Generalized Intuition vs Analysis Index

Runninghead:GENERALIZEDINTUITIONALVERSUSANALYTICAL
Generalized Intuitional versus Analytical Decision Making Index
Shontell B. Verwayne
Stetson University
Author Note
Shontell B. Verwayne, Department of Psychology, Stetson University
I would like to sincerely thank Professor D. Cochran and Professor A. Blum for all their
guidance throughout the production of my project and paper.
Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to:
Shontell B. Verwayne, Department of Psychology, Stetson University
E-mail: sverwayn@stetson.edu.

GENERALIZED INTUITIONALVERSUSANALYTICAL
Abstract
This paper explores the development of brief scales for measuring the extent to which
individuals prefer analytical or intuitional decision-making styles. The intuitional and analytical
scale will come together to create the Generalized Intuitional versus Analytical Decision-making
Index (GIADMI). In creating the two measures I look at reliability and validity of both of the
scales. In order to prove construct validity I combined my test with other test into a packet,
which also included other types of questionnaires (i.e. demographic). So the packet also included
the Alternate Uses Test (Guilford, 1976), the Planfulness Test (CPI, Gough, 1996), the
Rosenberg Self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965), the Capacity for Love Test (VIA: Cap, Peterson
and Seligman, 2004), the Talkativeness Test (AB5C: I+/IV-, Hofstee, de Raad, and Goldberg,
1992), and the Attractiveness Test (Big-7: 525, Saucier, 1997). The data showed that the
Analytical and Intuitive scale appeared to be reliable. A factor analysis revealed two factors
resulting in the discarding of some of the analytical and intuitional items. However, the
correlation between the two scales was very low. Furthermore, the two scales showed different
patterns of correlations with other measures and suggested some degree of construct validity.
The Intuitional scale was predicted to show higher correlations with creativity, self-esteem,
perceptions of attractiveness and capacity for love which involve more subjectivity. The
Analytical scale showed lower correlations with the other measures but showed an unexpected
significant negative correlation with Planfulness. The results of the study suggest that the
Intuitional scale might be a useful research instrument providing a brief, reliable measure of
intuitive thinking style. However, the Analytical scale needs further refinement to improve its
validity even though its reliability seems to be adequate.
Keywords: intuition, analytical, decision-making, preference

Generalized Intuitional versus Analytical Decision Making Index
Many believe intuition is an irrational way of thinking and should not be trusted in daily
decision-making. Nevertheless, lately there has been much more of a focus on intuition as a
viable method of decision-making. According to Grauer (2014), intuition can provide thought
processes that we may not be able to justify or verify through practical means. However, despite
the fact that more and more researchers are studying the concept of intuition, there is a scarcity
of empirical research looking in on the circumstances in which intuitive decision-making is
effective compared to analytical decision-making (Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012). According
to Boundless’s article, “Analytical Mindset” (2014), analytical decision-making is the ability to
see a problem whether it be simple or challenging, express what it is the problem is, and then
solve the problem efficiently based on available information. According to Lennart Sjöberg
(2003), decisions are crucial in many kinds of action; some would regard them as the most
important factor. But viewing decisions as the major motivation to action is questionable.
Emotions and other factors often guide action and decision-making, and in many real-life
situations it becomes necessary to cope with such things after a decision has been taken, and to
continue doing so for some time in the face of unforeseen complications and difficulties.
While there is currently not a great deal of research on making a scale that measures
intuitional or analytical decision-making or what kind of people prefer to use intuitional
decision-making styles or analytical decision-making styles, there are many studies about each
one as well as their differences. One such study, carried out by Thompson and Marsanyi (2012),
showed because intuition, which is produced by Type 1 processes, is effortless those making
their decision to feel confident in the decision. However, this effortlessness is not well aligned
with objective difficulty, causing the decision to be of poor quality despite how confident the

decision maker is in their choice. The researcher came to this conclusion by looking into fluency
of retrieval versus content of the answer, the fluency heuristics as a guide to confidence, fluency
and accuracy, the affective basis of the fluency heuristic, the fluency heuristic as inference,
fluency, feelings of righteousness (FOR), and control of Type 2 thinking, fluency and reasoning
biases. In the end they concluded that affective states, caused by fluency, lead individuals to
create FOR. This FOR makes intuitional judgments hard to ignore, even when this sense of
confidence has little to do with the quality of our judgment.
Another study, by Cassoti, Houde, Habib, Poirel, Aite, and Moutier (2012), showed that a
positive emotional context can decrease loss aversion and reinforced a well-researched idea that
the framing effect emanates from an affective heuristic, which is a part of the intuitive Type 1
processing. The experimenter came to this conclusion by having participants (n=57) engage in a
computerized decision-making task in which they were given monopoly like money. The
participants were told to choose between a gamble and a sure option. Different participant saw
different types of frames: a gain frame where if the participant was setback by any amount of
money it would show “You keep …” or a loss frame where if the participant was setback by any
amount of money it would show “You lose …” As a result of this experiment there were three
major findings: framing effected both the control group (no emotional context) and the negative
emotional context group, framing effected the positive emotional group, however this
disappeared once the positive emotional context was presented, and finally positive emotional
context did not encourage risk-taking generally, it did however decrease risk predilection in the
loss frame. This study demonstrated that a positive emotional context can have a significant
impact on decision-making.

More research on how emotion affects decision-making was done by Dunn, Galton,
Morgan, Evans, Oliver, Meyer, Cusack, Lawrence, and Dlagleish (2010). Not only did they
focus on emotion and decision-making, but they also looked at the heart in conjunction to
emotion. Dunn, et al. conducted two studies, one in which they correlated a participants ability to
track their heartbeat with their subjective arousal ratings of emotional images. The other study
expanded on the first by linking interception ability to the hindrance or assistance of adaptive
intuitive decision-making in reference to expected bodily signals. The researchers found that the
more participants were able to sense autonomic changes, such as an increase or decrease in
heartbeat, the more participants were able to link them to arousal experiences. Furthermore, the
researchers were also able to conclude that an absence of emotion, which can be caused by
frontal head injury, may lead to superior decision-making. Whereas an elevated sense of
interoceptive awareness can lead to anxiety.
Although Menzel (2013) also discusses emotions impact on decision-making, unlike the
other three researchers she discusses how this can lead to unsustainable decision-making and
then offers up solutions to provide sustainable decision-making. Menzel suggests four
explanations for why Type 1 and Type 2 processing can lead to unsustainable decision-making.
The first explanation is that intuitional decision-making causes people to make decisions that
may not be good for their environment because the desire can be so strong that sustainable
decision-making becomes unimportant. The second explanation is that intuitional decision-
making based off of societal acceptance causes people to not care to make sustainable choices if
society does not have a positive view of it. The third explanation is based on analytical
evaluations of alternative. Fundamentally, people choose less sustainable behaviors if there is a
higher pay-off. The fourth explanation is that, although emotions increase sustainable decision-

making, cognition may override those feelings in order to accomplish a goal causing a person to
engage in less sustainable decision-making. Menzel describes solutions to these complications in
which sustainable decision-making are hindered. She believes that fostering pro-sustainable
emotions, limiting the promotion of counter-sustainable intuitions, and questioning strong
contra-sustainable reasoning would lead to an increase of sustainable decision-making.
A study that focused more one analytical decision making was done by Robbins (2011).
Robbins discusses analytical thinking in classroom settings, where she seeks to correct
ineffective approaches to encouraging analytical thinking such as problem solving and reasoning.
The ineffective approaches Robbins lists are: open-ended questions, having teachers show
students how they would solve a problem and/or giving out sample solutions, having students
solve problems up on the board. The issues with these approaches is that students receive little
feedback on the process, teachers know too much as a result they do not struggle in the same
way as students therefore they don’t demonstrate the problem solving process, and student’s
didn’t learn anything from watching other student solve a problem because not everyone would
use the same approach, respectively. Robbins answer to the ineffective approaches in teaching
analytical thinking in schools was a modified version of Thinking Aloud Pair Problem Solving,
in which students are paired together each alternating between listener and speaker.
Another study on analytical thinking would by Betsch and Held (2012). They suggest
that analytical decisions are made through two different modes, RUN and JUMP. They describe
RUN mode as a process in which thought is focused on directing the process of a decision
strategy. They describe JUMP mode as the process in which an individual analyzes the
explanation of the decision situation as well as the suitability of alternate tactics. Furthermore,

they suggest that decisions can be considered rational if a person is capable of switching between
these two modes and balance the interaction between the JUMP and RUN mode.
A study that focused more one intuitional decision making was done by Dane,
Rockmann, and Pratt (2012), where they investigated conditions in which intuitive decision-
making is effective relative to analytical decision-making. Dane et al. conducted two
experiments in which they attempted to evaluate the link between domain expertise (low versus
high) with intuitive decision-making effectiveness. In the first experiment they looked at
basketball and in the second experiment they looked at handbag authentication. As a result they
found that the higher the domain expertise the more effective intuitional decision-making
becomes. The practical implications of the findings are that there are certain situations in which a
person should take stock of their intuition, however if a person lacks domain expertise trusting
their gut may not be a sensible idea.
A similar conducted by Cavojova and Hanak (2014). Cavojova and Hanak conducted two
experiments in which they attempted to evaluate the link between domain expertise (low versus
high) with intuitive decision-making effectiveness on information search, as well as the effects of
manipulation on information search. In the first experiment they looked at intuition and
information search under time stress versus no time stress and in the second experiment they
looked at intuition and information search in intuitive versus rational condition. The finding
showed that by inducing time stress or telling participants to think intuitively, information search
was negatively effected more so than a individuals preference for intution. Also they concluded
that intutional decision makers do not seem to look for less information than deliberative people,
unless non-experts were in intutive situations.

Another study on was conducted by Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005), where they research
intuition which they defined as “a non-sequential information-processing mode, which comprises
both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct knowing without any use of conscious
reasoning (p. 353).” In their research they examined way in which to measure intuitional
decision-making. In their research, Sinclair and Ashkanasy found four measures that evaluated
intuition: Intuitive Management Survey, International Survey on Intuition, Rational-Experiential
Inventory, and the Intuitive Profile. However, none of the listed measures comprehensively
evaluated intuition. Sinclair and Ashkanasy believes a comprehensive measure if intuition would
include separate scales for intuition and analytical decision-making.
Betsch and Glockner (2010), researched intuition in order to support their claim that
intuition is capable of rapidly processing a bunch of information without perceptible cognitive
effort. Furthermore they believe that intuition arises when the decision is about a preference or
choice. Whereas analytic thinking arises when the decision deals with searching, generation, and
change of information. After a thorough empirical research, Betsch and Glockner found that their
claims were supported.
Sauter (1999) discusses how decision makers use intuition and implications for decision
support systems. Sauter believed that as individual, particularly managers, became more
experienced in their field they begin to internalize certain activities until it becomes automatic.
An example that I incurred during school were teachers and lesson plans. According to many of
the professors at Stetson University and teachers at Citrus Grove Elementary, writing a lesson
plan gets easier until it become like second nature. Sauter also claims that intuition can stimulate
innovation; however this innovation can cause managers to become bored with routine, details
and repetition. Sauter claims that because apprenticeships are not happening any longer

employees do not have the experience to gain intuitional decision-making skills they did in the
past. However, Sauter notes that intuitional decision-making is becoming an increasingly
important to being a manager. In order to generate intuitional decision-making skills decision
support systems (DSS) can be created to provide intuition models that support, encourage, verify
intuitional decision-making.
The present study focused on developing the GIADMI, which would provide a useful
measure of people’s decision-making style, whether that is intuitive or analytical. The GIADMI
originally had 13-items in which respondents used a 6-point rating scale (6=Strongly Agree,
5=Agree, 4= Somewhat Agree, 3= Somewhat Disagree, 2=Disagree, 1=Strongly Disagree).
There were six items that modeled an analytical approach to decision-making and seven items
that modeled an intuitional approach. Examples of items that indicated a strong preference to
analytical decision-making were: “I have to make a pros and cons list in order to feel like I am
making the right choice”, “My friends and family often say that I am calculated”, and “I believe
that people shouldn't make decisions based off of their ‘gut’”. Examples of items the indicated a
strong preference to intuitional decision-making are: “If I feel like something is right”, “I usually
go with that feeling”, “My friends and family often say that I am insightful”, and “I often feel as
if I have a ‘Sixth Sense’”. I used a factor analysis in order to prove that my items relate to either
intuitional or analytical decision-making as it should. I then looked at the dependability of my
test by conducting a reliability analysis. In order to prove my test validity, I used convergent
validity and discriminate validity. For these two types of validity I cross-referenced my test with
already well-established tests. These tests includes the Alternate Uses Test (Guilford, 1976), the
Planfulness Test (CPI: Ac, Gough, 1996), the Rosenberg Self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965)
the Capacity for love test (VIA: Cap, Peterson and Seligman, 2004), the Talkativeness Test

(AB5C: I+/IV-, Hofstee, de Raad, and Goldberg, 1992), and the Attractiveness Test (Big-7: 525,
Saucier, 1997). I hoped prove predictive validity by looking at different majors with the hopes to
show what kind of people fit in to the analytical decision-making style and the intuitional
decision-making style. For my subject pool I looked at different demographics such as sex, race,
and degree type (i.e. Bachelors of Science or Bachelors of Arts). I proved my tests content
validity through the use of the Lawshe (1975) method. The Lawshe method refers to raters or
judges regarding how essential a particular item is. I did this by enquiring fellow classmates in
my Senior Research class as well as my professor, Dr. Carl Cochran opinion on my test items.
Although, the purpose of the present study was to create the GIADMI, making it a useful
research instrument in the future, I also wanted to observe what kind of people scored in a
particular way. So, it was hypothesized that those who claimed to be pursuing a Bachelor in Arts
would score higher on the intuitional scale than those who were pursuing a Bachelor in Business.
Likewise, it was hypothesized that those who claimed to be pursuing a Bachelor in Business
would score higher on the analytical scale than those who were pursuing a Bachelor in Arts. I
then looked at other demographics, such as race, religiosity, GPA, participation in certain
activities and/or groups, etc. Consequently, I hypothesized that any idea or attitude, group, and/or
activity that would cause a person to externalize their feelings, responsibility, and/or locus of
control would lead to a higher intuitional score. Likewise it was hypothesized that any idea or
attitude, group, and/or activity that would cause a person to internalize their feelings,
responsibility, and/or locus of control would lead to a higher analytical score.

Method
Participants
The participants consisted of college undergraduates (37 females, 12 males, N= 49)
attending Stetson University and enrolled either psychology courses or business courses.
Although 70 students attended the study, there was an error in data collection; therefore, only 51
individuals’ information was gathered. The participants were asked to participate in exchange for
required credit in their respective courses if they were psychology major. As for the business
majors their teacher extra credit for completing the survey. The individuals ranged from 18-22
years of age, with M= 19. The mean age of females was M= 19.73, with SD= 1.07, while the
mean age of males was M= 18.54, with SD= .69. The participant pool was 66.7% Caucasian,
5.9% African-American, 2.0% Asian, 13.7% Hispanic, 7.8% Bi-racial, and 2.0% Other.
Materials
For this experiment I created a packet that included the Generalized Intuitional versus
Analytical Decision-Making Index (GIADMI), which is the test I created to provide a measure of
people’s decision-making style by identifying an individual’s preference for intuitive or
analytical decision-making. This test contained 13 items (Table 1) at the moment the survey was
presented to the participants. Of the thirteen items that were originally created for the GIADMI
test six of them were meant to be analytical and seven of them were meant to be intuitional
In addition to my test the packet included six other tests. One of those six tests was that
Alternate Uses Test (1976). In this test participants were given five household items, such as
paper clip, Q-tip, and tennis ball. The participants were told to list as many applications of each
item as they could. Another test was the Planfulness Test (1996). For this test participants were

instructed to rate where they stood with each item by using a five point Likert scale, where 5 was
“Strongly Agree” and 1 was “Strongly Disagree”. A few examples of the Planfulness test items
are, “I stick to my chosen path”, “I choose my words with care”, “I don't bother to make an
effort”, and “I come up with unworkable plans”. An additional test that was included in the
packet was the Rosenberg Self-esteem scale (1965). In this test participants were also instructed
to rate where they stood with each item by using a five point Likert scale, where 5 was “Very
Often” and 1 was “Never”. A few examples of the Rosenberg Self-esteem scale items are, “On
the whole, I am satisfied with myself”, “At times I think I am no good at all”, “I feel that I have
a number of good qualities”, and “I feel I do not have much to be proud of”. Another test that
was included in the packet was the Capacity for love test (2004). This test also instructed the
participants to rate where they stood with each item by using a five point Likert scale, where 5
was “Highly Probable” and 1 was “Highly Improbable”. A few examples of the Capacity to Love
test items are, “I am willing to take risks to establish a relationship”, “I know that there are
people in my life who care as much for me as for themselves”, “I feel isolated from other
people”, and “I have difficulty accepting love from anyone”. An additional test that was in the
packet is the Talkativeness Test (1992). Once again the test was rates on a 5 point Likert scale,
where 5 was “Very Often” and 1 was “Never”. A few examples of the Talkativeness test items
are, “I do most of the talking”, “I make myself the center of attention”, “I speak softly”, and “I
dislike talking about myself”. The final test that was included in the packet is the Attractiveness
Test (1997). Once again the test was rates on a 5 point Likert scale, where 5 was “Very Often”
and 1 was “Never”. A few examples of the Talkativeness test items are, “I keep myself well-
groomed”, “I like to tidy up”, “I know that I am not a special person”, and “I don't like to get
dressed up”. These tests were added to prove that the Generalized Intuitional vs. Analytical

Decision-making Index had convergent and discriminant validity. I also added at the beginning
of the packet some demographical questions, such as age, sex, birth order, activities, etc. The
purpose of those questions was to look for some predictive validity that my test can provide.
Procedure
The participants were given the survey packet in a group setting (in a classroom) on the
Stetson campus. They were informed that participation is voluntary and their answers would
remain anonymous. Either I or their professor administered the survey and answered whatever
questions that the participants had. The participants were given just about 10-15 minutes to
complete the packet and turn it in to either their professor or myself.
Results
A factor analysis was run in order to isolate the factors that the items fell into. The factor
analysis revealed two factors resulting in the analytical and intuitional items shown in Tables 1
and 2. A reliability analysis was also run. The Analytical scale had a mean of 7.33 (SD = 2.94)
and appeared reliable with coefficient Alpha = .78. Similarly, the Intuitive scale was reliable
(Coefficient Alpha = .72) and had a mean of 25.33 (SD = 4.78).
A bivariate analysis was run to look at the correlation between the two scales, Intuitional
and Analytical, as well as look in to the construct validity of the test. The correlation between the
two scales was very low (r = .03). This low correlation shows that the two scales tests for two
different measures. This indicates that, according to the GIADMI data, intuition and analytical
thinking are not on the same spectrum, but rather are two distinct functions by themselves. Also,
the two scales showed different patterns of correlations with other measures and suggested some
degree of construct validity. The Intuitional scale was predicted to show higher correlations with

creativity, self-esteem, perceptions of attractiveness and capacity for love which involve more
subjectivity. As Table 3 indicates, these predictions were supported except for the correlation
with creativity (Alternative Uses). The Analytical scale showed lower correlations with the
other measures but showed an unexpected significant negative correlation with Planfulness.
Another bivariate correlation was conducted with hopes to find correlations between
attitudes, types of personalities, majors, etc. and either the intuitional or the analytical scale.
These finding would give some insight on what kind of people show more of a preference
towards intuitional decision-making or analytical decision-making. Although there were some
interesting findings, many of the significant correlations corresponded with societal stereotypes.
As seen on Table 4 and Table 5, the analytical scale significantly correlated with Greek
Membership (r = -.478, p = .001) and the intuitional scale significantly correlated with Race (r =
.318, p = .023) and Religiosity (r = -.294, p = .036). Essentially, the data points to the fact that
those who claim to be a part of fraternity or sorority scored higher on the analytical scale.
Furthermore, those who claimed a race that was not “White” tended to score higher on the
intuitional scale. In accordance to that, those who recorded a higher score on religiosity also
scored higher on the intuitional scale.
The Big Five Personality Traits was another factor that was analyzed in consideration of
figuring out what type of people how more of a preference towards intuitional decision-making
or analytical decision-making. As seen on Table 6 and Table 7, both the analytical scale and
intuitional scale significantly correlated with Extraversion (r = .429, p = .002 and r = .405, p =
.003, respectively). However the analytical scale significantly correlated with Neuroticism (r = -
.400, p = .004) and Conscientiousness (r = -.360, p = .009). Essentially, the data points to the fact
that those who claim to be an extraverted scored high on both the analytical and intuitional scale.

Furthermore, those who did not consider themselves to be neurotic or conscientious tended to
score higher on the analytical scale.
Discussion
The data supported the hypothesis that the Generalized Intuitional versus Analytical Decision-
making Index was both valid and reliable. However, based off of the data the analytical scale
was not valid because it did not match up with the convergent and discriminant tests as expected.
This may be due to a limitation of the study, discussed below.
The outcome of this study suggests that the intuitional scale might be a useful research
instrument providing a brief, reliable measure of intuitive thinking style. This has intriguing
implications for every field in which human decision-making is used, as well as psychological
and sociological studies on decision-making. The results of the study could be applied to the
relationships between a person’s belief system, grouping (i.e. race, birth order, Greek life, etc.),
and whether they prefer intuitional decision-making styles or analytical decision-making styles.
There are several limitations to the current study. Due to the small sample size and the
skew towards females, the pool of participants may not be representative of a larger population.
In addition, many of the individuals who took the questionnaire did not answer some of the
questions. There was also the fact that for the business students I was not able to give them the
questionnaire myself. This opens up a few problems, the first being that the testing environment
was different. The second being that the business students may have needed some clarification
that, due to my absence, they did not get.
As not much research has been done on the differentiation of who is more intuitional
versus who is more analytical relatively little is known about its influence in everyday life, this
study may help to open the door for further scientific inquiries in this realm of human cognition.

Continued research of this phenomenon may adjust different aspects of the study, such as the
number of participants. It may be that with a larger representative sample size the analytical scale
may actually show that is not only reliable but valid as well. Also, a larger representative sample
may show trends in what groups of people prefer intuitional or analytical decision-making styles.
A reworking of the study could include changes to the analytical items in hopes to find one that
are more fitting and will be valid. This could provide insights into the nature of what kinds of
people lean more to intuitional decision-making and what kinds of people lean more towards
analytical decision-making.

References
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https://www.boundless.com/business/textbooks/boundless-business-
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Table 1. Items of Original Generalized Intuitional versus Analytical Decision Making Test
Items
1. I find it too risky to not analyze my choices.
2. I often feel as though I make a checklist of things in my head and/or on paper when
making decisions
3. It’s best to wait until I have all of the facts.
4. If I don’t feel in my heart that a decision is correct, I will usually go with my instinct.
5. My first instincts are usually right.
6. Trusting our instinct often saves us from disaster.
7. I often feel as if I have a “Sixth Sense”.
8. If I feel like something is right, I usually go with that feeling.
9. My friends and family often say that I am insightful.
10. I believe that people shouldn’t make decisions based off of their “gut”
11. Making a pros and cons list has always been a tedious act for me
12. My friends and family often say that I am calculated
13. I have to make a pros and cons list in order to feel like I am making the right choice

Table 1. Items of Analytical Part of the Test with Item Total Correlation
Items Inter-Total
Correlations
1. I find it too risky to not analyze my choices. .550
2. I often feel as though I make a checklist of things in my head and/or
on paper when making decisions
.615
3. It’s best to wait until I have all of the facts. .615

Table 2. Items of Intuitional Part of the Test with Item Total Correlation
Items Inter-Total
Correlations
14. If I don’t feel in my heart that a decision is correct, I will usually go
with my instinct.
.419
15. My first instincts are usually right. .457
16. Trusting our instinct often saves us from disaster. .413
17. I often feel as if I have a “Sixth Sense”. .600
18. If I feel like something is right, I usually go with that feeling. .410
19. My friends and family often say that I am insightful. .452

Table 3. Correlations between Analytical and Intuitional Test Scores and Other Measures
Related to Convergent and Discriminant Items
New Scales
Other Measures Analytical Intuitional
Alternate Uses Test .082 .011
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale -.039 .322*
Attractiveness -.153 .300*
Talkativeness .158 .129
Capacity for Love .056 .244
Planfulness -.271 -.088

Table 4. Correlations between Analytical and Intuitional Test Scores and Demographic
Information
New Scales
Analytical Intuitional
Race -.260 .318*
Religion -.091 -.294*
Age .197 -.016
Gender .69 .51
Birth Order .057 -.078
GPA -.288 .006

Table 5. Correlations between Analytical and Intuitional Test Scores and Different Groups
New Scales
Major .004 .054
Political Views -.076 .139
Greek Membership .186 -.478**
Class Standing .086 -.086

Table 6. Correlations between Analytical and Intuitional Test Scores and the Big Five
Personality Traits
New Scales
Openness of Experience .249 .259
Conscientiousness -.360** .018
Extraversion .429** .405*
Agreeableness .181 .051
Neuroticism -.400** -.212

Table 7. Factor Loadings of Analytical Items (loadings smaller than .40 are not reported)
Items Inter-Total
Correlations
1. I find it too risky to not analyze my choices. .766
2. I often feel as though I make a checklist of things in my head and/or
on paper when making decisions
.829
3. It’s best to wait until I have all of the facts. .848

Table 8. Factor Loadings of Intuitional Items (loadings smaller than .40 are not reported)
Items Factor
Loading
1. If I don’t feel in my heart that a decision is correct, I will usually go
with my instinct.
.609
2. My first instincts are usually right. .631
3. Trusting our instinct often saves us from disaster. .591
4. I often feel as if I have a “Sixth Sense”. .774
5. If I feel like something is right, I usually go with that feeling. .604
6. My friends and family often say that I am insightful. .654

Generalized Intuition vs Analysis Index

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