Caribbean Petroleum Tank Terminal Explosion and Multiple Tank Fires

1. Process Safety Forum
Learning Brief #15 – Issued on 27th
November 2015
Caribbean Petroleum Tank Terminal Explosion and Multiple Tank Fires
On the night of October 23, 2009, a large explosion occurred at the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation
(CAPECO) facility in Bayamón, Puerto Rico, during offloading of gasoline from a tanker ship, the Cape
Bruny, to the CAPECO tank farm onshore. A 5-million-gallon aboveground storage tank (AST) overflowed
into a secondary containment dike. The gasoline spray aerosolized, forming a large vapour cloud, which
ignited after reaching an ignition source in the wastewater treatment (WWT) area of the facility. The blast
and fire from multiple secondary explosions resulted in significant damage to 17 of the 48 petroleum storage
tanks and other equipment onsite and in neighbourhoods and businesses offsite. The fires burned for
almost 60 hours. Petroleum products leaked into the soil, nearby wetlands and navigable waterways in the
surrounding area.
There are striking similarities to the Buncefield explosion and fires of the 11th
December 2005, highlighted
in the key findings below.
Key Findings
 Control and monitoring failures
o Inadequate tank filling operations
o Unreliable tank gauging equipment
 Safety Management System failures
o No independent high level alarm system
o No independent automatic overfill prevention system
 Human Factors failures
o Bund valve system design meant that it was difficult to determine if a valve was open or
closed
o Insufficient lighting in the bund area
 Lack of reporting requirements
o Incomplete national incident database of incidents, meaning that failure frequencies could
not be determined – inhibiting targeted improvements.

2.  Emergency response weaknesses
o CAPECO and local fire-fighting teams lack of relevant equipment
o Lack of emergency planning g and training
o Lack of co-ordination between federal, commonwealth and non-governmental agencies that
responded to the explosion and fire
 Regulatory weaknesses
o US regulatory system does not recognise large above-ground storage tanks storing
flammable material to have a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) potential
o Tank terminal facilities are not required to conduct risk assessments to address potential
MAH
o High level alarm systems or overfill prevention systems are not required under regulatory
standards
 Industry standards
o Despite similar incidents, stakeholders in the US have been slow to react to learnings
o NFPA 30, API 2350 and ICC standards vary and none provide adequate information on risk
assessment and overfill prevention system design.
Further reading
To download a copy of the full Chemical Safety Board (CSB) report, visit the CSB website here:
http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/16/06.09.2015_FINAL_CAPECO_Draft_Report__for_Board_Vote.pdf
An animation of the incident is also available: http://www.csb.gov/videos/filling-blind/
More information on the Buncefield explosions can be found here:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/response.htm
Reference can also be made to PSF Learning Brief 14 Learning from Buncefield: http://www.p-s-
f.org.uk/?p=365
The Process Safety Forum has been set up to provide an industry association platform whereby initiatives, best practice, lessons
from incidents and process safety strategy can be distilled and shared across sectors, to influence our stakeholders (including the
Regulators), and to drive the process safety management agenda. The Process Safety Forum consists of representatives from
UKPIA, TSA, CIA, OGUK, CBA, RSSB, ENA, ECIA, UKLPG, BAMA, EIG, UKOPA, SWA, MPA, UKLPG, BAMA, SWA and SDF.
For further details contact: peter.davidson@ukpia.com.