COGNITIVE REPAIRS: HOW ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICESCAN COMPENSATEFOR INDIVIDUAL SHORTCOMINGS ChipHeath,RichardP. Larrick, andJoshuaKlayman ABSTRACT The literaturein cognitive psychology has described a varietyof shortcomings that preventindividuals from learningeffectively. We review this literature and provide examplesofa numberoforganizational practices that may effectivelyrepairthecog- nitive shortcomingsof individuals. We call these practicescognitiverepairs. We then discusssix tradeoffs that affect the success of cognitive repairs.We close by consideringhow a cognitive perspective might benefitthosewho studyorganiza- tional learning and those who manageit. Research inOrganizational Behavior, Volume 20, pages 1-37. Copyright © 1998 hy JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISBN: 0-7623-0366-2 1 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, andJOSHUA KLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs 3 INTRODUCTION In afamous speech, Hamletdeclares,“What a pieceof work is man.How noble in reason,how infinite in faculties” (Hamlet, II, 2). An observer whosummarizedthe psychologyof the late twentiethcenturywould probably choose very different phrases to describe the humancondition—perhaps,“What fools these mortals be” (Midsummer Night’sDream, III, 2). Are people“infinite in faculties” and “noble inreason”?HerbertSimon won a Nobel prize for arguingthat social science mustunderstandthe waysthat human facultiesare limited. Instead of being infinite in faculties,Simon’s humans could be only “boundedlyrational” because theircognitive abilities—their ability to perceive,remember,andprocessinformation—were restricted. Well, then, ifpeo- ple arenot infinite in faculties,a.re they “noble inreason”?Cognitive psycholo- gists havespent30 years examining the actualprocessesthat people usewhen they collect information, combineit, anddraw inferences about their world(Nis- bett & Ross, 1980; Kahneman,Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Holland,Holyoak,Nis- bett, & Thagard,1986).Insteadof depicting people as “noble” (or magnificent) in reason, this researchhas arguedthat peoplereasonin ways that producesystem- atic errors. A pessimistic modern Hamlet might combine the observations of these two research streams and describe humans as equipped with primitive hardwnre andbuggy software. However, outsidershave not alwaysacceptedthe pessimistic description of human faculties and reason that is found in the research literature.As one skeptic put it, “If we are so stupid,how did we get to the moon?” (Nisbett & Ross,1980). How should we resolve the apparent discrepancy betweenthe pessimisticliter- atureon human shortcomings and the optimistic evidence of humanaccomplish- ment? One way is todismiss the laboratory research. Someresearchershave argued that the shortcomings that have beendocumentedin the lab areso minor that they do not constitute mistakes ofany real consequence(Funder, 1987; Cohen,1981).Others havearguedthat individuals areless likely to make errors in natural environ ...

1. COGNITIVE REPAIRS:
HOW ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICESCAN
COMPENSATEFOR
INDIVIDUAL SHORTCOMINGS
ChipHeath,RichardP. Larrick, andJoshuaKlayman
ABSTRACT
The literaturein cognitive psychology has described a varietyof
shortcomings that
preventindividuals from learningeffectively. We review this
literature and provide
examplesofa numberoforganizational practices that may
effectivelyrepairthecog-
nitive shortcomingsof individuals. We call these
practicescognitiverepairs. We
then discusssix tradeoffs that affect the success of cognitive
repairs.We close by
consideringhow a cognitive perspective might benefitthosewho
studyorganiza-
tional learning and those who manageit.
Research inOrganizational Behavior, Volume 20, pages 1-37.
Copyright © 1998 hy JAI Press Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
ISBN: 0-7623-0366-2
1

2. CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, andJOSHUA
KLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs 3
INTRODUCTION
In afamous speech, Hamletdeclares,“What a pieceof work is
man.How noble in
reason,how infinite in faculties” (Hamlet, II, 2). An observer
whosummarizedthe
psychologyof the late twentiethcenturywould probably choose
very different
phrases to describe the humancondition—perhaps,“What fools
these mortals be”
(Midsummer Night’sDream, III, 2).
Are people“infinite in faculties” and “noble
inreason”?HerbertSimon won a
Nobel prize for arguingthat social science mustunderstandthe
waysthat human
facultiesare limited. Instead of being infinite in
faculties,Simon’s humans could
be only “boundedlyrational” because theircognitive abilities—
their ability to
perceive,remember,andprocessinformation—were restricted.
Well, then, ifpeo-
ple arenot infinite in faculties,a.re they “noble
inreason”?Cognitive psycholo-
gists havespent30 years examining the actualprocessesthat
people usewhen
they collect information, combineit, anddraw inferences about
their world(Nis-
bett & Ross, 1980; Kahneman,Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;
Holland,Holyoak,Nis-
bett, & Thagard,1986).Insteadof depicting people as “noble” (or
magnificent) in

3. reason, this researchhas arguedthat peoplereasonin ways that
producesystem-
atic errors. A pessimistic modern Hamlet might combine the
observations of these
two research streams and describe humans as equipped with
primitive hardwnre
andbuggy software.
However, outsidershave not alwaysacceptedthe pessimistic
description of
human faculties and reason that is found in the research
literature.As one skeptic
put it, “If we are so stupid,how did we get to the moon?”
(Nisbett & Ross,1980).
How should we resolve the apparent discrepancy betweenthe
pessimisticliter-
atureon human shortcomings and the optimistic evidence of
humanaccomplish-
ment? One way is todismiss the laboratory research.
Someresearchershave
argued that the shortcomings that have beendocumentedin the
lab areso minor
that they do not constitute mistakes ofany real
consequence(Funder, 1987;
Cohen,1981).Others havearguedthat individuals areless likely to
make errors in
natural environmentsthan in contrived laboratory experiments
(Anderson,1991;
Gigerenzer,1996; Cheng& Holyoak, 1985;Hilton, 1995).
We proposeanotherway to resolvethe discrepancy.Unlike
someresearchers,
we do not dismissthe examples of limitations, errors, and biases
reported in thelit-
erature; we assume that individuals arelimited, their decision

4. processes are
biased, andthat they often make costly mistakes onimportant
decisions. We
resolve the apparent discrepancy between evidence of
individualshortcomings
and the empirical factof moonwalksby observing
thatindividualsdid not make it
to themoon, NASA did.
Organizationslike NASA may have discovered ways
toavoid~orrepair theindi-
vidual shortcomingsthat have been documentedby cognitive
researchers.Orga-
nizations may develop such repairs through deliberate analysis,
learn them
throughtrial and error, or discoverthem through serendipitous
accident.In some
cases, repairsmay derive from formal academicdisciplineslike
economicsor sta-
tistics (e.g., Nisbett,1992;Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, &Kunda,
1983; Larrick, Mor-
gan, & Nisbett, 1990), but in most casesthey will not: They will
be ad hoc,
intuitive rulesthat emerge from day-to-daypractice. Our
thesis,then, isthat indi-
viduals indeed face cognitive limitations and shortcomings, but
thatorganizations
can provide individuals withnormsandproceduresthat mitigate
theirlimitations
and reduce their shortcomings.
In this paper we describe a variety of
potentiallyseriousshortcomingsthat have
beendocumentedin researchon humanjudgmentand reasoning.
We focus inpar-

5. ticular on learning and hypothesis testing,that is, how people
use information to
develop and revise theirmental model of the world.Foreach
cognitiveshortcom-
ing we discuss, we provide examples of organizational practices
thatmay repair
this shortcoming. We call these practicescognitive repairsto
emphasize the fact
that they correct somecognitive processthat wasinitially flawed
and in need of
repair.
We identify potential cognitive repairs to spurresearchersto
considerhow such
repairs might look and function.Althoughat thispoint, we
canmake only ananec-
dotal case forinterpretingcertain practicesas “repairs,” we hope
that,by pointing
out someplausible examples of such repairs, we
willpromptresearchersin both
psychologyand organizationsto considermore systematicallyhow
such repairs
might function.
More generally, the concept oforganizationalcognitive
repairsillustratesthat
researchers may find interesting relationships betweenindividual
cognitionand
organizational practice.Theserelationships have not received the
attention they
deserve.On the one side, research in cognitive psychology has
largely treated
individual learnersas “rugged individualists”who face a difficult
environment
alone, equippedonly with their own, flawed cognitive strategies.
On the other

6. side, organizational research has largely ignored the literature
on individualcog-
nition, focusing insteadon issues of motivation orincentives.By
studyingorgani-
zational sources of cognitive repairs, we bringtogethertwo
frequently disparate
literatures anddemonstratehow knowledge at onelevel of
analysiscaninform the
other.
By reviewing individual shortcomingsand identifying potential
cognitive
repairs, wealsohope tocontributeto the academic andpopular
literatureonorga-
nizational learning (Epple,Argote, & Devadas, 1991; Deming,
1982; Senge,
1990; Cohen, 1991; Miner & Mezias, 1996).One important
means tofacilitate
learningby organizations is to develop processes that overcome
theshortcomings
of individuals within the organization.
Below, we start with a briefexampleof the kinds of repairs that
weconsiderin
this paper. Then we introduce a framework that describes
different stages in the
learning process, and we use it toreview the literature
onindividual shortcomings
and to suggest potential repairs.As a preliminary reply
toHamlet,we say that
even ifruggedindividualsare unlikely to be infinite in faculties
and noble inrea-
4 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and JOSHUA

7. KLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs
son, individualswho have access to organizational and cultural
repairs maysome-
times appearso.
An Exampleof OurApproach
Consider one studythat might be regardedas an ominous
indication of ignoble
reasoningby individual experts. Hynes andVanmarcke(1976)
asked seven“inter-
nationally known” civil engineers to predict the height of a
structurethat would
cause a foundation tofail; they alsoasked the engineers toset a
50 percentconfi-
dence interval around their prediction sothat their
confidenceinterval was wide
enough to have a 50 percent chance of enclosing the true failure
height. Theresults
were quitesobering: not one engineer correctly predicted the
truefailure height
within his or herconfidenceinterval.
Evidently, the civil engineers thoughtthey knew more thanthey
did—if they
had been awareof the limitations of their analysis,they would
haveset widercon-
fidenceintervals andwould have predicted the truefailure
heightmorecorrectly.
In the psychologicalliterature this kind of finding has been
labeled“overconfi-
dence,”and it is not anaberration.Similarresultshave been
observed with anum-
ber of individual professionals(e.g., Russo &
Schoemaker,1992).In summarizing

8. the evidence,Griffin and Tversky (1992) quipped that experts
are “often wrong
but rarely in doubt.”
To illustrate why this study paintsan ominous picture of
individual reasoning,
considerthat (unlessyou arereading this paper outside)you are
sitting in abuild-
ing that was constructedby civil engineers who were
substantiallyless accom-
plishedthanthe internationally known experts in thestudy. Your
civil engineers
made numerous decisions to ensure the stability and safety of
yourbuilding; they
decidedhow strong to makeits roofsupports andhow stableto
makeits founda-
tton. If evenexpertengineersare overconfident,shouldyou be
concerned about
your safety?
The answer, we believe, is no. Fortunately, the engineering
profession has
developeda particular repair, called“safety factors,” that
mitigatethe overconfi-
dent reasoningof individual engineers.In an actual assignment
civil engineers
would preciselycalculatethe amount andstrengthof
foundationmaterialsneces-
sary to hold a structure of a particular height,then they would
multiply their pre-
cise answerby a safety factor(i.e., a number between three and
eight), and use the
larger figure to build the foundation.Were the
confidenceintervals of the engi-
neerstoo narrow?Yes. Werethey toonarrow by a factor of three?
No.

9. Safetyfactors arean example of thekindof cognitive repair
weconsiderin this
paper.An organization (e.g., an engineeringfirm or the
engineering profession at
large) provides its members with a repair thathelps combat a
systematic and
potentially serious bias inindividual judgment. As a result,the
organization
shields individualswithin the organization from actingon their
flawed decisions,
5
and it shields individuals inside andoutsidethe organizationfrom
suffering the
consequences.
Whatis a CognitiveRepair?
Organizational repairscanroughly bedivided into two classes:
(1) motivational
repairs increase theenergy and enthusiasm with which
individuals pursue a task
and (2) cognitive repairs improve the
mentalproceduresindividuals use todecide
which task to pursue andhow to pursueit. Organizational
research onmotivation
and incentives can be regarded as the study of motivational
repairs(Milgrom &
Roberts,1992; Eisenhardt,1989).Organizations may need to
repair motivational
problems in order to encourage individuals tolearn(e.g., see
Heath,Knez, &
Camerer,1993).For example, individualsmay not be willing

10. toexperimentwith
newtasks becausethey have becomeendowedwith the benefits
associated with
the old task.
Although previous work hasrecognizedtheimportanceof
motivational repairs,
it hasneglected cognitive repairs. Even when individuals have
the right incentives
and resources, theymay not learnfrom their experience ifthey
use the wrong
mentalprocess
togeneratehypotheses,collectinformation,anddrawconclusions.
The civil engineers who misestimated the stability of the
clayembankment.were
adequatelymotivatedto getthe right answer. However,they did
not on their.own
invoke the kind of correctives(e.g., safety factors)that might
havemadetheir
guesses more appropriately cautious.
REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL LEARNING AND
EXAMPLES OF COGNITIVE REPAIRS
In this section we organize the literatureon learning and
decision making around
three different stages of the learning process. Effective learners
must (1) generate
hypotheses that explain thecausalstructureof the world,
(2)collectinformation to
distinguishamong theirhypotheses,(3) draw conclusions that
areappropriateand
~autious. Theboundariesbetween these stages arefuzzy—theyare
interrelated
~ndinterconnected(Klayman, 1995). However, we distinguish
among them

11. ecause theyinvolve different psychological processes.
Our strategythroughoutthe review is to considerfirst the
individual then the
‘ganization. For each stageof learning, we describe howan ideal
individual
irner might reason, andreview psychological research showing
how realmdi-
luals depart from this ideal. Then, we describe potential
cognitive repairsby
ich organizations might correct the individual shortcoming in
question.
6 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and
JOSHUAKLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs 7
Generating Hypotheses
In the first stage of the learning process individuals must
generate hypotheses
about the relationships amongevents.Subjectto constraints of
time andinforma-
tion, individuals should generate hypotheses that are deep(i.e.,
by considering
causesthat are more general or systemic) and broad(i.e., by
considering a larger
numberof potential causes).However,a greatdeal of
psychological researchsug-
geststhat individuals develop hypothesesthat are shallowand
narrow.
Individuals GenerateHypotheses thatareShallowRatherthanDeep
Individuals Searchfor Explanationsthat MakeThemselvesLook

12. Good
Individuals often conductshallow searches when theytry to
explain success or
failure becausethey search in a self-serving way(i.e., in a way
that allows them
to feel good about themselves).In a meta-analysisof 91 tests of
this self-serving
bias, Mullen and Riordan (1988)show that individuals typically
conclude that
their successesresulted from stable, internal factors (e.g.,
ability), butthat their
Jailures resultedfrom unstable,environmentalfactors (e.g.,
thedifficulty of the
environment, insufficient effort, or bad luck)(see alsoFiske &
Taylor, 1991,
pp. 78-82).
How might organizations repair self-servingbiases?Some
repairsmay be quite
simple: Traderson Wall Street are warned, “Don’t confuse
brains and a bullmar-
ket” (Odean, 1996).This compactphrase prompts individual
traders toconsider
the base rate of success inthe market, and it makes it
moredifficult for them to
indulge in self-servingexplanations for their success.
At FloridaPower andLight employeesdevelopeda new way to
fightself-serv-
ing biases afteran incident thatprominentlyfeatured
aJapaneseinspector for the
Deming Prizewho laterbecamea folk hero withinthe
company(Walton, 1990,
p. 61). To impressthe inspector,FP&L managerstook him to visit
a new facility

13. that had been constructed faster and moreeconomicallythan any
facility in the
history of theindustry.However, the Deming inspector did
notsimply accept the
results at face value and congratulate themon their “quality”
projectmanagement;
instead, he asked a number ofquestionsto determinewhythey
were so successful.
Themanagers’answerswere so inadequate that it soon
becameclearthatthey did
not understandenough about their success torecreateit in the
future. The inspec-
tor dismissed their “success” in hisJapanese-accentedEnglish—
”you were
rucky.” Later on his phrase, complete withaccent,became a
common repairfor
self-serving interpretationsof success.
The Deminginspectordeflated a self-serving biasby
consideringalternative
hypotheses for success (e.g., luck rather thanskill or
knowledge). Traditionally at
FP&L, managers were not questioned as long as they
achievedgood results. After
this incident managerswere much more likely to be asked to
explain their sue-
cesses.If they could notdo so, the verdictwould be delivered:
“you wererucky”
(Walton, 1990,p. 61). The strategic use of the accent was
designed to remindman-
agers about theearlier incident whereluck
produceddramaticresults that were
unlikely to be repeated.
Individuals Focuson PeopleRather thanSituations

14. Individuals alsogeneratea shallow set of hypotheses because
social settings
tend to highlight people as causes.In Westernculture individuals
typically choose
to explain events in terms of people’s actions and traits rather
than situationalfac-
tors (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett,
1991). In a recent
study observers heardanother studentgive a pro-life or pro-
choice speechon
abortion. Afterward, observers assumedspeakersheld attitudes
consistent with
their speeches even though the speeches were derived
fromscripts written by the
experimentersand even though the observers themselves told the
speakers which
position to speak for (Gilbert & Jones,1986).Similarly, Deming
(1982) describes
a company that used a varietyof flammableproducts in their
production process.
After analyzing the dataon fires, Deming found that the fires
were a stable and
predictableoutcomeof the production process.However,
according to Deming,
the companypresidentfocusedhis attentionselsewhere.He “sent a
letter toevery
one ofthe 10,500employeesof the company to plead with
themtoset fewer fires”
(p. 325).
People’s actions are frequently more obvious than their
situations.Therefore,
when individuals generate hypotheses about whyan event
occurred, their first
hypothesis is likely to bethat someperson caused it(e.g., Ross &

15. Nisbett,1991).
This tendency to focuson people rather than situations has
beendocumentedby-so
manyinvestigatorsin so many situations that it has
beencalledthefundamental
attributionerror(Ross,1977; for recent reviews see Ross &
Nisbett, 1991; Gilbert
& Malone, 1995).
Organizations might repair thefundamentalattributionerrorby
remindingiridi-
viduals toconsidercauses other than people,especiallythe
peoplewho are likely
to be closest to anyproblem: front-line workers.For example,an
old military
adage says, “Thereare no such things as bad troops, only
badofficers” (Cohen &
Gooch, 1990, p. 228). Parallel repairs are found in total quality
management
(TQM). Ishikawa says, “whenever mistakes occur, two-thirdsto
four-fifths of
responsibility rests with management” (Ishikawa,1985,p. ix).
Such maximsmay
partially repair thefundamentalattribution errorbecausethey
encourageindivid-
uals tolookbeyondthe front line. On the otherhand,they may
simply focus the
erroron people at ahigherlevel. Thus, abetter repairmay be one
from Deming,
who tells managers thatof the problems he has seen, “94%
belong to the system”
(Deming, 1982, p. 315). Ishikawa and Deming both use vivid
statistics toover-
comethe fundamentalattribution error even though it isunlikely
that either has

16. 8 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and
JOSHUAKLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs 9
conducteda preciseempirical analysis.Deming’s “94%” is
particularlynotewor-
thy because ofits apparent precision.
Individuals StopSearchingasSoon as TheyGenerateOne
Hypothesis
Self-serving biases andthe fundamentalattribution error are
specialcasesof a
much broader tendency:Individuals tend to stopsearchingfor a
causeas soonas
they locate a plausible candidate hypothesis(Gregory, Cialdini,
& Carpenter,
1982;Hoch, 1984).
To counterthis generaltendency,organizations have
developedsome repairs
that arewidely applicableacrossa numberof domains.In
onetechniqueknown as
the “Five Whys,” workersat Toyota learned to ask “why?”five
times beforethey
stoppedgenerating hypotheses. Whenthey did so, they were
more likely tofind a
root cause ratherthan a superficialone.Imai (1986) illustrates
thetechniquewith
the following example:
Question1:
Answer I:
Question2:
Answer2:

17. Question3:
Answer3:
Question4:
Answer4:
Question5:
AnswerS:
Why did the machine stop?
Because the fuseblew dueto an overload.
Why wastherean overload?
Becausethe bearinglubrication was inadequate.
Why wasthe lubricationinadequate?
Becausethe lubrication pumpwas not functioningright.
Why wasn’tthe lubricating pumpworking right’?
Becausethe pump axle woreout.
Why wasit worn out?
Because sludgegot in.
Imai arguesthat by asking “why” five times,workers identified
“the real cause
and therefore the realsolution: attaching astrainerto the
lubricating pump. If
workers had notgone through such repetitive questions,they
might havesettled
with an intermediatecountermeasure,such asreplacingthe fuse”
(Imai, 1986, p.
50). Another illustrationof the Five Whys deals directly with
thefundamental
attribution error: “Problem: He doesn’t manage well. (1)Why?
He’s not on the
floor. (2)Why?He’s in the equipment room. (3) Why? The
newest equipment isn’t
working. (4) Why? Purchasing gave the supplier a short
leadtime. (5) Why?Poor
planning system”(Forum, 1992, p. 54). In general, when
individuals ask“why”

18. the first time, they are likely to developanswersthat invoke
somesalient, recent,
or proximal event (e.g.,someperson’sactions). Subsequentwhys
are likely to
cause individuals to think more broadly and situationally.
Although the Five Whys is an admirable cognitive repair
becauseof its power
and simplicity,individuals may find it difficult to executeby
themselves.When
individuals have one good hypothesis in mind,that
hypothesisoften blocks their
ability to seealternatives(Gregory,Cialdini, & Carpenter,1982;
Gnepp & Klay-
man,1992; Mynatt, Doherty,& Dragan, 1993).For example,
Hoch (1984) found
that subjectswho generatedpro reasons for buying aproducthad
more difficulty
generating conreasonsimmediately afterward.
If individuals find itdifficult to generate alternate hypotheseson
their own,then
organizationsmay repairshallow searchby confronting
individuals with others
who are expertin asking questionsthat reveal deep causes.
AtMicrosoft, Bill
Gateshas by personal example, encouraged aculturethat relieson
relentlessques-
tioning. Says oneWindows manager, “yougo into the meetings
andyou come out
just sweating because, if there is anyflaw, he will land on it
immediately and pick
itto bits” (Cusumano &Selby, 1995,p. 25). Employees “overuse”
terms borrowed
from Gates,like “drill down” asa euphemism for “going into

19. more detail” (“What
Bill GatesReally Wants,” 1995).
A similar cognitive repair isfound in theorganizationthat
administersthe Dem-
ing quality prize. Here, official Deming
inspectorsexaminemanagers using a
techniquecalled“single-caseborequestions.”They begin with
broad exploratory
queries andthen relentlessly delve down intoweaknessesand
omissions inthe
answersthey receive. Single-case borequestionssometimes
identifycausesthat
arequite deep. For example,FloridaPower andLight often had to
deal with power
outagesthat occurredwhen a treefell on a powerline and
severedit. To improve
the reliability of its service,FP&L organized a unit to trim all
the trees in sites
where damage had occurred, and thus prevent future outages.
Managers at FP&L
congratulated themselves for creating aprocedurethat
preventedfutureproblems.
However, the Deming inspectors were not satisfied with
theproceduresince~itpre-
vented problems only in areas that had already experienced
acrisis.Theysearched
for a solution at adeeperlevel, and askedmanagersa numberof
questionsabout
what might beconsideredforestry! What kind of trees grow in
theregion?Do
palms grow faster or slowerthan oaks? Managersat FP&L
realized they did not
know the answers to these questions, and thatthey had not
searcheddeeply
enough tosolve their problems. After their experience with

20. single-caseboreques-
tions, FP&L managers consulted with foresters anddevelopeda
regularmainte-
nanceprocedureto trim trees basedon their growth ratesand
acrossthe entire
region, notjust in areas wheretreeshad previously severed lines
Afterparticipat-
ing in sessionsof this kind with the
Deminginspectors,managersat the firm
learned to ask single-case borequestionsin their own internal
discussions, thus
institutionalizingthis cognitive repair(Walton, 1990,pp. 57-63).
Individuals GenerateHypothesesthat areNarrow
RatherThanBroad
In an ideal world individual learnerswould not only
generatedeeperhypothe-
ses;they would alsoconsidera broad ratherthan narrow set of
potentialhypothe-
ses. However, even when individuals generate
alternativehypotheses,their
“alternatives” often differonly slightly from one another,and all
lie within the
same general frame.For example,participants in
oneexperimentwere asked to
considerthe serious parking problem facedby their university,
and they were
10 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and
JOSHUAKLAYMAN
Cognitive Repairs 11
given time togenerateas manysolutionsasthey could (Gettys

21. etal., 1987).Com-
bined,participants generated about300 solutionsthat
researcherswere later able
to classify into about seven majorcategories.One category, for
example,sug-
gested ways to reduce demand for parking (e.g.,by increasing
parking fees) and
anothersuggested waystouse parking moreefficiently (e.g.,by
segregatingpark-
ing slots according tosize). The averageparticipantproposed
about11 solutions
but these11 solutionsrepresented only about three of the seven
possiblecatego-
ries. The authors askedan independentpanel ofexpertsto compile
a completelist
of high-qualitysolutions, andthey used thiscompletelist to
assesshow many
solutionswere missedby eachindividual. The typical participant
missed from70
to 80 percent of the high-quality solutions.However, when
asked, individuals
believedthey had missed only25 percent.
Evenexpertsfail toconsiderahrQadrangeof alternative
hypotheses.Forexam-
ple, one group ofresearchersshowed professional
automechanicsa “fault tree”
that listed a number of hypotheses aboutwhy a car might
notstart (e.g., battery,
starting system,fuel system,ignition). Some mechanics were
presented with a
“full tree” that containedsevenspecific hypotheses,otherswere
givena ‘~pruned
tree” that omittedsome important hypotheses (e.g. the ignition
system). The
resultsindicatedthat when hypotheses were prunedoff the tree,

22. mechanics did not
adequatelyconsiderthem (Fischhoff,Slovic, &
Lichtenstein,1978).
How might organizationsrepair narrow search by
individuals?Individuals
might search more broadly ifthey arecuedto think about a
problem from different
perspectives.At Sharp, employees are told to be “dragonfliesbut
not flatfish.”
Dragonflieshavecompound eyes and see things from multiple
perspectives at
once, butflatfish havelargeeyes that onlylookin one direction
(Nonaka &Takeu-
chi, 1995).
The “dragonfly” repair exhorts individuals toconsiderdifferent
perspectives,
but thismay be difficult for individuals to do by themselves.
Organizations might
repairnarrow search more effectivelyby encouraging
individualsto- recruit others
who havedifferent perspectives. A good example of this is
providedby Bridge-
stone Tire,which conducts “kokai watches”
togeneratealternative hypotheses for
improving workpractices.During akokai watch a group ofup to a
dozenpeople,
from different areas of afactory, gather for a few hours to watch
otherswork. In
one four-hour watch adozenpeople identified63 potential
dangers with a new
machine(Walton, 1990,pp. 200-201).
The kokai watchhas a numberof features that ensure that
watchersgeneratea

23. broadarray of hypotheses. First, it mandates alargenumber of
watchers (up to
12). Second, it selects watchers from a variety of different
areas—in one kokai
watchthat examineddie and material changes, watchers included
a plantvisitor,
a memberof the humanresourcesstaff, a chemist, and a project
manager. “The
idea was that people could observe a process, even thosewho
were strangers toit,
with fresheyes,seeing thingsthat closelyinvolved workersmight
not” (Walton,
1990, p. 200). Third, it ensures that watchers do
notdiscardhypothesesprema-
turely. The watchersare instructed to “write down
anything,‘Hey, looks like the
guy is walking toomuch,’ or ‘Looks like he’snot handlingthe
knife right”’ (Wal-
ton, 1990,p. 201). Only after watchers generate
hypothesesindependentlyarethe
results combined andfiltered.
Otherorganizational procedures also repairnarrow individual
searchby ensur-
ing that individuals generate hypothesesindependently.For
example, when
Motorola formscross-functionalteams toevaluate new
products,they do not
allow employees who have participated in one product team to
participate in
anotherteam with a similarproduct. This prohibition limitsthe
pool of potential
team members in acostlyway; evaluation teamsinvolve six to
nine people and
spendtwo to three months to develop a business plan for the

24. newproduct. How-
ever, by consciously disregardingprevious experience,Motorola
allows new
teams to develop recommendations independently from previous
teams. At the
same time, Motorolaavoids losing the knowledgeof previous
“veterans”—they
serve asa “review team” that evaluatesthe recommendationsof
the newestteam.2
Other repairsensure that a broad range ofalternativesare
consideredsimulta-
neously.Somecompaniesdivide aproductdevelopmentteam into
competingsub-
groups which develop separate projectproposals,and only later
recombine to
debatethe advantages and disadvantages of theindependent
proposals.Again, this
strategy is costly because it is redundant.However, it may have
advantages
becausethe built-in independenceensuresthat different subgroups
will approach
a problemfrom different perspectives (Nonaka &
Takeuchi,1995,p. 14).
CollectingInformation
In the second stage of the learning process ideal
learnerscollectinformation to
test and revise their hypotheses. Therearetwo main sources of
such information:
the information that individuals already have in their memory
and theinformation
that they collect from theenvironment.Both kinds of information
have potential
flaws, but individuals mightminimizethese flawsif they

25. collectedinformationin
a rigorousway. However, learnersdo not always actas
thoughthey are awareof
the potential flaws in their information—they frequentlycollect
only a small,
biasedsample.
Individuals OftenCollectSmall Samplesof Information
Individuals often collect only a limited sample of
informationbecausethey are
constrainedby time or attention.In a classicstudy, Payne (1976)
asked hissub-
jectsto chooseone apartmentout of a number of alternatives,
each of which was
describedon severaldifferent dimensions(e.g., rent, cleanliness,
landlordquality,
noiselevel). Whensubjects chose among only two apartments,
theytendedto con-
sider all of the information beforethey decided.However,
individuals searcheda
smaller and smaller percentage of information as more
informationbecameavail-
12 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK,
andJOSHUAKLAYMAN Cognitive Repairs 13
able. For example, one subject, whowas decidingamong 12
apartmentscharac-
terized on eight different dimensions,looked at only about 25
percent of the
information beforemakinga final choice.
It would be reasonable forindividual learners to collect only a

26. smallsampleof
information ifthey performed acost/benefitanalysis and
decidedthat collecting a
large sample was too costly. However, there is evidence that
individuals collect
only a smallsampleof information becausethey systematically
underestimate the
benefits of larger samples. Tversky andKahneman(1971)
arguethat individuals
typically believe that small sampleswill be quite similar to the
population from
which theyare drawn. They labeled thisbeliefthe “lawof small
numbers” tohigh-
light that it contradictsthe statistical “law of large numbers,”
whicharguesthat
samplescan yield an accurate picture of a population whenthey
are sufficiently
large. When individuals believe in the law of small
numbers,they assumethat any
samplewill be sufficient,no matterhow small.
At the extreme,individuals may not collect any information
from the external
environment becausethey believe that they already have
adequate information
stored in theirhead.Organizations may overcome thistendencyby
encouraging or
requiring individuals tocollectlarger samples. This kind of
repair ispervasivein
writings on TQM. “In promoting statistical qualitycontrol,we
have used theslo-
gan, ‘Let ustalk with data”’ (Ishikawa,1985,p. 200). At
manyTQM companies
one of the main principles of the quality effort is
“Managementby Fact” (Walton,

27. 1990,p. 37).
And TQM not only talks aboutdata, it provides individuals with
toolsthat help
themcollectand analyzedata.For example, six of the
“SevenTools” of TQM pro-
vide ways tocollectdata (e.g., checksheets) or to simplify and
display largequan-
tities of data(e.g., histograms, scatter plots, Pareto diagrams,
control charts)
(Deming, 1982;Imai, 1986;Ishikawa,1982, 1985;Juran,1992).
Individuals Collect BiasedSamplesof Information
Individual learners not only collect smallsamplesof
information,they alsotend
to collect samplesthat are biased (i.e., that are
unrepresentativeof the larger
world). Consider the commonclaims that “the otherline
alwaysmovesfaster” or
“it only rains after I wash mycar.” Unless we want to
believethat a malevolent
spirit is in charge of such harassment, these
examplesdemonstratethat ourmem-
oriesdo not store a randomsampleof all waiting times orall
rainstorms—weare
more likely torememberthe rainstorms thatspoil the finishon-
ourfreshlywashed
car. Even whenindividualscollectinformation from
theoutsidework1(rath~vtha~i
from memory),they do not always attend tothe most relevant
andimportantinfor-
mation.Below, we discuss anumberof factorsthat might lead
individual learners

28. to collect biased samples.
Individuals Only Consider AvailableInformation
As indicatedby the car wash example, individuals often collect
biased samples
because they collect information that is easilyavailable in
memory, for example,
because it isespeciallyvivid or recent. The problemis that
individuals typically
assumethat the information that is availableis also most
frequent, probable, and
causally important(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This
assumption is often
wrong. Individuals dramaticallyoverestimatethe likelihood of
vivid causes of
deathlike accidents or homicides, and they underestimate
thelikelihood of less
vivid causeslike disease or strokes.Individuals estimate that
accidents causedas
many deaths as diseases andthat homicides wereas commonas
strokes. Infact,
diseasestake 16 times more livesthan accidents and strokes
take11 times more
lives than homicides. Individuals also overweight
recentinformation. They
assume that the most recent flood provides an upper boundon
possibleflood dam-
age, and the purchase of earthquake insurance “increases
sharply after aquakeand
then decreases steadilyas memories fade”(Slovic, Fischhoff, &
Lichtenstein,
1982,p. 465).
Many organizationsrepair individuals’ tendencyto rely on
biased,available

29. informationby instituting a process that collects information
more systematically.
At a Motorola division that develops equipment forcellular
phone systems, one
group realizedthat an availability bias was causing it to
overlook certaincustom-
ers when it evaluated new products. The unit assigned account
managers only to
large accounts, so when managers evaluated newproducts,they
primarily consid-
ered the needs and requirements of only
largecustomers.However, the unit also
serveda numberof smaller customersthat did not have theirown
accountman-
ager. Together,these small customersaccountedfor a
largepercentageof reve-
nues. Motorola overcame theavailability bias by developing a
Feature
PrioritizationProcess; theysurveyedcustomersup to four times a
year andthen
weightedall of the inputsbasedon customervolume andpriority.3
Hospitals also have a variety ofproceduresto force individuals
tocollectinfor-
mation more systematically. Trauma physicians are often
confrontedby vivid but
potentially misleading information. One doctor states that,
contrary to what one
might expect, stabbings and bullet woundsare “relatively
straightforward affairs”
becausethey leave“clear trackson the body.” Other injuries are
more difficult to
treat becausethey leave no visible cues. “It would be all too
human to focuson a
laceratedscalp—agory but basically insignificantinjury—and
miss a fractured

30. thighbone that hadinvisibly severedamajorartery”
(Rosenthal,1994,p. 48). The
medical profession has developed a series of strict protocolsfor
traumasituations
that allow doctors toquickly collect all the relevant information,
not just that
which is salient. For example, when a patient firstentersthe
emergencyroom,
physiciansfollow the “ABCs”; they establishairway, then
breathing, thencircu-
lation.4 For situationsthat are more critical, such
ascardiacemergencies,proto-
cols are even more rigorous and specific.
14 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and JOSHUA
KLAYMAN 15
Cognitive Repairs
If individuals tend to focuson information that is
highlyavailable,it is notter-
ribly surprising that they are frequently unaware of missing
information. Even
when information is present, learnersdo not pay as much
attention to whatdoesn’t
happenas what does (Agostinelli, Sherman,Fazio, & Hearst,
1986; Newman,
Wolff, & Hearst,1980).
Certain professions andorganizationshave learned to repair the
tendency to
ignore missing information. Homicide detectives learn to notice
the absenceof
itemsat murderscenes, sincemany murderers takebacksomething
that belongs to

31. them after committingthe crime.“You look atwhat’s beentaken
andyou find out
who it belongedto originally” (Fletcher,1990,p. 75).
A particularly importantform of missing information is the
absence ofexperi-
ence with highly unusualevents.Bank examiners rarely see a
bank fail,nuclear
techniciansrarely see a meltdown, airline personnel
rarelywitnessa crash(March,
Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991; Perrow, 1984). Certain organizations
institutionalize
proceduresthat encourage individuals to pay attention to
suchinformation:desjtito
the factthat such eventsare unlikely to beavailablein their own
experience. For
example,at the Federal Reserve Bank, which certifies the
security of banks, senior
bank examinersdeliberately recountstoriesof failed banks to
keepjunior exam-
iners aware thatthey should bevigilant.5 At one bank’s
commerciallending
department, senior creditofficers would hold seminars and
informal brown-bag
lunches todiscusspast lending mistakes, particularly in areas
characterizedby
unusual or rare events(e.g., “problems with highly leveraged
companies, real
6
estate, environmentalliability on contaminatedproperty”). By
forcing individu-
als to rehearse suchinformation,organizations help individuals
learn fromvicar-
ious experiencesthat are rare but highlyinformative.
Furthermore,organizations

32. remind individuals of potentially painful information that self-
serving biases
would make thempreferto ignore.
IndividualsCollect BiasedInformation Basedon Their
PreexistingTheories
Researchsuggests that individuals tend to think of “facts,
experiences, and
arguments thatsupporta current hypothesis more readilythan
those that refuteit”
(Klayman, 1995; see also, Baron,1988; Kunda, 1990; Nisbett &
Ross, 1980).
Thus, whenindividuals collect information from memory,they
may focus on
information that supports their preexistingtheories.Individuals
may also do this
whenthey collectinformation from the externalenvironment.For
example, when
individuals collect information fromothers,they often
askspecific, directive
questions thatare likely to elicit the answer they expect
(Hodgins& Zuckerman,
1993; Zuckerman,Knee,Hodgins, & Miyake, 1995).
The Chicago Board of Trade has astaffof in-
houseinvestigatorswhoscrutinize
tradesthat may violate exchange rules.
Intheseinvestigations,which areobvi-
ously quite sensitive,it is veryimportantthat investigatorsdo not
collectinforma-
tion that is biasedby their initial theories.To repair
thistendency,the investigators
are trainedto avoid questionsthat canbe answered with a yes or
no response.

33. “This forcesan investigator to askopen-endedquestionsand
allows her to draw
out as much information aboutthe situation as possible.”
Byasking open-ended
questions,investigatorsavoid the possibility of directing the
interview in a way
thatelicits only information that is consistentwith their
preexistingtheories.7
Someorganizationshave developed maxims that seem designed
to encourage
individuals tocollectdataratherthan relyingon their (potentially
biased) theories.
At BridgestoneTire employees use two Japaneseterms:
genbutsu(actual product)
and genba(actual place)(Walton, 1990,p. 194). Theseterms
remind employees
not to rely on their own theories, but to actuallygo out
andinvestigatethe actual
product in the actualplace where the problemsarose. Another
group (Forum,
1992)uses a similar cognitive repair they call thethreeactualrule:
(I) Go to the
actual place; (2)Seethe actual problem;(3) Talk to the actual
peopleinvolved.
Individuals ConsiderOnly Part of the RelevantInformation
Finally, individual learners maycollectbiased samples because
they tendto col-
lect information fromonly one small corner of the universe of
information. This
arises from basic cognitive processes. Memory isassociative—
whenindividuals
retrieve onepiece of information, theytend to think of other
information thatis

34. linked to it by strong associations,commonfeatures,or similar
meaning. Even
when individualscollect information from the external
environment,they are
likely to collect informationbasedon the samekind of associative
process.
Researchin cognitive psychology hasshownthat individuals
attend to andprocess
information more comprehensively when they have a
mentalschemathat tells
them what information is needed in a given situation and where
to findit (Ander-
son, 1995).
Accordingly,organizationscan repair biased
informationcollectionby provid-
ing individuals with aschemathat reminds them of the full range
of relevantinfor-
mation.Many schemas of this kindcanbe found in
thefinancialservicesindustry,
where individuals must assess a wide varietyof information
todeterminewhether
to buy, sell, or lend.At the FederalReserveBank of NewYork,
the BankExami-
nationsgroup protects the FDIC insurance fund by ensuring that
individual banks
are in soundfinancialcondition.Whenreviewing
eachbank,examiners use arat-
ing system knownas CAMEL: they review Capital
adequacy,Assetquality, Man-
agement, Earnings, andLiquidity.8 In another bank’s
commercial loan
department,creditanalysts use the “Five Cs of
Credit”:Collateral,Capacity,Cap-
ital, Conditions, andCharacter.9

35. Organizational schemaslike CAMEL and the Five Cs are likely
to encourage
individuals tocollect a broaderrangeof information than they
wouldnormally
collect.It wouldbe very easyfor individual learnersto
collectinformationon only
on themost salientfactors(such as cashflow in a loan
decision).Although cash
flow is certainlyimportant, it canalsobe misleadingor
unreliable,particularly in
16 CHIPHEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK,
andJOSHUAKLAYMAN Cognitive Repairs 17
an environment where conditions are changing. By emphasizing
the FiveCs, a
bank canrepair the tendencyof individual analysts to neglect
informationabout
importantvariablesthat are less obvious orare harder to assess.
For example, the
Five Cs reminds loanofficers to considercharacter—Whatare the
management
skills of the owners? Dothey have good personalcredit
records?Although the
answersto such questionsare quite important,
individualanalystsmight forget to
ask them in a numbers-oriented environmentlike a bank, without
acognitive
repairlike the FiveCs.
Individuals WhoCollect BiasedInformation Fail to Correctfor
Bias
We have discussed a number of factorsthat might lead

36. individual learners to
collect biased information.However, even if
learnerscollectbiased information,
they might still be able to draw effective conclusion as long as
theyrecognizedthe
bias and corrected forit. Forexample,supposean individual made
the statement,
“the otherline alwaysmovesfaster,”but thenremindedherself that
suchsituations
might be overlyavailablein her memory.This kind of correction
improves the
conclusions drawn from even a biased sample.On the other
hand, even ifindivid-
uals are aware thatthey have collected biased information,they
may not know
how to correctfor biases after thefact. For example, after
individuals ask biased
questions and therefore receive biased answers,they do not take
into accounthow
much theanswerswere biasedby their initial questions
(Zuckerman, Knee, Hod-
gins, & Miyake, 1995).
Because individualsdo not always correcttheir information
forbiases,some
organizationsattempt to ensure that individualscollectunbiased
samplesfrom-the
start. Microsoft requires itssoftware developersto use the
sameprogramsand
machinesthat areusedby their customers.For example,
programmers whowere
developingthe new Windows NT operating system ran the
current day’sversion
of the programasthey programmed the next day’s version.
AtMicrosoftthis pro-

37. cess isknown as “eating yourown dog food.” It ensuresthat
developers collect a
large, unbiasedsample of information about the current state of
the program.If
Windows NT crashed while a developer wasdesigninga new
printerdriver, he
had tofix the problem with NT before he could return to his
driver (Cusumano &
Selby, 1995,p. 331). Microsoft also requiresdevelopersto use the
same machine
usedby customers,a requirement thathas been “controversial at
times” because
developers like to have thefastest, coolest machineson their
desks. However,
when developershavebettertechnology than
theaveragecustomerthey collect
biased information abouthow well their software
programsperform.One man-
ager said,“every time I’ve had a project where thedevelopershad
hardware that
was a generation beyond what customers had, the [software]
always hadperfor-
mance problems” (Cusumano &Selby, 1995,p. 347).
Byrequiringdevelopersto
use the same machines as their customers,Microsoft forces them
to collectan
unbiased sample of information about theoperatingspeed and
memory demands
of the softwarethey are developing.
DrawingConclusions
After generating hypotheses and collectinginformation,ideal
learners should

38. evaluatethe information they have collected and
drawconclusionsthat areappro-
priate andcautious.Researchers have suggestedthreemain
classesof problems
that real individuals facewhenthey interpretevidence. First, they
often weigh
information in a way that is not statisticallyappropriate—
forexample, they
emphasizethe importanceof extreme evidence butthey do not
emphasize therel-
ative amount of extreme versus non-extreme evidence. A
second, even more
insidious problem is that individuals use their initial theoriesto
interpretthe evi-
dence. While individuals may readily accept information that is
consistentwith
their initial hypothesis,they cast a critical eyeon information
thatcontradictsit.
Third, as a resultof the two previous processes
andothers,individuals frequently
drawconclusionsthat are overconfident and overly optimistic.
Individuals WeighVivid and Extreme EvidenceMore Heavily
Once individuals have collected information,how shouldthey
combine it and
weigh it? An ideal learnerwould weigh informationbasedon the
quality of the
information.However,actual learnersdo not
alwaysassignappropriateweights to
all aspectsof the decision.For example, they tendto weigh more
vivid, easily
imagined information more heavily(Keller & McGill,
1994).They also focuson
the extremity or strength of theavailableinformation (e.g., the
warmth of arec-

39. ommendation letter) without adequately attending tothe amount
or weightof the
evidence(e.g., the writer’s amountof contactwith the
recommendee)(Griffin &
Tversky, 1992).
If individuals tend tooveremphasizevivid or
extremeinformation, organiza-
tions might prevent thisby requiring individuals
toconsciouslyclassifyinforma-
tion according to its appropriate weight. Manycompanieshave
internal audit
groupsthat examine the records of company divisions to ensure
that they areusing
proper accounting proceduresand spending moneyon legitimate
expenses.An
audit usually uncoversa variety of major andminor
“exceptions”(i.e., situations
where correctprocedureswere not followed). One auditor
saysthat auditors must
be careful not to “place too much emphasison memorableerrors,
e.g., an error in
the president’s expensereportor the misuseof the companycar.”
One auditing
group repaired this temptationby first classifying
eachexceptionas major or
in
minor then consciously ignoring theminor issues.
Consistent with the tendency tooverweightthe extremityof
information and
ignore the amount, individuals frequentlyplace higher weighton
one vivid case
than on a much larger sample of information. Joseph Stalin is
reported to have

40. 18 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, andJOSHUA
KLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs 19
said, “The death of a single Russian soldier isa tragedy.A
million deathsis a sta-
tistic” (Nisbett & Ross,1980,p. 43). In a studythat supports this
observation,Bor-
gida andNisbett (1977) showedsome students a statistical
summary ofhow
dozensof students hadratedvariouscoursesin the previous term.
Other students
attended a panel discussion, during whichtwo or three upper-
division students
rated eachcourseon a numerical scale and providedsomegeneric,
uninformative
comments. Despite the factthat the statistical summary provided
students with a
larger amountof information, individuals who heard the
smallsample of vivid
information were more likely to change thecoursesthey selected.
Microsoft also discoveredthat
individualsdiscountlargesamplesof statistical
information.At one point, Microsoft started surveying users to
seehow many of
them found it easy tousea particularfeature. Softwaredevelopers
often refused to
believe the statistics.“The usability groupwould tell the
development group‘Six
out often couldn’t dothis.’ And thedeveloper’sreactionwould be,
‘Where’d you
find six dumbpeople?”’(Cusumano &Selby, 1995,p. 379).In
order to repair this

41. tendencyto ignore base rateinformation,Microsoft made the
information more
vivid. It built a “usability test lab” where developers can watch
real usersstruggle
with new productsfrom behind a one-waymirror. Instead of
presentingdevelop-
ers with pallid statistics, the test lab presents them with real
people(albeita mxtch
smallersample).The lab managersaysthat when developers see
auser, “twenty
ideasjust immediately come tomind. First of all, you
immediately empathize with
the person. Theusual nonsense answer‘Well, they canjust look
in the manual if
they don’t know how to useit,’ or ‘My idea is brilliant;you just
found ten stupid
people’...that kind of stuffjust goes out thedoor...” (Cusumano
&Selby, 1995,p.
379). This cognitive repair is interesting because it uses
onekind of bias (over-
weighting of extreme, orvivid information) to fight another
(underweighting of
statisticalinformation).
IndividualsUse Their PreexistingTheoriesto Interpret the
Evidence
Individuals not only weigh information inappropriately,they
also havediffi-
culty interpreting information independently of their
preexistingtheories.Instead
of using the information to test theirtheories,they use their
theories to test their
information. This often leads them todiscountinformation that
disagrees with
their preexistingbeliefs.

42. In a classic demonstration of such discounting, Lord, Ross, and
Lepper (1979)
selectedundergraduateswho strongly supported or opposed
capital punishment
and presented them withtwo purportedacademic studiesthat
evaluated capital
punishment’seffectivenessusing very different methods. A study
using one
methodfound that capital punishmentwas effective and a study
using the other
methodfound it was ineffective (the
researcherscounterbalancedwhich method
was associated with whichresult). Participantsapplaudedthe
positive aspects of
whichevermethodsupported theirown preexistingtheory, andthey
critiqued the
“design flaws” in the other. In fact, after receivingmixed results
fromthe two
studies, subjectsbecamemoreconvincedof the validity of their
original position.
Seemingly, they regardedthe evidence as “one good studythat
supports my
beliefs, and one lousy studythat draws the wrong
conclusions.”Individual sub-
jects thus failed to evaluate the incoming information separately
from theirpreex-
isting theories. Unfortunately, similar results have been
notedwith professional
scientists(Mahoney,1976;Koehler, 1993).
One bank helped itsloan officers repair the waythey interpret
evidenceby
encouragingthem toconsidera nonstandardtheory of lending.In
mortgagelend-

43. ing, loan officers oftenlookfor reasonsto deny loans because
loans are difficult to
make (they are subject to a mountain ofregulations)and
potentially quite costly
(e.g.,foreclosureon a badloan maycostup to 20% of the property
value). Thus,
the initial hypothesis in manyloan decisions isthat an applicant
should be denied
a loan unless proven otherwise. One mortgageloan
departmentgrew at an annual
rate of30 percentby forcing loan officers toconsideran
alternative to the standard
hypothesis.Instead of asking whetheran applicant should
bedenieda mortgage
loan, it asked whether theapplicantshould beapproved.This
reversalled the
departmentto develop specialprogramsfor qualified
applicantswho had low
incomes or other specialcircumstances.11
Individuals use their theoriestodevelopexpectationsabout what
is normal, and
they frequently label unexpected events as “problems” or
“failures.” These labels
may be misleading,however, particularly in research
anddevelopmentwhere
unexpected events may point the way to
importantbreakthroughs.One research
organization has developed a repair that discourages individuals
from thinking
that unexpected events are
failures(Sapolsky,1997).JacksonLaboratoriesbreeds
mice that exhibit physiologicalor behavioraltraits that are of
interest to medical
researchers.For example,it sells mice that lack growthhormoneto
researchers

44. who are interested inunderstandingthe biology of mammalian
growth. It found
that the animal technicians (e.g.,the peoplewho cleanedthe
cages) often noticed
unusual behaviorthat was scientifically important. The mice that
lacked growth
hormone were discoveredby a technician who noticed
aparticularmouse that
didn’t grow at a normal rate. Another technician noticed a
mousethat didn’t
respond normally to the loudnoisesthatoccurredwhen the cages
werecleaned--
its offspring were found to be susceptible
tohereditarydeafness.After several
experienceslike this where
unexpectedbehaviorproducedimportantdiscoveries,
the company started holding regular meetings with
animaltechniciansto inquire
whetherthey have spottedanything unusual.Theseforums for
highlighting the
importanceof unexpected eventsare called“deviant searches.”
CRSS,an architecturalfirm, developeda special position to repair
the problem
of theory-based interpretationof evidence.“Most designerslove
to draw,to make
‘thumbnail sketches’,”says one manager, but this rush todraw
conclusionsis
often premature.CRSScreateda uniquejob description,the
“programmer,” to
ensurethat somemembers of its design teams were not allowing
theirown theo-
20 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK,

45. andJOSHUAKLAYMAN Cognitive Repairs 21
ries to dominate the waythey evaluated information from
clients.Programmers
arenot in charge ofdesigningor problem solving,they are in
chargeof “problem
seeking.” They are trained touse techniques that help them to
resist premature
conclusions,and thus listen more carefully to clients. “The
experienced, creative
I programmerj withholdsjudgment,resists pre-conceived
solutions andthe pres-
sure to synthesize...he refuses to make sketches until heknows
the client’sprob-
lem” (Peters,1992,p. 402).
Often, organizationsensure that individuals weigh information
effectivelyby
forcing them to interact with others who might weighthe
informationdifferently.
One researcher hasexploredwhether training as a scientist cures
the problemsthat
other individuals have in evaluatingevidence(Dunbar,1995).The
answer isno.
For example,scientists,especiallyyoung ones, often believethat a
singleexperi-
mental result hasjust resolvedan important problem. However,
when Dunbar
studied aset of microbiologylabsthat had been particularly
successful, he found
that they placed more emphasison group lab meetings. At
thesemeetingsanindi-
vidual scientist presented his or herresultsto a varietyof
skeptical,uninvolved
peers.Whenthe individual scientist presented a striking new
piece of evidence

46. (e.g., I have detectedEnzymeZ in a biological process where
ithas never been
observedbefore), theindividual’s peers were typically quite
willing to propose
alternate ways of interpreting the evidence (e.g.,the samplewas
contaminated
with residual Enzyme Z from a prior procedure). In successful
labs, even when
individual scientists failed to weigh a particular piece of
evidence appropriately,
their peersdid so for them. Moreover, the most successful labs
werethose that
includedmemberswith different training and backgrounds.Such
“lab meetings”
are not limited to successfulmolecularbiology labs; similar
meetings takeplaceat
venture capitalfirms wherefirms decide whether to allocate
money tonew ven-
tures (Kaplan,1995).
IndividualsDraw Conclusions thatare Overconfidentand Overly
Optimistic
Imagine that individuals havegenerateda set of hypotheses,
collectedsome
new information, and interpreted the relevanceof the
information for the initial
hypotheses. How much confidence should they place in the
conclusionsthey have
drawn?If individual learners were adequately cautious, their
conclusionswould
reflect the degree ofuncertaintyin the dataon which they are
based.Over the
years, researchhas documentedthat individuals often express
morecertaintyin
their conclusionsthan is warrantedby the factsavailable to them

47. (or by their
actual performance). This kind of problem has
beendocumentedextensively in
laboratorystudies,but also infield studies of
individualjudgmentin a variety of
professions,like the civil engineers in theintroduction(Griffin &
Tversky, 1992;
Lichtenstein,Fischhoff, &Phillips, 1982; Russo &
Schoemaker,1992).
Individualsoften exhibit aparticularkind of overconfidencethat
we mightlabel
a planningfallacy (Buehler, Griffin,& Ross,1994)or
anoptimismbias. Thisopti-
mism bias ispervasivein work environments. Software
developers at Microsoft
often experience burnout becausethey “grossly
underestimate”how long it will
takethem to accomplish certaintasks (Cusumano &Selby, 1995,
p. 94). Organi-
zationsdo not always successfully overcome this individual
bias. A study ofpio-
neerprocessplantsrevealed that thetypical plant experienced
actual construction
costs that were almostdouble the originalprojections;similarly, a
study ofstart-
ups showed that morethan 80 percentfell short of their projected
marketshare
(Davis, 1985). Theseexamples suggest that individualsdraw
conclusionsthat
underestimate the amount of uncertainty and error in their
predictions, butthey
tend todo it asymmetrically—theyrarely overestimate a project’s
cost or time to
completion.

48. Of course, individuals maydisplayan optimismbiasbecausethey
confrontmis-
alignedincentives.Perhaps if engineerscorrectlyestimated the
true cost of a new
energy plant, decision makers might choose not to buildit.
However, the real
causesof theoptimismbias seem to be cognitive, since
individuals areoverconfi-
dent by the same magnitude even in labexperimentsthat
rewardaccuracy.For
example,individuals typically assumethat their predictions are
more precisethan
they are.Whenthey are askedtoset confidenceintervals around a
quantity, so that
theirconfidenceinterval has a98 percentchanceof including the
true answer,they
are typically surprisedby the true answer not2 percent of the
time, but20 to 50
percent (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, &Phillips, 1982; Russo &
Schoemaker,1992).
How might organizationsrepairindividual tendencies
towardoptimism bias
and overconfidence? One strategy is to allow individuals to
makeoverconfident
predictions, thenadjustthem overtly. This was the
strategypursuedby the engi-
neering profession withits safety factors. Microsoft uses
asimilar strategy tocor-
rect the overly optimistic projections of individual
softwaredevelopers:It has
rules about the amountof buffertime that should beaddedto
projects.For reason-
ably well-understoodprogrammingchallenges,suchas
applicationsprogramslike

49. Excel andWord, Microsoft typically adds buffer timethat
constitutes30 percent
of the schedule.However,for operatingsystemslike Windows,
where developers
mustcreatea system thathas to mesh effectively with
numerouspiecesof hard-
ware and software, Microsoft may add buffertime that reaches50
percent
(Cusumano &Selby, 1995).Similar repairs have evolved
inotherindustries. At
one Big Six accounting firm, where teams mustprepareformal
plans for acon-
sulting engagement,projectleadersdevelop their best estimatesof
time, expense,
t2
andcontingencycosts, thenincreasethe finalnumberby 15 percent.
This repair
has evolved despite the fact that this environmentprovidessome
incentives to
underestimatecosts—bidsthat are too highmay not be accepted.
WhenMicrosoft adds buffer time to a schedule, it corrects the
predictions of
overconfident individualsby overriding them.However, it has
also developed
proceduresthat help individual developers decrease their
initiallevel of overcon-
fidence. For example, the company has improved itsschedulesby
requiringdevel-
opers tocreatea detailed work planthat specifies which tasksthey
will perform
22 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK,

50. andJOSHUAKLAYMAN Cognitive Repairs
during specific windowsof time. Says one manager, “The
classicexampleis you
aska developerhow long it will take him to do something
andhe’ll say a month,
becausea month equalsan infinite amount of time.And you say,
‘Okay,a month
has22 working days init. What arethe 22 thingsyou’re going to
do during those
22 days?’ And the guy will say, 0h, well, maybe it will taketwo
months.’ Even
by breakingit down into22 taskshe realizes,‘Oh, it’s a lot harder
than I thought”’
(Cusumano &Selby, 1995, p. 254).
Some organizations repair overconfidenceby forcing individuals
to interact
with others whoare trained to question their conclusions. For
example,the Penta-
gon for manyyears had what they calledthe “murder board,” a
group ofexperi-
enced officersthat reviewed theplans for importantmissions,
withthe goal of
killing the mission. According to Pentagonlore, the failed
Iranian hostage rescue
during theCarteryears wasnotvettedby this boardbecausehigh
governmentoffi-
cials were too concerned about securityleaks.13
Other organizationshave developednorms of frank feedback to
ensure that
individuals question others’ conclusionshonestlyand openly.In
its featureanima-
tion unit, Disney regularly holds “Gong Shows” where

51. personnel(including
departmentsecretaries)canpitch ideas to a group
ofseniorexecutives. Gong
Shows mayattract40 people whopresenttheir idea to
theexecutivesand other
presentersfor three to five minutes. The seniorexecutivesare
careful to give
exceptionallyfrank feedback atthe end of the
session,highlightingbothgood and
bad aspectsof the presentations. “Somebody may have
agreatconcept, but the
story may not be very good. [Wecan’tsay] ‘Oh, that’s fabulous.
Great pitchguys!’
and whenthey leave, mumble,‘That was awful!’....We don’t pull
our punches.
[Eventually] people begin tounderstandthat no matterhow
good,bad,or indiffer-
ent theidea, it can be expressed,accepted, and thought
about”(McGowan, 1996).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this paper we have reviewed the literatureon individual
learningusing a simple
frameworkthat considersthreebroad stagesof the learning
process.We argued
that ideal learnerswould generate a broad and deepset of
hypotheses,test them
with a large, unbiasedset of information,and draw conclusions
in a cautious and
balancedway. Thepsychologicalliteratureindicates, however,that
realindividu-
als are not ideal learners; they think and act in ways that reduce
their ability to
learneffectively.

52. Fortunately, individual learners do not have togo it alone.We
have argued that
organizationsfrequently repair theshortcomingsof individual
learners through
the use of sayings, informal routines, and formal procedures.We
believe the
examples we have offered illustratethe tremendouspromise of
organizational
sources of cognitive repairs.
23
Nevertheless,we do not thinkthat cognitive repairs will
overcomeevery indi-
vidual problem. Cognitive repairs are heuristics—like themental
processesthey
repair,they arepragmaticand often efficient, but
alsoapproximateand inexact.
For example,they maysolve 75 percent of
individualshortcomingswhile incur-
ring only one-thirdof the costs of optimalprocedures(e.g.,
fromeconomicsor sta-
tistics). However,they are unlikely to beperfect.
Consider thefive whys. It undoubtedlyprompts individuals to
think more
deeply about causes, but it is only a roughheuristic.Why five
questionsand not
three orseven?And which questions? “Problem: He doesn’t
manage well.” (1)
Why? He doesn’t manage conflict well. (2)Why? He grewup in a
dysfunctional
family. (3) Why?His parentswere alcoholics...” In this example,
the answers took
an unhelpful detouraway from potential
solutionssometimearound answer 2.

53. Even when repairs are reasonablyeffective, they may still leave
roomfor fur-
therrepair.Consider,for example, the military’s partial repairfor
thefundamental
attribution error: “There are no bad troops,only bad
officers.”This adage may
repair tendencies to attribute blame tothe people whoareclosest
to a problem (the
troops who areon the battlefield);however,it merely focuses
attentionon another
group of people. Thus, itmay prevent individuals from fixing
systems orproce-
duresthat have basic flaws (Cohen &Gooch, 1990).A more
effectiverepairmight
say, “There are no bad people, only bad systems.”
Otherrepairsmay be imperfect becausethey fix one problem
well, butexacer-
bate others.For example, the Five Cs may help individual
loanofficers collect
more kinds of information but theymay
createsecondaryproblems.First, by
emphasizing character, the Five Cs may provoke
thefundamentalattribution error.
Second, although theyexpandthe set of factors loan officers
willconsiderin a
loan decision,they may also institutionalize any tendencythat
they may have to
ignoreotherpotentially relevant factors. Third, they may help
loan officerscollect
information, butthey do not necessarily help theminterpretit.
They seem toindi-
cate that each C should beweightedequally, whereasan ideal
statisticalmodel
would weigh someCs more heavilythan others.

54. As these caveats illustrate, cognitive repairs areunlikely to
completelyrepair
the shortcomingsof individual learners.Thus, when we
assesswhethera given
cognitive repair is successful, we mustconsiderthe costs and
benefitsof the
repair. Below,we considersix dimensions that may affect the
costs and benefitsof
repairs, and therefore their success.
Tradeoffs Associatedwith Successful Repairs
In order to be successful, a cognitive repair must be effective—
it must mend
some individual shortcoming and improve learning relative to
the status quo.To
be truly successful,however,a cognitive repair must also
beacceptedin the orga-
nization and actively used. A repair that is not implemented is
not arepair.
24 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, andJOSHUA
KLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs
Cognitive repairsare a kind of innovation,and as such, theiruse
will undoubt-
edly be affectedby many of the characteristics that
havepreviously beenmen-
tioned in literatureson diffusion andadoption (Rogers,1995;
Scott, 1995).We
will focus on innovation characteristicsthat are
particularlyrelevantfor cognitive

55. repairs. Cognitiveshortcomingsnot only createthe need for a
repair,they also
limit what repairsmay succeed.
Below, we consider six dimensions that affect whether a repair
will be success-
ful: simple versuscomplex,domain-specific versus domain-
general,familiar ver-
sus novel, corrective versuspreventative,social versusindividual,
and top-down
versusbottom-up.(We will typically focus on the endpointsof
these dimensions,
but they shouldbe regardedas continuousrather
thandichotomous.)Most dimen-
sionsinvolve tradeoffs.For example, qualitiesthat make a repair
more effective in
solving an individual shortcoming sometimes reduce the
chancesthat it will be
acceptedand usedby individuals.In the absenceof perfectly
effective andaccept-
able repairs, we mustrecognizeand understandthe tradeoffsthat
make repairs
more or less successful.
Simple versus Complex
One obviousdimensionalong which cognitiverepairs vary is
whetherthey are
relatively simple or complex.Many of the repairs we have
discussed in this paper
are strikingly simple—they require an individual
torememberand apply aproce-
durethat is only a fewstepslong (e.g., the five whys or the
physiciansABCs). In
contrast,many of the proceduresthat are taught as formal repairs
in academic

56. environmentsare quite complex, andinvolve many stagesof
sorting, arranging,
and calculating(e.g., formal financial or statisticalanalysis).
Simple repairshave profound advantages over complex repairs.
First,they are
more likely to be used because thecostsare small; individuals
will find iteasierto
learnand implementshorterprocedures. By contrast, complex
repairs typically
require extensive backgroundknowledgeand tax basic cognitive
resourceslike
attention and memory (Bell,Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988; Nisbett &
Ross, 1980).
Thus, when individuals encounter a complex repair, they are
likely to perceive the
costs of learning it as large and immediate, and the benefits of
using itas small,
uncertain, and delayed.
Second, simple repairs are easier torememberand
reconstructthan complex
repairs, and this increases the probability that individuals will
accurately apply
them and accuratelytransmitthemto others. Because complex
repairs require
individuals to remember a number of stages,they are more likely
to be distorted
whenthey are transmitted from individual toindividual. This
problem will bepar-
ticularly pronounced in situationsthat requirelearningby
observation andimita-
tion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Individuals who learn a repair
through
observationmay find it difficult to infer the completerules of
behaviorfor com-

57. 25
plex repairsbecauseinformation about the rules is incomplete,
unavailable, ordis-
tributed across time in a waythat makeslearningdifficult.
Although simple repairshave profound advantages
overcomplexrepairs, they
also havesome disadvantages. Fundamentally, thetradeoff
between simple and
complex repairs is atradeoffbetween ease ofuse and
accuracy.Complexproce-
dures are oftencomplicatedbecause they attempt to be precise.
Simple repairs
gain easeof useby sacrificing accuracy.For example, a simple
aphorism suchas
“don’t confuse brains and a bullmarket” suggests the correct
direction toadjust
one’sjudgment,but providesno guidance aboutexactlyhow much
one shoulddis-
credit the success of an individualtrader. To precisely estimate
theamount of
credit due to brains versus themarket,an individualwould have
to perform a more
complex procedure,suchascalculatingthe overall market
performance andmea-
suring an individual’s performance relative to the dispersion
and centraltendency
of the market.
Domain-Speczflcversus Domain-General
Cognitive repairs also vary in the rangeof contextsto which they
canbe applied
(Nisbett, 1992), with some repairs being relatively more

58. domain-specific and
somebeing more domain-general.Domain-specificrepairs are
tailorednarrowly
for a specific context(e.g., the FeaturePrioritization Process at
Motorola or the
Five Cs of Credit). Domain-generalrepairs aredescribedso
generally, and
abstractlythat they apply across mostjudgmenttasks(e.g.,the
Five Whys or most
economicor statistical principles).
Domain-specific rules haveat leasttwo advantages overdomain-
generalrules.
First, individualsfind it easier torecognizethat a domainspecific
rule is relevant
becausethe situation itself remindsthem to usethe rule (e.g.,
acreditanalyst who
has learned to think aboutthe Five Csof Credit will find it
difficult to think about
lending decisionswithout consideringall five categories of
information). Second,
individualsmay find it easierto apply domain-specific
thandomain-generalrules.
Consider, forexamplea loan officer who istryingto apply a
general rulelike “cal-
culate the netpresentvalue (NPV)” of makingthe loan.This
domain-generalrule
appliesto many more financial decisions thanthe Five Cs; but it
contains no hints
about how it should be applied to aloan decision. In contrast,
the Five Cs pointout
specificaspects of theloan decisionthat might affect the
loan’squality. Similarly,
securities traders mightfind it hardto benefitfrom a domain-
generalwarning
against self-serving biases(e.g., “pay attention tosituational

59. determinantsof suc-
cess, and don’t over-attribute achievement
topersonalcharacteristics”).In con-
trast,they are unlikely to miss the point of a moredomain-
specificwarning not to
confuse brains and a bullmarket.
Although domain-specificrules have advantages, they also have
limits.Their
specificcontentwill make them more likely tospreadwithin their
domain, but it
may also preventthem from spreadingacross domains.For
example,engineers
26 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, andJOSHUA
KLAYMAN Cognitive Repairs 27
have safety factors and softwaredevelopershave buffer time,
butknowing about
safetyfactors does notautomaticallysuggest the need
forbuffertime. And even a
single individualmay use a rule effectively in one domain
butfail to-seeits impli-
cations foranother.Auditors areoften quitegood at ignoring
theirpreexistingThe-
ones about aclient’s financial health whenthey
investigateauditing problems.
However, they arelesslikely to do so whenthey confront similar
problemsoutside
the auditing domain, even if the problem relates to their other
professionalactivi-
ties (Smith & Kida, 1991).

60. A second limitationof domain-specific repairs is that
theyaretightly tailored to
fit a particular task andenvironment.Because of this tightfit,
they maybe less
successful thandomain-generalrepairs when the task
environment is in flux. A
buffer factor designed during a specific period oftime—
”multiply all time-to-
delivery estimatesby 1.5—maylose its effectiveness
whentechnologicalor eco-
nomic conditions change. Considerthat Microsoft had to develop
separate buffer
factors to repair overconfidencein applications andoperating-
systents?.In general,
domain-specific rules will be helpful incompaniesor divisions
where the tasks
and environmentsare stable over time, whiledomain-
generalapproacheswill be
helpful in situations where tasks and environments change
frequently(e.g., at
higher levels in an organizationwhere tasks and decisions
areless routine).
A potential method of combining the advantages of domain-
specific and
domain-generalrules maybe to give individuals a domain-
specific repair and then
train them to generalize that repair to otherdomains(Fong &
Nisbett, 1990;Lar-
rick, Morgan,& Nisbett, 1990).Individualstypically find it easier
to generalizeby
analogy from onespecificinstance toanotherthan to map
fromgeneraLprinciples
down to specifics (Bassok,1990).For example, peoplewho learn
to ignore sunk
costs in financial investments correctlyrecognizethat this rule

61. applies toinvest-
ments of time as well(Larrick, Morgan, &
Nisbett,1990).Similarly, amanagerin
industry may find it easier to applythe specific military adage
about their being
no such thingas bad troops” than to apply a more
generallessonabout thefun-
damental attribution error.
CorrectiveversusPreventative
Cognitive repairs also differ in whethertheypreventor
correcttheshortcomings
of individuals. Corrective repairs interveneduring or after
aparticularcognitive
process (e.g., the accounting team that corrects their tendency
tooverweightvivid
exceptions by forcing themselves to consciously classify each
exceptionas major
or minor). At the extreme, a corrective repair might only
intervene at thevery end
of a processto correctthe overall outcome(e.g., safety factors).
Preventative
repairs intervene early in a cognitive process before
shortcomings have had a
chance toact. Microsoft prevents developers from acquiringa
biased sample
about the speed of their programsby forcing them to develop
programson the
same machines usedby customers.
Someshortcomingsareeasierto correctthan others.Forexample,
when ashort-
coming arises because individuals have the wrongrule, they
maynot find it diffi-

62. cult to substitute a different rule(Wilson & Brekke,
1994).Trauma physicians
may learnto check airway before breathing, and accountantsmay
learn to ignore
vivid but minorexceptions. In general, corrective repairs will be
appropriate when
individuals accept the need for a repair andthey understandhow
to execute the
correction.
However,when a shortcoming arises becauseof some basic
cognitive process,
organizationsmay need to intervene more forcefullyby
bypassingor eliminating
the faulty process (Arkes,1991;Wilson & Brekke,
1994).Forexample,individu-
als may find it difficult to generate abroadand independentset of
hypotheses
because associative memory leads them toconsiderthe
samealternativestheypre-
viously considered.Theoretically, Motorola could instruct
individuals whoare
developing anew consumerproduct to “ignore what you’ve done
in the past and
approach this problemcreatively.”However, individuals
mightfind it difficult to
ignore their previoussolutions.Thus, Motorola prevents the
problemby prohibit-
ing them from serving on morethan one
productdevelopmentteam. Similarly, the
Chicago Board of Trade could warn itsinvestigatorsto
discountthe answersthey
receive whenthey ask leading questions. Instead it prevents
individualinvestiga-
tors from asking yesor no questions, and thusensuresthat they
receivelessbiased

63. information in thefirst place.
Familiar versusNovel
Repairsmay also vary in the extent to which theyarenovel
ratherthan familiar.
Novel repairs require individuals to change their assumptions or
tolearna proce-
dure from scratch. For example the “programmers” at the
CRSSarchitecturalfirm
had to learn to resist theirtendencyto sketch solutions before
evaluatingall the
informationfrom a client. On the otherhand,familiar repairs
buildon preexisting
knowledge (e.g., the CAMELschemafor bank examiners or the
ABCs fortrauma
physicians).Theserepairs have familiarcontent-traumaphysicians
knowthat they
should attend tobreathingand circulation, and bank examiners
knowthey should
pay attentionto capital and earnings. They also have afamiliar
form—they are
organizedby a simple acronymthat individuals already haveas a
part of their
mental lexicon.
Familiarrepairsmay be at anadvantageovernovel
repairsbecausethey areless
costlyto use and their benefitsmay be moreapparent.CAMEL and
the ABCs
reduce costsby using a familiaracronymto remind individuals
tocollecttypes of
information that they know they should be collecting. In
contrast,the CRSSpro-
grammershad to work hard to overcome thebehaviorsthey had
learnedas archi-

64. tects, andthey mayhave questioned the benefits of
theelaboratenew procedures
they were being taught.Familiarrepairsare alsoless likely to
provoke resistance
28 CHIPHEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and
JOSHUAKLAYMAN Cognitive Repairs 29
thannovel repairs. Anything that requires individualstothrow out
old practices or
adopt new beliefsmay be technically and psychologically
difficult.
However, familiar repairsmay sometimes be too familiar for
theirown good.
First, they may be lesslikely to createenthusiasm.If individuals
thinkthat a new
repairdiffers only trivially from current practice,they mayseeno
advantage toit.
Because individuals often ignore thefamiliar, would-be change
agents often strive
to createthe perception that their programs arenovel and
unique(Abrahamson,
1996).Second, familiar repairsmay be subject todistortion.If a
repair seemspar-
tially familiar, individuals may neglect itsunfamiliar aspects or
force them to
mimic the more familiar aspects (aprocessthat psychologists call
assimilation).
For example, the propertechniquefor brainstorming requires
aspecificsequence
of steps:first, a creative, idea-generation stage which does
notallow criticism,
then a stage where ideasare evaluatedand selected. Although

65. organizationsfre-
quently report thatthey use brainstorming, careful
examinationrevealsthat the
organizationsare actually engaged in a more familiar activity: a
basic business
meeting (Zbaracki, in press). Thenovel aspectsof the
brainstorming procedure,
suchas the separation of stages and the “no criticism”rule, are
often lostas brain-
storming isassimilated to the more familiar practice of the
standard business
meeting.In the end, only theattractivelabel remains. In
situations whereassimt-
lation is a problem, repairsthat are novel may be less likely to
suffer distortion
than repairsthat are more familiar becausenovel repairsdo not
evokethe preex-
isting knowledgethat leadsto assimilation.
SocialversusIndividual
Many of the cognitiverepairs we have considered are social;they
work because
individuals interact with others(e.g., single-caseborequestions
in the Deming
Prize organization,or the murderhoard atthe
Pentagon).Otherrepairsare indi-
vidual; individualsapply them to theirown learning processes
without theinter-
vention of others(e.g., individuals learn to use the Five Whys,
and individual
investigatorsat the Board ofTrade learn to avoid “yes or no”
questions).
In general, we suspect that manysuccessfulrepairs will be social
becauseindi-

66. vidualsmay not recognizethe need to repair themselves. The
very cognitiveshort-
comings that organizations might hope to repairwill make it
difficult for
individuals to see theirown flaws. As we
havediscussed,individuals tendtoretain
current assumptionsin the face of conflicting data
(Klayman,1995). Also, they
interpretevents in waysthat protect their self-image; theyavoid
potentiallythreat-
ening feedback(Frey, 1986; Larrick, 1993)and attribute their
poor outcomes to
luck or forces outside theircontrol. Although individualsmay
find it hard torec-
ognizetheir own biases,they may findit easier torecognizethe
biases ofothers.
Many of the repairs we document have the feelof (friendly)
socialgamesmanship.
Forexample, learners at FP&L did notconsiderthe
hypothesisthatthey had been
“rucky”—their colleagues considered it for them.
Similarly,during weekly micro-
biology lab meetings,researchersdid not have to suggest
alternative ways ofinter-
preting theirevidence,their peers didso. Social
competitionamong individuals
aids the spreadof repairs even when individualsare
overconfident and believe
they would have donejust aswell without therepair.
Social repairsdo have to overcomesomedisadvantages.For
example,individ-
uals may not appreciate otherswho attempt to repair their
biases, andthey may
dismissthe repairattemptsas theproductof picky or abrasive

67. personalities. Thus,
social repairs may be moresuccessfulwhen an individual
understandsthat his or
hertormentorsare playing an important, formal role.
Individualsmay find it easier
to entertainan antagonist’scritiques when he or she islabeledas
a“devil’s advo-
cate,” or whenthe individual is appearing before the “murder
board.” Disneyclar-
ified the role of the evaluators and theoccasionby establishingits
norm of frank
feedback andby labelingits tryouts as “The Gong Show.”
Eventually,social repairsmay be transformed into individual
repairs asindivid-
ualslearnto imitate the patterns of analysis forcedon them by
others. In order for
individuals to learn, they needvivid, immediate feedback.Social
encountersare
likely to provide a keysource of such feedback.For example,
when Deming
examiners asksingle-case-borequestions, or when lab
colleaguestry to shoot
holes in a lab presentation, individual learnersmay eventually
learn to engage in
preemptiveself-criticismin order tolookbetterduring social
encounters(Tetlock,
1992).(Many academicpapers arebetterbecause authorslearnto
mentallysimu-
late potentialreviewer’scomments.)Such repairsinvoke social
forces at twodif-
ferentlevels: individuals who anticipatesocial interactionmay be
more aware of
someof their own shortcomings, andthenactualsocial
interactionmay overcome
additionalshortcomingsthat individualscannotrepair on their

68. own.
Top-DownversusBottom-Up
Some cognitive repairs originate from“top-down” within an
organization.Typ-
ically these repairsare deliberately designed and implemented
by managers or
outsideexperts.Others arise frombottom-upthrough informal
observationorser-
endipitousdiscovery fromthe people who aredoingthe work.
The source of the repair isimportantbecause it is likely to affect
itsform. In
general, bottomup repairs, suchas organizational adages, willbe
simpler and
more domain-specific than top-down repairsdesignedby
technically sophisti-
catedengineers,statisticians, or management gurus.Thelocal
originof bottom-up
repairs may also make them feel more familiar and acceptable
than top-down
repairs. Thus, theorigin of a repair will be highlycorrelatedwith
many of the
tradeoffs we have already discussed.
More importantly, the origin of the repair is also likely to
affecthow potential
adopters perceiveit. Top-down repairsmay be perceivedwith
suspicion orhostil-
ity precisely becausethey originateoutsidethe organizationor are
imposedfrom
above. Front-line workers may doubt that outsiderslike
consultantsunderstand

69. 30 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK,
andJOSHUAKLAYMAN Cognitive Repairs 31
their situationwell enough to make wise recommendations.
When managerssug-
gest a repair,they seem toimply that employees
havebeenperformingpoorly or
cannot be trusted to perform theirjob correctly. If so, then
individualsmay resist
adopting a repairbecauseof the same kind of self-serving biases
we discussedear-
lier.
Top-downrepairsmay also be resisted becausethey will be
perceivedasdriven
by politics or fashion and notby the demands of the task. Some
top-downrepairs
may be resisted becausethey seem too political. Particularly
when top-down
repairs rely on fixed procedures,they may provoke resistance
because individuals
may think thatthey aredesigned tocentralizecontrol or
removeindividual-discre-
tion. Other top-downrepairsmay be resisted becausethey seem
tobe driven by
fashion. Institutional theorists contend that organizations adopt
new practices for
reasonsother than greaterefficacy. Organizational membersmay
share similar,
cynical intuitions (Adams,1996),and will resist repairsthat they
seeasmerewin-
dow dressing oras this year’s fad. Whenindividuals have trouble
recognizing
their shortcomings, thenthey may be particularly likely to
attribute top-down

70. repairs to politics or fashion becausethey will not recognizethe
repair’s true
value.
Bottom-up repairs will often benefit from their local,
homegrown origins. Local
repairs have a meaningful history that makesthem
memorableand appealing.
Even a repairthat is potentially threatening, suchas “you were
rucky,” may be
more acceptable if organizational members see itas their own
invention. Just as
lawyers are entitled to tell lawyerjokes,organizational members
are entitled to
develop self-critical repairs and toconveytheir insider statusby
using iliem. And
homegrown repairs evoke a stronger sense of ownership; at the
same time that
they call attentionto a potential shortcoming,they also givethe
n’~er creditfor fix-
ing it.
Conclusions: SuccessfulRepairs
We have considered six differentdimensionsalong which
cognitive repairscan
be classified. For example, the physician’s ABCsare simple,
domain-specific,
corrective,familiar, individual, and top-down. Although we have
suggestedsome
advantages and disadvantagesofeach endpoint of each
dimension, we believe-that
our discussion suggests at leastsomepreliminary conclusions
about successful
repairs. Forexample,because individuals have limited
faculties,organizations

71. who wish individuals to learncomplex,domain-generalrepairs
will find them-
selvesdevoting a greatdeal of scarce time, money, and effortto
ensurethat such
repairs are learned and used. Similarly, because individuals are
overconfident
about theirown conclusions, they may not spontaneously
execute individual
repairs tocorrecttheir own biases. Basedon the advantages and
disadvantages we
have considered, we suspect that the most successful repairs
will be simple,
domain-specific,socially administered, and evolved frombottom-
uprather than
developed from top-down.We find this conclusion
intriguingbecauseit describes
repairs that differ sharply from those that arerecommendedin
academiclitera-
tureson decision analysis, statistics, and economics.
Implications for Research
Cognitive psychologistsoften think of people asruggedcognitive
individual-
ists, constrainedby their own cognitive limitations and a poor
environment in
which to learn. Cognitiveresearcherscontinueto argueoverhow
well individuals
actually perform the cognitive tasksthey encounterin their lives
(see Anderson,
1991, and accompanyingcommentaries,and the debate between
Gigerenzer,
1996; and Kahneman &Tversky, 1996). However, it is
importantto remember
that much of what people do, including muchof their cognition,

72. takes place in the
contextof organizationsand other social structures.
Some recent approaches in psychology doexplorecultural
andsocial contribu-
tions to individual learning. For example, work on
“transactivememory” (Weg-
ner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991; Liang, Moreland, & Argote,
1995) showshow
individuals reduce their memory limitationsby distributing
memory-heavytasks
across multiple people. Thus,therecan becollectivememory that
does notreside
in any individual. Our concept of organizational repairs is in the
samespirit, but it
deals with“higher order” cognition: Reasoning and decision
making can alsobe
improved through socialstructureand culturalbootstrapping.
We also believethat organizationalpsychologists
couldbetterunderstandorga-
nizational processes ifthey thoughtmore about the
cognitiveprocessesof the indi-
viduals who makeup the organization.Researchtying individual
psychology to
organizationalbehavior certainlyhas along and venerable
pedigree (March &
Simon, 1958),but recently,some researchershave expressed
concern that that
approachis still underutilized. For example, in the contextof
institutional diffu-
sion processes,Zucker(1991) has warnedthat “without a solid
cognitive, micro-
level foundation, we risk treatinginstitutionalizationas
ablackbox at theorgani-
zational level, focusing oncontentat the exclusion of developing

73. a systematic
explanatorytheory of process” (p.105). And Miner (1994)
warns,“most evolu-
tionary discussions of organizational changediscussroutines
asthoughthey exist
independentof individual human beings” and“evoke images
ofdisembodiedenti-
ties removed from day-to-day human interaction” (p. 87).
Knowledge ofindivid-
ual cognitioncan be crucial tounderstandingwhy
thingshappenastheydoiri-an
organization.Forexample,why do engineeringfirms use a
systemby which the
best engineers make their bestestimates,only to have the firm
second-guess them
by adding a huge safety factor?Any explanationwould
beincompletewithout an
understandingof individual overconfidence.Understandingthe
abilities andcon-
straints of individualspermits a kind of cognitive archaeologyof
organizational
practices thatmay allow organizationalresearchersto better
understandwhy cer-
tain rules, norms, andproceduresdevelop in organizations,
andwhy others fail.
32 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P.LARRICK,
andJOSHUAKLAYMAN Cognitive Repairs 33
Implicationsfor Practice
Managers who think explicitly about cognitive repairswill, we
think, be in a
betterposition tofoster improvements in their organizations.

74. Managers already
think about factors such as incentive systems andinformation-
technoLQgyas tools
to fosterlearning andinnovation.We believe that cognitive
repairswill be a useful
additionto the toolbox. Managerswho
consciouslyconsiderindividual cognition
may be able torecognizea larger number of
repairopportunitiesandmay target
top-down repairs moreeffectively. Furthermore,they may
designmore effective
repairs ifthey take a cognitive approach andconsiderrepair
dimensionslike the
six we discussedearlier.
Even whenrepairsare developedbottom-uprather than top-down,
a manager
who is informedabout individualcognitionmight have a positive
influence.As
has beenobservedby researchers who think about evolutionary
approaches to
organizations, oneof the critical components of organizational
learning is tostart
with a rich and varied pool of alternative practices(Levitt &
March, 1988;Miner,
1994). Savvymanagers canenhancethe pool of alternatives that
areavailableby
teachingorganizationmembers about the concept of repairs
andby encouraging
them toidentify existing repairs and to seek new repair
opportunities. Managers
canrecognizeand reward individuals
whodiscovercognitiverepairs,and-they-can
disseminate effectiverepairs via demonstration,
training,communication,and
rotation of personnel.

75. Managersmay also find it veryimportantto think about cognitive
repairs when
they evaluate existing organizationalpractices. Consider, for
example, a new
executivewho discovers that her development groupis split up
into six separate
teams, eachtrying to solve the same problem without
anycommunicationwith
each other untilwell into the process.Thismight seemlike a
paradigmof bureau-
cratic inefficiency. Yet, this is the kind of systemthat Motorola
has found to be
effective ingeneratinga broaderset of options. Without
understanding thepoten-
tial value of this repair, the newexecutivemight besadly
surprisedby the results
of streamlining theprocess.
Managers might also benefit from a cognitive
approachbecausecognitive
repairs, like other innovations,may suffer from the law of
unintendedconse-
quences. A repairthat is intended tofix one problem can well
end up creating
another.Recall, for example,Microsoft’s laudableattempt to
make thecustomer
moresalientto program developersby having them watch live-
customers attempt
to use their products in the usabilitytestlab. Thetestlab
repairedthe developer’s
tendency to beunmovedby cold statistics, but it
probablyexacerbatedtheir ten-
dency to believethat small samples were reliably
representative.In responseto
seeing onecustomerin the test lab,developersmight

76. wastetimealtering a feature
that would have been okay for mostcustomers.Managers who
take a cognitive
approach would,we hope, be more likely to avoid unwantedside
effects, or at
least bein a betterposition to recognize and cope with them.
Final Words
In contrast to Hamlet’s enthusiasm, we argue thatthereis good
reason to be
aware ofthe limitations of individual learners. People are not
“infinite infacul-
ties” or “noble in reason.” As individuals, we make
systematicmistakesthat com-
promiseour ability tolearnfrom our experiences and
tounderstandthe world.On
the otherhand, wemortals are notall fools. We are able toform
socialstructures
that havethe potential to magnifysomeof our abilities and to
minimizesomeof
our failings. In thispaperwe have concentrated
ondemonstratingthat effective
organizational repairs happen. Wedo not mean to imply
thatorganizationscure
any and all individual shortcomings, nor eventhat
organizationsalways make
thingsbetterrather thanworse.Nevertheless, we do believe that
theorganizations
in which we work can provide us with norms, reminders,
protocols, andproce-
duresthat help usmovebeyond our individual shortcomings.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thankthe Graduate Schoolof Business,University of

77. Chicagoandthe FuquaSchoolof
Business,Duke University, for researchsupport. For helpful
commentson this project, we
thank participantsat Rod Kramer’s 1996 conferenceon
OrganizationalLearning; we also
thank Jim March, Cade Massey, Elizabeth McSweeny, Sim
Sitkin, Dick Thaler, Elke
Weber, andJohnWright.
NOTES
1 We primarily want to distinguish problemsof incentives
fromproblemsof mental process. In
this reviewwe will not distinguish between mental errors that
arise from “motivatedreasoning”and
thosethat arise from “colder” processes.
2. Personalcommunication,Abhay Joshi.
3. Personalcommunication,RobertAlan Fisch.
4. Personalcommunication,Jan Elsbach.
5. Personalcommunication,Francisco Bayron.
6. Personalcommunication,DeanSiewert.
7. Personalcommunication,JustinScott Bradley.
8. Personalcommunication,Francisco Bayron.
9. Personalcommunication,DeanSiewert.
10. Personalcommunication,Ken Myszkowski.
II. Personalcommunication,Leo Tucker.
12. Personalcommunication,Raymond Stukel.
13. Personalcommunication,John Payne
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