Anger Creates Automatic Prejudice Toward Outgroups

Research Article
Prejudice From Thin Air
The Effect of Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes
David DeSteno,1 Nilanjana Dasgupta,2 Monica Y. Bartlett,1
and Aida Cajdric1
1
Northeastern University and
2
University of Massachusetts–Amherst
ABSTRACT—Two experiments provide initial evidence that
spe-
cific emotional states are capable of creating automatic prej-
udice toward outgroups. Specifically, we propose that anger
should influence automatic evaluations of outgroups because of
its functional relevance to intergroup conflict and competition,
whereas other negative emotions less relevant to intergroup
relations (e.g., sadness) should not. In both experiments, after
minimal ingroups and outgroups were created, participants
were induced to experience anger, sadness, or a neutral state.

Automatic attitudes toward the in- and outgroups were then
assessed using an evaluative priming measure (Experiment 1)
and the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2). As predicted,
results showed that anger created automatic prejudice toward
the outgroup, whereas sadness and neutrality resulted in no
automatic intergroup bias. The implications of these findings
for
emotion-induced biases in implicit intergroup cognition in par-
ticular, and in social cognition in general, are considered.
Since the heyday of frustration-aggression and scapegoating
theories
of prejudice (e.g., Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears,
1939),
social psychologists have recognized that intergroup relations,
and the
stereotypes and prejudices that inevitably accompany them, are
in-
fluenced by perceivers’ emotional states. As in the case of
attitudes
more generally, emotions have been found to influence when,
and to
what extent, people express positive or negative attitudes

toward, and
beliefs about, members of in- and outgroups (Bodenhausen,
Muss-
weiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, 2001; Fiske, 1998; cf. Petty,
DeSteno, &
Rucker, 2001). For example, anger and happiness are known to
en-
hance heuristic processing of social information that, in turn,
ex-
acerbates stereotypic judgments of outgroups (Bodenhausen,
Shep-
pard, & Kramer, 1994; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Sadness,
however,
has been shown to promote systematic processing of
information that,
in turn, decreases stereotypic judgments (Lambert, Khan,
Lickel, &
Fricke, 1997). These and similar findings have led to wide
acceptance of the view that specific emotions can influence
people’s
beliefs about social groups.
It is important to note, however, that thus far, the growing
corpus of

research on emotion and intergroup cognition has focused
exclusively
on the effects of emotion on self-reported, or explicit,
judgments of
social groups (for a review, see Bodenhausen et al., 2001). Such
judgments involve conscious deliberation and are, therefore,
clearly
under perceivers’ voluntary control. Indeed, if people suspect
that
incidental emotion may unduly influence an unrelated judgment,
they
often correct for the perceived bias (Lambert et al., 1997; cf.
DeSteno,
Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000). Moreover, happy individuals,
who
typically engage in heuristic processing, are able to process
system-
atically when instructed to do so (Queller, Mackie, &
Stroessner,
1996) or when counterstereotypic information motivates them to
do so
(Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996). Such control, however, is
not
available for all types of judgments, especially automatic ones

(Banaji
& Dasgupta, 1998; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In the domain
of
intergroup cognition, automatic attitudes stand as an
unconscious
analogue to self-reported or conscious attitudes; that is, they
rep-
resent evaluations of social groups whose initiation and
modification
typically operate without volitional control (Fazio & Towles-
Schwen,
1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Understanding the conditions
that
lead to the formation and exacerbation of automatic prejudice is
im-
portant not only because of its pervasiveness, but also because
of
accumulating evidence that automatic prejudice does not remain
confined to mental life—it diffuses into people’s behavior
toward
outgroup members (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002;
Fazio,
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; McConnell & Leibold,
2001).

We believe that people’s emotional states at the time of
intergroup
judgment ought to influence their automatic evaluations of
social
groups by moderating or even creating intergroup biases outside
of
awareness. This hypothesis stems from a functional view of
emotions
as phenomena designed to increase adaptive responding to en-
vironmentally significant stimuli (Damasio, 1994; Keltner &
Gross,
1999; LeDoux, 1996).
1
From an adaptiveness standpoint, it seems
The first two authors contributed equally to this work. Address
correspondence to David DeSteno, Department of Psychology,
Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, e-mail:
[email protected]
neu.edu, or to Nilanjana Dasgupta, Department of Psychology,
Tobin Hall, 135 Hicks Way, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst,
MA 01003, e-mail: [email protected]
1
The influence of emotion on cognition and behavior is theorized
to produce
adaptive responses that prepare organisms to meet
environmental challenges.

However, the influence of emotions may also diffuse into new
situations; that is,
a preexisting or incidental emotion may influence interactions
with a sub-
sequent target (cf. Bodenhausen et al., 2001; Petty et al., 2001).
Any biases
that stem from the influence of incidental emotions on
judgments of subsequent
targets need not represent an adaptive response.
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
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reasonable to expect that specific emotions should facilitate
people’s
ability to evaluate social groups quickly and automatically, as
well as
slowly and carefully. We predict that to the extent that
outgroups often
signify sources of conflict, competition, or blockage of goals
(Brewer &
Brown, 1998; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002), and to the extent that
emotions help individuals meet environmental challenges by
acti-

vating goal-driven action tendencies (Frijda, 1986; LeDoux,
1996),
emotions that prepare organisms to meet challenges related to
conflict
or competition (e.g., anger) should bias automatic intergroup
evalua-
tions in accord with these functional goals.
EMOTION AND AUTOMATIC INTERGROUP ATTITUDES
Although no evidence directly bears on this hypothesis, findings
from
three lines of research lend credence to the idea that emotion
ought to
shape automatic attitudes toward social groups. First, cognitive
neu-
roscience research has begun to identify subcortical structures
in-
volved in automatic evaluative appraisals of social groups
(Phelps
et al., 2000) and has found these structures to be reciprocally
linked
to both cortical and subcortical regions of the brain involved in
the
experience of emotion (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli,
2002).

Such reciprocal pathways suggest not only that automatic
appraisals of
particular stimuli can trigger emotion, but also that extant
emotional
states can influence subsequent appraisals. Given these
linkages, it is
possible that an emotional state renders individuals more
vigilant
against certain threats in the environment and that such
vigilance
modulates subsequent automatic evaluations of relevant social
stim-
uli. Because automatic evaluations facilitate rapid responses
when
strategic analysis is unavailable, it seems reasonable to expect
that
these responses may be an important medium through which
emotions
allow organisms to meet environmental challenges; for example,
cer-
tain emotion-driven automatic responses may act as the first
line of
defense against threatening stimuli.

Second, the functional view of emotion readily extends into the
realm of intergroup relations. Recent work has begun to find
that
appraisals of social groups evoke specific emotional states,
goals, and
action tendencies that facilitate the successful negotiation of
group
interactions (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Given this link between
social
groups and specific emotions, it is conceivable that the
experience of
such emotions, even when their source is incidental to
intergroup
relations, may influence people’s perceptions of in- and
outgroups in
accord with their functional significance.
Finally, for emotion-based moderation of automatic intergroup
at-
titudes to occur, such attitudes must show some degree of
flexibility.
Recent research has supported this view, providing evidence
that
automatic beliefs and attitudes toward groups are not as
immutable as

previously theorized, but rather are quite sensitive to external
cues
such as social context (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001;
Wittenbrink,
Judd, & Park, 2001). Consequently, emotion, given its context-
rel-
evant signaling value, ought to act as an internal cue capable of
moderating automatic intergroup attitudes.
EXPERIMENT 1
We used a minimal-group procedure to provide an initial test of
the
hypothesis that specific emotions can bias automatic attitudes
toward
social groups. Minimal groups provided a clean assessment of
the
primary hypothesis because participants had no preexisting
attitudes
or emotional reactions toward them. Thus, any automatic
preference
for one group over another could be interpreted as a new
attitude.
2
To

the extent that outgroups signify sources of conflict and
competition,
they may evoke feelings of anger and contempt (cf. Brewer &
Brown,
1998; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002). We propose that just as anger
can
originate from current interactions with groups, so may
incidental
feelings of anger from an unrelated situation affect automatic
ap-
praisals of social groups in a subsequent situation because the
emo-
tion signals a hostile environment and prepares individuals to
act
accordingly. Specifically, we propose that incidental feelings of
anger
are likely to increase automatic bias against an outgroup
because
anger increases negativity toward the outgroup, decreases
positivity,
or both. According to a functionalist perspective, the emergence
of
outgroup bias should be specific to feelings of anger as opposed
to

other negative emotions that are typically less relevant to
intergroup
relations (e.g., sadness). To examine this hypothesis, we
assigned
participants to minimal groups, induced one of three emotional
states
(i.e., anger, sadness, neutrality), and then assessed participants’
au-
tomatic attitudes toward these groups with an evaluative
priming task.
Method
Participants
A community sample of 87 New York City residents (50
females, 37
males) participated in exchange for $10.
Manipulations and Measures
Creation of Minimal Groups. To create minimal groups, we had
par-
ticipants complete a bogus personality test in which they
estimated
the frequency of various events (e.g., ‘‘How many people ride
the New
York subway every day?’’). After they completed the test, the

computer
ostensibly analyzed their responses and informed them that they
were
either an ‘‘overestimator’’ or an ‘‘underestimator.’’ In reality,
each
participant had been randomly assigned to one of these two
groups. To
ensure that participants remembered their group membership
throughout the experiment, we instructed them to wear
wristbands
designating their group: red wristbands for underestimators and
blue
ones for overestimators. Participants were then shown pictures
of 6
ingroup members and 6 outgroup members.
3
The backdrops of these
pictures were color-coded red for underestimators and blue for
over-
estimators. By matching participants’ wristbands to the color of
the
photographs, we sought to make group membership readily rec-
ognizable by a visually salient characteristic.

Assessment of Automatic Intergroup Attitudes. An evaluative
priming
task was used to measure automatic intergroup attitudes
(elements of
this priming task were borrowed from Fazio et al., 1995, and
Payne,
2001). In the first block of 12 trials, participants categorized the
pictures of in- and outgroup members that they had seen
previously
during the minimal-group assignment procedure as belonging to
the
2
There is debate about whether evaluative biases captured by
response la-
tency measures ought to be interpreted as personal attitudes or
as cultural
associations learned by exposure to particular stimulus pairings
in the en-
vironment (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). The evaluative biases
captured in the
present experiments cannot be attributed to cultural associations
given that the
target stimuli were experimentally created minimal groups.
3
Individual pictures assigned to the overestimator and
underestimator
groups were counterbalanced.

320 Volume 15—Number 5
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ingroup (‘‘us’’) or outgroup (‘‘them’’). These images were
presented one
at a time in a random order and later served as target stimuli. In
the
second block of 12 trials, participants learned to classify
valenced
words as good or bad; these later served as primes. The third
block of
24 trials allowed participants to practice the standard evaluative
priming procedure. In each priming trial, several stimuli were
pre-
sented in rapid succession in the following order: (a) an
orienting
stimulus (n) for 500 ms, (b) a word prime for 200 ms, (c) a
target
picture for 200 ms, and (d) a gray mask that stayed on screen
until

participants pressed the appropriate key on a computer keyboard
to
indicate whether the target picture belonged to their ingroup
(‘‘us’’) or
outgroup (‘‘them’’). A 500-ms pause separated individual trials.
Par-
ticipants were instructed to attend to all stimuli presented on
screen,
but to categorize only the pictures. For each trial, the prime and
target
were selected randomly from a pool of 12 primes and 12 targets.
Once
practice was over, participants experienced the emotion
induction
(described in the next paragraph). They then completed two
blocks of
45 data-collection trials each, received a second round of the
emotion
induction, and finally completed two more blocks of 45 data-
collection
trials (total of 180 critical trials).
Emotion Induction. The emotion-induction task was introduced
as a

study of people’s memories. Participants were asked to write in
detail
about an autobiographical event from the past that had made
them
very angry, very sad, or emotionally neutral (control condition).
The
duration of the initial writing task was 4 min. Participants were
told
that they would have an opportunity later to continue writing
about
their memory. In the second round of the induction procedure,
par-
ticipants were told to continue writing from where they had left
off for
another 2 min.
4
Emotion Manipulation Check. Emotional states were assessed
using
5-point adjective rating scales known to tap sadness and anger
(DeSteno et al., 2000). The anger subscale consisted of angry,
an-
noyed, frustrated, and irritated (a 5 .90). The sadness subscale
con-
sisted of sad, gloomy, and down (a 5 .91).

Procedure
Participants arrived at the lab for what they thought was an
experi-
ment on people’s personalities. They first completed the
minimal-
group assignment task, which they believed to be a measure
designed
to determine their personality type. Immediately following this
ma-
nipulation, participants completed the evaluative priming task,
which
served as a measure of their automatic attitudes toward the
ingroup
and outgroup. This task was introduced as a measure of ‘‘hand-
eye
coordination’’ that was allegedly necessary to serve as a
baseline
because of individual differences in people’s speed of
responding to
visually presented stimuli. As noted earlier, the emotion
induction was
embedded before the first and again before the third data-
collection
blocks of this priming task. After the priming task, participants

completed an emotion-manipulation check and were debriefed.
All
data were collected and instructions and stimuli presented via
com-
puter using MediaLab (Jarvis, 2002) and Inquisit (Draine,
2000).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check
The emotion manipulations were successful in producing the
expected
3 (emotion-induction condition) � 2 (emotion rating)
interaction, F(2,
85) 5 15.04, p < .001. That is, participants in the angry
condition
reported more anger (M53.32) than sadness (M52.57),
t(30)53.01,
p < .01, d 5 0.54; participants in the sad condition reported
more
sadness (M 5 3.28) than anger (M 5 2.36), t(24) 5 3.35, p < .01,
d 5 0.67. Neutral participants reported low levels of both
emotions
(Msadness 5 1.40, Manger 5 1.53).
Automatic Attitudes Toward Social Groups

A 3 (emotion) � 2 (prime) � 2 (target) mixed analysis of
variance
revealed that the experience of specific emotional states
differentially
influenced automatic attitudes toward the target groups, as
indicated
by the three-way interaction, F(2, 85)52.50, p5 .08 (see Fig. 1).
5
A
Prime � Target interaction emerged among angry participants,
in-
dicating that, as predicted, the outgroup became a strongly
valenced
attitude object, F(1, 30)54.95, p5 .03, d50.57.
6
More specifically,
angry participants were slower to associate positive attributes
than
negative attributes with the outgroup, t(30)52.35, p5 .03,
d50.42.
There was no difference in the speed with which they associated
positive versus negative attributes with the ingroup (t < 1),
indicating
a neutral evaluative stance toward this group. Moreover, as
expected,

no intergroup bias (i.e., Prime � Target interaction) emerged
for
neutral or sad participants (Fs < 1.3). These data suggest that
anger
exerted a functional influence on automatic attitudes and, in so
doing,
created automatic prejudice where none had previously existed.
However, before placing confidence in this finding, we wanted
to at-
tempt a cross-method replication, especially given that the
omnibus
test of the three-way interaction did not reach the conventional
level
of statistical significance.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment, we used a different measure to assess the
effect of
emotion on automatic attitudes—the Implicit Association Test
(IAT).
We used the IAT for two reasons. First, it provided the
opportunity to
conduct a cross-method validation of the findings of Experiment
1.
Evaluative priming and the IAT share several commonalities:

(a) Both
tasks assume that if an attitude object evokes a particular
evaluation,
it will facilitate responses to stimuli that are evaluatively
congruent
versus neutral or incongruent, and (b) both tasks interpret
response
facilitation as a measure of the strength of association between
the
object and attribute (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992;
4
To avoid confounding the anger induction with the priming of
information
related to intergroup conflict, we screened participants’
responses for memories
that were intergroup in nature. None of the memories involved
intergroup
themes; all were interpersonal.
5
Analyses involving response latencies were conducted using
log-trans-
formed values to normalize the distributions. For easier
interpretation, how-
ever, we present descriptive statistical information using the
millisecond
metric.

6
We were agnostic about whether increased intergroup bias
would be driven
by less positivity or greater negativity toward the outgroup.
Previous work on
automatic prejudice in particular, and automatic evaluations in
general, has
typically relied on the existence of significant Prime � Target
interactions, as
opposed to absolute comparisons of response latencies across
different types of
trials, to indicate the existence of an evaluative bias because
such individual
comparisons can be compromised by confounding factors that
differentially
influence responses to specific types of stimuli (see Bargh,
Chaiken, Govender,
& Pratto, 1992; Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002;
Fazio et al.,
1995; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Klauer, Rossnagel, & Musch,
1997).
Volume 15—Number 5 321
D. DeSteno et al.
Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000; Fazio,
Sanbonmatsu,

Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998).
However, there are procedural differences between these two
tasks.
Thus, replicating Experiment 1 using the IAT would
demonstrate the
robustness of the predicted effect. Second, some data suggest
that
compared with priming techniques, the IAT may be more
sensitive to
individual and group differences and somewhat more reliable
across
time (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). We therefore
expected
that this task might be better able to capture the predicted
pattern of
emotion-induced moderation of intergroup bias.
Method
Participants
Eighty-one students (51 females, 30 males) participated in this
ex-
periment in partial fulfillment of requirements for a psychology
course.

Procedure and Measures
The procedure and measures used were identical to those of
Experi-
ment 1 with two exceptions: Automatic attitudes were assessed
using
an IAT instead of evaluative priming, and participants’ self-
reported
attitudes toward the ingroup and outgroup were also measured
to
ensure the success of the minimal-group manipulation.
In the IAT task, participants first completed three practice
blocks
during which they categorized four types of stimuli (pictures
rep-
resenting in- and outgroup members and positive and negative
words) using two designated response keys. Specifically,
participants
classified (a) valenced words for 20 trials, (b) pictures of in-
and
outgroup members for another 20 trials, and then (c) all four
types of
stimuli simultaneously (20 trials). These practice tasks were
coun-

terbalanced such that half the participants learned to categorize
ingroup and good stimuli using the same key and outgroup and
bad
stimuli using a different key. The remaining participants learned
the
opposite stimulus pairing. Participants then completed the first
round
of emotion induction, which was followed by a data-collection
block
of the IAT that was identical to the last practice block, only
longer
(50 trials).
Next, additional practice was given so that participants could
learn
to categorize stimuli in the combination opposite to what they
had
learned before. During this practice, they first classified
pictures of in-
versus outgroup members using response keys opposite to those
they
had used previously (20 trials). Next, they classified all four
types of
stimuli simultaneously such that, for example, those participants

who
had previously paired ingroup with good and outgroup with bad
learned to associate ingroup with bad and outgroup with good
(20
trials). Participants then completed another round of emotion
induc-
tion to reinstantiate their feeling state, followed by a second
data-
collection block of the IAT (50 trials). Next, participants
reported their
attitudes toward the groups using a five-item, 7-point semantic
dif-
ferential scale (unintelligent-intelligent, bad-good, unpleasant-
pleas-
ant, dishonest-honest, awful-nice); their responses were
averaged into
a single attitudinal index (a5.87). Participants’ emotional states
were
assessed at the end as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks
The emotion manipulations were successful, as indicated by the
Emotion Induction � Emotion Rating interaction, F(2, 79) 5

13.14,
p < .001. Participants in the sad condition reported more
sadness
(M 5 3.63) than anger (M 5 2.98), t(25) 5 2.89, p < .01, d 5
0.57;
participants in the angry condition reported more anger (M 5
3.64)
than sadness (M 5 3.21), t(27) 5 2.46, p 5 .02, d 5 0.46. Neutral
Fig. 1. Reaction time in the evaluative priming task (Experiment
1) as a function of emotion, prime, and
target. Error bars represent standard errors.
participants reported low levels of both emotions (Msadness 5
1.57,
Manger 5 2.05).
Analysis of participants’ self-reported attitudes verified the
success
of the group-assignment procedure. As in previous minimal-
group

research, participants reported more positive attitudes toward
their
ingroup (M54.90) than their outgroup (M54.46), F(1, 79)511.21,
p 5 .001, d 5 0.75.
7
Automatic Attitudes Toward Social Groups
Automatic attitudes were measured as the differential speed
with
which participants classified outgroup with good stimuli and
ingroup
with bad stimuli compared with the reverse combinations; larger
difference scores correspond to stronger bias against the
outgroup
relative to the ingroup. Participants’ emotional states
differentially
biased their intergroup evaluations, F(1, 79) 5 4.03, p < .05, d 5
0.54.
8
As shown in Figure 2, only participants in the angry condition
showed strong automatic prejudice against the outgroup and
relative
preference for the ingroup, t(27)53.32, p < .01; those in the sad
and

neutral conditions showed no intergroup bias (both ts < 1).
Further
analyses revealed that the interaction effect was driven by
slower
responses to outgroup 1 good/ingroup 1 bad classifications for
par-
ticipants in the angry condition compared with those in the
neutral
and sad conditions, F(1, 79) 5 3.91, p 5 .05. Response latencies
for
ingroup 1 good/outgroup 1 bad classifications did not differ
signifi-
cantly across emotion conditions (F < 1). Thus, as in
Experiment 1,
anger created automatic outgroup bias where none had
previously
existed.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Using different measures of automatic attitudes, two
experiments
support our contention that incidental feelings of anger can
create
automatic prejudice against outgroups. Because this effect was

not
produced by a different negative emotion that is functionally
less
relevant to intergroup cognition (e.g., sadness), the results are
in-
consistent with a simple valence-based interpretation of
emotional
bias. We believe that anger, because of its basic association
with in-
tergroup competition and conflict, evoked a psychological
readiness to
evaluate outgroups negatively vis-à-vis ingroups, thus creating
an
automatic prejudice against the outgroup from thin air. To our
knowledge, the present findings stand as the first evidence that
spe-
cific emotions are capable of shaping people’s automatic
evaluations
toward social groups in accordance with their functional value.
In everyday life, anger-induced psychological readiness is
likely to
prepare one to deal rapidly with possible aggression or resource
competition. Although the exact mechanism underlying this

exacer-
bation of prejudice remains unknown at present, we speculate
that it
is likely to involve the activation of emotion-specific action
tenden-
cies and the accompanying cascade of physiological and
psycholog-
ical sequelae that result from the occurrence of specific
emotional
states (cf. Frijda, 1986; LeDoux, 1996). Given this functional
view, it
seems plausible that the ability of extant emotional states to
bias
automatic evaluation may not be limited to intergroup
cognition, but
may occur for many types of automatic appraisals. Emotions, in
each
case, might function to shunt automatic appraisals toward goal-
spe-
cific outcomes.
It is important to note, however, that anger may not be the only
negative emotion that can influence automatic attitudes toward
known

social groups. Although anger is a fundamental emotion
associated
with intergroup conflict, it is clear that negative feelings toward
dif-
ferent outgroups do indeed vary in emotional tone. Envy, fear,
disgust,
or some other negative emotion may be a salient component of
an
individual’s phenomenological experience with a specific
outgroup,
depending on that outgroup’s power, status, or other qualities in
re-
lation to the perceiver’s ingroup (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Thus,
an
important goal of future research is to determine if other
discrete
emotions associated with specific groups can alter automatic
attitudes
toward those groups even when these emotions are evoked by an
unrelated source. At present, however, the current findings
extend
previous research on the interplay between emotion and
intergroup
relations into a new realm by providing evidence that emotions

are
capable of shaping automatic attitudes relevant to one of the
central
adaptive challenges in contemporary society—negotiating
intergroup
interactions.
Acknowledgments—This research was supported by National
Sci-
ence Foundation Grants BCS-0109105 and BCS-0109898.
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/Downsample16BitImages true
/FlattenerPreset <<
/PresetSelector /MediumResolution
>>
/FormElements false
/GenerateStructure false
/IncludeBookmarks false
/IncludeHyperlinks false
/IncludeInteractive false
/IncludeLayers false
/IncludeProfiles false
/MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings
/Namespace [
(Adobe)
(CreativeSuite)
(2.0)
]
/PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK
/PreserveEditing true
/UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged
/UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile
/UseDocumentBleed false
>>
]
>> setdistillerparams
<<

/HWResolution [1200 1200]
/PageSize [612.000 792.000]
>> setpagedevice

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