Presented by Anil Shukla, QinetiQ, in the UK Spectrum Policy Forum UK SPF Workshop: Spectrum Infrastructure Resiliency & Interference on the 18 April 2016. http://www.techuk.org/about/uk-spectrum-policy-forum

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Introduction to Spectrum Infrastructure
Resiliency & Interference Workshop – Tech UK
Dr Anil Shukla
QinetiQ Fellow
18th April 2016;
Tech UK
London
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Agenda
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Title Presenter
Introduction and overview of the
focus of the workshop
Anil Shukla - QinetiQ
New regulations for controlling
interference from apparatus
Andrew Cutting, Spectrum Policy Advisor, Spectrum Group,
Ofcom
Space Sector Mike Willis, Head of Spectrum Policy, UK Space Agency
Utilities Sector Adrian Grilli, Managing Director, JRC
CNI Reliance on GNSS - A Serious
Vulnerability
Charles Curry, Managing Director, Chronos Technology Ltd
Medical Equipment and Devices Val Lynch, Chief Executive Officer, AND Technology
Research Ltd
Cybersecurity Jim Norton, Chair, Royal Academy of Engineering Digital
Systems Engineering Community of Practice
Potential Mitigation Techniques
and Initiatives
Paul Howland, EM Spectrum and RF Cyber - Dstl

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Principles of Infrastructure Resilience
“An event or situation threatens damage to human welfare only if it involves,
causes or may cause:
I. loss of human life;
II. human illness or injury;
III. homelessness;
IV. damage to property;
V. disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel;
VI. disruption of a system of communication;
VII. disruption of facilities for transport; or
VIII. disruption of services relating to health.”
The 9 sectors are: food, energy, water, communications, transport, health, emergency
services, government, and finance.
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Infrastructure Resilience
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• Resistance - focused on providing protection
• Reliability - ensures that the infrastructure components are inherently designed to
operate under a range of conditions
• Redundancy - concerned with the design and capacity of the network or system
• Response and Recovery - fast and effective response to and recovery from events.

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What is an emergency / resilience
• Resilience is the ability of assets, networks and systems to anticipate,
absorb, adapt to and / or rapidly recover from a disruptive event.
• Spectrum Resilience – is the ability of systems that access the spectrum to
be able to respond to a disruptive event
• Disruptive event – denial of spectrum access maliciously or accidently
• Not talking about modifying the “1” and “0” but the physical denial of the information
• Not cyber attacks but an attack of the spectrum cyber infrastructure
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Spectrum usage critical to national infrastructure
Infrastructure defined as facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the
functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in
the UK depends; UK's national infrastructure is
• communications
• emergency services
• Energy
• financial services
• food
• Government
• health
• transport
• water
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Spectrum use may
be hidden so do
users understand the
spectrum risk

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Spectrum Lifecycle
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http://www.dtic.mil/pae/paeosg02.html
WRC / ITU / Ofcom / ETSI / IEEE
Design out interference
Malicious / accidental
interference – area of interest

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Increasing concern of malicious interference because
Design information
• Increasing availability of spectrum design information,
Technologies
• Availability of highly reconfigurable technologies, makes
disruption to spectrum access easier,
• Sophisticated tools that were once expensive and owned by
nations now available to activists and criminals.
• Not uncommon to find signal jammers for sale.
Cost
• Civil systems may also be more prone to disruption as
interference margins are related to systems cost and size,
Usage
• Do users know how the spectrum is being used.
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From Google

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Disruption examples
• GPS jamming product causing major
disruptions at Newark Airport in New Jersey
• Finland dropped GSM-R in favour of a domestic
radio system due to Interference.
• Rail threats are further highlighted in the
Security of Railways Against Electromagnetic
Attacks conference.
• An accidental example is where the Dynamic
Frequency Selection mechanism was disabled
at 5GHz which resulted in interferences to
meteorological radars.
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Potential Future Example ?
• Autonomous systems – command and control links are interrupted which could
cause crashes e.g. quadcopter hitting infrastructure being surveyed
• Sensing systems – factory wide automated entry that fail to operate due to
interrupted data; near field radar systems collision avoidance systems ; systems
used for logistics
• Wireless offices – if the whole office is wireless what is the business impact of
interrupted services
• Wireless control systems – systems used to control / monitor processes where
equipment fail to open / or result in poor state monitoring for maintenance
• Entertainment / leisure systems – local interference systems used to disrupt home
entertainment and change behaviours
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Other examples of easy access of high technology
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http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2467857/FBI-investigating-latest-
laser-pointer-attacks-pilots-landing-LaGuardia-airport-incidents-rise-17-
cent-New-York-area-airports-year.html
• 1440 reported laser strikes on
aircraft in the UK
• over 3800 in the US in 2014 alone
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/29/dron
es-near-misses-major-uk-airports-heathrow-stansted
• Drones in four near-misses at
major UK airports, air
investigators reveal
Will spectrum access suffer the same way ?

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Today’s Workshop Aim
Society is becoming increasingly reliant on spectrum dependent systems;
e.g. internet of things, smart meters, autonomous vehicles, dependent
on spectrum access, the question must now be asked:
“Do spectrum consumers (uses) understand their spectrum access risk and
is spectrum access a UK critical dependency and a resilience issue?”
• Capture key potential spectrum access risks, (and any examples)
• Describing what the impacts may be – loss of revenue, transport
delays, H&S impacts
• Predict if the problem will get worse in the future
• Suggesting policy initiatives to mitigate the issue.
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