This document discusses whether water should be considered a security issue according to realist theory in international relations. It argues that water meets the criteria of a security issue given its vital importance to human life and the potential for conflicts over scarce water resources. While realism traditionally focused narrowly on military threats to states, the failure of realists to predict major global changes like the end of the Cold War suggests the theory needs to be more flexible and adaptive to contemporary security challenges like environmental stress and resource scarcity. Including water as a security issue could make realism more relevant and effective in analyzing current global politics.

1. 1
Keith
Cavalli
Drawing
on
your
own
analysis
of
a
case
study,
explain
the
meaning
of
security
in
contemporary
global
politics.
Drink
up
Realism!
In
Observing
the
Middle
East,
Should
Realism
Accept
Water
as
a
Security
Issue?
Introduction
Dying
of
thirst
is
a
particularly
disturbing
fate.
The
cells
of
the
body
shrink,
releasing
water
into
the
bloodstream,
the
kidneys
fail,
delirium
ensues,
and
death
soon
follows
(Bernstein,
2010).
Depending
on
the
circumstances
this
process
can
extend
for
days,
or
sometimes,
mercifully,
takes
only
hours.
With
such
consequences,
it
might
be
accepted
that
thirst
is
one
of
the
most,
if
not
the
most,
prominent
motivations
for
human
behavior
(Berns,
quoted
by
Bernstein,
2010).
However,
as
a
determinant
of
life
and
death,
the
provision
of
potable
water
to
humans
can
be
neglected
in
the
contemporary
world.
Even
if
some
degree
of
basic
water
needs
are
met
under
the
Millennium
Development
Goals,
as
many
as
76
million
water-­‐related
deaths
are
estimated
to
occur
by
the
year
2020,
with
most
of
the
victims
being
children
(Gleick,
2002,
p.
1).
In
the
context
of
fetid
rivers
and
swamps,
and
brown-­‐mosaicked
plains
of
agricultural
desertification,
the
pollution
of
water
systems
on
which
life
depends
could
be
seen
as
analogous
to
a
serious,
life-­‐threatening
condition
(Falkenmark
and
Lundqvuist,
1998,
p.
38).

2. 2
This
essay
identifies
and
includes
water
as
a
security
issue
in
the
contemporary
global
environment.
This
inclusion
does
not
intend
to
broaden
the
subject
of
security
into
humanitarian
concerns.
Rather,
the
necessity
of
water
to
life,
and
its
close
association
with
conflict,
is
seen
to
legitimise
water
as
a
security
issue
under
the
realist
paradigm.
Environmental
stress
is
being
increasingly
acknowledged
as
a
challenge
to
the
state,
for
example
the
recent
report
by
the
United
States
Department
of
Defense
(DoD)
(2014)
accepts
the
challenges
of
environmental
change.
And
acceptance
of
water
by
realism
could
be
considered
as
appropriate
and
necessary
step
to
develop
the
effectiveness
and
maintain
the
relevance
of
the
theory
in
contemporary
global
politics.
This
essay
analyses
the
relationship
of
water
to
state
security
using
the
Middle
East
and
Iraq
as
examples,
and
demonstrates
that
water
is
a
primary
security
concern
for
the
state
in
the
anarchical
world
order
assumed
by
realism.
Water
security.
Realism
and
human
paradigms
Critical
resource
vs.
humanitarian
luxury
The
realist
view
could
be
considered
narrow
in
its
considerations
when
applied
to
security
studies.
During
the
Cold
War
the
majority
of
security
scholars
framed
security
studies
in
realist
terms
of
military
threat
to
the
state
(Baldwin,
1996,
p.
126).
As
such,
realism
has
been
criticised
as
inflexible,
and
lacking
the
malleability
required
of
the
contemporary
global
political
environment
(Kolodziej,
1992).
Realist
theory
demonstrates
reluctance
to
expand
its
considerations
of
state
security
for
fear
of
broadening
the
subject
of
security
into
an
unmanageable,
and
unrealistic
agenda
(Newman,
2010).
For
example,
in
a

3. 3
comprehensive
review
of
works
by
the
field’s
scholars,
Baldwin
(1996,
p.
129)
quoting
Allison,
Treverton
and
Romm
(1993)
argues
that
security
remains
‘“the
study
of
the
threat,
use,
and
control
of
military
force.”’
And
to
paraphrase
Walt’s
(1991)
The
Renaissance
of
Security
Studies,
while
the
parameters
of
academic
subjects
such
as
security
are
receptive
to
new
discourses,
efforts
to
expand
the
scope
of
security
studies
might
be
considered
to
derail
its
Hobbesian
focus,
for
the
subject
is
skewed
to
the
study
of
war.
However,
realists
could
be
viewed
as
discrediting
their
intramural
practice
of
restricting
constitutions
of
security
through
their
own
professed
failures.
For
example,
some
realist
international
relations
scholars
themselves
are
criticised
for
demonstrating
their
incompetence
through
their
inability
to
predict
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
(Kolodziej,
1992,
p.
425).
The
failure
to
foresee
the
end
of
a
war,
by
scholars
that
pride
themselves
on
the
predictive
nature
of
a
theory
that
focuses
on
war,
is
admitted
as
an
embarrassment
by
major
international
relations
figures
(Gusterson,
1999,
p.
319).
Furthermore,
security
academics,
demonstrating
an
affinity
for
unawareness,
refused
to
acknowledge
the
change
in
global
power
in
the
post-­‐Cold
War
environment
after
it
was
well
under
way
(Lebow
and
Risse-­‐Kappen,
1995,
cited
by
Gusterson,
1999,
p.
319).
And
in
a
consensus
of
authors,
Baldwin
(1991,
p.
117)
concludes
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
did
change
the
nature
of
the
field
in
that
hard
military
power
is
less
important.
The
author
argues
there
is
a
need
to
‘reexamine
the
way
we
think
about
international
relations
and
national
security’,
and
expand
the
view
of
what
constitutes
national
security
(Baldwin,
1991,
p.
118).
Realist
security
scholars
could
be
judged
to
have
demonstrated
their
incompetence
in
key
areas
of
their

4. 4
security
studies.
Water,
as
critical
to
life,
should
not
be
regarded
by
realists
as
opening
the
subject
of
security
into
an
endless
list
of
humanitarian
considerations.
Rather,
acceptance
of
water
by
realism
might
be
considered
a
necessity
in
order
to
demonstrate
the
ability
of
scholars
to
adapt
their
practice
and
remain
effective
in
their
analyses.
Adding
water
to
realist
security
studies
is
concomitant
with
the
increasingly
accepted
view
that
climate
change
is
a
part
of
the
contemporary
environment,
and
maintains
realism’s
state
focus.
Climate
change
has
been
a
catalyst
for
including
the
environmental
health
of
a
nation
to
the
considerations
of
national
security,
not
necessarily
the
individual
(Tarlock
and
Wouters,
2000,
p.
55).
More
recently,
the
DoD
(2014,
p.
11)
states
in
its
strategic
report,
‘“the
[DoD]
must
consider
the
effects
of
climate
change…and
how
these
effects
could
impact
our
national
security”’.
And
realist
theory
is
well
positioned
to
analyse
water
as
a
security
issue
due
to
the
fear
and
potential
for
conflict
incited
by
water
related
issues.
Gleick
(1993,
p.
87)
argues
that
even
the
sensitivity
amongst
nations
concerning
availability
of
fresh,
potable
water
has
the
potential
to
be
used
as
a
political
instrument
to
assert
power
and
may
result
in
violence
and
military
conflict.
Problematic
to
this
argument
is
that
none
of
the
four
indicators
Gleick
(1993)
uses
to
analyse
the
nation
with
respect
to
water,
security,
and
violence
are
empirically
derived
or
tested
(Yoffe,
et
al.,
2004,
p.
2).
Nevertheless,
national
leaders
have
previously
acknowledged
the
empirical
shortcomings
of
the
indicators
used
by
Gleick
(1993).
Furthermore,
the
relationship
of
water
to

5. 5
conflict,
without
empirical
focus,
has
been
developed
by
some
of
contemporary
history’s
most
prominent
state
leaders.
For
example,
President
Truman’s
historical
analysis
generated
his
belief
that
water,
and
the
geography
and
infrastructure
responsible
for
its
delivery,
is
the
source
of
200
years
of
European
wars
(Tarlock
and
Wouters,
2009,
p.
54).
However,
the
view
that
water
and
conflict
are
critically
linked
may
be
obfuscated
by
human
security.
In
general
terms,
human
security
is
defined
by
‘freedom
from
want
and
fear’,
with
provision
of
rights
necessary
to
fundamental
individual
needs,
and
is
based
on
ethics
and
norms
(Newman,
2010,
p.
78).
The
theory
suffers
from
the
absence
of
a
consensus
of
definition,
and
specific
aspirations
(McDonald,
2010,
p.
279).
Water
seems
to
lose
its
critical
status
under
this
model
where
the
concept
of
security
as
derived
from
the
environment
moves
beyond
the
assumption
of
causality
between
environmental
stress
and
violent
conflict,
and
into
the
broader
theory
of
human
security
that
includes
the
dynamics
between
environment
and
society
(Yoffe,
et
al.,
2004,
p.
2).
This
widening
of
the
security
agenda
is
seen
as
problematic
by
realists,
and
may
have
diluted
the
perception
of
water
as
critical
to
the
state,
and
the
power
of
water
to
motivate
human
behavior
(Berns,
cited
by
Bernstein,
2010).
The
fear
of
the
human
security
paradigm
is
that
it
is
a
‘shopping
list’
that
risks
incorporating
multiple
issues
into
a
definition
of
security
to
the
point
where
the
effectiveness
of
the
concept
is
lost
to
policymakers
(Krause,
cited
by
Newman,
2010,
p.
82).
It
may
not
be
the
case
that
water
security
will
result
in
the
security
‘shopping
list’
argued
by
Newman
(2010),
rather
it
may
be
the
association
with

6. 6
words
such
as
‘society’
and
‘poverty’
that
could
make
the
prospect
of
including
water
under
the
realist
paradigm
feel
like
it
may
open
the
realm
of
humanitarian
concerns.
For
as
a
determinant
of
life
and
death,
water
is
integral
to
nearly
all
aspects
of
human
production
and
the
environment
that
sustains
us
(Grey
and
Sadoff,
2007,
p.
547).
Water
security
does
not
result
in
a
list
of
needs
so
much
as
it
is
a
universal
requirement
in
the
existence
of
all
countries.
As
a
force
for
destruction,
either
catastrophically
through
droughts
and
floods,
or
progressively
through
desertification,
the
detrimental
nature
of
water
resulting
from
such
power
demonstrates
its
capacity
to
influence
state
populations
(Grey
and
Sadoff,
2007,
p.
547).
The
example
of
the
Middle
East
can
illustrate
that
inclusion
of
water
to
the
realist
view
of
security
is
appropriate,
as
the
resource
could
be
considered
integral
to
conflict
and
the
existence
of
the
state.
Water,
conflict,
and
displacement
in
the
Middle
East
The
tide
of
conflict
in
the
desert
The
inclusion
of
water
in
conflict
could
be
considered
unexciting
as
opposed
in
comparison
to
the
dramatic,
elegant,
destruction
caused
by
machine
guns
and
phosphorous
as
described
by
Broyles
(1984,
p.
8).
In
The
Coming
Anarchy
(2000,
p.
19)
Kaplan
argues
that
the
subject
of
‘the
environment’
or
‘diminishing
natural
resources’
in
foreign
policy
forums
becomes
quickly
mired
in
boredom
and
skepticism,
but
claims
it
is
time
to
regard
environmental
factors
as
the
primary
national
security
issues
of
the
twenty
first
century.
Future
wars
will
be

7. 7
intensified,
or
even
caused,
by
environmental
shortages,
and
waged
in
a
bid
for
communal
survival
(Kaplan,
2000,
p.
49).
The
proliferation
of
globally
desperate
circumstances
creates
a
picture
of
anarchy
and
self-­‐interested
behaviour
envisioned
by
realists.
This
could
be
viewed
as
revolving
around
environmental
degradation
and
resources
such
as
water.
Kaplan
(2000,
p.
49)
puts
forth
scenarios
where
water
and
the
environment
are
deteriorated
threaten
the
state,
and
that
neglect
of
conflict
at
the
subnational
level
will
gradually
degrade
the
power
of
the
state,
and
ultimately
result
in
the
demise
of
the
state
itself.
Water
security
may
correspond
with
state
security.
Tarlock
and
Wouters
(2009,
p.
54)
argue
that
the
‘characterisation
of
water
stresses
as
a
security
problem
has
an
extensive
pedigree’
extending
to
the
period
of
the
Old
Testament,
and
that
the
stress
of
drought
has
always
generated
fear.
However,
a
study
by
international
relations
scholars
of
shared
freshwater
resources
found
that
while
conflicts
over
water
occurred,
international
cooperation
far
outweighed
conflict,
which
resulted
in
numerous
international
water
agreements
(Yoffe,
et
al.,
2004,
p.
7).
Closer
examination
reveals
this
study
lacks
the
historical
perspective
put
forth
by
Tarlock
and
Wouters
(2009),
and
considers
only
the
last
sixty
years
(Wolf,
Yoffe
and
Giordano,
2003,
p.
29).
Water
and
conflict
could
have
a
much
stronger
historical
relationship
than
water
and
cooperation.
For
example,
water
supply
infrastructure
has
been
targeted
in
military
conflicts
from
the
time
of
6th
Century
BC
and
Nebuchadnezzar
in
Babylon,
and
continues
in
conflicts
throughout
the
Middle
East
in
the
contemporary
period
(Gleick,
2000,
p.
87).

8. 8
Arguments
over
water
security
in
the
region
can
be
criticised
for
neglecting
the
global
view
of
international
relations
(Yoffe,
et
al.,
2004,
p.
9-­‐10).
However,
responses
to
national
and
regional
disagreements
in
the
terms
of
use
of
water
have
been
re-­‐identified
as
a
problem
of
security
as
significant
as
war
and
terrorism
(Tarlock
and
Wouters,
2000,
p.
54).
Furthermore,
Chuck
Hagel,
the
U.S
Secretary
of
Defense
has
officially
acknowledged
the
link
between
conflict
and
water
shortages
(DoD,
2014,
foreword).
While
water
and
the
infrastructure
required
for
delivery
may
meet
individual
needs,
as
a
component
of
state
security
it
could
be
argued
to
fit
into
the
realist
paradigm
due
to
the
link
between
water
and
conflict.
A
distinctive
aspect
to
water
is
that
its
presence,
in
addition
to
its
absence,
may
also
become
a
security
issue
(Grey
and
Sadoff,
2007,
p.
547).
For
example,
the
World
Health
Organisation
(WHO)
predicts
that
260
million
people
will
be
infected
by
Schistosomiasis,
a
disease
contracted
via
contact
with
water
tainted
by
the
parasite
(WHO,
2014).
Without
significant
efforts
to
combat
the
deleterious
effects
of
the
parasite,
the
demand
for
water
intensifies
as
its
usefulness
declines,
and
reuse
becomes
impossible
(Falkenmark
and
Lundqvuist,
1998,
p.
38).
This
phenomenon
can
be
viewed
beyond
parasitic
epidemics.
Pollution
loads
degrade
the
capacity
of
water
systems
to
purify
which
will
gradually
lead
to
situations
where
water
is
not
only
the
source
of
life
and
wellbeing
of
humans
and
ecosystems,
but
also
a
cause
of
disease,
ecosystem
disruption,
and
societal
disorder:
a
term
known
as
hydrocide
(Lundqvist,
cited
in
Falkenmark
and
Lundqvuist,
1998,
p.
38).
As
the
strategic
value
of
potable
water
increases,
the
control
of
supply
becomes
central
to
state
security.
In
this
way,
the

9. 9
water
assets
of
Turkey
are
an
example
of
the
relationship
between
water
and
state
security.
According
to
Kaplan
(2000,
p.
41),
the
water
resources
of
the
Turks,
such
as
the
monumental
hydropower
complex
comprised
partially
of
the
Ataturk
Dam,
define
the
state
as
a
significant
power.
‘“Turks
may
have
little
oil,
but
their
Anatolian
heartland
has
lots
of
water
-­‐
the
most
important
fluid
of
the
21st
century”’
(Kaplan,
2000,
p.
36).
For
example,
when
the
flow
of
the
Euphrates
river
into
Syria
and
Iraq
was
interrupted
for
a
month
to
partially
fill
the
reservoir,
the
power
implications
and
potential
for
conflict
immediately
became
apparent:
Turkey
had
a
water
‘weapon’
that
could
be
used
against
Syria
and
Iraq
(Gleick,
2003,
p.
89).
Indeed,
the
site
manager
of
the
dam
claimed
the
water
flow
could
be
used
to
regulate
the
behaviour
of
these
countries
(Kaplan,
2000,
p.
37).
Furthermore,
the
cross
border
relationship
between
source
and
recipient
is
common
between
states.
‘Thirty
nations
receive
more
than
one-­‐third
of
their
surface
water
from
across
national
borders’
(Gleick,
1993,
p.
102).
In
the
example
of
Syria
and
Iraq,
the
security
of
Iraq
is
particularly
vulnerable
due
to
70%
of
Iraq’s
water
supply
being
controlled
by
Turkey,
Iran,
and
Syria
(Partow,
cited
in
Richardson,
2006,
p.
487).
Conversely,
ten
million
Kurds
threaten
Turkey
due
to
their
need
for
water
resources
(Kaplan,
2000,
p.
41).
And,
in
line
with
the
claims
of
state
power
by
the
dam’s
site
manager,
Turkey
has
used
the
threat
of
restricting
water
flow
to
Syria
to
force
Syrian
withdrawal
of
support
for
the
Kurds
(Gleick,
2003,
p.
89).
The
behaviour
of
the
Turkish
government
can
be
explained
through
realist
concepts.

10. 10
For
example,
the
nationalist
nature
of
the
Ataturk
Dam
project
is
thought
to
be
important
to
the
state
as
the
geopolitical
and
identity-­‐related
sense
of
isolation
due
to
the
location
of
Turkey
between
Christian
Europe
and
the
Arab
Muslim
Middle-­‐East
(McDonald,
2010,
pp.
285-­‐286).
Not
only
does
the
potential
for
military
conflict
hinge
on
water,
so
does
the
displacement
of
populations
of
neighbouring
countries.
This
may
give
rise
to
the
‘formless
battlefield’
envisioned
by
Kaplan
(2000,
p.
8),
which
is
defined
more
so
by
resources
and
displaced
persons
than
the
era
of
nation-­‐states
precipitated
by
the
1648
Peace
of
Westphalia.
A
prime
example
of
water
being
used
as
a
weapon
and
resulting
in
population
displacement
is
that
of
the
southern
marshes
of
Iraq.
The
Marsh
Arabs,
disliked
by
Saddam
Hussein,
were
sustained,
and
protected
from
the
Iraqi
military,
by
water
(Fawcett
and
Tanner,
2002,
p.
29-­‐30).
The
draining
of
the
southern
marshes
was
undertaken
by
Iraq
in
order
to
accomplish
military
and
political
goals
with
an
added
benefit
due
to
the
presence
of
oil
under
the
marshes
(Fawcett
and
Tanner,
2002,
p.
1).
In
the
1980’s
this
resulted
in
the
displacement
of
up
to
a
million
people
in
this
‘evisceration’
of
rural
Kurdistan
with
the
intent
to
break
the
independent
spirit
of
the
Kurds,
forcing
the
population
to
rely
on
Iraqi
authorities
for
water
and
staples
(Fawcett
and
Tanner,
2002,
p.
10).
Though
a
significant
part
of
the
offensive
was
undertaken
via
conventional
military
applications
in
the
region,
water
was
also
a
tactical
component
of
military
operations.
By
the
early
1990’s,
Iraq
attempted
to
completely
drain
the
marshes
in
an
effort
to
subdue
the
Marsh
Arabs
(Fawcett
and
Tanner,
2002,
p.
30).
In
addition
to

11. 11
being
drained,
the
water
was
purposefully
contaminated,
displacing
upwards
of
100,000
people
(Fawcett
and
Tanner,
2002,
p.
31).
This
was
a
factor
in
forcing
migration
due
to
environmental
scarcity
envisioned
by
Kaplan
(2000,
p.
20).
Migration
which
results
from
water
and
environmental
factors
is
accepted
by
the
DoD
(2014)
as
a
state
security
issue.
Following
the
2003
Invasion
of
Iraq
by
the
United
States,
local
Iraqi
populations
began
destroying
the
system
of
dykes
and
dams
in
order
to
reflood
the
marshes
(Richardson
and
Hussain,
2006,
p.
480).
However,
questions
remain
about
the
effects
on
viability,
the
loss
of
biodiversity,
contamination
from
chemical
residue
and
military
ordnance,
and
the
control
of
water
by
Turkey
(Fawcett
and
Tanner,
2002,
p.
40).
Furthermore,
conflicting
environmental
and
economic
interests
are
now
at
play
in
attempts
to
reestablish
wetlands
where
oil
is
now
being
extracted
(Fawcett
and
Tanner,
2002,
p.
41).
Put
simply,
extraction
of
oil
where
there
is
water
is
problematic,
and
the
area
may
remain
permanently
changed.
The
number
of
people
who
have
returned
to
the
region
is
thought
to
be
under
10,000,
with
less
than
10%
of
the
original
population
expected
to
follow
because
of
poor
fishing
and
contaminated
drinking
water
(Richardson
and
Hussain,
2006,
p.
487).
The
map
and
interests
of
this
region
could
well
be
redefined
by
this
event.
The
issues
emanating
from
reflooding
are
critical
to
the
authority
of
the
state
(Fawcett
and
Tanner
2002,
p.
52).
The
displaced
people
are
central
to
any
new
order
in
the
Iraq,
and
there
are
ramifications
for
the
security
of
neighbouring
states
(Fawcett
and
Tanner
2002,
p.
52).
Water
could
be
considered
a
critical
factor
in
conflict,
state
power,
and
security.

12. 12
Conclusion
Conflict,
anarchy,
threat,
fear,
and
self-­‐
interest
are
ever-­‐present
in
the
world
as
argued
by
Kaplan
(2000),
and
realism
should
be
considered
an
appropriate
theory
to
analyse
contemporary
security.
However,
realism
can
be
a
victim
of
its
own
focus
and
ignore
important
and
pertinent
factors
to
state
conflict
such
as
water.
Inclusion
of
water
security
will
develop
the
theory
to
be
more
effective
in
the
current
environment.
The
presence
or
absence
of
water
potable
water
presents
numerous
security
challenges
ranging
from
instability
between
nations,
to
increased
dust
from
desertification
affecting
military
operations
(DoD,
2014,
pp.
5-­‐6).
Accepting
water
part
of
security
may
not
result
in
an
extended
list
of
concerns
under
the
paradigm
of
human
security.
Rather,
it
allows
a
more
thorough
examination
of
an
anarchical
environment
where
the
realist
paradigm
remains
relevant.
Security,
under
realism,
remains
in
large
part
defined
by
war
and
the
state,
and
water
is
an
integral
component
of
the
relationship.
In
examining
the
Middle
East
water
can
be
seen
as
a
national
concern
that
defines
state
power.
Water
and
conflict
are
historically
linked,
and
recent
events
in
the
region
continue
to
demonstrate
the
relationship.
Water
can
be
used
by
the
state
as
a
weapon,
for
leverage,
and
even
potentially
to
redefine
borders.
The
recent
acceptance
of
environmental
aspects
by
the
U.S.
Department
of
Defense
(2014)
emphasises
the
centrality
of
water
to
the
security
concerns
of
the
state.
Realism
should
not
overlook
the
opportunity
to
follow
suit,
and
improve
the
theory
for
application
in
contemporary
global
politics.

13. 13
Bibliography
Baldwin,
D.
A.
(1995)
‘Security
studies
and
the
end
of
the
cold
war’,
World
Politics,
48(01),
pp.
117-­‐141.
Bernstein,
L.
(2014)
‘What
its
like
to
die
of
thirst’,
The
Washington
Post.
7
August
2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-­‐your-­‐
health/wp/2014/08/07/what-­‐its-­‐like-­‐to-­‐die-­‐of-­‐thirst/
(accessed
15
September
2014)
Broyles,
W.
Jr.
(1984)
‘Why
men
love
war’,
Esquire,
November,
61,
pp.
1-­‐12.
Falkenmark,
M.
and
J.
Lundqvist
(1998)
‘Towards
water
security:
political
determination
and
human
adaptation
crucial’,
Natural
Resources
Forum,
22(1),
pp.
37-­‐51
Gleick,
P.
H.
(2002)
Dirty-­‐water:
Estimated
Deaths
from
Water-­‐related
Diseases
2000-­‐2020.
Pacific
Institute
for
Studies
in
Development,
Environment,
and
Security.
Gleick,
P.
H.
(1993)
‘Water
and
conflict:
fresh
water
resources
and
international
security’,
International
Security,
pp.
79-­‐112.

14. 14
Grey,
D.,
and
C.
W.
Sadoff
(2007)
‘Sink
or
swim?
water
security
for
growth
and
development’,
Water
Policy,
9(6),
pp.
545-­‐571.
Gusterson,
H.
(1999)
‘Missing
the
end
of
the
cold
war
in
international
security',
in
Weldes,
J.,
M.
Laffey,
H.
Gusterson,
and
R.
Duvall,
eds.
Cultures
of
Insecurity:
States,
Communities,
and
the
Production
of
Danger.
University
of
Minnesota
Press.
pp.
319-­‐345.
Kaplan,
R.
D.
(2000)
The
Coming
Anarchy:
Shattering
the
Dreams
of
the
Post-­‐Cold
War
World.
New
York.
Random
House.
Kolodziej,
E.
A.
(1992)
‘Renaissance
in
security
studies?
caveat
lector!’,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
pp.
421-­‐438.
McDonald,
M.
(2002)
‘Human
security
and
the
construction
of
security’,
Global
Society,
16(3),
pp.
277-­‐295.
Newman,
E.
(2010)
‘Critical
human
security
studies’,
Review
of
International
Studies,
36(01),
pp.
77-­‐94.
Richardson,
C.
J.
and
N.
A.
Hussain,
(2006)
‘Restoring
the
garden
of
Eden:
an
ecological
assessment
of
the
marshes
of
Iraq’,
BioScience,
56(6),
pp.
477-­‐
489.

15. 15
Tarlock,
D.
and
P.
Wouters
(2009)
‘Reframing
the
water
security
dialogue’,
Environmental
Law,
423
(9),
pp.
53–60.
United
States
Department
of
Defense
(2014)
Department
of
Defense
2014
Climate
Change
Adaptation
Roadmap’,
Office
of
the
Deputy
Under
Secretary
of
Defense
for
installations
and
Environment
(Science
and
Technology
Directorate),
June
2014,
pp.
1-­‐16.
Walt,
S.
M.
(1991)
‘The
renaissance
of
security
studies’,
International
Studies
Quarterly,
pp.
211-­‐239.
Wolf,
A.
T.,
S.
B.
Yoffe
and
M.
Giordano
(2003)
‘International
waters:
identifying
basins
at
risk’,
Water
policy,
5(1),
pp.
29-­‐60.
World
Health
Organisation
(2014)
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/facts_figures/en/
(accessed
19
September
2014)
Yoffe,
S.,
G.
Fiske,
M.
Giordano,
M.
Giordano,
K.
Larson
,
K.
Stahl
and
A.T.
Wolf
(2004)
‘Geography
of
international
water
conflict
and
cooperation:
data
sets
and
applications’,
Water
Resources
Research,
40(5),
pp.
1-­‐12.