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1. Cooperation and Conflict
2014, Vol. 49(4) 464­–482
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836714530576
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State feminism going
global: Norway on the United
Nations Peacebuilding
Commission
Torunn L Tryggestad
Abstract
This article examines the role played by small states in the promotion or reinforcement of new
ideas and emerging norms within international society. More specifically, it examines the role
played by Norway in reinforcing the normative framework of ‘women, peace and security’, with
a particular view to Norway’s first period of membership in the United Nations Peacebuilding
Commission. Norway is regarded internationally as one of the lead countries in terms of
promoting women’s rights in relation to peace and security. The article discusses four possible
reasons that may explain Norway’s apparent suitability and effectiveness as a norm entrepreneur
in this particular issue-area.
Keywords
Norm entrepreneur, Norway, small states, state feminism, United Nations Peacebuilding
Commission, ‘women, peace and security’
Introduction
The role played by small states in the promotion or reinforcement of new ideas and
emerging norms within international society is an issue that has caught the attention of a
number of international relations scholars over the last couple of decades (Ingebritsen
et al., 2006). In lack of power relative to size and military capabilities, small states often
exercise issue-specific power. The Nordic countries are often chosen to exemplify how
small states can influence international agendas and world politics by adopting the role
of norm entrepreneur (Björkdahl, 2007b). In this article, I examine the role played by
Norway in reinforcing the normative framework of ‘women, peace and security’ (WPS),
with a particular view to Norway’s first period of membership in the United Nations
Corresponding author:
Torunn L Tryggestad, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), PO Box 9229 Grønland, 0134 Oslo, Norway.
Email: torunn@prio.no
530576CAC0010.1177/0010836714530576Cooperation and ConflictTryggestad
research-article2014
Article

2. Tryggestad 465
(UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Norway is regarded internationally as one of
the lead countries in terms of promoting women’s rights in relation to peace and security,
and I discuss here four possible reasons that may explain Norway’s apparent suitability
and effectiveness as a norm entrepreneur in this particular issue-area.
Firstly, Norway has a legacy of being a staunch supporter of both the UN and multi-
lateralism more generally. As a small state, Norway has a strong self-interest in promot-
ing ideas and norms that contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of international
law and order. The WPS agenda is seen as contributing to such a system maintenance.
Secondly, the welfare-state model that defines the structure of Norwegian society has
strongly influenced the country’s political visions as to how sustainable development,
social justice and peace can be achieved at the global level. The WPS agenda encom-
passes a set of norms on women’s rights that fit hand in glove with what is seen as
Norway’s normative state interests, and the UN has become the central organizational
arena for the promotion of these interests.
Thirdly, since the early 1990s, Norway has been able to operate successfully as a
norm entrepreneur on a wide range of issues related to conflict resolution and peace-
building because it enjoys a strong standing internationally and is regarded by many
countries of the global south as a neutral actor (having no history of colonialism), with
no obvious material or geopolitical agendas. Perceptions of neutrality, combined with a
donor policy characterized by relatively few strings attached, have given Norway an
opportunity to enter into dialogue with governments that from the outset may have been
sceptical of, or indifferent to, liberal normative agendas such as WPS. Yet, by virtue of
being a major donor, both multilaterally and bilaterally, Norway has the means to back-
stop normative agendas and policy priorities financially, which again provides Norway
with leverage, although perhaps not always explicitly recognized.1
Finally, civil society involvement is a key component of the Norwegian model for
development cooperation and foreign policy execution. While civil society collaboration
may not be exclusive to Norway, what is particular in the Norwegian model is the level
of institutionalization of such collaboration, as well as the broad domestic consensus
across political parties on the application of this collaboration as a Norwegian foreign
policy instrument. Close cooperation with both national and international non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, advocacy groups and individual experts –
often organized in transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) – has
become the rule rather than the exception. Rather than viewing civil society actors and
transnational advocacy networks with scepticism – as is often the case with many other
UN member states – Norway has taken advantage of their expertise and made them
implementing partners on issues of high priority to Norwegian foreign policy.2
Close collaboration between the state and civil society groups in developing machin-
eries and policies friendly to women’s rights has a particularly long tradition in Norway.
Helga Hernes (1987) first coined the concept ‘state feminism’, which refers to the inter-
play between civil society – specifically women’s organizations – and state institutions
in developing policies for gender equality in the Scandinavian countries. According to
Hernes, these policies were ‘a result of the interplay between agitation from below and
integration policy from above’ (Hernes, 1987: 11). At the global level similar strategies
have been pursued in setting WPS on the UN agenda, and bringing it to fruition with the

3. 466 Cooperation and Conflict 49(4)
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). The resolution was an out-
come of intense lobbying by international women’s organizations ‘from below’ in com-
bination with diplomacy ‘from above’ by individuals within the UN system and in a
small group of UN member states, including Norway (Tryggestad, 2009).
In this article, the above theses about Norway’s ability to act as a norm entrepreneur
are discussed in the context of and supported by a case study of Norway’s performance
during its time as co-chair of the UN PBC and chair of the latter’s Burundi country con-
figuration from June 2006 to July 2008. A founding member of the PBC, Norway was
well-placed to influence policy development and promote issues of particular concern to
Norwegian foreign policymakers, including the WPS agenda. In order to analyse how
this agenda was pursued and reinforced during the period of Norway’s PBC membership,
I have examined official documents from both the UN and the Norwegian government,
including resolutions, reports, action plans, speeches and press statements. Secondary
literature, such as books and NGO reports, has also been an important source of informa-
tion. In addition, a number of individuals centrally involved in the PBC deliberations
during the period in question have been interviewed. The narratives of my informants
proved to be important sources of data for capturing discussions and processes that took
place behind the scenes. My study also included an element of participant observation,
as I attended (as an observer) both meetings of the PBC and seminars organized by
NGOs (in New York) on the topic of women and peacebuilding in Burundi. However,
before outlining the empirical study in more detail, I will begin by providing a brief
introduction to the conceptual framework on which it is based.
Norm emergence and norm advocacy
A norm is generally defined as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a
given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). In explaining how norms influence
behaviour and policy change, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895) refer to a three-stage
process where norms in the first stage emerge, in the second stage cascade (or prolifer-
ates), before finally becoming internalized.At each stage you will typically find different
types of actors – or norm entrepreneurs – applying different kinds of strategies and meth-
ods to influence behaviour and policy change.
Realist theorists would argue that it takes a hegemonic state to set this process in
motion. Other states will then follow (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; Keohane and
Goldstein, 1993). Sikkink (1998) takes issue with the realist approach and claims that it
does not explain the origins of social purpose of hegemonic action. This is particularly
the case when it comes to the emergence of human rights norms. It could also be added
that the realist approach does not explain instances where norms emerge and cascade
without a hegemonic state in the lead. This has indeed been the case with the WPS
agenda, where hegemons have been followers rather than leaders (Klotz, 1995).
According to Sikkink (1998: 518), ‘Norms research suggests that the origins of many
international norms lie not in pre-existing state interests but in strongly held principled
ideas (ideas about right and wrong) and the desire to convert others to those ideas’. For
the Nordic countries ‘gender equality’ is one such principled idea they strongly believe
in promoting. However, states rarely operate on their own when it comes to norm

4. Tryggestad 467
promotion (Jolly et al., 2009; Weiss and Thakur, 2010). In their seminal book Activists
beyond Borders (1998), Keck and Sikkink show how transnational advocacy networks of
norm entrepreneurs inside governments, within international organizations and NGOs
are becoming increasingly influential in setting agendas and changing international poli-
tics, particularly on human rights issues. These advocacy networks have also played a
key role in setting the WPS agenda and promoting the proliferation of this normative
framework.
The normative framework of women, peace and security
For new norms to proliferate they need to be institutionalized in organizations with high
legitimacy (Elgström, 2000). The first step towards legitimization of the WPS agenda
was made when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 in October 2000.
The provisions of the resolution build on a set of norms related to women’s rights in the
social, political and economic spheres that are already acknowledged in international
legal instruments, such as the Human Rights Declaration (1966) and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979). Thus,
at the time of the adoption there was little principled disagreement as to the legitimacy
of women’s rights in general. What made Resolution 1325 groundbreaking, however,
was that women’s rights were now also to become an integral part of UN deliberations
on international peace and security (Tryggestad, 2009). The resolution calls for wom-
en’s full involvement in all UN peace and security activities, along with the main-
streaming of women’s interests and particular needs in peace negotiations, conflict
management and peacebuilding processes. By implication, women’s inclusion in such
processes and the integration of women’s issues and concerns in peace agreements,
strategy documents, operational programming and planning, as well as in budgeting for
various peace and security initiatives, is to become standard practice. The choice of
location for the lobbying and negotiation of this normative framework – the Security
Council – has proved to be very important for the proliferation of the WPS agenda
(Coleman, 2011).
In UN parlance, the provisions of Resolution 1325 are referred to as the ‘WPS agenda’
and are treated as a formal item on the Security Council’s agenda. The WPS agenda is
recognized and referred to as ‘a normative framework’ – or standard of behaviour – by a
steadily growing number of UN member states, actors within the UN system and NGOs
alike. As per September 2013, 43 UN member states have adopted national action plans
(NAPs) on the implementation of Resolution 1325, and a number of others are in the
process of doing so. Also, regional organizations, such as the European Union, the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and theAfrican Union, have all adopted implementation policies. However,
the WPS agenda is a normative framework that has not yet reached the final stage of the
Finnemore and Sikkink norm life-cycle, where it has been fully accepted and internal-
ized. It is still dependent on the support and mobilization of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ if it is
to be fully incorporated into strategic analysis, policy planning and operational activities.
In the context of its engagement in the UN PBC, Norway seized the opportunity and used
the power of being co-chair of the Commission and chair of the Burundi country

5. 468 Cooperation and Conflict 49(4)
configuration to advocate for the WPS agenda (for more on the ‘power of the chair’, see
Björkdahl, 2007a). This was a deliberate policy approach, one that enjoyed strong politi-
cal and financial backing. It also involved close cooperation with civil society actors,
both nationally and internationally. What Norway did as norm entrepreneur was not to
put a new issue on the agenda. Norway decided to take a norm that was in the making
and give it an extra push by bringing it to the forefront in PBC deliberations.
Norway and system support
Norway has a long tradition as a staunch supporter of the UN and its efforts to strengthen
international law and world order. The general sentiment among the majority of
Norwegian politicians – irrespective of party affiliation – has long been that small coun-
tries such as Norway are best served by a UN that is as strong and effective as possible
in protecting the interests of small states (Frydenlund, 1982; Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2012). Since the early 1970s, successive Norwegian governments have
promoted a series of UN reform initiatives – often as part of a Nordic block of member
states (De Carvalho and Schia, 2004). In addition, several prominent Norwegian politi-
cians have served in high-level UN positions, which have given them an opportunity to
influence organizational matters and policy processes.3
The strengthening of the UN through increased efforts at reform was a key element of
the Government Platform adopted by the Norwegian coalition government, which was in
office from October 2005 to October 2013. Accordingly, when the PBC was formally
launched in 2005 as a key UN reform initiative, it received the wholehearted support of
the Norwegian government (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, 2005). The
Norwegian government even envisaged a special role for itself in relation to peacebuild-
ing efforts. The Government Platform states that ‘Norway can play a more important role
in peace building than in other foreign policy areas, and Norway can strengthen this field
through a further systematisation of Norwegian initiatives and activities’ (Office of the
Prime Minister, 2007).
The PBC was established to fill a capacity gap within the UN system related to the
provision of assistance to countries in an immediate post-conflict transitional phase (UN
General Assembly, 2005; UN Security Council, 2005). The Commission was mandated,
among other things, to assist countries emerging from conflict to develop integrated strat-
egies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, and to strengthen the coordination
among the many actors (both multilateral and bilateral) involved in peacebuilding efforts.
The PBC works through two primary configurations: a central Organizational
Committee (OC) and country-specific meetings (also referred to as ‘country configura-
tions’). In addition, there is a Working Group on Lessons Learned. The OC consists of 31
member states, representing key UN bodies and important groups of member states. A
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) have also been
established to support the Commission’s work. Together, these three central entities – the
PBC, the PBSO and the PBF – make up what is known as the ‘UN peacebuilding archi-
tecture’. The PBC became operational in June 2006, with Burundi and Sierra Leone as
the first two countries on its agenda (for more on the PBC, see Berdal, 2009; Jenkins,
2008; Tryggestad, 2010).

6. Tryggestad 469
Norway was elected co-chair of the UN PBC at the Commission’s first formal meet-
ing, representing the group of major donors to the UN system. Beyond serving as co-
chair of the OC – and in that capacity being centrally involved in deliberations on a
number of organizational matters in the startup phase – Norway was also assigned spe-
cific responsibility for chairing the process on developing a peacebuilding strategy for
Burundi. As this study shows, the Burundi country configuration would soon become an
arena for the promotion of norms and values important to the Norwegian government.
Among these were women’s rights in relation to peace and security matters, with a par-
ticular emphasis on women’s political empowerment and inclusion in decision making
processes.
The Peacebuilding Commission: An arena for Norwegian
norm entrepreneurship
The fact that it was not only a member of the PBC’s OC but also co-chair of an
entirely new body provided Norway with a unique possibility to influence delibera-
tions, guidelines, work procedures and the institutional identity of the PBC. One of
Norway’s overarching goals during its membership period was to contribute to the
establishment of guidelines and routines for consultations between the PBC and civil
society – including women’s groups – both in New York and in the countries that fell
under the PBC’s agenda. In the Commission’s formative years, this was quite a con-
troversial issue, particularly among member states representing the global south, but
it was an area on which the Norwegian government was unwilling to make any com-
promises.4 The importance of both cooperation and consultation with civil society is
firmly embedded not only in Norway’s ‘multi-stakeholder approach’ to peacebuild-
ing, but also in the country’s approach to peace and reconciliation efforts more gener-
ally. Since the early 1990s, close cooperation with Norwegian NGOs with a presence
in conflict areas has opened up various windows of opportunity for Norwegian gov-
ernment involvement in peace and reconciliation processes around the world. In turn,
a range of Norwegian and international NGOs have become operational partners in
the execution of a number of peace and development projects and programmes.
Among these NGOs we also find national and international women’s organizations
and networks. NGO collaboration is a key characteristic of the much-discussed
‘Norwegian model for peace and reconciliation’. In addition, what may have started
out simply as an ad hoc arrangement became institutionalized as a formal foreign
policy instrument in 2000 through the establishment of a Section for Peace and
Reconciliation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Egeland, 2008; Neumann,
2011; for a critical account, see Tvedt, 2009).5
Membership in the PBC was also regarded by senior diplomats and the political lead-
ership of Norway’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs as providing an important arena for the
exercise of political influence and the promotion of Norwegian policies and interests on
a whole set of thematic issues beyond that of civil society cooperation. According to one
senior diplomat who was centrally involved in the process, the ‘Platform for Norwegian
Membership in the PBC’6 served as the guide for the day-to-day work of the Norwegian
chairmanship.7 In addition to providing overarching guidance on Norwegian goals and

7. 470 Cooperation and Conflict 49(4)
priorities for the period of Norway’s membership, the platform states that in the country
configurations particular priority should be given to the following issue-areas:
•• women/gender-equality perspective – with a particular emphasis on effective inte-
gration of such a perspective in strategies discussed and recommended by the
PBC;
•• security sector reform (including the military, police and justice system); and
•• effective resource mobilization through the PBC.
The Norwegian prioritization of particular issue-areas and normative frameworks that
should ideally be integrated into peacebuilding strategies for post-conflict countries was
in keeping with a long tradition of Scandinavian norm entrepreneurship – or what
Christine Ingebritsen (2002: 13) has referred to as promotion of ‘a particular view of the
good society’. Ingebritsen argues that the Scandinavian countries ‘share distinct ideas
about appropriate forms of domestic and international interventions’, and suggests that,
since they lack military and economic power, the Scandinavian group of countries ‘pur-
sues “social power” by acting as norm entrepreneurs in the international community’.
Ingebritsen lists ‘sustainable development’, ‘peaceful resolution of conflicts’ and ‘provi-
sion of foreign aid’ as issue-areas where the Nordic countries have been particularly
influential as norm entrepreneurs. To these, I would add ‘gender equality’ and ‘women’s
rights’ as another distinct issue-area in which the Nordic countries have exercised nor-
mative power, not only in relation to the social, political and economic spheres, but also
increasingly within the sphere of international peace and security.8
Ingebritsen (2002: 18) claims that the evolution of the welfare state has been an
important catalyst for the normative-entrepreneurship role of the Scandinavian countries
internationally. Global social solidarity is a logical extension of the intrastate social soli-
darity enjoyed by the Scandinavian countries, she suggests. The role played by Norway
as a norm entrepreneur in relation to the WPS agenda during the country’s membership
of the UN PBC provides yet another example of this Nordic social responsibility ethos
going global.
State feminism going global
Internationally, Norway is regarded as a lead country with considerable normative power
on women’s issues and gender equality. In addition, Norway’s specific engagement with
women’s issues in relation to international peace and security began years before the
adoption of Resolution 1325. Already in the mid-1990s, Norway was providing financial
support to a series of Expert Group Meetings on gender, peace and conflict initiated by
the UN Department for the Advancement of Women (now a part of UN Women).9
Together with Sweden, Norway also initiated and funded the first major study under the
auspices of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) on how to
mainstream a gender perspective in UN peace operations (Olsson et al., 1999). Directed
by an external expert, the study consisted of a number of case studies conducted by a
group of independent researchers (Olsson, 1999; Stiehm, 2000), and its preliminary find-
ings were presented and discussed at a high-level seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, in

8. Tryggestad 471
May 2000. The outcome of this seminar was the ‘Windhoek Declaration’, which also
included the ‘Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in
Multidimensional Peace Support Operations’ (United Nations, 2000) – a document that
served as an important precursor to Resolution 1325, which was adopted later that year.
Furthermore, in 1996 the Norwegian government appointed a female ambassador,
Helga Hernes (the ‘mother’ of the state feminism concept), as the Norwegian foreign
ministry’s Special Advisor on Peacekeeping Operations.10 Hernes was one of the first
ambassadors that in statements and speeches in various UN forums – most notably within
the influential Special Committee on Peacekeeping (also known as the Fourth Committee
of the UN General Assembly) and the Commission on the Status of Women – called for
the acknowledgement of women’s roles in relation to international peace and security
and highlighted the need to recruit more women as peacekeepers.11 In 2004, the UN
DPKO established a gender adviser position, which for many years was funded by
Norway, while Norway simultaneously lobbied for the incorporation of this position
within the regular DPKO budget. Since 2000, Norway has also been an active member
of the ‘Friends of Resolution 1325’ – a group of UN member states, coordinated by
Canada, that meets regularly to discuss policy initiatives and issues relevant to the imple-
mentation of Resolution 1325. The funding and political support provided by Norway for
the various initiatives listed above were important early steps to build normative power
in relation to the emerging WPS agenda. Throughout this early period of lobbying and
policy development there was a close collaboration between Norwegian policy makers
and national as well as international women’s organizations and individual experts on
women’s rights issues.
Another important step towards normative power by Norway was the adoption in
March 2006 of a NAP for the implementation of Resolution 1325 (Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 2011). In November 2004 the Security Council called on mem-
ber states to develop NAPs to speed up the implementation of Resolution 1325. Norway
was the second member state to respond to this call. The NAP sets out a series of imple-
mentation initiatives and commitments made by the Norwegian government, both multi-
lateral and bilateral. In relation to the PBC, the NAP states that ‘Norway will seek to
ensure that a gender perspective is integrated into all aspects of the UN Peacebuilding
Commission’s work’ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006: 13). It should be
noted that the NAP was drafted and published long before it was decided that Norway
would become a member of the PBC, to say nothing of being co-chair of that body. Still,
already at this point Norway had clear views on which norms should be promoted
through the PBC.
Accordingly, it is perhaps unsurprising that women’s issues formed part of the
Norwegian platform for the PBC membership. What is interesting to note, however, is
that the WPS agenda was listed first among Norway’s thematic priorities for the work in
the country configurations.
The platform was developed immediately after the adoption of the Norwegian NAP
on Resolution 1325. Thus, it is likely that the level of political commitment among
Norway’s ministers of foreign affairs and development cooperation, as well as awareness
among key civil servants regarding the relevance of the WPS agenda for policy develop-
ment, budgeting and operational activities, were still strong. The process of developing

9. 472 Cooperation and Conflict 49(4)
a peacebuilding strategy for Burundi was regarded by the Norwegian diplomats and poli-
cymakers involved as an important test case for the PBC and UN reform efforts. It was
also seen as a test case for the NAP on Resolution 1325.
Political and financial backing of a normative agenda
Norway was not at the outset an obvious candidate to chair the Burundi country configu-
ration, and the country has never played a particularly active role as either donor or
partner in development cooperation in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. Nevertheless, when
asked by the group of major UN donors to take on the role of chair of the Burundi coun-
try configuration, it was difficult for Norway to respond negatively. Indeed, according to
Johan Løvald, former Norwegian ambassador to the UN, the Norwegian government
regarded it an honour to be asked.12 Of course, the matter was not just a question of hon-
our. Taking on the role of chair of the Burundi process was an expression of what
Neumann (2011) refers to as ‘small-state routine diplomacy’, in which Norway could
both maximize its own national interests and contribute to the maintenance of the UN
system.
The Burundian government itself also favoured Norway as chair. Because of its lack
of a colonial history, Norway was regarded by the Burundian government as a country
with no self-interests in Burundi or the Great Lakes Region.13 Informants also alluded to
the fact that Burundian representatives regarded it as favourable to have a rich donor
country as chair of the peacebuilding strategy process, as it was expected that bilateral
donor support would increase as a result of the process.
After the decision had been made, the efforts of the New York-based Norwegian chair
enjoyed strong political and financial backing from Oslo. According to Løvald, the back-
ing of the Norwegian government strengthened Norway’s credibility and ability to influ-
ence negotiations.14 The quality and scope of support provided by then Norwegian
minister for international development and the environment, Erik Solheim, was noticed
both in New York and Bujumbura. Just prior to his appointment as minister in 2005,
Solheim went on a parliamentary visit to Burundi to get a first-hand impression of the
peace process. Once appointed minister, he identified Burundi as a promising case for
successful peacebuilding – a peacebuilding process that Norway as a peace nation should
actively support.15
Consequently, when Norway was elected chair of the Burundi country configuration
in June 2006, considerable political prestige and resources were invested to support the
country’s ongoing peace process. Norway worked through different channels and by dif-
ferent means. Diplomatic negotiations were supported by the high degree of visibility of
top-level Norwegian politicians and dignitaries, both multilaterally through the PBC and
bilaterally with the Burundian government. A few months after Norway was elected
chair of the Burundi configuration, Minister Solheim went on an official visit to the
country. To emphasize Burundi’s newly gained importance to Norwegian peace and
development efforts, a Norwegian embassy section was established in Bujumbura in
May 2007.16 It was hardly a coincidence that the Norwegian crown prince, in his capac-
ity as goodwill ambassador for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
paid Burundi an official visit in October/November 2007. He was also invited by the

10. Tryggestad 473
Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs to open a high-level seminar on the Burundi peace-
building process in Oslo in February 2008. Further, in early 2008, Minister Erik Solheim
appointed a senior diplomat, with longstanding experience from diplomatic postings in
the Great Lakes Region, as his special envoy to Burundi. The appointment was an ad hoc
arrangement, as the category ‘special envoy’ is not a regular job category within the
Norwegian foreign ministry.
The political prestige invested in the Burundian peace process was backed by a con-
siderable investment of financial resources. On his second visit to the country to attend
the donors’ roundtable in Bujumbura in May 2007, Solheim pledged NOK 60 million in
bilateral budget support for Burundi per year for a three-year period (2007–2009). The
level of support was increased to NOK 100 million in 2008. Norway was one of the first
countries to provide direct budget support to the Burundian government. In addition,
considerable financial support for the peace process was channelled through Norwegian
and international NGOs operating in Burundi,17 regional initiatives, and various UN
agencies, programmes and funds – including the UN PBF, to which Norway was and still
is one of the largest contributors.18 The PBF provided US $35 million for Burundi during
2006–2008, of which US $7 million was spent on projects with a special focus on women
and/or gender equality (PBSO, 2009). This is a fairly high percentage of ‘gender ear-
marking’ of funds in a UN context. The projects were largely initiated by women’s
organizations in Burundi, through UN entities already operating in the country (such as
the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), now a part of UN
Women). However, the projects enjoyed strong political backing from the PBC in New
York in the bidding process for PBF funds.19
Norm-building through negotiations
One of the PBC’s core principles is that peacebuilding strategies should be developed
and owned by the governments of the countries in question. The role of the PBC is to
support, facilitate and coordinate actors involved in peacebuilding efforts. However,
since it was an entirely new creature within the UN family, the Commission’s work pro-
cedures were not set in stone from the outset. Due to a lack of formal guidelines, neither
the PBC member states, the PBSO nor the countries on the PBC agenda knew exactly
how to go about having the strategy work done. This left member states with experience
of international negotiations and staff members within the PBSO with the upper hand in
terms of being proactive and able to influence the final outcome of the strategy work. In
Burundi, neither the government nor civil society knew quite what to expect from the
PBC process. The Burundian government had little experience of international negotia-
tions and insufficient human resources to undertake consultations and coordination
efforts nationally. Civil society got involved in the process after the government had put
together the first draft of its peacebuilding priorities, and after pressure had been exerted
on the government both from New York and from various international and national civil
society actors – including women’s organizations.
When the Burundian government delegation arrived in New York in October 2006 to
present the first draft of its peacebuilding strategy, ‘women’s issues’ were not on the list
of prioritized issue-areas. Rather, the head of delegation, then minister of foreign

11. 474 Cooperation and Conflict 49(4)
relations and international cooperation Antoinette Batumubwira, emphasized that
Burundian women had already made it into decision making by ensuring a high level of
women’s representation in the country’s parliament and among government ministers.20
Thus, there was no need to raise women’s issues in particular. According to Burundi’s
recently adopted Constitution (February 2005), women were to make up at least 30% of
all members of parliament – a target that had been achieved when Burundi held its first
democratic elections during the summer of 2005. In addition, the Burundian government
had a high number of female ministers in posts traditionally held by men in most coun-
tries, including the posts of minister of foreign relations and international cooperation,
minister of finance, and minister of commerce and industry. Also, both the vice-president
and the speaker of parliament were women (United Nations Operation in Burundi, 2005).
The Burundian delegation was proud and self-confident about how Burundian women
had achieved high-level representation in politics. Former minister Batumubwira admits
that she had no knowledge of Resolution 1325 or the WPS agenda when she joined the
Burundian cabinet in 2005.21 When she presented her government’s priorities for peace-
building to the members of the PBC, the list contained issues that she regarded as being
important for Burundians – without highlighting women in particular. She remembers
that the Burundian delegation had long discussions with the PBC chair about this issue.
Inexperienced with international negotiations, the relatively newly elected Burundian
government had little knowledge and awareness of the types of problems and challenges
they would need to watch out for. Government capacities were also weak. Batumubwira
recounts that she only had a small group of people working on the strategy document, in
close collaboration with the UN presence in Burundi. They were also working under consid-
erable time pressure. For the PBC, it was important to have some quick results to point to.
Thus, in the beginning there was not really much time for broad national consultations. The
consultations were first and foremost with the Norwegian chair and the staff at the PBSO,
supported by the UN presence in Burundi. Still, Batumubwira remembers the negotiations
with the PBC – or its Norwegian chair – as a dialogue and learning process rather than as a
process in which certain issues or ideas were forced upon the Burundian representatives
against their will: ‘We knew that we were not equal. But they, the way they behaved, helped
us to feel really confident and that we could talk like people who are at the same level’.22
In the end, the Burundian government had no real problems with including specific
references to women in the strategy document, as long as employment remained the most
important priority. In the words of Batumubwira, ‘[reference to women] remains an
added value, as long as it is not diluting the other priorities. So it was not pressure, but
we felt that it would be preferable’.
For their part, the Norwegian diplomats in New York were surprised to find that wom-
en’s issues did not figure high on the agenda of the Burundian delegation, particularly
since women were so prominent in government positions in Burundi. Based on long
experience with negotiations both within multilateral frameworks and as facilitators in a
number of peace processes around the world, the Norwegian diplomats knew that issues
not specifically addressed or made mention of in key agreements and strategies tend to
be forgotten in the implementation phase, ending up far down the list of priorities of the
governments and donors in question. This has been particularly the case in relation to the

12. Tryggestad 475
status of women and women’s interests in peace negotiations and peacebuilding pro-
cesses (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010, 2011).
In the Burundian case, although the country had a modern constitution, well ahead
of most other countries in terms of accommodating women’s rights and gender equal-
ity, Burundian society at large remained very conservative and traditional in terms of
gender roles. According to ambassador Løvald, it was important for the PBC to base
its approach to women’s issues on the legal instruments already available.23 In this
way, the PBC could play an important role in reinforcing and promoting a national
process that was already under way. Accordingly, the Norwegian chair regarded it as
important that references to women and Resolution 1325 were integrated into the
formal peacebuilding documents, if only to keep the wording as a reference point for
later advocacy and policy-formulation processes.24 From a theoretical point of view,
this was a clear-cut act of normative interventionism and norm-building by the chair,
and very much along the traditional state feminist way of thinking on how to best
promote women’s rights.
Norm promotion through civil society cooperation
Another example of Norway’s state feminist approach to norm promotion is the way by
which women and women’s organizations were included in the formal peacebuilding
process in Burundi. At the time when Burundi was referred to the PBC, there was already
a vibrant women’s movement in the country, actively lobbying for the inclusion of
women and women’s concerns in the country’s ongoing peacebuilding process (Anderson,
2010; Falch, 2010). Nevertheless, irrespective of what had been achieved in terms of
women’s representation in politics, Burundian women’s organizations still struggled to
be heard and relied heavily on the international network of women’s NGOs and entities
to get access to information on PBC matters and funding from the PBF (Klot, 2007). The
central international NGOs were International Alert, Care and the NGO Working Group
on Women, Peace and Security, as well as UN entities such as the UNIFEM (International
Alert, 2008; NGO Working Group, 2006; NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and
Security et al., 2005; Tripp et al., 2009).
As part of the peacebuilding process a PBF National Steering Committee was set up,
which served as a forum for national dialogue on peacebuilding priorities and as a point
of contact between the national level and the PBC in New York. In the initial phase of its
operation, membership was limited to representatives of the Burundian government and
various UN entities already operating in the country. Gradually, participation at commit-
tee meetings was expanded to include donors, international NGOs and national civil
society representatives as observers (ActionAid et al., 2007), although women and wom-
en’s organizations were still excluded.
In early 2007, the NGO Working Group in New York was contacted by a representa-
tive of the Dushirehamwe (‘Let’s Reconcile’) women’s network in Burundi, who
expressed her concern about the lack of women’s representation in the National Steering
Committee. This came as something of a surprise to the NGO Working Group. Gina
Torry, former coordinator of the group, notes:

13. 476 Cooperation and Conflict 49(4)
Despite having 30% representation of women in government, despite having women inside the
UN Headquarters helping set this up, somehow the National Steering Committee in Burundi
had been set up without any women.25
The NGO Working Group immediately invited a Burundian women’s representative
to New York to meet with the PBC and its Norwegian chair. For the Norwegian ambas-
sador and his team, the idea of chairing a strategy process for peacebuilding without
somehow including women and women-specific concerns was unthinkable. Such an
approach would go against key political priorities for the Norwegian chairmanship
period. In negotiations with the Burundian government, Norwegian diplomats argued
that it would be in the interest of peace and stability, as well as the government’s interna-
tional standing, to include women and women’s concerns in the peacebuilding process.26
Through a combination of emphasis on integration policies from above and NGO agita-
tion from below changes took place. As Torry put it:
Norway played a very important role in getting women onto the National Steering Committee
in Burundi. So within, I would say, eight weeks, there were women sitting on the National
Steering Committee. Dushirehamwe credits the NGO Working Group and Norway with this
happening.
The Norwegian chair also made a point of meeting with women’s groups and organi-
zations whenever a delegation from the PBC visited Burundi. Likewise, it was regarded
as important to meet with representatives of Burundian women’s organizations when
these visited New York. By attending gatherings for women only in Burundi, the PBC
made women’s organizations not just legitimate actors in the peacebuilding process, but
also harder for the Burundian government to overlook.27 Many of these organizations
also received funding either through the PBF or bilaterally from Norway for projects
aimed at women’s empowerment. Such support included the creation of a position within
an international NGO so that a coordinator could work with Dushirehamwe to ensure
that women’s rights were integrated into PBC/PBF processes (ActionAid et al., 2007).
Concluding remarks
The PBC’s founding resolutions call upon the Commission’s members to integrate the
WPS agenda into all aspects of its work (UN General Assembly, 2005; UN Security
Council, 2005). During the first formative years of the PBC, Norway was both a regular
commission member and served as chair of the so-called Burundi configuration. Norway
used ‘the power of the chair’ both to negotiate gender language in formal peacebuilding
documents and to negotiate the inclusion of women in a number of peacebuilding
activities.
Although women’s concerns were not on the Burundian government’s initial list of
priorities for a peacebuilding strategy, the WPS agenda (including a specific reference to
Resolution1325)waswellintegratedintothefinalStrategicFrameworkforPeacebuilding
in Burundi adopted by the PBC in June 2007 (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2007).
Not only did this have direct implications for women’s involvement in the peacebuilding

14. Tryggestad 477
process in Burundi, but the strategy document also served as an important formal rein-
forcement of an emerging normative agenda in international relations. Since the Strategic
Framework for Burundi was the first strategy document to be adopted by this entirely
new UN body, it set an example and provided direction for the strategy processes to fol-
low in other post-conflict countries on the PBC agenda.
In the beginning of this article four possible explanations were outlined for why a
small state like Norway is particularly well-placed to take on a norm entrepreneur role.
In the case of Norway on the PBC all of these explanations were at play. Normative
power was exercised through diplomacy, backed by both political and financial means.
Advocacy and awareness-raising through close cooperation with national and interna-
tional civil society actors were also important. Interestingly, Norway’s normative inter-
ventionism took place without giving rise to any criticism of imposing agendas – at least
none visible in any of the data generated for this study. Rather, the role Norway played
as norm entrepreneur has been applauded both by UN member states and by the NGO
community as an example to be followed by other state actors.
One reason for this absence of criticism may be Norway’s integrity as a longstanding
supporter of the UN system, in both normative and financial terms. Another may be the
perception prevalent among countries of the global south of Norway as a neutral, altru-
istic actor in international affairs. In the case of the Burundian government, the absence
of criticism may of course also be a result of the asymmetric power relations at play
during negotiations. Burundi was – and still is – a very poor country, totally dependent
on donor support, while Norway was one of the major donors to the UN peacebuilding
architecture in general, and to peacebuilding initiatives in Burundi in particular.
In the literature on norms and global governance, the emergence of the normative
framework of WPS, as well as the role that small states like Norway have played in its
promotion and reinforcement, remains largely unrecognized. Yet, the integration of the
WPS agenda into the deliberations of the UN PBC exemplifies both the normative power
that small states can exercise and the difference they can make in reinforcing norms in
the making – if they are willing and able, of course, to take on the role of norm entrepre-
neur. It also illustrates how, through the exercise of such normative power, small states
are able not only to promote and/or reinforce a given issue, but also to reinforce their
own standing within the international community of states.
Funding
This research has been conducted as part of the research project Gender, Conflict and Peacebuilding
at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, PRIO. The research project is funded by the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Notes
1. In 2008, Norway ranked as the sixth-largest donor of voluntary contributions to the UN
system in overall terms, and the second largest per capita (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2012: 14).
2. One of the most well-known examples of such a close NGO–state partnership is the success-
ful campaign to ban landmines, in which Norway worked closely with the international advo-
cacy network of NGOs to have a declaration adopted and signed in 1997 (Neumann, 2011).

15. 478 Cooperation and Conflict 49(4)
3. Norwegian Trygve Lie was the first UN Secretary-General from 1946 to 1952. Gro Harlem
Brundtland, former Norwegian prime minister, was head of the World Commission on
Environment and Development (UN General Assembly, 1987) and served as Director
General of the World Health Organization from 1998 to 2003. Former Minister of Foreign
Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg was UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 1990 and Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia in 1993. More
recently, former state secretary of the ministry of foreign affairs Jan Egeland served as UN
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator from
2003 to 2006, while former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg co-chaired the High-
Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence (UN General Assembly, 2006).
4. Conversation with senior Norwegian UN diplomat, June 2007.
5. In his memoirs, Egeland provides a particularly interesting account of how the Norwegian
government in the early 1990s consciously cooperated with civil society actors to facili-
tate the secret negotiations between the parties to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which
led to the 1993 Oslo Accords. Egeland was state secretary at the ministry of foreign affairs
at the time and is regarded as the architect behind the ‘Norwegian model for peace and
reconciliation’.
6. Unpublished internal memo, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006. Provided to the
author by an informant. Translated to English by the author.
7. Email exchange with the author in December 2009.
8. The Nordic countries were among the first UN member states to adopt national action plans
(NAPs) for the implementation of Resolution 1325: Denmark in 2005, Norway and Sweden
in 2006, and Finland and Iceland in 2008. On several occasions, the Nordic countries have
issued joint statements on WPS, most recently at the UN Security Council Open Debate on
Women, Peace and Security on 28 October 2011; see http://fnnewyork.um.dk/en/statements/
newsdisplaypage/?newsid=998d8ea5-f352-4fd9-bccf-330a67aa426a (accessed 9 April 2014).
9. The first Expert Group Meeting was organized by the Department for the Advancement of
Women in December 1994 (UN Doc. GAP/1994/1). Two more meetings were organized: one
in the Philippines in 1995 with UNESCO, and another in the Dominican Republic in 1996
with the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) in cooperation with UNESCO
and INSTRAW (Skjelsbæk and Smith, 2001). At all these meetings, researchers and NGO
representatives played important roles in providing background knowledge and advice to
policymakers on how to develop new policies.
10. Before she entered politics and later became a diplomat, Hernes was a renowned researcher
on feminism, women’s issues and the Nordic welfare state.
11. Conversation with Helga Hernes, August 2011.
12. Interviewed by the author in New York, 12 November 2008.
13. Antoinette Batumubwira, former Burundian foreign minister, phone interview, 15 September
2011.
14. Interviewed by the author in New York, 12 November 2008.
15. See Dagsavisen (2006).
16. The Norwegian diplomatic presence in Bujumbura is not a full-fledged embassy, but an
office staffed with only one diplomat. The embassy section is administered by the Norwegian
embassy in Kampala, Uganda.
17. In 2009, CARE Norway, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council
(NRC) were among the Norwegian NGOs that received the most funding. The NRC ran all
four refugee camps in Burundi at the time. Among international NGOs, ACCORD, Right to
Play, Interpeace/CENAP and International Alert were key donor recipients. Source: www.
norway.go.ug (accessed 14 April 2011).

16. Tryggestad 479
18. During Norway’s first period as member of the PBC, the Norwegian government pledged
a total of US $32.12 million to the PBF (PBSO, 2008). This made Norway the third-largest
donor, surpassed by Sweden (US $42.3 million) and the UK (US $35.9 million) (PBSO,
2010).
19. Ambassador Løvald, email exchange, 2009.
20. View expressed by several diplomats in interviews and informal conversations during field
trips to New York. This view was also expressed by the minister herself during the question-
and-answer session at a public seminar held at the Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs
(NUPI) in Oslo, 9 February 2007.
21. Phone interview, November 2011.
22. Phone interview, November 2011.
23. Author interview, 2008.
24. Conversation with senior Norwegian diplomat, New York, 2007.
25. Author interviewed, Oslo, 21 November 2008.
26. Conversation with senior Norwegian diplomat, June 2007.
27. Løvald in interview, 2008.
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Author biography
Torunn L. Tryggestad is a researcher and project leader at the Peace Research Institute Oslo
(PRIO). Her main areas of interest are the UN and the gendered dimensions of UN peace and
security politics, currently with a particular emphasis on gender and mediation. Her most recent
publication is a book chapter (in Norwegian) on the relevance of UN Security Council Resolution
1325 on Women, Peace and Security to the Norwegian Armed Forces (Abstrakt Forlag, 2014).