This document discusses three common agency problems that arise in business firms: 1) between owners and managers, 2) between controlling and non-controlling owners, and 3) between the firm and its contractual counterparties. It also outlines ten legal strategies that are used to reduce agency costs arising from these problems, including using rules or standards to constrain agents, regulating terms of entry/exit, aligning incentives, and allocating decision/appointment rights. Reducing agency costs benefits all parties by allowing principals to offer agents higher compensation in exchange for honest, high-quality performance.
BGS-Module 2-Corporate Governance and CSR.pptxvijay312820
Corporate governance refers to the system and processes by which companies are directed and controlled. It establishes accountability, oversight and transparency of a corporation's management and board of directors to its stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors, auditors and regulators. Effective corporate governance helps ensure the efficient functioning of companies and markets. It becomes increasingly important due to changing ownership structures, a focus on social responsibility and the growing number of corporate scams.
This document provides an overview of corporate governance in the banking industry. It discusses how banks differ from other corporations in ways that impact governance, such as their role in liquidity production and reliance on deposits. It also summarizes the Basel Accords, international standards for banking regulation and capital requirements. The Basel II Accord introduced three pillars for governance: Pillar 1 sets minimum capital requirements; Pillar 2 focuses on supervisory review of risks and governance standards; and Pillar 3 promotes market discipline through transparency.
This document provides an overview of corporate governance in the banking industry. It discusses how banks differ from other corporations in ways that impact governance, such as their role in liquidity production and reliance on deposits. It also summarizes the Basel Accords, international standards for banking regulation and capital requirements. The Basel II Accord introduced three pillars for governance: Pillar 1 sets minimum capital requirements; Pillar 2 focuses on supervisory review of risks and governance standards; and Pillar 3 promotes market discipline through transparency.
This paper examines how separation of ownership and control in large corporations can be an efficient organizational structure. It summarizes that management and risk bearing are naturally separate factors that should be viewed independently. The paper argues that markets discipline both managers and risk bearers. Competition in managerial labor markets both within and outside the firm, along with market signals from stock prices, motivate managers to improve performance. Meanwhile, risk bearers are incentivized by diversification across many firms. When combined, these market forces can resolve agency problems from separation of ownership and control.
This document summarizes and critiques the concept of stakeholder management. It makes the following key points in 3 sentences:
Stakeholder management argues that managers should consider the interests of all stakeholders, not just shareholders, in decision making. However, it fails to recognize that serving shareholder interests through the current system of corporate governance can also benefit all stakeholders. While stakeholder management correctly stresses that all stakeholders should benefit, it incorrectly assumes this is the task of management rather than being achieved through other means like markets interacting with corporations.
This document provides a summary of the literature on corporate governance. It discusses how corporate governance addresses conflicts of interest between managers and other stakeholders in companies. The summary focuses on the separation of ownership and control in companies with dispersed shareholders as a key governance problem. It also reviews various external and internal mechanisms used to monitor managers and discipline them, in order to better align manager and shareholder interests.
This document discusses the differences in corporate governance between banks and other firms. It argues that banks require different corporate governance structures than manufacturing companies due to their unique capital structure, liquidity production function, deposit insurance, and risk of moral hazard. The governance of banks is complicated by the many stakeholders involved, including depositors, taxpayers, and regulators. Bank boards of directors play a crucial role in governance but also face additional expectations from regulators beyond other industries. The document also analyzes empirical data that finds bank holding company boards are typically larger with 18 members on average compared to 12 for manufacturing firms. Bank boards are also subject to more meetings per year due to state regulations.
Corporate Governance - A Broader Perspectiveiosrjce
In this paper it is argued that the notion of market-based corporate governance approach should be
broadened to include the problem of owner-controlled firms and large block-holders and should be generalized
to a model of multilateral negotiations and influence-seeking among a number of different stakeholders. In
practice such a model should incorporate checks and balances between various stakeholders and outside
constraints and must take into account how the political and legal system of a country affects this balance. In
fact, even if there is theoretical reason to believe that ownership with its incumbent benefits and costs belongs
to equity, this view is not dominant in most economies outside United Kingdom and United States of America.
The broader notion of corporate governance offers hope for understanding better the developing economies in
particular - and other economies in general - where anonymous stock markets are not likely to promote the
necessary entrepreneurial activity and corporate restructuring. It suggests that other mechanisms, such as
product market competition, peer pressure, or labor market activity, may compensate for this weakness, or more
realistically, may be more promising targets for legal or political reform than the stock market.
BGS-Module 2-Corporate Governance and CSR.pptxvijay312820
Corporate governance refers to the system and processes by which companies are directed and controlled. It establishes accountability, oversight and transparency of a corporation's management and board of directors to its stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors, auditors and regulators. Effective corporate governance helps ensure the efficient functioning of companies and markets. It becomes increasingly important due to changing ownership structures, a focus on social responsibility and the growing number of corporate scams.
This document provides an overview of corporate governance in the banking industry. It discusses how banks differ from other corporations in ways that impact governance, such as their role in liquidity production and reliance on deposits. It also summarizes the Basel Accords, international standards for banking regulation and capital requirements. The Basel II Accord introduced three pillars for governance: Pillar 1 sets minimum capital requirements; Pillar 2 focuses on supervisory review of risks and governance standards; and Pillar 3 promotes market discipline through transparency.
This document provides an overview of corporate governance in the banking industry. It discusses how banks differ from other corporations in ways that impact governance, such as their role in liquidity production and reliance on deposits. It also summarizes the Basel Accords, international standards for banking regulation and capital requirements. The Basel II Accord introduced three pillars for governance: Pillar 1 sets minimum capital requirements; Pillar 2 focuses on supervisory review of risks and governance standards; and Pillar 3 promotes market discipline through transparency.
This paper examines how separation of ownership and control in large corporations can be an efficient organizational structure. It summarizes that management and risk bearing are naturally separate factors that should be viewed independently. The paper argues that markets discipline both managers and risk bearers. Competition in managerial labor markets both within and outside the firm, along with market signals from stock prices, motivate managers to improve performance. Meanwhile, risk bearers are incentivized by diversification across many firms. When combined, these market forces can resolve agency problems from separation of ownership and control.
This document summarizes and critiques the concept of stakeholder management. It makes the following key points in 3 sentences:
Stakeholder management argues that managers should consider the interests of all stakeholders, not just shareholders, in decision making. However, it fails to recognize that serving shareholder interests through the current system of corporate governance can also benefit all stakeholders. While stakeholder management correctly stresses that all stakeholders should benefit, it incorrectly assumes this is the task of management rather than being achieved through other means like markets interacting with corporations.
This document provides a summary of the literature on corporate governance. It discusses how corporate governance addresses conflicts of interest between managers and other stakeholders in companies. The summary focuses on the separation of ownership and control in companies with dispersed shareholders as a key governance problem. It also reviews various external and internal mechanisms used to monitor managers and discipline them, in order to better align manager and shareholder interests.
This document discusses the differences in corporate governance between banks and other firms. It argues that banks require different corporate governance structures than manufacturing companies due to their unique capital structure, liquidity production function, deposit insurance, and risk of moral hazard. The governance of banks is complicated by the many stakeholders involved, including depositors, taxpayers, and regulators. Bank boards of directors play a crucial role in governance but also face additional expectations from regulators beyond other industries. The document also analyzes empirical data that finds bank holding company boards are typically larger with 18 members on average compared to 12 for manufacturing firms. Bank boards are also subject to more meetings per year due to state regulations.
Corporate Governance - A Broader Perspectiveiosrjce
In this paper it is argued that the notion of market-based corporate governance approach should be
broadened to include the problem of owner-controlled firms and large block-holders and should be generalized
to a model of multilateral negotiations and influence-seeking among a number of different stakeholders. In
practice such a model should incorporate checks and balances between various stakeholders and outside
constraints and must take into account how the political and legal system of a country affects this balance. In
fact, even if there is theoretical reason to believe that ownership with its incumbent benefits and costs belongs
to equity, this view is not dominant in most economies outside United Kingdom and United States of America.
The broader notion of corporate governance offers hope for understanding better the developing economies in
particular - and other economies in general - where anonymous stock markets are not likely to promote the
necessary entrepreneurial activity and corporate restructuring. It suggests that other mechanisms, such as
product market competition, peer pressure, or labor market activity, may compensate for this weakness, or more
realistically, may be more promising targets for legal or political reform than the stock market.
Here are some ways the WorldCom board could have improved its corporate governance:
- Been more independent from management and exercised stronger oversight of financial reporting. The board appeared to rubber stamp whatever the CEO wanted.
- Had audit committees comprised solely of independent directors to oversee the financial auditing process. WorldCom's audit committee included non-independent directors.
- Rotated auditing firms more frequently to reduce coziness between auditors and management. WorldCom kept Andersen on for years.
- Established stricter controls over financial reporting to prevent the massive accounting fraud that occurred. No meaningful controls were in place.
- Terminated the CEO once massive accounting problems came to light instead of allowing him to
1) Stakeholder theory asks what responsibility management has to various stakeholders like shareholders, creditors, employees, communities, etc. There is debate around whether shareholders should be considered the primary stakeholders over others.
2) Identifying stakeholders as primary or secondary is problematic as it implies some are less important than others. It is difficult to identify and balance the needs of all stakeholders.
3) Pursuing short-term shareholder returns can intensify pressure on management and increase the risk of fraud, especially if opportunities are available to mitigate that pressure. Long-term attention to both financial and non-financial outcomes for all stakeholders is important for sustainable business practices.
A comparative study of the corporate governance codes of a developing economy...Alexander Decker
This document summarizes and compares corporate governance codes between developing and developed economies. It begins with an abstract describing how corporate governance codes aim to prevent corporate collapses by regulating corporate executives and financial practices. The document then provides details on two case studies of corporate collapses in Nigeria's banking sector to analyze the effectiveness of Nigeria's corporate governance codes. It evaluates Nigeria's codes in light of codes from the UK and US to identify weaknesses. The research method of qualitative analysis through case studies and secondary sources is described as most appropriate.
This document provides an introduction to corporate governance. It begins by defining corporate governance and discussing key theories, including the principal-agent model. It notes the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations. The document outlines various agency problems that can arise, such as between shareholders and managers, and majority vs minority shareholders. It also discusses alternative forms of organization like mutual organizations and employee-owned partnerships.
This document discusses different theories of governance and management's obligations to stakeholders. It covers four main theories - agency theory, stewardship theory, shareholder theory, and stakeholder theory. It also discusses how laws like the UK Companies Act of 2017 and Indian Companies Act recognize stakeholders' interests that company directors must consider. The document outlines issues and responsibilities management has regarding different stakeholder groups like shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, society, and creditors.
This document discusses and defines the concept of corporate governance. It provides definitions from various sources and discusses the importance and significance of corporate governance. Some key points:
1. Corporate governance involves balancing the interests of a company's many stakeholders through systems of rules, practices and processes.
2. It became a pressing issue following accounting scandals to restore confidence in markets.
3. Good corporate governance practices include discipline, transparency, accountability, responsibility and fairness.
This document provides an overview of agency theory and stewardship theory as they relate to corporate governance. It defines agency theory as concerned with conflicts of interest between shareholders, managers, and bondholders due to diverging goals and information asymmetries. The document discusses how agency problems manifest in investment, financing, and risk preference decisions. It also outlines strategies for managing agency problems, such as performance-based pay and restrictive debt covenants. Stewardship theory is introduced as an alternative perspective that views managers as inherently trustworthy and motivated by non-financial factors like responsibility. The document compares how agency and stewardship theories approach CEO duality and board governance. Finally, it provides sample assignment questions analyzing aspects of both theories.
The determinants of financial covenants on private debtAlexander Decker
This document summarizes a research paper that examines the determinants of financial covenants in private debt agreements of listed French companies. It develops hypotheses about factors that may influence the presence of financial covenants, such as borrower characteristics (size, leverage, cash flow, profitability, growth options), debt characteristics (type of debt, credit risk, rating), and uses prior literature to support the hypotheses. The document then outlines the methodology and results of testing these hypotheses on a sample of large listed French firms from 2003-2009 to identify what factors significantly influence the inclusion of financial covenants in private debt contracts.
“Ensuring Competitive Advantage and Sustainability: an Overview of Obligation...inventionjournals
Corporate Governance is a buzz word in the field of economic administration, regulatory framework and behavioral sciences. The subject of corporate governance has its relevance and significance to varied stakeholders in different ways. In fact, Corporate Governance is a form of obligation, which a corporate body has towards shareholders, employees, customers, Government, Public and towards the Society. Organizations, which are known for good governance by fulfilling all these obligations with a proper blend, are the lead players for the others to follow for securing better and effective competitive advantage. Keeping in mind these varied obligations, Organizations and corporate bodies regularly updating their policies and practices especially for continued competitive advantage but the process of updating is not so easy, they have to find it in a pro-active manner to withstand in the market. The present research paper with this in view aimed at understanding the framework of corporate governance and its role in securing better and effective competitive advantage from the ambit of various stakeholders with a broader consideration from the angle and obligation of Sustainability and Corporate Social Responsibility. Further, the study remarked the changing nature obligations for existence of corporate bodies under dynamic environment. The research paper also differentiated the gap between theory and practice in adoption of sustainability practices. Finally, the research paper ends with some suggestions and ways for better and good governance for organizational sustainability.
Agency theory examines conflicts of interest that arise between parties in a principal-agent relationship, such as between shareholders and company managers. It aims to align their goals and reconcile different risk tolerances. Mechanisms for dealing with conflicts include incentive-based executive compensation, shareholder monitoring and intervention, and the threat of firing or takeover. Agency costs refer to the costs shareholders incur to encourage managerial wealth maximization over self-interest. The theory has implications for ethics in balancing principals' and agents' respective duties and interests.
Agency theory examines conflicts of interest that arise between parties in a principal-agent relationship, such as between shareholders and company managers. It aims to align their goals and reconcile different risk tolerances. Mechanisms for dealing with conflicts include incentive-based executive compensation, monitoring by shareholders, and the threat of firing or takeover. Agency costs are those borne by shareholders to encourage managerial wealth maximization rather than self-interest. The theory has implications for ethics in balancing principals' and agents' respective duties and interests.
The document discusses principal-agent theory and different approaches to addressing principal-agent problems, including through incentives, monitoring, and cooperation. It provides examples of how firms like Pepsico rely more on incentives, while General Motors relies more on monitoring. Cooperation and teamwork are emphasized at firms like Southwest Airlines. The challenges of balancing incentives with risk are also covered.
There are two types of life insurance companies: stock and mutual. Stock companies are owned by shareholders, while mutual companies are owned by policyholders. Principal-agent relationships differ between the two, with stock companies having separate stockholder and manager roles and mutual companies merging the roles of stockholder and policyholder. Principal-agent conflicts can arise when the goals of these groups differ. Various mechanisms like managerial compensation and board control help address these conflicts.
Discussion QuestionHow much, if any, action on ergonomics in th.docxduketjoy27252
Discussion Question:
How much, if any, action on ergonomics in the work-place should rely on the voluntary actions of employers (as favored by George W. Bush) and how much should be mandatory on the part of managements. Explain.
Read the following:
Chapter 9 – Institutional Issues under Collective Bargaining
Chapter 10 – Administrative Issues under Collective Bargaining
Chapter Summaries
Chapter 9 – Institutional Issues under Collective Bargaining
The rights and duties of the employers, employees, and unions are the institutional issues of collective bargaining. On occasion, they can be more troublesome than the economic questions involved with wages and benefits. Some of the longest and most bitter strikes have resulted from conflict over the institutional questions of labor relations.
One of the most controversial issues is union membership as a condition of employment. Labor organizations seeking greater security have negotiated a number of compulsory union membership devices, the most common being the union shop. The closed shop, maintenance-of-membership arrangement, agency shop, and the preferential shop are other security measures that appear less frequently. The growth of the union shop is best explained by the Taft-Hartley prohibition of the closed shop in firms engaged in interstate commerce. The goal of each of these measures is to establish and maintain the institutional security of the union. Such devices are present in about 82 percent of today’s collective bargaining contracts.
There are elements of morality, labor relations stability, and power in this area. Union security may provide stability in industrial relations, but is it moral to compel a worker to join a union? Are these ideological and philosophical issues a mere disguise for the real goal, increased power and influence? Some twenty-two states now have legislation that bans any form of compulsory union membership. These “right-to-work” laws are formidable obstacles in the path of union institutional security. Although Congress has preemptive power in the field of interstate commerce, this state legislation is likely to be allowed to stand.
More than 95 percent of current contracts contain a checkoff procedure by which the employer collects union dues, and often other fees, by deduction from the worker’s paycheck. The advantage to the union is a savings of time and money. The checkoff also can benefit the employer, which explains why it is not a crucial issue of negotiation. Taft-Hartley requires the written authorization of the employee for such an arrangement, which is irrevocable for one year, or the duration of the contract, whichever is shorter. Usually the individual has an annual opportunity to rescind his authorization. If he or she does not, the checkoff remains in force for another year.
The obligations of the union are typically set down in one or more provisions of the contract. The most important is a pledge by the union not to strik.
This white paper examines the two primary sources of compliance obligations related to contracts: performance obligations and government regulations. For each source of compliance challenge, this paper identifies methods to improve compliance and contract management. Finally, this paper examines the kind of reporting that makes
Contracts create the network of relationships that allow organizations to thrive. Contracts generate revenue and control expenses. They allocate risks and responsibilities. Contracts create assets and liabilities. Contracts are the foundation of enterprise.
Compliance requirements touch every organization across industries. Regulations can lay down the rules of the road or impose barriers to business. Compliance is essential for success, like good brakes on a car.
The document discusses corporate governance in India, highlighting several key points:
1. Corporate governance issues are universal but particularly important in India due to features like family-run businesses, weak legal enforcement, and high ownership concentration.
2. Effective corporate governance promotes strong financial systems and economic growth by enhancing access to financing and investment while reducing risks.
3. The main challenges are ensuring managers serve shareholder interests and protecting minority shareholder rights in contexts like family businesses where interests may not align.
Mba1034 cg law ethics week 2 corporate governance introStephen Ong
This document provides an introduction to corporate governance. It begins by defining corporate governance and discussing the key theoretical models, including:
1) Principal-agent theory, which describes the conflicts of interest that can arise between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) due to information asymmetries.
2) The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations, where professional managers control companies owned by dispersed shareholders.
3) The agency problems that can result from this separation, such as managers prioritizing their own interests through perks or empire building rather than maximizing shareholder value.
The document then discusses alternative forms of corporate organization beyond public companies, such as mutual organizations, before concluding with definitions
Visual Medium Advertisement Analysis Es. Online assignment writing service.Sheila Sinclair
The document provides instructions for requesting and completing an assignment writing request through the website HelpWriting.net. It outlines a 5-step process: 1) Create an account with a password and email. 2) Complete a 10-minute order form providing instructions, sources, and deadline. 3) Review bids from writers and choose one. 4) Review the completed paper and authorize payment. 5) Request revisions to ensure satisfaction, with the option of a full refund for plagiarized work.
Personal Essay Template. The Per. Online assignment writing service.Sheila Sinclair
The document discusses both the positive and negative impacts of globalization. It notes that globalization can both promote progress through greater interconnectivity between people worldwide, but can also lead to cultural homogenization and the alteration of local cultural values and traditions. Specifically, the document states that while globalization expands exposure to foreign cultures, it can also influence people, especially younger generations, to take on global cultural trends at the expense of their traditional local identities. Both benefits like the spread of ideas and challenges like changes in traditional customs are discussed as complex effects of the growing interconnectedness between societies worldwide under globalization.
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Here are some ways the WorldCom board could have improved its corporate governance:
- Been more independent from management and exercised stronger oversight of financial reporting. The board appeared to rubber stamp whatever the CEO wanted.
- Had audit committees comprised solely of independent directors to oversee the financial auditing process. WorldCom's audit committee included non-independent directors.
- Rotated auditing firms more frequently to reduce coziness between auditors and management. WorldCom kept Andersen on for years.
- Established stricter controls over financial reporting to prevent the massive accounting fraud that occurred. No meaningful controls were in place.
- Terminated the CEO once massive accounting problems came to light instead of allowing him to
1) Stakeholder theory asks what responsibility management has to various stakeholders like shareholders, creditors, employees, communities, etc. There is debate around whether shareholders should be considered the primary stakeholders over others.
2) Identifying stakeholders as primary or secondary is problematic as it implies some are less important than others. It is difficult to identify and balance the needs of all stakeholders.
3) Pursuing short-term shareholder returns can intensify pressure on management and increase the risk of fraud, especially if opportunities are available to mitigate that pressure. Long-term attention to both financial and non-financial outcomes for all stakeholders is important for sustainable business practices.
A comparative study of the corporate governance codes of a developing economy...Alexander Decker
This document summarizes and compares corporate governance codes between developing and developed economies. It begins with an abstract describing how corporate governance codes aim to prevent corporate collapses by regulating corporate executives and financial practices. The document then provides details on two case studies of corporate collapses in Nigeria's banking sector to analyze the effectiveness of Nigeria's corporate governance codes. It evaluates Nigeria's codes in light of codes from the UK and US to identify weaknesses. The research method of qualitative analysis through case studies and secondary sources is described as most appropriate.
This document provides an introduction to corporate governance. It begins by defining corporate governance and discussing key theories, including the principal-agent model. It notes the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations. The document outlines various agency problems that can arise, such as between shareholders and managers, and majority vs minority shareholders. It also discusses alternative forms of organization like mutual organizations and employee-owned partnerships.
This document discusses different theories of governance and management's obligations to stakeholders. It covers four main theories - agency theory, stewardship theory, shareholder theory, and stakeholder theory. It also discusses how laws like the UK Companies Act of 2017 and Indian Companies Act recognize stakeholders' interests that company directors must consider. The document outlines issues and responsibilities management has regarding different stakeholder groups like shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, society, and creditors.
This document discusses and defines the concept of corporate governance. It provides definitions from various sources and discusses the importance and significance of corporate governance. Some key points:
1. Corporate governance involves balancing the interests of a company's many stakeholders through systems of rules, practices and processes.
2. It became a pressing issue following accounting scandals to restore confidence in markets.
3. Good corporate governance practices include discipline, transparency, accountability, responsibility and fairness.
This document provides an overview of agency theory and stewardship theory as they relate to corporate governance. It defines agency theory as concerned with conflicts of interest between shareholders, managers, and bondholders due to diverging goals and information asymmetries. The document discusses how agency problems manifest in investment, financing, and risk preference decisions. It also outlines strategies for managing agency problems, such as performance-based pay and restrictive debt covenants. Stewardship theory is introduced as an alternative perspective that views managers as inherently trustworthy and motivated by non-financial factors like responsibility. The document compares how agency and stewardship theories approach CEO duality and board governance. Finally, it provides sample assignment questions analyzing aspects of both theories.
The determinants of financial covenants on private debtAlexander Decker
This document summarizes a research paper that examines the determinants of financial covenants in private debt agreements of listed French companies. It develops hypotheses about factors that may influence the presence of financial covenants, such as borrower characteristics (size, leverage, cash flow, profitability, growth options), debt characteristics (type of debt, credit risk, rating), and uses prior literature to support the hypotheses. The document then outlines the methodology and results of testing these hypotheses on a sample of large listed French firms from 2003-2009 to identify what factors significantly influence the inclusion of financial covenants in private debt contracts.
“Ensuring Competitive Advantage and Sustainability: an Overview of Obligation...inventionjournals
Corporate Governance is a buzz word in the field of economic administration, regulatory framework and behavioral sciences. The subject of corporate governance has its relevance and significance to varied stakeholders in different ways. In fact, Corporate Governance is a form of obligation, which a corporate body has towards shareholders, employees, customers, Government, Public and towards the Society. Organizations, which are known for good governance by fulfilling all these obligations with a proper blend, are the lead players for the others to follow for securing better and effective competitive advantage. Keeping in mind these varied obligations, Organizations and corporate bodies regularly updating their policies and practices especially for continued competitive advantage but the process of updating is not so easy, they have to find it in a pro-active manner to withstand in the market. The present research paper with this in view aimed at understanding the framework of corporate governance and its role in securing better and effective competitive advantage from the ambit of various stakeholders with a broader consideration from the angle and obligation of Sustainability and Corporate Social Responsibility. Further, the study remarked the changing nature obligations for existence of corporate bodies under dynamic environment. The research paper also differentiated the gap between theory and practice in adoption of sustainability practices. Finally, the research paper ends with some suggestions and ways for better and good governance for organizational sustainability.
Agency theory examines conflicts of interest that arise between parties in a principal-agent relationship, such as between shareholders and company managers. It aims to align their goals and reconcile different risk tolerances. Mechanisms for dealing with conflicts include incentive-based executive compensation, shareholder monitoring and intervention, and the threat of firing or takeover. Agency costs refer to the costs shareholders incur to encourage managerial wealth maximization over self-interest. The theory has implications for ethics in balancing principals' and agents' respective duties and interests.
Agency theory examines conflicts of interest that arise between parties in a principal-agent relationship, such as between shareholders and company managers. It aims to align their goals and reconcile different risk tolerances. Mechanisms for dealing with conflicts include incentive-based executive compensation, monitoring by shareholders, and the threat of firing or takeover. Agency costs are those borne by shareholders to encourage managerial wealth maximization rather than self-interest. The theory has implications for ethics in balancing principals' and agents' respective duties and interests.
The document discusses principal-agent theory and different approaches to addressing principal-agent problems, including through incentives, monitoring, and cooperation. It provides examples of how firms like Pepsico rely more on incentives, while General Motors relies more on monitoring. Cooperation and teamwork are emphasized at firms like Southwest Airlines. The challenges of balancing incentives with risk are also covered.
There are two types of life insurance companies: stock and mutual. Stock companies are owned by shareholders, while mutual companies are owned by policyholders. Principal-agent relationships differ between the two, with stock companies having separate stockholder and manager roles and mutual companies merging the roles of stockholder and policyholder. Principal-agent conflicts can arise when the goals of these groups differ. Various mechanisms like managerial compensation and board control help address these conflicts.
Discussion QuestionHow much, if any, action on ergonomics in th.docxduketjoy27252
Discussion Question:
How much, if any, action on ergonomics in the work-place should rely on the voluntary actions of employers (as favored by George W. Bush) and how much should be mandatory on the part of managements. Explain.
Read the following:
Chapter 9 – Institutional Issues under Collective Bargaining
Chapter 10 – Administrative Issues under Collective Bargaining
Chapter Summaries
Chapter 9 – Institutional Issues under Collective Bargaining
The rights and duties of the employers, employees, and unions are the institutional issues of collective bargaining. On occasion, they can be more troublesome than the economic questions involved with wages and benefits. Some of the longest and most bitter strikes have resulted from conflict over the institutional questions of labor relations.
One of the most controversial issues is union membership as a condition of employment. Labor organizations seeking greater security have negotiated a number of compulsory union membership devices, the most common being the union shop. The closed shop, maintenance-of-membership arrangement, agency shop, and the preferential shop are other security measures that appear less frequently. The growth of the union shop is best explained by the Taft-Hartley prohibition of the closed shop in firms engaged in interstate commerce. The goal of each of these measures is to establish and maintain the institutional security of the union. Such devices are present in about 82 percent of today’s collective bargaining contracts.
There are elements of morality, labor relations stability, and power in this area. Union security may provide stability in industrial relations, but is it moral to compel a worker to join a union? Are these ideological and philosophical issues a mere disguise for the real goal, increased power and influence? Some twenty-two states now have legislation that bans any form of compulsory union membership. These “right-to-work” laws are formidable obstacles in the path of union institutional security. Although Congress has preemptive power in the field of interstate commerce, this state legislation is likely to be allowed to stand.
More than 95 percent of current contracts contain a checkoff procedure by which the employer collects union dues, and often other fees, by deduction from the worker’s paycheck. The advantage to the union is a savings of time and money. The checkoff also can benefit the employer, which explains why it is not a crucial issue of negotiation. Taft-Hartley requires the written authorization of the employee for such an arrangement, which is irrevocable for one year, or the duration of the contract, whichever is shorter. Usually the individual has an annual opportunity to rescind his authorization. If he or she does not, the checkoff remains in force for another year.
The obligations of the union are typically set down in one or more provisions of the contract. The most important is a pledge by the union not to strik.
This white paper examines the two primary sources of compliance obligations related to contracts: performance obligations and government regulations. For each source of compliance challenge, this paper identifies methods to improve compliance and contract management. Finally, this paper examines the kind of reporting that makes
Contracts create the network of relationships that allow organizations to thrive. Contracts generate revenue and control expenses. They allocate risks and responsibilities. Contracts create assets and liabilities. Contracts are the foundation of enterprise.
Compliance requirements touch every organization across industries. Regulations can lay down the rules of the road or impose barriers to business. Compliance is essential for success, like good brakes on a car.
The document discusses corporate governance in India, highlighting several key points:
1. Corporate governance issues are universal but particularly important in India due to features like family-run businesses, weak legal enforcement, and high ownership concentration.
2. Effective corporate governance promotes strong financial systems and economic growth by enhancing access to financing and investment while reducing risks.
3. The main challenges are ensuring managers serve shareholder interests and protecting minority shareholder rights in contexts like family businesses where interests may not align.
Mba1034 cg law ethics week 2 corporate governance introStephen Ong
This document provides an introduction to corporate governance. It begins by defining corporate governance and discussing the key theoretical models, including:
1) Principal-agent theory, which describes the conflicts of interest that can arise between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) due to information asymmetries.
2) The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations, where professional managers control companies owned by dispersed shareholders.
3) The agency problems that can result from this separation, such as managers prioritizing their own interests through perks or empire building rather than maximizing shareholder value.
The document then discusses alternative forms of corporate organization beyond public companies, such as mutual organizations, before concluding with definitions
Visual Medium Advertisement Analysis Es. Online assignment writing service.Sheila Sinclair
The document provides instructions for requesting and completing an assignment writing request through the website HelpWriting.net. It outlines a 5-step process: 1) Create an account with a password and email. 2) Complete a 10-minute order form providing instructions, sources, and deadline. 3) Review bids from writers and choose one. 4) Review the completed paper and authorize payment. 5) Request revisions to ensure satisfaction, with the option of a full refund for plagiarized work.
Personal Essay Template. The Per. Online assignment writing service.Sheila Sinclair
The document discusses both the positive and negative impacts of globalization. It notes that globalization can both promote progress through greater interconnectivity between people worldwide, but can also lead to cultural homogenization and the alteration of local cultural values and traditions. Specifically, the document states that while globalization expands exposure to foreign cultures, it can also influence people, especially younger generations, to take on global cultural trends at the expense of their traditional local identities. Both benefits like the spread of ideas and challenges like changes in traditional customs are discussed as complex effects of the growing interconnectedness between societies worldwide under globalization.
Steps On How To Write An Essay. Steps To Writing AnSheila Sinclair
The document provides 5 steps for writing an essay through the website HelpWriting.net:
1. Create an account with a password and email.
2. Complete a 10-minute order form providing instructions, sources, and deadline.
3. Review bids from writers and choose one based on qualifications.
4. Review the paper and authorize payment if pleased. Revisions are allowed.
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2. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies
30
30
that the managers are responsive to the owners’ interests rather than pursuing their
own personal interests.
The second agency problem involves the conflict between, on one hand, owners
who possess the majority or controlling interest in the firm and, on the other hand, the
minority or noncontrolling owners. Here the noncontrolling owners can be thought
of as the principals and the controlling owners as the agents, and the difficulty lies
in assuring that the former are not expropriated by the latter. While this problem is
most conspicuous in tensions between majority and minority shareholders,4 it appears
whenever some subset of a firm’s owners can control decisions affecting the class of
owners as a whole. Thus if minority shareholders enjoy veto rights in relation to partic-
ular decisions, it can give rise to a species of this second agency problem. Similar prob-
lems can arise between ordinary and preference shareholders, and between senior and
junior creditors in bankruptcy (when creditors are the effective owners of the firm).
The third agency problem involves the conflict between the firm itself—including,
particularly, its owners—and the other parties with whom the firm contracts, such as
creditors, employees, and customers. Here the difficulty lies in assuring that the firm, as
agent, does not behave opportunistically toward these various other principals—such
as by expropriating creditors, exploiting workers, or misleading consumers. In addition
to these agency problems—which we view as fundamentally voluntary in nature—
there are also situations where a firm imposes costs on parties who do not contract
with it—so-called “externalities.” We treat these issues specifically in Chapters 4 and 5.
In each of the foregoing problems, the challenge of assuring agents’ responsiveness
is greater where there are multiple principals—and especially so where they have diver-
ging interests, or “heterogeneous preferences” as economists say. Multiple principals
will face information and coordination costs, which will inhibit their ability to engage in
collective action.5 These in turn will interact with agency problems in two ways. First,
difficulties of coordinating between principals will lead them to delegate more of their
decision-making to agents.6 Second, the more difficult it is for principals to coordinate
on a single set of goals for the agent, the harder it is to ensure that the agent does the
“right” thing.7 Coordination costs as between principals thereby exacerbate agency
problems.
Law can play an important role in reducing agency costs. Obvious examples are rules
and procedures that enhance disclosure by agents or facilitate enforcement actions
brought by principals against dishonest or negligent agents. Paradoxically, mechanisms
that impose constraints on agents’ ability to exploit their principals tend to benefit
agents as much as—or even more than—they benefit the principals. The reason is that
a principal will be willing to offer greater compensation to an agent when the principal
is assured of performance that is honest and of high quality. To take a conspicuous
example in the corporate context, rules of law that protect creditors from opportunistic
behavior on the part of corporations should reduce the interest rate that corporations
4 These problems become more severe the smaller the degree of ownership of the firm that is
enjoyed by the controlling shareholder. See Luca Enriques and Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance
Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 Journal of Economic Perspectives 117, 122–5 (2007).
5 Classic statements of this problem are found in James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent 63–116 (1962) and Mancur Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action
(1965).
6 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
66–7 (1991).
7 See Hideki Kanda, Debtholders and Equityholders, 21 Journal of Legal Studies 431, 440–1,
444–5 (1992); Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 39–44 (1996).
3. Legal Strategies for Reducing Agency Costs 31
31
must pay for credit, thus benefiting corporations as well as creditors. Likewise, legal
constraints on the ability of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority share-
holders should increase the price at which shares can be sold to noncontrolling share-
holders, hence reducing the cost of outside equity capital for corporations. And rules
of law that inhibit insider trading by corporate managers should increase the compen-
sation that shareholders are willing to offer the managers. In general, reducing agency
costs is in the interests of all parties to a transaction, principals and agents alike.
It follows that the normative goal of advancing aggregate social welfare, as discussed
in Chapter 1,8 is generally equivalent to searching for optimal solutions to the corpora-
tion’s agency problems, in the sense of finding solutions that maximize the aggregate
welfare of the parties involved—that is, of both principals and agents taken together.
2.2 Legal Strategies for Reducing Agency Costs
In addressing agency problems, the law turns repeatedly to a basic set of strategies. We
use the term “legal strategy” to mean a generic method of deploying law instrumentally
in a functional way—the function in this context being to mitigate the vulnerability
of principals to the opportunism of their agents. A rule of law implementing a legal
strategy may be, as discussed in Chapter 1, either a mandatory or a default rule, or
one among a menu of alternative rules.9 Indeed, most such strategies do not neces-
sarily require generally applicable legal norms for their implementation: a practice of
contracting may be an effective substitute, or contracts may complement a general rule
by tailoring it to particular circumstances. We observed in Chapter 1 that, of the five
defining characteristics of the corporate form, only one—legal personality—clearly
requires special rules of law.10 The other characteristics could, in principle, be adopted
by contract—for example, through appropriate provisions in the articles of association
agreed to by the firm’s owners.11 The same is true of the various strategies we set out
in this section.12 It follows that the contribution of “the law” in implementing legal
strategies will vary depending on the strategy in question.
Legal strategies for controlling agency costs can be loosely categorized into two sub-
sets, which we term, respectively, “regulatory strategies” and “governance strategies.”
Regulatory strategies are prescriptive: they dictate substantive terms that govern the
content of the principal-agent relationship, tending to constrain the agent’s behavior
directly. By contrast, governance strategies seek to facilitate the principals’ control over
their agent’s behavior.13
The efficacy of governance strategies depends crucially on the ability of the prin-
cipals to exercise their control rights. Coordination costs between principals will
make it more difficult for them either to monitor the agent so as to determine the
8 See Chapter 1.5.
9 See the discussion of the various forms that rules can take in Chapter 1.3–1.4.
10 See Chapter 1.2.1.
11 Law can, however, provide useful assistance to parties in relation to these other characteristics
through the provision of “standard forms.” See Chapter 1.4.1.
12 For evidence on the role of contractual solutions to agency problems adopted by individual
firms, see Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2003); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell,
What Matters in Corporate Governance? 22 Review of Financial Studies 783 (2009).
13 An alternative labelling would therefore be a distinction between “agent-constraining” and
“principal-empowering” strategies.
4. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies
32
32
appropriateness of her actions, or to decide whether, and how, to take action to sanc-
tion nonperformance. High coordination costs thus render governance strategies less
successful in controlling agents, and—other things equal—make regulatory strategies
more attractive.
Regulatory strategies have different preconditions for success. Most obviously,
they depend for efficacy on the ability of an external authority—a court or regula-
tory body—with sufficient expertise to determine whether or not the agent complied
with particular prescriptions. To be sure, governance strategies rely too on legal insti-
tutions to protect the principals’ decision-making entitlements as respects corporate
assets—that is, their “property rights.”14 But governance strategies themselves do not
specify appropriate courses of action. Specification of agents’ required behavior also
presupposes effective disclosure mechanisms to ensure that information about the
actions of agents can be “verified” by the relevant external body. In contrast, gover-
nance strategies—where the principals are able to exercise them usefully—require for
effective decisions only that the principals themselves are able to observe the actions
taken by the agent, for which purpose “softer” information may suffice.
Table 2–1 sets out ten legal strategies which, taken together, span the law’s principal
methods of dealing with agency problems. These strategies are not limited to the cor-
porate context; they can be deployed to protect nearly any vulnerable principal-agent
relationship. Our focus here, however, is naturally on the ways that these strategies are
deployed in corporate law. At the outset, we should emphasize that the aim of this exer-
cise is not to provide an authoritative taxonomy, but simply to offer a heuristic device
for thinking about the functional role of law in corporate affairs. As a result, the vari-
ous strategies are not entirely discrete but sometimes overlap, and our categorization
of these strategies does not correlate perfectly with corporate law doctrine. Moreover,
their use in practice is not mutually exclusive: they may be applied, as appropriate, in
combination or individually.
2.2.1 Rules and standards
The most familiar pair of regulatory strategies constrains agents by commanding
them not to take courses of action that would harm the interests of their principals.
Lawmakers can frame such constraints as rules, which require or prohibit specific
behaviors, or as general standards, which leave the precise determination of compliance
to adjudicators after the fact.
Both rules and standards attempt to regulate the substance of agency relationships
directly. Rules, which prescribe specific behaviors ex ante,15 are commonly used in the
14 See Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 119, at 123–5 (1988).
15 For the canonical comparison of the merits of rules and standards as regulatory techniques,
see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke Law Journal 557 (1992).
Table 2–1 Legal Strategies for Protecting Principals
Agent
Constraints
Affiliation
Terms
Incentive
Alignment
Appointment
Rights
Decision
Rights
Ex Ante Rules Entry Trusteeship Selection Initiation
Ex Post Standards Exit Reward Removal Veto
5. Legal Strategies for Reducing Agency Costs 33
33
corporate context to protect a corporation’s creditors and public investors. Thus cor-
poration statutes universally include creditor protection rules such as dividend restric-
tions, minimum capitalization requirements, or rules requiring action to be taken
following serious loss of capital.16 Similarly, capital market authorities frequently pro-
mulgate detailed rules to govern takeovers and proxy voting.17
By contrast, few jurisdictions rely solely on rules for regulating complex, intra-
corporate relations, such as, for example, self-dealing transactions initiated by con-
trolling shareholders. Such matters are presumably too complex to regulate with just
a matrix of prohibitions and exemptions, which would threaten to codify loopholes
and create pointless rigidities. Rather than rule-based regulation, then, intra-corporate
topics such as insider self-dealing tend to be governed by open standards that leave
discretion for adjudicators to determine ex post whether violations have occurred.18
Standards are also used to protect creditors and public investors, but the paradigmatic
examples of standards-based regulation relate to the company’s internal affairs, as when
the law requires directors to act in “good faith” or mandates that self-dealing transac-
tions be “entirely fair.”19
The efficacy of both rules and standards depends in large measure on the vigor with
which they are enforced. In principle, rules can be mechanically enforced, but require
effort to be invested ex ante by rule-making bodies to ensure they are appropriately
drafted. Standards, in contrast, require courts (or other adjudicators) to become more
deeply involved in evaluating and sometimes molding corporate decisions ex post.20
These decisions themselves then prescribe the standard to future parties, over time
building up to a body of guidance.
2.2.2 Setting the terms of entry and exit
A second set of regulatory strategies open to the law involve regulating the terms
on which principals affiliate with agents rather than—as with rules and standards—
regulating the actions of agents after the principal-agent relationship is established.
The law can dictate terms of entry by, for example, requiring agents to disclose informa-
tion about the likely quality of their performance before contracting with principals.21
Alternatively, the law can prescribe exit opportunities for principals, such as awarding
to a shareholder the right to sell her stock, or awarding to a creditor the right to call
for repayment of a loan. In publicly traded companies, the way in which these strate-
gies are deployed affects directly the operation of capital markets and the market for
corporate control.
The entry strategy is particularly important in screening out opportunistic agents
in the public capital markets.22 Outside investors know little about public companies
unless they are told. Thus, it is widely accepted that public investors require some
16 See Chapter 5.2.2.
17 See e.g. Chapter 8.1.2.4 (takeovers) and Chapter 3.2.4 (proxy voting).
18 See Chapter 6.2.5. This is not to say that rules are wholly absent from such situations: some
jurisdictions regulate forms of self-dealing judged to merit particular suspicion through rules in com-
bination with a more general standards strategy.
19 See Chapter 6.2.5.
20 In this sense, standards lie between rules (which simply require a decision-maker to determine
compliance) and another strategy that we will address below—the trusteeship strategy, which requires
a neutral decision-maker to exercise his or her own good faith best judgment in making a corporate
decision.
21 See Chapter 5.2.1 and Chapter 9.1.2. 22 See Chapter 9.1.2.
6. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies
34
34
form of systematic disclosure to obtain an adequate supply of information. Legal rules
mandating such disclosure provide an example of an entry strategy because stocks
cannot be sold unless the requisite information is supplied, generally by the corpora-
tion itself.23 A similar but more extreme form of the entry strategy is a requirement
that the purchasers of certain securities meet a threshold of net worth or financial
sophistication.24
The exit strategy, which is also pervasive in corporate law, allows principals to escape
opportunistic agents. Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of exit rights. The first is
the right to withdraw the value of one’s investment. The best example of such a right
in corporate law is the technique, employed in some jurisdictions, of awarding an
appraisal right to shareholders who dissent from certain major transactions such as
mergers.25 As we discuss in Chapter 7,26 appraisal permits shareholders who object to
a significant transaction to claim the value that their shares had prior to the disputed
transaction—thus avoiding a prospective loss if, in their view, the firm has made a
value-reducing decision.
The second type of exit right is the right of transfer—the right to sell shares—which is
of obvious importance to public shareholders. (Recall that transferability of shares is a
core characteristic of the corporate form.) Standing alone, a transfer right provides less
protection than a withdrawal right, since an informed transferee steps into the shoes of
the transferor, and will therefore offer a price that impounds the expected future loss
of value from insider mismanagement or opportunism. But the transfer right permits
the replacement of the current shareholder/principal(s) by a new one that may be more
effective in controlling the firm’s management. Thus, unimpeded transfer rights allow
hostile takeovers in which the disaggregated shareholders of a mismanaged company
can sell their shares to a single active shareholder with a strong financial interest in
efficient management.27 Such a transfer of control rights, or even the threat of it, can
be a highly effective device for disciplining management.28 Moreover, transfer rights
are a prerequisite for stock markets, which also empower disaggregated shareholders by
providing a continuous assessment of managerial performance (among other things) in
23 The role of disclosure rules in facilitating entry is most intuitive in relation to prospectus dis-
closure for initial public offerings, and new issues of seasoned equity. Ongoing disclosure rules may
to some extent also facilitate entry, by new shareholders in the secondary market, while at the same
time facilitating exit by existing shareholders—an example of a single set of rules implementing more
than one strategy. However, the function of ongoing disclosure rules is more general: see Section 2.3
and Chapter 9.1.2.
24 See Chapter 9.1.2.4.
25 The withdrawal right is a dominant governance device for the regulation of some non-corporate
forms of enterprise such as the common law partnership at will, which can be dissolved at any time
by any partner. Business corporations sometimes grant similar withdrawal rights to their shareholders
through special charter provisions. The most conspicuous example is provided by open-ended invest-
ment companies, such as mutual funds in the U.S., which are frequently formed as business corpora-
tions under the general corporation statutes. The universal default regime in corporate law, however,
provides for a much more limited set of withdrawal rights for shareholders, and in some jurisdictions
none at all. See John Morley and Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale Law Journal 84 (2010).
26 See Chapter 7.2.2, 7.4.1.2.
27 Many firms introduce contractual provisions which serve to restrict transfer rights, such as “poi-
son pills”: see Bebchuk et al., note 12. Some jurisdictions impose limits on the extent to which transfer
rights may be impeded. An example is the EU’s “breakthrough rule” for takeovers, implemented in a
few European countries. See Chapter 8.4.2.2.
28 Viewed this way, of course, legal rules that enhance transferability serve not just as an instance of
the exit strategy but, simultaneously, as an instance of the entry strategy and incentive strategy as well.
The same legal device can serve multiple protective functions.
7. Legal Strategies for Reducing Agency Costs 35
35
the form of share prices.29 Mandated disclosure also assists with this version of the exit
strategy, by increasing transparency for existing investors and potential bidders about
whether the company is underperforming under its current management team.30
2.2.3 Trusteeship and reward
Thus far we have described regulatory strategies that might be extended for the protec-
tion of vulnerable parties in any class of contractual relationships. We now move to
strategies that relate to the hierarchical elements of the principal-agent relationship.
We consider first incentive alignment strategies, which straddle the boundary between
regulatory and governance strategies.
The first incentive alignment strategy—the trusteeship strategy—seeks to remove
conflicts of interest ex ante to ensure that an agent will not obtain personal gain
from disserving her principal. In many contexts—including its origin in the role of a
“trustee” proper—this involves a regulatory strategy, which does not define what the
agent can do, but rather what she can’t do.31 This strategy assumes that, in the absence
of strongly focused—or “high-powered”—monetary incentives to behave opportunis-
tically, agents will respond to the “low-powered” incentives of conscience, pride, and
reputation,32 and are thus more likely to manage in the interests of their principals.
One well-known example of the trusteeship strategy is the “independent director,”
now relied upon in many jurisdictions to monitor management. Such directors will
not personally profit from actions that disproportionately benefit the firm’s manag-
ers or controlling shareholders, and hence are expected to be guided more strongly
by conscience and reputation in making decisions.33 Similarly, reliance on auditors
to approve financial statements and certain corporate transactions is also an example
of trusteeship, provided the auditors are motivated principally by reputational con-
cerns.34 In certain circumstances other agents external to the corporation may be called
29 See James Dow and Gary Gorton, Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a
Connection? 52 Journal of Finance 1087 (1997). And see Chapter 9.1.1.
30 See John Armour and Brian Cheffins, Stock Market Prices and the Market for Corporate Control,
2016 University of Illinois Law Review 101 (2016).
31 See Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-
Fiduciary Duties (2010).
32 We use the terms “high-powered incentives” and “low-powered incentives” as they are conven-
tionally used in the economics literature, to refer to the distinction between economic incentives on
the one hand and ethical or moral incentives on the other. These correspond to some degree with the
distinction drawn in the psychology literature between “extrinsic” (instrumental) and “intrinsic” (for an
activity’s own sake) motivation. Economic incentives are high-powered in the sense that they are con-
crete and sharply focused. See e.g. Williamson, note 2, 137–41; Bengt Hölmstrom and Paul Milgrom,
The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 American Economic Review 972 (1994). By referring to moral
norms as “low-powered” incentives we do not mean to imply that they are generally less important in
governing human behavior than are monetary incentives. Surely, for most individuals in most circum-
stances, the opposite is true, and civilization would not have come very far if this were not the case.
33 On the reputational consequences for independent directors of poor performance, see David
Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 54 Journal of
Finance 2281 (2004); Eliezer M. Fich and Anil Shivdasani, Financial Fraud, Director Reputation,
and Shareholder Wealth, 86 Journal of Financial Economics 306 (2007); Ronald W. Masulis and
Shawn Mobbs, Independent Director Incentives: Where do Talented Directors Spend their Limited Time
and Energy? 111 Journal of Financial Economics 406 (2014).
34 While auditors face reputational sanctions for failure (see e.g. Jan Barton, Who Cares About
Auditor Reputation? 22 Contemporary Accounting Research 549 (2005)), their independence
and hence trustee status may be compromised by financial incentives in the form of consulting con-
tracts: see John C. Coffee, What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89
Cornell Law Review 269, 291–3 (2004).
8. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies
36
36
upon to serve as trustees, as when the law requires an investment banker, a state official,
or a court to approve corporate action.
The second incentive strategy is the reward strategy, which—as the name implies—
rewards agents for successfully advancing the interests of their principals. Broadly
speaking, there are two major reward mechanisms in corporate law. The more common
form of reward is a sharing rule that motivates loyalty by tying the agent’s monetary
returns directly to those of the principal. A conspicuous example is the protection that
minority shareholders enjoy from the equal treatment norm, which requires a strictly
pro rata distribution of dividends.35 As a consequence of this rule, controlling share-
holders—here the “agents”—have an incentive to maximize the returns of the firm’s
minority shareholders—here the “principals”—at least to the extent that corporate
returns are paid out as dividends.
The reward mechanism less commonly the focus of corporate law is the pay-for-
performance regime, in which an agent, although not sharing in his principal’s returns,
is nonetheless paid for successfully advancing her interests. Even though no jurisdic-
tion imposes such a scheme on shareholders, legal rules often either facilitate or dis-
courage high-powered incentives of this sort.36 American law, for example, has actively
encouraged incentive compensation devices such as stock option plans,37 while more
skeptical jurisdictions seek to restrict their use.38 Because of the peculiarly firm-specific
(and even executive-specific) nature of pay-for-performance packages, this reward
strategy is typically implemented by contract. The process of writing such contracts is
itself potentially susceptible to agency costs.39 In a development that illustrates how
multiple legal strategies may be deployed in combination, many jurisdictions have in
recent years prescribed decision rights regarding this process, typically granting share-
holders a type of veto over compensation proposals, known as “say on pay.”40
There is potential for tension between trusteeship and reward. High-caliber agents
will not adopt trusteeship roles without meaningful payment. Yet trustee compensa-
tion arrangements require careful thought, because they can generate high-powered
incentives that weaken or even overpower low-powered incentives.41 Heavy reliance
on stock options, for example, encourages risk-taking, whereas the payment of a large
fixed stipend may discourage critical engagement. Neither approach would be desir-
able in a trustee. The key is therefore to ensure that trustees are paid enough to make
their role worth doing, but not so much as to sideline low-powered incentives.42
35 See Chapter 4.1.3.2. On rules requiring pro rata sharing of takeover premia see Chapter 8.3.3
and 8.3.4.
36 See Chapter 3.3.2.
37 U.S. tax law has since 1993 limited the tax-deductibility of executive compensation to a maxi-
mum of $1m per annum, except so far as payments are “performance based” (IRC §162(m)). This
greatly encouraged the use of incentive compensation: see Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, The
Trouble with Stock Options, 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 49 (2003).
38 See e.g. European Commission, Recommendation 2009/3177/EC on Strengthening the
Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies.
39 See Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Executive Compensation (2004).
40 See Chapter 3.3.2 and Chapter 6.2.3.
41 See e.g. Bruno S. Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 American Economic Review 746 (1997). The sorry saga
of the banking sector provides a salient illustration: see Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, and Michel André
Maréchal, Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry, 516 Nature 86 (2014).
42 See e.g. Yermack, note 33, at 2286–9 (outside directors of U.S. firms commonly receive stock
and option awards, but with a pay-performance sensitivity much lower than for executives).
9. Legal Strategies for Reducing Agency Costs 37
37
2.2.4 Selection and removal
Given the central role of delegated management in the corporate form, it is no sur-
prise that appointment rights—the power to select or remove directors (or other man-
agers)—are key strategies for controlling the enterprise. Indeed, these strategies are
at the very core of corporate governance. As we will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4,
moreover, the power to appoint directors is a core strategy not only for addressing the
agency problems of shareholders in relation to managers, but also, in some jurisdic-
tions, for addressing agency problems of minority shareholders in relation to control-
ling shareholders, and of employees in relationship to the shareholder class as a whole.
2.2.5 Initiation and ratification
The final pair of legal strategies expands the power of principals to intervene in the
firm’s management. These are decision rights, which grant principals the power to ini-
tiate or ratify management decisions. Again, it is no surprise that this set of decision
rights strategies is much less prominent in corporate law than are appointment rights
strategies. This disparity is a logical consequence of the fact that the corporate form
is designed as a vehicle for the delegation of managerial power and authority to the
board of directors. Only the largest and most fundamental corporate decisions (such as
mergers and charter amendments) require the ratification of shareholders under exist-
ing corporation statutes, and no jurisdiction to our knowledge requires shareholders to
initiate managerial decisions.43
2.2.6 Ex post and ex ante strategies
The bottom rows in Table 2–1 arrange our ten legal strategies into five pairs, each
with an “ex ante” and an “ex post” strategy. This presentation merely highlights the
fact that half of the strategies take full effect before an agent acts, while the other half
respond—at least potentially—to the quality of the agent’s action ex post. In the case
of agent constraints, for example, rules specify what the agent may or may not do ex
ante, while standards specify the general norm against which an agent’s actions will be
judged ex post. Thus, a rule might prohibit a class of self-dealing transactions outright,
while a standard might mandate that these transactions will be judged against a norm
of fairness ex post.44 Similarly, in the case of setting the terms of entry and exit, an
entry strategy, such as mandatory disclosure, specifies what must be done before an
agent can deal with a principal, while an exit device such as appraisal rights permits
the principal to respond after the quality of the agent’s action is revealed.45 Turning to
incentive alignment, trusteeship is an ex ante strategy in the sense that it neutralizes an
agent’s adverse interests prior to her appointment by the principal, while most reward
strategies are ex post in the sense that their payouts are contingent on uncertain future
outcomes, and thus remain less than fully specified until after the agent acts.
The appointment and removal strategies also fall into ex ante and ex post pairs. If
principals can appoint their agents ex ante, they can screen for loyalty; if principals can
43 See Chapter 3.2.3. The utility, for reducing agency costs, of separating the initiation of deci-
sions from their ratification was first emphasized by Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 Journal of Law and Economics 301 (1983).
44 Compare Chapter 6.2.4 (ex ante prohibitions) and 6.2.5 (ex post standards).
45 Compare e.g. Chapters 5.2.1, 6.2.1.1, 9.1.2.5 (mandatory disclosure), and 7.2.2 (appraisal).
10. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies
38
38
remove their agents ex post, they can punish disloyalty. Similarly, shareholders might
have the power to initiate a major corporate transaction such as a merger, or—as is
ordinarily the case—they might be restricted to ratifying a motion to merge offered by
the board of directors.46
We do not wish, however, to overemphasize the clarity or analytic power of this
categorization of legal strategies into ex ante and ex post types. One could well argue,
for example, that the reward strategy should not be considered an ex post strategy but
rather an ex ante strategy because, like the trusteeship strategy, it establishes in advance
the terms on which the agent will be compensated. Likewise, one could argue that
appointment rights cannot easily be broken into ex ante and ex post types, since an
election of directors might involve, simultaneously, the selection of new directors and
the removal of old ones. We offer the ex post/ex ante distinction only as a classification
heuristic helpful for purposes of exposition.
Indeed, as we have already noted, it is in the same heuristic spirit that we offer our
categorization of legal strategies in general. The ten strategies arrayed in Table 2–1
clearly overlap, and any given legal rule might well be classified as an instance of two
or more of those strategies. Again, our purpose here is simply to emphasize the vari-
ous ways in which law can be used as an instrument, not to provide a new formalistic
schema that displaces rather than aids functional understanding.
2.3 Disclosure
Disclosure plays a fundamental role in controlling corporate agency costs. As we have
already noted,47 it is an important part of the affiliation terms strategies. Most obvi-
ously, prospectus disclosure forces agents to provide prospective principals with infor-
mation that helps them to decide upon which terms, if any, they wish to enter the firm
as owners. To a lesser extent, periodic financial disclosure and ad hoc disclosure—for
example, of information relevant to share prices, and of the terms of related party
transactions—also permits principals to determine the extent to which they wish to
remain owners, or rather exit the firm. However, continuing disclosure also has more
general auxiliary effects in relation to each of the other strategies; hence we treat it
separately at this point in our discussion.
In relation to regulatory strategies that require enforcement, disclosure of related
party transactions helps to reveal the existence of transactions that may be subject to
challenge, and provides potential litigants with information to bring before a court.48 In
relation to governance strategies, disclosure can be used in several different, but comple-
mentary, ways. First, and most generally, mandating disclosure of the terms of the gover-
nance arrangements that are in place allows principals to assess appropriate intervention
tactics. Second, and specifically in relation to decision rights, mandatory disclosure of
the details of a proposed transaction for which the principals’ approval is sought can
improve the principals’ decision. Third, disclosure of those serving in trustee roles serves
to bond their reputations publicly to the effective monitoring of agents.
There is of course a need to ensure compliance with disclosure obligations them-
selves. This is a microcosm of the more general problem of securing agent compliance.
46 See Chapter 7.4.
47 See Section 2.2.2; see also Chapter 9.1.2.
48 See e.g. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, The
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 Journal of Financial Economics 430 (2008).
11. Compliance and Enforcement 39
39
For periodic disclosures, where the type of information is expected but the content
is not yet known (so-called “known unknowns”), no additional compliance mecha-
nism may be required beyond a public statement that the disclosure is expected. If the
principals are made aware that a particular piece of information (e.g. annual financial
statements, the structure and composition of the board, or executive compensation
arrangements) is expected to be disclosed in a particular format, then non-disclosure
itself can send a negative signal to principals, stimulating them to act.49 The compli-
ance issue with periodic disclosure is not so much whether it happens, but its quality,
and hence a trusteeship strategy—in the form of auditors—is typically used to assist
in assuring this. For ad hoc disclosure, the compliance issues are different, because by
definition, principals do not expect particular disclosures in advance. Here vigorous
legal enforcement seems to be needed to ensure compliance.50
2.4 Compliance and Enforcement
Legal strategies are relevant only to the extent that they help to induce agents to act
in the principal’s interest, which for brevity we term agent compliance. In this regard,
each strategy depends on the existence of other legal institutions—such as courts, regu-
lators, and procedural rules—to secure enforcement of the legal norms. In this section,
we consider the relationship between enforcement and compliance. We then discuss
three modalities by which enforcement may be effected.
2.4.1 Enforcement and intervention
Enforcement is most directly relevant as regards regulatory strategies such as rules and
standards. These operate to constrain the agent’s behavior. They cannot do this cred-
ibly unless they are in fact enforced.51 This necessitates well-functioning enforcement
institutions, such as courts and regulators, along with appropriately structured incen-
tives to initiate cases.
In contrast, governance strategies rely largely upon intervention by principals to
generate agent compliance.52 Formal enforcement (of regulatory strategies) and inter-
vention (by governance strategies) are therefore substitutes; both impose penalties on
agents in a bid to secure compliance. Whether this intervention takes the form of
appropriate selection of agents and structure of rewards, credible threats of removal,
or effective decision-making on key issues, its success in securing agent compliance
depends primarily upon the ability of principals to coordinate and act at low cost.
To be sure, governance strategies rely upon background legal rules to support their
49 This mechanism is used to enforce disclosure of governance arrangements in the UK and else-
where under so-called “comply or explain” provisions.
50 See Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 Journal
of Finance 75 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 229, at 263–66 (2007).
51 This point is not new. For early recognition, see Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action,
44 American Law Review 12 (1910); Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 Journal of Political Economy 169 (1968).
52 It is possible to talk of such interventions as an informal form of “enforcement,” in the sense that
they make the impact of the governance strategies credible to the agent (see John Armour, Enforcement
Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment, in Rationality in
Company Law 71, at 73–6 (John Armour and Jennifer Payne eds., 2009). However, to avoid confusion
with the more specific sense of enforcement understood by lawyers, we eschew here this wider sense.
12. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies
40
40
operation; in particular, they rely on rules defining the decision-making authority of
the various corporate actors.53 They therefore also require legal enforcement institu-
tions to make such delineations of authority effective. However, governance strategies
require less sophistication and information on the part of courts and regulators than
is required to enforce agent compliance more directly through regulatory strategies.54
Enforcement institutions, therefore, are of first-order importance for regulatory strate-
gies, but only of second-order importance for governance strategies.
2.4.2 Initiators of enforcement
Turning now to the nature of these “enforcement institutions,” we distinguish three
modalities of enforcement, according to the character of the actors responsible for
taking the initiative: (1) public officials, (2) private parties acting in their own inter-
ests, and (3) strategically placed private parties (“gatekeepers”) conscripted to act in
the public interest. Modalities of enforcement might of course be classified across a
number of other dimensions. Our goal here is not to categorize for its own sake, but
to provoke thought about how the impact of substantive legal strategies is mediated
by different modalities of enforcement. We therefore simply sketch out a heuristic
classification based on one dimension—the type of enforcers—and encourage read-
ers to think about how matters might be affected by other dimensions along which
enforcement may vary. The categorization we have chosen, we believe, has the advan-
tage that it likely reflects the way in which agents involved in running a firm perceive
enforcement—as affecting them through the actions of public officials, interested pri-
vate parties, and gatekeepers.
2.4.2.1 Public enforcement
By “public enforcement,” we refer to all legal and regulatory actions brought by organs
of the state. This mode includes criminal and civil suits brought by public officials and
agencies, as well as various ex ante rights of approval exercised by public actors. For
example, in many jurisdictions, issuers making a public offer must submit the required
documents for review by securities regulators.
Public enforcement action can be initiated by a wide variety of state organs, ran-
ging from local prosecutors’ offices to national regulatory authorities that monitor cor-
porate actions in real time—such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) monitoring corporate disclosures—and have the power to intervene to prevent
breaches. We also describe some self-regulatory and quasi-regulatory authorities, such
as national stock exchanges and the UK’s Financial Reporting Council,55 as “public
enforcers.” Such bodies are enforcers to the extent that they are able in practice to
53 For example, decision rights strategies require courts to deny validity to a purported decision
made by a process that does not reflect the principals’ decision rights. In the absence of legal institutions
capable of protecting principals’ entitlements in relation to corporate assets, even purely governance-
based strategies will be ineffective: see Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova, Russian
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? 52 Stanford Law Review 1731 (2000).
54 See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements
and Judicial Strategies, 21 Journal of Legal Studies 271 (1992); Edward B. Rock and Michael L.
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 University
of Pennsylvania Law Review 1619 (2001).
55 The UK’s Financial Reporting Council, through its Conduct Committee, reviews the financial
statements of publicly traded companies for compliance with the law.
13. Compliance and Enforcement 41
41
compel compliance with their rules ex ante or to impose penalties for rule violations
ex post, whether these penalties are reputational, contractual, or civil. Moreover, they
are meaningfully described as public enforcers where their regulatory efficacy is spurred
by a credible threat of state intervention, and they can be seen as public franchisees.56
Where no such credible threat exists, then such organizations are better viewed as
purely private.
In theory, public enforcement suffers from the limitation—as compared with pri-
vate enforcement—that the officials responsible for initiating suits have weaker incen-
tives to do so than private plaintiffs, because they do not retain any financial payments
recovered.57 However, this distinction is increasingly eroded in cases where public
enforcers are permitted to retain some or all of penalties levied from corporate defen-
dants, which may bias enforcement decisions according to ability to pay rather than
culpability.58 In practice, public enforcement is an important modality for securing
corporate agent compliance in almost all jurisdictions.59
2.4.2.2 Private enforcement
As with public enforcement, private enforcement embraces a wide range of institu-
tions. At the formal end of the spectrum, these include class actions and derivative
suits, which require considerable legal and institutional infrastructure in the form of a
plaintiffs’ bar, cooperative judges, and favorable procedural law that facilitates actions
through matters as diverse as discovery rights, class actions, and legal fees.60 The U.S. is
an international outlier in the availability of these institutional complements to private
enforcement, with an “opt out” approach to class action certification and support for
contingency fees. As a result, rates of private enforcement in corporate law appear far
higher in the U.S. than any other of our core jurisdictions.61 Indeed, the probability
56 The concept of “coerced self-regulation” is developed in Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite,
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 101–32 (1992).
57 Jonathan R. Hay and Andrei Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal
Reform, 88 American Economic Review 398 (1998).
58 Margaret H. Lemos and Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 Harvard Law
Review 853 (2014); Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with
Corporations (2014).
59 See e.g. Armour, note 52, at 87–102; John Armour and Caroline Schmidt, Building Enforcement
Capacity for Brazilian Corporate and Securities Law, in Public and Private Enforcement: China
and the World (Robin Huang and Nico Howson eds., forthcoming 2017); Coffee, Law and the
Market, note 50, at 258–63; Howell E. Jackson and Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of
Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207 (2009); Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws? 61 Journal
of Finance 1 (2006).
60 For example, enhancements across several of these dimensions have been credited with trigger-
ing a significant increase in private enforcement in Japan: Tom Ginsburg and Glenn Hoetker, The
Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 Journal of Legal Studies
31 (2006).
61 See e.g. John Armour, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and Richard Nolan, Private Enforcement
of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 Journal
of Empirical Legal Studies 687 (2009) (absence of UK shareholder litigation); Guido Ferrarini
and Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, in John
Armour and Joseph A. McCahery, After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising
Securities Regulation in Europe and the US 159 (2006) (lack of private enforcement in Italy);
Theodore Baums et al., Fortschritte bei Klagen Gegen Hauptversammlungsbeschlüsse?: Eine Empirische
Studie, ZIP 2007, 1629 (modest levels of shareholder litigation in Germany). While rates of share-
holder litigation increased significantly in Japan during the 1990s (see Mark D. West, Why Shareholders
14. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies
42
42
of lawsuits being launched alleging misfeasance by corporate directors in large merger
transactions was approaching 100 percent by 2012.62
Unlike public enforcement, the modality we term private enforcement depends
chiefly on the mechanism of deterrence—namely, the imposition of penalties ex post
upon the discovery of misconduct. There are few direct analogs in private enforcement
to the ex ante regulatory approval we have included within the mode of public enforce-
ment. One example of such enforcement may be the UK’s “scheme of arrangement”
procedure, whereby a company wishing to undertake a major restructuring transac-
tion and having obtained requisite votes from shareholders (and creditors, if they are
parties) may seek court approval of the arrangement.63 The court will scrutinize the
procedural steps taken at this point, and if its sanction is given to the scheme, it cannot
be challenged ex post. However, if the focus is widened to include not only enforce-
ment in the strict sense, but means of securing agent compliance more generally, there
is an important counterpart: private actors are of course very much involved in ex ante
governance interventions to secure compliance by agents. Indeed, while the discussion
in this section has focused on public and private actors as initiators of law enforcement,
the same conceptual distinction can also be made in relation to governance interven-
tions. Public actors may also be involved in governance interventions, for instance
where the state is a significant stockholder. Although not observed in most of the juris-
dictions we survey, in some countries—for example, France, Italy, and Brazil—state
ownership of controlling shares in publicly traded companies is common.64 Under
such circumstances, public actors—namely government agencies—take decisions
regarding governance intervention.
2.4.2.3 Gatekeeper control
Gatekeeper control involves the conscription of noncorporate actors, such as accoun-
tants and lawyers, in policing the conduct of corporate actors. This conscription gen-
erally involves exposing the gatekeepers to the threat of sanction for participation in
corporate misbehavior, or for failure to prevent or disclose misbehavior.65 The actors
so conscripted are “gatekeepers” in the sense that their participation is generally neces-
sary, whether as a matter of practice or of law, to accomplish the corporate transactions
that are the ultimate focus of the enforcement efforts. We call the mode “gatekeeper
control” to emphasize that it works by harnessing the control that gatekeepers have
over corporate transactions, and giving them a strong incentive to use that control to
prevent unwanted conduct.
Gatekeeper control is probably best viewed as a form of delegated interven-
tion: principals do not themselves engage in scrutiny of the agent, but leave this to
the gatekeeper. Compliance is generally secured through the ex ante mechanism of
Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 Journal of Legal Studies 351 (2001)), they are still nothing like
the same level of frequency as in the U.S.
62 John Armour, Bernard Black, and Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing its Cases? 9 Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies 605, at 623, 627 (2012). There is, however, no mechanism for public
enforcement by the state of Delaware.
63 Companies Act 2006 (UK), Part 26.
64 See Aldo Musacchio and Sérgio Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism (2014).
65 See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2
Journal of Law Economics and Organization 53 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The
Professions and Corporate Governance (2006).
15. Compliance and Enforcement 43
43
constraint (e.g. auditors refuse to issue an unqualified report) rather than through the
ex post mechanism of penalizing wrongdoers. Such delegation of course creates a new
agency problem between the gatekeeper and the principals. This is dealt with through
the application of the basic legal strategies to the gatekeepers themselves, with chief
reliance on the standards and trusteeship strategies.66
2.4.3 Penalties
Enforcement by the modalities described, or indeed governance interventions, secures
compliance either by introducing an ex ante requirement for approval, or imposing
an ex post penalty. We use the term “penalty” here as a broad functional category, to
encompass all consequences of enforcement that are likely to be costly for the defen-
dant and thereby serve to deter misconduct. In many cases, the calibration of such
penalties is rather more subtle than at first might be imagined.
Perhaps the most obvious form of penalty is a payment of money.67 A preliminary
issue concerns who should bear the liability. For legal strategies seeking to control
manager–shareholder and shareholder–shareholder agency problems, the most obvi-
ous defendant is the agent in question. Whereas for the control of externalities, mak-
ing the corporation pay the penalty encourages managers to take the expected costs of
penalties into account.
However, it is common practice in some jurisdictions—such as the U.S., Germany,
and others—for corporations to provide indemnities and insurance for managers
(“D&O insurance”), which has the effect of shifting the burden from the individual
to the firm. This generally reduces the effective size of financial obligations imposed by
civil liability on managers, so much so that even in jurisdictions where shareholder liti-
gation is frequent, outside directors rarely, if ever, are required to make payments from
their personal assets following a shareholder lawsuit.68 The functional rationale for this
is that too-zealous imposition of personal liability on managers might induce them to
behave in a risk-averse fashion, contrary to the wishes of diversified shareholders.69
Conversely, it may be desirable in some cases to shift liability for failure to control
externalities from the firm to individual agents. Where corporate assets are insufficient
to cover expected losses, then limited shareholder liability means that there may be
insufficient incentive to internalize the costs of hazardous activities. Imposing penalties
on individuals associated with the firm can enhance the effectiveness of relevant legal
strategies.70
66 See e.g. Selangor United Rubber Estates v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555 (UK Ch D); RBC
Capital Markets LLC v Jervis 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015) (secondary liability for bankers who know-
ingly or dishonestly assist in boards’ breaches of duty).
67 In keeping with the broad use of the term “penalty,” we include here both compensatory and
punitive—more narrowly defined—payments.
68 Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner, Liability Risk for Outside Directors: A Cross-
Border Analysis, 11 European Financial Management 153 (2005); Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith,
How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 755 (2009).
69 Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale Law
Journal 957 (1984). See also Gutachten E zum 70. Deutschen Juristentag: Reform der
Organhaftung? Materielles Haftungsrecht und seine Durchsetzung in Privaten und
öffentlichen Unternehmen (Gregor Bachmann ed., 2014); cf. Regional Court (Landgericht)
München 10.12.2013 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2014, 570 (the Siemens/Neubürger case).
70 Kraakman, note 69; John Armour and Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value,
6 Journal of Legal Analysis 35 (2014). See Chapter 4.3.
16. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies
44
44
In many civil law countries, another important ex post consequence of violating
company law rules is annulment of corporate decisions.71 Such orders deny the legal
efficacy of corporate actions reached on the basis of a process that failed to conform
to applicable rules. This mechanism is useful for ensuring compliance with standards
and process rules regarding various governance strategies used to control the first two
varieties of agency cost on which we focus. The costs to a corporation of cancelling or
delaying its actions until the process has been regularized may be substantial, and for
this reason such annulments function as penalties in the sense we use the term here.
Where misconduct is deemed sufficiently serious to be classed as “criminal,”
then incarceration may also be available as a penalty for individual—although not
corporate—defendants.72 For corporate defendants in regulated industries, perhaps
the most severe penalty that may be inflicted is loss of a firm’s regulatory license, which
will effectively shut down its business. The threat of criminal sanctions and/or loss of
regulatory licenses can, without careful calibration of expected sanctions, easily result
in over-deterrence.73
Defendants may face a range of extra-legal—principally reputational—consequences
flowing from enforcement actions. For individual agents, these may include loss of jobs
and greater difficulty finding other employment.74 For firms, reputational harm can be
understood as the downward revision by contracting partners of their expectations of
performance, with a consequently adverse impact on the firm’s terms of trade.75 This
can greatly exceed the size of financial penalties—indeed, no financial penalty need
be imposed to trigger reputational loss, simply the credible dissemination of informa-
tion about malfeasance.76 While the potential for reputational loss both makes the
total effective penalty larger, it also makes it less predictable.77 Moreover, corporate
misconduct that does not harm contracting counterparties, but rather imposes purely
external costs, does not necessarily imply any change in expectations about contractual
71 See Holger Fleischer, Fehlerhafte Aufsichtsratsbeschlüsse: Rechtsdogmatik— Rechtsvergleichung—
Rechtspolitik, Der Betrieb 2013, 160–7 and 217–24; Martin Gelter, Why do Shareholder Derivative
Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe? 37 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 843–92
(2012).
72 Whether criminal sanctions can be used at all against legal persons is controversial. While most
jurisdictions now permit this, some, such as Germany, refuse to do so. See generally Guy Stessens,
Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective, 43 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 493 (1994).
73 See e.g. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 Journal
of Legal Studies 833 (1994); Daniel R. Fischel and Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 Journal
of Legal Studies 319 (1996). A particular concern in the EU context is competition law enforce-
ment: see Case C-172/12 P, EI du Pont de Nemours v Commission [2013] European Court Reports
I-0000, ECLI: EU: C:2013:605 (parent fined for breaches of competition law by subsidiary, with fine
amount calculated as a percentage of parent’s turnover).
74 See e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, note 33; Maria Correia and Michael Klausner, Are Securities Class
Actions “Supplemental” to SEC Enforcement? An Empirical Analysis, Working Paper, Stanford Law
School (2012).
75 See Jonathan Karpoff and John Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Face from Committing
Criminal Fraud, 36 Journal of Law and Economics 757 (1993); Cindy Alexander, On the Nature
of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 Journal of Law and Economics 489
(1999); Jonathan Karpoff, D. Scott Lee, and Gerald Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books,
43 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 581 (2008).
76 See e.g. Benjamin L. Liebman and Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities
Market, 108 Columbia Law Review 929 (2008).
77 See John Armour, Colin Mayer, and Andrea Polo, Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage
in Financial Markets, forthcoming, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (2017)
(finding no correlation between size of reputational loss and financial penalty).
17. Systematic Differences 45
45
performance, and does not appear to lead to reputational losses.78 This has implica-
tions for the selection of legal penalties in relation to the control of externalities.79
2.5 Legal Strategies in Corporate Context
The law does not apply legal strategies in the abstract but only in specific regulatory
contexts. For purposes of exposition and analysis, we have grouped those contexts into
six basic categories of corporate decisions and transactions. Each of the next seven
chapters focuses on one of those categories. Necessarily, the boundaries of these cat-
egories are to some degree arbitrary and overlapping. Nevertheless, each category has
a degree of functional unity, and the typical deployment of legal strategies in each is at
least moderately distinct.
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the legal strategies at play in the regulation of ordi-
nary business transactions and decisions. Not surprisingly, governance strategies pre-
dominate in this context. Chapter 5 turns to corporate debt relationships and the
problem of creditor protection—a context in which regulatory strategies are common,
except when the firm is insolvent, when the emphasis shifts to governance strategies.
Chapter 6 examines the legal regulation of related party (or self-dealing) transactions;
Chapter 7 investigates the corporate law treatment of “significant” transactions, such as
mergers and major sales of assets, and Chapter 8 assesses the legal treatment of control
transactions such as sales of control blocks and hostile takeovers. As the discussion
below will show, jurisdictions adopt a fluid mix of regulatory and governance strategies
in all of the last three transactional contexts. Then, Chapter 9 turns to the regulation
of issuers on the public market, where regulatory strategies predominate.
While we do not claim that these transactional and decisional categories exhaust
all of corporate law, they cover most of what is conventionally understood to be cor-
porate law, and nearly all of the interesting and controversial issues that the subject
presents today.
Within each of our seven substantive chapters, our analysis proceeds functionally. In
most chapters, our analytic discussion is organized by agency problems and legal strate-
gies: for a given category of corporate decisions, we review the legal strategies that are
actively deployed by our core jurisdictions. In two chapters, however, the analytic dis-
cussion is organized somewhat differently—by categories of transactions in Chapter 7
(significant transactions), and by agency problems in Chapter 8 (control transactions).
This variation in structure responds to the greater heterogeneity of the transactions
dealt with in those chapters. Finally, to the extent that there are significant differences
across jurisdictions in the legal strategies employed to regulate a given class of corporate
decisions, we attempt to assess the origins of these differences.
2.6 Systematic Differences
We might expect the use of the various legal strategies for controlling agency costs, and
of the associated modes of enforcement, to differ systematically across jurisdictions.
78 See Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr., and Eric W. Wehrly, The Reputational Penalties
for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 Journal of Law and Economics 653 (2005);
Armour et al., note 77.
79 See Chapter 4.3.
18. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies
46
46
In particular, we would expect to see strong complementarities between the structure
of share ownership and the types of legal strategies relied upon most heavily to con-
trol agency costs. Since the efficacy of governance mechanisms is closely linked to the
extent to which principals are able to coordinate, it would be surprising if the structure
of share ownership did not affect the extent to which these strategies are employed to
control managers. In most jurisdictions around the world, the ownership of shares
in publicly traded firms is concentrated in the hands of relatively few shareholders—
whether families or institutional investors. With such ownership patterns, owners face
relatively low coordination costs as between themselves, and are able to rely on gov-
ernance strategies to control managers—although of course the control of control-
ling shareholders themselves becomes more problematic. Where ownership of shares
is more diffuse, however, governance mechanisms are less effective in controlling man-
agers, and there is more need for regulatory mechanisms to take the fore.
Just as the choice of legal strategies for controlling agency problems is likely to com-
plement the pattern of ownership, it will in turn be complemented by the nature and
sophistication of the enforcement institutions. In systems relying heavily on regulatory
strategies, enforcement institutions will likely have a greater role to play in securing
compliance by agents, as opposed to intervention by principals themselves.80 At a more
micro level, particular regulatory strategies complement and are supported by differ-
ent enforcement institutions. Rules require a sophisticated and responsive regulator to
promulgate them, if they are not to end up imposing greater hindrance than benefit on
parties. Standards, on the other hand, require independent and sophisticated courts and
lawyers, if they are to be deployed effectively. Similarly, reliance on complex contracts
will likely place greater demands on enforcement institutions than simple legal rules.81
In addition, the appropriate scope of continuing disclosure obligations may vary
depending on the extent to which particular legal strategies are employed.82 Thus in the
U.S., where regulatory strategies are extensively used, continuing disclosure tradition-
ally focused on self-dealing transactions, so assisting in formal enforcement activities.
In the EU, by contrast, where greater reliance is placed on governance mechanisms,
disclosure obligations traditionally emphasized details of board structure. However,
these differences have narrowed in recent years—in step with a more general conver-
gence in ownership structure we discuss in Chapter 3—with enhancements to disclo-
sure of related-party transactions in the EU and of board composition and functioning
in the U.S.83
The necessary extent of disclosure will also vary depending on the ownership struc-
ture. Where owners are highly coordinated, frequent disclosure may be less important
as a response to managerial agency costs:84 owners are better able to discover informa-
tion for themselves, and governance strategies can be used to stimulate disclosure of
80 The existence of a demand for regulatory, as opposed to governance, strategies may be expected
to spur the development of regulatory expertise. Thus in jurisdictions with widely dispersed retail
shareholdings, such as the U.S., specialist courts tend to be more active because they are more in
demand. See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality,
91 California Law Review 393 (2003).
81 Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, and Andrei Shleifer, Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 853 (2001).
82 See e.g. para. 9 Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive or supervisory
directors of listed companies and on committees of the (supervisory) board, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 51.
83 See Chapter 3.2.4, 3.4.2, and Chapter 6.2.1.1.
84 See John Armour and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Berle-Means Corporation in the 21st Century,
Working Paper (2008), at <http://www.law.upenn.edu>.
19. Systematic Differences 47
47
greater information. This is not to say, however, that effective and adequately enforced
disclosure obligations do not matter in systems with coordinated owners. Rather, the
problem with coordinated owners is not the first of our three agency problems but the
second: conflicts between shareholders. Here disclosure ensures that information about
how powerful owners exercise their control rights—including related party transac-
tions—is disseminated to minority shareholders, and that information management
transmits to controllers makes its way to all owners equally, preventing so-called “selec-
tive disclosure.”
Many such institutional differences may make little overall difference to the success
of firms’ control of their agency costs, as various combinations of strategies and associ-
ated institutions may be functionally equivalent. However, there are some institutions
whose presence or absence is likely to be important in any jurisdiction. In particu-
lar, given the fundamental role played by disclosure in supporting both the enforce-
ment of regulatory strategies and the exercise of governance, institutions supporting
disclosure—a strong and effective securities regulator and a sophisticated accounting
profession, for example—are always likely to make an overall difference to the success
of firms in controlling agency costs.85
85 See Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48
UCLA Law Review 781 (2001).