L'objectif du "bail-in" est de forcer, en l'espace d'un week-end, les créanciers et actionnaires de l'établissement financier défaillant à absorber les pertes, ce avant toute intervention publique. Ce rapport donne un compte-rendu critique de l'avancée de l'Union Bancaire Européenne (tant sur le volet supervision, que sur le volet résolution) en prenant comme point de comparaison la réglementation américaine (Partie 1). Ce compte-rendu est ensuite complété par des études de cas (Partie 2) et une série de recommandations (Partie 3). L’application du pouvoir de bail-in en matière de résolution bancaire est particulièrement d’actualité depuis le début de la crise des banques italiennes en 2017. En juin 2017, le pouvoir de bail-in a été appliqué à Banco Popular et a conduit à l’éviction des actionnaires et des créanciers juniors, dans le cadre de l’application de la nouvelle directive européenne relative à la résolution bancaire. En revanche, l’Etat italien a engagé 17 milliards d’euros pour sauver deux banques régionales vénitiennes, Veneto Banca et Banco populare di Vicenza fin juin 2017, ce pour des considérations d’ordre essentiellement politique. Un tel sauvetage, qui représente une exception notable à l’application du pouvoir de bail-in, a été rendu possible par l’interprétation large du mécanisme d’aide d’Etat prévu par la directive et constitue une remise en cause de la crédibilité du volet résolution de l’Union Bancaire Européenne sur le plan international.
A new European framework for resolution cases: the BRRDLászló Árvai
This document summarizes the key points of a presentation on the new European framework for bank resolution cases established by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). It discusses the financial crisis and state aid rules, the goals and principles of the BRRD in establishing a single rulebook and resolution mechanism, and upcoming challenges in implementing the new framework, including using the bail-in tool and ensuring adequate loss-absorbing capacity.
The document provides guidelines for developing recovery plans according to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). It outlines the five key sections required in a recovery plan: [1] governance processes, [2] recovery indicators, [3] recovery options, [4] scenario testing, and [5] a summary. The author recommends a five-step approach to developing these sections, beginning with analyzing the institution and ending with scenario testing and a summary. The BRRD aims to ensure banks have plans in place to recover from financial distress and to empower authorities to intervene early if needed.
Basel norms and bcci scam and international bankingGulshan Poddar
The document discusses regulation of international banking and the Basel Committee. The Basel Committee was formed in 1974 to enhance supervision of international banks and close gaps in supervision. It works to set standards but has no legal authority. Its members include major countries. The committee aims to ensure no bank escapes supervision and supervision is adequate. It issued core banking principles in 1997. Basel III was agreed in 2010-2011 to strengthen bank capital, liquidity, and decrease leverage in response to the financial crisis.
Presentation at the FMI: The new French bank resolution mechanismVermeille & Co
The document provides a critical analysis of bank resolution mechanisms in France and Europe. It summarizes the context around the adoption of new bank resolution laws in France in July 2013 and the European proposal from June 2013. It critiques several aspects of the French law, including its questionable valuation mechanism, scope that includes non-systemic banks, and ineffective "no creditor worse off" principle. It also argues the European proposal contains too many safeguard provisions that could have counterproductive effects. The recommendations are for France to offer a new draft not based on current bankruptcy law and for the EU to avoid specific treatments that distort markets.
Introduction The crisis has shown that there is no such thing as an optimal banking structure or model. Some pure investment banks (e.g. Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns), some pure retail banks (e.g. Spanish Cajas, Irish banks, Northern Rock), and some universal banks (e.g. ING or RBS) alike either failed or were absorbed or required exceptional government support. Accordingly, the European High-Level Expert Group chaired by Erkki Liikanen came to the conclusion that no particular business model fared particularly well, or particularly poorly, in the financial crisis, but the Group rather pointed out excessive risk taking as well as reliance on short term funding, not matched with adequate capital protection.1 To address these weaknesses many key reforms have been adopted at the international level over the last years or will be finalised in the coming months.2 Most notably, the agreement reached by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2011) on the new bank capital and liquidity framework will raise the quality, quantity and international consistency of bank capital and liquidity, constrain the build-up of leverage and maturity mismatches, and introduce capital buffers above the minimum requirements that can be drawn upon in bad times. Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) will also be required to have higher loss absorbency capacity. These multi-pronged reforms lay down much stricter rules for banks within a short timeframe.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was created in 1974 by central bank governors of Group of Ten nations. It meets four times a year at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. The Basel I Accord of 1988 aimed to strengthen banking stability and consistency. It assigned risk weights to asset classes from 0% to 100%. Basel II, created in response to Basel I limitations, introduced three pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. Pillar 1 separates credit and operational risk. Pillar 2 covers banks' risk assessments and supervisory review. Pillar 3 mandates risk disclosures. The RBI implemented Basel I in 1993 and Basel II in 2007 for Indian banks, using standardized approaches
The Federal Reserve System is the central banking system of the United States. It was established in 1913 and consists of regional Federal Reserve Banks, numerous commercial bank members, and a Board of Governors. The System serves to regulate the money supply and banking system, acting as a lender of last resort to banks. It also serves as the government's bank, handling Treasury transactions and auctions. Monetary policy is set by the Federal Open Market Committee, which includes the Board of Governors and Federal Reserve Bank presidents.
The Basel Committee was formed by central bank governors of G10 countries to enhance banking supervision worldwide. It is best known for its capital adequacy standards. Basel I (1988) focused on credit risk capital requirements. Basel II (2004) added operational risk and market risk requirements, and introduced three pillars for minimum capital standards, supervisory review, and market discipline. Basel III (2010) was introduced after the 2008 crisis to strengthen banks' capital reserves and introduce leverage ratios and liquidity requirements to improve financial stability. The three pillars of Basel II were retained in Basel III to balance bank stability and transparency.
A new European framework for resolution cases: the BRRDLászló Árvai
This document summarizes the key points of a presentation on the new European framework for bank resolution cases established by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). It discusses the financial crisis and state aid rules, the goals and principles of the BRRD in establishing a single rulebook and resolution mechanism, and upcoming challenges in implementing the new framework, including using the bail-in tool and ensuring adequate loss-absorbing capacity.
The document provides guidelines for developing recovery plans according to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). It outlines the five key sections required in a recovery plan: [1] governance processes, [2] recovery indicators, [3] recovery options, [4] scenario testing, and [5] a summary. The author recommends a five-step approach to developing these sections, beginning with analyzing the institution and ending with scenario testing and a summary. The BRRD aims to ensure banks have plans in place to recover from financial distress and to empower authorities to intervene early if needed.
Basel norms and bcci scam and international bankingGulshan Poddar
The document discusses regulation of international banking and the Basel Committee. The Basel Committee was formed in 1974 to enhance supervision of international banks and close gaps in supervision. It works to set standards but has no legal authority. Its members include major countries. The committee aims to ensure no bank escapes supervision and supervision is adequate. It issued core banking principles in 1997. Basel III was agreed in 2010-2011 to strengthen bank capital, liquidity, and decrease leverage in response to the financial crisis.
Presentation at the FMI: The new French bank resolution mechanismVermeille & Co
The document provides a critical analysis of bank resolution mechanisms in France and Europe. It summarizes the context around the adoption of new bank resolution laws in France in July 2013 and the European proposal from June 2013. It critiques several aspects of the French law, including its questionable valuation mechanism, scope that includes non-systemic banks, and ineffective "no creditor worse off" principle. It also argues the European proposal contains too many safeguard provisions that could have counterproductive effects. The recommendations are for France to offer a new draft not based on current bankruptcy law and for the EU to avoid specific treatments that distort markets.
Introduction The crisis has shown that there is no such thing as an optimal banking structure or model. Some pure investment banks (e.g. Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns), some pure retail banks (e.g. Spanish Cajas, Irish banks, Northern Rock), and some universal banks (e.g. ING or RBS) alike either failed or were absorbed or required exceptional government support. Accordingly, the European High-Level Expert Group chaired by Erkki Liikanen came to the conclusion that no particular business model fared particularly well, or particularly poorly, in the financial crisis, but the Group rather pointed out excessive risk taking as well as reliance on short term funding, not matched with adequate capital protection.1 To address these weaknesses many key reforms have been adopted at the international level over the last years or will be finalised in the coming months.2 Most notably, the agreement reached by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2011) on the new bank capital and liquidity framework will raise the quality, quantity and international consistency of bank capital and liquidity, constrain the build-up of leverage and maturity mismatches, and introduce capital buffers above the minimum requirements that can be drawn upon in bad times. Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) will also be required to have higher loss absorbency capacity. These multi-pronged reforms lay down much stricter rules for banks within a short timeframe.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was created in 1974 by central bank governors of Group of Ten nations. It meets four times a year at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. The Basel I Accord of 1988 aimed to strengthen banking stability and consistency. It assigned risk weights to asset classes from 0% to 100%. Basel II, created in response to Basel I limitations, introduced three pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. Pillar 1 separates credit and operational risk. Pillar 2 covers banks' risk assessments and supervisory review. Pillar 3 mandates risk disclosures. The RBI implemented Basel I in 1993 and Basel II in 2007 for Indian banks, using standardized approaches
The Federal Reserve System is the central banking system of the United States. It was established in 1913 and consists of regional Federal Reserve Banks, numerous commercial bank members, and a Board of Governors. The System serves to regulate the money supply and banking system, acting as a lender of last resort to banks. It also serves as the government's bank, handling Treasury transactions and auctions. Monetary policy is set by the Federal Open Market Committee, which includes the Board of Governors and Federal Reserve Bank presidents.
The Basel Committee was formed by central bank governors of G10 countries to enhance banking supervision worldwide. It is best known for its capital adequacy standards. Basel I (1988) focused on credit risk capital requirements. Basel II (2004) added operational risk and market risk requirements, and introduced three pillars for minimum capital standards, supervisory review, and market discipline. Basel III (2010) was introduced after the 2008 crisis to strengthen banks' capital reserves and introduce leverage ratios and liquidity requirements to improve financial stability. The three pillars of Basel II were retained in Basel III to balance bank stability and transparency.
The document discusses the Basel II Accords, which establish international standards for banking regulations and capital requirements. Basel II aims to make capital requirements more risk-sensitive by measuring credit, operational, and market risks. It introduces a three pillar framework: Pillar 1 sets minimum capital standards; Pillar 2 establishes supervisory review; and Pillar 3 promotes market discipline through disclosure. Implementation of Basel II varies by country and bank sophistication in risk measurement. The overall goal is a safer, more stable global banking system.
Basel II is an international standard that establishes capital requirements for banks to guard against financial and operational risks. It consists of three pillars: minimum capital requirements to cover credit, market and operational risks; supervisory review to ensure adequate capital to cover all risks; and market discipline through disclosure requirements. While Basel II aims to make capital requirements more risk sensitive, Indian banks face challenges in implementing it due to lack of risk management expertise, need for technology investments, and restructuring of non-performing assets. A gradual implementation process will help ensure a smooth transition to the new framework.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides financial services to central banks to help them manage their foreign exchange reserves. Headquartered in Basel, it has 140 central bank customers. It offers asset management and short-term credit services on a collateralized basis, but not to private individuals or entities. Important events highlighted by the document include the Herstatt Crisis of 1974, the Basel Concordat of 1974 establishing supervision guidelines between countries, and the Basel Capital Accords of 1988 and beyond establishing capital adequacy standards for banks.
Basel 1 and Basel 2 promote banking safety and soundness. Basel 1 introduced risk-based capital requirements but had weaknesses. Basel 2 builds on Basel 1 with three pillars: minimum capital requirements calculated based on credit, market and operational risk; supervisory review of risk management; and market discipline through disclosure. It utilizes internal ratings-based and standardized approaches to determine capital requirements in a more risk-sensitive manner.
This document is a green paper from the European Commission on shadow banking. It provides context on shadow banking and outlines some of the key risks and challenges related to its oversight and regulation. Some of the main points include:
- Defining shadow banking as credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system.
- Identifying potential shadow banking entities like special investment vehicles and money market funds.
- Noting the growth of shadow banking and estimating its global size at €46 trillion in 2010.
- Describing some of the risks shadow banking can pose like runs, leverage, and circumventing rules.
- Highlighting challenges for authorities in monitoring shadow banking given its complexity and lack of data.
Hse lecture iii (may 23, 2011) basel i and basel ii (1)Rohan Rustagi
This document provides a history of the evolution of bank capital regulation from early US practices to the Basel I and Basel II accords. It discusses key events that led to the development of international capital standards, including the 1988 Basel I Accord which established the first risk-based capital requirements. It then outlines the development of the 2006 Basel II Accord, which refined capital requirements to incorporate banks' internal risk models and added a pillar for operational risk. The document also notes some criticisms of the accords and implications for regulation going forward.
The document discusses reforms to India's financial sector that began in the early 1990s. It covers banking sector reforms, monetary policy reforms, and reforms to financial markets and the foreign exchange market. The reforms aimed to create an efficient, competitive financial sector by reducing regulations, introducing market forces, and improving regulatory standards and oversight. They occurred in two phases, with the initial phase in the early 1990s focused on operational flexibility and the second phase strengthening the system.
Basel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA) - Part ACompliance LLC
Certified Basel iii Professional (CBiiiPro)
Objectives: The seminar has been designed to provide with the knowledge and skills needed to understand the new Basel III framework and to work in Basel III Projects.
Target Audience: This course is intended for managers and professionals working in Banks, Financial Organizations, Financial Groups and Financial Conglomerates who need to understand the new Basel III requirements, challenges and opportunities. It is also intended for management consultants, vendors, suppliers and service providers working for financial organizations.
This course is highly recommended for:
- Managers and Professionals involved in Basel III (decision making and implementation)
- Risk and Compliance Officers
- Auditors
- IT Professionals
- Strategic Planners
- Analysts
- Legal Counsels
- Process Owners
Regulatory updates from RR Donnelley December 2015Robert McNamara
December Regulatory Updates covering PRIIPs, Solvency II, European Market Infrastructure Regulation and additional reporting requirements under Irish Domiciled UCITS Funds.
This paper was presented at the SAFA Workshop on Impact of Basel II, held on September 8, 2014 in Dhaka, Bangladesh. By Sayyid Mansoob Hasan, FCMA - Chairman SAFA Task Force to develop a strategy to combat corruption in SAARC Region.
SAFA: South Asian Federation of Accountants
The document discusses financial sector reforms in India. It outlines deficiencies in the existing system including declining productivity and profitability. The objectives of reform are to establish prudent regulatory norms, upgrade managerial competence, and reform the financial structure. The first phase of reforms in the early 1990s focused on reducing reserve requirements, interest rate deregulation, and establishing capital adequacy norms. The second phase emphasized specialization among banks, risk management, and consolidation in the banking sector.
Basel Accords - Basel I, II, and III Advantages, limitations and contrastSyed Ashraf Ali
The Basel Accords is referred to the banking supervision Accords (recommendations on banking regulations). Basel I, Basel II and Basel III was issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). They are called the Basel accords as the BCBS maintains its secretariat at the Bank for
International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland and the committee normally meets there. The Basel Accords is a set of
recommendations for regulations in the banking industry.
The document provides information on the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Basel I accord. It discusses that BIS was established in 1930 by central banks and continues to serve as a forum for international cooperation on banking supervision. Basel I, released in 1988, was the first international banking accord that set minimum capital requirements for credit risk. It established risk weights for various types of assets and exposures. However, it only addressed credit risk and was later improved by Basel II and III.
The document provides summaries of regulatory news from February 2019 across multiple jurisdictions and topics:
1) It addresses upcoming issues with implementing aspects of EMIR Refit and discusses reports from ESAs on regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs. Updated bank risk dashboards show improved capital ratios but weak profitability.
2) New standards for market risk are announced with a simplified approach for smaller banks. EBA and ESMA reports address crypto-asset regulations and need for an EU-wide approach. Another report finds investment costs significantly reduce returns.
3) Draft delegated regulations on sustainable finance and sector views from FCA are published. Guidance is provided on exposures associated with high risk and on ESG disclosure. Reviews
Banking sector reforms and Basel norms 1 & 2NayanaUK
The document discusses banking reforms and Basel norms in India. It provides details on the recommendations of the Narasimhan Committee which led the government to undertake various banking reforms since 1991. This included lowering statutory liquidity and cash reserve ratios, implementing prudential norms, capital adequacy norms, deregulating interest rates, facilitating debt recovery, allowing private sector banks, and giving more operational freedom. It also explains the Basel accords formulated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to establish common international standards for banking regulations and supervision, including Basel I focusing on credit risk and Basel II refining this with three pillars around capital, supervision, and disclosure.
The document discusses Uganda's financial services sector. It begins with an overview of the history of banking in Uganda, from the initial four commercial banks at independence to periods of economic breakdown and reforms. It then describes the structure of Uganda's financial sector, divided into four tiers including commercial banks, credit institutions, microdeposit taking institutions, and informal institutions. The roles of key players like the Bank of Uganda, commercial banks, development banks, insurance companies, and the informal sector are outlined. Mobile money is also mentioned as a newer form of financial service.
The document discusses Uganda's financial services sector. It begins with an overview of the history of banking in Uganda, from the initial four commercial banks at independence to periods of economic breakdown and reforms. It then describes the structure of Uganda's financial sector, divided into four tiers - commercial banks, credit institutions, microdeposit taking institutions, and other organizations. The roles of key players like the Bank of Uganda, commercial banks, development banks, insurance companies, and informal financial services are outlined. Mobile money is also mentioned as a newer non-traditional financial service.
The document discusses Uganda's financial services sector. It begins with a historical overview of banking in Uganda, from the initial four commercial banks at independence to periods of economic breakdown and reforms. It then describes the structure of Uganda's financial sector, including the roles of various institutions such as commercial banks, development banks, microfinance organizations, and the Bank of Uganda as regulator. The informal financial sector is also briefly outlined.
The document appears to be a project report on reforms to the Indian financial system submitted by Rahul Jain. It includes sections on the executive summary, introduction, current structure of the financial system, what has changed in recent decades, the need and importance of the financial sector, banking and credit policy, and financial innovations. The report examines reforms to the Indian financial system over the past few decades and how the system has evolved.
Understanding Basel III, January 2012 to June 2012Compliance LLC
The document discusses the importance of high-quality risk disclosure for promoting financial stability and market discipline. It notes that risk disclosure is good for markets, regulators, and financial stability. However, disclosure must be complemented by incentives for monitoring. The public sector has a role to play in promoting transparency to address market failures around information production and contagion risks. Regulators have focused on improving disclosure templates and data to strengthen the third pillar of Basel III on market discipline.
A new European framework for resolution cases: the BRRDLászló Árvai
1.The control of State aid during the financial crisis
2.A new comprehensive framework: the BRRD
3.Implementation of the BRRD and upcoming challenges
This presentation reflects the view of the author and does not express the view of the European Commission.
David Doyle, EU Policy Adviser, 14 January 2014Chris Skinner
The document discusses the extensive EU agenda for financial services legislation. It outlines numerous directives and regulations that are aimed at increasing regulation and centralization of oversight of capital markets and financial institutions. These include measures related to banking union, derivatives, asset management, insurance, and corporate governance. The agenda reflects a cultural shift towards a more precautionary, harmonized, and centralized approach to regulation across the EU.
The document discusses the Basel II Accords, which establish international standards for banking regulations and capital requirements. Basel II aims to make capital requirements more risk-sensitive by measuring credit, operational, and market risks. It introduces a three pillar framework: Pillar 1 sets minimum capital standards; Pillar 2 establishes supervisory review; and Pillar 3 promotes market discipline through disclosure. Implementation of Basel II varies by country and bank sophistication in risk measurement. The overall goal is a safer, more stable global banking system.
Basel II is an international standard that establishes capital requirements for banks to guard against financial and operational risks. It consists of three pillars: minimum capital requirements to cover credit, market and operational risks; supervisory review to ensure adequate capital to cover all risks; and market discipline through disclosure requirements. While Basel II aims to make capital requirements more risk sensitive, Indian banks face challenges in implementing it due to lack of risk management expertise, need for technology investments, and restructuring of non-performing assets. A gradual implementation process will help ensure a smooth transition to the new framework.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides financial services to central banks to help them manage their foreign exchange reserves. Headquartered in Basel, it has 140 central bank customers. It offers asset management and short-term credit services on a collateralized basis, but not to private individuals or entities. Important events highlighted by the document include the Herstatt Crisis of 1974, the Basel Concordat of 1974 establishing supervision guidelines between countries, and the Basel Capital Accords of 1988 and beyond establishing capital adequacy standards for banks.
Basel 1 and Basel 2 promote banking safety and soundness. Basel 1 introduced risk-based capital requirements but had weaknesses. Basel 2 builds on Basel 1 with three pillars: minimum capital requirements calculated based on credit, market and operational risk; supervisory review of risk management; and market discipline through disclosure. It utilizes internal ratings-based and standardized approaches to determine capital requirements in a more risk-sensitive manner.
This document is a green paper from the European Commission on shadow banking. It provides context on shadow banking and outlines some of the key risks and challenges related to its oversight and regulation. Some of the main points include:
- Defining shadow banking as credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system.
- Identifying potential shadow banking entities like special investment vehicles and money market funds.
- Noting the growth of shadow banking and estimating its global size at €46 trillion in 2010.
- Describing some of the risks shadow banking can pose like runs, leverage, and circumventing rules.
- Highlighting challenges for authorities in monitoring shadow banking given its complexity and lack of data.
Hse lecture iii (may 23, 2011) basel i and basel ii (1)Rohan Rustagi
This document provides a history of the evolution of bank capital regulation from early US practices to the Basel I and Basel II accords. It discusses key events that led to the development of international capital standards, including the 1988 Basel I Accord which established the first risk-based capital requirements. It then outlines the development of the 2006 Basel II Accord, which refined capital requirements to incorporate banks' internal risk models and added a pillar for operational risk. The document also notes some criticisms of the accords and implications for regulation going forward.
The document discusses reforms to India's financial sector that began in the early 1990s. It covers banking sector reforms, monetary policy reforms, and reforms to financial markets and the foreign exchange market. The reforms aimed to create an efficient, competitive financial sector by reducing regulations, introducing market forces, and improving regulatory standards and oversight. They occurred in two phases, with the initial phase in the early 1990s focused on operational flexibility and the second phase strengthening the system.
Basel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA) - Part ACompliance LLC
Certified Basel iii Professional (CBiiiPro)
Objectives: The seminar has been designed to provide with the knowledge and skills needed to understand the new Basel III framework and to work in Basel III Projects.
Target Audience: This course is intended for managers and professionals working in Banks, Financial Organizations, Financial Groups and Financial Conglomerates who need to understand the new Basel III requirements, challenges and opportunities. It is also intended for management consultants, vendors, suppliers and service providers working for financial organizations.
This course is highly recommended for:
- Managers and Professionals involved in Basel III (decision making and implementation)
- Risk and Compliance Officers
- Auditors
- IT Professionals
- Strategic Planners
- Analysts
- Legal Counsels
- Process Owners
Regulatory updates from RR Donnelley December 2015Robert McNamara
December Regulatory Updates covering PRIIPs, Solvency II, European Market Infrastructure Regulation and additional reporting requirements under Irish Domiciled UCITS Funds.
This paper was presented at the SAFA Workshop on Impact of Basel II, held on September 8, 2014 in Dhaka, Bangladesh. By Sayyid Mansoob Hasan, FCMA - Chairman SAFA Task Force to develop a strategy to combat corruption in SAARC Region.
SAFA: South Asian Federation of Accountants
The document discusses financial sector reforms in India. It outlines deficiencies in the existing system including declining productivity and profitability. The objectives of reform are to establish prudent regulatory norms, upgrade managerial competence, and reform the financial structure. The first phase of reforms in the early 1990s focused on reducing reserve requirements, interest rate deregulation, and establishing capital adequacy norms. The second phase emphasized specialization among banks, risk management, and consolidation in the banking sector.
Basel Accords - Basel I, II, and III Advantages, limitations and contrastSyed Ashraf Ali
The Basel Accords is referred to the banking supervision Accords (recommendations on banking regulations). Basel I, Basel II and Basel III was issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). They are called the Basel accords as the BCBS maintains its secretariat at the Bank for
International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland and the committee normally meets there. The Basel Accords is a set of
recommendations for regulations in the banking industry.
The document provides information on the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Basel I accord. It discusses that BIS was established in 1930 by central banks and continues to serve as a forum for international cooperation on banking supervision. Basel I, released in 1988, was the first international banking accord that set minimum capital requirements for credit risk. It established risk weights for various types of assets and exposures. However, it only addressed credit risk and was later improved by Basel II and III.
The document provides summaries of regulatory news from February 2019 across multiple jurisdictions and topics:
1) It addresses upcoming issues with implementing aspects of EMIR Refit and discusses reports from ESAs on regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs. Updated bank risk dashboards show improved capital ratios but weak profitability.
2) New standards for market risk are announced with a simplified approach for smaller banks. EBA and ESMA reports address crypto-asset regulations and need for an EU-wide approach. Another report finds investment costs significantly reduce returns.
3) Draft delegated regulations on sustainable finance and sector views from FCA are published. Guidance is provided on exposures associated with high risk and on ESG disclosure. Reviews
Banking sector reforms and Basel norms 1 & 2NayanaUK
The document discusses banking reforms and Basel norms in India. It provides details on the recommendations of the Narasimhan Committee which led the government to undertake various banking reforms since 1991. This included lowering statutory liquidity and cash reserve ratios, implementing prudential norms, capital adequacy norms, deregulating interest rates, facilitating debt recovery, allowing private sector banks, and giving more operational freedom. It also explains the Basel accords formulated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to establish common international standards for banking regulations and supervision, including Basel I focusing on credit risk and Basel II refining this with three pillars around capital, supervision, and disclosure.
The document discusses Uganda's financial services sector. It begins with an overview of the history of banking in Uganda, from the initial four commercial banks at independence to periods of economic breakdown and reforms. It then describes the structure of Uganda's financial sector, divided into four tiers including commercial banks, credit institutions, microdeposit taking institutions, and informal institutions. The roles of key players like the Bank of Uganda, commercial banks, development banks, insurance companies, and the informal sector are outlined. Mobile money is also mentioned as a newer form of financial service.
The document discusses Uganda's financial services sector. It begins with an overview of the history of banking in Uganda, from the initial four commercial banks at independence to periods of economic breakdown and reforms. It then describes the structure of Uganda's financial sector, divided into four tiers - commercial banks, credit institutions, microdeposit taking institutions, and other organizations. The roles of key players like the Bank of Uganda, commercial banks, development banks, insurance companies, and informal financial services are outlined. Mobile money is also mentioned as a newer non-traditional financial service.
The document discusses Uganda's financial services sector. It begins with a historical overview of banking in Uganda, from the initial four commercial banks at independence to periods of economic breakdown and reforms. It then describes the structure of Uganda's financial sector, including the roles of various institutions such as commercial banks, development banks, microfinance organizations, and the Bank of Uganda as regulator. The informal financial sector is also briefly outlined.
The document appears to be a project report on reforms to the Indian financial system submitted by Rahul Jain. It includes sections on the executive summary, introduction, current structure of the financial system, what has changed in recent decades, the need and importance of the financial sector, banking and credit policy, and financial innovations. The report examines reforms to the Indian financial system over the past few decades and how the system has evolved.
Understanding Basel III, January 2012 to June 2012Compliance LLC
The document discusses the importance of high-quality risk disclosure for promoting financial stability and market discipline. It notes that risk disclosure is good for markets, regulators, and financial stability. However, disclosure must be complemented by incentives for monitoring. The public sector has a role to play in promoting transparency to address market failures around information production and contagion risks. Regulators have focused on improving disclosure templates and data to strengthen the third pillar of Basel III on market discipline.
A new European framework for resolution cases: the BRRDLászló Árvai
1.The control of State aid during the financial crisis
2.A new comprehensive framework: the BRRD
3.Implementation of the BRRD and upcoming challenges
This presentation reflects the view of the author and does not express the view of the European Commission.
David Doyle, EU Policy Adviser, 14 January 2014Chris Skinner
The document discusses the extensive EU agenda for financial services legislation. It outlines numerous directives and regulations that are aimed at increasing regulation and centralization of oversight of capital markets and financial institutions. These include measures related to banking union, derivatives, asset management, insurance, and corporate governance. The agenda reflects a cultural shift towards a more precautionary, harmonized, and centralized approach to regulation across the EU.
This document discusses regulatory issues related to hedge funds. It provides background on hedge funds and raises questions in five key areas:
1) Defining hedge funds and whether a targeted regulatory approach is justified.
2) Assessing the systemic risks hedge funds may pose and whether more oversight of leverage and exposures is needed.
3) Evaluating hedge funds' impact on market efficiency and integrity, particularly around short selling.
4) Monitoring hedge funds' risk management and asset valuation processes.
5) Improving transparency around hedge fund activities and strategies.
The document seeks input from interested parties on these issues as European regulators review financial regulations in response to the financial crisis.
This document provides an overview and analysis of non-performing loans (NPLs) in Europe and offers guidance on resolving NPLs. Some key points:
- The stock of NPLs in EU banking sectors totals around €1 trillion, with 10 countries having average ratios over 10%. NPL resolution has been slow.
- High NPL levels pose macroprudential and financial stability risks by consuming bank resources and increasing funding costs. They also reflect broader corporate solvency issues that hamper economic growth.
- Impediments to NPL resolution include weak bank incentives, asymmetric information deterring investors, and inefficient debt recovery processes.
- A comprehensive response is needed to swiftly but
Understanding Risk Management and Compliance, May 2012Compliance LLC
The document discusses several topics related to banking regulation:
1) It discusses the EBA's work over the past year to strengthen bank capital positions in response to the financial crisis, including stress tests and recommendations to raise over €115 billion in capital.
2) It outlines the EBA's goal of establishing a Single Rulebook to harmonize banking rules across the EU and prevent a relaxation of standards.
3) It focuses on the EBA's work developing regulatory technical standards for defining bank capital and ensuring high quality capital instruments are used across all member states.
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2. Introduction & Literature review : The future of bail-in resolution in Europe
Page 3
I Overview of the European resolution framework for financial institutions Page 4
II Evidence and case studies of some European banks Page 15
III Challenges and recommendations Page 30
Contact
Page 41
1
3. 2
Introduction
Between 2008 and 2012, the European Commission approved €3.6 trillion of
state aid measures to financial institutions, of which €1.6 trillion was used.
EU Member States provided €591.9 billion (4.6% of EU GDP in 2012) of capital
support to the financial sector.
The objective of the new EU resolution framework is to allocate the losses from
a bank’s failure to private investors in order to enhance market discipline ex ante
and preserve public finance ex post.
The implementation of the bail-in tool raises two fundamental issues which are
(A) the transition phase from the old to the new regime and (B) the credibility and
predictability of the new resolution framework.
4. 3
Literature review
Four lessons we can learn from the literature on bail-ins and banking resolution:
The creation of constructive certainty, whereby the regulators should indicate
the preferred path for resolution (i.e. investors are at risk if the bank fails);
The respect of the market economics, i.e. loss expectation of the investors and
established resolution process with clear recovery rules;
The maintenance of the continuity of the failed bank’s business, i.e. access
to the market infrastructure during the resolution procedures; and
The establishment of clear rules relating to liquidity assistance following the
opening of resolution procedures (e.g. liquidity assistance through the ECB).
5. 4
PART I
Overview of the European resolution framework for financial institutions
6. 5
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.1 – BRRD, State Aid, Banking Union and prudential supervision
The new Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (“BRRD”) of May 2014 aims
at harmonizing the procedures for resolving all banks in the European Union,
including Systemically Important Financial Institutions (“SIFIs”).
The BRRD covers bank’s living wills and an early intervention framework in the
phase before resolution as well as the resolution process itself.
Under the BRRD framework, State Aid granted to failing banks shall comply with
the EU competition rules and with specific conditions relating to the objective of
the state aid granted (e.g. preserve financial stability) and to the form of the state
aid (e.g. state guarantee to back liquidity facilities).
7. 6
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.1 – BRRD, State Aid, Banking Union and prudential supervision
From a governance perspective, the Banking Union relies on two pillars: Single
supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).
The Single Resolution Board (SRB) is part of the SRM and coordinates banks’
resolution at the European level. The decision to put a financial institution into a
resolution procedure is taken by the ECB or by the SRB.
The SRB is accountable to the European Parliament and the European Council.
A formal Memorandum of Understanding has been agreed upon between the
ECB and the SRB, whereas the collaboration between the SSM and the SRB has
not been defined as part of a specific agreement and is informal in nature.
8. 7
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.1 – BRRD, State Aid, Banking Union and prudential supervision
The BRRD is one element of a set of financial regulations relating to prudential
supervision. Prudential supervision and resolution process are connected to each
other in the structure of the BRRD framework.
Banks shall fulfill the level of minimum requirements for own funds and liabilities
(“MREL”) set by the SRB, while reflecting the resolution strategy laid down in the
recovery plan. The MREL requirement is completed by the Total Loss-Absorbing
Capacity (“TLAC”) applicable to SIFIs from 2019.
Further amendments has been proposed to the Capital Requirements Directive
(“CRD”) and to the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”) by the EU
Commission, relating i.a. to the leverage ratio, net stable funding ratio, capital
add-ons and large exposure limit.
9. 8
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.2 – Essential features of the BRRD resolution framework
Essential role given to public authorities in the case of the failure of a financial
institution (i.e. the resolution authority shall be a public administrative authority).
Main objectives are the continuity of the critical functions of the failing financial
institution, the financial stability, the protection of public funds and of depositors.
The maximization of the enterprise’s value is only a secondary objective, which
is a notable difference compared to corporate insolvency law.
The BRRD allows for both a single point-of-entry approach and a multiple point-
of-entry approach. The resolution procedure can be conducted on a single entity
level or on a consolidated basis on a case-by-case basis.
10. 9
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.2 – Essential features of the BRRD resolution framework
Scope of the BRRD based on a formal definition of the term “financial institution”
and covers financial institutions, subsidiaries and holding companies.
Opening of the resolution procedure submitted to quantitative conditions, which
are alternatively a breach of regulatory requirements (e.g. capital requirements),
the overindebtness or the illiquidity of the failing financial institution.
Additional qualitative conditions must be cumulatively fulfilled, as follows: (1) the
decision to place the financial institution under resolution must be taken by the
prudential supervision authority, (2) the absence of private sector alternative and
(3) the resolution procedure is necessary for the public interest (i.e. the fulfillment
of the resolution objectives).
11. 10
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.3 – Precautionary recapitalization under the BRRD framework
In some specific cases, a demand for extraordinary public financial support will
not be considered as an opening case of a resolution procedure.
This exception covers (1) a State guarantee to back liquidity facilities, (2) a State
guarantee of newly issued liabilities or (3) an equity participation of the State (if
none of the quantitative conditions above-mentioned is fulfilled).
A precautionary recapitalization is only allowed if (1) the State aid is compliant to
the EU state aid framework, (2) the public financial support is temporary and of
precautionary nature, (3) the support aims at preserving the financial stability and
(4) the support shall not be used to offset losses of the financial institution.
12. 11
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.4 – Essential powers granted to the public resolution authority
Legal power to replace the management of the financial institution and operate
and conduct the activities of the institution as well as dispose of its assets.
Legal power to appoint a special manager to implement the resolution measures
following the decision of the resolution authority (e.g. takeover transaction).
Restructuring of the financial institution following the application of the bail-in
tool based on a business reorganization plan; or
Orderly winding-down of the failing financial institution if it is considered as a
gone-concern, with the objective of realization of the assets of the institution.
13. 12
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.5 – Resolution tools - Presentation
Sale of business tool - Transfer to an independent third-party of shares, assets,
rights and/or liabilities of the financial institution - without consideration of applica-
ble legal or contractual impediments.
Bridge institution tool - Transfer to a legal entity partially or fully owned by one or
more public authorities of shares, assets, rights and/or liabilities of the financial
institution - without consideration of applicable legal or contractual impediments.
Asset separation tool - Transfer of any assets, rights or liabilities of the financial
institution to a newly founded asset management vehicle.
Bail-in tool - Writting-down of the claims of the financial institution’s creditors if
the financial institution is restructured and considered as a going-concern.
14. 13
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.6 – Resolution tools - Specificities of the bail-in tool
Ranking of creditor’s claims shall be compliant with the order of priority of their
claims under normal insolvency proceedings (equality of same class creditors).
Numerous exceptions to this principle are listed in Article 44 BRRD. Especially,
covered deposits, secured liabilities, short-term liabilities, liabilities to specific
trade and commercial creditors will not be written-down.
Furthermore, specific exceptions can be granted by the resolution authority on a
case-by-case basis in exceptional circumstances, as follows: (1) impossibility to
bail-in the liabilities within a reasonable time, (2) avoidance of widespread conta-
gion, (3) maintenance of the continuity of the critical functions of the institution; or
(4) avoidance of a destruction in value.
15. 14
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.6 – Resolution tools - Specificities of the bail-in tool
Application of the no creditor worse-off principle, pursuant to which no creditor
shall incur greater losses if the financial institution had been wound up under
normal insolvency procedures.
Independent valuation of the creditor’s claims through an independent third-
party, following the implementation of the resolution measures.
Bail-in of at least 8% of the total liabilities including capital instruments of the
financial institution including capital instruments through write-down or debt con-
version if public financing sources (i.e. public equity support or temporary public
ownership) are used.
16. 15
I. Overview of the EU resolution framework
1.7 – Specific issues relating to the implementation of the BRRD framework
Transition phase of the BRRD - Retroactive application of the bail-in tool before
the 1. January 2016, leading to legal uncertainty for the banks’ resolution started
before 31 December 2015 (e.g. Banco Espirito Santo).
Implementation gap between BRRD bail-in and MREL/TLAC requirements - The
loss-absorbing capacity in the Banking Union will be implemented with the MREL
and TLAC requirements in 2019, so that existing bail-inable liabilities on banks’
balance-sheets may be insufficient.
State-aid framework - The case Monte Dei Paschi shows that the disposition on
the State aid framework can be interpreted in a broad manner - i.e. even in the
absence of financial instability.
18. 17
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.1 – Theoretical bail-in example
Example of a bank balance sheet with a size of 100 (total assets), capital requi-
rements of 7% RWA, RWA / assets = 5% and capital requirements expressed as
3.5% of total assets. The bank is currently well capitalized since 5% > 3.5%:
19. 18
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.1 – Theoretical bail-in example
Application of a small loss of 2% of the total assets. Equity drops to 3%, leading
to a violation of the capital requirements. Following the bail-in of 2% of junior debt
and the conversion into two units of equity, whereby 2% of losses are borne by
the shareholders, the bank is recapitalized back to 5%:
20. 19
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.1 – Theoretical bail-in example
Application of a large loss of 6% of the total assets. Shareholders are wiped out
completely and junior debt holders lose one unit of debt and four units of the debt
is converted into equity. One unit of senior debt is converted into equity, so that
the initial level of 5% of capitalization is reached:
21. 20
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.2 – Case studies of some European banks
Overview of the balance-sheets of the European banks considered - one year
prior to the restructuring:
22. 21
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.2 – Case studies of some European banks
The assets are represented in million euros. The ratios are measured one year
before the failure of the respective bank.
CE = common equity. JD = junior debt. SD = senior unsecured debt, excluding
all deposits. 3Y imp = three-year cumulative impairment rate, calculated based
on customer loans losses, leading to declining interest and operating income.
The table shows that the average three-year asset loss is just under 8% and
typically higher than equity but less than the sum of equity, junior and senior debt
together - except for Laiki and Anglo-Irish bank.
23. 22
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.3 – Hypo Real Estate (“HRE”) failure
HRE is the result of a spin-off from HypoVereinsbank in 2003. In 2007, HRE
acquired Depfa, an Irish public finance company. Following the losses accumula-
ted by Depfa, the German banking association provided €35 billion of liquidity to
HRE, backed by a State guarantee in September 2008.
The German state acquired 90% of the shareholders’ equity and proceeded to a
squeeze-out of the remaining shareholders. Public capital injections represented
€9.95 billion. In 2010, non-performing, non-strategic assets were transferred to a
government-backed vehicle. Realization losses were supported by the German
State.
Some Tier 2 instruments called Genussrechte were arbitrarily bailed-in, due to
special legal features. Tier 1 instruments could not receive haircuts outside of a
bankruptcy procedure.
24. 23
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.4 – SNS Reaal Group failure
Dutch banking and insurance group which underwent a government equity injec-
tion in 2008 and a nationalization in 2013, due to losses in the real estate sector.
In February 2013, the total loss incurred was €1.8 billion in capital losses. More-
over, €2.5 billion of capital needs were required to meet minimum capital require-
ments of the group.
The government and Dutch banks funded €2.2 billion of the recapitalization and
a total of €2.1 billion in hybrid capital and subordinated debt were expropriated.
The government acquired a share of €565 million of the hybrid capital.
25. 24
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.4 – SNS Reaal Group failure
The table below gives an overview of the timeline of the restructuring of SNS
Reaal Group:
26. 25
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.5 – Summary of the case studies
The table below gives a summary of public interventions (millions of euros):
27. 26
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.5 – Summary of the case studies
The table below gives an overview of the haircuts and burden sharing of the
European banks considered:
28. 27
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.5 – Summary of the case studies
The columns “equity loss”, “junior debt loss” and “senior debt loss” represent the
haircut rates for each respective class of stakeholders.
The column “public recapitalization” is the sum of all capital injections by public
authorities for the respective bank. The column “recapitalization need” is the sum
of public recapitalization, of guarantees granted and of losses incurred by the
private investors.
The guarantee values are calculated based on the face value of the guarantee
multiplied by the CDS spread of the respective bank for a three-year insurance.
The column “PSI” represents the contribution of the private sector to the total
recapitalization of the respective bank.
29. 28
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.5 – Summary of the case studies
The average PSI of the table above is 33%, so that taxpayers provided approx.
2/3 of the total recapitalization of the European banks considered. The case HRE
shows a low PSI participation (13%), whereas the PSI participation is significantly
higher in the SNS Reaal Group case.
If shareholders, junior and senior creditors had participated at least up to 8% of
the total liabilities of the respective bank, the average PSI would have been 64%.
With a loss participation of 12%, the average PSI would have been 77%.
The efficient application of the bail-in rules could hence significantly reduce the
public sector costs linked to banks’ failures.
30. 29
II. Evidence and case studies of some European banks
2.6 – Outlook: the case of Banco Popular
First formal resolution of a failing European bank under the BRRD framework in
June 2017. Early application before the implementation of the loss-absorbing fra-
mework.
Complete wipe-out of shareholder’s equity and of junior Additional Tier 1 (AT1)
and of Tier 2 (T2) capital instruments: total loss-sharing of € 3.3 billion. Senior
creditors and institutional depositors remained unaffected.
Sale to Banco Santander for a nominal sum of € 1 and subsequent raising of € 7
billion to clean-up the bank’s balance-sheet.
Looking forward: application of the European resolution framework during a sys-
temic crisis and/or in the absence of a sale’s to a third-party.
32. 31
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.1 – Establishing credibility: common good, private cost
Proposal 1 - The SSM should break with the European tradition of ‘too
little, too late’ by acting early and proactively, even if this creates some
(limited, short-term) financial volatility.
Proposal 2 - The board of the SSM should be made more independent,
with more permanent members, along the lines of the board of the SRB.
33. 32
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.2 – The need to monitor who holds bail-inable instruments
Proposal 3 - The revision of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD4) and
the Markets in Financial Instruments and Investment Directive (MiFID)
should include a rule that bail-inable debt instruments cannot be sold
directly to retail investors.
Proposal 4 - The ECB/SSM should maintain a database to identify the main
holders of bail-inable debt.
34. 33
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.3 – Design of stress tests
Proposal 5 - The stress tests should include a moderately negative scenario
in addition to the baseline and the severely adverse scenarios. The
moderately adverse scenario should be used instead of the baseline to
decide on bail-in versus precautionary recapitalization.
35. 34
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.4 – Harmonization and predictability of insolvency and collateral security laws
Proposal 6 - Conduct a survey to quantify the potential differences in
treatment of creditors under the collateral securities laws in the EU
member states in order to provide some legal clarity to investors across
the Union, and perform an assessment on the transposition differences
relating to the creditor hierarchy under the TLAC / MREL requirements.
Proposal 7 - In the long run, we recommend that the Banking Union adopt
a dedicated bankruptcy chapter for financial institutions to ensure a
disconnect between the bank insolvency legislation and the corporate
insolvency legislation.
36. 35
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.5 – Timing and coordination
Proposal 8 - Clarify the right of the SRB to weigh in on supervisory matters.
Establish a Memorandum of Understanding laying down the conditions of
the cooperation between the SRB and the SSM, including the joint review
of recovery and resolution plans and information sharing in a crisis
scenario.
37. 36
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.6 – Living wills and liquidity
Proposal 9 - Regulators should impose higher MREL on banks that do not
provide credible living wills, in particular with respect to how they would
manage liquidity in resolution, in either SPE or MPE framework.
Proposal 10 - ELA for banks in resolution should be moved from national
central banks towards the ECB, perhaps in a dedicated facility. At least the
required consent of the council of governors should be strengthened. It
might also make sense to use the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) to provide
liquidity instead of only capital.
38. 37
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.7 – Cross-border resolution and the choice between SPE and MPE
Proposal 11 - A litmus test for whether the Banking Union is complete is
whether the Eurozone can be considered a single jurisdiction as far as
liquidity and capital are concerned. Ring-fencing inside/outside the
Eurozone can make sense, but ring-fencing within the Eurozone defeats
the purpose of the Banking Union. MREL, SRF and the European Deposit
Insurance Scheme (EDIS) must be strong enough to ensure that liquidity
and capital remain freely mobile within the Eurozone, both before and
during resolution.
39. 38
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.8 – Derivatives, short-term liabilities and safe harbor
Proposal 12 - Give the resolution authority more flexibility in relation to
the duration of the automatic stay applicable to financial transactions,
with the right to extend the automatic stay for a duration greater than 24
hours.
Proposal 13 - Reformulate the exception granted to short-term unsecured
senior debt from the bail-in power, so that the exception does not rely on
a duration (seven days) but rather on the qualitative elements of such
short-term debt. The definition should be restricted to partially funded,
revolving or other open lines of credit necessary for the continuation of
the operations essential to the financial institution, as in the US
framework.
40. 39
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.9 – Reduced discretion of bail-in rules
Proposal 14 - Submit the granting of a precautionary recapitalization to
stricter conditions, including the fulfilment of quantitative and qualitative
elements, to avoid discretionary use of the public sector funds before the
opening of a resolution procedure.
Proposal 15 - Limit the bail-in exemption to clearly defined categories of
debt with no playing-room granted to the resolution authority.
41. 40
III. Challenges and recommendations
3.10 – Creation of a privilege of new money
Proposal 16 - Amend the resolution framework to add a privilege of new
money with a clear privilege in the claim ranking hierarchy given to the
creditor granting a new liquidity facility during the resolution procedure.
The definition of the privilege of new money should be as wide as possible
to include private sector support as well as public back-stop facilities, and
should be comparable with the privilege of new money in Chapter 11 of
the US Bankruptcy Code.
42. 41
Contact
International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB)
International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies
Chemin Eugène-Rigot, 2
1202 Geneva
Switzerland
Tel: (41 22) 734 95 48
Web: www.icmb.ch