Homegrown violent extremism homegrown violent extremism

1. Homegrown Violent Extremism
Homegrown Violent Extremism
Erroll Southers
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book comes on the heels of several years of focused
research and
study, as well as a counterterrorism and law enforcement career
that
spans more than three decades. As such, I have a lifetime of
people to
thank.
First, I must thank Elsevier for their support and readiness to
pub-
lish on this important topic and Ehsan Zeffar for the
introduction.
I also owe a great deal of thanks and appreciation to Dr. Eric
Heikkila, my doctoral committee chair. His tireless support,
guidance
and encouragement helped make this book come to fruition.
Thanks
also to the members of my doctoral committee—Boaz Ganor,

4. Michael
Orosz, Peter Robertson and Milind Tambe—all experts in their
respec-
tive disciplines who provided invaluable expertise and insight.
This work would not have been possible without the support of
the
University of Southern California and my Trojan Family; the
Sol
Price School of Public Policy, Viterbi School of Engineering,
and the
National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis for Terrorism
Events
(CREATE). I also offer a special thanks to President Max
Nikias,
Deans Jack Knott and Yannis Yortsos, Vice Dean Elizabeth
Graddy, Associate Dean Regina Nordahl, Catie Burke, Director
Stephen Hora, Deborah Natoli, Isaac Maya, Martin Krieger, Dan
Haverty, Kelly Buccola, Erin Callichio, Carmen Gomez, Stan
Henderson, Sabrina Feeley, and Heather Rosoff.
I also owe a great deal to my very dear mentors and incredible
friends: Arnold Schwarzenegger, Rep. Jane Harman, Rep.
Bennie
Thompson, Secretary Janet Napolitano, Bonnie Reiss, Peter
Bergen,
Frank Quiambao, Brian Keith, Matthew Bettenhausen, Connie
Rice,
Claire Vasios, Randy Parsons, Don Leighton, Jim Butts, Jim
Featherstone, Arif Alikhan, Brian Banning, Rich Callahan, Jim
Davis,
Amy Zegart, Ron Iden, Bill Leider, Ivan Newman, Maria Ressa,
Fran
Townsend, Richard Clarke, Hon. Michael Chertoff, Joanne St.
Lewis,
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Alexandra Lieben, Fred Roberts,

5. Johnathan
Tal, Edan Gottlib, Doron Pely, Larry Dietz, Peter Franklin,
Julie
Cruzal, Elliot Brandt, my colleagues at the Interdisciplinary
Center in
Herzliya, Israel and my attorneys, Marc Cohen and Sheri
Jeffrey. The
editorial guidance of my writing partner, Justin Hienz, is
extraordinary.
His knowledge and organization helped get this work completed
ahead
of schedule. Perhaps most important among these, my dear
friend
Desmond Saunders-Newton, who passed before this work was
com-
pleted. I know he would be proud that I heeded his advice.
This work represents another important step in the collective
national effort to protect the United States. I thank the
academics,
practitioners and other experts who have developed our
counterterror-
ism capabilities to what they are today, and I respectfully stand
on
their shoulders to continue this important effort.
None of this would have been possible without the
unconditional
support and extraordinary patience of my mom and dad, my
children,
my brother David, an incredible writer in his own right, and my
wife
Caryn. I owe more to her than any book acknowledgement can

6. express. She will finally be able to make a meal without my
interrup-
tions to read or listen to countless drafts.
And thank you, reader, for taking the time and interest to read
this
humble contribution to the ongoing international discussion
about
security and methods for preventing violent extremis m. People
fear
what they don’t understand.
viii Acknowledgments
INTRODUCTION
Since September 11, 2001, security experts, law enforcement
profes-
sionals and government leaders have been expecting another
terrorist
attack. Even as the United States and other countries have
vastly
improved their security posture through billions of dollars in
technol-
ogy and operational investments, training, and policy
improvements,
there has been a solemn recognition that no matter how
advanced and
coordinated a country’s security efforts, eventually, a terrorist
would
find vulnerability in the system and exploit it.
On April 15, 2013, in Boston, the inevitable occurred. Two
men—

7. Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—placed pressure cooker
bombs
amid the crowd gathered at the finish line of the Boston
Marathon.
Spectator cameras were recording when these bombs exploded,
sending
fireballs into the air and hurling shrapnel into the hundreds of
people
nearby. The blasts killed three people and injured 264 others. It
was
the first successful attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, and it was the
first
attack on a sporting event since the 1996 Olympic Games.
While an attack of some form had been expected for years, the
big
questions for security professionals were always where, when
and from
whom would an attack come? Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda
domi-
nated the public gaze for nearly a decade. The wars in
Afghanistan
and Iraq, as well as joint operations in Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia
and other countries, focused the military response to
transnational ter-
rorism squarely on the al Qaeda threat. This severely disrupted
the pri-
mary organization and its satellites (such as al Qaeda in the
Arabian
Peninsula). Funding was cut off, leaders were killed and
communica-
tions were intercepted. While there remains some vestige of the
terror-
ist organization, it is a shell of what it was on 9/11. The United
States,

8. with the help of its allies, put an end to core al Qaeda. But we
did not
end terrorism. That is, tragically, impossible.
There is limited capacity and opportunity for international
terrorists
to plot and launch attacks against the United States from
abroad.
Aviation and immigration security, far-reaching intelligence
gathering,
and an increasingly aware and alert public make another 9/11-
style
attack a remote possibility. While violent extremists operating
in law-
less, poverty-stricken, failing states have little chance of
planning and
executing a major terrorist attack, the United States and other
coun-
tries have always feared another kind of threat—one that is
vastly
more difficult to anticipate and interrupt. As seen in Boston,
when ter-
rorism arises from within a domestic population, there is often
little
warning. Once homegrown adversaries are in motion, it is
incredibly
difficult to detect and stop them.
Within the context of America, this homegrown violent
extremism
(HVE) is terrorist activity or plots targeting the United States
and U.S.
assets by American citizens or residents who have embraced

9. their
extremist ideology largely within this country. This threat is
diverse
and growing.
As a basis for any thoughtful analysis of HVE, it must be
accepted
that total security—that is, the permanent absence of a terrorist
threat—
is unobtainable. No matter how effective the security
technology or
refined the processes, we as a society can never be fully free of
the threat
from violent extremism. There are, however, ways to reduce
risk and
improve our counterterrorism efforts. This necessitates a robust
under-
standing of HVE and radicalization, which is the purpose of this
book.
I.1 OVERCOMING THE “OTHER” MINDSET
Any terrorist attack causes a predictable level of chaos and
uncer-
tainty. Immediately after the Boston bombing, law enforcement,
the
FBI and other intelligence organizations shifted into high gear.
The
Boston police department communications center dispatched a
con-
stant stream of reports about suspicious packages and unknown
indivi-
duals. Every potential unattended bag or unidentified person
became
suspect, and for hours after the attack, police rushed from one
location

10. to another, assuming out of necessity that there were more
bombs
waiting to explode. Thankfully, there were not.
Within hours of the attack, law enforcement identified a “Saudi
national” who had been at the marathon as a person of interest.
This
man had been wounded by shrapnel, and he was kept under
armed
guard at the hospital. Ultimately, we learned that he was just
one of
the hundreds of bombing victims. Yet, that he became a person
of
x Introduction
interest to begin with shows where suspicion fell before all the
facts
were available. We were looking for foreigners.
This reveals a critical flaw in our collective understanding of
terror-
ism, a misplaced belief that evildoers necessarily only come
from other
countries. They must look different, practice a different faith,
and hold
a different nationality. They are “other” than us. Yet, the attack
in
Boston showed this to be a miscalculation. The origin of the
ideology
is irrelevant in determining homegrown versus international
terrorism;
what matters is where it is embraced.

11. After several days, the Tsarnaev brothers were identified as the
attackers, and the ensuing manhunt ended with a dramatic
shootout
and standoff. While the brothers were born in another country,
they
had been living in the United States for more than a decade.
Both men
grew up in the United States, without any overt indications that
they
would someday choose a life of terrorism. The older brother,
Tamerlan, was a legal U.S. resident who had found some
difficulty
attaining citizenship. The younger brother, Dzhokhar, however,
was
an American, having taken the oath of citizenship, ironically, on
September 11, 2012.
It is believed these men traversed a process of self-
radicalization in
the United States, perhaps enhanced by skills gained during
Tamerlan’s overseas trip just months before the attack.
Regardless, the
brothers were locals, educated, living and working in the area.
The
Tsarnaevs walked into infamy alone and within U.S. borders,
making
them, by definition, homegrown violent extremists.
The terrorist threat to the United States is not as neat and
clearly
defined as we would like. If the terrorists of the world all
looked the
same, followed the same ideology and used the same tactics,
America
might be able to achieve total security. An infallible security
system

12. and a uniform terrorist threat, however, do not exist. There is no
sin-
gle group on which we can focus our counterterrorism efforts.
There
is no easy way to know in advance who among us will lead a
peace-
ful existence and who will endeavor to cause mass death,
destruction,
and fear. Terrorism messaging has benefited significantly from
global-
ization. Ideas that might seem distant and foreign are also right
here,
at home. Likewise, the ideologies that grow in the United States
also
reach around the world. Whenever we attempt to fit the terrorist
xiIntroduction
threat into clear-cut borders and definitions, we fail to
anticipate the
whole threat, which has no common nationality, motivation, or
profile.
To address the broader challenge of preventing terrorist attacks
that
originate with citizens and residents (rather than foreign
adversaries),
we must take on a more nuanced, thoughtful and intelligent
perspec-
tive of HVE, its origins, and the methods for interrupting those
on a
pathway to violence. Part of this strategy includes focused
efforts to
counter the extremist ideologies and messages that propel

13. individuals
through the radicalization process.
I.2 UNDERSTANDING THE RADICALIZATION PATHWAY
As the world learned, the Tsarnaev brothers were motivated by
an
extremist Muslim Identity ideology. For many, this seemed to
be an
indication that irrespective of nationality, the terrorist threat is
pre-
dominantly driven by an extremist interpretation of Islamic
beliefs. To
be sure, there are myriad examples of terrorists who fall within
this
camp, but maintaining a limited focus on Muslim Identity
creates a
profound blind spot in our national security efforts.
Since the start of the Obama Administration, there has been an
unprecedented increase in domestic extremist groups. The
election of
an African-American president with an Arabic sounding name
and a
Muslim father, as well as public debate over his place of birth,
fueled
anti-government sentiment and extremist ideologies. This has
swelled
the ranks of groups that view the federal government as the
enemy,
feeding ideologies that see the government as an illegitimate
corpora-
tion of elites planning to implement a “one-world government.”
While
the terrorist threat these groups pose has not received broad
coverage

14. in mainstream media reporting, their thwarted plots include the
intended bombing of federal buildings, assassination of public
officials,
attacks on uniformed law enforcement and the use of biological
agents
against the public.
For many, violent extremism has become synonymous with
Islamic
radicalism, but this is a woefully myopic view. Religious belief
is only
one example of legitimizing ideology that can contribute to
violent
activity. Ultimately, it is not the ideology itself that propels
HVE; it is
a combination of many factors that together create conditions
under
xii Introduction
which someone might cross the line from extremist rhetoric to
violent
action. This is the radicalization pathway.
HVE radicalization is not a conveyor belt that starts with a set
of
grievances and ends with violence, with easily discernible
signposts
along the way. It is a path through a complex and changing
social and
psychological landscape that is unique to every individual.
What
causes one person to embrace violent extremism may not have
the

15. same effect on another. There is no HVE checklist that can be
used to
identify someone in the midst of the radicalization process and
deter-
mine whether they will turn violent.
In the investigation into the Boston bombing, authorities have
focused on Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s 6-month trip to Chechnya,
which pre-
ceded the attack. Whatever he did there and whomever he met
with
likely contributed to Tsarnaev’s plans, but we can be reasonably
assured that his path to HVE began long before his trip to his
family’s
motherland. Like other violent extremists, Tsarnaev’s
radicalization
was a long progression of experiences and grievances, nearly all
of
which occurred within the United States.
The radicalization process often begins with a “cognitive
opening,”
an event or experience that yields a personal grievance, which
in turn
makes someone more susceptible to accepting an extremist
ideology.
Grievances take many forms, such as conflicted identities,
injustice,
oppression or socioeconomic exclusion. Critically, there is no
way of
knowing what an individual will internalize as a life-changing
griev-
ance. What is devastating to one person may be irrelevant to
another.
Even as grievance may lead to a broader openness to an

16. ideology,
it is not simply the belief in extremist ideologies that leads to
HVE.
There are many people who hold extremist views but do not
engage in
violent activity. While understanding how grievances can feed
into an
ideology is one avenue for addressing the potential for violent
extrem-
ism, the radicalization pathway is not limited to any one racial,
reli-
gious or issue-oriented group. It is a crosscutting phenomenon
with an
ever-uncertain end. It is often impossible to know who will exit
the
radicalization pathway as a violent extremist until they do so.
It is important to note the role online media can play in
fostering
violent extremism. Arguably, the Internet’s capacity for
propelling
xiiiIntroduction
extremists through the radicalization process is the single most
impor-
tant and dangerous innovation to the terrorist threat since the
9/11
attacks. Future attacks against the United States and its interests
will
likely involve adversaries who have traversed the radicalization
pro-
cess, at least in part, online.

17. In searching for a comprehensive understanding of violent
extrem-
ism and those engaged in the radicalization process, history
teaches
valuable lessons, if we are willing to learn. After the bombing
of Pearl
Harbor, the United States declared martial law and interned
110,000
Japanese Americans. More than two-thirds of those interned
were
American citizens, and half of them were children. In some
cases, fam-
ily members were separated and sent to different camps. None
had
ever shown disloyalty to the nation, and throughout the war,
none of
the people convicted of spying for Japan were of Japanese or
Asian
ancestry. The internment was a monumental policy failure on a
num-
ber of levels. The lesson with regard to HVE is that attempts to
iden-
tify and disrupt threats must be evidence-based. Often, targeting
potential adversaries according to one broad category (such as
ethnic-
ity or religion) leads to unjust scrutiny of innocent individuals.
Terrorism requires a combination of three things: an alienated
indi-
vidual, a legitimizing ideology (engaged through radicalization)
and an
enabling environment. Of the three, it is the environment that is
most
susceptible to positive influences. While it is tempting to focus
counter-
terrorism efforts on alienated, extremist individuals,

18. recognizing that
the goal is to contain terrorism and not simply stop terrorists,
we must
support and collaborate with communities to identify peopl e on
the
path to violent extremism. Indeed, working with communities,
we have
the potential to disrupt the radicalization pathway altogether.
I.3 FOSTERING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
Our best chance for preventing terrorist incidents is to embrace
a more
holistic, community-based effort. Counterterrorism and law
enforce-
ment professionals have limited resources. Given the plethora of
threats
to a safe society, as well as the foggy, often-unseen
radicalization pro-
cess that can take place anywhere, anytime, those with the
greatest
capacity to identify and help disrupt the path to violent
extremism are
the very communities from which potential terrorists arise.
xiv Introduction
Every terrorist has a family, a network of friends and acquain-
tances, and a local environment where they live and work.
Knowing
that the path to violent extremism is long and complex, it is
essential
that those charged with preventing terrorism work with
communities

19. to implement programs and foster transparency and information
shar-
ing. This can help identify individuals who are susceptible to
turning
violent—but critically, before they do so.
This community-based effort should help policy makers and
commu-
nity members identify challenges and develop collaborative
strategies to
improve the community’s general wellbeing. The community-
based
effort is not focused solely on reducing the risk of HVE, nor is
it driven
by law enforcement. Unlike traditional community-based
policing,
which has shown some positive results, this strategy enhances
relation-
ship building and information sharing, emphasizing an overall
improve-
ment in the community’s quality of life.
Public awareness and engagement is an effective supplement to
the
dedicated work of America’s security, intelligence and law
enforcement
professionals. No one knows an area better than the local
community,
and no one is more attuned to troubling changes in an
individual’s
beliefs and behavior than those who know them on a personal
level.
Extremist beliefs are as individual and varied as the people who
embrace them. As such, we must build the public vigilance and
capac-
ity to identify potentially threatening individuals, creating a

20. mosaic of
engagement that supports and amplifies our national security.
Community inaction—either through tacit approval of extremist
ideas or a hesitancy to speak up when encountering an
individual
exploring a legitimizing ideology—provides an enabling
environment
that allows extremism to fester and sometimes mature into
violence.
Conversely, engaged and alert community members who are
willing to
report suspicious activities provide an invaluable resource in
the broad-
er national security effort. They can help disrupt the
radicalization
process, thereby undermining terrorism. This means addressing
grie-
vances, as well as recognizing and encouraging stakeholder
engage-
ment. We should seek out opportunities to empower
communities to
this end.
Doing so requires strong bonds between law enforcement,
security
professionals and the communities they strive to protect.
Singling out a
xvIntroduction
person or entire community as suspect based on limited criteria
(such
as religion alone) undermines the public cohesion that is

21. essential to
collective efforts and information sharing. When individuals or
com-
munities feel marginalized by profiling, they become
increasingly
unwilling to share knowledge of potentially violent extremist
activity.
Additionally, this may create opportunities for extremist groups
to
recruit individuals who feel victimized by oppressi ve public
policies.
Thus, not only is a focus on one legitimizing ideology over
another
inadequate in terms of assessing and preparing for a range of
potential
threats, it can also hinder the community collaboration that
might dis-
rupt the radicalization process and prevent terrorist activity.
I.4 TOWARD AN ACADEMIC STUDY OF HVE
The information and analysis presented here is intended to build
a
comprehensive understanding of HVE. Perhaps one of the
greatest
challenges to a discipline-wide discussion of HVE is a
definition of the
phenomenon itself. To that end, Chapter 1 introduces the
complexities
of defining terrorism generally and HVE specifically. Violent
extrem-
ism as a phenomenon is explored through its multifaceted
characteris-
tics, the role of a legitimizing ideology and the factors that
contribute
to violent action.

22. With a clearer understanding of precisely what is meant by the
term
HVE, Chapter 2 investigates the numerous groups that embrace
a
range of extremist doctrines. Race, religion and issue-oriented
ideolo-
gies come in many forms, as do the groups that espouse beliefs
in line
with these ideologies. Looking closely at HVE ideological
motivations,
missions and long-term objectives helps reveal the central
factors that
become associated with terrorist acts. As shown, it is clear that
ideo-
logical adherents can come to embrace a hybrid of beliefs, and
some of
the most troubling extremist ideologies are followed and spread
by
non-Muslim Identity groups. These groups employ sophisticated
strate-
gies for furthering their extremist beliefs and objectives under
the guise
of constitutionally-protected activities.
With knowledge of the diverse ideologies followed by different
groups throughout the United States, and indeed, the world,
Chapter 3
examines the complex components in the radicalization process.
As a
part of this, the chapter also looks closely at the role of
community in
xvi Introduction

23. the trajectory toward violent extremism. As the community is
the one
element that may reduce the potential for recruitment and
radicaliza-
tion, contributing factors and challenges are examined with a
view
toward the development of a community-based, risk-reduction
model.
Essential elements facilitating the model, such as leadership
styles,
group behavior research, and associated theoretical structures,
illus-
trate areas where research and policy challenges need to be
addressed.
Chapter 4 discusses how counterterrorism should evolve in
profes-
sional practice. The development of security and
counterterrorism tac-
tics has not necessarily yielded a true academic discipline
focused on
understanding and countering violent extremism. To encourage
a more
robust field, the chapter examines core questions and research
method-
ologies in the humanities, sciences and social sciences. This
helps reveal
each discipline’s value proposition and how these diverse areas
of study
may be leveraged into HVE research. The scientific method and
criti-
cal theory, when applied to the study of extremists and
extremist group
relationships, provide the capacity to identify appropriate
research

24. questions critical to strategies for countering extremist
ideologies.
Finally, Chapter 5 introduces the Mosaic of Engagement model,
a
“whole of community” concept designed to improve community
qual-
ity of life by enhancing public safety generally, while
challenging and
containing violent extremism specifically. The model examines
the
achievements and shortcomings of the United Kingdom’s
Preventing
Violent Extremism Strategy, which was considered one of the
most
innovative counterterrorism programs in the world when it was
first
implemented. As well as drawing from the best-practice
outcomes of
the “community indicators” model in City Heights, San Diego,
Mosaic
incorporates lessons learned from both programs to develop a
commu-
nity and school-based model for limiting circumstances and
factors
that can facilitate HVE recruitment and radicalization.
As shown throughout this book, HVE is hardly a fully defined
and
exhaustively researched phenomenon. Indeed, academia and the
secu-
rity professions are just beginning to understand this evolving
challenge
to public safety. The threat requires a risk-based response; there
is no
comprehensive strategy that yields 100% security. Rather, we

25. are chal-
lenged to approach the terrorist threat in a new way, with a
more
nuanced understanding of how violent extremism originates and
erupts.
xviiIntroduction
Notwithstanding the serious threats to national security posed
by al
Qaeda and its affiliates, we focus only on this specific group
(and
Muslim Identity ideologies) at our great peril. HVE is defining
the
twenty-first century terrorist threat. The United States and many
other
countries face creative, adaptive adversaries. Some we have
identified;
others continue to operate in the shadows.
If the Boston marathon bombing taught us anything about HVE,
it
is that we cannot hope to thwart terrorist attacks by using only
our
current models of terrorism. We have an obligation to update
our
understanding of terrorism and violent extremism such that it
accu-
rately reflects the nature of the evolving threat. This book is
intended
to be a catalyst that will keep our collective efforts moving
forward,
toward a more effective response to the ever-present threat from
HVE.

26. xviii Introduction
CHAPTER 11
Defining Homegrown Violent Extremism
Homegrown violent extremism (HVE) represents the next
challenge for
counterterrorism, but addressing the threat with effective risk-
reduction
and intelligence-driven security demands a clear understanding
of what
constitutes HVE. What is “homegrown?” Is HVE synonymous
with
domestic terrorism?
Much like the word “terrorism,” there is no comprehensive
definition
for HVE. For homegrown and foreign actors alike, there is no
consis-
tency with regard to race, religious belief, national origin,
ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation or indeed, any other characteristic
(aside
from the desire to attack structures or people to achieve an
ideologically
driven societal, governmental, or economic goal).
Recognizing that one size does not fit all in the
counterterrorism
lexicon, this book uses the following definition as a baseline for
com-
parative analysis of the homegrown phenomenon:

27. HVE describes a terrorist act within the context of ideologically
motivated vio-
lence or plots, perpetrated within the United States or abroad by
American
citizens, residents or visitors, who have embraced their
legitimizing ideology
largely within the United States.
Within this definition are three primary terms requiring further
description. These are a definition of a “terrorist act;”; an
examination
of what constitutes extremism and violent extremism; and the
charac-
teristics of a “homegrown” adversary.
1.1 WHAT IS TERRORISM?
There are few words more emotionally or politically …