This document discusses the African Union (AU) and its effectiveness in addressing African problems through African solutions. It provides background on the AU's predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which struggled to respond to conflicts and unite Africans. The OAU declined in the 1980s. The AU was then established in 2001 with the goal of being more proactive. While the AU has faced criticism, it has found some success in security issues and could be well placed to make progress in other areas if given further support. The document examines the AU's role and actions in security to argue for its capability to reduce conflicts.

1. African
Solutions
to
African
Problems:
Security
as
a
Case
for
the
Continued
Effectiveness
of
the
African
Union
Keith
Cavalli
Introduction
The
African
Union
(AU)
has
been
perceived
internationally
to
struggle
to
reform
its
governing
bodies,
and
have
a
long
way
to
go
before
it
is
fully
functional
(Hanson,
2009).
Indeed
the
website
of
the
organisation
has
proven
unreliable,
and
is
occasionally
unavailable.
This
is
unsurprising,
given
that
Africa
is
generally
considered
by
the
global
North
to
suffer
chronic
dysfunction.
In
Kenya,
for
example,
the
U.S.
Department
of
State
(2014)
warns
that
‘in
the
past
year
and
a
half,
there
have
been
numerous
attacks
involving
shootings,
grenades,
or
other
explosive
devices’.
Additionally,
the
department
warns
of
continued
threats
of
terrorist
suicide
operations,
car
and
other
types
of
bombings,
kidnappings,
and
attacks
on
civil
aircraft
and
maritime
vessels
(U.
S.
Department
of
State,
2014).
Terabytes
of
data
depict
the
parlous
states
of
health,
economy,
infrastructure,
environment,
society,
disease,
conflict,
governments,
HIV/AIDS,
and
the
haunting
Ebola
virus.
However,
the
AU
claims
it
is
willing
to
lead
in
addressing
the
issues
of
the
continent
through
the
slogan
‘African
solutions
to
African
problems’.
Despite
setbacks,
the
AU
has
found
a
voice
over
the
last
decade
(Vines,
2013,
p.
109),
primarily
through
success
in
security
issues.
There
is
a
case
to
be
made
for
the
AU
as
a
capable
and
primary
organisation
to
address
the
challenges
in
Africa.
While
slogans
and
bureaucratic
jargon
may
seem
absurd
in
the
context
of
Africa’s
difficulties,
the
AU
is
well
placed
to
achieve
results
through
the
constructivist
approach
of
norm
creation
and
institutionalism
that
is
argued
by
Williams
(2005).
The
actions
of
the
AU
will
be
examined
from
a
security
perspective
to
demonstrate
the
effectiveness
of
the
AU
in
reducing
conflict,
and
that
the
constructivist
paradigm
is
suitable
in
analysis
of
African
issues.
Additionally,
further
support
to
the
AU
by
the
United
Nations
(UN),
and
logistical

2. improvements
on
the
continent,
could
result
in
positive
outcomes
in
other
areas
of
the
AU’s
Constitutive
Act
(CA).
A
brief
history
of
the
African
Union
The
miracle
of
a
resurrection
To
understand
the
AU
and
criticism
to
which
it
is
subjected,
its
predecessor,
the
Organisation
of
African
Union
(OAU)
will
be
examined.
The
OAU
unified
the
states
of
the
African
continent
in
1963.
However,
freeing
the
continent
from
colonialism
did
not
automatically
result
in
peace
and
prosperity
(Udombana,
2002,
p.
1183).
By
the
late
1970’s
the
organisation
had
become
weak
and
disunited,
having
failed
to
respond
to
intra-­‐African
conflicts
or
unite
Africans
against
foreign
intervention
(Packer
and
Rukare,
2002,
p.
366).
The
fight
against
apartheid,
integral
to
the
formation
of
the
OAU,
remained
as
the
sole
unifier
of
the
organisation
(Packer
and
Rukare,
2002,
p.
366).
By
the
1980’s,
the
OAU
was
a
nominal
player
in
development
and
progress
in
Africa:
civil
wars
on
the
continent
went
unchecked,
and
the
OAU
slid
into
insignificance
with
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
(Packer
and
Rukare,
2002,
p.
366).
Weakness
was
considered
to
have
spread
throughout
the
organisation,
including
the
secretary
general
(Packer
and
Rukare,
2002,
p.
369),
and
calls
for
reform
became
widespread
(Packer
and
Rukare,
2002,
p.
366).
‘African
solutions
to
African
problems’
is
arguably
a
tough
sell
to
the
global
community.
The
transition
from
the
OAU
into
AU
could
be
viewed
as
unusual
for
it
was
underwritten
by
Libyan
dictator
Muammar
Gaddafi,
the
leader
thought
to
have
personally
ordered
the
fatal
bombing
of
Pan
Am
flight
103
(Black
and
Beaumont,
2011).
Under
Gaddafi
the
AU
is
conceptualised
as
forming
‘a
larger
community
of
peoples
transcending
cultural,
ideological,
ethnic
and
national
differences’.
The
formation
of
the
institution
required
the
votes
of
Nigeria
and
South
Africa,
and
which
they
granted
in
order
to
secure
their
interests
(Ronen,
cited
in
Møller,
2009,
pp.
8-­‐9).
In
2001,
the
AU
was
established,
terminating
the
OAU.
The
process
was
largely
unrecognised,
and
the
CA
incorporated
into
action
within
two
years
(Packer
and
Rukare,
2002,
p.
365).
The
rapid
development
was
viewed

3. as
demonstrating
political
commitment,
however,
the
formation
was
received
with
skepticism
by
its
critics,
for
the
treaty
could
possibly
provide
cover
for
African
dictators
to
commit
human
rights
abuses
under
the
guise
of
its
humanitarian
clauses
(Udombana,
2002,
pp.
1182-­‐1183).
It
is
tempting
to
criticise
the
AU
and
its
humanitarian
goals
as
idealistic,
with
the
AU
website
seemingly
proud
to
display
its
OAU
origins
and
fifty
year
history.
The
outgoing
AU
Commission
chair,
Jean
Ping,
recently
presented
this
idealism,
stating
‘the
solutions
to
African
problems
are
found
on
the
continent
and
nowhere
else’
(Vines,
2012,
p.
89),
thus
channeling
the
once
hollow
slogan,
‘African
solutions
to
African
problems’.
However,
despite
the
link
of
the
‘new’
AU
to
a
problematic
and
at
times
bizarre
past,
the
AU
could
be
viewed
as
effective
in
improving
continental
security,
and
with
optimism
for
further
successes.
Security,
colonialism,
hegemony
Cooperation
as
a
product
of
conflict
Post-­‐colonial
history
has
seen
Africa
bombarded
by
conflict.
Over
the
last
50
years
roughly
65%
of
sub-­‐Saharan
African
countries
experienced
armed
conflict
since
independence
from
colonial
powers
(Vines,
2013,
p.
94).
The
OAU’s
policy
of
non-­‐intervention
could
be
deemed
to
have
facilitated
the
problems.
Records
show
that
300,000
people
were
killed
in
Uganda
between
1971
and
1979,
over
3
million
deaths
occurred
in
Sudan
after
war
broke
out
in
1983
(Patterson,
2012,
p.
10),
and
the
1994
genocide
in
Rwanda
claimed
an
estimated
800,000
lives
(Patterson,
2012,
p.
1)
in
only
months.
Rwanda,
in
particular,
seems
to
continue
to
stain
the
reputation
of
multilateral
peacekeeping
forces.
Williams
(2007,
p.
275)
claims
it
is
likely
that
the
oppression
brought
about
by
Idi
Amin
in
Uganda
and
the
Rwandan
genocide
generated
sizeable
local
backing
for
intervention
in
conflict.
The
AU
could
be
regarded
to
demonstrate
unity
and
motivation
to
reduce
conflict
through
adopting
the
CA
in
2000
where
Article
4h
formalised
the
AU’s
right
to
intervene
in
a
member
state
‘in
respect
of
grave
circumstances:
war
crimes,
genocide
and
crimes
against
humanity’
(Williams,
2007,
p.
275).
Under
the
structure
of
the
African
Peace
and
Security
Architecture
(APSA),
the
AU
is

4. producing
results
in
securing
the
continent.
Coinciding
with
formation
of
the
AU,
the
number
of
wars,
unconstitutional
incidents,
and
coup
d’états
across
39
African
states
dropped
immediately.
This
occurred
after
the
particularly
volatile
year
of
2002
in
which
there
were
12
military
and
political
coups,
and
12
wars
(Vines,
2013,
p.
93).
The
result
could
have
been
influenced
by
Article
10
of
the
CA
which
grants
the
power
of
military
intervention.
At
the
core
of
the
AU
is
the
Peace
and
Security
Council
(PSC).
Through
the
Continental
Early
Warnings
System
and
African
Security
Force
(ASF),
the
council
is
poised
to
anticipate
and
prevent
conflicts
(Vines,
2013,
p.
97).
Outlining
the
obligation
to
take
action
when
regional
security
is
threatened
leads
to
greater
assertiveness
in
this
area
(Paterson,
2002,
p.
23).
‘Members
of
regional
organisations
are
closer
to
the
crisis,
and
they
often
share
a
cultural
background
with
its
location,
so
that
their
operations
can
be
seen
to
be
more
legitimate
and
sensitive’
(Weiss
and
Welz,
2014,
p.
889)
to
the
complex
dynamics
of
the
region.
However,
a
potential
weakness
of
the
ASF
mandate
is
that
action
is
intended
to
be
undertaken
in
conjunction
with
the
UN
whose
peacekeeping
force
and
system
is
criticised
as
cumbersome
(Cilliers,
2008,
p.
7).
Yet,
between
2003
and
2012,
of
the
9
members
that
the
AU
took
action
against,
only
Madagascar
failed
to
cooperate,
and
has
since
been
suspended
(Vines,
2012,
p.
92).
It
appears
that
member
countries
are
responding
to
the
actions
of
the
AU,
and
that
the
reason
may
be
found
in
their
shared
history
of
colonialism.
Makinda
and
Okumu
(2007,
p.
13)
argue
that
colonialism
constructed
a
pan-­‐African
identity
based
on
the
unity
required
to
rid
the
continent
of
European
occupation.
In
the
contemporary
environment,
state
misbehaviour
is
seen
to
breach
this
unity,
and
results
in
a
collective
humiliation
that
influences
the
state
to
behave
responsibly
(Makinda
and
Okumu,
2007,
p.
13).
The
actions
of
the
AU
therefore
appear
to
generate
compliance
through
the
‘name
and
shame’
effect
of
AU
sanctions.
Continued
success
in
peacekeeping
may
hinge
on
the
membership
of
a
state
that
qualifies
as
a
hegemon
such
as
South
Africa
or
Nigeria
(Møller,
2009,
p.
3).
While

5. the
AU
appears
determined
to
bring
stability
through
multilateral
governance,
in
applying
Keohane’s
(1996)
hegemonic
stability
theory,
Møller
(2009)
argues
the
workings
of
the
AU
are
actually
based
on
a
bigemony
or
possibly
trigemony
(Adebajo
and
Landsberg,
2003;
Landsberg
2008,
cited
by
Møller,
2009,
p.
5),
and
that
the
AU’s
formal
structure
may
not
represent
the
pan-­‐African
governance
envisioned.
This
does
not
necessarily
matter.
Whatever
set
of
institutionalised
responses
to
conflict
are
held
by
the
union,
violations
will
likely
occur.
Paramount
to
effective
governance
by
the
AU
is
that
the
African
community
condemns
behavior
that
violates
the
constructivist
norms
created
by
the
AU,
and
aspires
to
take
action
(Williams,
2007,
p.
273).
Furthermore,
if
the
influential
powers
consistently
neglect
their
obligations
to
‘junior’
members
of
the
AU,
they
will
find
themselves
in
the
position
of
leading
by
coercion,
as
opposed
to
consent,
which
can
be
significantly
more
demanding
and
far
less
desirable
(Møller,
2009,
p.
5).
It
is
accepted
though
by
the
UN
that
the
primary
deployment
will
involve
the
AU,
and
be
followed,
possibly,
by
a
UN
peacekeeping
force
(Cilliers,
2008,
p.
7).
However,
the
UN
has
been
seen
to
ignore
its
responsibilities
in
Africa
(Paterson,
2012,
p.
1).
Considering
the
sustained
reduction
in
conflict
under
the
AU,
perhaps
a
more
appropriate
role
of
the
UN
resides
in
financial
support
for
AU
operations,
and
which
could
extend
into
areas
of
concern
beyond
security.
Møller
(2009,
p.
13)
raises
the
possibility
that
a
threat
to
the
advancements
made
by
the
AU
in
security
could
reside
in
states
such
as
Nigeria
or
South
Africa
not
being
elected
to
the
PSC.
This
may
lead
to
retaliation
within
the
union
by
reigning
in
peacekeeping
operations
to
the
prescribed
minimum
(Møller,
2009,
p.
13).
The
possibility
of
frequent
conflict
resurfacing
could
thus
reopen.
This
scenario
may
be
unlikely,
as
oil-­‐rich
Nigeria
is
a
natural
hegemon.
With
a
population
equal
to
the
sum
of
the
population
of
all
West
African
nations
(Kaplan,
2000,
p.
14-­‐15),
Nigeria
in
this
context
could
act
as
a
stabilising
force.
In
the
current
environment,
the
AU
seems
effective
in
security,
and
could
be
well
served
through
support,
as
opposed
to
handing
over
operations
to
the
UN.
African
resolutions
to
African
conflicts
appear
to
work.
While
recommendations

6. have
been
made
that
the
PSC
improve
early
warning
reporting,
and
provide
greater
support
to
the
Panel
of
the
Wise
(POW)
to
enhance
mediation
(Patterson,
2012,
p.
4),
the
relatively
low
number
of
conflicts
is
demonstrated
by
Vines
(2012,
p.
93)
to
continue.
This
is
in
contrast
to
the
chaotic
predictions
by
authors
such
as
Kaplan
in
The
Coming
Anarchy
(2000),
where
dysfunction
in
West
Africa
is
argued
may
infect
the
globe.
Perhaps
South
Africa’s
ambassador
to
Mauritania,
in
response
to
the
coups
of
Togo
and
Mauritania,
summed
up
African
solutions
best
stating
that
‘although
the
principle
of
the
AU
is
not
to
agree
with
coups...
we
shall
not
have
one
policy
to
fit
every
situation’
(Williams,
2007,
p.
274).
The
policy,
at
least
with
respect
to
the
stability
of
governments,
seems
to
be
able
to
reserve
the
right
to
change
policy.
Given
the
multifaceted
nature
of
regional
conflicts
in
Africa,
this
approach
seems
to
work
well
for
the
AU.
The
motivation
to
achieve
results,
combined
with
factors
of
a
shared
history,
may
be
reason
for
the
reduced
number
of
conflicts
under
the
AU.
Realism,
constructivism
and
institutionalised
norms
Further
constitutional
wins
can
be
made,
through
the
right
plays.
While
the
AU
appears
effective
in
security
operations,
its
broad
constitution
could
be
perceived
to
risk
further
progress
through
widening
its
agenda,
and
diluting
efforts
toward
the
goals
of
the
AU.
For
example,
the
realist
scholar
Walt
(1991,
p.
223)
claims
the
need
to
be
‘wary
of
the
counterproductive
tangents
that
have
seduced
other
areas
of
international
studies’.
Possibly
worse,
as
argued
by
Bellamy
(2005),
is
that
the
predominant
powers
could
use
the
mandate
of
humanitarian
intervention
as
a
‘trojan
horse’
to
assert
their
state
agendas.
The
realist
argument
is
daunting,
and
could
be
incorrect
in
analysis
of
the
AU.
The
objectives
of
Article
3,
and
principles
of
Article
4
of
the
CA
can
be
regarded
as
idealistic.
For
example,
the
stated
goal
to
promote
research
in
all
fields,
or
the
principal
of
gender
equality
might
be
difficult
to
realise
in
the
context
of
current
conditions
in
AU
countries
in
some
respects.
And
in
analysing
Africa,
it
is
easy
to
dismiss
humanitarian
concerns
and
favour
realist
theory
as
‘significant
parts
of
Africa’
conform
to
Lockean
and
Hobbesean
cultures
where
neighbouring
states

7. are
viewed
with
the
assumption
that
they
are
either
rivals
or
enemies,
and
are
an
inherent
threat
(Williams,
2007,
p.
254).
Williams
argues
(2007,
p.
254)
though
that
realism
is
ineffective
in
analysis
of
Africa,
in
that
it
masks
the
importance
of
non-­‐state
actors,
and
emphasises
states
as
unitary
and
rational.
Realism
fogs
the
importance
of
common
cultural
beliefs
between
states
that
transcend
regional
power
distributions
(Williams,
2007,
p.
255).
The
AU
may
be
well
placed
and
motivated
to
make
genuine
progress
in
further
areas
of
the
CA.
Lieutenant
Colonel
Beebe
is
the
Senior
Africa
Analyst
for
the
intelligence
division
of
the
US
Army
Deputy
Chief
of
Staff.
He
argues
that
in
the
case
of
Africa,
the
human
security
paradigm
should
be
leveraged,
and
traditional
western
models
shelved,
in
order
to
achieve
African
solutions
to
African
problems
(Beebe,
2011).
This
would
employ
the
AU
system
of
norm
creation
and
institutionalisation
while
factoring
the
culture
and
post-­‐Colonial
history
of
AU
countries
into
its
applications.
Beebe
might
be
well
placed
to
understand
the
unique
dynamics
of
challenges
faced
by
the
AU.
He
lives
in
Angola,
which,
despite
an
abundance
of
relative
resources,
remains
mired
at
162
on
the
Human
Development
Index
(United
Nations
Children’s
Fund,
2013,
p.
2).
The
author
contends
that
African
security
leaders,
military
and
civilian,
will
‘almost
always
couch
security
in
terms
of
environmental
security,
poverty
alleviation,
issues
of
water
and
sanitation,
food
security,
infrastructure
development,
and
lack
of
vocational
skills
training’
(Beebe,
2011).
This
remains
a
difficult
concept
to
grasp
due
to
the
strength
of
the
traditional
realist
paradigm
employed
by
the
western
military
leadership
(Beebe,
2011).
However,
the
credibility
of
debate
amongst
western
nations
as
to
how
the
AU
should
apply
itself,
for
example
in
the
perceived
failure
of
the
AU
in
Darfur
in
2004,
has
been
diminished
as
a
result
of
what
could
be
regarded
as
the
botched
Invasion
of
Iraq
(Bellamy,
2005,
p.
51).
Furthermore,
the
AU
seems
to
possess
a
critical
factor
for
success,
the
will
to
undertake
action,
which
has
resulted
in
reduced
conflict
(Vines,
2013).
In
the
case
of
Darfur
‘President
Obasanjo
lamented
that
although
the
AU
was
willing
to
deploy
more
peacekeepers,
it
was
unable
to
do
so
without
international
assistance’
(Bellamy,
2005,
p.
44).
Assistance
continues
to
be

8. required,
however
the
AU
may
be
well
placed
to
make
further
progress
in
areas
of
its
CA
if
logistical
factors
can
be
improved.
In
a
critique
of
the
AU,
logistical
challenges
and
the
lack
of
infrastructure
warrant
consideration,
for
these
aspects
continually
impede
the
efforts
of
the
AU.
Logically,
progress
in
many
of
the
areas
targeted,
such
as
health,
cannot
be
made
if
the
problems
cannot
be
physically
accessed.
Bellamy
(2005,
p.
44)
cites
logistics
as
a
major
factor
in
the
failure
of
the
AU’s
intervention
in
Darfur.
Cilliers
(2008,
p.
6)
states
that,
despite
the
numerous
advancements
of
the
ASF,
logistical
issues
remain
a
substantial
problem.
And
recently,
the
logistical
challenges
faced
by
the
AU
were
mentioned
in
a
ten-­‐year
review
by
the
Berlin
Colloquium
which
put
forth
infrastructure
improvement
as
a
key
policy
recommendation
(Paterson,
2012,
p.
4).
It
is
overwhelming
to
consider
the
numerous
requirements
for
building
a
few
decent
roads
and
bridges
in
Africa.
And
counter
to
this,
it
is
useful
to
consider
what
further
progress
the
AU
could
achieve
under
better
logistical
conditions.
Nevertheless,
regional
organisations
are
closer
to
crises
in
African
nations
and
can
respond
quicker
and
at
lower
cost
(Weiss
and
Welz,
2014,
p.
889).
Leaning
on
the
UN
adds
further,
intercontinental,
logistical
layers
to
the
challenges
of
improving
conditions
in
Africa.
Beebe
(2011)
argues
that
‘Africans
best
understand
a
human
security
narrative,
and
should
the
West
earnestly
adopt
this
human
security
narrative
in
addressing
Africa,
a
great
deal
more
could
be
accomplished’.
This
author
agrees
wholeheartedly.
But
the
narrative
cannot
be
fully
engaged,
or
results
improved,
unless
the
AU
can
access
the
regions
of
its
53
active
members.
Infrastructure
and
support
for
the
AU
could
even
be
considered
as
more
important
than
handing
over
operations
to
the
UN.
Security
and
development
on
the
African
continent
are
‘inextricably
linked’
(Beebe,
2011).
The
AU
has
demonstrated
it
can
reduce
conflict
as
a
multilateral
institution.
Through
a
process
of
norm
creation
and
internalisation
and
action
it
is
possible
that
further
issues,
such
as
HIV/AIDS
prevention,
disarmament,
and
child
protection
could
be
funnelled
into
this
process
and
progress
made
in

9. further
issues.
Such
a
scenario
is
envisioned
by
Beebe
(2011)
where
using
the
military
to
train
participants
in
civilian
vocations
progress
is
two
fold;
firstly
in
value
adding
to
society
and
reducing
the
predatory
element
of
the
military,
and
secondly
by
producing
a
workforce
capable
of
supporting
the
human
security
paradigm.
If
such
a
viable
force
were
to
be
created
through
the
efforts
of
the
AU,
then
the
constructivist
paradigm
could
make
progress
in
other
critical
areas
addressed
by
the
CA
such
as
health
and
poverty.
Conclusion
Improvement
in
Africa
through
the
AU
is
a
significant
challenge.
Factors
deleterious
to
progress
in
the
region
are
ever-­‐present,
and
due
to
colonialism,
are
largely
distinctive
to
Africa.
African
solutions
to
uniquely
African
problems
might
sound
logical,
but
post-­‐colonial
challenges
are
not
easily
fixed,
for
the
50
year
period
of
the
OAU
was
marred
by
some
of
the
most
vicious
conflicts
of
contemporary
times.
However,
the
advent
of
the
AU
brought
progress
in
the
areas
of
security,
and
thus
further
potential
for
progress
exists.
Facilitating
the
process
of
norm
creation
and
internalisation
in
the
AU
will
result
in
cultural
and
regional
factors
being
considered
in
its
actions.
Disproportionate
outside
influence
may
taint
this
process.
In
Africa,
while
the
realist
paradigm
seems
appropriate
due
to
violent
post-­‐colonial
history,
the
paradigm
of
human
security
is
better
suited
to
advance
the
CA.
Considering
the
success
of
the
AU
in
delivering
regional
stability,
it
would
be
encouraging
to
see
additional
concerns
of
the
AU
addressed
to
facilitate
regional
advancement.
According
to
Beebe
(2011),
this
is
possible.
African
solutions
to
African
problems
can
continue
to
work
and
expand
into
other
aspects
of
the
CA.
Through
its
success
in
security,
the
African
Union
has
created
the
groundwork
for
further
progress.
If
some
decent
roads
and
bridges
could
be
put
in
place,
the
African
Union
may
yet
produce
long
awaited
results
in
further
areas
of
its
Constitutive
Act.

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