8 and 4 600 m – F-4E: 5,5 g @ M 0,8 and 3 100 m with 40% fuel● Wing loading @ 50% fuel, 4 AMRAAM and 2 Sidewinder: – F-35A: 428 kg/m2, F-35B: 434,2 kg/m2, F-35C: 338 kg/m2 – Rafale C: 276 kg/m2 – Gripen C: 287 kg/m2 – F-16 C: 392 kg/m2
  20. 20. Maneuverability● Thrust-to-weight ratio @ 50% fuel, 4 AMRAAM and 2 Sidewinder: – F-35A: 1,07 – F-35B: 1,05 – F-35C: 0,93 – Rafale C: 1,22 – Gripen C: 0,95 – F-16C: 1,186
  21. 21. Maneuverability● Combat weight: – 18 270 kg F-35A – 18 541 kg F-35B – 21 009 kg F-35C – 12 629 kg Rafale C – 8 605 kg Gripen C – 10 936 kg F-16C
  22. 22. Speed● internal carriage means that speed is same in combat and in clean configuration – M 1,6 maximum● maximum speed in combat configuration: – Rafale M 1,8, Typhoon M 1,8, Gripen M 1,8, F-16 M 1,6● maximum speed in clean configuration: – Rafale M 2, Typhoon M 2, Gripen M 2, F-16 M 1,8
  23. 23. Combat persistence● measured by fuel fraction – F-35A: 0,38 – F-35B: 0,29 – F-35C: 0,36 – Rafale C: 0,31 – Typhoon: 0,29 – Gripen C: 0,27 – F-16C: 0,26
  24. 24. Numbers● F-35A: 197 million USD flyaway cost● F-35B: 237,7 million USD flyaway cost● F-35C: 236,8 million USD flyaway cost● likely 36 hours of maintenance per hour in the air (80% of F-22s maintenance downtime)● force presence: aircraft for equal cost x sortie rate● Rafale C: 88,43 million USD flyaway cost, 8 hours of maint.● Typhoon T3: 130 million USD flyaway cost, 9 hours of maint.● Gripen C: 42,98 million USD flyaway cost, 19 hours of maint.● F-16 C: 68,8 million USD flyaway cost; 19 hours of maint.● all values in FY 2012 USD
  25. 25. Numbers● Aircraft for 1 billion USD: – F-35 A: 5 – F-35 B: 4 – F-35 C: 4 – F-16 C: 14 – Gripen C: 23 – Rafale C: 11 – Typhoon T3: 7
  26. 26. Numbers● 1 bln USD force sorties per week: – F-35A: 22 – F-35B: 18 – F-35C: 18 – F-16C: 117 – Gripen C: 351 – Rafale C: 205 – Typhoon T3: 117
  27. 27. Comparision: weapons effectivenessvs non-maneuvering targets gun IR missile radar missile vs maneuvering targets 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
  28. 28. Comparision: bounce
  29. 29. Comparision: gun firing delayGun F-35 F-16 Rafale/Gripen 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
  30. 30. Comparision: maneuverability Combat w eightThrust-to-w eight F-35 A F-35 B F-35 C Wing loading Rafale C Gripen C F-16 C T3 TyphoonOperational g limit Ultimate g limit
  31. 31. Comparision: force presence Aircraft Rafale C Gripen C T3 Typhoon F-16C F-35A F-35B F-35CSorties per day 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
  32. 32. Conclusion: air combat● F-35 is failure on all fronts – unlikely to achieve first look or first shot – unable to outmaneuver modern fighter aircraft in order to gain firing solution – unable to escape if detected – unable to provide required force presence – unable to withstand attrition
  33. 33. Fleet defense● F-35 incapable of fighting modern fighter aircraft or performing most missions other than ground attack● low sortie rate especially problematic due to limited number of aircraft carrier can carry● single engine: more vulnerable to corrosion
  34. 34. Tactical bombing● requirements – ability to attack tactical targets on the ground● only mission F-35 can actually do● still requires cooperation with slower aircraft if there is danger of unwanted collateral damage
  35. 35. CAS● definition: usage of aircraft against hostile targets representing possible threat to friendly forces – result: targets attacked are often in close proximity to friendly forces● F-35 too delicate to survive ground fire and too fact to find and attack ground targets
  36. 36. Reconnaissance● sensory suite is suitable for scout missions, but it cannot escape if attacked● low sortie rate and high cost - both per-aircraft and per-sortie - will make such missions rare and high risk
  37. 37. Forward air control● too fast and high flying for pilot to recognise tactical targets or telltale signs of hidden enemy forces, and to distinguish between friendly troops, enemy troops and civillians● same problems cause it to be incapable of assessing the damage done to enemy troops precisely
  38. 38. Written by● Picard578● http://defenseissues.wordpress.com/● 13. 3. 2013.

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