1. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Homework Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Research Paper help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Online Tutoring
https://www.homeworkping.com/
click here for freelancing tutoring sites
+Index
+Index.........................................................................................................................................................1
Strategy Sheet.............................................................................................................................................5
Inherency....................................................................................................................................................6
Solvency F/L...............................................................................................................................................7
Solvency F/L...............................................................................................................................................8
Solvency F/L...............................................................................................................................................9
Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................10
Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................11
Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................12
Solvency – Ext. #1 – International Backlash.........................................................................................13
Solvency – Ext. #4 – Cyber Terrorism...................................................................................................14
Solvency – Ext. #6 – Space Debris..........................................................................................................15
Solvency – Ext. #6 – Space Debris..........................................................................................................16
Solvency – Ext. #7 – Technical Barriers................................................................................................17
Solvency – Ext. #10 – Timeframe..........................................................................................................18
Solvency – Ext. #13 – Alt Causes............................................................................................................19
Competitiveness F/L................................................................................................................................20
Competitiveness F/L................................................................................................................................21
Competitiveness – Ext. #3 – Heg Inevitable..........................................................................................22
Failed States F/L......................................................................................................................................23
Fossil Fuels F/L........................................................................................................................................24
1
2. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Japan F/L..................................................................................................................................................25
Japan F/L .................................................................................................................................................26
Lunar Materials F/L................................................................................................................................27
Military Readiness F/L............................................................................................................................28
Military Readiness F/L............................................................................................................................29
Military Readiness – Ext. #1 – Readiness Low Now.............................................................................30
Pollution....................................................................................................................................................31
Space Colonization F/L...........................................................................................................................32
Space Colonization F/L...........................................................................................................................33
Space Colonization F/L...........................................................................................................................34
Space Colonization – Ext. #3 – Extinction Not Inevitable...................................................................35
Space Colonization – Ext. #5 – Infeasible..............................................................................................36
AT: Space Weaponization.......................................................................................................................37
AT: Space Weaponization.......................................................................................................................38
AT: Space Weaponization Inevitable.....................................................................................................39
Space Weaponization Bad – Prolif.........................................................................................................40
Space Weaponization Bad – Accidental Attack....................................................................................41
Space Weaponization Bad – International Law...................................................................................42
Space Weaponization Bad – US-Russia Relations................................................................................43
Space Weaponization Bad – Terrorism.................................................................................................44
Space Weaponization Bad – Soft Power................................................................................................45
Space Weaponization Bad – Ext. Space Prolif......................................................................................46
Space Weaponization Bad – Ext. Accidental Attack............................................................................47
Space Weaponization Bad – Ext. International Law...........................................................................48
Space Weaponization Bad – Ext. Russian Relations Key To Space....................................................49
Space Weaponization Bad – Ext. Russia Relations Good....................................................................50
Space Weaponization Bad – Space War Impact Magnifier.................................................................51
Space Weaponization Bad – Space War Impact Magnifier.................................................................52
Space Weaponization Bad – AT: Solves Prolif.....................................................................................53
Space Weaponization Good....................................................................................................................54
Space Weaponization Good....................................................................................................................55
Space Weaponization Good – AT: Arms Race.....................................................................................56
2
3. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Heg Bad.....................................................................................................................................................57
Heg Bad.....................................................................................................................................................58
Heg Bad.....................................................................................................................................................59
Heg Bad – Ext. Terrorism.......................................................................................................................60
Heg Bad – AT: Benign Hegemon...........................................................................................................61
AT: NASA Key.........................................................................................................................................62
AT: NASA Key.........................................................................................................................................63
T – Incentives...........................................................................................................................................64
Bizcon DA Link........................................................................................................................................65
Spending DA Link...................................................................................................................................66
Politics DA Link – Congress Hates Plan................................................................................................67
Politics DA Link – Congress Hates Plan................................................................................................68
Politics DA Link – Congress Loves Plan...............................................................................................69
Politics DA Link – Plan Bipartisan........................................................................................................70
Politics DA Link – Plan Popular............................................................................................................71
Politics DA Link – Plan Unpopular.......................................................................................................72
Politics DA – Plan Not Salient................................................................................................................73
China CTBT DA – 1NC Shell.................................................................................................................74
China CTBT DA – 1NC Shell.................................................................................................................75
China CTBT DA – China Wants Peace.................................................................................................76
China CTBT DA – China Key To CTBT..............................................................................................77
China CTBT DA – AT: CTBT Hurts US Nukes...................................................................................78
China CTBT DA – AT: CTBT Collapses Heg......................................................................................79
China CTBT DA – AT: Can Cheat CTBT............................................................................................80
Space Militarization DA Uniqueness.....................................................................................................81
Space Militarization DA Link.................................................................................................................82
Private Sector CP – 1NC Shell...............................................................................................................83
Private Sector CP Solvency.....................................................................................................................84
Private Sector CP Solvency.....................................................................................................................85
Private Sector CP Solvency.....................................................................................................................86
Private Sector CP – AT: Perm Do Both................................................................................................87
Private Sector CP – AT: Plan Solves.....................................................................................................88
3
4. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Private Sector CP – AT: Plan Solves.....................................................................................................89
DoD CP – 1NC Shell................................................................................................................................90
DoD CP Solvency.....................................................................................................................................91
DoD CP Solvency.....................................................................................................................................92
Japan CP – 1NC Shell ............................................................................................................................93
Japan CP Solvency..................................................................................................................................94
Japan CP Solvency..................................................................................................................................95
Japan CP – AT: Perm Do Both..............................................................................................................96
4
5. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Strategy Sheet
The best strategy in the file is probably the States CP (have the states give funding to private industry to
do the plan). The aff will have a lot of cards that say federal involvement is key, but the cards don’t
provide any warrants. If they do provide warrants, they aren’t reasons why the USFG is key but rather why
any level of government involvement is key – the states can capture these warrants.
The Japan CP is solid, but it might be trickier because a lot of the advantages are specific to the US.
The DoD CP is also pretty good, but the net benefit situation is trickier. You could run it with a politics
DA with NASA-specific links and argue that the DoD solves the plan better.
Disads
Politics – the best links to read are plan unpopular. Congress never gives NASA as much money as it asks
for, and although NASA is popular with the public, there’s decent evidence that the public really doesn’t
care about space exploration.
A Space Militarization DA can be found in the generic alternative energy DA’s file. The uniqueness in the
file seems to go the wrong way, so I’ve included a couple new uniqueness cards and another link. You can
find more impacts in the Space Weaponization Bad part of this file.
Advantages
I’ve included some generic heg bad cards. They will read hegemony as an impact to various arguments –
military readiness, leadership, competitivenss – so rather than include heg bad cards in all of these
frontlines, I put them in a separate file.
One lab may also claim a space weaponization advantage. This advantage is a bit tricker because they
have internal links going both ways. The space weaponization frontline consists of generic cards
explaining why space weaponization won’t happen, and then there are cards on space weaponization good
and space weaponization bad depending on which way they read their impact.
Other Tricks
Normally source quals don’t matter much, but most of the aff’s solvency/US key warrants come from the
government itself (NSSO studies or Rouge – they both are part of the government). A good argument
could be made for source bias here.
5
6. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Inherency
High interest in Space Solar Power Now
Leonard David Special Correspondent, Space News 9-17-07
http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/070919_sps_airforce.html
BRECKENRIDGE, Colorado – The deployment of space platforms that capture sunlight for beaming down electrical
power to Earth is under review by the Pentagon, as a way to offer global energy and security benefits – including the
prospect of short-circuiting future resource wars between increasingly energy-starved nations.
A proposal is being vetted by U.S. military space strategists that 10 percent of the U.S. baseload of energy by 2050,
perhaps sooner, could be produced by space based solar power (SBSP). Furthermore, a demonstration of the concept is
being eyed to occur within the next five to seven years. A mix of advocates, technologists and scientists, as well as legal and
policy experts, took part in Space Based Solar Power – Charting a Course for Sustainable Energy, a meeting held here
September 6-7 and sponsored by the United States Air Force Academy's Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies and
the Pentagon's National Security Space Office.
6
7. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency F/L
1. International cooperation is key – unilateral action creates backlash from other nations
Dr. Peter Glaser, member of National Space Society Board of Governors, former Vice President for Advanced Technology at Arthur
D. Little, Inc., fellow of the American Association of the Advancement of Science and the American Institute for Aeronautics and
Astronautics, inducted into the Space Technology Hall of Fame, and inventor of SSP, Spring ’08, “An Energy Pioneer Looks Back,”
Ad Astra (magazine of the National Space Society), http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdf [Tandet]
Since it would be such a huge undertaking, I think it would be best accomplished at an international level, perhaps even
managed by the United Nations. Each country could contribute their best effort, and then each country would reap the
benefit of cheap and plentiful power from the sun. We could utilize the knowledge of all the nations that have been
researching space- based solar power. If only one country has the satellites, the international community will worry that
the technology will be misused. With every nation taking part in the planning, building, and operation of the system,
there would be inherent transparency, oversight, and equality. There would be no secrets, and no country would be left in
the dark. On the other hand, if one nation decides to build the system, all hell may break loose. There would be distrust
and a huge shift in the balance of power. Any nation with such a system would not only have an advantage in space,
but they would have economic and military advantages on the ground as well. And there are many countries taking the
idea of solar power from space much more seri- ously that we are in the United States. I would prefer to see a network of
power satellites built by an international effort.
2. International backlash creates lash-out – other countries get angry and sabotage US leadership, turning
case
Michael Katz-Hyman, Research Assistant at the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L.
Stimson Center and the author or editor of eleven books and over 350 articles, April ’03, “Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case
Against Weaponizing Space,” Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=81 [Tandet]
Given the extraordinary and growing differential in power that the United States enjoys in ground warfare, sea power, and air
power, it is hard to propound compelling arguments for seeking to supplement these advantages by weaponizing space. The
current U.S. lead in the military utilization of space has never been greater and is unchallenged. If the United States pushes to
extend its pronounced military dominance into space, others will view this through the prism of the Bush administration's
national security strategy, which places emphasis on preventive war and preemption. Foreign leaders will not passively accept U.S.
initiatives to implement a doctrine of space dominance. They will have ample, inexpensive means to take blocking action, as it
is considerably easier to negate U.S. dominance in space than on the ground, at sea, and in the air. The introduction of space
weaponry and ASAT testing are therefore likely introduce grave complications for the terrestrial military advantages that the
United States has worked so hard, and at such expense, to secure.
7
8. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency F/L
3. Government control crowds out the private sector, ultimately creating rebellion
Taylor Dinerman, editor and publisher of SpaceEquity.com, 1-15-07, “Independent space colonization: questions and
implications,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/784/1 [Tandet]
In the long term the effort to impose controls on private space colonization by the use of a vague process of international
consensus-seeking will create a reaction not only against the OST but against the whole idea that Earth governments should be
allowed any say whatsoever in the governance of off-Earth activities. In the near term it is relatively easy for governments to
impose their will on space activities, but when vehicles that can provide low-cost access to low Earth orbit are as available to
the public as oceangoing private yachts, maintaining control will be much harder.
4. Satellites are vulnerable to terrorism – ground and cyber terrorists can attack satellite beams or ground
control centers, rendering satellites ineffective
The Economist, 1-17-08, “Disharmony in the Spheres,” http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10533205
[Tandet]
Many strategists argue that the most vulnerable parts of the American space system are closer to home. Ground stations
and control centres, particularly those of commercial operations, are exposed to conventional bombing, whether by armies
or terrorists. Communication links to and from satellites are open to interference. In cyber-warfare, critical parts of the
space system could be attacked from distant computers. Even without external meddling, notes Tom Ehrhard, a senior
fellow at the CSBA, American forces struggle to find enough bandwidth and to prevent the myriad of electronic systems from
jamming each other.
Some remedial action is being taken. Backup ground stations are being set up in case the main GPS control centre outside
Colorado Springs is disabled. New satellites will have a more powerful GPS signal that is harder to block. America is
experimenting with satellite-to-satellite communication by laser, which can carry more data and is less prone to interference
than radio waves.
And the armed forces are starting to train for warfare with few or no data links. Simulated attacks by both space and
cyberspace “aggressors” are being incorporated into events such as the regular “Red Flag” air-combat exercises over the
Nevada desert. But, said an officer at one recent wargame, there are other ways of doing things. “If you really want to take us
down, why go to space? You could just try to take out the control tower or bring down the electricity supply to the
base.”
5. NASA doesn’t want to develop SPS – they’d just reject the aff’s funding
Jeff Foust, aerospace analyst and editor/publisher of The Space Review, 8-13-07, "A Renaissance for Space Solar Power?", The
Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/931/1
Another big problem has been finding the right government agency to support R&D work on space solar power. Space solar
power doesn't neatly fit into any particular agency's scope, and without anyone in NASA or DOE actively advocating it, it has
fallen through the cracks in recent years. "NASA does science, they do astronauts, and they do aeronautics, but they don't do
energy for the Earth," Mankins said. "On the other side, the Department of Energy doesn't really do energy for space." That
situation, at least in regards to those two agencies, shows little sign of changing.
8
9. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency F/L
6. Satellites are vulnerable to space debris – anything larger than an M&M can destroy them
Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, July ’04, “What if
Space Were Weaponized?”, Center for Defense Information http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf [Tandet]
There are, however, dangers to placing such important assets in space. Satellites are inherently vulnerable. They
travel in predictable, fixed orbits — this is the reason that some in the Air Force call intercepting a satellite “scheduling.”
Because of the high velocities of objects in orbit, even a small object can destroy the most durable military satellite.
For example, engineers cannot shield satellites against orbital debris larger than one centimeter in diameter – anything
larger than an M&M.
7. There are major technical barriers to SPS – conversion efficiency, waste heat, expensive access, and
environmental damage – and the technology their cards claim to use has never been tested in space
John C. Mankins, former manager of NASA’s Advanced Concepts Studies Office of Space Flight, Spring ’08, “Energy Free from
Orbit,” Ad Astra (magazine of the National Space Society), http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdf [Tandet]
If collecting solar power in space is such a good idea, why isn’t it already being done today? The simple answer: because it’s
hard! The platform itself offers major challenges. One challenge is to efficiently convert sunlight into electrical power,
and in turn efficiently create an electrically (not mechanically) steered beam for transmission to a receiver on Earth.
Another closely related platform challenge is to cost- effectively remove the remaining waste heat from the platform and its
electronics so that it won’t overheat and fail. The platform must meet these challenges while being as lightweight and
inexpensive as possible. There are also a range of detailed issues involving pointing and control of the platform, and of
designing platform systems for assembly, maintenance, and repair.
A major barrier to all space endeavors also applies to space solar power, and that is affordable access to space. This barrier
is one of compelling importance. The problem of space access includes both low-cost and highly-reliable Earth-to-orbit
transportation, and in-space transportation. (Fortunately, one of the key ingredients in overcoming this barrier is having a
market that requires many flights. It’s hard to imagine how air travel between continents would be affordable if the aircraft
were used once or twice per year rather than once or twice per day!)
Advances that drive down the cost of space operations present significant hurdles, too. These hurdles involve a range of
capabilities, most of which have never been demonstrated in space—but all of which are entirely taken for granted here on
Earth. The kinds of capabilities in question include the highly-autonomous assembly of large structures, the deployment and
integration of modular electronic systems, refu eling, and repair and maintenance. (The key ingredient is to perform such
operations without large numbers of operators and sustaining engineers on Earth—which drive the high cost of contemporary
space operations.)
Environmental interactions pose another potential challenge. It is not yet understood how the space environment may
affect the space solar power platform or how transmitting the energy may affect Earth’s atmosphere.
9
10. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency F/L
8. Treaties make SPS illegal – this prevents effective tech and hurts security and competitivenss
National Security Space Office, part of a long-term government study on the feasibility of solar space power as a provider of
U.S. energy, 10-10-07, “Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security,”
http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf
Application of the International Traffic Arms Regulations (ITAR) may constitute a major barrier
to effective partnerships in SBSP and negatively impact national security. Right now ITAR
greatly restricts and complicates all space‐related business, as it treats all launch and satellite
technologies as arms. This has had the effect of causing America’s competitors to develop
ITAR‐free products, and had a negative impact on our domestic space industries, which can no
longer compete on level ground. Many participants in the feasibility study were very vocal that
including satellite and launch technology in ITAR has had a counterproductive and detrimental
effect on the U.S.’s national security and competitiveness—losing control and market share,
and closing our eyes and ears to the innovations of the competition while selling ourselves on a
national illusion of unassailable space superiority. Effective collaboration, even with allies on
something of this level, could not take place effectively without some special consideration or
modification.
9. No tech spillover – demonstrating feasibility doesn’t mean the tech will necessarily be used
Charles V. Pena, Cato's former director of defense policy studies, and Edward Hudgins, formerly director of regulatory studies
for the Cato Institute and editor of Regulation magazine, 3-18-02, “Should the United States ‘Weaponize’ Space? Military and
Commercial Implications,” CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-427es.html [Tandet]
When evaluating a threat to U.S. spacebased military and commercial assets, it is important to note that possession of a
technology by a potentially hostile power does not mean that the country will be able to translate the technology into an
effective military system. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had scientists and engineers doing cutting-edge work,
but it often found it extremely costly and difficult to produce in quantity�or sometimes prototype�the most cutting-edge
systems, equipment, or devices. The race to the moon was a case in point. The Soviet Union produced many space firsts but
ultimately could not produce refined, quality systems that could be launched successfully, time after time. America had its
major mistakes as well, such as the fire on the launch pad of Apollo 1 in 1967. But America learned from its mistakes and
constantly improved its systems, even ones run by the American government. In the late-1960s, the Soviet Union built what for
some years was the world�s largest telescope, the Bolschoi Teleskop Azimultalnyi. The problem was that it rarely worked
properly. At a more basic and humble level, the Soviet Union was not able to produce quality consumer products in quantity.
China, the country often feared as threatening U.S. space-based assets, has quality problems similar to those of the old
Soviet Union. For example, it has never been able to produce in quantity a quality fighter plane, which would be far
more important to its military needs than exotic space weapons. Thus, the fact that a country possesses a technology
that could be developed to threaten U.S. space assets is a reason for attention and concern, but it is not a reason for
new, costly programs to counter phantom threats.
10
11. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency F/L
10. The plan has a long timeframe – satellites won’t even be launched until 2050
Jeff Foust, aerospace analyst and editor/publisher of The Space Review, 8-13-07, “A Renaissance for Space Solar Power?”, The
Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/931/1 [Tandet]
Smith made it clear, though, that he’s not looking for a quick fix that will suddenly make solar power satellites feasible in the
near term. “If I can close this deal on space-based solar power, it’s going to take a long time,” he said. “The horizon we’re
looking at is 2050 before we’re able to do something significant.” The first major milestone, he said, would be a small
demonstration satellite that could be launched in the next eight to ten years that would demonstrate power beaming
from GEO. However, he added those plans could change depending on developments of various technologies that could alter
the direction space solar power systems would go. “That 2050 vision, what that architecture will look like, is carved in Jell-O.”
[“Smith” refers to Lt. Col. Michael Smith, an officer in the US Air Force and Chief of Future Concepts of the National Security
Space Office]
11. Space shuttles are dangerous and costly – unmanned vehicles are better
Jim Grichar, professor of economics who formerly worked for the federal government, 1-21-04, “Wielding the Budget Axe: It’s
Time to Abolish NASA,” http://www.lewrockwell.com/grichar/grichar33.html [Tandet]
The space shuttle is a disaster, having led to the deaths of 14 astronauts. It costs too much to use it to launch payloads into
space, and over its more than 20 year life, it has been proven to be unreliable. Cheaper, unmanned vehicles are more useful
and reliable for putting payloads into orbit. In a move that reveals the multibillion-dollar boondoggle status of the international
space station, the Bush Administration is proposing that U.S. funding of it be ended in the near future, and, with savings from the
proposed termination of the space shuttle and some additional funds (yet to be specified, of course), that the U.S. once again put
astronauts on the moon and eventually send manned expeditions to Mars. This plan, if funded, would probably raise NASA’s
budget to the $50 billion annual level from the proposed $16.4 billion for fiscal year (fy in the b-lingo) 2005.
12. International cooperation is key to solve – U.S. alone isn’t as efficient
Joseph D. Rouge – Acting Director, National Security Space Office; 10-10-07; National Security Space Office;
http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf
FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found that although there was universal agreement that international
cooperation was highly desirable an necessary, there was significant disagreement on what form the cooperation
should take.
There are multiple values to be balanced with respect to international cooperation. The various goods to be
optimized include efficiency, speed of development, cost savings, existing alliances, new partnerships, general
goodwill, American jobs and business opportunities, cooperation, safety & assurance, commercial autonomy, and
freedom of action. Adding more and new partners may increase goodwill, but add additional layers of approval and
slow development. Starting with established alliances and shared values fulfills some expectations and violates others.
The spectrum of participation ranges from beginning with a demarche before the UN General Assembly, to privately
approaching America’s closest allies, to arranging multi‐national corporate conferences. Many participants felt the
International Space Station (ISS) overvalued cooperation for cooperation’s sake, and took mutual dependency too far.
11
12. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency F/L
13. Ground solar power is a pre-requisite to space solar power
Geoffrey A. Landis, scientist at the NASA Glenn Research Center, on the science team of the Pathfinder mission to Mars and the
Mars Exploration Rovers mission, February ’04, “Reinventing the Solar Power Satellite,” NASA,
http://gltrs.grc.nasa.gov/reports/2004/TM-2004-212743.pdf [Tandet]
Analyses of space solar power often assume that ground solar power is a competing technology, and
show that space solar power is a preferable technology on a rate of return basis. In fact, however, space
solar power and ground solar power are complementary technologies, not competing technologies. These
considerations were initially discussed in 1990 [4]. Low-cost ground solar power is a necessary precursor
to space solar power: Space solar power requires low cost, high production and high efficiency solar
arrays, and these technologies will make ground solar attractive for many markets. The ground solar
power market, in turn, will serve develop technology and the high-volume production readiness for space
solar power.
Since ground solar is a necessary precursor to space solar power, an analysis of space solar power
should consider how it interfaces with the ground-based solar infrastructure that will be developing on a
faster scale than the space infrastructure.
12
13. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency – Ext. #1 – International Backlash
International community will backlash against unilateral US action
Stephen Latchford, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Air Force, December ’05, “Strategies for Defeating Commercial Imagery
Systems,” USAF Center for Strategy and Technology, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat39.pdf [Tandet]
Beyond the din generated by the international community, the United States will need to consider the actual destabilizing
effects of deploying a space weapon, even if nominally defensive. As the world's superpower, a rush to weaponize in absence of an
impending threat to its military superiority will be regarded with suspicion. American politicians must be prepared to respond to
the question, “What threat is so grave that it cannot be handled by America’s prodigious terrestrial capability?” Although
competitors may not respond militarily to U.S. weaponization, some will see it as a dangerous move by a hegemon and will shift
to create a counterbalance. Coalitions are likely to form, particularly in diplomatic circles, in resistance to any effort to
capitalize on weaponization, and adversaries will look to field asymmetric countermeasures against those weapons. Even a U.S.
policy to build space weapons to be held in reserve until needed is certain to draw fire from those who perceive little difference
between a quick-reaction defensive capability and an offensive capability.
13
14. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency – Ext. #4 – Cyber Terrorism
Satellites are vulnerable to cyber-attack – information can be co-opted and satellites can be destroyed
Christopher M. Petras, former legislative director of the Saginaw Chippewa tribe, fall ’02, “The Use of Force in Response to Cyber-
Attack on Commercial Space Systems,” Journal of Air Law and Commerce, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2159/ [Tandet]
Although the 1996 National Space Policy directed that steps be taken to protect satellites from cyber-attacks,
commercial satellite operators have generally not seen a need to do this, due to the high cost and the lack of demand from
customers for protective measures. Hence, U.S. commercial satellites are vulnerable to cyber-attack, and "the political,
economic, and military value of space systems makes them attractive targets." The growing interdependence between
U.S. civilian and military space systems further increases the likelihood that cyber-attacks might be launched against
American commercial satellites, if for no other reason than military action directed against U.S. space capabilities will have to
target the nation's broader space infrastructure to be successful. In addition, to potential foreign adversaries seeking to avoid
a direct military confrontation with the U.S. forces, whether a traditional uniformed military or "non-traditional" adversary
(such as a terrorist organization), the commercial sector represents the "soft underbelly" of American space power, which
can be attacked through cyberspace in such a way as to make determining the origin of the attack very difficult.
14
15. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency – Ext. #6 – Space Debris
Space junk in space limits space travel and satellite deployment
Rachel Courtland, Expert analyst for News Scientist Space MIT alum., 6/27/08, Newscientistspace “Weak Solar Cycle May Keep
More Space Junk In Orbit” (http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn14207-weak-solar-cycle-may-keep-more-space-junk-in-orbit.html)
These numbers are set to fall, regardless of the severity of the solar cycle, as the pieces gradually get dragged into Earth's
atmosphere, where they will burn up. But if the weak solar cycle forecast is correct, hundreds more pieces of Fengyun-1C
debris larger than 10 cm will still be in orbit by 2019 compared to a normal cycle, according to simulations by Whitlock
and colleagues. This could spell trouble for satellite operators, who must plan manoeuvres to avoid passing Fengyun
debris. In 2007, for example, the NASA satellite Terra had to dodge a fragment set to approach it within 19 metres. Mild solar
weather could also keep thousands of smaller pieces in orbit. An estimated 40,000 Fengyun pieces between 1 and 10 cm across
– below the limit ground-based radars can detect – currently circle the Earth, says Whitlock. These objects can also cause
considerable damage. "Anything over 1 centimetre can really cause problems, almost for any satellite. If it happens to
hit an instrument or an antenna, it could completely disable it,"
The plan only makes space debris worse – space conflict increases debris
Michael Krepon, Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the author or editor of eleven books and over 350 articles, July
’05, “Seven Questions: Space Weapons,” Foreign Policy, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1443/ [Tandet]
Once you blow something up in space, the debris lingers. It isn't like a sea battle where the remains of two warships sink to
the bottom. The last anti-satellite weapons test was carried out in 1985 by the United States. We took aim at an old, dying
Air Force satellite -- just as a test -- and it created 200 pieces of debris that were large enough to track. The last piece of
debris finally left low Earth orbit 17 years later, and one of the pieces came within 1 mile of the International Space
Station and could have done significant damage. Debris is the single greatest threat to the space shuttle. This is why the Air
Force prefers to jam or dazzle satellites rather than blowing them up. But once we go down this road, there are no
guarantees that other countries will play by our rules. It is a lose-lose situation if space warfare happens. The United
States will still win wars, but we will win with more casualties and more destruction.
15
16. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency – Ext. #6 – Space Debris
High risk of space debris now – the plan only makes it worse
John B. Rhinelander, senior counsel in Pillsbury's healthcare & life sciences group, and Philip E. Coyle, senior advisor to the
Center for Defense Information, September ’02, "Drawing the Line: the Path to Controlling Weapons in Space, Disarmament
Diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd66/66op1.htm [Tandet]
The problem of space debris is a factor in the weaponisation of space, and in the ability of arms control agreements to deal
with weapons in space for both defensive and offensive purposes. Reportedly, the US Space Command currently tracks
about 9,000 man-made objects larger than four inches across. Most of these are small objects, the result of shroud or stage
separation, missile break-up, or other phenomena. The exact number of man-made objects is impossible to catalogue, but there
are reportedly hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of smaller man-made objects ranging from golf ball-sized objects
to flecks of paint. The increase in space debris has become such a concern to the US military that it voluntarily constrains
its activities likely to further aggravate the problem. Obviously, weapons fired at objects in space would very quickly and
dramatically add to the burden from space debris.
16
17. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency – Ext. #7 – Technical Barriers
Their author concedes that there are significant technological barriers to economic feasibility
John C. Mankins, former manager of NASA’s Advanced Concepts Studies Office of Space Flight,, 10-12-07, “Leading Scientists
and Thinkers on Energy,” from an interview with Mankins conducted by David Houle, an analyst who advises companies on new
developing technology, http://www.evolutionshift.com/blog/2007/10/12/leading-scientists-and-thinkers-on-energy-–-john-c-mankins/
[Tandet]
All of the basic science seems to be in hand. Unlike fusion energy R&D, not fundamental problems of science remain to be
solved for space solar power to become feasible. However, there are definitely significant technical challenges remaining
before economic feasibility can be established. Solving these challenges is more than just engineering—it requires real
invention—but not basic research. A number of areas remain to be developed, including wireless power transmission,
robotics, materials and structures, thermal management—and, of course, very low cost Earth to orbit transportation is
critical.
Plan’s not possible – there’s no way to get the satellites into space
David Boswell, keynote a speaker at the 1991 International Space Development Conference, “Whatever happened to solar power
satellites?”, 8-30-04, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/214/1
A fully-operational solar power satellite system could end up needing to be enormous. Some designs suggest creating
rectangular solar arrays that are several kilometers long on each side. If we assume that enough money could be found to
build something like this and that it could be run competitively against other energy options, there is the very real problem of
figuring out how to get it into orbit or how to build it in orbit from separate smaller pieces.
The largest solar panels ever deployed in space are currently being used on the International Space Station. They cover
more than 830 square meters and are 73 meters long and 11 meters wide. These large panels make the ISS one of the brightest
objects in the night sky. Scaling up from there to something much larger would be challenging, but the good news is that
we can take one thing at a time.
For a proof of concept satellite it makes sense to use the station’s solar panels as a baseline. By taking advantage of
improvements in solar cell technology we could launch a demonstration satellite of the same size that generates up to 3 times
as much power. The station’s solar panels are 14% efficient, but recent advances with solar cells and solar concentrators could
allow us to build panels that are up to 50% efficient.
If this demonstration system validated the theory behind generating power in space and beaming it down to Earth, the next step
would be figuring out how to put even bigger solar panels in space. It may be that with our current launch options it simply
isn’t possible to launch an operational solar power system into orbit. If that were the case, the concept would need to be put
on hold until other lift options, such as a space elevator, are available.
17
18. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency – Ext. #10 – Timeframe
Plan won’t happen until 2050
Space Island Group, Group of prominent engineers scientists economists and financial officers, Aug 30, 2004, The Space Review:
Whatever happened to solar power satellites? (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/214/1)
This will allow solar satellites to begin replacing most Earth-based generating plants during the next decade, which will in turn
reduce the greenhouse gases these plants produce. It will also reduce the need for nuclear power plants. However conversion of 90%
of Earth’s power needs to solar power generators could be completed by 2050, giving companies and employees several
decades to adjust to this new technology.
18
19. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Solvency – Ext. #13 – Alt Causes
The American educational system is ineffective – education reform is a prerequisite to space tech
development
James Burk, vice president of Artemis Society International and staff writer for Mars News, 6-3-04, “What the Moon-Mars
Commission's Report Should Say...” http://www.marsnews.com/articles/20040603-
what_the_moonmars_commissions_report_should_say.html [Tandet]
American students were #1 in the world in the 1950's in math & science skills. Now every year we are closer to the
bottom of industrialized nations. This problem has been ignored for decades and, for me at least, is extremely disturbing.
The effects are profound: not only are people lacking in basic skills that are needed in a 21st century technical society, but also
the problem endangers our economy and accellerates the exodus of technical jobs out of the country. The Hart-Rudman
commission on terrorism threats even said that the decline in math & science education was the second largest national
security threat that America faces.
The 21st century is about technology & America's economic and political leadership in the world depends on our ability to
innovate and create new products & ideas, which will lead to industries that create technology jobs for Americans. The next
generation of Americans, in school now, will create the new space industries of tomorrow. It is imperative that we give
them all the tools they need to succeed in learning math & science.
19
20. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Competitiveness F/L
1. Status quo solves the aff – American Competitiveness Initiative was already established
US Gov. Domestic Policy Council Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2/06, “AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
INITIATIVE,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/aci/aci06-booklet.pdf[TANDET]
To build on our successes and remain a leader in science and technology, I am pleased to announce the American
Competitiveness Initiative. The American Competitiveness Initiative commits $5.9 billion in FY 2007 to increase
investments in research and development, strengthen education, and encourage entrepreneurship. Over 10 years, the
Initiative commits $50 billion to increase funding for research and $86 billion for research and development tax
incentives. Federal investment in research and development has proved critical to keeping America’s economy strong by
generating knowledge and tools upon which new technologies are developed. My 2007 Budget requests $137 billion for
Federal research and development, an increase of more than 50 percent over 2001 levels. Much of this increased Federal
funding has gone toward biomedical research and advanced security technologies, enabling us to improve the health of our
citizens and enhance national security. We know that as other countries build their economies and become more
technologically advanced, America will face a new set of challenges. To ensure our continued leadership in the world, I am
committed to building on our record of results with new investments—especially in the fields of physical sciences and
engineering. Advances in these areas will generate scientific and technological discoveries for decades to come.
2. US dominance is inevitable – we’ll always be ahead in space
Dwayne A. Day, space journalist and noted historian, 10-4-07, “SpaceWar 2057,” The Space Review,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/970/1 [Tandet]
The principles of military space system development listed above can be applied to many countries, not simply the United
States, although it is the United States that develops the biggest and most expensive—and therefore most problem-plagued
—military spacecraft. But, of course, any future projection of military space fifty years from now should address what
America’s potential adversaries may be capable of. It is safe to assume that the United States will continue to lead in the
development of military space systems, as it always has, even while American technological leadership in the commercial
world is now frequently challenged. However, military space technology has proliferated since the end of the Cold War.
Numerous countries have acquired limited reconnaissance capabilities, few have acquired space radar or signals
intelligence capabilities, and fewer still have sought offensive space capabilities. How those newly-acquired space
capabilities will affect America’s military space program is very difficult to predict. This is one area where the past fifty years
may not tell us much about the next fifty years in military space, and the movies are useless.
20
21. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Competitiveness F/L
Hegemony will never decline – we’re ahead of every other country in the world in tech and military
leadership – they can never catch up
Stephen G. Brooks, Assistant Prof, Govt, Dartmouth, and William C. Wohlforth, Associate Prof, Dept Govt, Dartmouth
College, Jul/Aug, 2002, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, Issue 4, ebsco [Tandet]
To understand just how dominant the United States is today, one needs to look at each of the standard components of national
power in succession. In the military arena, the United States is poised to spend more on defense in 2003 than the next 15-
20 biggest spenders combined. The United States has overwhelming nuclear superiority, the world's dominant air force,
the only truly blue-water navy, and a unique capability to project power around the globe. And its military advantage is
even more apparent in quality than in quantity. The United States leads the world in exploiting the military applications
of advanced communications and information technology and it has demonstrated an unrivaled ability to coordinate and
process information about the battlefield and destroy targets from afar with extraordinary precision. Washington is not
making it easy for others to catch up, moreover, given the massive gap in spending on military research and development
(R&D), on which the United States spends three times more than the next six powers combined. Looked at another way,
the United States currently spends more on military R&D than Germany or the United Kingdom spends on defense in total.
No state in the modern history of international politics has come close to the military predominance these numbers
suggest. And the United States purchases this preeminence with only 3.5 percent of its GDP. As historian Paul Kennedy notes,
"being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world's single superpower on the cheap is astonishing."
America's economic dominance, meanwhile -- relative to either the next several richest powers or the rest of the world
combined -- surpasses that of any great power in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945
(when World War II had temporarily laid waste every other major economy). The U.S. economy is currently twice as large
as its closest rival, Japan. California's economy alone has risen to become the fifth largest in the world (using market
exchange-rate estimates), ahead of France and just behind the United Kingdom.
It is true that the long expansion of the 1990s has ebbed, but it would take an experience like Japan's in that decade -- that is,
an extraordinarily deep and prolonged domestic recession juxtaposed with robust growth elsewhere -- for the United
States just to fall back to the economic position it occupied in 1991. The odds against such relative decline are long,
however, in part because the United States is the country in the best position to take advantage of globalization. Its status as the
preferred destination for scientifically trained foreign workers solidified during the 1990s, and it is the most popular destination
for foreign firms. In 1999 it attracted more than one-third of world inflows of foreign direct investment.
U.S. military and economic dominance, finally, is rooted in the country's position as the world's leading technological
power. Although measuring national R&D spending is increasingly difficult in an era in which so many economic activities
cross borders, efforts to do so indicate America's continuing lead. Figures from the late 1990s showed that U.S. expenditures
on R&D nearly equaled those of the next seven richest countries combined.
21
22. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Competitiveness – Ext. #3 – Heg Inevitable
Heg will never decline.
Stephen G. Brooks, Assistant Prof, Govt, Dartmouth, and William C. Wohlforth, Associate Prof, Dept Govt, Dartmouth
College, Jul/Aug, 2002, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, Issue 4, ebsco [Tandet]
Many who acknowledge the extent of American power, however, regard it as necessarily self-negating. Other states
traditionally band together to restrain potential hegemons, they say, and this time will be no different. As German political
commentator Josef Joffe has put it, "the history books say that Mr. Big always invites his own demise. Nos. 2, 3, 4 will gang up
on him, form countervailing alliances and plot his downfall. That happened to Napoleon, as it happened to Louis xiv and the
mighty Hapsburgs, to Hitler and to Stalin. Power begets superior counterpower; it's the oldest rule of world politics."
What such arguments fail to recognize are the features o America's post-Cold War position that make it likely to buck
the historical trend. Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the
United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main
potential challengers to its unipolarity, meanwhile -- China, Russia, Japan, and Germany -- are in the opposite position.
They cannot augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an
immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even international politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of
attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any
of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would almost certainly
help contain them, as would the massive latent power capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary
to head off an emerging threat.
22
23. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Failed States F/L
1. Multiple alt causes – food crisis, political upheaval, and US economy – causing state failure now
Foreign Policy Magazine, July/August ’08, “The Failed States Index 2008,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?
story_id=4350 [Tandet]
On top of the country’s already colossal challenges, a food crisis seems an especially cruel turn for a place like Somalia. But it
is a test that dozens of weak states are being forced to confront this year, with escalating prices threatening to undo
years of poverty-alleviation and development efforts. The unrest in Mogadishu echoes food riots that have erupted on nearly
every continent in the past year. Tens of thousands of Mexicans protested when the price of corn flour jumped 400 percent in
early 2007. Thousands of Russian pensioners took to the streets in November to call for a return to price controls on milk and
bread. In Egypt, the army was ordered to bake more loaves at military-run bakeries after riots broke out across the country.
Kabul, Port-au-Prince, and Jakarta experienced angry protests over spikes in the price of staples.
But if few foretold the hunger and hardship that have followed the uptick in prices, the events of 2007 revealed that
unexpected shocks can play a decisive role in the stability of an increasing number of vulnerable states. Primary among
last year’s shocks was the implosion of the U.S. subprime market, which burst housing bubbles worldwide, slowed
trade, and sent currencies into tailspins. A contested election in Kenya in December swiftly shredded any semblance of
ethnic peace in a country that many had considered an African success story. And though Benazir Bhutto feared her own
assassination upon returning to Pakistan, her murder reverberated in a country already contending with the challenges of
ambitious mullahs, suicide bombers, and an all-powerful military.
These shocks are the sparks of state failure, events that further corrode the integrity of weak states and push those on
the edge closer to combustion. As the food crisis has shown, these political and economic setbacks are not unique to the
world’s most vulnerable countries. But weak states are weak precisely because they lack the resiliency to cope with unwelcome
—and unpleasant—surprises. When a global economic downturn pinches the main export base, an election goes awry, or
a natural disaster wipes out villages, the cracks of vulnerability open wider.
2. No way to determine failed states – under their interpretation the US is a failed state
Stephen Lendman, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization, 4-30-06, “Failed States: Comments on Noam
Chomsky’s New Book,” http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article12889.htm [Tandet]
Having laid out his premises, Chomsky believes the US today exhibits the very features we cite as characteristics of
"failed states" - a term we use for nations seen as potential threats to our security which may require our intervention against
in self-defense. But the very notion of what a failed state may be is imprecise at best, he states. It may be their inability to
protect their citizens from violence or destruction. It may also be they believe they're beyond the reach of international
law and thus free to act as aggressors. Even democracies aren't immune to this problem because they may suffer from a
"democratic deficit" that makes their system unable to function properly enough.
Chomsky goes much further saying if we evaluate our own state policies honestly and accurately "we should have little
difficulty in finding the characteristics of 'failed states' right at home." He stresses that should disturb us all, and I would
add, as a citizen of this country and now in my eighth decade, it obsesses me. Chomsky then spends the first half of his book
documenting how the US crafts its policies and uses its enormous power to threaten other states with isolation or
destruction unless they're subservient to our will. He also explains how we react when they go their own way and how
routinely and arrogantly we ignore and violate sacred international law and norms in the process.
23
24. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Fossil Fuels F/L
1. SPS alone can’t cover the world’s energy needs – won’t create a complete shift
John C. Mankins, former manager of NASA’s Advanced Concepts Studies Office of Space Flight,, 10-12-07, “Leading Scientists
and Thinkers on Energy,” from an interview with Mankins conducted by David Houle, an analyst who advises companies on new
developing technology, http://www.evolutionshift.com/blog/2007/10/12/leading-scientists-and-thinkers-on-energy-–-john-c-mankins/
[Tandet]
Mankins: Solar power satellites will be very, very large. Of course, all solar power systems are enormous. On the ground, it’s
hard to see because the solar arrays are spread across thousands of rooftops. However, the overall systems is still of tremendous
size. In the case of solar power satellites, if each satellite were to provide about 4,000 megawatts of power, then five of them
would be needed to provide about 20 GW – which is approximately 2 percent of the U.S. demand for electricity. World
demand for energy is currently about 4-times U.S. demand, but is growing fast! By 2100, huge new sources of renewable
energy will be critical to our civilization, including hydroelectric (already in place), wind, ground solar, appropriate nuclear
power—and space solar power.
Evolutionshift.com: It sounds to me as though SSP is the one form of alternative energy that can supply a significant
percentage of the energy needs of the planet. So it sounds like the vision needs to be forged into a multi-national will and then
receive the necessary funding. Is that correct? If so, care to comment on the probability of this starting up in the next 2-3 years?
Mankins: Actually, even if space solar power were fully developed, the global economy should have more than just one
option: a prudent scenario would also involve a portfolio of current energy options—and a “quiver” full of new energy
technologies ready to be deployed if, or when they are needed. Certainly, however, space solar is one of very few options to
provide a substantial fraction of the truly vast amount of renewable energy that is needed to support human civilization.
24
25. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Japan F/L
1. Their Farrar evidence indicates that whoever takes the lead on SPS will be the global energy provider,
not the global hegemon - no internal link into hegemony.
2. North Korea militarization makes Japanese rearmament inevitable in the status quo
Ratner, their author, ’03 Ellen, “Engage North Korea!” http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30541)
That is now threatened by North Korea's brazen stupidity. By rattling the nuclear saber, withdrawing from non-
proliferation treaties and tossing out U.N. inspectors, the North Koreans are on the verge of making one of the colossal
blunders of world history. If North Korea is not reined in, then it is likely that Tokyo will rearm – and experts predict
that with Japan's high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery systems within
three years.
3. No internal link into Japanese hegemony – they don’t read any evidence that Japan would become the
global hegemon as a result of the plan or that Japanese heg leads to Japanese rearmament
25
26. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Japan F/L
4. Turn – Japanese rearmament is key to Sino-Japanese relations and Asia-Pacific stability
Thi Lam, former general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, 10-27-95, “Why a Remilitarized Japan Is Crucial for Asia-Pacific
Stability,” http://www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/columns/pacific-pulse/951027-japan.html [Tandet]
Public clamor in Japan for the U.S. military to get out of Okinawa has heightened fears that Japan may be contemplating its
own remilitarization. Ironically, the best hope for stability in the economically booming Asia-Pacific lies in Japan's
rearmament -- both militarily and morally. PNS analyst Thi Lam served as a general in the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam and is the author of "Autopsy: The Death of South Vietnam (1985)"
Public outrage over the rape of an Okinawa school girl by a United States serviceman may finally push the Japanese towards
remilitarization, ending 50 years of "splendid isolation" under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Despite nascent Asian fears of
renewed Japanese expansionism, Japan's remilitarization would greatly enhance the security prospects of the Asia-Pacific
region.
For decades Japan, like Germany, has basked in the generosity of its American conqueror, rising from the ashes of World War
II to become an economic superpower. But whereas Germany finally broke free of the victor-vanquished complex, actively
helping to contain the former Soviet Union as a NATO member, and ultimately integrating itself into the European Union,
Japan clung to its post-war insular mentality. Recently, it has remained conspicuously silent in the face of Chinese aggression
in the South China Sea through which pass some of the world's most vital shipping lanes. Even when the 1992 Gulf War
threatened its Mideast oil supplies, Japan refused to send ground troops to aid the U.S.-led coalition, despite repeated requests
from Washington. Instead, it sent money.
But money alone cannot buy security in the Asia Pacific, particularly in an era of U.S. disengagement and new Chinese
assertiveness. A growing chorus of domestic critics -- notably New Frontier Party chief and long-time Diet member Ichiro
Ozawa -- have warned that Japan risks following the path of ancient Carthage, whose "belief that wealth alone could
sustain a nation ultimately caused its demise."
There are signs that more and more Japanese are heeding the warning. Well before the Okinawa outrage, Japanese voters
rejected anti-rearmament left-wing party candidates in elections for parliamentary seats in the Diet. Their loss paved the way
for new legislation authorizing deployment of Japan's Self Defense Forces on non-combat UN missions. (Two years earlier,
Japan sent engineer army units to Cambodia to help rebuild the country's road network under UN supervision.)
Meanwhile, Japan and the United States have been working on an agreement to standardize military equipment similar to those
of NATO allies. Even more significant, Ryutaro Hashimoto, the man many consider destined to become the country's next
prime minister, actively favors revising the restrictive U.S. imposed constitution so that Japan can play a more active role in
regional security.
If there is any single factor goading Japan to finally assume its global responsibilities it is China's growing military power.
Only a remilitarized Japan can offer a strategic counter-weight to help stabilize the economically booming region. But
the new rearmament of Japan is not intended as a show of hostility towards Beijing. Rather, the aim is to bring about a
cooperation between the two East Asian giants. The model is the cooperation between France and Germany that
became the foundation for a peaceful and prosperous European community.
26
27. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Lunar Materials F/L
1. Lunar business won’t happen – it’s too expensive and it takes too long
Jeff Foust, aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher. His is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, 12-11-06, “Moonbase
why,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/764/1 [Tandet]
There are certainly proposals for businesses based on lunar resources, from searching from platinum-group metals
deposited by impacting meteorites to beaming solar power back to Earth (and, of course, everyone’s favorite lunar resource,
helium-3, ready for the taking on the Moon once we get around to developing fusion reactors.) However, many of these ideas
are many years, if not decades, away from fruition, if they are even feasible in the first place. Moreover, these potential
new industries will have to struggle with the high costs of space transportation, something the Vision does little, if
anything, to address. “The human inhabitation of space in any significant numbers won’t happen until someone can
tackle the costs of getting astronauts the first hundred miles up,” an editorial in USA Today last week noted.
2. Going to the moon now doesn’t catalyze further space exploration later
Jeff Foust, aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher. His is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, 12-11-06, “Moonbase
why,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/764/1 [Tandet]
Human missions to Mars, if and when they might occur, are so far in the future that lessons learned on the Moon will
have little relevance. If humans eventually travel to Mars, technology that would be used will be far advanced over that
which NASA would employ on the Moon in the next twenty years. The first humans who might travel to Mars will probably
not have the immediate objective of establishing a settlement. Rather, they will go as explorers and spend only that amount of
time required to meet initial objectives, with their staytime defined by orbital mechanics. Determining how to utilize lunar
resources to supply a lunar base will not have applicability to a Mars base as the technology and processes needed to
use Mars raw materials will be unique to Mars resources. Other surface conditions on Mars that human explorers will
have to cope with will also be much different than those found on the Moon and will require specific technology to ensure
safe operations. Costly and risky human exploration of Mars may never be needed. As robots become more capable, the major
scientific and philosophical question that drives Mars exploration—does life exist or has it ever existed on Mars—may well be
answered by robotic missions. The need to establish human settlements on Mars in the future is problematic.
3. Lunar materials have no economic value – their cards rely on unscientific projections
Donald A. Beattie, former NASA manager who also managed programs at the National Science Foundation, 2-12-07, “Just how full
of opportunity is the moon?”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/804/1 [Tandet]
There are no lunar resources that, when processed, would have any economic value if utilized on the Moon or returned
to Earth. Lunar in situ resource utilization has been shown by several analyses to not have a positive cost benefit.
Enthusiasts who have made claims to the contrary have done so by using questionable and very optimistic projections of
what would be required. They would be well advised to reopen their chemistry and physics textbooks and spend some time
with real-world mining and drilling operations.
27
28. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Military Readiness F/L
1. Impact empirically denied – multiple alt causes mean military readiness has already hit rock bottom
John Murtha, U.S. Congressman, 9-13-06, “United States Army Military Readiness,”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006_rpt/060913-murtha-obey_army-readiness.htm [Tandet]
The U.S. Army’s preparedness for war has eroded to levels not witnessed by our country in decades. As deployments to
Iraq and Afghanistan continue unabated, there is a very real prospect that Army readiness will continue to erode,
undermining its ability to meet the theater commanders’ needs and foreclosing any option for the U.S. to respond to conflicts
elsewhere around the globe. The degradation of Army readiness is primarily a function of unanticipated high troop
deployment levels to Iraq, chronic equipment and personnel shortages, funding constraints, and Pentagon civilian
mismanagement. These factors have resulted in:
2. Alt cause – smoking impairs readiness
Doug Sample, Sergeant 1st Class, 11-19-03, “With Military Readiness on the Line, DoD Reminds Smokers 'D-Day' Is Nov. 20,”
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27759 [Tandet]
Smoking affects both the personal health and readiness of military personnel, so DoD is encouraging those who smoke or
use smokeless tobacco to take steps to end their addiction by taking part in the Great American Smokeout Nov. 20.
According to Dr. David Tornberg, deputy assistant secretary of defense for clinical and program policy, smoking percentages
are highest in the 18-25 age group, which is a significant part of the military's ranks. He said that smoking impacts
military readiness by "cutting" into the physical endurance of military personnel.
"There is a substantial reduction in physical endurance as a consequence of smoking. And we just can't ignore it,"
Tornberg said. He added that cigarette smoking can have a "psychological" impact on military personnel as well.
3. Alt cause – equipment shortfalls impair readiness
William J. Perry, Former Secretary of Defense, and Michele A Flournoy, Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, ’06, National Defense Magazine, “The U.S. Military: Under Strain And at Risk,” May 2006, p.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/may/TheU.S.MilitaryUnder.htm
The Army and the Army National Guard also have experienced equipment shortfalls that increased the level of risk to
forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and reduced the readiness of units in the United States. From the beginning of
the Iraq war until as late as last year, the active Army experienced shortages of key equipment — such as radios, up-
armored Humvees, trucks, machine guns, rifles, grenade launchers, and night vision equipment — for troops deploying
overseas.
While many of these shortfalls have now been addressed for deployed units, the readiness ratings of many non-deployed
units have dropped. This is particularly worrisome because some of these units are slated to deploy later this year. This
situation is even worse for Army National Guard units, many of which have had to leave their equipment sets in Iraq for
arriving units. These readiness shortfalls are only likely to grow as the war in Iraq continues to accelerate the wear-out
rate of all categories of equipment for ground forces.
28
29. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Military Readiness F/L
4. Military readiness is massively low now – personnel shortages are the key internal link
John Murtha, U.S. Congressman, 9-13-06, “United States Army Military Readiness,”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006_rpt/060913-murtha-obey_army-readiness.htm
Again, the situation facing the Army Guard and Reserve is comparatively worse. Of all the Guard units not currently
mobilized, about four-fifths received the lowest readiness rating. Conversely, only about 1 in 10 received the highest or
second highest ratings for readiness, which are the ratings traditionally required for a unit to be considered capable of
deploying and completing its mission. The same is true for the Army Reserve; about four-fifths of non-mobilized Army
Reserve units received the two lowest readiness ratings; only one in 10 received the two top ratings. Personnel
shortages are the major reason behind the decline in Guard and Reserve readiness - shortages created, for the most
part, by mobilizations having lapsed or personnel having been pulled from units to augment others in theater
29
30. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Military Readiness – Ext. #1 – Readiness Low Now
Military readiness is the lowest in history now – their impacts should already have happened
Roxana Tiron, staff writer for The Hill (Capitol Hill newspaper), 11-25-07, “Members warn of ‘national crisis’ in military
readiness,” http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/members-warn-of-national-crisis-in-military-readiness-2007-11-25.html [Tandet]
Although Democrats in Congress have not been able to force an Iraq withdrawal, two House Armed Services Committee
leaders are sounding the alarm that readiness shortfalls could prevent the U.S. military from responding to new threats at
home and abroad.
Reps. Solomon Ortiz (D-Texas), the chairman of the Armed Services Readiness subcommittee, and Neil Abercrombie (D-
Hawaii), chairman of the Air and Land Forces subcommittee, this week introduced a resolution detailing the challenges facing
the military and the resulting impact on national security.
The two veteran lawmakers are working on getting co-sponsors for the bill, and the Armed Services panel could have a hearing
on the issue at the beginning of next year.
“While the Congress has been unable to agree on policy related to Iraq in veto-proof numbers, we should all be able to agree on
one thing: the U.S. military constitutes our first and last line of protection – and they are in a world of hurt,” Ortiz said
in a joint statement accompanying the resolution.
“Our military’s ground forces are broken by the ongoing operations, particularly in Iraq, and we are watching the making
of a full blown national security crisis,” Ortiz added.
30
31. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Pollution
Plan increases pollution – rocket fuel contaminates the Earth
Jennifer Lee, staff writer for the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 10-29-03, “Health threat of rocket fuel debated,”
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/145886_rocket29.html [Tandet]
Perchlorate, a component of fuels for solid rockets such as the large boosters on the space shuttle, first became a
concern in 1997, when technologies became sophisticated enough to detect the chemical at extremely low levels. The EPA set
in motion a process of setting safety levels for perchlorate. Despite criticism from the Pentagon, EPA scientists have been
steadfast in their recommendations, and the scientific debate was referred to the National Academy of Sciences last spring for
review.
The EPA has recommended that levels of perchlorate be restricted to concentrations as low as one part per billion, but
the agency's current guidelines specify concentrations of 4 to 18 parts per billion. The California Environmental Protection
Agency, which has conducted an independent risk assessment, has made similar recommendations. By contrast, the Pentagon
has urged that the safety levels be set at 200 parts per billion, higher than the levels of ground contamination already
found.
Perchlorate contamination has been an issue for some time in the West, particularly in California and Nevada. Over 300
municipal and local wells have been closed in California alone, and Native American tribes that draw water from the lower
Colorado River are contemplating lawsuits against companies to force them to clean the water. Of the 45 states where the
Pentagon uses perchlorate, 25 have confirmed cases of perchlorate contamination.
31
32. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Space Colonization F/L
1. Going to space causes killer viruses, space arms race, and global war
Bruce K. Gagnon, coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, ’99, “Space Exploration and
Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm [Tandet]
We are now poised to take the bad seed of greed, environmental exploitation and war into space. Having shown such
enormous disregard for our own planet Earth, the so-called "visionaries" and "explorers" are now ready to rape and pillage the
heavens. Countless launches of nuclear materials, using rockets that regularly blow up on the launch pad, will seriously
jeopardize life on Earth. Returning potentially bacteria-laden space materials back to Earth, without any real plans for
containment and monitoring, could create new epidemics for us. The possibility of an expanding nuclear-powered arms
race in space will certainly have serious ecological and political ramifications as well. The effort to deny years of
consensus around international space law will create new global conflicts and confrontations
2. Reproduction is impossible in space – gravity means that the sperm won’t reach the egg
Giuseppe Lippi, professor and surgeon at the University of Verona, 2-26-08, “Abolishing the Law of Gravity,” Canadian Medical
Association Journal, http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/178/5/598 [Tandet]
As the International Space Station moves us closer to the possibility of colonizing space, it is becoming increasingly important
to understand the effects of altered gravity on mammalian reproductive physiology. There is evidence that hypo- and hyper-
gravity induce changes in male and female reproductive processes.2 Findings from studies using a variety of
experimental conditions to simulate hypogravity raise questions about whether reproduction is possible when gravity is
reduced.
Studies using the Holton hindlimb suspension model, which provides a practical way to simulate the major physiologic effects of
hypogravity, are providing evidence that hypogravity might exert pronounced effects on male reproductive processes and
reduce the rate of implantation during early pregnancy in rats. Moreover, the cardiovascular deconditioning, bone
demineralization and decrease in red blood cell concentration associated with hypogravity might affect the ability of female
rats to sustain their pregnancies. Similar findings from experiments during space flights raise questions about whether
early pregnancy can be sustained in humans when gravity is reduced.2 Additional research is needed to fill in the gaps in our
knowledge about reproductive physiology under conditions of hypo- and micro-gravity.
3. Extinction is not inevitable – empirically proven that their articles are just empty alarmism
Robert Shapiro, staff writer for The Space Review, 3-19-07, “Why the moon? Human survival!”,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/832/1 [Tandet]
Of course, we have been hearing predictions of Doomsday for years, and we are still here. According to geologists, the
eruption of Mt. Toba in Indonesia 71,000 years ago darkened the sky for years. The event caused killed much of plant life
on the planet. The famine that resulted caused a severe drop in the human population of that time. The Black Death of the
14th century killed perhaps one-third of the population of Europe and the great flu epidemic of 1918 claimed an estimated
40 million victims. Despite these disasters, and others such as global wars, humanity has muddled through and even
prospered. Why should things be different now?
32
33. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Space Colonization F/L
4. Investors won’t fund space development – no short-term profit
John Hickman, Ph.D. and associate professor of government at Berry College, November ’99, Journal of Evolution and
Technology, “The Political Economy of Very Large Space Projects,” http://www.transhumanist.com/volume4/space.htm [Tandet]
Attempting to persuade investors to risk enough capital to finance the construction of a very large space development
project would run up against the same capitalization problems now faced by entrepreneurs seeking capital for ordinary
space development projects such as launching communication satellites. Investors and lenders seek to maximize economic
returns from capital while avoiding risk. The cost of capital is higher for riskier investments. Persuading investors and
lenders to part with their capital requires making credible promises that they will receive better returns than they
would have received from making alternative investments during the same time period commensurate with risk. While
investors often accept higher levels of risk than do lenders, they do so in the expectation of even better returns. Ordinary
space development projects confront not only the risks that their businesses might not make money and that the
technology might fail to work as projected, but also that they might not attract enough investment because the
necessary capital investment is too “chunky.” In other words, the “up-front” capital investment necessary to proceed with
even an ordinary space development project tends to be relatively large and to take a relatively long time period before
generating cash flows or profits (Simonoff 1997: 73-74; U.S. Department of Commerce 1990: 55-60; McLucas 1991). It is
important for the subsequent discussion that the reader note that many investors typically understand the phrase “long time
period” to mean “5 years” (Marshall and Bansal 1992: 99-100).
5. SpaceCol will never happen. Even if the plan allows further space development, humans won’t ever live
in space – it’s too expensive and no one would lead.
Hank Dolben, senior computer developer, 1-6-04, “No Escape from Environmental Disaster,”
http://www.dolben.org/nothingisperfect/archives/2004/01/no_escape_from.html [Tandet]
Second, we will never accomplish the colonization of space. Again, not because it is technically impossible, though certainly much
more difficult than most people seem to appreciate. How can one imagine that we could create artificial ecosystems that would be
sufficiently rich and robust to support human life as we know it, when we could not prevent our own destruction of the natural
world that gave us our existence to begin with? What potential return on investment would motivate the unimaginably huge
expense of attempting the establishment of a self-sustaining colony? Or do you think that some government would have the political
will and resources to accomplish it? There would not be enough resources if the crisis were reached, not enough will if not. In
short, there is a better chance of saving our existing environment than creating a new one. Still, it's unprovable, only refutable by
counterexample.
33
34. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Space Colonization F/L
6. Space is too harsh an environment – we can’t live there
Rudy M. Baum, editor-in-chief of Chemical & Engineering News, 2-5-07, “NASA’s Bad Idea,”
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/editor/85/8506editor.html [Tandet]
There is an enormous cost to designing and building spacecraft that can transport humans safely to the moon and beyond.
Space will never be anything other than a brutally hostile environment. The surface of the moon is outer space with gravity. The
surface of Mars is far harsher than Antarctica in the dead of the austral winter. Putting humans in these environments serves
no useful purpose whatsoever other than satisfying an atavistic hubris that is no longer affordable.
7. Public won’t support – means no colonization
John Hickman, Ph.D. and associate professor of government at Berry College, November ’99, Journal of Evolution and
Technology, “The Political Economy of Very Large Space Projects,” http://www.transhumanist.com/volume4/space.htm [Tandet]
Persuading a space faring power to support any part of a very large space development project will require
mobilization of elite and mass public support. The historical experience of late 19
th
century naval arms races and
exploration (and colonialism) in Africa, of early 20
th
century polar exploration, and of late 20
th
century Cold War nuclear
weapons race and space exploration all suggest that international competition offers a far better tool for mobilizing public
support than international cooperation. At least in the short term, effective political advertizing and lobbying should be
capable of emotionally engaging masses and elites in international competition over the further exploration and control of
territory in space. International competition need not be military in nature to fire the public imagination. International
competition in civilian endeavors such as Olympic sports can also whip up intense public passions, at least over the short term.
Good propaganda requires the same elements as melodrama: a hero, a villain, and a simple story line involving struggle
between good and evil. A public relations firm would have little difficulty locating all three elements in competition over
space. The public relations job would be to convince elites and masses in the United States, the European Union, or Japan
that competition for territory in space has erupted and that their team is being left in the dust. Such a neo-jingoist
public relations and policy lobbying campaign would need to be coordinated by an interest group capable of keeping the
focus of new public interest in space on competition in civilian endeavors.
34
35. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Space Colonization – Ext. #3 – Extinction Not Inevitable
Space colonization is not necessary – even if disaster strikes, we won’t die
Robert Shapiro, staff writer for The Space Review, 3-19-07, “Why the moon? Human survival!”,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/832/1 [Tandet]
Physicist Stephen Hawking, and a number of others, have called for humanity to spread out to distant planets of our Solar
System. But there is no need to go so far to protect ourselves. After a few decades—centuries at worst—dust and ash will
settle, radioactive materials will decay, and viruses will perish. Earth will once again become the best home for
humanity in the Solar System. Return would be easiest if a safe sanctuary were nearby. In the more probable instance that
only a limited disaster took place, that nearby sanctuary could also play a valuable role in restoring lost data and cultural
materials, and coordinating the recovery. And of course, construction of the rescue base will be much easier if it is only
days, rather than months or years, away.
35
36. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
Space Colonization – Ext. #5 – Infeasible
Space colonization is impossible – we can’t survive in space and there’s no economic motivation
Charlie Stross, science fiction writer and space enthusiast, June ’07, “The High Frontier, Redux,”
http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2007/06/the_high_frontier_redux.html [Tandet]
We're human beings. We evolved to flourish in a very specific environment that covers perhaps 10% of our home
planet's surface area. (Earth is 70% ocean, and while we can survive, with assistance, in extremely inhospitable terrain, be it
arctic or desert or mountain, we aren't well-adapted to thriving there.) Space itself is a very poor environment for humans to
live in. A simple pressure failure can kill a spaceship crew in minutes. And that's not the only threat. Cosmic radiation
poses a serious risk to long duration interplanetary missions, and unlike solar radiation and radiation from coronal mass
ejections the energies of the particles responsible make shielding astronauts extremely difficult. And finally, there's the
travel time. Two and a half years to Jupiter system; six months to Mars.
Now, these problems are subject to a variety of approaches — including medical ones: does it matter if cosmic radiation
causes long-term cumulative radiation exposure leading to cancers if we have advanced side-effect-free cancer treatments?
Better still, if hydrogen sulphide-induced hibernation turns out to be a practical technique in human beings, we may be able to
sleep through the trip. But even so, when you get down to it, there's not really any economically viable activity on the
horizon for people to engage in that would require them to settle on a planet or asteroid and live there for the rest of
their lives. In general, when we need to extract resources from a hostile environment we tend to build infrastructure to exploit
them (such as oil platforms) but we don't exactly scurry to move our families there. Rather, crews go out to work a long shift,
then return home to take their leave. After all, there's no there there — just a howling wilderness of north Atlantic gales and
frigid water that will kill you within five minutes of exposure. And that, I submit, is the closest metaphor we'll find for
interplanetary colonization. Most of the heavy lifting more than a million kilometres from Earth will be done by robots,
overseen by human supervisors who will be itching to get home and spend their hardship pay. And closer to home, the
commercialization of space will be incremental and slow, driven by our increasing dependence on near-earth space for
communications, positioning, weather forecasting, and (still in its embryonic stages) tourism. But the domed city on Mars
is going to have to wait for a magic wand or two to do something about the climate, or reinvent a kind of human being who can
thrive in an airless, inhospitable environment.
36
37. Solar-Powered Satellites Neg
DDI 2008 – Clark/Martin Lab
Gabrielle
AT: Space Weaponization
1. DoD won’t use SPS as a space weapon – it’s motivated by other things
Joseph D. Rouge, director of the National Security Space Office, space-based solar power study group under a government
organization that is responsible for integration and coordination of defense, intelligence, civil, and commercial space activities , Spring
’08, “Strategic Importance,” Ad Astra (magazine of the National Space Society), http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdf
[Tandet]
When first confronted with the idea of gigawatts of coherent energy being beamed from a space- based solar power
(SBSP) satellite, people immediately ask, “wouldn’t that make a powerful weapon?” Depending on their bias that could
either be a good thing: developing a disruptive capability to enhance U.S. power, or a bad thing: proliferating weapons to
space. But the NSSO is not interested in space- based solar power as a weapon.
1. The DoD is not looking to SBSP for new armaments capabilities. Its motivation for studying SBSP is to identify
sources of energy at a reasonable cost any- where in the world, to shorten the logistics lines and huge amount of
infrastructure needed to support military combat operations, and to prevent conflicts over energy as current sources
become increasingly costly.
2. SPS is not a reliable weapon – it can’t hit targets with intense light, and cheaper options exist
Joseph D. Rouge, director of the National Security Space Office, space-based solar power study group under a government
organization that is responsible for integration and coordination of defense, intelligence, civil, and commercial space activities , Spring
’08, “Strategic Importance,” Ad Astra (magazine of the National Space Society), http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdf
[Tandet]
2. SBSP does not offer any capability as a weapon that does not already exist in much less- expensive options. For
example, the nation already has working ICBMs with nuclear warheads should it choose to use them to destroy large enemy
targets.
3. SBSP is not suitable for attacking ground targets. The peak intensity of the microwave beam that reaches the
ground is less than a quarter of noon-sun- light; a worker could safely walk in the center of the beam. The physics of
microwave trans- mission and deliberate safe-design of the transmitting antenna act to prevent beam focusing above a pre-
determined maximum intensity level. Additionally, by coupling the transmitting beam to a unique ground-based pilot signal,
the beam can be designed to instantly diffuse should pilot signal lock ever be lost or disrupted.
4. SBSP would not be a preci- sion weapon. Today’s militar- ies are looking for more precise and lower collateral-
damage weapons. At several kilometers across, the beam from geostationary Earth orbit is just too wide to shoot indi-
vidual targets—even if the intensity were sufficient to cause harm.
37