Jds 2 1_gskhurana

98 Journal of Defence Studies • Vol. 2 No. 1
Gurpreet S. Khurana
Aircraft Carriers and India’s
Naval Doctrine
Gurpreet S. Khurana*
Introduction
Epic sea battles between aircraft carriers have not recurred after World
War II; in the post-war period, most carriers began to retire without
even having participated in a battle. Many countries that possessed
carriers or were aspiring to get them thus began to re-assess the military-
strategic utility of such platforms in the radically altered global geo-
strategic environment. The operational concept incorporating carriers
also came under the scanner due to the risk to these high-value assets
by the proliferation of sea-denial platforms and weapons. For example,
the acquisition of submarines by Indonesia and Pakistan in the mid-
1960s led to India’s employment of INS Vikrant with much hesitation.1
Whether the enormous financial investment needed to acquire and operate
a carrier can be justified against its need has been another contentious
issue. Notwithstanding these protracted debates over the years, the
aircraft-carrier has still not followed the battleship into oblivion.
Merely on the basis of reduced employment of aircraft-carriers in the
recent past, or by a casual reckoning of the shifting offence-defence
balance against these platforms, it may be perilous to infer that aircraft-
carriers are redundant in contemporary times. The current regional
geo-political and security environment is marked by ambiguities and
uncertainties. It is still unclear as to what kind of world order will emerge
after the bipolar one ended with the Cold War. The only certitude is that
*Commander Gurpreet Khurana is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence and Strategic
Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.

Journal of Defence Studies • Summer 2008 99Journal of Defence Studies • Summer 2008
Aircraft Carriers and India’s Naval Doctrine
the process will involve substantial geo-political competition wherein
the possibility of military conflicts, albeit of short duration, cannot be
discounted. Furthermore, given the shifting global focus to the Indian
Ocean-PacificOcean(fromthePacific-Atlanticcombine),thecompetition
is more likely to manifest in this region. Coupled with India’s expanding
vital interests, such a regional environment may necessitate a carrier
capability. This paper aims to examine this need and assess the related
operational-level and tactical aspects of carrier operations in the Indian
context.
Strategic Imperatives
The Asia-Pacific is largely a maritime-configured region. Therefore,
there is much rationale for a regional power like India to possess a carrier
capability. Even if India could obtain access to extra-territorial air-bases
for use by its land-based aircraft, it may not be prudent to factor such
bases, since these may not be made available in the most critical occasion
due to geo-political factors. There are numerous possible scenarios
wherein a carrier capability would be indispensable; some of them are
as follows:
 In Support of Land Battle: The concept of using a carrier
to support a continental war is not alien to India. During the 1971
operations for liberation of Bangladesh, the aircraft onboard INS
Vikrant was employed very successfully to strike strategic targets
deep inside the erstwhile East Pakistan. It is important to note that
as long as much of India’s land boundary (stretching from north-
west to north-east) remains disputed, the potential of a border
conflict, and thereby the likelihood of such a need, will persist.
 Security of Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOC): In
the event of a military conflict, a carrier is the only naval asset
that can provide a comprehensive protection to merchant shipping
carrying strategic commodities to India. The Indian naval chief
recently expressed apprehensions on the future vulnerability

of energy imports through the Strait of Hormuz due to China’s
strategic “foothold” in Pakistan’s Gwadar port, as part of its overall
“String of Pearls” strategy.2
Like Gwadar, many other locations
(“pearls”) in the Indian Ocean littoral dispersed along the arterial
shipping routes bear a similar potential. Owing to the ongoing
diversification of energy sources away from the Persian Gulf area,
these distant SLOCs are also assuming strategic significance for
India.
 Maintaining Influence in IOR: India’s security is directly
linked to and closely enmeshed with that of the Indian Ocean
and the adjoining littoral region (IOR)—the area of its primary
strategicinterest.TheChinese“pearls”intheIndianOcean,besides
addressing Beijing’s strategic vulnerability in terms of its energy
imports is likely to be aimed at “displacing” India’s influence
in the IOR. A possible Chinese politico-military intervention
in the region will seriously impinge on India’s security. In that
sense, a carrier can best bestow on India a capability to maintain
its influence in these waters and achieve a strategic “dissuasion”
against any inimical extra-regional power.
 Safeguarding Vital Interests Overseas: Carrier aviation
will enable India to safeguard its strategic interests overseas, not
only in the IOR but also beyond. India’s economic/strategic stakes
are conspicuously increasing in Afro-Asian states, many of which
are plagued by political, socio-economic and ethnic instabilities.
Besides, many Indian citizens are working in these countries,
and past events have amply demonstrated how their lives and
property can be jeopardised. New Delhi will need to safeguard
these interests in conjunction with the host nations. When the
operational situation so warrants, it may be preferable to carry out
precision air-strikes to “soften” the target before inserting ground
forces, since to do otherwise may lead to avoidable casualties.
The Gulf wars conducted by the US are instructive in this regard.
Even if its own interests are not directly endangered, India may
Gurpreet S. Khurana

need to meet its international obligations by participating in a
peace-enforcement operation under the aegis of the UN.
 Security of Island Territories: Integral naval aviation
is essential for defence of India’s far-flung island territories,
particularly theAndaman and Nicobar Islands (AN) that lie more
than 1,000 km from the Indian mainland. These islands are also
extremely vulnerable due to their geographical spread, and the
fact that most of these are uninhabited. The possibility of foreign
military occupation or claim may be unlikely in the foreseeable
future, but cannot be ruled out altogether. The take-over of the
Falklands Islands by Argentina was also considered a remote
possibility until it actually occurred in 1982. By all indicators,
high-value naval/air assets are unlikely to be based in the AN
Islands. This makes the aircraft carrier indispensable, even as a
deterrent.
 Non-military Missions: Although the concept of a carrier
is essentially centred on its military role, such a platform would
substantially increase India’s operational options to respond to a
natural disaster in the regional seas or littoral. While it has begun
inducting large sealift platforms with integral helicopters like the
INS Jalashwa Landing Platform Dock (LPD), a disaster of a large
magnitude may necessitate the employment of a carrier. Akin to
a floating city, a carrier can provide virtually unlimited sealift,
substantial airlift and all conceivable essential services ranging
from freshwater to electric supply, and medical to engineering
expertise. There is an effort to further enhance the usefulness of a
carrier for such roles, such as by incorporating a modular concept.
It incorporates modular spaces/containers carrying specialised
personnel, engineering equipment, medical facilities, etc., which
can be rapidly deployed for specific missions.3
Not the least important is the employment of a carrier to fulfil the
politico-diplomatic role of the navy. The large platform is an awesome

symbol of national power. Its overseas missions and port-calls, when
used with prudence and in a non-threatening pose, can yield intangible,
but substantial, dividends to the country.
Air Power: Sea-based versus Land-based
The recent past is witness to quantum advancement in aviation
technologies, leading to the induction of “fourth-generation-plus” aircraft
by many countries, including India (SU-30 MKI). Their intrinsically
enhanced flight endurance is further augmented by in-flight refuelling
capability. It may therefore seem that land-based air-power can meet any
of the aforesaid strategic objectives, which hitherto necessitated carrier-
borne air operations. However, the following considerations indicate
otherwise:
 Aerial refuelling has its own operational constraints, such as in
terms of safety of the tanker-aircraft.
 The “time on task” of a land-based aircraft in the conflict zone
would be significantly less than that of its sea-borne counterpart.
 Carrier-borne aircraft are better able to maintain combat efficiency,
in contrast to the lengthy transit of land-based aircraft, which
would degrade crew efficiency by the time the aircraft reached
the conflict zone/ “task” area.4
 Positioning the carrier in close geographical proximity to the
conflict zone enables the commander to better monitor the
changing operational scenario and execute timely measures.5
 In case of some scenarios like a military conflict across the land
border, the targets may lie well within the striking range of land-
based strike aircraft. However, employment of carrier-based
aircraft will be necessary to present an element of surprise and
uncertainty to the adversary.
Gurpreet S. Khurana

 For India to defend its widely dispersed island territories, carrier-
based aviation may be a more cost-effective option as compared
to land-based aircraft, which would need elaborate supporting
infrastructure. Besides the airfield, it will need an air-surveillance
radar chain, a fixed anti-submarine sensor network, fuel stores,
ammunition depots, and so on.

 Inmanycases,ascomparedtoanairfield,acarrierislessvulnerable
to the enemy’s pre-emptive strike due to its mobility.
The Weak Case Against Carriers
The arguments against a carrier essentially revolve around the increasing
operational vulnerability of such a high-value platform, which is bound
to be a focal target for an adversary’s military strategy during war. It is
true that a carrier is more prone to detection today due to the advent of
spaced-based surveillance, unlike in the past when it could “hide” in the
vast expanse of the ocean. It is also stated that once detected, it is also
more assailable to sea-denial forces than hitherto. This assertion may
however be too simplistic, and does not reckon the inherent defences
of a carrier taskforce. The raison d’être of a carrier is to establish sea-
control (including air-dominance) in a sizable area around it, with its
precise size being contingent upon the threat perception and the forces
at the carrier’s disposal. This implies that before a carrier is put to sea,
it must be capable of sanitising all possible threats (in all dimensions) in
the sea-control area. The case against the carrier also pertains to some
specific threats, which are examined and accounted for later.
The hype on insecurity of a carrier largely stems from a larger fear – if
the carrier is lost to the enemy, it would not only severely and irreversibly
degrade the nation’s military capability, but will also lead to a major
symbolic dent to its morale and pride: after all, nowhere in the annals
of military history has the loss of a single asset to the enemy, including
that of the battleship, ever been so damaging to national interest. The
following accounts for the oft-stated arguments against the carrier and
their inherent weakness.

Vulnerability to Anti-Ship Missiles has Increased
The new generation anti-missiles like Exocet, Harpoon and Moskit
are characterised by increasing lethality in terms of their speed; sea-
skimming flight profile to evade the targets radar; sophistication of its
Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) to evade ship’s “soft-
kill” defences, and so on. However, the technological effectiveness
of defence has also increased substantially, almost in tandem with the
offence.
Besides, considering that the adversary is likely to resort to concentration
of force to “saturate” its defences, tactical doctrines have been re-
oriented accordingly to bolster the defence. For example, it has now
become necessary to destroy the launch-platform before it launches the
missile. The platform could be a warship or a maritime patrol aircraft,
like the P-3C Orion operated by Pakistan. It could also be a submarine,
which is examined later in greater detail. The value of “organic” aviation
of a carrier here lies in the availability, at virtually immediate notice, of
a means to search and positively identify distant hostile platforms, and
thereafter “kill” these, before a missile launch. This makes the carrier-
borne aircraft in anti-air, anti-ship and anti-submarine roles imperative,
to protect not only the carrier and its escorts, but also other units operating
in the area.
To cater for the possibility that the destruction of launch platform is not
achieved, the many subsequent layers of defence directed at destruction of
the incoming missiles are facilitated by the various sensors on the carrier
taskforce units, including those of the carrier-borne Ka-31 helicopters
that provide a continuous Air Early Warning (AEW) cover.
Furthermore, a carrier’s inherent battle-damage resistance is often
underestimated. History has shown that large ships are significantly less
vulnerable than small ships and can withstand high degrees of damage
without loss. Even if a carrier is hit by one or two missiles, this is unlikely
to affect even its fighting efficiency, let alone its ability to come back to
harbour or to stay afloat.
Gurpreet S. Khurana

Vulnerability to Submarines has Increased
In the increasing “transparency” of maritime battlefield brought
about by space and information technologies, the intrinsic attributes
of underwater medium have undoubtedly provided an edge to the
submarine. It is however important to note that an aircraft carrier can
bring to bear substantial anti-submarine capabilities to prosecute the
enemy submarine, much greater than what any taskforce devoid of a
carrier can do. According to one account of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, had
INS Vikrant (with its Alize anti-submarine aircraft) not been deployed
in the Bay of Bengal, the Pakistani submarines would not have been so
successful in the Arabian Sea. (One of these sank even INS Khukri.)6
The induction of underwater-launched long-range missiles by the
submarines of India’s potential adversaries has presented a more serious
threat. The Exocet (on Pakistan’s Agousta-class), Klub-S (on Chinese
Kilo-class) and YJ-8-2 (on Chinese Song-class) are capable of striking a
carrier at extended stand-off ranges. However, the employment of such
capability must necessarily be preceded by precise location of the carrier
through the submarine’s radar or electronic support measures (ESM).
A submarine is severely constrained here, since this would require it to
come to the surface/periscope-depth, making it vulnerable to detection
and prosecution. Even if it does so, due to the limited height of its radar/
ESM mast, its “horizon” for electronic search/tracking is extremely
limited in relation to the maximum range of its missile.
Ties Down Substantial Forces in Escort Role

It is true that a carrier never sails in a “hostile” environment without
numerous consorts in escort role to cater for a multi-dimensional threat.
However, the argument that this “ties down” these forces is based on
ignorance of the mutual support that carriers and the other ships offer
as part of an integrated force. The carrier supports the consorts as
much as the consorts escort the carrier, if not more.7
Besides, a full-

fledged protective “screen” around a carrier is not always necessary. In
accordance with the prevailing threat scenario, the force commander can
exercise his discretion to detach forces for other missions intimated by
the shore command.
Besides, the “overwhelming” naval forces being employed for the
protection of the carrier could be reduced significantly if the platform
possesses adequate weapon-systems. To keep the cost low and have
space for larger number of aircraft, this is not being resorted to by India
in case of the Admiral Gorshkov(future INS Vikramaditya). Nonetheless,
it remains an option for India’s future carriers. Another option is to
increase the carrier tonnage (size). This will enable the platform to carry
more aircraft (in anti-ship and anti-submarine roles) for its own defence,
without commensurately increasing its vulnerability in terms of radar
signature or manoeuvrability.
It is pertinent to note the global technological developments in favour of
the carrier. For example, the fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
have already been operationalised in many countries. The induction of
rotary-wing craft and underwater vehicles is on the anvil. In the coming
years, such force-multipliers will further augment the defence of the
carrier, which may reduce the necessity for a large number of escort
vessels.
Acquisition and Operating Cost is Prohibitive
While a current-generation destroyer (5,000 tons displacement) costs
aboutRs.3,000crore,anaircraftcarrierofabout35,000tonsdisplacement
costs twice that amount. But this also indicates that the procurement
cost of a carrier on a per-ton basis is substantially less than that of a
destroyer. Furthermore, when seen in the context of a carrier’s ability to
perform varied roles, including that of a floating airfield, which no other
type of naval asset can perform, the high induction and operating cost is
well justifiable.
Gurpreet S. Khurana

During the aircraft carrier debate in Australia in the 1970s, one of the
proponents stated that “Virtually all weapon acquisitions are expensive;
but a carrier to meet the… requirements need cost no more than two
destroyers. And no other equipment acquisition can match the essential
capability of the aircraft carrier at equivalent cost.”8
Conclusion
Given the aforesaid considerations, prima facie, the imperative of
including carriers in its naval doctrine far outweighs its cost, both
financial and operational.
It is important to remember that many of the arguments against the
carrier mentioned in this paper were used even before World War II. The
statistics of the war pertaining to allied forces later disputed these – in
comparison to 11 per cent carriers, the allies lost 18 per cent battleships,
33 per cent cruisers, 36 per cent frigates, 21 per cent sloops and 37 per
cent submarines.9
The post-Cold War global trends of carrier acquisitions
are instructive. Despite the fact that only Indian and British carriers went
into action in the Cold War-era, France, Italy, Spain and Thailand did
not hesitate to acquire carriers.
Like India, China is another major regional power. With the exception of
its maritime-territorial claims in the western Pacific, China’s emerging
vital interests are likely to be similar to those of India. Although China
has not yet operationalised a carrier, it is more due to geo-strategic
compulsions specific to it, rather than for any reason applicable in Indian
context. Furthermore, while such compulsions are likely to persist in the
foreseeable future, Beijing has maintained a long-term vision to acquire
carriers and has also been working towards it, such as in terms of formal
induction in January 2007 of the old Soviet Varyag as Shilang (hull no
83) and the ongoing negotiations with Russia to procure the carrier-
capable SU-33 naval aircraft.

Gurpreet S. Khurana
In the US, the debate was not about the need of carriers, but their optimum
numbers to support its global interests.10
Likewise, the debate in India
must be on the number and size of its carriers, rather than on the platform
per se.
Notes
1 C. Uday Bhaskar, “Maritime Security and the Aircraft Carrier”, Strategic Analysis, March 1998, p.1782
2 “Navy Chief ‘concerned’ over new Pak port”, Indian Express, January 23, 2008, p.6
3 John Gordon IV et al, “Leveraging America’s Aircraft Carrier Capabilities”, National Defence Research Institute, RAND
Corporation monograph series, 2006, p. xix
4 Dean Mathew, “Aircraft carriers: An Indian Introspection”, Strategic Analysis, March 2000, p.2135
5 -ibid-
7 Pegasus, “The Aircraft Carrier Replacement: The Real Requirement”, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute (ANI),
November 1978, p.66.
8 -ibid-, p.60.
9 G. Nekrasov, Commander (Royal Australian Navy), “The Aircraft Carrier: Past and Future”, Journal of the Australian Naval
Institute (ANI), May 1976, p.28 and 30.

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