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GOVERNMENTS AS MARKET PLAYERS:
STATE INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY
Giselle Datz
Financial innovation emanating from the public sector is not a
new phenomenon.The literature and practice of financial
regulation is filled with instances in which
the public sector understood and tried to contain financial
excesses and attempted to
maximize opportunities for economic growth via private
investment. Hardly studied,
however, have been cases of financial innovation that are not
primarily related to
regulation of private or public financial flows. This paper
focuses on how govern-
ments in emerging markets are acting increasingly as financial
market players,
enacting strategies that are not simply those of a risk-averse
welfare maximizer (in a
formal modeling description), but that of a high(er) yield
seeking investor.
The public realm in which states operate is symbiotic. It
encompasses two dual-
ities: one between public and private activity and authority, and
the other between
demand and supply for financial innovation. In continuing with

its transformative
process, the state in emerging markets is undergoing a process
of further hybridiza-
tion, applying private methodologies to serve public goals
(however politically
insulated) and engaging as both a supplier and consumer of
financial innovation in
more aggressive ways. This hybridization shapes a new
relationship between states
and financial risk. However, the extent to which sovereigns can
act as private players
is limited by the understanding that they are inescapably tied to
strategic public
"interests that will take precedence over profit maximization."'
The ability to grasp the broadened investment room to move
emerging market
governments, as well as the new constraints they face,
ultimately requires an under-
standing of the state as a heterogeneous category. In other
words, the heterogeneity
that exists within financial markets in terms of strategies used
and instruments
available, can be found within the state with its diverse time
horizons, functions and
strategies.2 Therefore, understanding the role of states demands
unpacking various
layers of public and private mechanisms that manipulates them,
which together
determine their clout in the global economy.
Journal of International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2008, Vol. 62, No.
1. F A L L / W INTER 2008 | 35
© The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York

Giselle Datz
T H E PUBLIC AS A SYMBIOTIC ENTITY
The public realm encompasses a symbiotic relationship in
financial innovation
that is not simply concerned with regulating private activity,
sponsoring privatiza-
tions or leaving room for private authority to emerge. Instead, it
is actually assuming
"private-like behavior" through risk management activities
regarding liability (debt)
management and asset (reserves) diversiflcation.3 This is
translated in the work of
relatively new and autonomous debt-management offices and of
sovereign wealth
funds (SWFs). Within these can be detected a pervasive private
strategy in actions
ranging from the hiring of uniquely qualified financial
professionals at market-
competitive rates to the expansion of return-related operations.''
A second symbiosis is also at play. Governments that have
always behaved as
suppliers of financial assets—most notably sovereign bonds—by
catering to the
needs of institutional investors, are now playing a different role
by providing
demand for financial innovation and financial assets.
Increasingly, states in emerg-
ing markets are becoming net exporters of capital rather than
importers. Emerging
market governments, especially in the Persian Gulf and Asia-
Pacific regions, are less
content to leave large volumes of excess foreign reserves to be

invested in risk-free
assets with low return. More and more, there is a flight to risk
through more auda-
cious investments made by sovereign wealth funds—relatively
autonomous and,
thus far, secretive institutions.
Indeed, since the late 1990s, the globalization literature has
been keen on
parceling out the role of the state. Studies that claimed that the
state was withering
away gave way to more focused analyses of states as negotiators
trying to intersect
national law with foreign actors, especially through competitive
deregulation or
reregulation linked to the preferences or imperatives of foreign
capital.5 A key para-
doxical relationship between states and global capital was
identified. Although the
scope of states' autonomy to control monetary and fiscal
policies was constrained by
economic globalization, in order to realize the material gain
from this process, as
James Mittelman suggested, the state increasingly facilitated its
development acting
as its agent. 6 This facilitation operated not only at the level of
political infrastruc-
ture, but particularly at the level of legal infrastructure. For Leo
Panitch, states
authored a regime that defined and guaranteed the global and
domestic rights of
capital through international treaties with constitutional effect.''
Hence, the role of
states was not only one of internalizing, but especially of
mediating adherence to
international capitalist competition.

Eric Helleiner's analysis of the Bretton Woods system provided
a historical
understanding of how states were indeed proactive in the
development of financial
globalization, initially restricted by the pervasiveness of the
embedded liberalism
compromise, e.g. economic liberalization accompanied by
domestic welfare policies.8
36 I JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Governments as Market Players
Incrementally, however, the tenants of neoliberalisn: as both a
political project and
a set of ambitious economic reforms, promoted the abolition—
even if not univer-
sally—of capital controls in favor of freer international
financial flows.^
Governments recognize the importance of international
coordination in monetary
policy. Furthermore, central bank independence remains an
important tool for signaling
credibility to markets. However, transforming key
administrative functions within states
and financial innovations lay beyond both pillars.lo States
endured internal changes as

a consequence of their renewed engagement with global capital.
Saslda Sassen suggests
that the "internal structuration of states" is in fact an element of
analyses of the state
and globalization that has been neglected." In her view, state
participation in imple-
menting its global economic agenda entailed the ascendance of
what became strategic
agencies within the government apparatus that were most
directly connected to this
agenda, namely central banl«, treasuries and regulatory
agencies. 12
This discussion leads to an analysis of what Sassen calls the
"restructuring of the
private-public divide," where "forms of authority once exclusive
to the public
domain are now shifting to or being constituted in the private
sphere of markets
with the corresponding normative recording."'3 More
specifically, Sassen refers to
cases of expansion of the private sphere, particularly through
privatization and
marketization processes launched in the 1980s. In other words,
she sees economic

actors seeking to privatize public regulatory functions in a way
that increases their
authority over matters once exclusive to the public domain,
such as commercial arbi-
tration, property rights and the regulation of trade and capital
markets.
This analysis of the privatization of forms of authority, however
insightful, still
does not fully account for a parallel process marking a different
trend. Privatization
often means that public functions and authority cease to be
exercised solely by a
public entity and become a private venture undertaken by
private agents who
usually follow efficiency-maximization criteria and remain far
from any mandate to
provide public goods. In this sense, what is privatized is no
longer publicly managed.
Nevertheless, these processes do not fit this kind of
transformation: Sovereign debt
and asset management are not functions that have become
privatized. The private
in this discussion has to do with how, not who. These functions
are still a responsi-

bility of the state, yet are conducted almost as private-
investment operations insofar
as they: (a) count on highly specialized professionals with
private experience or
outsource some services to the private sector in serving a public
purpose; (b) involve,
in the case of asset management by SWFs, a mix of "opaque
operations and invest-
ments" such as acquisition equity (making sovereign states
shareholders in private
businesses abroad); and (c) utilize models of risk management
through hedging akin
to that of private financial players. Together such functions
entail competitive strate-
gies among different sovereign debt and asset managers for the
most lucrative deals,
FALLAVINTER 2008 I 37
Giselle Datz
taldng the understanding of a "competitive state" to yet another
level of specializa-
tion and interaction. 14 In all of these areas, we see a
rearticulation ofthe relationship
between states and financial risk. At stake is a more welcoming

engagement with the
motto, "no risk, no reward."
Sassen aptly suggests that understanding the global economy
may entail the
blurring, rather than the neat segmentation, of "longstanding
dualities in state schol-
arship, notably those concerning the distinctive
QlStinCtlOn spheres of influence of respectively the national
and
l i c ^^ global, of state and non-state actors, and of the
orirl -rkfixT-o+o i o private and the public."'^ In this sense, my
argument
«mu. p r i v a t e IS ., o , , . . .
j ^ , merges with Sassen s notion that globalization is
QcLerinineQ Oy producing within states a form of authority
that is a
tlie kinds of hybrid, "neither fully private nor fully public,
neither
constraints that ^"'̂ ^ national nor fully global."'^ I argue that
the
. , t" . 1 distinction between public and private is then not
states as rinancial
determined by passive versus active investment and
y p e t and
players risk management, but by the ldnds of constraints that
subject to. states as financial market players are subjected to.
More than a hybrid, the state is a heterogeneous cate-

gory that entails a symbiotic relationship between private and
public strategies,
obstacles and methodologies.
For Geoffrey Underhill, a neat separation of state and market is
not realistic as
there is a latent interdependence between the two, one which is
evidently not new,
but rather endogenous to governance and the process of
economic competition.!''
Such interdependence is not welcoming of a market and
government conceptual
dichotomy (seeing markets as exchange and governance as
coercion), but rather
more conducive to the idea of a "state-market condominium."
Under this condo-
minium, public regulation and supervision of market forces is
more than the result
of an antagonistic relationship between the public and the
private. Instead, "it is
systematic evidence of the ways in which market interests and
state policy processes
are integrated."is In this view, the transformation of markets
goes hand-in-hand with
the transformation of the state. Yet more than a reciprocal
relationship, a symbiotic
interaction between public and private in the heart of the state
is apparent. The case
of SWFs that purchase stakes in important Western firms has
led to a series of reac-
tions by official sectors in developed countries. The complexity
of the situation is
well illustrated by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Christopher
Cox, to whom the increasing involvement of governments as
both owners of compa-

nies and investors in securities can be seen to challenge the
classical (liberal)
understanding of states as proposed by Adam Smith and Milton
Friedman, who
Governments as Market Flayers
emphasize minimal intervention at a fundamental level.'^
Underlining this unfolding policy confusion is the reality of
"embedded neolib-
eralism," which is, as Philip Cerny suggests, a system of
production and
private-public interaction—not simply via state, but also via
civil society networks—
multifaceted and impressively fungible.20 That is, the current
phase of capitalism,
based on a combination of tenants from neoclassical economic
theory targeting
global economic integration, has become increasingly "what
actors make of it."
What states have been making of it goes beyond setting up
firewalls; it now involves
a closer understanding of risk and how some exposure to it may
be worth the ride.

DEBT MANAGEMENT
Sovereign debt management has gone through important
changes in both devel-
oped and developing countries. In the European Union (EU),
political integration
was a product of an important process of economic
harmonization, which entailed,
among other initiatives, balancing budgets along the lines of
accountable and trans-
parent debt management. From this emphasis came the initiative
to make debt
management a more autonomous function of entities located
inside the Ministry of
Finance, yet behaved separately from it in a more specialized
fashion. For example,
the Ministry of Finance defines the medium-term strategy for
debt management
according to its risk preferences and the macroeconomic
constraints of the country,
while the Debt Management Office (DMO) implements that
strategy and adminis-
ters the issuance of domestic and foreign-currency debt.2 '
At the macroeconomic level, the logic for this separation of

tasks is analogous to
investor-signaling arguments made by students of central bank
independence.22
Sovereign debt management that is independent of monetary
policy would signal to
financial markets and domestic constituencies that governments
are indeed commit-
ted to the transparent and accountable management of debt
policy. That could lower
the government's borrowing costs, indicating that the country is
much less likely to
engage in risky strategies, such as irresponsible indebtedness, in
order to suit
political goals.
At the microeconomic level, an autonomous debt agency
functions much like
private fund administrators in the sense that it tries to attract
professionals who are
knowledgeable in the intricacies of global financial markets. In
an International
Monetary Fund (IMF) report. Marcel Cassard and David
Folkerts-Landau explain
that a great advantage of an autonomous DMO is that it "can be
given a clearly

defined objective, without being hampered by either the
management of structure or
pay scale of the public sector. "23 A flexible pay structure is
seen as an important mech-
anism to attract qualified staff. Translated into practice,
performance criteria was
developed for debt managers, which made their daily work,
accountability structures
Giselle Datz
set aside, a risk management operation of liabilities. If they
were in charge of manag-
ing assets, their work would not differentiate much from that of
private mutual or
pension fund managers. After all, the logic goes that "debt
management could be
significantly improved if it was entrusted to portfolio managers
with knowledge and
experience in modern risk management techniques, and if their
performance was
measured against a set of criteria defined by the Ministry of
Finance."24
Indeed, the perceived necessity to attract these kinds of
professionals was a
reason for Ireland, Sweden and Denmark to develop separate
debt management

offices placed outside of the Ministry of Finance and staffed
with financial experts
with experience in portfolio risk management. It was then
assumed that funding
operations would be carried out more aptly because those in
charge "followed private
sector, market-oriented principles and that, since they did not
have to comply with
bureaucratic procedures, they would create an environment
appropriate for quick
decision making. "25 Philip Anderson stresses the fact that
recruitment and retention
of staff with appropriate skills is often a challenge in the public
sector.26 Yet, creative
solutions are increasingly being discovered, such as providing
staff with training
opportunities, contracting skilled and experienced staff on
fixed-term assignments
and allowing for placements of private sector personnel in the
debt management
unit or for the use of long-term advisors with specialist skills.27
Furthermore, bench-
marks for debt management are set in accordance with the risk
tolerance of each
government, which is, in turn, a function of the size of the
public debt, its currency
composition and maturity.28 Sovereign debt managers, like
private pension and
hedge or mutual funds managers, are held accountable for their
actions if they
perform below benchmark targets set in terms of the foreign
currency market.
Increased competitiveness is another goal of DMOs, further
linking public poli-
cies to private methodologies. For example, France's Debt

Management
Office—^Agence France Tresor—was created to reduce the cost
of debt for the French
taxpayer and "to help investors better identify French debt
securities within the range
of sovereign debt products available in European and world
markets."29 Catering to
investors' demands and preferences is an effective way to gain
terrain among competi-
tors. In this effort, sovereign debt management institutions are
increasingly issuing
inflation-indexed bonds as well as long-maturity bonds that
appeal to investors inter-
ested in cushioning growing inflationary pressures
worldwide.^o
W^hat we see then are two important transformations having
taken place. Not
only was more autonomy given to DMOs and equivalent
agencies, but also a private
rationale for conducting business was inserted in the system via
increased competi-
tion among these agencies. The Financial Times reported in
2002 that, although
"European finance ministers are not usually at the forefront of
innovation in capital
markets," the picture is definitely changing. The newspaper
went on to report that,
as "competition for funding from investors intensifies in the

wake of the euro, newly-
styled and aggressive debt management agencies are getting
more creative and more
opportunistic in meeting their governments' borrowing
requirements." If, in the
past, the supply of European sovereign bonds was relatively
predictable, now supply
for bonds is a major mover of financial markets. So much so
that "some of the
elements of the corporate bond market are beginning to
influence the shape of the
government market. "31
Since 2001, the World Bank and the IMF have been advocating
for the estab-
lishment of quasi-independent agencies to manage the public
debt of emerging
market countries, emphasize the benefits of lower cost for
public credit, create trans-
parency and accountability, especially regarding the
development of accurate and
comprehensive debt data, implement of cost effective cash
management policies that
"minimize government liquidity and repayment risks"; and
provide consistency in
the development of governments' securities market.32 The
crucial difference between
emerging market economies and Organisation for Economic Go-
operation and
Development (OECD) economies is not the level of
indebtedness, which has been
positively altered by high levels of reserve accumulation in the
developing countries,
but how governments' balance sheets are exposed to external
shocks, given their low
level of investment diversification and amount of debt issued in

foreign currency.33
The Nigerian Debt Management Office, for example, was
established in 2000 in
order to consolidate the management of public debt in a semi-
autonomous agency.
Its goals were to reduce debt stock and cost, link debt
management to effective fiscal
and monetary policies and to project and promote the "good
image of Nigeria as a
disciplined and organized nation, capable of managing its assets
and liabilities."34
The Nigerian DMO has been able to deliver on its mandate to
reduce the debt stock
and, perhaps more importantly, lead the way in the much needed
development of
Africa's debt markets. A crucial achievement of Nigeria's DMO
has been the
country's exit from the Paris and London clubs through effective
negotiations and
debt buybacks.35
Autonomous DMOs operating in developing countries are still
relatively rare,
even if the notion of increased strategic debt management has
been prevalent since
the 1990s. Where no major institutional change was carried out,
evident moves have
been made in most countries in terms of methodological
assessments and updates in
risk management practices. In countries where the central bank
is responsible for
domestic debt, it has been hard to transform this responsibility
to a different agency,
as in the cases of Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Sri Lanka. Pakistan
has set up a coor-

dination office and Gosta Rica a coordination committee. These
are layers of
"complex arrangements" politically and financially when it
comes to debt manage-
ment in a context of volatile financial flows.36 In addition,
developing countries have
Giselle Datz
focused on creating domestic public debt markets. For example,
in Brazil these debt
markets have been a component of the country's debt
management strategy^?
With varying degrees of depth, more private-like approaches to
public debt
management are changing in important ways the channels
through which govern-
ments do business with public and private financial players,
both as demand for high
yield and supply of new investment tools.
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
After decades of severe indebtedness, many developing
countries are now able
to accumulate foreign reserves, make early repayments of their
debts to the IMF
and buy back foreign-currency debts. This has to do with
learning curves from the
1997 Asian crisis, which made it evident that reserve
accumulation was an imper-

ative to buffer sudden instability. As Ben Thirkell-White puts
it, "the build up of
reserves in the post-crisis Asia suggests that the need for
finance is not so desper-
ate that countries are prostrate in the face of market
pressure."38 Indeed, the tide
has turned. Developing countries are consolidating their
positions as capital
exporters.39 That is a critical change in the configuration of
capital flows. The
salience is no longer that of the private sector, nor is it that of
the public sector in
developed countries exporting money to developing countries.
Rather, a structural
shift is underway, marking a "dramatic redistribution of
international wealth"
according to which large flows of publicly-owned funds are
moving from countries
that "historically have not been major players in international
finance" to those who
used to play this role. Therefore, governments, not private
players, are in control of
"the new international wealth."40
A large volume of this wealth is held by sovereign wealth funds
(SWFs), govern-
ment investment vehicles funded by foreign reserve exchange
assets that are
managed separately from the official reserves of the central
bank and reserve-related
functions of the finance ministry.^i According to recent
estimates, there are fifty-four
SWFs (pension and non-pension funds) in operation today. They
are linked to
thirty-seven different countries and hold approximately US$5.3
trillion in assets.42

Sources of funding and hence strategies of investment and time
horizons differ
among SWFs. Some are funded through central bank reserves
(as in the case of the
giant funds from China and Singapore). Others are funded
through export revenues
of state-owned resources (Abu Dhabi, Kuwait), taxation from
exports (Russia), fiscal
surpluses (Korea, New Zealand) or privatization receipts
(Malaysia, Australia).
According to the IMF, there are five types of SWFs based on
policy objectives.
There are stabilization funds set up by countries rich in natural
resources to cushion
volatility in commodity prices, savings funds that "transfer non-
renewable assets
into a diversified portfolio of international financial assets to
provide for future
generations," funds that operate as reserve investment
corporations pursuing poli-
cies with higher returns, development funds that allege priority
to socioeconomic
projects and sovereign funds that are, in effect, pension
funds.''^
Having existed for over three decades, SWFs are not new; what
is new is the
number of funds and their sheer current and predicted sizes. In

2007, sovereign
funds invested US$92 billion in equity transactions, compared
to US$3 billion in
2000. Moreover, the trend seems to be accelerating as these
funds' investments
during the first quarter of 2008 alone reached US$58 billion,
which exceeds their
combined total for the years 2000 to 2005.44
Such growth is linked to the accumulation of sovereign reserves
in emerging
markets through trade surpluses "unequalled as a percentage of
the global economy
since the beginning of the 20th century," which have made
official reserves held by
some governments become "astronomically high." The key here
is that SWFs do not
simply represent saving for a rainy day, but strategic investing
for the long term.45
They mark a departure from the trend to invest foreign reserves
in liquid assets such
as short-term U.S. Treasury bills and government securities
issued by other devel-
oped countries to investment in high-return equities. After all,
as Nouriel Roubini
puts it, "Why hold U.S. T-bills with a meager 5 percent return,
German Bunds with
a 4 percent return, or Japanese government bonds with a 0.5
percent return when
you can acquire foreign firms, invest in real assets, stock
markets, or higher-yielding
corporate bonds? "46 Indeed, there is pressure on governments
with surpluses to earn
better returns through different and riskier investment avenues.
One of the key financial developments of the turbulent period of

late 2007 and
early 2008 was the way in which emerging market governments,
through their
SWFs, acted as stabilizers of key commercial and investment
banks plagued by ever-
increasing losses from the sub prime crisis. For example, the
Chinese Investment
Corporation (CIC) invested US$5 billion in Morgan Stanley,
acquiring a 9.9 percent
share in the company. This happened despite CIC's losses in a
previous US$3 billion
deal with Blackstone whose initial public offering price dropped
over 50 percent
after the deal was concluded. The Government of Singapore
Investment
Corporation (GIC) and an undisclosed investor from the Middle
East invested
US$12 billion in the Swiss UBS. Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority injected US$7.5
billion into Citigroup late in 2007.
Sovereign wealth funds are not only investors in large Western
financial institu-
tions, but also clients. Investment banks have been keen on
creating the
infrastructure to attract sovereign investment. For example,
HSBC Investments has
hired a new "global head of sovereign and supranational," and
Morgan Stanley
Investment Management has announced the appointment of a
"managing director
and head of central banks and sovereign wealth funds."
According to the person who
FALL/WINTER 2008 I 43

Giselle Datz
assumed this latter position, his role is to "help improve the
firm's coverage of these
increasingly important clients." In his own words: "It's about
engaging with the
clients to understand their needs and then providing tailored
investment solutions."
Another asset manager in charge of dealing with sovereign
funds states that "one of
the reasons why sovereign funds are important...is because it's
new business, it's new
money."'"' That entails managing funds on behalf of SWFs,
many of which outsource
mandates when in-house expertise is lacking, as in the case of
Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority whose assets—between 70 and 80 percent—are
managed outside the
country. Norway's Government Pension Fund has about 28
precent of its assets
managed by fewer than fifty third-party bond and equity asset
managers. As
expected, competition for the business of SWFs is stiff. Wall
Street firms are increas-
ing their focus on sovereign funds by selling services that range
from advice on
merger and acquisitions to structured services.48
The liaison between Wall Street and some emerging market
governments
should not recall the time Citibank—despite being "too big to
fall"—lent money to
Latin American countries only to witness the default of these
loans en masse in the

1980s. This is a different kind of relationship. It is a private
investment firm
serving the sovereign client, helping it generate higher yield for
public monies, and,
expectedly, collecting handsome fees in return. Not only is the
public-private
symbiosis within the state a case in point, but the renewed ways
in which Wall
Street deals with and in some ways relies on sovereign wealth
from emerging
markets adds more depth to what Richard Gnoddle calls the
"new ecosystem of
global capital."49
Sovereign wealth funds retreated from Wall Street as the U.S.
financial crisis
worsened in the early fall of 2008. Yet, retreating does not
mean that these sover-
eign investors are behaving less like market players. On the
contrary, as all investors
are now engaging in a "flight to quality," or to liquidity,
destined to the U.S. bond
market, SWFs are still behaving akin to most market players as
well as foreign
central banks. These funds are said to be taking their time to see
how the U.S.
government's bailout plan shapes up and whether it helps to
ease the sense of chaos
in the Western banking system. However, risks as well as new
opportunities for
profit lie ahead.5O SWFs are poised to take advantage of the
latter. In addition, it is
likely that Gulf economies in particular may seek to invest more
locally. As long as
oil prices remain high, their fundamentals remain strong, in
sharp contrast to those

of most Western economies.^'
INESCAPABLY PUBLIC: HYBRIDITY AND CONSTRAINTS
The literature on globalization—suggesting that emerging
markets were severely
constrained by ñnancial market expectations—^was apt in its
detection of public
responses to financial preferences and their impact on policy
autonomy. More
recently, the ways in which states in developed countries found
room to move became
clearer, even at the level of international institutions and the
commitments therein.^2
Less attention has been paid to the effort of identifying room
for policy maneuvers in
emerging markets, even at times of economic distress.^^
Increasingly it is important
to consider that the types of constraints imposed on emerging
market governments
will not merely be imposed by international financial investors,
but by new rules at

the public level that limit governments' actions as market
players. Those can be
endogenous and intrinsic to public mandates to foster domestic
economies and
consistent with macroeconomic goals. They can also be related
to accountability
abroad regarding sovereign investment in private markets and
key institutions.
Indeed, public initiatives that use private methodologies for
liability manage-
ment or new and rislder channels for asset investments will still
be circumscribed by
the notion, or fear, that states are not always profit maximizers,
and thus "their
private activity is [always] public in character. "̂ 4 xhis public
character entails legal
restrictions and incipient but potentially restrictive "codes of
conduct" for govern-
ments as foreign investors. How restrictive those will ultimately
be is still history in
the making, yet countries that try to curb the penetration of
foreign public invest-
ment in their domestic economies will pay the price of
potentially losing a financial

tie to limited pockets of wealth in the currently ailing global
economy.
CONCLUSION
In the last two decades, governments have undergone important
transforma-
tions in the constant challenge to compete, adapt and innovate
in a realm of global
economic and financial integration. Focusing on the element of
innovation, particu-
lar autonomy is being given to debt and asset management
agencies within the state,
which increasingly operate as private actors. They engage in
hedging risks, but they
also seek returns. This is not privatization of state activity or
delegation of author-
ity from the public to the private sector. It is something more
symbiotic happening
within the public realm, linking governments' roles as both
supply and demand for
financial assets and innovation. There is a reconfiguration of
public financial goals,
which is strategic, sophisticated and proactive, rather than
purely regulatory.
One important implication has to do with financial complexity

and state behav-
ior. States are less and less capable of fully regulating financial
transactions due to
the fact that, as Alan Greenspan notes in his recent
autobiography, "Markets have
become too huge, complex, and fast moving to be subject to
20th century supervi-
sion and regulation." He adds that it is no wonder that "this
globalized financial
behemoth stretches beyond the full comprehension of even the
most sophisticated
of market participants."55 Nonetheless, this is not a monolithic
phenomenon.
Giselle Datz
Despite this general sense of bewilderment, the state in
emerging markets is far from
retreating. Rather, it is evolving, and in some areas of its
involvement with financial
players, it is taking the role akin to that of an investor or risk
manager—at times
equally secretive and opportunistic despite inescapable
constraints that attach
governments' financial moves to broader public interest goals.

Another implication involves the contours of a new relationship
with risk between
the public and private sectors. If risk indeed drives the demand
for regulation, and
hence underlies the regulatory (defensive) role of the state, so
too does it propel the
active (offensive) role of governments as financial players,
using private sector princi-
ples to manage sovereign assets and liabilities. Governments are
following
methodologies tailored to corporations, creating benchmarks for
risk taking while
keeping an eye on opportunities to generate returns that make
them intensively
competitive, definitively adaptable and increasingly innovative.
As Julie Froud, Adam
Leaver and ICarel Williams posit, what sustains the remaldng of
capitalism today is the
"proliferation of new actors, contradictory agendas and multiple
logics" brought about
by financial dynamics.56 The state is hardly a new actor, but its
role is constantly recon-
figured according to its intrinsic heterogeneity of tasks, tools
and responsibilities. '^
NOTES
*I am grateful to Leslie Armijo, Phil Cerny, Anna Gelpern and
Iain Hardie for their comments.
• Ashby Monk, Scott Moore and Xunyi Xu, "A Review of
Chinese Language Literature on Sovereign
Wealth Funds" (Oxford International Review Working Paper
SWFOOl, 1 July 2008), 3.
2 Javier Santiso, Ttte Political Economy of Emerging Markets:

Actors, Institutions, and Financial Crises
in Latin America (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Iain Hardie,
"Trading the Risk: Financialisation, Loyalty
and Emerging Market Government Policy" (paper presented at
the annual meeting of the International
Studies Association, San Francisco, 26-29 March 2008).
3 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996).
^ According to the International Monetary Fund-World Bank
Debt Management Guidelines, sovereign
debt management can be defined as "the process of establishing
and executing a strategy for managing
the government's debt in order to raise the required amount of
funding, achieve its risk and cost objec-
tives and to meet any other sovereign debt management goals
the government may have set, such as
developing and maintaining an efficient market for government
securities." "Guidelines for Public Debt
Management," International Monetary Fund and World Bank
(2001).
5 Saskia Sassen, "Embedding the Global in the National:
Implications for the Role of the State," in States
and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, ed. David A. Smith,
Dorothy J. Solinger and Steven C. Topik
(London: Routledge, 1999); Philip Cerny, "The Asian Grisis and
the Gompetition State" (manuscript.
University of Manchester, 2003); Steven Vogel, Freer Markets,
More Rules (Ithaca: Gornell University
Press, 1996); Michael Moran, "Understanding the Regulatory
State," British Journal of Political Science
32, no. 2 (2002), 391-413.
6 James Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome:

Transformation and Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
^ Leo Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State," in
Globalization: Critical Reflections, ed. James
Mittelman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).
^ Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994);
John Ruggie, "Globalization and the Embedded Liberalism
Compromise: The End of an Era?" (MPIFG
Lecture Series on Economic Globalization and National
Democracy, Cologne, 1996).
9 Philip Cerny, "Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a
Hegemonic Paradigm," ¡oumal of
International Trade and Diplomacy (forthcoming. Spring 2008);
David Harvey, A Brief History of
Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
'0 Sylvia Maxfield, Gatekeepers of Growth: The International
Political Economy of Central Banking in
Developing Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1997); According to W. Scott Frame and

Lawrence White financial innovations are characterized by new
products (e.g. adjustable-rate mortgages,
exchange-traded indexed funds); new services (e.g. online
securities trading, internet banking); new
production processes (e.g. a new type of electronic exchange for
trading securities, internet-only banks).
In their review of the economic and financial literature on
financial innovation the authors point out that
empirical studies on financial innovation are surprisingly few.
More revealingly, in listing sources and
actors involved in innovation, the authors never mention the
role states play in it. W Scott Frame and
Lawrence White, "Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation:
Lots of Talk, Little Action?" Journal of
Economic Literature 42 (March 2004), 118.
' ' Saskia Sassen. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval
to Global Assemblages (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2006a).
'2 In Territory, Authority, Rights, Sassen extends this argument
to include an expansion of executive
powers in the United States (continued and deepened by the
current Bush administration) in a realm of
heightened security concerns, withering civil privacy and

increased secrecy.
13 Sassen (2006a), 184.
''^ Philip Cerny, "Paradoxes of the Competition State: The
Dynamics of Political Globalization,"
Government and Opposition 32, no. 1 (1997), 251-274.
'^ Saskia Sassen, "When National Territory is Home to the
Global: Old Borders and Novel Borderings,"
in Debates in New Political Economy, ed. Anthony Payne
(London: Routledge, 2006b), 109.
16 Sassen (2006b), 109-110.
•^ Geoffrey Underhill, "States, Markets, and Governance for
Emerging Market Economies: Private
Interests, the Public Good, and the Legitimacy of the
Development Process," International Affairs 79, no.
4 (2003), 755-781; Geoffrey Underhill, "Markets, Institutions,
and Transaction Costs: The Endogeneity
of Governance," (working paper no. WEF0025, World Economy
and Finance Research Programme of the
UK Economic and Social Research Council, 2007).
18 Underhill (2007), 681.
19 Christopher Cox, "The Rise of Sovereign Business," (speech
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange

Commission chairman, Washington, DC, 5 December 2007).
20 Cerny (2008), 10 (page number as in the original
manuscript).
21 While central banks are usually in charge of operations
regarding foreign reserve management.
Ministries of Finance have the authority over liabilities (debt)
management.
22 Central bank independence did not necessarily entail debt
management independence because debt
management was still being used in some countries to achieve
monetary goals; see the case of Sweden
from World War 11 until the mid-1980s; Elizabeth Currie, Jean-
Jacques Dethier and Eriko Togo,
Giselle Datz
"Institutional Arrangements for Public Debt Management,"
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
No. 3021,2003).
23 Marcel Cassard and David Folkerts-Landau, "Risk
Management of Sovereign Assets and Liabilities,"
(IMF Working Paper No. 97/166, 1997), 14-15.
24 Ibid., 11.

25 Currie, Dethier and Togo (2003), 16.
26 Philip Anderson, "The Changing Role ofthe Public Debt
Manager," (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005).
27 The expanded roles of public debt managers would justify
such fiexibility Those can include: conduct-
ing transaction in derivatives markets (such as swaps and
futures), modeling cost and risk of the debt
portfolio, advancing information technology systems and
handling all financial instruments, managing
operational risks (Anderson 2005).
28 Cassard and Landau (1997).
29 Agence France Tresor, "The Best ofthe Euro," (Paris: Agence
France Tresor, 2007).
30 In February 2005, France recorded a "groundbreaking" sale
of 50-year maturity bonds in response to
a notable demand by institutional investors, including pension
and insurance funds, which need longer-
maturity assets to match their liabilities in a context of ageing
populations {Financial Times, 23 February
2005). These institutional investors accounted for one quarter of
the transaction. Notably, hedge funds
were also interested in the deal. With this operation, France
became the first G-7 country to issue such
a long-maturity bond (way beyond the maximum 30-year bonds
in existence) in modern times; Inflation-
linked bonds are not strangers of emerging market countries in
Latin America and Europe (which made
up 73% of the $46 billion in these bonds). Yet, recently it has
been reported that more countries in the
Asia-Pacific region are likely to also issue these so-called
linkers in order to signal commitment with price

stability. The absence of a substantial number of linkers issued
in the region has to do with the lack of a
large pension fund sector, yet sovereign wealth funds are
making for potentially sizable new demand
{International Herald Tribune, 1 August 2008).
3 ' Financial Times, 1 March 2002.
32 "Strengthening Debt Management Practices: Lessons from
Country Experiences and Issues Going
Forward," (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund and
World Bank, 2007), 5.
33 Currie, Dethier and Togo (2003).
34 "About DMO," Debt Management Office of Nigeria, 20
September 2008, http://www.dmo.gov.ng/
aboutdmo/about.php.
35 In 2003, Nigeria took advantage of a downtime in debt
markets to repurchase US$601million of its
par bonds and US$288 million of its oil warrants at
considerably discounted prices in a public auction
coordinated by Citigroup. This was done in preparation before
the Paris Club in 2005, when Nigeria
struck a deal that eliminated US$30 billion of debt, combining
forgiveness (US$18 billion was written
off) with two repayments of US$12 billion combined {Financial
Times, 1 July 2005).
36 IMF and World Bank (2007).
37 IMF and World Bank (2007); "Building a Debt Managing
Department: The Brazilian Experience,"
(Brasilia: Tesouro Nacional, 2006).

38 Ben Thirkell-White, "The International Financial
Architecture and the Limits of Neoliberal
Hegemony," New Political Economy 12, no. 1 (2007), 36.
39 Stephany Griffith-Jones, cited in Financial Times, 9
February 2007.
Governments as Market Flayers
'*0 Edwin Truman, "A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund
Best Practices," (policy brief no. PB08-3,
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008), 3.
' ' ' Clay Lowery "Remarks by Acting Under Secretary of
International Affairs, Clay Lowery on Sovereign
Wealth Funds and the International Financial System," (speech.
United States Treasury, Washington,
DC, 2007).
42 Truman (2008).
43 Often these are assets still understood as "reserves"; IMF
and World Bank (2007), 46.
44 Assessing the Risks: The Behaviors of Sovereign Wealth
Funds in the Global Economy (Cambridge,
MA: Monitor Group, 2008).

45 ING Investment Management, "Rich SWF Seek Long
Mutually Fulfilling Relationship(s)," ING
Investment Weekly (May 28, 2007).
46 Nouriel Roubini, "The New Bogeyman of Financial
Capitalism," Project Syndicate, http;//www.project-
syndicate.or^commentary/roubini 1 (2007).
47 Euromoney, December 2007.
48 Financial Times, 27 June 2008.
49 Richard Gnoddle, "New Actors Play a Vital Role in the
Global Economy," Financial Times, 12
November 2007.
50 Roula Khalaf, "Gulf Wealth Funds Poised to Pounce on US
Assets," Financial Times, 27 September
2008.
51 Simeon Kerr, "Local Liquidity Loss Shatters Gulfs Faith,"
Financial Times, 26 September 2008.
52 Layna Mosley, Global Capital and National Governments
(New York: Cambridge University Press, .
2003); Linda Weiss, "Global Governance, National Strategies:
How Industrialized States Make Room to
Move under the WTO," Review of International Political
Economy 12, no. 5 (2005), 723-749.

53 Giselle Datz, "What Life After Default? Time Horizons and
the Outcome of the Argentine Sovereign
Debt Restructuring," Review of International Political Economy
(forthcoming).
54 Larry Cata Becker, "The Private Law of Public Law: Public
Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares,
Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private
Choice of Law," Tulane Law Review 82,
no. 1 (2008).
55 Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence (London: Penguin
Books, 2007), 489.
56 Julie Froud, Adam Leaver, and Karel Williams, "New Actors
in a Financialized World," New Political
Economy 12, no. 3 (2007), 339-347.
11
Nothing has been more important since the beginning of my
reign
than increasing the prosperity of my people. The introduction of
certain new manufacturing industries … enables thousands of

my people to gain their bread honorably, the raw material stays
in
the country … and my subjects can easily pay their taxes. While
previously money left the country, it now stays within, making
the
country richer and more populated. Leopold I, Emperor of
Austria
(1640–1705)1
We quote Emperor Leopold here because his touching concern
for his
subjects’ welfare (and their ability to pay their taxes)
communicates
a clear message: the government needs to play a big role in
expanding
his country’s economy. Instead of issuing a proclamation
encour-
aging local entrepreneurs to innovate, he instituted an active
policy,
backed by state funds, to create important new industries. The
idea
of depending solely on local entrepreneurs to build such
industries
would not have entered his head.
Leopold was neither the first nor, certainly, the last head of
state to hold such views. Rulers of his era were well aware that
build-

ing a country’s economic prosperity had the desirable side-
effect
of increasing its power in international affairs, and many acted
on that realization. In the late 1600s Sir Walter Raleigh
observed,
“Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade, whosoever
commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the
world
and consequently the world itself.”2 As a result, the competitive
race
1 Government: Boss, financial
partner, regulator – Entrepreneurs
in mixed economies
1 J. Berenger, Histoire de l’empire des Habsbourg 1273 –1918
(Paris: Librairie
Arthème Fayard, 1990), p. 331.
2 A. Herman, To rule the waves (New York: HarperCollins,
2004), p. 150.
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Gover nment: Boss, fina ncia l pa rtner, r egulator12
to industrialize and sustain national trade advantages was a con-
stant source of international friction, sometimes leading to war.

Statesmen have been involving themselves in their countries’
economies for centuries. They know that building and
maintaining
a healthy industrial base is the key to growing national wealth
and
sustaining prosperity. They are not about to leave the outcome
of
this high-stakes game to chance. Naturally, the economic purists
who advocate totally free markets are perpetually distressed by
this
state of affairs.
But these purists ignore the lessons of history. Free enterprise
cannot prosper without the infrastructure, investments, and rule
of
law that government provides. Likewise, governments sabotage
eco-
nomic growth – and their global influence in the bargain – when
they try to impose too many controls on business, or establish
rigid
plans for its direction.
In other words, government and entrepreneurs need each other.

This does not imply that Emperor Leopold’s command-and-
control
mode of economic planning is a model for our times. Economies
have evolved toward more open, mixed systems with complex
inter-
play between the public and private sectors. Entrepreneurs may
exploit opportunities to build new companies or industries, but
gov-
ernments still play a major role in charting the overall course of
an
economy and supporting its growth. The only “pure” systems
are
failed systems. Plenty of evidence is available to back this up.
Historical antecedents
National economic development programs have historically
relied
on several stratagems:
investments in education and infrastructure;•
subsidies for exporters;•
state funding to help or even create new companies;•
erection of trade barriers to limit imports;•
establishment of local monopolies or cartels to reduce domestic
•
competition and increase the ability to export.

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Histor ica l a ntecedents 13
This is as true for free-market countries as for nations with con-
trolled economies. A nation’s official commitment to free
enterprise
has never stood in the way of a little cheating to help its
preferred
industries.
For entrepreneurs, such government involvement – or “med-
dling,” as the purists would have it – is a decidedly mixed
blessing.
Government influence over the economy can have a decisive
impact
on the success of individual ventures, and decisions made at the
highest levels can foster or stifle entrepreneurial efforts.
Problems usually start for entrepreneurs when political leaders
are looking to jump-start their country’s industrialization
process.

Politicians typically believe that national programs to promote
rapid
industrial development (and exports) work faster than independ-
ent entrepreneurial enterprises acting in their own perceived
best
interests.
It follows that the establishment of state-owned corporations
to address critical industrial needs has been a recurring theme in
countries that are seeking to accelerate their industrialization.
Clearly, the heads of these state-owned enterprises are
bureaucrats,
not entrepreneurs, in the context of our discussion.
But real entrepreneurs who build new industries with direct or
indirect state help have also emerged in most industrializing
coun-
tries. Entrepreneurs have learned to live with whatever hand the
government deals them and find ways to prosper, which is part
of
the definition of being an entrepreneur.
For example, during Leopold’s reign Austria began producing
textiles and arms in privately owned factories. At the start of

the
process, the country lacked the knowledge and expertise to
build
and operate these industries. So it set about attracting the talent
it
needed.
Its appeal was simple. The government promised to grant local
monopolies, place import restrictions on competitive products,
and
give business people access to some state capital to establish
their
industries. These incentives lured experienced entrepreneurs
and
skilled technicians from elsewhere to set up shop in Austria. If
you
were an entrepreneur, seventeenth-century Austria was a good
place
to be, not in spite of government meddling, but because of it.

England, the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, may have
led
the way in the race to industrialize in the seventeenth and
eighteenth
centuries, but over the next 200 years its increasing prosperity
encour-
aged others to follow its example. France, the US, Germany,
Russia,
Japan, and other countries industrialized in turn, each at its own
pace,
and with varying degrees of government oversight and support.
Since the 1960s it has been the turn of Asian countries to join
the ranks of industrialized nations, and they have done so with a
high level of government involvement. These newcomers have
learned from history, and have no hesitation in using aggressive
national economic strategies to hasten their growth. China,
India,
South Korea, and Taiwan have all emerged as industrial powers,
with exports that compete successfully with the most
sophisticated
products of the developed world. Their emergence has
revolutionized

the world economy and trade patterns.
China has been the most closely watched of all the Asian suc-
cess stories, because of both its size and its extraordinary
industrial
progress. It launched its industrial program in earnest only in
the
late 1970s, but by 2010 it moved from the back bench to second
place
in the world economy, displacing Japan. It now has prospects of
sur-
passing even the US.
China’s industrialization process has been a forced march, con-
trolled by an omnipotent Communist Party. Individual
entrepreneur-
ship has played a minor role. The term “state capitalism” has
been
applied to the current Chinese model because of its combination
of
state and private capital. But this policy is actually a modern
form of
an old system called mercantilism. It should be seen in that
context.

Early mercantilism
Mercantilism has a long history. The term is commonly applied
to
national economic policies that encourage exports and
discourage
imports. The ultimate goal is to produce a trade surplus. Such
pol-
icies were roundly condemned as long ago as 1776 by Adam
Smith in
The Wealth of Nations.
Smith advocated free trade of complementary products among
nations. But as we have already noted, very few statesmen are
will-
ing to leave economic development hostage to the vagaries of
the free
market when vital national interests are at stake.
Mercantilism as a policy was widely practiced from the seven-

teenth to the nineteenth century, particularly as countries with
agrarian economies sought to industrialize. It protected
fledgling
domestic industries from being crushed by outside competition.
Governments would provide state support to build locally
important
industries where the market risk was very low and the
technology
well established. Once these industries had succeeded in
replacing
imported products, the state could then promote exports and
hope-
fully generate a trade surplus.
Does this sound familiar? It should. Classic mercantilism
bears a striking resemblance to policies being pursued by
developing
countries to this day, including China.
Colbert launches modern French industry
Mercantilist policy was first deployed on a large scale by Jean-
Baptiste
Colbert (1619–1683), finance minister of France for twenty-two
years

under Louis XIV.
Leopold I expressed pride in the growing prosperity of his
Austrian subjects. Whether Colbert worried much about the wel-
fare of his fellow Frenchmen is highly debatable. What is
certain is
that Colbert’s big problem was financing the aggressive wars of
his
king.3
Four years after Louis XIV personally took over the reins of
government in 1661, he chose Colbert to rescue France from
near
3 For a summary of Colbert’s career and influence, see I. Murat,
Colbert (Paris:
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1980), pp. 225–263.
bankruptcy, mostly brought on by previous military adventures.
But

this did not stop the “Sun King” from enmeshing France in
conflicts
of his own making. In the succeeding fifty years of his reign
France
was involved in three major and two minor wars, creating a
nearly
constant need for cash.
During this era soldiers and foreign allies had to be paid in
gold and silver. Since France lacked mines for precious metals,
the
only way to accumulate bullion was by building a trade surplus,
and
the structure of the economy made that impossible. French
industry
was underdeveloped and backward, in the hands of small craft
enter-
prises that simply could not compete in international markets.
Colbert decided to fix the problem by building industries such
as glass and textile manufacturing. His plan was to restrict com-
petitive imports and promote exports of exceptionally fine
products.
In this way he could generate a trade surplus that would bring a

net
inflow of foreign gold and silver into France.
Ruthless, determined, able, and in full control of the finances of
France, he poached craftsmen and entrepreneurs from various
coun-
tries by offering highly attractive incentives to set up shop in
France.
Many of the resulting businesses were granted “Royal
Privilege,”
which meant that they received state funding, paid no taxes, and
were guaranteed government orders for their products.
Colbert expected that such new businesses would become inde-
pendent of state support as their products became commercially
suc-
cessful. But this was a slow process. He was known to complain
of
continuing demands by entrepreneurs for new funds to cover
operat-
ing losses. If you were a favored entrepreneur in Colbert’s
France, you
did very well. Why not hold onto your perks as long as you
could?

The new companies built large factories with over 1,000 work-
ers – something new in France at the time. Their workers lived
in
dormitories and were paid minimal wages. The working day was
between fourteen and sixteen hours, and the only days off were
reli-
gious holidays. Colbert complained to the Roman Catholic
author-
ities that there were simply too many of those.
Labor was cheap because France was blessed, if that is the
word, with a large population and significant unemployment in
its
rural economy. Colbert had enough foresight to ensure a
continued
supply of cheap labor by encouraging early marriages – women
were
expected to marry before the age of twenty.

Having pirated technical expertise from other countries,
Colbert worried about losing what our era calls “intellectual
prop-
erty” by the same means. He took draconian steps to prevent it.
Once
in France, skilled craftsmen could not leave the country. Severe
pun-
ishments awaited those caught fleeing – from a sentence of
rowing
in one of the King’s galleys to the death penalty.
For Colbert’s program to succeed, French products had to win
international customers. To ensure that the new industries
produced
the highest quality goods, Colbert established a corps of state-
funded
industrial inspectors who were tasked with checking the quality
of
products. Delinquent producers were penalized and publicly
pun-
ished for repeated lapses in quality.
At the same time he made sure that the industries he was build-
ing were protected from outside competition until they were
ready

to compete in the international market. For example, the
importing
of Venetian glass was forbidden in 1672. And woe to the
entrepreneur
who attempted to evade his trade and quality controls. His
techno-
crats were said to have had over 15,000 small entrepreneurs
executed
for the crime of importing or manufacturing cotton cloth in
viola-
tion of French law.
Colbert did not limit his attention to manufacturing. He was
also anxious to compete with the Dutch in international trade,
which they dominated. To that end Colbert promoted the
construc-
tion of a merchant navy, and gave preference to its ships for
French
trade. To discourage competitive transport, high fees were
placed on
foreign vessels visiting French ports.
By most measures Jean-Baptiste Colbert was a thoroughly
nasty man, widely hated within and outside France. But he

launched
the country on the path of large-scale industrialization. Under
his
compulsion French industry became renowned for its quality,
par-
ticularly in such luxury products as silk fabrics, tapestries, and
fine
glass. In these areas French products came to surpass any goods
pre-
viously available on the international market.
Many famous company names in France date from this era,
including the tapestry maker Gobelin and the glass maker Saint-
Gobain. In 1688 a Venetian ambassador wrote that “such is the
qual-
ity of the French products that they are the best in the world and
attract orders from all countries.” Colbert’s policies were
successful

in at least sustaining the finances of France in spite of the
country’s
being in an almost continuous state of warfare.
Colbert’s basic approach held sway in France for some time
after
his death. In the eighteenth century French industry benefited
from
government attempts to attract English technicians and entrepre-
neurs. France sent agents on undercover missions to England to
recruit
people and collect commercial secrets, particularly those
dealing with
production machinery and metallurgical processes. For example,
the
first English steam engines were secretly imported into France.
In 1779 the ice between France and England thawed consider-
ably as the two countries signed agreements allowing the French
to
import steam engines openly. Bilateral agreements covering
other
products were also negotiated, but true free trade was far in the
future. Entrepreneurs who followed the rules had done well
under

tight government control, but free trade was something better to
look forward to.4
In fact, it was in 1846 that England led the way to a national
free-trade policy by removing the restrictive Corn Laws and
easing
its control of the export of advanced technology. By the 1860s
prac-
tically all restrictions on imports were gone. At that time
England
4 This presentation draws on the wealth of historical
information found in J.-C.
Asselain, Histoire économique de la France du XVIII siècle à
nos jours (Paris:
Éditions du Seuil, 1985), pp. 77–105; A. Malet and J. Isaac,
XVII and XVIII Siècle
(Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1923), pp. 190–194; and Murat,
Colbert, pp. 249–261.
Moder n merca ntilism 19
had such a huge industrial lead on other countries that it could
afford

to be generous and open its market. It did not anticipate that
imports
would ever threaten domestic industry. Other countries trying to
catch up continued to play by more restrictive trading rules –
and
are doing so still.
Modern mercantilism
You might ask why we are spending so much time on mercantil-
ism and its history in a book on the modern global entrepreneur.
The simple answer is that today’s entrepreneurs operate in a
world
where governments increasingly control economies, a defining
fea-
ture of mercantilism over the centuries and one that will not
dis-
appear quickly.
This reality shapes the economic decisions made by business
people and entrepreneurs as they seek markets and business
partners
in countries with diverse economic agendas. To fully understand
its

implications, it is necessary to see it in a historical perspective.
For the same reason we must also take some time to discuss
China, by far the most prominent of modern countries with
controlled
economies. China has the second largest – and fastest growing –
econ-
omy in the world. What happens there, in consumer or industrial
mar-
kets, has a huge impact on the direction of all global business.
Industrializing Asia
We are witnessing an economic revolution in Asia, affecting
billions
of people. Countries in that region are striving to industrialize
as
quickly as possible. Given the pressure to make rapid progress
and
the top-down structure of many of their economies, it is not
surpris-
ing that Asian countries would adopt mercantilist methods.
Indeed, we are living in the golden age of broadly defined mer-
cantilism. It is currently being practiced in a highly developed
form,

on a scale unprecedented in history, by China. The world’s most
populous country has embarked on a path to industrialization
that
in some ways mirrors the journey of France under Colbert,
using
some of the same strategies. Its astonishing success has
prompted
other countries to learn from its example and shape their trade
pol-
icies accordingly.
Long relegated to the ranks of a “third-world” country with a
primarily agrarian economy, China has vaulted into a position
of eco-
nomic leadership in just forty years. The ruling Communist
Party

still controls the land, much of the economy, the military,
foreign
policy, and whatever else is of major importance to the country.
But
the highly pragmatic Party has abandoned some communist
prac-
tices and embraced a number of capitalist methods without
relin-
quishing political control.
Perhaps the biggest difference between China and the devel-
oped West is that the state owns all of the country’s banks,
either in
part or in whole. It also controls their activities, and can
therefore
channel capital to meet its industrial objectives.5 China’s
reluctance
to allow banks to operate outside of government control is as
much a
matter of history as it is of ideology. The country suffered
through a
long period of weakness and foreign intervention, and its
government
is determined to keep it free of foreign economic domination.6

Within China the most obvious sign of the success of these pol-
icies is plain to see. Visitors are frequently amazed at the
quality and
quantity of public facilities that have been built in the past
couple of
decades. Indeed, the development of a modern infrastructure is
a key
element of comprehensive state plans for industrial
development.
Of course the government of China had some powerful advan-
tages in its rapid construction of the infrastructure to support a
modern economy. In addition to absolute control of the
country’s
5 For an excellent review of the Party’s role, see D.
Shambaugh, China’s
Communist Party: Atrophy and adaptation (San Francisco, CA:
University
of California Press, 2010). Also, R. McGregor, The Party: The
secret world of
China’s Communist rulers (New York: HarperCollins, 2010).
6 H. Jones, Chinamerica: Why the future of America is China
(New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2010) contains a good overview of Chinese
economic practices and
policies.

finances, the government owns all the land. Hence it can
develop
roads, airports, railways, and public structures without the legal
restrictions found in countries where land is in private hands. It
can
also set arbitrarily low lease rates for land to stimulate the
build-
ing of factories and other facilities wherever and by whomever
it
chooses.
China’s emergence as an economic power is not accidental. It
is based on long-term development plans drawn up by
government
authorities in order to
preserve Chinese control over key domestic industries and the
economy;•
promote exports and create a trade surplus;•
acquire modern technology; and•

build a domestic industrial base capable of innovation.•
Developing nations are watching China’s amazing progress very
closely. As more countries adopt various aspects of its
approach,
entrepreneurs in the global marketplace will have to make
adjust-
ments to economic systems in which mercantilism is flying high
and the government is in the pilot’s seat. It is worth looking
more
closely at what they face in China, and may encounter in the
other
countries that it influences.
Mixed ownership, tight control
China’s economic policy permits a mix of ownership models:
pri-
vately owned businesses, joint ventures with foreign investors
and
corporations, and businesses that are fully government owned
and
funded. Regardless of ownership, foreign trade by all of these
busi-
nesses is controlled by the government. Needless to say in a
country

where the currency is tightly regulated, access to foreign
exchange
is also strictly controlled.
Some businesses in non-strategic consumer industries,
such as textiles, services, and retail, may be fully owned by for-
eign investors, but restrictions exist on investment and cap-
ital repatriation. Large companies in industries deemed critical,
including telecommunications services and banking, are either
fully
government-owned or have majority government ownership.
Even
when these vital companies are publicly traded, the government
maintains significant ownership and ultimate control.
Fifty-four state-owned enterprises, including China Mobile,
Petro China, Sinopec, and China Electronics Corporation

(CEC), are
considered “backbone” companies. To get an idea of the scale
and
scope of these enterprises, consider the fact that CEC, which
was
established only in 1989, today has 70,000 employees.
While control remains with the parent company, CEC owns
fourteen subsidiaries that are publicly listed and have some
degree of
public ownership. These businesses cover software, computers
and
computer components, and consumer electronics products. Some
of
these companies rank among the world leaders in their product
cat-
egories. They include joint ventures with foreign companies
such
as HP, IBM, and Philips who contribute their technology. With
rev-
enues in excess of $10 billion annually, CEC is a big
technology con-
glomerate with the resources to address new business areas.
As would be expected in such an economy, exporting for the

purpose of acquiring foreign exchange is a key objective of
state plan-
ners. In this they have been markedly successful. Much to the
chag-
rin of its trading partners, China runs a large trade surplus. A
major
reason for this success is the number of foreign companies that
have
moved their production to China. The products from these trans-
planted factories are exported under their original brand names.
Like Colbert’s France, China’s government offers significant
incentives to attract foreign manufacturing: a modern infrastruc-
ture, a disciplined low-cost labor force, and significant financial
inducements for companies that locate factories in areas of the
coun-
try designated for development. It is enough to convince many
com-
panies that previously manufactured in Europe, Japan, or the US
to
move their equipment into Chinese plants.
China benefits from its new status as the world’s factory in

three ways.
Transplanted manufacturing plants churn out products for which
there •
is already worldwide demand, building exports at minimum risk.
These plants provide employment for many millions of Chinese
workers.•
Last but not least, they bring the latest technology into China,
helping •
it acquire the skills and knowledge to compete on its own in the
international market.
By some estimates as much as 70 percent of the exported
products
from China are from such transplanted manufacturing plants.
To take one prominent example, most Apple® products are
assembled in China, using imported and locally manufactured
com-
ponents. In some cases the factories where they are produced
are joint
ventures with local companies; in other cases the manufacturing

is
done by contractors such as Foxconn. Either way, it is estimated
that
over 100,000 workers are employed in manufacturing Apple
prod-
ucts alone. These wildly popular products are sold worldwide
under
the Apple brand, helping boost China’s burgeoning trade
surplus.
Foxconn, a huge company ($80 billion of annual revenues in
2009) of Taiwanese origin, exemplifies the importance of
transplants
to the development of China’s economy and its workforce.
Foxconn
is a contract manufacturer of electronic products not only for
Apple,
but for HP and other major international brands.
The company has built virtual dormitory cities for its Chinese
workers. One such location, in Shenzhen, houses over 300,000
work-
ers in a sprawling compound. Since factories draw their low-
wage
workers from rural areas, owners have to provide the workers

with
access to affordable housing near the plants.
Building domestic industries
Infrastructure, employment, exports: all are prerequisites for a
mod-
ern industrial economy. But other bricks are needed to build a
stable
industrial base. While transplants contribute to growth, they are
no
substitute for home-grown industry.
China’s leaders, anxious to make sure that foreigners do not
control key industries, made the development of domestic
industry
a state policy, as one analyst has noted. “In the late 1990s
increas-
ing dependence on foreign companies led Beijing to build
strong

national industries in the protected shell of the domestic market.
But then excess capacity and reliance on foreign consumer
markets
impelled Beijing to strive to make its national champions truly
glo-
bal and to back them with an assertive trade policy.”7
Its success in turning these companies into effective global
competitors was and is helped by the use of foreign-developed
tech-
nology from foreign firms seeking access to the potentially
large
Chinese market. Since many are restricted from doing business
on
their own in industries deemed critical to the state, foreign com-
panies have to participate in joint ventures within China, which
involves a sharing of their expertise.
It works like this. As noted above, China may allow minor-
ity foreign ownership in a China-based company. There is a
better
chance of this happening if the local company can acquire state-
of-the-art technology as part of the deal. In this scenario

foreigners
benefit economically from the domestic market, but without
hav-
ing total control of the venture or of their intellectual property.
For example, GE has made minority investments in local com-
panies that produce wind turbines for power generation – an
indus-
try that Chinese authorities deem critical as they seek to build
world
leadership in this new technology. GE is expected to contribute
its
own technology to the joint venture.8
Chinese authorities have also targeted electric automobiles
as a crucial product for the country’s industrial future. Here,
too,
they are looking to foreign firms for technology that could give
them a leadership position. “China’s government is considering
plans that could force foreign auto makers to hand over cutting-
edge
electronic-vehicle technology to Chinese companies in
exchange for
7 J. Holsiag, “China’s flexing of its muscles is a sign of

weakness,” Financial
Times, September 28, 2010, p. 13.
8 See P. Glader, “GE in China wind-power venture,” The Wall
Street Journal,
September 28, 2010, p. B3.
access to the nation’s huge market, international auto executives
say.”9
But the imported technology does not generate products
strictly for domestic consumption. For example, Japanese and
European companies that pioneered high-speed train technology
and shared it with Chinese companies are now facing
competition
from the Chinese products in international markets.10
Overseas companies find access to China’s immense and
increasingly affluent market a powerful argument for sharing
their

expertise, but the country needs to develop its own technology
if it
is to build a competitive industrial sector. To that end,
government
planners are working to generate domestic innovation by
funding
research institutes and universities.
In addition, the authorities are pushing local companies to
invest in research and development. This investment rose from
0.5
percent in 2004 to 1.8 percent in 2009. When a new industrial
activ-
ity needs to be developed to meet a market need, state funds are
available and every effort is made to build plants for mass
produc-
tion. This ensures that new technologies are not neglected.11
China
now ranks among the top four largest generators of patents after
the
US, Japan, and Germany.12
The effort is paying off. Some newly created corporations in
technology sectors have already become world leaders. For

example,
Huawei Technologies, established in 1988, is now one of the
lead-
ing manufacturers of advanced telecommunications and
networking
equipment, with over $30 billion in annual sales in 2011.
Huawei
successfully competes globally against established vendors such
as
Alcatel-Lucent and Ericsson.
9 N. Shirouzu, “China spooks auto makers,” The Wall Street
Journal, September
17, 2010, p. A1.
10 N. Shirouzu, “Train makers rail against China’s high-speed
designs”, The Wall
Street Journal, November 18, 2010, p. A1.
11 J. Dean, A. Browne, and S. Oster, “China’s state capitalism
sparks a global back-
lash,” The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2010, p. A1.
12 IEEE Spectrum, July 2011, p. 68.

Follow the leader
You can debate whether a top-down, controlled economy can
con-
tinue to prosper into the indefinite future. It is easy enough to
point
to basic weaknesses including a neglect of environmental condi-
tions and overbuilding of certain industries. We can point to
plenty
of examples in other countries where bureaucratic incompetence
sooner or later impedes progress.
However, the emergence of China has changed global trade
patterns. It is hard to think of an industry that is not affected by
competitors from China or by the promise of sales of its
products to
China. Hence the importance of China to entrepreneurs with
ambi-
tions to become global players.
China’s success also encourages other industrializing coun-

tries such as Malaysia, India, Brazil, Thailand, and Vietnam to
step
up their own national initiatives to woo manufacturing sites
from
the developed countries with subsidies and other incentives.
Vietnam’s case is especially interesting. It too is a country con-
trolled by a monolithic Communist Party but open to foreign
capital
and technology importation. Foreigners are investing in the
country,
setting up factories that once upon a time would have gone to
China.
Two-thirds of the economy is now in private hands (but with
state
supervision); the remaining third consists of state-owned
corpora-
tions in industries deemed vital by the authorities. In general
terms
Vietnam is closely emulating the Chinese model.
However, the government is dealing with the same problem that
has bedeviled other mercantilist countries, starting with
Colbert’s

France: state-owned companies can easily become unprofitable,
for-
cing taxpayers to cover their losses. This has been the case with
the
Vietnam Shipbuilding Industries Group, which ran up multi-
billion
dollar debts while its operating losses ballooned.13
13 J. Hookway and P. Barta, “A troubled state flagship makes
waves in Vietnam,”
The Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2010, p. C1.
In spite of this risk, the model of combined state and private
ownership is spreading. For example, Brazil is funding the
construc-
tion of dams to generate power through such companies. A dam
built
to generate 11,200 megawatts, begun in 2010, is 49 percent
owned by

the government-controlled Eletrobras. Its total cost will be BRL
20
billion. The rest of the funds came from non-direct state sources
and
private investors. The demand for power is stimulating the
interest
of investors, with the government coming in when such
generating
capacity or transmission needs are not met by private capital.14
Heavy-handed government doctoring of the economy, admin-
istered with an (un)healthy dose of good old-fashioned
mercantilism,
can act as a quick tonic for an underdeveloped industrial sector.
It
is not only developing countries that are tempted to self-
medicate
in this way. In developed countries where jobs are disappearing,
dis-
gruntled citizens are alarmed, and political pressure is building
to “do
something,” politicians are equally susceptible to the lure of
more
government intervention. We return to this subject in Chapter
10.

Among the public, a commitment to free trade is usually the
first victim of the malaise. The call for tariffs to deter low-cost
imports has become ever louder in countries that, like the US,
have
suffered a loss of industry. A recent survey shows a marked
deterior-
ation in US public opinion regarding free trade agreements,
accord-
ing to The Wall Street Journal. In 1999, only about 30 percent
of the
people polled believed that free-trade agreements hurt the US
econ-
omy, while in 2010 over 50 percent thought such agreements
hurt
the country. Even more significant is that only about 15 percent
of
the people believed that such agreements were helpful.15
Given this level of disapproval on the part of the public, we
should not wonder if politicians engage in ever louder saber-
rattling
over tariffs and trade deficits in the coming years.
14 P. Winterstein, “Brazil power will still see state pressure

under Roussseff,” Dow
Jones Newswires, September 2010.
15 S. Murray and D. Belkin, “Americans sour on trade: Majority
say free trade pacts
have hurt the US” The Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2010, p.
A1.
Implications for entrepreneurship
The changing world economic order has enormous implications
for
entrepreneurs everywhere. The greater the degree of government
control and willingness to finance and protect industries, the
harder
the task is for independent entrepreneurs reliant on private
funding.
Such policies affect access to markets and capital. And, most
trouble-
some, government-protected competitors can behave
irrationally, as

they are not subject to normal market forces.
We live in a world where the fastest-growing economy is the
one where the government has the most control. This has
encour-
aged other governments to become more involved in their
economies
in the hope of encouraging competitive new industries and
defend-
ing established ones. Ours is also a time when trade barriers are
likely to grow.
How do entrepreneurs feel about building their businesses in
this environment? It depends on where they are, and where the
best
market for their products is located. We look first of all at the
effects
on a Chinese entrepreneur.
While China’s planners are not dependent on domestic entre-
preneurs to build the country’s economic muscle, there is ample
opportunity for entrepreneurship in industrial sectors that don’t
compete head-on with state enterprises. There is even a growing

venture capital industry there to finance such new businesses.
Some
of this activity is financed by foreign capital looking for high
returns
in a fast-growing economy.
Indeed there are investment opportunities available. A growing
number of independent entrepreneurs, as opposed to state-
appointed
managers, are now creating big businesses. For example, the
largest
group of Chinese electronics retail stores, Gome, was started by
a
private entrepreneur. He was reputed to be the richest man in
China
after the company had a public offering of its securities in the
Hong
Kong exchange. We will discuss three other Chinese startups in
Chapter 8.

Implications for entr epr eneurship 29
As an independent entrepreneur in China, you would welcome
the government’s financial help. In fact, a survey of
entrepreneurs
in China suggests that many count on some kind of government
support for their success.16 But you would have to learn to deal
with
state planning policies.
For example, 2010 was the last year of a national Five Year
Plan
that called for a 20 percent reduction in energy use per unit of
GDP
to reduce pollution. As a result, if you are an entrepreneur
running
an energy-intensive manufacturing business, you might find that
the power available to your factory has been reduced or even
shut
down by the local power utility. Such cutbacks actually
occurred in
2010, reducing the production of materials such as polysilicon
used
to manufacture solar cells.

Your only alternative would be to buy diesel-powered electrical
generators. Of course, their exhausts will add to air pollution –
dir-
ectly negating the intent of the Five Year Plan. But that is not
your
problem.
Now, let us imagine that you are an entrepreneur in the US.
You are likely to wish for freedom from all government
interference.
Here is a classic statement of this position from two US
entrepre-
neurs, published as a letter to the editor in The Wall Street
Journal:
“In our experience [as entrepreneurs] the very last group we
would
appeal to for help with a new venture would be a federal
bureaucrat.
We thus feel the best way to revive the US economy and
revitalize
the past ability to innovate would be to cut government
spending,
regulation, and taxation.”17
While such total independence is praiseworthy in principle,

it simply isn’t practical in the real world. Entrepreneurs aiming
to
build major enterprises have no choice but to have a global
strat-
egy and they cannot do it just on the merits of their products.
This
16 R. Steeter, “Asian entrepreneurs are bullish on the future,”
The Wall Street
Journal, August 6, 2010, p. A13.
17 Letter to the editor by R. Gamblin and K. Borgh, The Wall
Street Journal,
September 18, 2010, p. A14.
means they may have to accept from the US government such
“help”
as tax rebates, licenses, access to loans, or financial assistance
with
exports if they are to succeed.

For example, if you want to sell your products in a country
where government restrictions limit imports, you will certainly
welcome US government help in opening such markets. You
will
also be happy to accept its help in protecting your intellectual
prop-
erty. And you will also welcome new business opportunities
created
by government mandates.
Here is an interesting example of how a US government man-
date helped launch a new business. Telnet was arguably the first
commercial packet switching network service provider. In the
mid-
1970s, it started offering dial-up modem access to central
packet
switches that provided email and, later, file transfer services.
Telnet subscribers accessed these services through local wire-
line telephone networks, which created a problem. In some
states the
telephone rates are flat or fixed, while in other states they are
priced
on usage. There were long holding times for data sessions,

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