In the 1990’s, 'crypto wars' emerged when society began using strong encryption that governments couldn’t crack. Now that strong crypto use is pervasive online, is our digital society heading towards a new round of 'crypto wars' or are there alternatives? Presented on 1 May 2019 at the Internet Identity Workshop 28 IIW Main Site: https://internetidentityworkshop.com IIW Proceedings: https://iiw.idcommons.net/Main_Page

1. Steven H. McCown
Are Crypto Wars Coming?
Issues, Solutions, and Avoiding Key Escrow

2. Crypto Wars of the 1990’s
• Strong Encryption == algorithms that governments couldn’t decrypt
• Government rules
• Categorized encryption as a ‘weapon of war’ (munition)
• Export controls created to prohibit dissemination
• Clipper chip, low bit lengths, etc.
• Commercial needs
• Secure financial transfers
• eCommerce
• Secure Socket Layer
• Restrictions still exist, but currently less restrictive
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3. Encryption is Everywhere
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4. Should we use strong encryption?
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5. 2015 San Bernardino Attack
2 Dec 2015: 14 people were killed and 22 others were injured
FBI
• “homegrown violent extremists” inspired by foreign terrorist groups
• NSA couldn’t hack perpetrator’s iPhone 5C
• Asked Apple to backdoor iOS
Apple
• Refuses – “too dangerous to create” a backdoor
• Fears the precedent … and use by hackers and malicious insiders
FBI / DOJ
• DOJ court order: Apple must create and install malware
• Wash Post: “professional hackers” paid $1M to create 0-day
• DOJ withdraws the lawsuit
CBS Poll: FBI 50% -- Apple 45% 5References:
• https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_San_Bernardino_attack

6. Safety or Encryption?
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7. Encryption Dilemma … Re-Igniting Crypto Wars?
Criminals: won’t disclose encryption keys
Law Enforcement: can’t break strong crypto
Can technology solve this dilemma?
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8. What is a ‘Backdoor’?
Root access via: secret accounts, passwords, policies, weak crypto, etc.
Examples (reported)
• Cisco: HW / SW 0-days let CIA remotely control 318 products (Wikileaks 2017)
• VW: 4 shared secret keys open 100M VW vehicles
• Cannon Printer: ‘Extended Random’ creates vulnerable encryption (BSAFE)
Problems
• Insider abuse (personal, political, financial, etc.)
• External hackers
• Uncontrolled execution
• “Responsible Encryption” (2017-18) euphemism for backdoors
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References:
• Cisco: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ciscos-investigation-into-vault-7-leak-uncovers-0-day-affecting-318-products/
• VW: https://www.wired.com/2016/08/oh-good-new-hack-can-unlock-100-million-volkswagens/
• Cannon: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2017/12/19/the-strange-story-of-extended-random/

9. Can Lawmakers Mandate Backdoors?
• FBI Director James B. Comey (2015):
• In a Senate Judiciary Committee called on companies employing end-to-end encryption to
revise their “business model”
• Senator Richard Burr (R-NC):
• Current encryption sets data “above the law.”
• Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA):
• “I am hopeful that this draft will start a meaningful and inclusive debate on the role of
encryption and its place within the rule of law … No entity or individual is above the law”
• Ben Wallace, UK Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime, 2018
• “It is mob rule on the internet. You shouldn’t be able to hide behind anonymity.”
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10. Is there a model for balancing personal rights
with societal needs
…
without resorting to extreme measures like
key escrow or backdoors?
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11. US Constitution as a Model
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”
-- Fourth Amendment
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12. Can the 4th Amendment be Modeled in Tech?
Goal: to create a technology system that makes searches impossible until
mandatory requirements have been met and verified.
Requirements:
1. Leave encryption keys within the user’s sole possession (i.e., no key escrow)
2. Create immutable rules regarding when and how a recovery may be performed
3. Create a set of reviewing authorities (each with competing interests; law
enforcement & watchdog groups) that independently evaluate access requests
and either provide or deny search authorization
4. Create the technical capability to retrieve a key only after all of the reviewing
authorities reach a unanimous consent to allow a disclosure
5. Require immutable event logging that can be subsequently audited
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13. System Overview
A A A A A A
Smart
Contract
Key Recovery
Authorization
Group Steward
Key Recovery
Authorization
Group Steward
Key Recovery
Authorization
Group Steward
Key Recovery
Authorization
Group Steward
App Store
Client software (installed on user device)
- Manages enrolled keys / data
- Obtains user consent of a smart contract of terms
- Creates a unique partial key access token for each Steward
- Evaluates tokens received from Stewards requesting access
- Evaluates completion of smart contract terms
- Transmits key according to smart contract terms
Key Recovery Authorization Group Stewards
- Store partial key access tokens from users
- Evaluate the lawfulness of key recovery requests
- Evaluate whether smart contract terms are met
- Transmits partial key access token as per smart
contract when terms are met
Cryptographic Ledger
- Immutable record of system actions,
access requests, recovery attempts, etc.
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14. Transparent Terms: disclosed via Smart Contract
Smart Contract
1. Full process description
2. Keys remain in user’s device
3. Recovery requirements
4. Recovery process methods
5. Audit methods
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15. Private Key
1) Users make keys
and
they stay here!
Court of Law
Appeals Court
Watchdog
Group
Law
Enforcement
T1 T2
T3 T4
3) Partial Key Access Tokens
sent to competing agencies
2) Unique Partial Key
Access Tokens created
Process Requirements:
• Multiple Key Recovery Access
Stewards with competing interests
approve or deny access requests
• On-device processes control access
• All tokens must be received by device
to invoke a recovery
• Any access attempt is logged
A A A A A A
Enrollment
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16. Private Key
Court of Law
Appeals Court
Watchdog
Group
Law
Enforcement
T1
T2
T3
T4
1. Law enforcement:
-- wants access
-- must send the proper token
Token
Validator
2. Court of Law:
-- concur with request
-- send the proper token
3. Appeals Court:
-- concur with request
-- send the proper token
4. Watchdog Group:
-- concur with request
-- send the proper token
5. Tokens are Validated:
-- Zero Knowledge Proofs
-- Blockchain
6. If all tokens are validated:
-- Key is recovered
7. Else
-- No recovery
A A A A A A
7. Every granted access (or attempt) is
logged and auditable via a blockchain
Recovery
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17. Reframing The Encryption Dilemma
Door #2:
No recourse
against criminals
Door #1:
Government control of
encryption
‘Door #3’:
Secure privacy, facilitate lawful recovery
processes, & enforce checks & balances.
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18. Steven H. McCown
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smccown@anonyome.com
https://anonyome.com
https://www.linkedin.com/in/mccown
Anonyome Labs
Chief Architect