1. Introduction
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Johann Friedrich Herbart, (born May 4, 1776, Oldenburg—died Aug. 14, 1841, Göttingen,
Hanover), German philosopher and educator, who led the renewed 19th-century interest in
Realism and is considered among the founders of modern scientific pedagogy.
After studying under Johann Gottlieb Fichte at Jena (1794), Herbart worked as a tutor at
Interlaken, Switz., from 1797 to 1800, during which period he made the acquaintance of
Pestalozzi. Becoming a licentiate of the University of Göttingen in 1802, he was appointed
extraordinary professor there in 1805. At the close of 1808 he became Kant’s successor as
professor at Königsberg. There he also conducted a seminary of pedagogy until 1833, when he
returned as professor of philosophy to Göttingen, where he remained until his death.
Herbart’s position in the history of philosophy is due mainly to his contributions to the
philosophy of mind. His aims in this respect are expressed by the title of his textbook—
Psychologie als Wissenschaft neu gegrundet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik, und Mathematik, 2 vol.
(1824–25; ―Psychology As Knowledge Newly Founded on Experience, Metaphysics, and
Mathematics‖); of central importance is the inclusion of Mathematik. He rejected the whole
concept of faculties (in Kantian terms) and regarded mental life as the manifestation of
elementary sensory units or ―presentations‖ (Vorstellungen). These he conceived as mental
forces rather than as mere ―ideas‖ in Locke’s sense. The study of their interactions gave rise to a
statics and dynamics of the mind, to be expressed in mathematical formulas like those of
Newtonian mechanics. Ideas need not be conscious; and they might either combine to produce
composite resultants or conflict with one another so that some get temporarily inhibited or
repressed ―below the threshold of consciousness.‖ An organized but unconscious system of
associated ideas formed an ―apperception mass‖; such a system could apperceive a new
presentation and thus give it richer meaning. On this basis Herbart developed a theory of
education as a branch of applied psychology.
His theory of education—known as Herbartianism—was set out principally in two works,
Pestalozzis Idee eines A B C der Anschauung (1802; ―Pestalozzi’s Idea of an A B C of Sense
Perception‖) and Allgemeine Pädagogik (1806; ―Universal Pedagogy‖), which advocated five
formal steps in teaching: (1) preparation, a process of relating new material to be learned to
relevant past ideas or memories in order to give the pupil a vital interest in the topic under
consideration; (2) presentation, presenting new material by means of concrete objects or actual
experience; (3) association, thorough assimilation of the new idea through comparison with
former ideas and consideration of their similarities and differences in order to implant the new
idea in the mind; (4) generalization, a procedure especially important to the instruction of
adolescents and designed to develop the mind beyond the level of perception and the concrete;
and (5) application, using acquired knowledge not in a purely utilitarian way, but so that every
learned idea becomes a part of the functional mind and an aid to a clear, vital interpretation of
life. This step is presumed possible only if the student immediately applies the new idea, making
it his own.

2. Herbart maintained that a science of education was possible, and he furthered the idea that
education should be a subject for university study. His ideas took firm hold in Germany in the
1860s and spread also to the United States. By the turn of the century, however, the five steps
had degenerated to a mechanical formalism, and the ideas behind them were replaced by new
pedagogical theories, in particular those of John Dewey.
most popular topics
apperception
American Heritage Dictionary:
ap·per·cep·tion
Top
Home > Library > Literature & Language > Dictionary
(ăp'ər-sĕp'shən)
n.
1. Conscious perception with full awareness.
2. The process of understanding by which newly observed qualities of an object are related
to past experience.
Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/apperception#ixzz2SaMpLlVx
Philosophy of Education
Herbart's influence on educational theory is very important, even at the present time. He not only
developed a philosophical-psychological rationale for teaching but a teaching method as well.
Herbart believed that the mind was the sum total of all ideas which entered into one's conscious
life. He emphasized the importance of both the physical and the human environment in the
development of the mind. To Herbart, ideas were central to the process. He felt they grouped
themselves into what he called "apperceptive masses." By assimilation (or apperception) new
ideas could enter the mind through association with similar ideas already present. This was the
learning process.
Herbart's method of instruction has been identified by his students as involving the "Five Formal
Steps of the Recitation." These are preparation, presentation, association, generalization, and
application. Herbart went further to emphasize that through the proper correlation of subjects
(curriculum materials) the student would come to understand the total unity of what is the world.
In Germany, Leipzig and Jena became centers for Herbartianism. It was through the influence of
Americans who studied at Jena that the ideas of Herbart reached the United States (ca. 1890).
The advocates formed the National Herbartian Society in 1892 (now the National Society for the

3. Study of Education). Its purpose was to promote Herbart's ideas as they might relate to America's
needs. The principal criticism which has been leveled at the Herbartians is the extreme formality
into which they let Herbart's instructional method fall.
Further Reading
Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/johann-friedrich-herbart#ixzz2SaNGDlry
Herbart, Johann Friedrich (yōˈhän frēˈdrĭkh hĕrˈbärt)[key], 1776–1841, German philosopher
and educator. Influenced by Leibniz, Kant, and Fichte, Herbart made many important
contributions to psychology. In 1805 he lectured at Göttingen and from 1809 to 1833 held the
chair of philosophy at Königsberg. He then returned to Göttingen as professor of philosophy.
Psychologie als Wissenschaft (1824–25) was his major psychological work and Allgemeine
Metaphysik (1828–29) his most important philosophical study. Herbart held that the concepts of
change and becoming harbored a contradiction that destroyed the reality of continuous identity.
He maintained that true being consists of a plurality of simple reals, which were modeled after
the Leibnizian monads. Change is nothing but alteration in the various relationships among reals.
Though he denied the possibility of psychological experiment, Herbart sought to develop the
mathematical and empirical, as well as the metaphysical, aspects of psychology. In education he
emphasized the importance of relating new concepts to the experience of the learner so that there
would be less resistance to apperception of new ideas. He stressed the need for moral education
through experience and brought the work of teaching into the area of conscious method. Many of
Herbart's educational works, such as his Application of Psychology to the Science of Education
(tr. 1892), have been translated into English.
See H. B. Dunkel, Herbart and Herbartianism (1970).
Basal readers are textbooks used to teach reading and associated skills to schoolchildren. Commonly
called "reading books" or "readers" they are usually published as anthologies that combine previously
published short stories, excerpts of longer narratives, and original works. A standard basal series comes
with individual identical books for students, a Teacher's Edition of the book, and a collection of
workbooks, assessments, and activities.
Johann Friedrich Herbart
Johann Friedrich Herbart

4. Johann Friedrich Herbart
Born
4 May 1776
Oldenburg, Duchy of Oldenburg
Died
14 August 1841 (aged 65)
Göttingen, Kingdom of Hanover
Era 19th-century philosophy
Region Western philosophy
Influenced by[show]
Influenced[show]
Having thus determined what really is and what actually happens, our philosopher proceeds next
to explain synthetically the objective semblance (der objective Schein) that results from these.
But if this construction is to be truly objective, i.e. valid for all intelligences, ontology must
furnish us with a clue. This we have in the forms of Space, Time and Motion which are involved
whenever we think the reals as being in, or coming into, connection and the opposite. These
forms then cannot be merely the products of our psychological mechanism, though they may turn
out to coincide with these. Meanwhile let us call them intelligible, as being valid for all who
comprehend the real and actual by thought, although no such forms are predicable of the real and
actual themselves.
The elementary spatial relation Herbart conceives to be ―the contiguity (Aneinander) of two
points,‖ so that every ―pure and independent line‖ is discrete. But an investigation of dependent
lines which are often incommensurable forces us to adopt the contradictory fiction of partially
overlapping, i.e. divisible points, or in other words, the conception of Continuity.[note 1]
But the
contradiction here is one we cannot eliminate by the method of relations, because it does not
involve anything real; and in fact as a necessary outcome of an intelligible form, the fiction of
continuity is valid for the objective semblance. By its help we are enabled to comprehend what

5. actually happens among reals to produce the appearance of water. When three or more reals are
together, each disturbance and self-preservation will (in general) be imperfect, i.e. of less
intensity than when only two reals are together. But objective semblance corresponds with
reality; the spatial or external relations of the reals in this case must, therefore, tally with their
inner or actual states. Had the self-preservations been perfect, the coincidence in space would
have been complete, and the group of reals would have been inextended; or had the several reals
been simply contiguous, i.e. without connection, then, as nothing would actually have happened,
nothing would appear. As it is we shall find a continuous molecule manifesting attractive and
repulsive forces; attraction corresponding to the tendency of the self-preservations to become
perfect, repulsion to the frustration of this. Motion, even more evidently than space, implicates
the contradictory conception of continuity, and cannot, therefore, be a real predicate, though
valid as an intelligible form and necessary to the comprehension of the objective semblance. For
we have to think of the reals as absolutely independent and yet as entering into connexions. This
we can only do by conceiving them as originally moving through intelligible space in rectilinear
paths and with uniform velocities. For such motion no cause need be supposed; motion, in fact,
is no more a state of the moving real than rest is, both alike being but relations, with which,
therefore, the real has no concern. The changes in this motion, however, for which we should
require a cause, would be the objective semblance of the self-preservations that actually occur
when reals meet. Further, by means of such motion these actual occurrences, which are in
themselves timeless, fall for an observer in a definite time — a time which becomes continuous
through the partial coincidence of events.
But in all this it has been assumed that we are spectators of the objective semblance; it remains to
make good this assumption, or, in other words, to show the possibility of knowledge; this is the
problem of what Herbart terms Eidolology, and forms the transition from metaphysic to
psychology. Here, again, a contradictory conception blocks the way, that, viz. of the Ego as the
identity of knowing and being, and as such the stronghold of idealism. The contradiction
becomes more evident when the ego is denned to be a subject (and so a real) that is its own
object. As real and not merely formal, this conception of the ego is amenable to the method of
relations. The solution this method furnishes is summarily that there are several objects which
mutually modify each other, and so constitute that ego we take for the presented real. But to
explain this modification is the business of psychology; it is enough now to see that the subject
like all reals is necessarily unknown, and that, therefore, the idealist's theory of knowledge is
unsound. But though the simple quality of the subject or soul is beyond knowledge, we know
what actually happens when it is in connexion with other's reals, for its self-preservations then
are what we call sensations. And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but
they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know
the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to
posit absolutely.
Principles of Education
Herbart’s pedagogy emphasized the connection between individual development and the
resulting societal contribution. In Platonic tradition, Herbart espoused that only by becoming
productive citizens could people fulfill their true purpose: ―He believed that every child is born
with a unique potential, his Individuality, but that this potential remained unfulfilled until it was

6. analysed and transformed by education in accordance with what he regarded as the accumulated
values of civilization‖.[2]
Only formalized, rigorous education could, he believed, provide the
framework for moral and intellectual development. The five key ideas which composed his
concept of individual maturation were Inner Freedom, Perfection, Benevolence, Justice, and
Equity or Recompense.[3]
According to Herbart, abilities were not innate but could be instilled, so a thorough education
could provide the framework for moral and intellectual development. In order to develop an
educational paradigm that would provide an intellectual base that would lead to a consciousness
of social responsibility, Herbart advocated that teachers utilize a methodology with five formal
steps: ―Using this structure a teacher prepared a topic of interest to the children, presented that
topic, and questioned them inductively, so that they reached new knowledge based on what they
had already known, looked back, and deductively summed up the lesson’s achievements, then
related them to moral precepts for daily living‖.[4]
In order to appeal to learners’ interests, Herbart advocated using literature and historical stories
instead of the drier basal readers that were popular at the time. Whereas the moralistic tales in
many of the primers and readers of the period were predictable and allegorical, Herbart felt that
children would appreciate the psychological and literary nuances of the masterpieces of the
canon.[5]
Though he died in 1841, his pedagogy enjoyed a renaissance of sorts in the mid- nineteenth
century; while Germany was its intellectual center, it ―found a ready echo in those countries such
as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States in which the development of Individuality
into Character appeared particularly well attuned to the prevailing economic, political and social
circumstances‖.[6]
The combination of individual potentiality and civic responsibility seemed to
reflect democratic ideals.
Though the emphasis on character building through literary appreciation diminished somewhat
after the movement toward utilitarianism following World War I, Herbart’s pedagogy continues
to influence the field by raising important questions about the role of critical thinking, and
literary appreciation in education.
Aesthetics and ethics
Aesthetics elaborates the ideas involved in the expression called forth by those relations of object
which acquire for them attribution of beauty or the reverse. The beautiful is to be carefully
distinguished from the allied conceptions of the useful or the pleasant, which vary with time,
place and person; whereas beauty is predicated absolutely and involuntarily by all who have
attained the right standpoint. Ethics, which is but one branch of aesthetics, although the chief,
deals with such relations among volitions (Willensverhältnisse) as thus unconditionally please or
displease. These relations Herbart finds to be reducible to five, which do admit of further
simplification; and corresponding to them are as many moral ideas (Musterbegriffe), as follows:
1. Internal Freedom, the underlying relation being that of the individual's will to his judgment of it

7. 2. Perfection, the relation being that of his several volitions each other in respect of intensity,
variety and concentration
3. Benevolence, the relation being that between his own will and the thought of another's
4. Right, in case of actual conflict with other
5. Retribution or Equity, for intended good or evil
The ideas of a final society, a system of rewards and punishments, a system of administration, a
system of culture and an animated society, corresponding to the ideas of law, equity,
benevolence, perfection and internal freedom respectively, result when we take account of a
number of individuals. Virtue is the perfect conformity of the will with the moral ideas; of this
the single virtues are but special expressions. The conception of duty arises from the existence of
hindrances to the attainment of virtue. A general scheme of principles of conduct is possible, but
the sublimation of special cases under these must remain matter of fact. The application of ethics
to things as they are with a view to the realization of the moral ideas is moral technology
(Tugendlehre), which the chief divisions are Paedagogy and Politics.
Theology
In theology Herbart held the argument from design to be as valid of divine activity as for human,
and to justify the belief in a supersensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is
neither tenable nor on practical grounds desirable
For John Dewey, education and democracy are intimately connected.
According to Dewey good education should have both a societal purpose and purpose for the
individual student. For Dewey, the long-term matters, but so does the short-term quality of an
educational experience. Educators are responsible, therefore, for providing students with
experiences that are immediately valuable and which better enable the students to contribute to
society.
Dewey polarizes two extremes in education -- traditional and progressive education.
The paradigm war still goes on -- on the one hand, relatively structured, disciplined, ordered,
didactic tradition education vs. relatively unstructured, free, student-directed progressive
education.
Dewey criticizes traditional education for lacking in holistic understanding of students and
designing curricula overly focused on content rather than content and process which is judged by
its contribution to the well-being of individuals and society.

8. On the other hand, progressive education, he argues, is too reactionary and takes a free approach
without really knowing how or why freedom can be most useful in education. Freedom for the
sake of freedom is a weak philosophy of education. Dewey argues that we must move beyond
this paradigm war, and to do that we need a theory of experience.
Thus, Dewey argues that educators must first understand the nature of human experience.
Dewey's theory is that experience arises from the interaction of two principles -- continuity and
interaction. Continuity is that each experience a person has will influence his/her future, for
better or for worse. Interaction refers to the situational influence on one's experience. In other
words, one's present experience is a function of the interaction between one's past experiences
and the present situation. For example, my experience of a lesson, will depend on how the
teacher arranges and facilitates the lesson, as well my past experience of similar lessons and
teachers.
It is important to understand that, for Dewey, no experience has pre-ordained value. Thus, what
may be a rewarding experience for one person, could be a detrimental experience for another.
The value of the experience is to be judged by the effect that experience has on the individual's
present, their future, and the extent to which the individual is able to contribute to society.
Dewey says that once we have a theory of experience, then as educators can set about
progressively organizing our subject matter in a way that it takes accounts of students' past
experiences, and then provides them with experiences which will help to open up, rather than
shut down, a person's access to future growth experiences, thereby expanding the person's likely
contribution to society.
Dewey examines his theory of experience in light of practical educational problems, such as the
debate between how much freedom vs. discipline to use. Dewey shows that his theory of
experience (continuity and interaction) can be useful guides to help solving such issues.
Throughout, there is a strong emphasis on the subjective quality of a student's experience and the
necessity for the teacher of understanding the students' past experiences in order to effectively
design a sequence of liberating educational experiences to allow the person to fulfil their
potential as a member of society.
Reference
Dewey, J. (1938/1997). Experience and education. Macmillan.
Short Summary on John Dewey's Ethical theory.
I recently read Dewey's Theory of Moral life, an extracted short version of his work Ethics.
His theory is along the lines of no ethical theory gets it right(he thinks ethical theories can never be
comprehensive and become treated as rigid lifeless dogmas instead of carefully considered and revised
living hypothesises of experience) though all have elements of truth- intention is important

9. ,consequences is important, habit is important etc .That means and ends are a reciprocal
relationship.That we work out what is good and bad as we go along using principles as guides but
accepting they must be contextual.He offers no grand theory like Kant or Aristotle. He simpliy says that
ethics arises because we face a conflict in how we previously did things.Our ethical behaviour arises out
of habits and there's that which is customary and that which we must deliberate on.And that
deliberation leads to a gradual improvement and expansion of our moral thinking( I guess you could
apply this to feminism,environmentalism,animal ethics etc )
nstrumental
Use Instrumental in a sentence
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in·stru·men·tal
[in-struh-men-tl] Show IPA
adjective
1.
serving or acting as an instrument or means; useful; helpful.
2.
performed on or written for a musical instrument or instruments: instrumental music.
3.
of or pertaining to an instrument or tool.
4.
Grammar .
a.

10. (in certain inflected languages, as Old English and Russian) noting or pertaining to a case having as its
distinctive function the indication of means or agency, as Old English beseah blīthe andweitan “looked
with a happy countenance.”
b.
noting the affix or other element characteristic of this case, or a word containing such an element.
c.
similar to such a case form in function or meaning, as the Latin instrumental ablative, gladiō, “by means
of a sword.”
d.
(in case grammar) pertaining to the semantic role of a noun phrase that indicates the inanimate,
nonvolitional, immediate cause of the action expressed by a verb, as the rock in The rock broke the
window or in I broke the window with the rock.
noun
5.
Grammar .
a.
the instrumental case.
b.
a word in the instrumental case.
c.
a construction of similar meaning.
6.
a musical composition played by an instrument or a group of instruments. Compare vocal ( def 8 ) .

11. Empiricism
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This article is about the field of philosophy. For the album by Borknagar, see Empiricism (album).
John Locke, a leading philosopher of British empiricism
Empiricism is a theory of knowledge that asserts that knowledge comes only or primarily from
sensory experience.[1]
One of several views of epistemology, the study of human knowledge,
along with rationalism, idealism, and historicism, empiricism emphasizes the role of experience
and evidence, especially sensory experience, in the formation of ideas, over the notion of innate
ideas or traditions;[2]
empiricists may argue however that traditions (or customs) arise due to
relations of previous sense experiences.[3]
Empiricism in the philosophy of science emphasizes evidence, especially as discovered in
experiments. It is a fundamental part of the scientific method that all hypotheses and theories
must be tested against observations of the natural world rather than resting solely on a priori
reasoning, intuition, or revelation.
Philosophers associated with empiricism include Aristotle, Alhazen, Avicenna, Ibn Tufail,
Robert Grosseteste, William of Ockham, Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, Robert Boyle, John

12. Locke, George Berkeley, Hermann von Helmholtz, David Hume, Leopold von Ranke, and John
Stuart Mill.
Naturalism (philosophy)
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This article is about the term that is used in philosophy. For other uses, see Naturalism (disambiguation).
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15. Naturalism refers to the viewpoint that laws of nature (as opposed to supernatural ones) operate
in the universe, and that nothing exists beyond the natural universe or, if it does, it does not
affect the natural universe.[1]
Adherents of naturalism (i.e. naturalists) assert that natural laws are
the rules that govern the structure and behavior of the natural universe, that the universe is a
product of these laws.[2]
Philosopher Paul Kurtz argues that nature is best accounted for by reference to material
principles. These principles include mass, energy, and other physical and chemical properties
accepted by the scientific community. Further, this sense of naturalism holds that spirits, deities,
and ghosts are not real and that there is no "purpose" in nature. Such an absolute belief in
naturalism is usually referred to as metaphysical naturalism (or philosophical naturalism).[3]
In
contrast, assuming naturalism in working methods, without necessarily considering naturalism as
an absolute truth with philosophical entailments, is called methodological naturalism.[4]
With the exception of Pantheists - who believe that Nature and God are one and the same thing -
Theists challenge the idea that nature is all there is. They believe in one or more gods that
created nature. Natural laws have a place in their theology; they describe the effects of so-called
secondary causes (see History section, below). But natural laws do not define nor limit deities as
primary causes.
In the 20th century, W.V. Quine, George Santayana, and other philosophers argued that the
success of naturalism in science meant that scientific methods should also be used in philosophy.
Science and philosophy are said to form a continuum, according to this view