1114237 - Cengage Learning ©5Utilitarianism and John Stu

1114237 - Cengage Learning ©
5
Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Explain differences between utilitarianism and egoism as
kinds of consequentialism.
• Explain the difference between act utilitarianism and rule
utilitarianism.
• Describe the trolley problem and how it exemplifies the
challenge of utilitarianism.
• Identify key components of the utilitarian assessment of
pleasure: intensity, duration, fruitfulness,
and likelihood.
• Articulate ways that utilitarianism is connected with
hedonism and Epicureanism.
• Apply utilitarian reasoning to a variety of cases in the real
world.
• Provide an overview of John Stuart Mill's defense of
utilitarianism.
• Defend your own thesis with regard to the value of
utilitarianism.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
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I
n 2015, the global population exceeded 7.3 billion people. The
United Nations predicts that
another billion people will be added to the world's population
by 2030, with the
population increasing to over 9 billion by 2050.1 The increase
in human population
during the past two centuries has been explosive. Causes for
this growth include
industrialization, a revolution in agriculture and other
technologies, and better political
organization. This growing population has created problems,
however, as soils are
depleted, oceans are overfished, and pollution has increased.
Industrialization and
technology have led to massive use of carbon-based fuels,
which contribute to global
climate change. If the world's population keeps growing at the
current pace—and if the
growing human population eats, drives, and consumes at current
rates—we may be
headed for a worldwide environmental and humanitarian crisis.
A recent United Nations
report concluded, “should the global population reach 9.6
billion by 2050, the equivalent of
almost three planets could be required to provide the natural
resources needed to sustain
current lifestyles.”2
Some argue that a prudent solution would be to take steps to

limit consumption,
population growth, or both. The means that are used to control
population might include
morally controversial technologies such as abortion. Moral
concerns also haunt proposals
to limit consumption: each of us wants the freedom to earn,
spend, and consume as we
wish. Even though individuals enjoy expanding their families
and consuming products, the
cumulative choices of individuals pursuing their own happiness
can lead to less
happiness for all—as the overall increase in population,
pollution, and environmental
degradation may well decrease opportunities and life prospects
for everyone. When we
think about issues from this perspective—one that takes into
account the general
happiness of everyone—we are adopting a utilitarian point of
view.
Large social engineering projects are often grounded in
utilitarian concerns. Consider
the effort in China to control population growth by limiting
reproduction to one child per
family. Critics of the policy argued that this violates a
fundamental right to reproduce. Can
limitations on basic rights be justified by the larger utilitarian
concerns of social policies?
Utilitarian efforts to maximize good consequences require that
we adjust our policies in
light of changing circumstances. The one-child policy created
outcomes that rippled
across Chinese society, including, for example, a shift in family
structure and gender
ratios. As the Chinese government has adjusted its population
policies, it has struggled to

manage costs and benefits. Should morality be focused on
complex and changing
consequences or should it be concerned with abstract and
invariable moral principles?
Utilitarian reasoning can be used to justify a variety of actions
and policy decisions.
How do we justify speed limits on the highways? It might seem
that each of us should be
free to go as fast as we want. However, unbridled speed would
result in more accidents,
which not only kill people but also slow the rest of us down.
Speed limits satisfy the
utilitarian goal of maximizing the greatest happiness for the
greatest number. Some will
be unhappy because they can't drive 100 mph. But when we
each drive at 65 mph and
arrive safely, we are each more likely to be better off. Some
may be less happy because
they are forced to drive more slowly, but overall, more of us are
happier.
Some uses of utilitarian reasoning are controversial because
they seem to run counter
to our intuitions about basic principles of right and wrong.
Consider, for example, the use
of torture in interrogations of terror suspects. If a terrorist had
planted a bomb in a public
place that would threaten to kill thousands of innocent people,
would it be justifiable to
torture the terrorist to force him to reveal the location of the

bomb? On the one hand, some
assert that torture is never permissible because it violates basic
moral principles. The
Geneva Conventions regulating warfare prohibit torture and
define it as “any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession.”3
On the other hand, suppose, for example, that torture could save
many lives. Would it then
be justified? Former Vice President Dick Cheney maintained
that “enhanced interrogation
techniques” including waterboarding (a process that simulates
drowning) produced useful
information. According to the New York Times, the CIA
waterboarded terror suspect Khaled
Sheikh Mohammed 183 times.4 In a speech on the tenth
anniversary of September 11,
Cheney claimed that by waterboarding terrorists such as
Mohammed, information was
extracted that led to the assassination of Osama bin Laden.5
Cheney and other members
of the Bush administration justified torture on utilitarian
grounds. Their view is shared by
many. A Pentagon study of “the ethics of troops on the front
line” in Iraq found that 41
percent said that “torture should be allowed to save the life of a
soldier or Marine,” and
about the same number said that it “should be allowed to gather
important information
from insurgents.”6 From a utilitarian standpoint, it may make
good sense to inflict pain on
someone to prevent pain that would be inflicted on a greater
number of others. From the
same standpoint, however, one may argue that practices such as

torture cause greater
harm than good—by extracting false confessions and lowering a
country's standing with
potential allies. In any event, the question remains: Does a good
end justify otherwise
objectionable means?
Crowded village ferry crossing the River Hooghly, West
Bengal, India.
Weighing Consequences
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One way of thinking about this is to compare the benefits and
costs of each alternative.
Whichever has the greater net benefit is the best alternative.
Such an approach begins with
the belief that we can measure and compare the risks and
benefits of various actions. The
idea is that actions are morally better or worse depending on
whether they produce
pleasure or pain or, more abstractly, on how they affect human
well-being and happiness.
Unlike egoism, utilitarianism focuses on the sum of individual
pleasures and pains. It is
not my pleasures or pains that matter—but the cumulative
happiness of a number of
people.
Another aspect of utilitarianism is the belief that each of us
counts equally. Peter Singer,

an influential contemporary defender of utilitarianism, derives
utilitarianism from the basic
idea that each person's interests ought to be given equal
consideration. Related to this is
the idea that “my own interests cannot count for more, simply
because they are my own,
than the interests of others.”7 The basic procedure for
utilitarianism is to add up the
interests of everyone who is affected by an action without
privileging the interests of
anyone in particular. Utilitarianism is thus opposed to racist or
sexist ideas, for example,
which often hold that the interests of some people matter more
than the interests of
others.
Utilitarianism suggests that we ought to consider the totality of
consequences of a
policy or action. Forms of utilitarianism will differ depending
on how we understand what
sorts of consequences or interests matter. Complexities arise in
defining key concepts
such as happiness, interest, and well-being. Singer, for example,
wants to focus on
interests instead of pleasures or happiness. This indicates that it
is possible that some
pleasures are not really in our interest. For example, drug use
can produce pleasure, but it
is not in anyone's long-term interest to be addicted to cocaine or
heroin. We might also
focus on people's preferences—that is, what people themselves
state that they prefer. But
again there is an important question of whether our preferences
actually coordinate with
our interests—or can we prefer things that are not in our
interest? In different terms, we

might wonder whether pleasure is a good thing or whether
genuine happiness can be
reduced to pleasure. In any case, utilitarians have to provide an
account of what matters
when we try to add up benefits and harms—whether it is
subjective feeling, taste, and
preference, or whether it is something deeper and more
objective such as well-being or
other interests (in health, longevity, fulfillment,
accomplishment, etc.).
Utilitarianism has to provide an account of whose interests or
happiness matters.
Jeremy Bentham, one of the founding fathers of utilitarianism,
extended his utilitarian
concern in a way that included all suffering beings, including
nonhuman animals. Peter
Singer would agree. He is well-known as an advocate of animal
welfare. Like Bentham, he
claims that the interests of nonhuman animals ought to be taken
into account. (We
discuss the issue of animal ethics further in Chapter 17.)
One important point to bear in mind when discussing
utilitarianism is that utilitarians
generally do not think that actions or policies are good or bad in
themselves. Rather, for
the utilitarian, the goodness or badness of an action is solely a
function of its
consequences. Thus, even killing innocent people may be
acceptable if it produces an
outcome that saves a greater number of others from harm.
Historical Background
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill

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The classical formulation of utilitarian moral theory is found in
the writings of Jeremy
Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873).
Jeremy Bentham was an
English-born student of law and the leader of a radical
movement for social and legal
reform based on utilitarian principles. His primary published
work was Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). The title indicates
his aim: to take the same
principles that provide the basis for morals as a guide for the
formation and revision of
law. Bentham believed that the same principles guided both
social and personal morality.
James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, was an associate of
Bentham's and a
supporter of his views. John Stuart was the eldest of James's
nine children. He was
educated in the classics and history at home. By the time he was
twenty, he had read
Bentham and had become a devoted follower of his philosophy.
The basic ideas of
utilitarian moral theory are summarized in Mill's short work
Utilitarianism, in which he
sought to dispel the misconception that morality has nothing to

do with usefulness or
utility or that morality is opposed to pleasure. Mill was also a
strong supporter of personal
liberty, and in his pamphlet On Liberty he argued that the only
reason for society to
interfere in a person's life was to prevent him or her from doing
harm to others. People
might choose wrongly, but he believed that allowing bad
choices was better than
government coercion. Liberty to speak one's own opinion, he
believed, would benefit all.
However, it is not clear that utility is always served by
promoting liberty. Nor is it clear what
Mill would say about cases in which liberty must be restricted
to promote the general
good, as in the case of speed limits or airport security r ules. In
his work, On the Subjection
of Women, Mill also emphasized the general good and criticized
those social treatments
of women that did not allow them to develop their talents and
contribute to the good of
society. Consistent with these views, he also supported the right
of women to vote. Later in
life he married his longtime companion and fellow liberal,
Harriet Taylor. Mill also served
in the British Parliament from 1865 to 1868.
A portrait of the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–
1873).
The original utilitarians were democratic, progressive,
empiricist, and optimistic. They
were democratic in the sense that they believed that social
policy ought to work for the

good of all persons, not just the upper class. They believed that
when interests of various
persons conflicted, the best choice was that which promoted the
interests of the greater
number. The utilitarians were progressive in that they
questioned the status quo. For
example, they believed that if the contemporary punishment
system was not working well,
then it ought to be changed. Social programs should be judged
by their usefulness in
promoting the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
Observation would determine
whether a project or practice succeeded in this goal. Thus,
utilitarianism is part of the
empiricist tradition in philosophy, which holds that we know
what is good only by
observation or by appeal to experience. Bentham and Mill were
also optimists. They
believed that human wisdom and science would improve the lot
of humanity. Mill wrote in
Utilitarianism, “All the grand sources of human suffering are in
a great degree, many of
them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort.”8
The Principle of Utility
The basic moral principle of utilitarianism is called the
principle of utility or the greatest
happiness principle. As John Stuart Mill explained it (and as
you will see in the reading
that follows) “actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”

Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism. It focuses on the
consequences of actions.
Egoism is also a form of consequentialism. But unlike egoism,
utilitarianism focuses on
the consequences for all persons impacted by an action.
Consider the diagram used to
classify moral theories provided in Chapter 1.
According to classical utilitarian moral theory, when we
evaluate human acts or
practices, we consider neither the nature of the acts or practices
nor the motive for which
people do what they do. As Mill puts it, “He who saves a fellow
creature from drowning
does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the
hope of being paid for his
trouble.”9 It is the result of one's action—that a life is saved—
that matters morally.
According to utilitarianism, we ought to decide which action or
practice is best by
considering the likely or actual consequences of each
alternative. For example, over the
years, people have called for a suicide barrier on the Golden
Gate Bridge to prevent people
from using it to commit suicide. More than 1,600 people have
jumped from the bridge to
their deaths.10 Building a suicide barrier on a bridge is neither
good nor bad in itself,
according to utilitarianism. Nor is it sufficient that people
supporting the building of such a
barrier be well intentioned. The only thing that matters for the
utilitarian is whether, by
erecting such a barrier, we would actually increase happiness by
preventing suicides. After
much dispute, officials have agreed to build a suicide barrier—a
net to catch would-be

jumpers—on the bridge.
Pleasure and Happiness
Of course, there is an open question about whether suicide is
good or bad. Some will
argue that there is something inherently or intrinsically wrong
with suicide. The
deontologist Immanuel Kant provides this sort of argument, as
you will see in Chapter 6,
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maintaining that suicide is wrong in principle. But utilitarians
cannot argue that suicide is
intrinsically wrong—since they do not focus on the intrinsic
rightness or wrongness of
acts. Instead, utilitarians have to consider the impact of suicide
on the happiness of all
those it affects.
Since utilitarians reject the idea that certain acts are
intrinsically good or evil, they are

open to experimentation and evidence. And they are open to
various ways of conceiving
the goodness of consequences. Any sort of consequences might
be considered good—for
example, power, fame, or fortune. However, classical
utilitarianism is a pleasure or
happiness theory, meaning that it tends to reduce all other goods
to some form of
pleasure or happiness. Utilitarianism was not the first such
theory to appear in the history
of philosophy. Aristotle's ethics, as we shall see in Chapter 8,
also focuses on happiness,
although it is different from utilitarianism in its focus on virtue.
Closer to utilitarianism is
the classical theory that has come to be known as hedonism
(from hedon, the Greek word
for pleasure) or Epicureanism (named after Epicurus, 341–270
BCE). Epicurus held that the
good life was the pleasant life. For him, this meant avoiding
distress and desires for
things beyond one's basic needs. Bodily pleasure and mental
delight and peace were the
goods to be sought in life.
Utilitarians believe that pleasure or happiness is the good to be
produced. As Bentham
puts it, “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of
two sovereign masters, pain
and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to
do, as well as to determine
what we shall do.”11 Things such as fame, fortune, education,
and freedom may be good,
but only to the extent that they produce pleasure or happiness.
In philosophical terms, they
are instrumental goods because they are useful for attaining the
goals of happiness and

pleasure. Happiness and pleasure are the only intrinsic goods —
that is, the only things
good in themselves.
In this explanation of utilitarianism, you may have noticed the
seeming identification of
pleasure and happiness. In classical utilitarianism, there is no
difference between pleasure
and happiness. Both terms refer to a kind of psychic state of
satisfaction. However, there
are different types of pleasure of which humans are capable.
According to Mill, we
experience a range of pleasures or satisfactions from the
physical satisfaction of hunger
to the personal satisfaction of a job well done. Aesthetic
pleasures, such as the enjoyment
of watching a beautiful sunset, are yet another type of pleasure.
We also can experience
intellectual pleasures such as the peculiar satisfaction of making
sense out of something.
Mill's theory includes the idea that there are higher, uniquely
human pleasures—as we will
explain below.
In Mill's view, we should consider the range of types of
pleasure in our attempts to
decide what the best action is. We also ought to consider other
aspects of the pleasurable
or happy experience. According to the greatest happiness or
utility principle, we must
measure, count, and compare the pleasurable experiences likely
to be produced by various
alternative actions in order to know which is best.
CalCulating the Greatest Amount of Happiness
Utilitarianism is not an egoistic theory. As we noted in Chapter

4's presentation on egoism,
those versions of egoism that said we ought to take care of
ourselves because this works
out better for all in the long run are actually versions of
utilitarianism, not egoism. Some
philosophers have called utilitarianism universalistic because it
is the happiness or
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pleasure of all who are affected by an action or practice that is
to be considered. We are
not just to consider our own good, as in egoism, nor just the
good of others, as in altruism.
Sacrifice may be good, but not in itself. As Mill puts it, “A
sacrifice which does not increase
or tend to increase the sum total of happiness, (utilitarianism)
considers as wasted.”12
Everyone affected by some action is to be counted equally. We
ourselves hold no

privileged place, so our own happiness counts no more than that
of others. I may be
required to do what displeases me but pleases others. Thus, in
the following scenario, Act
B is a better choice than Act A:
____________
Act A makes me happy and two other people happy.
Act B makes me unhappy but five others happy.
____________
In addition to counting each person equally, Bentham and his
followers identified five
elements that are used to calculate the greatest amount of
happiness: the net amount of
pleasure or happiness, its intensity, its duration, its fruitfulness,
and the likelihood of any
act to produce it.13
Pleasure Minus Pain Almost every alternative that we choose
produces unhappiness or
pain as well as happiness or pleasure for ourselves, if not for
others. Pain is intrinsically
bad, and pleasure is intrinsically good. Something that produces
pain may be accepted,
but only if it causes more pleasure overall. For instance, if the
painfulness of a
punishment deters an unwanted behavior, then we ought to
punish, but no more than is
necessary or useful. When an act produces both pleasure or
happiness and pain or
unhappiness, we can think of each moment of unhappiness as
canceling out a moment of
happiness so that what is left to evaluate is the remaining or net
happiness or

unhappiness. We are also to think of pleasure and pain as
coming in bits or moments. We
can then calculate this net amount by adding and subtracting
units of pleasure and
displeasure. This is a device for calculating the greatest amount
of happiness even if we
cannot make mathematically exact calculations. The following
simplified equation
indicates how the net utility for two acts, A and B, might be
determined. We can think of
the units as either happy persons or days of happiness:
____________
Act A produces twelve units of happiness and six of
unhappiness (12 − 6 = 6 units of happiness).
Act B produces ten units of happiness and one of unhappiness
(10 − 1 = 9 units of happiness).
____________
On this measure, Act B is preferable because it produces a
greater net amount of
happiness, namely, nine units compared with six for Act A.
Intensity Moments of happiness or pleasure are not all alike.
Some are more intense than
others. The thrill of some exciting adventure —say, running
river rapids—may produce a
more intense pleasure than the serenity we feel standing before
a beautiful vista. All else
being equal, the more intense the pleasure, the better. All other
factors being equal, if I
have an apple to give away and am deciding which of two
friends to give it to, I ought to
give it to the friend who will enjoy it most. In calculations
involving intensity of pleasure, a

scale is sometimes useful. For example, we could use a positive
scale of 1 to 10 degrees,
from the least pleasurable to the most pleasurable. In the
following scenario, then, Act B is
better (all other things being equal) than Act A, even though
Act A gives pleasure to thirty
more people; this result is because of the greater intensity of
pleasure produced by Act B:
____________
Act A gives forty people each mild pleasure (40 × 2 = 80
degrees of pleasure).
Act B gives ten people each intense pleasure (10 × 10 = 100
degrees of pleasure).____________
Duration Intensity is not all that matters regarding pleasure. The
more serene pleasure
may last longer. This also must be factored in our calculation.
The longer lasting the
pleasure, the better, all else being equal. Thus, in the following
scenario, Act A is better
than Act B because it gives more total days of pleasure or
happiness. This is so even
though it affects fewer people (a fact that raises questions about
how the number of
people counts in comparison to the total amount of happiness):
____________
Act A gives three people each eight days of happiness (3 × 8 =
24 days of happiness).
Act B gives six people each two days of happiness (6 × 2 = 12

days of happiness).____________
Fruitfulness A more serene pleasure from contemplating nature
may or may not be more
fruitful than an exciting pleasure such as that derived from
running rapids. The
fruitfulness of experiencing pleasure depends on whether it
makes us more capable of
experiencing similar or other pleasures. For example, the
relaxing event may make one
person more capable of experiencing other pleasures of
friendship or understanding,
whereas the thrilling event may do the same for another. The
fruitfulness depends not only
on the immediate pleasure, but also on the long-term results.
Indulging in immediate
pleasure may bring pain later on, as we know only too well. So
also the pain today may be
the only way to prevent more pain tomorrow. The dentist's work
on our teeth may be
painful today, but it makes us feel better in the long run by
providing us with pain-free
meals and undistracted, enjoyable mealtime conversations.
Likelihood If before acting we are attempting to decide between
two available alternative
actions, we must estimate the likely results of each before we
compare their net utility. If
we are considering whether to go out for some sports
competition, for example, we should
consider our chances of doing well. We might have greater hope
of success trying
something else. It may turn out that we ought to choose an act
with lesser rather than
greater beneficial results if the chances of it happening are
better. It is not only the

chances that would count, but also the size of the prize. In the
following equation, A is
preferable to B. In this case, “A bird in the hand is worth two in
the bush,” as the old saying
goes:
____________
Act A has a 90 percent chance of giving eight people each five
days of pleasure (40 days × 0.90 = 36
days of pleasure).
Act B has a 40 percent chance of giving ten people each seven
days of pleasure (70 days × 0.40 = 28
days of pleasure).
____________
Quantity versus Quality of Pleasure
Bentham and Mill are in agreement that the more pleasure or
happiness, the better.
However, there is one significant difference between them.
According to Bentham, we
ought to consider only the quantity of pleasure or happiness
brought about by various
acts: how much pleasure, to how many people, how intense it is,
how long-lasting, how
fruitful, and how likely the desired outcome will occur.
Consider Bentham's own comment
on this point: The “quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin (a
children's game) is as
good as poetry.”14 The aesthetic or intellectual pleasure that

one might derive from
reading and understanding a poem is no better in itself than the
simple pleasure of
playing a mindless game.
Mill agreed with Bentham that the greater amount of pleasure
and happiness, the better.
But Mill believed that the quality of the pleasure should also
count. In his autobiography,
Mill describes a personal crisis in which he realized that he had
not found sufficient place
in his life for aesthetic experiences; he realized that this side of
the human personality also
needed developing and that these pleasures were significantly
different from others. This
experience and his thoughts about it may have led him to focus
on the quality of
pleasures. Some are intrinsically better than others, he believed.
For example, intellectual
pleasures are more valuable in themselves than purely sensual
pleasures. Although he
does not tell us how much more valuable they are (twice as
valuable?), he clearly believed
this greater value ought to be factored into our calculation of
the “greatest amount of
happiness.” Although I may not always be required to choose a
book over food (for
example, I may now need the food more than the book), the
intellectual pleasures that
might be derived from reading the book are of a higher quality
than the pleasures gained
from eating.
Mill attempts to prove or show that intellectual pleasures are
better than sensual ones.
We are to ask people who have experienced a range of pleasures

whether they would
prefer to live a life of a human, despite all its disappointments
and pains, or the life of an
animal, which is full of pleasures but only sensual pleasures. He
believes that people
generally would choose the former. They would prefer, as he
puts it, “to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”15
Socrates was often frustrated in his attempts to know certain
things. He struggled to get a
grasp on true beauty and true justice. Because human beings
have greater possibilities for
knowledge and achievement, they also have greater potential for
failure, pain, and
frustration. The point of Mill's argument is that the only reason
we would prefer a life of
fewer net pleasures (the dissatisfactions subtracted from the
total satisfactions of human
life) to a life of a greater total amount of pleasures (the life of
the pig) is that we value
something other than the amount (quantity) of pleasures; we
value the kind (quality) of
pleasures as well.16 When considering this argument, you might
ask yourself two
questions. First, would people generally prefer to be Socrates
than a pig? Second, if Mill is
correct in his factual assessment, then what does this fact
prove? Could it be that people
are mistaken about what kinds of pleasures are the best, as
Socrates himself often

implied? This points us back to the question of whether
happiness is merely a subjective
preference or whether happiness resides in a more objective
standard.
Evaluating Utilitarianism
The following are just some of the many considerations raised
by those who wish to
determine whether utilitarianism is a valid moral theory.
Application of the Principle
One reaction that students often have to calculating the greatest
amount of happiness is
that this theory is too complex. When we consider all of the
variables concerning pleasure
and happiness that are to be counted when trying to estimate the
“greatest amount of
pleasure or happiness,” the task of doing so looks extremely
difficult. We must consider
how many people will be affected by alternative actions,
whether they will be pleased or
pained by them, how pleased or pained they will be and for how
long, and the likelihood
that what we estimate will happen, will, in fact, come to be. In
addition, if we want to
follow Mill rather than Bentham, we must consider whether the
pleasures will be the
lowlier sensual pleasures, the higher more intellectual
pleasures, or something in between.
However, in reality, we may at any one time have to consider
only a couple of these
variables, depending on their relevance to the moral question
we are considering.

The point of this criticism is that no one can consider all of the
variables that
utilitarianism requires us to consider: the probable
consequences of our action to all
affected in terms of duration, intensity, fruitfulness, likelihood,
and type or quality of
pleasure. It also requires us to have a common unit of
measurement of pleasure.
(Elementary units called hedons have been suggested.) The
difficulty is finding a way to
reduce pleasures of all kinds to some common or basic unit of
measurement. A utilitarian
could respond to these criticisms by arguing that while this
complexity indicates that no
one can be a perfect judge of utility, we do make better
judgments if we are able to
consider these variables. No moral theory is simple in its
application.
A more difficult problem in how to apply the principle of utility
comes from Mill's specific
formulation of it. It may well be that in some cases, at least, one
cannot both maximize
happiness and make the greatest number of people happy. Thus,
one choice may produce
200 units of happiness—but for just one person. The other
alternative might produce 150
units of happiness, 50 for each of three people. If the
maximization of overall happiness is
taken as primary, then we should go with the first choice; if the
number of people is to take
precedence, then we should go with the second choice. Most
readings of Mill, however,
suggest that he would give preference to the overall
maximization of utility. In that case,
how the happiness was distributed (to one versus three) would

not, in itself, count.
Utilitarianism and Personal Integrity
A more substantive criticism of utilitarianism concerns its
universalist and maximizing
agenda—that we should always do that which maximizes overall
happiness. Many critics
have noted that utilitarian theory does not allow us to privilege
our own happiness over
that of others. Nor can we privilege the happiness of those w e
love. In determining what to
do, I can give no more weight to my own projects or my own
children than other people's
similar projects or their children. For some philosophers, the
idea that I must treat all
persons equally is contrary to common sense, which tells us that
we ought to care for our
own children more than we care for the children of distant
others. Utilitarians might
file://view/books/9781337467926/epub/OE BPS/04_9781305958
respond that we should probably give more attention to our own
projects and our own
children, but only because this is likely to have better results
overall. We know better how
to promote our own projects and have more motivation to do so.
Thus, giving preference

to ourselves will probably be more effective.
A further objection maintains that there is something wrong if
utilitarianism requires us
to not give preference to ourselves and to our own personal
moral commitments.
Utilitarianism appears to be an affront to our personal
integrity.17 The idea is that
utilitarianism seems to imply that I am not important from my
own point of view. However,
a utilitarian might respond that it is important that people
regard themselves as unique
and give due consideration to their own interests because this
will probably have better
consequences both for these individuals and the broader society.
Ends and Means
A second criticism concerns utilitarianism's consequentialist
character. You may have
heard the phrase “The end justifies the means.” People often
utter this phrase with a
certain amount of disdain. Utilitarianism, as a consequentialist
moral theory, holds that it
is the consequences or ends of our actions that determine
whether particular means to
them are justified. This seems to lead to conclusions that are
contrary to commonsense
morality. For example, wouldn't it justify punishing or torturing
an innocent person, a
“scapegoat,” in order to prevent a great evil or to promote a
great good? Or could we not
justify on utilitarian grounds the killing of some individuals for
the sake of the good of a
greater number, perhaps in the name of population control? Or
could I not make an
exception for myself from obeying a law, alleging that it is for

some greater long-term
good? Utilitarians might respond by noting that such actions or
practices will probably do
more harm than good, especially if we take a long-range view.
In particular, they might
point out that practices allowing the punishment of known
innocents would undermine the
legitimacy and deterrent effect of the law—and thus reduce
overall utility.
The Trolley Problem
One particular problem for utilitarianism is exemplified by what
has come to be called the
trolley problem.18 According to one version of this scenario,
imagine you find yourself
beside a train track, on which a trolley is speeding toward a
junction. On the track ahead of
the trolley are five workers who will all be killed if the trolley
continues on its current
course. You have access to a switch, and if you pull it, the
trolley will be diverted onto
another track where it will kill only one worker. According to
utilitarianism, if nothing else is
relevant, you would not only be permitted but required to pull
the switch, which would
result in one death and five lives saved. From a utilitarian
standpoint, it is obvious that you
should pull the switch, since not pulling the switch would result
in greater net loss of life.
Now, compare this scenario with another. In this case, you find
yourself on a bridge over a
single trolley track with the five workers below you. Next to
you on the bridge is an
enormously fat man. The only way to stop the trolley in this
case is to push the fat man
off the bridge and onto the tracks ahead of the workers. Would

you be permitted to do
this? In both cases, five lives would be saved and one lost. But
are the cases the same
morally? It would seem that according to utilitarianism, in
which only the results matter,
the cases would be morally the same. However, it is the
intuition of most people that the
second case is significantly different. You can't kill one person
to save five. To take
another example, it seems clear that a doctor who has five
patients needing organ
transplants to save their lives should not be permitted to take
those organs out of another
healthy patient, causing his or her death.
It is important to note that versions of the trolley problem have
been employed by
psychologists to probe human decision-making procedures.
Some of this research
examines how different parts of the brain are involved in
different ways of making
decisions that involve moral dilemmas.19 This sort of research
investigates the
psychological sources of our decisions—whether emotional
responses predominate,
whether we actually do calculate costs and benefits, and
whether we tend to feel bound to

abstract moral rules. One study used a virtual reality version of
the trolley problem to
pursue this question. It found that 89 percent of people chose
the utilitarian option when
confronted with at 3-D virtual reality representation of a run-
away boxcar that threatened
to crash into a group of people.20 One issue exposed by these
sorts of studies is that
people respond differently when confronted with the choice of
doing something (pulling
the lever to divert the train into the group of people) or not
doing something (allowing the
train to crash into the group). One conclusion of this sort of
research is that sometimes
there are conflicts in how we actually react and how we think
we should react to morally
fraught situations. Other inquiries have considered whether
utilitarian calculation involves
a sort of “coldness” that runs counter to empathy and other
emotional responses.21
Another study by Daniel Bartels and David Pizarro concludes,
“participants who indicated
greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on
measures of
psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and life meaning-lessness.”22
This conclusion appears to
follow from the fact that the utilitarian decision—to kill one in
order to save others—asks
us to overcome an emotional or instinctual aversion to harming
others. And yet, it might
be that—from the utilitarian point of view—this is exactly what
we should do in order to
bring about greater happiness for the greatest number. The
psychological research into
the dilemmas generated by utilitarianism is interesting. But the
normative or moral

question remains. Moral philosophy is not merely interested in
the psychological question
of how we react in these situations, it is also concerned with the
question of how we ought
to react.
Act and Rule Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism may appear to justify any action just so long as it
has better consequences
than other available actions. Therefore, cheating, stealing,
lying, and breaking promises
may all seem to be justified, depending on whether they
maximize happiness in some
particular case. In response to this type of criticism,
contemporary utilitarians often focus
on general rules instead of on individual acts. The version of
utilitarianism that focuses on
rules is usually called rule utilitarianism. This is contrasted
with act utilitarianism, which
focuses solely on the consequences of specific individual acts.
Both are forms of utilitarianism. They are alike in requiring us
to produce the greatest
amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. They
differ in what they believe
we ought to consider in estimating the consequences. Act
utilitarianism states that we
ought to consider the consequences of each act separately. Rule
utilitarianism states that
we ought to consider the consequences of the act performed as a
general practice.23
One version of the trolley problem.

Take the following example. Sue is considering whether to keep
or break her promise to
go out to dinner with Ken. She believes that if she breaks this
promise in order to do
something else with other friends, then Ken will be unhappy—
but she and the other friends
will be happier. According to act utilitarianism, if the
consequences of her breaking the
promise are better than keeping it, then she ought to break it.
____________
Act utilitarianism: Consider the consequences of some
particular act such as keeping or breaking one's
promise.
____________
A rule utilitarian, on the other hand, would tell Sue to consider
what the results would be
if everyone broke promises or broke them in similar situations.
The question “What if
everyone did that?” is familiar to us. According to rule
utilitarianism, Sue should ask what
the results would be if breaking promises in similar
circumstances became a general
practice or a general rule that people followed. It is likely tha t
trust in promises would be
weakened. This outcome would be bad, she might think, because

if we could not trust one
another to keep promises, then we would generally be less
capable of making plans and
relating to one another—two important sources of human
happiness. So, even if there
would be no general breakdown in trust from just this one
instance of promise-breaking,
Sue should still probably keep her promise according to rule
utilitarian thinking.
____________
Rule utilitarianism: Consider the consequences of some practice
or rule of behavior—for example, the
practice of promise-keeping or promise-breaking.
____________
Another way to understand the method of reasoning used by the
rule utilitarian is the
following: I should ask what would be the best practice. For
example, regarding promises,
what rule would have the better results when people followed
that rule? Would it be the
rule or practice: “Never break a promise made”? At the other
end of the spectrum would be
the rule or practice: “Keep promises only if the results of doing
so would be better than
breaking them.” (This actually amounts to a kind of act
utilitarian reasoning.) However,
there might be a better rule yet, such as: “Always keep your
promise unless doing so would
have very serious harmful consequences.” If this rule was
followed, then people would
generally have the benefits of being able to say, “I promise,”
and have people generally

believe and trust them. The fact that the promise would not be
kept in some limited
circumstances would probably not do great harm to the practice
of making promises.
Some utilitarians go further and ask us to think about sets of
rules. It is not only the
practice of promise-keeping that we should evaluate, but also a
broader set of related
practices regarding truthfulness and bravery and care for
children (for example). Moreover,
we should think of these rules as forming a system in which
there are rules for priority and
stringency. These rules would tell us which practices are more
important and how
important they are compared to the others. We should then do
what the best system of
moral rules dictates, where best is still defined in terms of the
maximization of
happiness.24
Which form of utilitarianism is better is a matter of dispute. Act
utilitarians can claim
that we ought to consider only what will or is likely to happen
if we act in certain ways—
not what would happen if we acted in certain ways but will not
happen because we are not
going to so act. Rule utilitarians can claim that acts are similar
to one another and so can
be thought of as practices. My lying in one case to get myself
out of a difficulty is similar
to others' lying in other cases to get themselves out of

difficulties. Because we should
make the same judgments about similar cases (for consistency's
sake), we should judge
this act by comparing it with the results of the actions of
everyone in similar
circumstances. We can thus evaluate the general practice of
“lying to get oneself out of a
difficulty.” You can be the judge of which form of utilitarian
reasoning is more persuasive.
“Proof” of the Theory
One of the best ways to evaluate a moral theory is to examine
carefully the reasons that
are given to support it. Being an empiricist theory,
utilitarianism must draw its evidence
from experience. This is what Mill does in his attempt to prove
that the principle of utility
is the correct moral principle. His argument is as follows: Just
as the only way in which we
know that something is visible is its being seen, and the only
way we can show that
something is audible is if it can be heard, so also the only proof
that we have that
something is desirable is its being desired. Because we desire
happiness, we thus know it
is desirable or good. In addition, Mill holds that happiness is
the only thing we desire for
its own sake. All else we desire because we believe it will lead
to happiness. Thus,
happiness or pleasure is the only thing good in itself or the only
intrinsic good. All other
goods are instrumental goods; in other words, they are good
insofar as they lead to
happiness. For example, reading is not good in itself but only
insofar as it brings us
pleasure or understanding (which is either pleasurable in itself

or leads to pleasure).
There are two main contentions in this argument. One is that
good is defined in terms of
what people desire. The other is that happiness is the only thing
desired for itself and is
the only intrinsic good. Critics have pointed out that Mill's
analogy between what is visible,
audible, and desirable does not hold up under analysis. In all
three words, the suffix means
“able to be,” but in the case of desirable, Mill needs to prove
not only that we can desire
happiness (it is able to be desired), but also that it is worth
being desired. Furthermore, just
because we desire something does not necessarily mean that we
ought to desire it or that
it is good. There is a risk of the naturalistic fallacy (as defined
in Chapter 1) here. Is this a
case of illegitimately deriving an ought from an is?
Mill recognizes the difficulty of proving matters in ethics and
that the proofs here will be
indirect rather than direct. On the second point, Mill adds a
further comment to bolster his
file://view/books/9781337467926/epub/OEBPS/04_97813059 58
case about happiness. He asserts that this desire for happiness is
universal and that we
are so constructed that we can desire nothing except what

appears to us to be or to bring
happiness. You may want to consider whether these latter
assertions are consistent with
his empiricism. Does he know these things from experience? In
addition, Mill may be
simply pointing to what we already know rather than giving a
proof of the principle. You
can find out what people believe is good by noticing what they
desire. In this case, they
desire to be happy or they desire what they think will bring
them happiness.25
Utilitarianism is a highly influential moral theory that also has
had significant influence
on a wide variety of policy assessment methods. It can be quite
useful for evaluating
alternative health care systems, for example. Whichever system
brings the most benefit to
the most people with the least cost is the system that we
probably ought to support.
Although Mill was perhaps too optimistic about the ability and
willingness of people to
increase human happiness and reduce suffering, there is no
doubt that the ideal is a good
one. Nevertheless, utilitarianism has difficulties, some of which
we have discussed here.
You will know better how to evaluate this theory when you can
compare it with those
treated in the following chapters.
The reading selection in this chapter is from the classical work
Utilitarianism by John
Stuart Mill. Mill considers the importance of happiness—and
the need to consider the
happiness of others. His work remains one of the important
touchstones for thinking

about utilitarianism.
Notes
1. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp
_2015.pdf (accessed January
13, 2016).
2. United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 12:
Ensure Sustainable Consumption and
Production Patterns
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-
consumption-
production/ (accessed January 13, 2015).
3. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, “Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment,”
http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-9.htm
4. Scott Shane, “Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2
Suspects,” New York Times, April 19, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/world/20detain.html?_r50
5. Chris McGreal, “Dick Cheney Defends Use of Torture on Al-
Qaida Leaders,” Guardian, September 9,
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/09/dick-
cheney-defends-torture-al-qaida
6. San Francisco Examiner, February 2, 1993, A4; San
Francisco Chronicle, May 5, 2007, p. A5.
7. Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (New York:
HarperCollins, 2001), p. 16.
8. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Oskar Priest

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), p. 20.
9. Ibid., p. 24.
10. John Bateson, “The Golden Gate Bridge's fatal flaw” Los
Angeles Times, May 25, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/25/opinion/la-oe-adv-
bateson-golden-gate-20120525
(Accessed January 13, 2016).
11. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1789).
12. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 22.
13. These elements for calculation of the greatest amount of
happiness are from Bentham's Principles
of Morals and Legislation.
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp
_2015.pdf
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-
consumption-production/
http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-9.htm
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/world/20detain.html?_r50
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/09/dick-cheney-
defends-torture-al-qaida
14. Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation.
15. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 14.
16. Note that this is an empiricist argument. It is based on an
appeal to purported facts. People's

actual preferences for intellectual pleasures (if true) are the
only source we have for believing them
to be more valuable.
17. J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For
and Against (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1973). Also see Samuel Scheffler, The
Rejection of Consequentialism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984). In The Limits of Morality (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Shelley Kagan distinguishes the universalist element of
utilitarianism—its demand that I treat all
equally—from the maximizing element—that I must bring about
the most good possible. The first
element makes utilitarianism too demanding, whereas the
second allows us to do anything as long
as it maximizes happiness overall.
18. Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine
of Double Effect,” in Virtues and Vices
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978); and Judith Jarvis Thomson,
“Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley
Problem,” The Monist (1976), pp. 204–17.
19. See, for example, work done by Joshua Greene and the
Moral Cognition Lab at Harvard University,
http://wjh.harvard.edu/~mcl/
20. C. David Navarrete, Melissa M. McDonald, Michael L.
Mott, and Benjamin Asher, “Virtual Morality:
Emotion and Action in a Simulated Three-Dimensional ‘Trolley
Problem,’” Emotion 12, no. 2 (April
2012), pp. 364–70.
21. K. Wiech, G. Kahane, N. Shackel, M. Farias, J. Savulescu,
and I. Tracey, “Cold or Calculating?

Reduced Activity in the Subgenual Cingulate Cortex Re?ects
Decreased Emotional Aversion to
Harming in Counterintuitive Utilitarian Judgment,” Cognition
126, no. 3 (March 2013), pp. 364–72.
22. Daniel M. Bartels and David A. Pizarro, “The Mismeasure
of Morals: Antisocial Personality Traits
Predict Utilitarian Responses to Moral Dilemmas,” Cognition
121, no. 1 (October 2011), pp. 154–
61.
23. See, for example, the explanation of this difference in J. J.
C. Smart, “Extreme and Restricted
Utilitarianism,” Philosophical Quarterly (1956).
24. Richard Brandt, “Some Merits of One Form of Rule
Utilitarianism,” in Morality and the Language of
Conduct, ed. H. N. Castaneda and George Nakhnikian (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press,
1970), pp. 282–307.
25. This explanation is given by Mary Warnock in her
introduction to the Fontana edition of Mill's
Utilitarianism, pp. 25–26.
r e a d i n g
Utilitarianism
JOHN STUART MILL
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following
questions:
1. How does Mill describe the basic moral standard of

utilitarianism?
2. How does he defend himself against those who accuse
utilitarianism of being a crass pleasure theory
similar to Epicureanism?
3. How do we know that happiness is a good in itself or as an
end?
WHAT UTILITARIANISM IS
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals “utility” or
the “greatest
happiness principle” holds that actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote
happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness. By happiness is
intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain
and the privation of
pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by
the theory, much more
requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the
ideas of pain and
pleasure, and to what extent this is left an open question. But
these supplementary
explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this
theory of morality is
grounded—namely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the
only things desirable
as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in

the utilitarian as in any
other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in
themselves or as means to
the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
Now such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among
them in some of the
most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To
suppose that life has (as
they express it) no higher end than pleasure—no better and
nobler object of desire and
pursuit—they designate as utterly mean and groveling, as a
doctrine worthy only of
swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early
period, contemptuously
likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally
made the subject of
equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English
assailants.
When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered that
it is not they, but
their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light,
since the accusation
supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except
those of which swine
are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not
be gainsaid, but would
then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure
were precisely the same
to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good
enough for the one would
be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean
life to that of beasts is
felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not
satisfy a human being's

conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more
elevated than the
animal appetites and, when once made conscious of them, do
not regard anything as
happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not,
indeed, consider the
Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out
their scheme of
consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any
sufficient manner, many
Stoic, as well as Christian, elements require to be included. But
there is no known
Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures
of the intellect, of the
feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments a much
higher value as
pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted,
however, that utilitarian
writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over
bodily pleasures chiefly in
the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the
former—that is, in their
circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature.
And on all these points
utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have
taken the other and, as it
may be called, higher ground with entire consistency. It is quite
compatible with the
principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of
pleasure are more desirable
and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while in
estimating all other

things quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation
of pleasure should be
supposed to depend on quantity alone.
Some Pleasures Are Better Than Others*
If I am asked what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures,
or what makes one
pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure,
except its being greater in
amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if
there be one to which all
or almost all who have experience of both give a decided
preference, irrespective of any
feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more
desirable pleasure. If one of the
two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both,
placed so far above the
other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended
with a greater amount
of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the
other pleasure which their
nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the
preferred enjoyment a
superiority in quality so far outweighing quantity as to render
it, in comparison, of
small account.
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally
acquainted with and
equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both do give a
most marked preference
to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.
Few human creatures
would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a

promise of the fullest
allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being
would consent to be a
fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of
feeling and conscience
would be selfish and base, even though they should be
persuaded that the fool, the
dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are
with theirs. They would
not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete
satisfaction of all
the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever
fancy they would, it is
only in cases of unhappiness so extreme that to escape from it
they would exchange
their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own
eyes. A being of higher
faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably
of more acute
suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one
of an inferior type; but
in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into
what he feels to be a
lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we
please of this
unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is
given indiscriminately to
some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of
which mankind are
capable; we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal
independence, an appeal to
which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for
the inculcation of it; to
the love of power or to the love of excitement, both of which do
really enter into and
contribute to it; but its most appropriate appellation is a sense

of dignity, which all
human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though
by no means in exact,
proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a
part of the happiness of
those in whom it is strong that nothing which conflicts with it
could be otherwise than
momentarily an object of desire to them. Whoever supposes that
this preference takes
place at a sacrifice of happiness—that the superior being, in
anything like equal
circumstances, is not happier than the inferior—confounds the
two very different ideas
of happiness and content. It is indisputable that the being whose
capacities of
enjoyment are low has the greatest chance of having them fully
satisfied; and a highly
endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can
look for, as the world
is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its
imperfections, if they are at all
bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is
indeed unconscious of the
imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good
which those imperfections
qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied; better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the
pig, are of a different
opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the
question. The other party to

the comparison knows both sides.
It may be objected that many who are capable of the higher
pleasures occasionally,
under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower.
But this is quite
compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority
of the higher. Men often,
from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer
good, though they know it
to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is
between two bodily
pleasures than when it is between bodily and mental. They
pursue sensual indulgences
to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the
greater good. It may be
further objected that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm
for everything noble,
as they advance in years, sink into indolence and selfishness.
But I do not believe that
those who undergo this very common change voluntarily choose
the lower description
of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that, before
they devote themselves
exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of
the other. Capacity for
the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily
killed, not only by
hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the
majority of young
persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their
position in life has
devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them,
are not favorable to
keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high
aspirations as they lose

their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or
opportunity for indulging them;
and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because
they deliberately prefer
them, but because they are either the only ones to which they
have access or the only
ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be
questioned whether
anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of
pleasures ever
knowingly and calmly preferred the lower, though many, in all
ages, have broken down
in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.
From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend
there can be no appeal.
On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures,
or which of two modes
of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its
moral attributes and
from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified
by knowledge of both,
or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be
admitted as final. And there
needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting
the quality of
pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even
on the question of
quantity. What means are there of determining which is the
acutest of two pains, or the
intenser of two pleasurable sensations, except the general
suffrage of those who are
familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are
homogeneous, and pain is always
heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a
particular pleasure is

worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the
feelings and judgment of
the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment
declare the pleasures
derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart
from the question of
intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from
the higher faculties, is
susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.
The Moral Standard
I have dwelt on this point as being a necessary part of a
perfectly just conception of
utility or happiness considered as the directive rule of human
conduct. But it is by no
means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the
utilitarian standard; for that
standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the
greatest amount of
happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether
a noble character is
always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that
it makes other people
happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by
it. Utilitarianism,
therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of
nobleness of character,
even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of
others, and his own, so
far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the
benefit. But the bare

enunciation of such an absurdity as this last renders refutation
superfluous.
According to the greatest happiness principle, as above
explained, the ultimate end,
with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are
desirable—whether we
are considering our own good or that of other people—is an
existence exempt as far as
possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both
in point of quantity and
quality; the test of quality and the rule for measuring it against
quantity being the
preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of
experience, to which must be
added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation,
are best furnished with
the means of comparison. This, being according to the
utilitarian opinion the end of
human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality,
which may accordingly be
defined “the rules and precepts for human conduct,” by the
observance of which an
existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest
extent possible, secured
to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of
things admits, to the
whole sentient creation.…
OF WHAT SORT OF PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY IS
SUSCEPTIBLE
It has already been remarked that questions of ultimate ends do
not admit of proof, in
the ordinary acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof
by reasoning is common

to all first principles, to the first premises of our knowledge, as
well as to those of our
conduct. But the former, being matters of fact, may be the
subject of a direct appeal to
the faculties which judge of fact—namely, our senses and our
internal consciousness.
Can an appeal be made to the same faculties on questions of
practical ends? Or by
what other faculty is cognizance taken of them?
Questions about ends are, in other words, questions [about]
what things are
desirable. The utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable,
and the only thing
desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as
means to that end. What
ought to be required of this doctrine, what conditions is it
requisite that the doctrine
should fulfill—to make good its claim to be believed?
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible
is that people actually
see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear
it; and so of the other
sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole
evidence it is possible
to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually
desire it. If the end
which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in
theory and in practice,
acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any
person that it was so. No
reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable,
except that each person,
so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own
happiness. This, however,

being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case
admits of, but all which it is
possible to require, that happiness is a good, that each person's
happiness is a good to
that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the
aggregate of all
persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of
conduct and,
consequently, one of the criteria of morality.
But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the sole
criterion. To do that, it would
seem, by the same rule, necessary to show, not only that people
desire happiness, but
that they never desire anything else. Now it is palpable that they
do desire things which,
in common language, are decidedly distinguished from
happiness. They desire, for
example, virtue and the absence of vice no less really than
pleasure and the absence of
pain. The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as
authentic a fact as the desire of
happiness. And hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard
deem that they have a
right to infer that there are other ends of human action besides
happiness, and that
happiness is not the standard of approbation and disapprobation.
Happiness and Virtue
But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue,

or maintain that virtue is
not a thing to be desired? The very reverse. It maintains not
only that virtue is to be
desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for itself.
Whatever may be the
opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by
which virtue is made
virtue, however they may believe (as they do) that actions and
dispositions are only
virtuous because they promote another end than virtue, yet this
being granted, and it
having been decided, from considerations of this description,
what is virtuous, they not
only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good
as means to the
ultimate end, but they also recognize as a psychological fact the
possibility of its
being, to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any
end beyond it; and hold
that the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable
to utility, not in the state
most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love
virtue in this manner—as
a thing desirable in itself, even although, in the individual
instance, it should not
produce those other desirable consequences which it tends to
produce, and on account
of which it is held to be virtue. This opinion is not, in the
smallest degree, a departure
from the happiness principle. The ingredients of happiness are
very various, and each
of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as
swelling an
aggregate. The principle of utility does not mean that any given
pleasure, as music, for
instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example

health, is to be looked upon
as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be
desired on that
account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves;
besides being means,
they are a part of the end. Virtue, according to the utilitarian
doctrine, is not naturally
and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so;
and in those who live it
disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cheri shed,
not as a means to
happiness, but as a part of their happiness.
To illustrate this further, we may remember that virtue is not
the only thing originally
a means, and which if it were not a means to anything else
would be and remain
indifferent, but which by association with what it is a means to
comes to be desired for
itself, and that too with the utmost intensity. What, for example,
shall we say of the love
of money? There is nothing originally more desirable about
money than about any
heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things
which it will buy; the
desires for other things than itself, which it is a means of
gratifying. Yet the love of
money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human
life, but money is, in
many cases, desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it is
often stronger than the

desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires
which point to ends
beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off. It may, then,
be said truly that money is
desired not for the sake of an end, but as part of the end. From
being a means to
happiness, it has come to be itself a principal ingredient of the
individual's conception
of happiness. The same may be said of the majority of the great
objects of human life:
power, for example, or fame, except that to each of these there
is a certain amount of
immediate pleasure annexed, which has at least the semblance
of being naturally
inherent in them—a thing which cannot be said of money. Still,
however, the strongest
natural attraction, both of power and of fame, is the immense
aid they give to the
attainment of our other wishes; and it is the strong association
thus generated between
them and all our objects of desire which gives to the direct
desire of them the intensity
it often assumes, so as in some characters to surpass in strength
all other desires. In
these cases the means have become a part of the end, and a more
important part of it
than any of the things which they are means to. What was once
desired as an
instrument for the attainment of happiness has come to be
desired for its own sake. In
being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of
happiness. The person
is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere
possession; and is made
unhappy by failure to obtain it. The desire of it is not a different
thing from the desire

of happiness any more than the love of music or the desire of
health. They are included
in happiness. They are some of the elements of which the desire
of happiness is made
up. Happiness is not an abstract idea but a concrete whole; and
these are some of its
parts. And the utilitarian standard sanctions and approves their
being so. Life would be
a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if
there were not this provision
of nature by which things originally indifferent, but conducive
to, or otherwise
associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires,
become in themselves
sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures,
both in permanency, in
the space of human existence that they are capable of covering,
and even in intensity.
Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of this
description. There
was no original desire of it, or motive to it, save its
conduciveness to pleasure, and
especially to protection from pain. But through the association
thus formed it may be
felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity
as any other good; and
with this difference between it and the love of money, of power,
or of fame—that all of
these may, and often do, render the individual noxious to the
other members of the
society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which
makes him so much a
blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested love of
virtue. And consequently,
the utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves those

other acquired desires, up
to the point beyond which they would be more injurious to the
general happiness than
promotive of it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love
of virtue up to the
greatest strength possible, as being above all things important to
the general
happiness.
Happiness the Only Intrinsic Good
It results from the preceding considerations that there is in
reality nothing desired
except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a
means to some end beyond
itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of
happiness, and is not
desired for itself until it has become so. Those who desire virtue
for its own sake desire
it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or
because the consciousness of
being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united; as in truth
the pleasure and pain
seldom exist separately, but almost always together—the same
person feeling pleasure
in the degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having attained
more. If one of these
gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love
or desire virtue, or
would desire it only for the other benefits which it might
produce to himself or to

persons whom he cared for.
We have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of
proof the principle of
utility is susceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated is
psychologically true—if
human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not
either a part of
happiness or a means of happiness—we can have no other proof,
and we require no
other, that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is
the sole end of human
action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge all
human conduct; from
whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of
morality, since a part is
included in the whole.
_______________
From John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, (London: Parker, Son,
and Bourn, 1863), chaps. 2 and 4.
*Headings added by the editor.
R E V I E W E X E R C I S E S
1. State and explain the basic idea of the principle of utility or
the greatest happiness principle.
2. What does it mean to speak of utilitarianism as a
consequentialist moral theory?
3. What is the difference between intrinsic and instrumental
good? Give examples of each.
4. Which of the following statements exemplify
consequentialist reasoning? Can all of them be given
consequentialist interpretations if expanded? Explain your
answers.
a. Honesty is the best policy.

b. Sue has the right to know the truth.
c. What good is going to come from giving money to a
homeless person on the street?
d. There is a symbolic value present in personally giving
something to another person in need.
e. It is only fair that you give him a chance to compete for the
position.
f. If I do not study for my ethics exam, it will hurt my GPA.
g. If you are not honest with others, you cannot expect them to
be honest with you.
5. Is utilitarianism a hedonist moral theory? Why or why not?
6. Using utilitarian calculation, which choice in each of the
following pairs is better, X or Y?
a. X makes four people happy and me unhappy. Y makes me
and one other person happy and three people
unhappy.
b. X makes twenty people happy and five unhappy. Y makes
ten people happy and no one unhappy.
c. X will give five people each two hours of pleasure. Y will
give three people each four hours of pleasure.
d. X will make five people very happy and three people mildly
unhappy. Y will make six people moderately
happy and two people very unhappy.
7. What is Mill's argument for the difference in value between
intellectual and sensual pleasures?
8. Which of the following is an example of act utilitarian
reasoning and which is an example of rule utilitarian
reasoning? Explain your answers.
a. If I do not go to the meeting, then others will not go either.
If that happens, then there would not be a

quorum for the important vote, which would be bad. Thus, I
ought to go to the meeting.
b. If doctors generally lied to their patients about their
diagnoses, then patients would lose trust in their
doctors. Because that would be bad, I should tell this patient the
truth.
c. We ought to keep our promises because it is a valuable
practice.
d. If I cheat here, I will be more likely to cheat elsewhere. No
one would trust me then. So I should not cheat
on this test.
For m ore chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
HCS335 v8
Ethical Decisions Worksheet
HCS/335 v8
Page 2 of 2Ethical Decisions Matrix Worksheet
Complete the matrix below. Respond to each section using 100
to 150 words.
Prompt
Response
Impact
Describe an event in which you made an individual ethical
decision.

[Explain the impact of your decision.]
Describe your ethical values and how your personal ethical
values impact your decisions.
[Explain how your values impacted your decision.]
Explain 2 ethical theories and how the theories could impact
future ethical decisions in health care.
[Explain how these theories would impact your future ethical
decisions in health care.]
Explain an ethical problem-solving methodology to positively
impact ethical decisions in health care.
[Explain how you could use this formal ethical problem-solving
method to positively impact future ethical decisions in health
care.]
Copyright 2020 by University of Phoenix. All rights reserved.
Copyright© 2020 by University of Phoenix. All rights reserved.

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1114237 - Cengage Learning ©5Utilitarianism and John Stu